With the mere reader the case is widely different; and most people have a

partiality for knowing the adventures of noted rogues. Even in fiction

they are delightful: witness the eventful story of Gil Blas de Santillane,

and of that great rascal Don Guzman d'Alfarache. Here there is no fear of

imitation. Poets, too, without doing mischief, may sing of such heroes

when they please, wakening our sympathies for the sad fate of Jemmy

Dawson, or Gilderoy, or Macpherson the Dauntless; or celebrating in

undying verse the wrongs and the revenge of the great thief of Scotland,

Rob Roy. If, by the music of their sweet rhymes, they can convince the

world that such heroes are but mistaken philosophers, born a few ages too

late, and having both a theoretical and practical love for

"The good old rule, the simple plan,

That they should take who have the power,

That they should keep who can;"

the world may perhaps become wiser, and consent to some better

distribution of its good things, by means of which thieves may become

reconciled to the age, and the age to them. The probability, however,

seems to be, that the charmers will charm in vain, charm they ever so

wisely.

[Illustration: FIGHT BETWEEN DU GUESCLIN AND TROUSSEL.]

DUELS AND ORDEALS.

There was an ancient sage philosopher,

Who swore the world, as he could prove,

Was mad of fighting.--_Hudibras_.

Most writers, in accounting for the origin of duelling, derive it from the

warlike habits of those barbarous nations who overran Europe in the early

centuries of the Christian era, and who knew no mode so effectual for

settling their differences as the point of the sword. In fact, duelling,

taken in its primitive and broadest sense, means nothing more than

combating, and is the universal resort of all wild animals, including man,

to gain or defend their possessions, or avenge their insults. Two dogs who

tear each other for a bone, or two bantams fighting on a dunghill for the

love of some beautiful hen, or two fools on Wimbledon Common, shooting at

each other to satisfy the laws of offended honour, stand on the same

footing in this respect, and are each and all mere duellists. As

civilisation advanced, the best-informed men naturally grew ashamed of

such a mode of adjusting disputes, and the promulgation of some sort of

laws for obtaining redress for injuries was the consequence. Still there

were many cases in which the allegations of an accuser could not be

rebutted by any positive proof on the part of the accused; and in all

these, which must have been exceedingly numerous in the early stages of

European society, the combat was resorted to. From its decision there was

no appeal. God was supposed to nerve the arm of the combatant whose cause

was just, and to grant him the victory over his opponent. As Montesquieu

well remarks,[51] this belief was not unnatural among a people just

emerging from barbarism. Their manners being wholly warlike, the man

deficient in courage, the prime virtue of his fellows, was not

unreasonably suspected of other vices besides cowardice, which is

generally found to be co-existent with treachery. He, therefore, who

shewed himself most valiant in the encounter was absolved by public

opinion from any crime with which he might be charged. As a necessary

consequence, society would have been reduced to its original elements, if

the men of thought, as distinguished from the men of action, had not

devised some means for taming the unruly passions of their fellows. With

this view, governments commenced by restricting within the narrowest

possible limits the cases in which it was lawful to prove or deny guilt by

the single combat. By the law of Gondebaldus king of the Burgundians,

passed in the year 501, the proof by combat was allowed in all legal

proceedings in lieu of swearing. In the time of Charlemagne, the

Burgundian practice had spread over the empire of the Francs, and not only

the suitors for justice, but the witnesses, and even the judges, were

obliged to defend their cause, their evidence, or their decision at the

point of the sword. Louis the Debonnaire, his successor, endeavoured to

remedy the growing evil by permitting the duel only in appeals of felony,

in civil cases, or issue joined in a writ of right, and in cases of the

court of chivalry, or attacks upon a man's knighthood. None were exempt

from these trials but women, the sick and the maimed, and persons under

fifteen or above sixty years of age. Ecclesiastics were allowed to produce

champions in their stead. This practice in the course of time extended to

all trials of civil and criminal cases, which had to be decided by battle.

[51] _Esprit des Loix_, liv. xxviii. chap. xvii.

