KANDAHAR--MURDER OF LIEUT. INVERARITY--THE ARMY CONCENTRATED--ADVANCE
BY THE VALLEY OF THE TURNUK UPON GHUZNI.
On the morning of the 27th of April we entered the plain in which
Kandahar is situated, and encamped about two miles from the city.
This plain is well irrigated and tilled. Gardens enclosed by high mud
walls, and abounding with a great variety of fruit, are seen on almost
every side on approaching the city; and so level is the plain in its
vicinity, that nothing could be discerned but a long mud wall with
a few domes looking over it. The wall which encloses Kandahar in an
oblong figure, (whose perimeter exceeds three miles,) is flanked by
numerous circular bastions, and defended by an irregular dry ditch.
The curtain is about twenty feet in thickness at the base, and its
relief varies from thirty-five to forty feet, according to the depth
or shallowness of the ditch. In the parapet are numerous embrasures
and loopholes for matchlocks or jingals. I need scarcely annex to this
brief description that it is a place of no strength.
The bazaar runs from the Shikarpore gate, by which we entered, across
the city, and is intersected at right angles by a similar bazaar from
east to west. At the point of intersection is a large dome, which
affords a respite from the sun, now becoming intolerably hot. The city
was thronged with inhabitants, in every variety of Eastern costume,
busily engaged in their various avocations; and notwithstanding their
material change of administration which took place yesterday, business
seemed to be going on as quietly as if nothing unusual had occurred.
From the estimate formed on that occasion, I should say the natives of
Kandahar were not very violent politicians.
The women were clad cap-à-pie in a flowing white robe, (not always
particularly clean,) in which a piece of netting was inserted over the
eyes, to give them an opportunity of seeing what was passing; although
it precluded them from what is said, perhaps unjustly, to constitute
a source of satisfaction amongst northerly dames--being seen. A neat
green or scarlet leather slipper gave some relief to the ghostlike
appearance, and generally attracted observation to a pretty foot.
The palace is situated in the southern quarter, and surrounded by
a high shot-proof wall, which was garnished by several old guns of
curious workmanship: a legend is attached to some of them, which is not
likely to be interesting to the world at large.
An abundance of supplies were procured for the army in Kandahar, and
the surviving horses of the cavalry brigade (nearly three hundred had
died on the march) once more tasted grain: but the relief came too late
with many, whose hearts had been broken, and the greater portion never
recovered condition.
About a fortnight after our arrival, the Bombay division joined us,
consisting of a wing of H.M. 4th Light Dragoons, H.M.'s 2nd and 17th
Regiments, two troops of Horse Artillery, 1st Native Cavalry, 19th
Native Infantry, and two companies of Foot Artillery; and now, for
the first time, the "Army of the Indus" were assembled, though many
hundred miles distant from the river in whose name they were baptized.
The Bombay force had suffered less from famine than ourselves, having
marched a shorter distance, and been better supplied with grain: two
thousand camel loads were dispatched for their use from Shikarpore, to
the grief of the Bengal commissariat.
In May, the hot winds set in with much virulence, and the heat in our
tents became very oppressive. In spite of every effort on our parts to
reduce the temperature by throwing horse-cloths over the canvas, and
keeping wet grass, day and night, against the doors, the thermometer
stood at 110° during the heat of the day, and did not fall more than
twelve degrees at night. The camp, which was now a long standing one,
became exceedingly offensive, owing to the number of dead cattle in the
vicinity, principally camels; and the swarms of flies that worried us,
enabled one to comprehend what that visitation must have amounted to
when sent to plague the Egyptians.
The hospital began to fill rapidly. By the middle of May ours held
more than one fourth of the regiment to which I belonged. Jaundice,
dysentery, and fever were the prevalent complaints; the two latter,
far the most fatal. The 13th Light Infantry and Company's European
regiment were very severe sufferers, and were ultimately reduced from
sickness and death to a very weak state, especially the former, who
buried more than an average of a man a day during the two months we
halted at Kandahar. The causes of these complaints, independent of
heat, were the bad water drank on the march, and the dampness of the
soil in the neighbourhood of the city.
The people of the country being apparently better disposed towards
us now than at first, the officers of the army strayed occasionally
some miles from camp on fishing and shooting excursions, until these
amusements were checked by a tragical event, which occurred on the
evening of the 28th of May.
