STORM AND CAPTURE OF GHUZNI--ADVANCE TO MEET DOST MAHOMED--HIS ARMY
DESERT HIM, AND HE FLIES TOWARDS THE HINDOO KOOSH.
The plan of operations against Ghuzni having now been arranged, general
orders directed the troops to move as quietly as possible from their
quarters to the allotted positions. About three in the morning the
artillery had occupied the heights near the Caubul gate of the fort,
and about three hundred yards from the ramparts. The infantry were
drawn up in columns of companies on the road beneath the hills, and to
the left rear of the artillery. The cavalry were posted round the fort
to intercept the retreat of the garrison and the advance of relief.
The 16th Lancers were on the Caubul road, in the rear of the infantry,
as a diversion was expected from the enemy's cavalry in the mountains,
in favour of the besieged.
The morning was exceedingly dark, and all around quiet as death; for
the garrison, who had hitherto kept up an almost incessant cannonade,
seemed to think they had done enough, and were enjoying repose. We
began to imagine that they had used up their ammunition in the past
vigorous efforts to alarm us, and that the fort had been evacuated.
This oppressive silence was interrupted by the word of command passing
down the ranks in a whisper; and the forlorn hope moved to their post
near the Caubul gate, to await the result of the engineers' experiment.
The bags of powder, amounting to three hundred pounds in weight, were
carried by the sappers, supported by a party of European volunteers;
and the engineer officers, who placed the powder at the gate,
distinctly heard the voices of the Afghan-guard conversing near the
gateway. The saucisson was laid, and fired by an officer of the Bengal
Engineers.
Suddenly, a broad glare lit up the ramparts, and with a smothered,
crushing report, the Caubul gate was shattered into innumerable
fragments. In one moment, the face of nature seemed to have awoke in
uproar. The rushing and confusion in the city, and on the ramparts,
was accompanied by a hasty and random fire from any gun which could
be manned, no matter where it was pointed. The whole city, aroused
instantaneously from repose, and yet too late, hurried in confused
masses to man the walls, ignorant of the disaster which had befallen
the gateway. Then burst from the hills the solemn, majestic roar of our
artillery; light flashed upon light in uninterrupted succession, and
the shell, sped on its mission of death, curved steadily through the
lurid atmosphere.
The fort continued a random answer from its guns, and hung out lights
from the walls, to discover the locality of their assailants; but this
served to direct the fire of our artillery, and the walls were soon
cleared of their occupants. The wing of a Native Infantry regiment,
posted on the south-eastern front, drew a part of the besieged in that
direction, to repel this false attack.
Under cover of the artillery fire, sweeping the parapets, Colonel
Dennie, leading four light companies from the 2nd, 13th, 17th, and
Company's European Regiment, advanced to storm the Caubul gate, closely
followed by Brigadier Sale, in command of the main body of the storming
party, consisting of the remainder of those four British regiments.
The enemy opened a smart fire of matchlocks upon the advance, and the
gateway was found much obstructed with rubbish and splintered beams
from the demolished framework. The postern, turning sharply to the
right, and leading to the interior of the place, induced an officer in
the passage to suppose it blocked up, in consequence of which, he took
upon himself to order a bugler to sound the retreat; but the advanced
party having penetrated to the interior, heard, or heeded not, the
recal.
Overcoming every obstacle, the gallant Britons rushed, with a loud
cheer, through the postern, at whose entrance they were met by a body
of Afghan desperadoes, who had thrown themselves devotedly into this
passage, resolved to defend it with their lives. Here, the struggle was
short, but deadly. Armed with sword and daggers, each Afghan fought and
fell, with his face to the enemy; and if a spark of life remained after
he had been hurled to the earth, his last act was to direct a sword or
pistol against the breast of his hated foe as our men trampled over him
in their ownward career. So confined had been the area for combat, that
many of the soldiers, being unable to use their weapons at full length
in the mêlée, unfixed their bayonets, and used them as daggers; and
the broken and blood-stained weapons told with what effect they had
been wielded.
The resistance at the entrance having been overcome by the destruction
of this desperate band, the cry was, "On--on! to the citadel!"
A panic had now seized and paralysed many of the garrison, for they
huddled together in confined spaces, and stood to be slaughtered like
sheep, or rushed in frenzy to the walls, and cast themselves from the
parapets.
