FIGHTING AT BAY
The forces of France also had been fighting to protect their retreat
southward in these August days of 1914. After the passages of the Sambre
were forced, during the great Mons-Charleroi battle, the Fifth French
Army was placed in very perilous straits by the failure of the Fourth
Army, under General Langle, to hold the Belgian river town of Givet.
Hard pressed in the rear by General von Buelow's army, and on their
right by General von Hausen commanding the Saxon Army and the Prussian
Guard, the Fifth Army of France had to retire with all possible speed,
for their path of retreat was threatened by a large body of Teutons
advancing on Rocroi.
On August 23, 1914, holding their indomitable pursuers in check by
desperate rear-guard action, with their two cavalry divisions under
General Sordet galloping furiously along the lines of the western flank
to protect the retiring infantry and guns, the Fifth Army unexpectedly
turned at Guise. At that point considerable reenforcements in troops and
material arrived, making the Fifth Army the strongest in France. It now
defeated and drove over the Oise the German Guard and Tenth Corps, and
then continued its retirement. But the left wing of the French army was
unsuccessful, and Amiens and the passages of the Somme had to be
abandoned to the invaders.
On Sunday, August 23, 1914, the Fourth Army, operating from the Meuse,
was heavily outnumbered by the Saxon army around the river town of
Dinant. They fell back, after furious fighting for the possession of the
bridges, which the French engineers blew up as the army withdrew
southward to the frontier. Soon after, at Givet, the Germans succeeded
in wedging their way across the Meuse. Some advanced on Rocroi and
Rethel, and other corps marched along the left bank of the Meuse,
through wooded country, against a steadily increasing resistance which
culminated at Charleville, a town on the western bank of the river.
There a determined stand was made.
On August 24, 1914, the town of Charleville was evacuated, the civilians
were sent away to join multitudes of other homeless refugees, and then
the French also retired, leaving behind them several machine guns hidden
in houses, placed so that they commanded the town and the three bridges
that connected it with Mezieres.
The German advance guards reached the two towns next day, August 25,
1914, which, as we know, witnessed the British retirement toward Le
Cateau. Unmolested, they rode across the three bridges into the quiet,
empty streets. Suddenly, when all had crossed, the bridges were blown
up behind them by contact mines, and the German cavalrymen were raked by
the deadly fire of the machine guns. Nevertheless, finding their foes
were not numerous, they made a courageous stand, waiting for their main
columns to draw nearer. Every French machine gunner was silenced by the
Guards with their Maxims; but when the main invading army swept into
view along the river valley, the French artillery from the hills around
Charleville mowed down the heads of columns with shrapnel. Still the
Teutons advanced with reckless courage. While their artillery was
engaged in a duel with the French, German sappers threw pontoon bridges
across the river, and finally the French had to retire. Between
Charleville and Rethel there was another battle, resulting in the
abandonment of Mezieres by the French.
The retreating army crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse, which
it enters below Mezieres, and advanced toward Neufchateau; but they were
repulsed by the Germans under the Duke of Wuerttemberg. At Nancy on
August 25, 1914, there was another engagement between the garrison of
Toul and the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria; after fierce
onslaughts the garrison was compelled to yield and retire. Finally, on
August 27, 1914, at Longwy, a fortified town near Verdun, the army of
the German crown prince succeeded in bursting into France after a long
siege, and marched toward the Argonne. Thus from the western coast
almost to Verdun there was a general Franco-British retreat.
On August 28, 1914, pressed by the German armies commanded by Von Kluck
on the west, by Von Hausen from Dinant and Givet, by Von Buelow from
Charleroi and Namur, the Allies were pushed back upon a line stretching
roughly from Amiens through Noyon-Le Fere to Mezieres; while their
forces east of the Meuse between Mezieres and Verdun were retreating
before Duke Albrecht of Wuerttemberg, and to the southeast of Verdun
before the Bavarians. All northern France was thus open to the invaders.
After the battle of Le Cateau, however, the Germans slackened their
pursuit for a very brief interval; partly because the terrific strain
of marching and fighting was telling upon them no less than upon the
Allies, partly because the engineers had blown up the bridges over every
river, canal, and stream, behind the retreating armies, and partly
because, under directions from the French commander in chief, General
Manoury was organizing a new force on the British left, a new Sixth
Army, mainly reserve troops, one corps of line troops, and General
Sordet's cavalry. On the right of the British were General Lanrezac's
troops; then, between Lanrezac's Fifth Army and the Fourth Army, came a
Ninth Army, under General Foch, formed of three corps from the south.
Counterattacks were ordered by the French general in chief, continued
during the entire retreat and had frequently brilliant results.
On August 29, 1914, a corps of the Fifth Army and of the divisions of
reserve attacked with success in the direction of St. Quentin with the
object of withdrawing the pressure on the British army. Two other corps
and a division of reserves joined issue with the Prussian Guard and the
Tenth Corps of the German army which debouched from Guise. This was a
very violent battle, known under the name of the Battle of Guise. At the
end of the day, after various fluctuations in the fight, the Germans
were thrown completely over the Oise and the entire British front was
relieved. The Prussian Guard on that occasion suffered great losses.
August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary
succeeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as he
endeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continued
on the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division of
Morocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinary
defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye.
Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in
good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized; as
a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point. All the
French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the offensive.
The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris at
great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the French
General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able to establish a
new alignment of forces. The new army established on the left of the
French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury, was not able to
complete its concentration in the localities first intended. In place of
concentrating in the region of Amiens it was obliged to operate more to
the south.