Two officers of the 16th Lancers, Lieuts. Wilmer and Inverarity, were
returning towards camp on a sporting excursion rather later in the
evening than usual. On ascending an eminence, about four miles from
camp, (having given their guns to the grooms to carry,) Inverarity
preceded his friend, and rode to the top of a rocky hillock, from
whence the camp fires were visible. When he reached this spot about
twenty Afghan savages rushed upon their unarmed victim, tore him from
his horse (as supposed), and inflicted several mortal wounds with
their cimiters. Wilmer, following, unconscious of what had occurred,
was suddenly attacked by some of the same gang. Providentially he had
a thick walking stick in his hand, which he raised in time to parry
the first blow made at his head, and, escaping from his assailants,
descended the hill, pursued by the assassins. These he soon distanced,
and reaching an outpost of irregular horse about a mile from the place,
returned with some of the party in search of the banditti. The cowardly
villains had absconded, leaving poor Inverarity covered with wounds,
but still alive. He spoke but a few words, faintly describing how he
had met with the disaster, and begged for some water, which, as soon
as it could be procured, he drank, and almost immediately afterwards
expired.
In the dead of night the party arrived in camp with his corpse, so
gashed and disfigured, that it could scarcely be recognised by his
brother-officers, and the following day his remains were interred with
the usual military honours in front of the standard guard.
The malice of his murderers rested not even in the grave, for some
months after we heard of a gang (who came from the direction of the
place where he was murdered) attempting to dig up his body. Having
demolished the tomb, they were interrupted in their accursed project by
a party of native infantry quartered in Kandahar, and fled to the hills.
Inverarity's remains were afterwards removed from the spot, and
interred in the city of Kandahar.
The barbarians who, it is supposed, committed the deed, were
subsequently secured by the exertions of Major Mac Laren[28]
of the 16th Native Infantry, while storming a small fort near
Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Some articles, supposed to have belonged to
Inverarity, were found in their possession; but the punctilious judge
did not consider them legally identified, and the assassins were
liberated, about in sufficient time, it was conjectured, to fall in
with another officer, who was murdered between Kandahar and Caubul.
Had the detection and punishment of the murderers been committed to
Shah Soojah (as he requested) there is every reason to suppose they
would not have escaped so easily, and the business would have afforded
his Majesty sincere pleasure.
Rumours of Dost Mahomed's preparations for an obstinate resistance were
now reaching us daily; but the envoy frequently expressed his firm
conviction that no opposition would be made. Sir John Keane differed
in opinion, and refused to leave the Bombay division behind, according
to Mr. Mac Naghten's suggestion, unless the envoy could guarantee that
Dost Mahomed would surrender.
This was of course out of the question, and it was at length determined
that the whole force should advance, except a small garrison for
the city. The commissariat exerted themselves to complete their
arrangements for the march, and the approaching departure was joyfully
welcomed by the army.
A Kafila, with grain from Shikarpore, arrived opportunely in camp
previous to our move, under the escort of two regiments and some local
horse, despatched from Kandahar to protect this caravan, as news had
been received that two chiefs of the powerful Ghilzie tribe were
preparing to pounce on the convoy.
It was fortunate that this precaution had been taken; for it was
ascertained that a large body of the enemy had made preparations to
surprise these necessary supplies on the road, and the fidelity of the
merchant who brought up the caravan was somewhat doubted, until the
arrival of the reinforcement put treachery out of his power.
In the beginning of June, the force under Brigadier Sale, which had
been detached soon after our arrival in pursuit of the Kandahar chiefs,
returned. Those princes had fled to Girishk, a fortress about eighty
miles distant from Kandahar, and near the Helmund river, but abandoned
it on the approach of their pursuers, and fled towards Herat.
Thus ended, in the most undignified manner, the authority of the three
Ameers, for the present. It is singular that in such extremities the
scheme of a reconciliation with their brother, Dost Mahomed, had not
been resorted to, for it would have been unquestionable policy in that
monarch to insure the re-establishment of the Kandahar chiefs to them
in their principality, in case of the united forces succeeding to repel
the British invasion.
It is evident, however, that no such measures could have been
preconcerted to oppose our advance, from the non-occupation of the
Kojuck and Bolan passes. The Afghans, near Kandahar, informed us that
the chiefs distrusted their subjects, and perhaps with cause.
Weak both in mind and authority, these chiefs hovered irresolutely
around their capital, but abandoned the power they had usurped when
danger accompanied its retention.
On the 27th of June, our camp was struck, and the Cavalry division,
with the 1st Brigade of Infantry and head-quarters, preceded.
Next day, came the second Brigade, Shah Soojah and his motley
procession, which swelled daily in numbers, with hordes of Afghans, who
came to join the Shah and tender their allegiance (as they affirmed),
but in reality, no doubt, to watch the progress of events: to remain
_faithful_ in case of success, or plunder in case of a reverse.