No thought of refuge and opposition in the citadel seemed to have
occurred to any, nor had it been sufficiently equipped for defence.
The efforts of the most rational were directed towards an escape
outside the walls, by secret outlets; but there, the clear light of
morning, and the sabres of the cavalry, left slender hopes of escape.
As daylight brought each minute tracing of the works into view, the
gallant British regiment were seen winding up the steep, rocky ascent
which led to the citadel, where, with a wild "hurrah!" they burst the
gate, mounted the ramparts, and cast loose the gay blazonry of their
banners to the wind as it moaned along the shattered battlements of
captured Ghuzni.
Scattered parties of the besieged now fled to the tops of the houses,
whence, after they had recovered a little from the prevalent panic, a
desultory fire was maintained on our soldiery. This useless resistance
nullified all attempts to restrain the carnage which ensued, and which
the garrison, by not surrendering at once, brought upon themselves.
So determined were many to carry war "to the knife," that they would
discharge their last pistol at the party advancing to capture them, and
then resign themselves, sullenly, to the fate which followed this last
act of outrage in the shape of a bullet or a bayonet. Probably, they
imagined that no quarter would be granted them; "the quality of mercy"
being rarely found "dropping like the gentle dew from heaven" on the
rugged surface of Afghanistan.
Possibly, the intelligence of yesterday's massacre of the prisoners
by Shah Soojah might have induced them to expect a similar fate in
captivity.
A brigade of sepoys which had entered the town and spread on the
ramparts, having scoured the buildings, soon cleared them of their
defenders, and put an end to all resistance in a few hours, the British
regiments being withdrawn to their lines.
Confusion, however, continued to prevail throughout the day, for a
herd of about one thousand two hundred horses belonging to the garrison
were dashing wildly through the town, driven frantic by wounds or
alarm. An officer, with a party of dragoons, was sent into the fort
to secure these horses, which now resembled wild beasts more than
domestic animals; and it was with much difficulty this roving band
were at length secured and led off. Very few horses of much value or
of sufficient size and strength for a cavalry remount were selected
from these captives. Those, however, which were used for that purpose
have mostly proved active and hardy animals, and are considered by many
superior to the general run of stud-bred horses in Bengal.
In the course of the day, Hyder Khan, the governor of Ghuzni, was
captured, and brought into camp, where Shah Soojah, at the instigation
of the commander-in-chief, reluctantly granted him his life, which the
Shah no doubt considered forfeited, for bearing arms against a king who
had been deposed before, or very shortly after, the delinquent's birth.
Not so fared Woolee Mahomed, (a relative of Dost Mahomed, and
standard-bearer of the army,) who defended himself to the last
extremity in the cellar, where he had taken refuge, close to his
Zenana,[31] which he protested should be entered by none, save over his
dead body. He surrendered, ultimately, to two officers on political
employ, who ventured to promise that his life should be spared, and was
brought before the tyrant Soojah, who immediately ordered him to be
executed.
It has been alleged that Woolee Mahomed had proved treacherous to the
Shah in some previous intercourse; but no sophistry can prove that Shah
Soojah was then a king, when Dost Mahomed sat on the throne, and, with
the approbation of his subjects, exercised supreme authority.
Many causes, too numerous to dwell upon, have been assigned for this
act of severity, by those desirous to defend Shah Soojah, but none
apparently can justify so cold-blooded a murder, when the words of two
British officers had been pledged for the safety of the unhappy victim.
Surely, blood enough had been shed that day to appease the royal
resentment, had it been confined to anything resembling moderate limits.
Amongst the besieged the carnage was found to be considerable. Upwards
of seven hundred bodies were interred in the fort, and about two
thousand were taken prisoners. It was impossible to ascertain the
number of wounded, for many crawled out of their hiding-places, in the
city, several days afterwards, and were taken charge of by such of the
citizens as had resumed their usual avocations; and in the villages,
some distance from Ghuzni, a few days afterwards, I found several,
dreadfully scorched and wounded, who admitted they had escaped over the
walls, on the morning of the storm, shortly before daylight.
Nearly all the prisoners were liberated, by direction of the
commander-in-chief, in the course of the day; for this, there was no
alternative, as we had not the means of taking charge of and supporting
such a large body of men, in the present state of affairs, and this act
of clemency, it was supposed, would produce a beneficial effect in the
beginning of the campaign.