The clergy, whose dominion was an intellectual one, never approved of a

system of jurisprudence which tended so much to bring all things under the

rule of the strongest arm. From the first they set their faces against

duelling, and endeavoured, as far as the prejudices of their age would

allow them, to curb the warlike spirit, so alien from the principles of

religion. In the Council of Valentia, and afterwards in the Council of

Trent, they excommunicated all persons engaged in duelling; and not only

them, but even the assistants and spectators, declaring the custom to be

hellish and detestable, and introduced by the devil for the destruction

both of body and soul. They added also, that princes who connived at duels

should be deprived of all temporal power, jurisdiction, and dominion over

the places where they had permitted them to be fought. It will be seen

hereafter that this clause only encouraged the practice which it was

intended to prevent.

But it was the blasphemous error of these early ages to expect that the

Almighty, whenever he was called upon, would work a miracle in favour of a

person unjustly accused. The priesthood, in condemning the duel, did not

condemn the principle on which it was founded. They still encouraged the

popular belief of divine interference in all the disputes or differences

that might arise among nations or individuals. It was the very same

principle that regulated the ordeals, which with all their influence they

supported against the duel. By the former, the power of deciding the guilt

or innocence was vested wholly in their hands; while by the latter they

enjoyed no power or privilege at all. It is not to be wondered at that,

for this reason, if for no other, they should have endeavoured to settle

all differences by the peaceful mode. While that prevailed, they were, as

they wished to be, the first party in the state; but while the strong arm

of individual prowess was allowed to be the judge in all doubtful cases,

their power and influence became secondary to those of the nobility.

Thus it was not the mere hatred of bloodshed which induced them to launch

the thunderbolts of excommunication against the combatants: it was a

desire to retain the power, which, to do them justice, they were in those

times the persons best qualified to wield. The germs of knowledge and

civilisation lay within the bounds of their order; for they were the

representatives of the intellectual, as the nobility were of the physical

power of man. To centralise this power in the Church, and make it the

judge of the last resort in all appeals, both in civil and criminal cases,

they instituted five modes of trial, the management of which lay wholly in

their hands. These were, the oath upon the evangelists; the ordeal of the

cross and the fire ordeal, for persons in the higher ranks; the water

ordeal, for the humbler classes; and, lastly, the _corsned_, or bread and

cheese ordeal, for members of their own body.

The oath upon the evangelists was taken in the following manner. The

accused who was received to this proof, says Paul Hay, Count du Chastelet,

in his _Memoirs of Bertrand du Guesclin_, swore upon a copy of the New

Testament, and on the relics of the holy martyrs, or on their tombs, that

he was innocent of the crime imputed to him. He was also obliged to find

twelve persons of acknowledged probity who should take oath at the same

time that they believed him innocent. This mode of trial led to very great

abuses, especially in cases of disputed inheritance, where the hardest

swearer was certain of the victory. This abuse was one of the principal

causes which led to the preference given to the trial by battle. It is not

at all surprising that a feudal baron, or captain of the early ages,

should have preferred the chances of a fair fight with his opponent to a

mode by which firm perjury would always be successful.

The trial by, or judgment of, the cross, which Charlemagne begged his sons

to have recourse to, in case of disputes arising between them, was

performed thus:--When a person accused of any crime had declared his

innocence upon oath, and appealed to the cross for its judgment in his

favour, he was brought into the church, before the altar. The priests

previously prepared two sticks exactly like one another, upon one of which

was carved a figure of the cross. They were both wrapped up with great

care and many ceremonies, in a quantity of fine wool, and laid upon the

altar, or on the relics of the saints. A solemn prayer was then offered up

to God, that he would be pleased to discover, by the judgment of his holy

cross, whether the accused person were innocent or guilty. A priest then

approached the altar, and took up one of the sticks, and the assistants

unswathed it reverently. If it was marked with the cross, the accused

person was innocent; if unmarked, he was guilty. It would be unjust to

assert, that the judgments thus delivered were, in all cases, erroneous;

and it would be absurd to believe that they were left altogether to

chance. Many true judgments were doubtless given, and, in all probability,

most conscientiously; for we cannot but believe that the priests

endeavoured beforehand to convince themselves by secret inquiry and a

strict examination of the circumstances, whether the appellant were

innocent or guilty, and that they took up the crossed or uncrossed stick

accordingly. Although, to all other observers, the sticks, as enfolded in

the wool, might appear exactly similar, those who enwrapped them could,

without any difficulty, distinguish the one from the other.