The Bombay division of Infantry, under Brigadier Willshire, brought up
the rear. One regiment of Bengal Native Infantry and the heavy guns
were left at Kandahar.
Most of our officers were on the sick list, and on the remainder the
duty was severe, consisting principally of guards to protect the
baggage, and pickets. The outlying cavalry picket was ordered, by the
commander-in-chief, to take post four miles in advance, where, of
course, no baggage was allowed, nor even a groom (strictly speaking) to
hold your charger. This picket was posted at nightfall, with orders to
fall back on the main picket, in case of feeling an enemy. The main
picket was usually posted about a mile from camp, consisting of a
squadron of cavalry, four companies of infantry, and two six-pounders,
from whence a chain of pickets communicated along the front and round
the flanks of the army, whence patrols from the rear-guards completed
the circuit.
The third day's march brought us to the Turnuk river, which is a clear
and shallow mountain stream, running through a valley sown abundantly
with barley and Indian corn. The water was excellent, and supplies for
our cattle were daily procurable; but numbers continued to die, unable
to overcome the debility ensuing from previous overwork and starvation.
The natives of the valley were peaceable agriculturists, who came
constantly into our camp, bringing for sale corn, eggs, fowls, and
fruit; but the mountains which flanked our march, at a short distance,
were amply stocked with marauders. The sickness under which the army
had long suffered now began to abate, or at least, to assume a less
virulent character; but the appearance of the sufferers was materially
altered. Those of previously stout and portly figures were seen walking
about in clothes once fitting closely, but now hanging down like empty
pudding-bags; and faces, whose rubicundity once emulated the richest
hues of Chateau Margaux, now wore a puckered-up, gamboge aspect, which
made sympathy no easy matter with those who were prone to laughter.
Many who had never much flesh to spare, were reduced to varieties
of angular shapes, which might have been useful to a mathematician
when studiously inclined, on the line of march. Such had been the
devastating effects of dysentery and fever on most of the community.
The zealous and able managers of the intelligence department had
prophesied that we should probably be seriously molested by the tenants
of a strong fort in the Ghilzie country, seven marches from Kandahar,
called Khelat-i-Ghilzie.
A bribe had been sent to the two principal chiefs of the Ghilzies,[29]
accompanied by a letter from Shah Soojah, desiring their assistance.
The money was retained, and an insulting answer of defiance returned.
On approaching Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the adjutant-general of cavalry was
sent, with a small escort, to reconnoitre the place.
The brigadier commanding the advanced guard of two squadrons of
cavalry, two guns, and a small body of infantry, on approaching this
memorable place, espied two or three hundred well-armed Ghilzies on an
eminence not far from the road.
Having minutely examined their position, the brigadier pronounced it to
be remarkably strong, and prudently resolved to await the arrival of
the main body of the army, previously to dislodging the party.
Whilst revolving in his mind the most advisable method of attack,
unfortunately, the head of the column hove in sight, and the doubtless
brilliant result that might have ensued was precluded by the Ghilzies
taking to flight.
It was considered fortunate that the enemy knew not their own strength,
or that a more rash officer had not been in command on the occasion,
who, in attempting to intercept the retreat of the Ghilzies, might have
incurred serious responsibility.
Sir John Keane, on his arrival at the encamping ground, was so
satisfied with the arrangements, that he is reported even to have
instituted a comparison between the gallant colonel and the Duke of
Wellington, in his usual energetic and classical mode of expression.
As we had ascended considerably since leaving Kandahar, and were
frequently on high tableland, the heat ceased to annoy us so severely
as during the three preceding months, and we considered we had overcome
by far our most formidable enemy in the relentless sun.
Various and contradictory rumours continued to pour daily into camp.
At one time, it was said that Dost Mahomed, at the head of an army
of thirty thousand men, with eighty guns, had taken up a strong
position near Caubul; at another, that his chiefs and Kuzzilbaches
(Persian mercenaries) having deserted him, he had despaired of making
any effectual resistance, and fled towards the Hindoo Koosh. Lastly,
we were informed that he had detached two of his sons, with chosen
men from the army, to garrison the fortress of Ghuzni; but the same
evening, perhaps, merchants would travel through our camp, _en route_
for Kandahar, and declare they had left Ghuzni but a few days, and had
not seen a single soldier in the place! These reports, when compared
with the actual events, are more reconcilable than appears at a first
glance.