Amongst our own troops, the list of killed and wounded amounted to
two hundred, but of this number not more than thirty were killed, or
died of their wounds. In the list of wounded were nineteen officers,
but none of their injuries proved fatal. Some had been wounded by a
short barbed arrow or bolt, shot from a cross-bow, which implement the
Afghans are tolerably expert in using; but these weapons had been in
the hands of the townspeople during the defence. The garrison had been
selected from the best of Dost Mahomed's troops, and were about three
thousand in number, and universally well equipped and armed.
Among the prisoners were found several Golundauze or Foot Artillery,
from Hindustan. One of these declared that, the day preceding the
storm, he had suggested to the governor the probability of our
attempting to blow in the gate of the fortress, and recommended that
a palisade should be thrown across the entrance; but his advice had
been disregarded, the gate being considered strong enough to resist any
attack.
The place being now in our hands, guards were posted at the gate, and
parties patrolled the town to prevent any more plundering, and to
collect the prize property.
Eight pieces of cannon, of various calibres, and twenty two jingals, or
wall pieces, were taken. Among the ordnance, was our old antagonist of
the 21st instant, which was found to carry a sixty-eight pound shot,
though assuredly at greater risk to the artillerymen who were rash
enough to fire it than to the enemy, for the interior was curiously
honeycombed.
Few things of much value were taken except horses, of which about one
thousand were picketed in front of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, but owing
to the insufficiency of ropes and picketing pegs, the greater part of
the horses broke loose during the night, and more than half escaped or
were stolen!
The whole of the prize property taken at Ghuzni, when sold, it is said,
fetched less than three lakhs of rupees, although the horses, arms,
and other articles, when put up for auction, sold for most exorbitant
prices, and the amount was realized in a few weeks. Yet an impenetrable
veil of mystery encompasses the subject. No officers to the present
date have received any part of the treasure; and information, though
frequently and publicly solicited, has been equally scarce.
After the capture of the fort, the enemy, who had occupied the adjacent
heights, retired, and left us for awhile at rest. Parties of Afghan
horsemen arrived daily in camp, from Caubul and its vicinity, to tender
their allegiance to Shah Soojah. These people concurred in asserting
that Dost Mahomed was still at Caubul, collecting his forces to give us
battle, and that his present army amounted to fifteen thousand men and
forty guns.
On July 27th, a deputation under Jubbar Khan (brother of Dost Mahomed)
arrived at our outposts, and were conducted to head-quarters. They came
to inquire what terms would be granted to Dost Mahomed by the British
government.
They were answered that Dost Mahomed must surrender himself into our
hands, and return with a portion of the army to Hindostan, where
a jageer would be allotted him, and a pension of a lakh of rupees
annually.
Indignant at the severity of the terms, the Afghan ambassador replied
nearly as follows:--
"These proposals are so insulting that I will not even mention them
to my brother; for what less could have been offered had you already
vanquished him in the field? We have hitherto heard that the English
were a just and equitable nation; but on what plea can you found the
right of dethroning a monarch, the choice of his country, and placing
on the throne yonder deposed puppet whom I spit at?[32] You have taken
our stronghold of Ghuzni; you may also, perhaps, overcome the army
which my brother has raised to defend himself; but the eyes of all Asia
are upon you. Asiatics will judge and appreciate your conduct; and the
blood of those innocent men who fall in the contest rests on your own
heads. May Allah defend the right!"
I have rarely heard a speech more to the purpose, and never one more
difficult to answer.
Jubbar Khan, having made more than half his auditors look
uncomfortable, returned to Caubul, after resting a short time at
the quarters of his friend, Sir Alexander Burnes, who spoke of him
in the highest terms. Jubbar Khan had formerly been ill treated by
Dost Mahomed, and been estranged thereby from his brother; but now
that adversity loured, forgetting all former differences, he came to
tender what service lay in his power, and remained faithful to the
last, although through his friend Sir Alexander Burnes, he might,
doubtless, have provided well for his own interests. A rare example
of disinterestedness, and almost a solitary case, according to all
accounts of Afghan character.