By the fire-ordeal the power of deciding was just as unequivocally left in

their hands. It was generally believed that fire would not burn the

innocent, and the clergy, of course, took care that the innocent, or such

as it was their pleasure or interest to declare so, should be so warned

before undergoing the ordeal, as to preserve themselves without any

difficulty from the fire. One mode of ordeal was to place red-hot

ploughshares on the ground at certain distances, and then, blindfolding

the accused person, make him walk barefooted over them. If he stepped

regularly in the vacant spaces, avoiding the fire, he was adjudged

innocent; if he burned himself, he was declared guilty. As none but the

clergy interfered with the arrangement of the ploughshares, they could

always calculate beforehand the result of the ordeal. To find a person

guilty, they had only to place them at irregular distances, and the

accused was sure to tread upon one of them. When Emma, the wife of King

Ethelred, and mother of Edward the Confessor, was accused of a guilty

familiarity with Alwyn Bishop of Winchester, she cleared her character in

this manner. The reputation, not only of their order, but of a queen,

being at stake, a verdict of guilty was not to be apprehended from any

ploughshares which priests had the heating of. This ordeal was called the

_Judicium Dei_, and sometimes the _Vulgaris Purgatio_, and might also be

tried by several other methods. One was to hold in the hand, unhurt, a

piece of red-hot iron, of the weight of one, two, or three pounds. When we

read not only that men with hard hands, but women of softer and more

delicate skin, could do this with impunity, we must be convinced that the

hands were previously rubbed with some preservative, or that the

apparently hot iron was merely cold iron painted red. Another mode was to

plunge the naked arm into a caldron of boiling water. The priests then

enveloped it in several folds of linen and flannel, and kept the patient

confined within the church, and under their exclusive care, for three

days. If, at the end of that time, the arm appeared without a scar, the

innocence of the accused person was firmly established.[52]

[52] Very similar to this is the fire-ordeal of the modern

Hindoos, which is thus described in Forbes's _Oriental

Memoirs_, vol. i. c. xi.:--"When a man, accused of a capital

crime, chooses to undergo the ordeal trial, he is closely

confined for several days; his right hand and arm are covered

with thick wax-cloth, tied up and sealed, in the presence of

proper officers, to prevent deceit. In the English districts

the covering was always sealed with the Company's arms, and

the prisoner placed under an European guard. At the time

fixed for the ordeal, a caldron of oil is placed over a fire;

when it boils, a piece of money is dropped into the vessel;

the prisoner's arm is unsealed and washed in the presence of

his judges and accusers. During this part of the ceremony the

attendant Brahmins supplicate the Deity. On receiving their

benediction, the accused plunges his hand into the boiling

fluid, and takes out the coin. The arm is afterwards again

sealed up until the time appointed for a re-examination. The

seal is then broken; if no blemish appears, the prisoner is

declared innocent; if the contrary, he suffers the punishment

due to his crime."... On this trial the accused thus

addresses the element before plunging his hand into the

boiling oil:--"Thou, O fire! pervadest all things. O cause of

purity! who givest evidence of virtue and of sin, declare the

truth in this my hand!" If no juggling were practised, the

decisions by this ordeal would be all the same way; but as

some are by this means declared guilty, and others innocent,

it is clear that the Brahmins, like the Christian priests of

the middle ages, practise some deception in saving those whom

they wish to be thought guiltless.