Small parties continued to arrive daily, and tender their allegiance
to Shah Soojah; and we were authentically informed, that the two
before-mentioned Ghilzie chiefs, with about five or six thousand
horse each, were moving daily on both flanks, parallel with our line
of march, and would neglect no opportunity to harass the army. Of the
truth of the latter part of the information, we entertained no doubt,
_provided_ they could do it with impunity.
About seventy miles from Ghuzni, we quitted the rich valley of the
Turnuk river, and crossed an extensive, well-cultivated plain, thickly
studded with small mud forts. The inhabitants of this part of the
country dare not dwell in open towns or villages, owing to the numerous
bands of marauders infesting the neighbouring mountains, who have no
mercy on the defenceless villages.
Small, but luxuriant groves of fruit-trees, bending beneath their loads
of rosy-cheeked apples, speckled the plain, and formed a pleasing
resting-place for the eye, fatigued with the ceaseless range of barren
mountains skirting the valley.
On the 20th of July, we reached a small place called Nance, about
twelve miles from Ghuzni; and as yet no authentic intelligence had been
received of Dost Mahomed's intentions or movements, nor of any steps
having been taken to interrupt our progress.
Sir John Keane, however, received news at this place which induced him
to order the rear column to close up to us in the evening. The fort
was said to be garrisoned by a body of Dost Mahomed's troops; and Ufzul
Khan, his second son, was supposed to be near us with four thousand
cavalry. As it was probable that Ufzul Khan would effect a junction
with the Ghilzie chiefs, and attempt to surprise our camp during the
night, the whole army were drawn up in line on their standard guards
soon after sunset, and lay under arms during the night.
Nevertheless, nothing certain was known regarding these reports. Major
Garden, the quartermaster-general, had ridden to reconnoitre Ghuzni in
the evening, and perceived no signs of its being garrisoned.
At daybreak, on the morning of the 21st, our line broke into three
columns, the cavalry on the right, the artillery in the centre, and the
infantry on the left, and in this order advanced over the plain, at the
extremity of which the fortress of Ghuzni is situated.
As we approached, a nephew of Dost Mahomed came to tender his
submission to the Shah, and gave information of the fort being occupied
by Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, with a garrison of three thousand
infantry and a few cavalry; but he expressed a suspicion that they
would evacuate the place. This individual complained of having been
ill-treated by his uncle; but there appeared little doubt that the
gentleman came into camp merely as a spy.
Reports from the advanced parties continued to state that no garrison
was to be seen on the ramparts: however, we continued to advance in the
same order.
When within about a mile of the walls, a smart fire of matchlocks
was suddenly opened on the advanced guard of infantry on our left,
from a small village, and from behind some garden walls. The column
immediately halted; the 16th Native Infantry were detached to clear the
village, in rear of which was a small redoubt, protected by the fire of
a bastion of the fort, on which the Afghans fell back.
Two officers,[30] and several men of the 16th Native Infantry, were
wounded by the Afghans in the skirmish.
The artillery now swept past us, and took up their position on an
elevated post in a village about four hundred yards distant from the
nearest bastion of the fort. At the same time the 4th Dragoons were
ordered to the rear to protect the baggage, which, it was supposed, was
likely to be attacked by a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been
descried on the right, moving in that direction.
The remainder of the cavalry-division were drawn up in close column of
squadrons, about three quarters of a mile from Ghuzni, and supplied
escorts to the reconnoitring parties.
The garrison now opened their fire upon us, which was answered by our
artillery from the village, but the guns, which were only six-pounders,
were found to have little or no effect on the walls, in consequence of
which they were soon withdrawn, having lost two or three horses from
the enemy's fire. Sir John Keane, in his despatch, assigns as a reason
for this eccentric cannonade, a desire to unmask the enemy's batteries.
About the same time the infantry were also withdrawn, and bivouacked in
rear of some gardens, enclosed by mud walls, and about a mile from the
fort.
The cavalry entirely escaped his excellency's notice. Early in the
day, several troops had been detached with the different reconnoitring
officers; but now being of no further use for the present, we were left
standing to our horses' heads, and meditating on what kind of service
we could be employed while the rest of the army were bivouacked.
At length, the garrison, being unemployed for the present, pitied
our forlorn condition, and prepared to provide for our amusement. A
monstrous gun from the citadel, carrying a sixty-eight pound shot,
was seen to be trained with much assiduity, in our direction, and we
awaited in agreeable suspense the result of the process.