Jubbar Khan's escort consisted of about one hundred cavalry, who were
nearly all uncommonly fine and powerful-looking fellows, mostly clad
in chain armour, and armed with lances and matchlocks, but mounted
on horses apparently not up to their weight: these animals, however,
are more active and hardy than would be supposed, and are trained to
perform long journeys at a shuffling pace of about five miles an hour,
and frequently on very short allowances of fodder.
On the morning of the capture of Ghuzni, the Cavalry Brigade turned out
about eleven o'clock, in consequence of the approach of a large body of
horsemen, which proved to be Hadji Khan, Kauker, with his followers.
He had kept some distance in our rear since quitting Kandahar, and now
pushed forward to join us, seeing our affairs wore a more favourable
aspect. This chief had maintained a correspondence with the political
agent since the army had entered Afghanistan, offering to remain with
the Kandahar chiefs, and do them all the injury in his power until
our arrival! Yet Hadji Khan never actively assisted the army, nor
did he restrain his people from committing depredations whilst we
were passing through his own hills. He now came forward with a camel
load of letters, (an excellent pretext,) asserting that he had been
earnestly engaged in collecting and forwarding our communication. His
influence might possibly have effected that object, without remaining
two or three marches in rear with his whole force. This new addition
augmented the Shah's force to so large a body of Afghans, that they
were prudently kept at arm's length; for treachery from that camp was
now quite as formidable as resistance from the enemy in our front.
On the 30th of July, we advanced from Ghuzni towards the capital, the
cavalry brigade preceding as before, accompanied by the first brigade
of infantry. Colonel Roberts's brigade followed, next day, with the
Shah; and General Willshire's division formed the rear-guard of the
army.
At the commencement of the march, we passed through a narrow defile,
which would have been an admirable position for Dost Mahomed to hold
during the siege of Ghuzni, or to select afterwards to oppose our
progress. The summit of this defile was found to be the highest ground
we had crossed, being fully 1000 feet above the site of Ghuzni, and
that fortress was computed at nearly 8000 feet above the level of the
sea.
Having traversed a considerable tract of rocky undulating ground, we
entered, on the third day's march, a small but well irrigated valley,
where the turf and bright corn fields beneath us, partially shaded
by avenues of fruit trees, nourished by the friendly assistance of a
mountain stream, whose course they closely and eagerly pursued to the
end of the valley, presented a prospect which would anywhere have been
admired, but, in these barren regions, it looked like
"That vale enchanting
Where all looks flowery, wild and sweet,
And nought but love is wanting."
Possibly, on reflection, we might have found other wants; but at
present it was necessary to dispense with wishes and encounter stern
reality.
Several deserters of Dost Mahomed's army joined us here, with
intelligence of his being in position about thirty miles from us, at
a place called Urghundee, with a force of fifteen thousand men and
thirty pieces of cannon; but the deserters suggested that he would
probably advance to meet us at Maidan, an open ground, which sloped
gradually towards a rivulet lying in our route. On receipt of this
news, orders were issued to the rear columns to close immediately to
the front, and we marched next morning about ten miles in momentary
expectation of encountering some of the enemies' advanced posts. Our
pickets were strengthened and carefully disposed along the front; and
our men, elated at the prospect of the approaching struggle, burnished
their arms and looked keenly to the condition of their chargers and
accoutrements. Every heart beat high in the confident anticipation of
shortly essaying what might be effected by a small band of resolute
and disciplined soldiers against this overwhelming mass of vaunting
Afghans, who amounted to more than double our numbers.
Such were the hopes entertained by our army; but, ere mid-day, these
brilliant anticipations were given to the winds; for a large body of
Afghans arrived at our pickets, bringing accounts that Dost Mahomed's
army was breaking up and deserting; and that, in despair, he had
abandoned them and his guns at Urghundee, and fled towards Bameean.
This news was soon after confirmed by numerous bodies of the ex-king's
cavalry arriving in camp to tender their useful submission and services
to Shah Soojah, until in the hour of need they might find it more
profitable and less dangerous to choose another master.
Major Cureton, with a squadron of the 16th Lancers, one of Native
Cavalry, and a few artillerymen, was immediately despatched to take
possession of the cannon. Twenty-five pieces were found in position
under the brow of a hill, near Urghundee, about twenty-two miles
distant from our present encampment.