As regards the water-ordeal, the same trouble was not taken. It was a

trial only for the poor and humble, and, whether they sank or swam, was

thought of very little consequence. Like the witches of more modern times,

the accused were thrown into a pond or river; if they sank, and were

drowned, their surviving friends had the consolation of knowing that they

were innocent; if they swam, they were guilty. In either case society was

rid of them.

But of all the ordeals, that which the clergy reserved for themselves was

the one least likely to cause any member of their corps to be declared

guilty. The most culpable monster in existence came off clear when tried

by this method. It was called the _Corsned_, and was thus performed. A

piece of barley bread and a piece of cheese were laid upon the altar, and

the accused priest, in his full canonicals, and surrounded by all the

pompous adjuncts of Roman ceremony, pronounced certain conjurations, and

prayed with great fervency for several minutes. The burden of the prayer

was, that if he were guilty of the crime laid to his charge, God would

send his angel Gabriel to stop his throat, that he might not be able to

swallow the bread and cheese. There is no instance upon record of a priest

having been choked in this manner.[53]

[53] An ordeal very like this is still practised in India.

Consecrated rice is the article chosen, instead of bread and

cheese. Instances are not rare in which, through the force of

imagination, guilty persons are not able to swallow a single

grain. Conscious of their crime, and fearful of the

punishment of Heaven, they feel a suffocating sensation in

their throat when they attempt it, and they fall on their

knees, and confess all that is laid to their charge. The same

thing, no doubt, would have happened with the bread and

cheese of the Roman Church, if it had been applied to any

others but ecclesiastics. The latter had too much wisdom to

be caught in a trap of their own setting.

When, under Pope Gregory VII., it was debated whether the Gregorian chant

should be introduced into Castile, instead of the Musarabic, given by St.

Isidore of Seville to the churches of that kingdom, very much ill feeling

was excited. The churches refused to receive the novelty, and it was

proposed that the affair should be decided by a battle between two

champions, one chosen from each side. The clergy would not consent to a

mode of settlement which they considered impious, but had no objection to

try the merits of each chant by the fire-ordeal. A great fire was

accordingly made, and a book of the Gregorian and one of the Musarabic

chant were thrown into it, that the flames might decide which was most

agreeable to God by refusing to burn it. Cardinal Baronius, who says he

was an eye-witness of the miracle, relates, that the book of the Gregorian

chant was no sooner laid upon the fire, than it leaped out uninjured,

visibly, and with a great noise. Every one present thought that the saints

had decided in favour of Pope Gregory. After a slight interval, the fire

was extinguished; but, wonderful to relate! the other book of St. Isidore

was found covered with ashes, but not injured in the slightest degree. The

flames had not even warmed it. Upon this it was resolved, that both were

alike agreeable to God, and that they should be used by turns in all the

churches of Seville.[54]

[54] _Histoire de Messire Bertrand du Guesclin_, par Paul Hay du

Chastelet, liv. i. ch. xix.

If the ordeals had been confined to questions like this, the laity would

have had little or no objection to them; but when they were introduced as

decisive in all the disputes that might arise between man and man, the

opposition of all those whose prime virtue was personal bravery, was

necessarily excited. In fact, the nobility, from a very early period,

began to look with jealous eyes upon them. They were not slow to perceive

their true purport, which was no other than to make the Church the last

court of appeal in all cases, both civil and criminal: and not only did

the nobility prefer the ancient mode of single combat from this cause, in

itself a sufficient one, but they clung to it because an acquittal gained

by those displays of courage and address which the battle afforded, was

more creditable in the eyes of their compeers, than one which it required

but little or none of either to accomplish. To these causes may be added

another, which was perhaps more potent than either in raising the credit

of the judicial combat at the expense of the ordeal. The noble institution

of chivalry was beginning to take root, and, notwithstanding the clamours

of the clergy, war was made the sole business of life, and the only

elegant pursuit of the aristocracy. The fine spirit of honour was

introduced, any attack upon which was only to be avenged in the lists,

within sight of applauding crowds, whose verdict of approbation was far

more gratifying than the cold and formal acquittal of the ordeal.