The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result of the
vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:
A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Chateau
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of four
active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne. The Second
Army (General von Buelow), with three active army corps and two reserve
corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The Third German Army
(General von Hausen), with two active army corps and a reserve corps,
had crossed the Aisne and reached Chateau Porcin-Attigny.
Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German Armies,
making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous
Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French troops (Fourth and
Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the others from Verdun to the
Vosges. Such was the situation.
It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Esperey, would have found
itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of the British
and French forces operating on its left, if the French had accepted the
challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander in chief resolutely
chose the alternative that obviated such a risk, that is, he decided on
a postponement of the offensive and the continuation of the retreat.
Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of the
retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and the region north of Bar-le-Duc.
That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the other
hand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if the forces
could be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation of the British
army and the army of Manoury on the left, and on the right that of the
divisions of reserve that had been held on the heights of the Meuse.
Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of August 29, 1914, the British
retirement began afresh, and 10,000 French troops also withdrew from the
Somme, blowing up the bridges as they went. Everywhere along the roads
were crowds of country folk and villagers with wagons and carts piled
high with household goods or carrying aged persons and children, all in
panic flight before the dreaded invaders, fleeing for refuge in Paris.
At various places these stricken multitudes joined the army ambulances,
taking the shortest routes. Rumors of the coming of the uhlans ran along
the straggling lines with tales of the grievous havoc and ruin which
these horsemen, vanguards of the German columns, had wrought in the
land. Hardly had the retirement begun, when a body of uhlans entered
Amiens and demanded from the mayor the surrender of the town. This was
formally given, and the civilians were ordered, on pain of death, not to
create the slightest disturbance and not to take part in any action,
overt or covert, against the soldiery. Afterward, cavalry, infantry, and
artillery took possession of the town on August 30, 1914. On the same
day a German aeroplane dropped bombs on Paris.
While retiring from the thickly wooded country south of Compiegne, the
British First Cavalry Brigade were surprised while dismounted and at
breakfast in the early morning of September 1, 1914. Moving figures on
the distant skyline first attracted the attention of those who had field
glasses, but in the dim light their identity was not at first revealed.
Suddenly all doubt was resolved by a rain of shells on the camp. Many
men and a large number of horses were killed. At once the order "Action
front!" rang out, and the remaining horses, five to a man, were hurried
to cover in the rear, while on the left a battery of horse artillery
went into instant action. The German attack was pressed hard, and the
battery was momentarily lost until some detachments from the British
Third Corps, with the guns of the artillery brigade, galloped up to its
support. Then they not only recovered their own guns, but also succeeded
in capturing twelve of the enemy's.
On the eventful day of September 3, 1914, the British forces reached a
position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. They had
defended the passage of the river against the German armies as long as
possible, and had destroyed bridges in the path of the pursuers. Next,
at General Joffre's request, they retired some twelve miles farther
southward with a view to taking a position behind the Seine. In the
meantime the Germans had built pontoon bridges across the Marne, and
were threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and
the Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several outpost actions
took place.
By the 1st of September, 1914, the day of the Russian victories at
Lemberg, Von Kluck's army had reached Senlis, only twenty-five miles
from Paris. Despite this imminent danger, the capital was remarkably
quiet and calm; every day, as fateful event crowded upon event, seemed
to renew the resolution and coolness of the population. It seemed
advisable, however, to transfer the seat of government for the time
being from Paris to Bordeaux, after assuring the defense of the city by
every means that could be devised.
The defenses of Paris consisted of three great intrenched camps, on the
north, east, and southwest, respectively. Of these the most important is
the last, which includes all the fortified area to the south and west of
the Seine. A railway over sixty miles in length connects all the works,
and, under the shelter of the forts, it could not only keep them
supplied with the necessary ammunition and stores, but also it could be
utilized to convey troops from point to point as they might be needed.
However, it was an open secret that even the outer and newer defenses
were not of any great strength. If the Germans broke through the
outlying circle of forts, the inner line would be of small value, and
the city itself would be exposed to long-range bombardment. Paris was
not ready for a siege, and if attacked it would speedily fall.
Early in the morning of September 3, 1914, President Poincare,
accompanied by all the ministers, left Paris, and was followed at noon
by the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and the reserves
of the Banque de France. The higher courts were also transferred to
Bordeaux. The municipal authority was constituted by the president of
the City Council, and the Council of the Seine Department, who were
empowered to direct civil affairs under the authority of General
Gallieni as military governor, the prefect of Paris, and the prefect of
police.
On his appointment to the command, Gallieni did what he could to
strengthen the defenses. Trenches were dug, wire entanglements were
constructed, and hundreds of buildings that had been allowed to spring
up over the military zone of defense were demolished in order to leave a
clear field of fire. The gates of the city were barred with heavy
palisades backed by sandbags, and neighboring streets also were
barricaded for fighting. Certain strategic streets were obstructed by
networks of barbed wire, and in others pits were dug to the depth of a
man's shoulders. The public buildings were barricaded with sandbags and
guarded with machine guns.
But while Paris was preparing for siege and assault the French staff
were concentrating their efforts on making a siege impossible by a
decisive stroke against the German advance.
Hardly had the Government left the city when tidings arrived that
instead of marching on Paris, General von Kluck had swung southeastward
toward the crossing of the Marne. This news was obtained by the allied
flying corps, which had made daring flights over the enemy's line.