At the same time, Captain Outram, A.D.C.[33] to the commander-in-chief,
with twelve other officers, and about two hundred and fifty Native
Cavalry, undertook the pursuit of Dost Mahomed towards the Hindoo
Koosh. Hadji Khan, Kaukur, volunteered to act as their guide, and to
assist in capturing the late monarch with several hundred of his Afghan
retinue; but these rapidly decreased in numbers as they approached
Bameean.
The gallant Outram, whose whole life has been a scene of daring
exploits, which obtained for him the appropriate designation of Bayard,
"Le chevalier sans peur et sans reproche," has sketched, in his "Rough
Notes," the details of this expedition, and I shall therefore not
presume to trace that ground.
Thus was the object of this singular campaign accomplished, and
Shah Soojah, after an exile of thirty years, re-established in his
dominions. The feeble resistance offered by Dost Mahomed was a matter
of surprise to all the army, considering the character for enterprise,
courage, and ability universally assigned him, and which the earlier
period of his career fully testified; but he had been many years a
king, which may perhaps account for the difficulty. Possessing such
strong natural obstacles to the advance as well as maintenance of
an invading army, as Afghanistan unquestionably does, he profited
by none of them. In the most rugged and formidable defiles, a few
marauders only were posted to assail our rear guards and baggage; and
even these not always at the suggestion of their prince, but to glut
their own appetites for blood and plunder. As we advanced through the
inhospitable regions of Lower Afghanistan, the inhabitants generally
fled from before us, but often left their standing crops for the
maintenance of our cattle. Had these been cut down and carried away to
the mountains by the villagers, our horses must all have died, for they
endured, even as it happened, starvation enough to destroy half and
enfeeble the remainder.
Though many opportunities presented themselves for cutting off our
supplies of water, this expedient was only once or twice attempted, and
that in so slovenly a manner that a party of twenty or thirty troopers
sufficed to restore the water to its channel, unopposed by the enemy.
These circumstances amply prove, without entering further into details,
that Dost Mahomed had neglected the important opportunities which lay
in his grasp, of multiplying our difficulties at the outset. He might
assuredly have induced the chiefs of Kandahar (his own brothers) to
make common cause against their common invaders, and, in conjunction
with the Ghilzie chiefs and Mehrab Khan of Khelat (both of whom, as
well as their adherents, showed abundant proofs of their readiness to
bear arms against us) dispute the passage of the numerous and difficult
passes we were compelled to traverse. This supposition may be fully
warranted by the reply which Burnes describes Dost Mahomed to have
given on a former occasion to the Kandahar chiefs, when threatened by
the Persians. "When the Persians approach, let me know; and as I am
_now_ your enemy will I then be your friend."[34]
Such would have appeared the most rational course to pursue; and had
he taken these measures and executed them with vigour, there is little
doubt that his own army would have remained faithful to him when the
prospect appeared favourable, and when an example should be set by
other tribes. It is no matter of surprise that an army of lawless
tribes should desert a chief whom they deem unable or unwilling to
direct their efforts to the best advantage.
The chieftains, whose aggregate force would have been considerable,
were allowed to be beaten in detail, or to abandon their position as
we advanced. Mehrab Khan, with two thousand brave followers, fell
in the defence of his fortress, even after the dethronement of his
sovereign. The Kandahar chiefs, with what remained of their army,
having lingered to the last moment, were compelled to abandon their
city without a struggle. The Ghilzie chiefs were willing enough,[35] as
they afterwards proved, to meet their invaders in the field, and their
numbers must have been considerable, as more than six thousand were
known to be moving on our flanks on the advance to Ghuzni.
Lastly, a garrison of less than three thousand men in a fortress,
which, by the modern rules of the art of war, must inevitably fall in
a few days, (considering the Gothic tracing of its defences,) was the
forlorn bulwark opposed by the monarch himself to the approaches of his
capital.