Lothaire, the son of Louis I., abolished that by fire and the trial of the

cross within his dominions; but in England they were allowed so late as

the time of Henry III., in the early part of whose reign they were

prohibited by an order of council. In the mean time, the Crusades had

brought the institution of chivalry to the full height of perfection. The

chivalric spirit soon achieved the downfall of the ordeal system, and

established the judicial combat on a basis too firm to be shaken. It is

true that with the fall of chivalry, as an institution, fell the

tournament and the encounter in the lists; but the duel, their offspring,

has survived to this day, defying the efforts of sages and philosophers to

eradicate it. Among all the errors bequeathed to us by a barbarous age, it

has proved the most pertinacious. It has put variance between men's reason

and their honour; put the man of sense on a level with the fool, and made

thousands who condemn it submit to it or practise it.

Those who are curious to see the manner in which these combats were

regulated, may consult the learned Montesquieu, where they will find a

copious summary of the code of ancient duelling.[55] Truly does he remark,

in speaking of the clearness and excellence of the arrangements, that, as

there were many wise matters which were conducted in a very foolish

manner, so there were many foolish matters conducted very wisely. No

greater exemplification of it could be given than the wise and religious

rules of the absurd and blasphemous trial by battle.

[55] _Esprit des Loix_, liv. xxviii. ch. xxv.

In the ages that intervened between the Crusades and the new era that was

opened out by the invention of gunpowder and printing, a more rational

system of legislation took root. The inhabitants of cities, engaged in the

pursuits of trade and industry, were content to acquiesce in the decisions

of their judges and magistrates whenever any differences arose among them.

Unlike the class above them, their habits and manners did not lead them to

seek the battle-field on every slight occasion. A dispute as to the price

of a sack of corn, a bale of broad-cloth, or a cow, could be more

satisfactorily adjusted before the mayor or bailiff of their district.

Even the martial knights and nobles, quarrelsome as they were, began to

see that the trial by battle would lose its dignity and splendour if too

frequently resorted to. Governments also shared this opinion, and on

several occasions restricted the cases in which it was legal to proceed to

this extremity. In France, before the time of Louis IX., duels were

permitted only in cases of _lèse majesté_, _rape_, _incendiarism_,

_assassination_, and _burglary_. Louis IX., by taking off all restriction,

made them legal in civil cases. This was not found to work well, and, in

1303, Philip the Fair judged it necessary to confine them, in criminal

matters, to state offences, rape, and incendiarism; and in civil cases, to

questions of disputed inheritance. Knighthood was allowed to be the best

judge of its own honour, and might defend or avenge it as often as

occasion arose.

Among the earliest duels upon record, is a very singular one that took

place in the reign of Louis II. (A. D. 878). Ingelgerius count of

Gastinois was one morning discovered by his countess dead in bed at her

side. Gontran, a relation of the count, accused the countess of having

murdered her husband, to whom, he asserted, she had long been unfaithful,

and challenged her to produce a champion to do battle in her behalf, that

he might establish her guilt by killing him.[56] All the friends and

relatives of the countess believed in her innocence; but Gontran was so

stout and bold and renowned a warrior that no one dared to meet him, for

which, as Brantôme quaintly says, "mauvais et poltrons parens estaient."

The unhappy countess began to despair, when a champion suddenly appeared

in the person of Ingelgerius count of Anjou, a boy of sixteen years of

age, who had been held by the countess on the baptismal font, and received

her husband's name. He tenderly loved his godmother, and offered to do

battle in her cause against any and every opponent. The king endeavoured

to persuade the generous boy from his enterprise, urging the great

strength, tried skill, and invincible courage of the challenger; but he

persisted in his resolution, to the great sorrow of all the court, who

said it was a cruel thing to permit so brave and beautiful a child to rush

to such butchery and death.

[56] _Mémoires de Brantôme touchant les Duels_.

[Illustration: DUEL BETWEEN INGELGERIUS AND GONTRAN.]

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