However, this dernier resort, even, was made the least of by his
majesty's unaccountable desire to linger near the capital. Had the
defile, five miles on the Caubul side of Ghuzni, been selected as a
position for his army, they would have been advantageously placed to
intercept our advance upon Caubul, and from thence dispositions might
have been made for the relief of Ghuzni, or to surprise us by a chupao,
or night attack, which mode of warfare has often been successfully
practised among the Afghans. What might have been the result of such a
manoeuvre it is difficult even to conjecture;[36] for in the darkness
of night many advantages of discipline are lost, where the enemy is
felt before he is seen, and fire is almost as likely to tell upon
friend as foe; their habit, it is said, is to attack the rear of camp,
where the confused mass of cattle driven from the bazaar into the lines
must create no trifling confusion amongst the troops turning out to
form on their alarm posts.
The fall of Ghuzni greatly dispirited Dost Mahomed's army;[37] they
became distrustful of him, and he of them, and the result was a mutual
separation.
Many of his soldiers concurred in stating, that they had assured
Dost Mahomed of their faith, and would have abided by him; but when
it became known that Jubbar Khan had proceeded to Ghuzni to open a
negotiation, they doubted him, and concluded he was about to provide
for himself at their expense.
Taking all these circumstances into consideration, this campaign,
in an abstract military point of view, has thus far turned out more
fortunately, and with less and feebler opposition from the enemy, than
the most sanguine of its instigators or conductors could reasonably
have anticipated.
Politically, I shall not discuss the subject, because I could never
perceive one sound reason for taking the haphazard and unprofitable
tour.
On advancing towards the position lately occupied by Dost Mahomed,
nearly the whole line of march was flanked by troops of the deposed
monarch. Many of them were well mounted, and all well armed, although
little uniformity was maintained in dress or weapons.
Some wore steel caps and gauntlets, chain-armour variously wrought, and
light, neatly-finished cimeters, which bore a remarkably keen edge,
owing to the hardness of the material; others were clad in padded
cotton or silk dresses, of every variety of colour, the head being
covered by turbans of thick and embroidered Cashmere, or plain white
muslin. They carried over their shoulders long matchlocks, inlaid with
silver or ivory.
The Kuzzilbashes, or Persian mercenaries, were the only troops amongst
whom prevailed any uniformity, and they were generally distinguished by
a high, black, sheepskin cap, with a small red cloth top, and a sort of
frock dress, generally white, which reached to the knees, opening in
four places from the waist. Light deerskin boots, fitting closely to
the leg, completed this plain and serviceable costume.
Amongst the cavalry were certainly some of the handsomest and most
powerful-looking fellows I ever saw; the complexions of many were
fairer than those of some of our own sunburnt veterans; and amongst
them, also, were some of the dirtiest, long-bearded, ferocious-looking
savages I had hitherto seen: men who would doubtless have taken no
small pleasure in carving and dissecting any luckless straggler from
our camp whom they might happen to meet singly and unarmed. The
descriptions I have read of the Huns and Goths who overran the Roman
empire in the fifth century, forcibly occurred to me as I marked their
personification on each side of the road, unaltered and unimproved
by a lapse of fourteen centuries; while the western emigrants have
progressed to a state of civilization and intelligence, having
subverted nations and monarchies in their resistless course.
As we surmounted the hill near Urghundee, which is flanked by dark
lofty mountains, without a trace of vegetation, the peaks of the Hindoo
Koosh were visible, glittering in the morning sun from their snowy
summits. The intervening country, to the foot of this mighty barrier of
Afghanistan, presented a most unattractive appearance: an undulating,
rocky soil, with a few patches of short dry grass, extended apparently
a great portion of the way towards their foot.
The guns remained in the same position in which they had been left by
Dost Mahomed, on high ground, and were ranged to command a gorge from
which our army issued. The ground, in front and rear, was flat and
favourable for cavalry, in which his principal strength consisted.
All that was requisite for the fray was a little more heart and less
distrust.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 31: The Zenana is the sanctum allotted to the ladies.]
[Footnote 32: This compliment was addressed to Shah Soojah.]
[Footnote 33: Governor of Scinde, afterwards, or as it was then
designated, "Political Agent."]
[Footnote 34: Vide Burnes' Travels, vol. iii. p. 272.]
[Footnote 35: The Ghilzies were the chief actors in the insurrection
and massacre of 1842.]
[Footnote 36: One of our chiefs suggested, in the event of a night
attack, that the men should remain in their tents, and fire upon the
assailants from the cover thus afforded.]
[Footnote 37: They expected Ghuzni to detain us many months, judging
from the difficulties it had presented in recent periods of Afghan
history.]