Two little tents had been procured by some of the officers, and pitched
on the spot where we had dismounted. Some luxurious fellows had been
out on a foraging excursion amongst the baggage, and returned laden
with a supply of bread, fowl, cold meat, and milk. This collation was
being discussed, and a vote of thanks to the industrious foraging
party was in the act of passing, when a loud report from the citadel
interrupted them, followed by a load of iron hurtling over our heads,
and plunging amongst the mass of baggage and camp followers in rear.
This was immediately succeeded by another, better directed, which cut
the ropes of our neighbours' tent, wounded one of their servants, and
killed a trooper of Native Cavalry.
I never saw two tents struck with such admirable alacrity as on this
occasion. I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say that in less than
two minutes the tents had disappeared, and the spy-glasses of the
inmates were directed at the walls to ascertain the cause of this
uncourteous interruption.
The senior officer present now ordered the cavalry to mount, and we
retreated half a mile to the rear, through the midst of a mass of
baggage which our camp followers were hurrying off with incredible
despatch, perceiving the probability of their becoming a target for the
merciless Golundauze in the fort.
Scarcely had we picketed our horses, when the trumpet called us again
to the saddle, and we changed position to the northern front of Ghuzni,
on the Caubul road, and about a mile from the nearest bastion. We
reached this ground about sunset; but the infantry, who passed by a
more circuitous route, round the other side of the fortress, did not
arrive in camp many of them till near midnight.
An incessant fire of cannon, matchlocks, and jingals, was kept up
during the night on the troops whilst marching, and after their arrival
in camp; but the enemy lost a night's rest, and wasted their ammunition
to very small purpose. As they had done us very little injury in the
daytime, the night fire was not a subject of much apprehension; but
all Asiatics have much confidence in great noise and constant firing,
without taking pains about its direction and effect; it keeps up their
courage by diverting their thoughts.
At daylight the following morning, from the intelligence received, and
the observations of reconnoitring parties, we were better enabled to
judge of the difficulties opposed.
Ghuzni is situated in a plain, which it commands easily on every side
but the north, where a small range of hills run down to within one
hundred and fifty yards of the walls. It is built on a low extensive
mound, the foot of which is surrounded by a mud rampart, flanked by
numerous circular bastions. The curtain of this enceinte varied from
thirty-five to forty-five feet in height, and averaged perhaps twenty
in thickness, which rendered it shot-proof to our artillery, as our
heaviest guns had been left at Candahar to be sent as a present to
Prince Kamran of Herat!
The rampart was defended by a deep wet ditch, over which permanent
bridges were built at the gates.
The citadel stands on a rock on the central and most elevated part of
the mound, commanding the whole of the town, and about two hundred and
fifty yards of the hills on the north, and is surrounded by a thick mud
rampart, defended by a fausse-braye. The soles of the embrasures and
loopholes in the parapet of the latter were not sufficiently depressed
to enfilade the approaches to the citadel.
The gates were all blocked with masonry excepting that which leads to
Caubul, and this was built of massive wood, strengthened by iron clamps
and bars, and defended by the cross fire of two adjacent bastions.
Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, commanded the garrison, which
consisted of three thousand infantry and one thousand four hundred
cavalry: amongst the former were about one hundred artillerymen, who
had deserted or been reduced in the East India Company's artillery.
The heights on one side of the plain were occupied by a body of about
three thousand cavalry, commanded by Ufzul Khan; and on the other, a
body of infidels, of similar strength, but infantry, were posted to
harass our left.
It was also conjectured that the two Ghilzie chiefs who had been
hovering on our flanks on the line of march, had joined their forces
with those of Ufzul Khan; and these chiefs were reported to be in
command of eight or ten thousand horsemen.
The news of Runjeet Singh's death (which occurred on the 27th of June,
1839) having set Dost Mahomed's mind at rest, regarding any serious
co-operation on the part of the Sikhs against him, he was now preparing
to move down with all the forces he could assemble, and attack us
whilst engaged with the siege of Ghuzni.
His eldest son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, had been detached with about five
thousand men to the entrance of the Khyber pass, which Colonel Wade was
preparing to enter, in company with the Shah Zada Timoor, Shah Soojah's
son.
Colonel Wade commanded a few companies of native infantry and some raw
levies, and was supported by a Sikh auxiliary brigade.
Before Colonel Wade entered the Khyber Pass, the Afghan force under
Mahomed Akbar had been recalled by Dost Mahomed, under the urgent
circumstances then pressing upon him; and the Khyber was entrusted
to the defence of the wandering tribes of Khyberees who infest those
extensive ranges of mountains.
Our own _effective_ force now scarcely amounted to two thousand
eight hundred European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and about
four thousand sepoys: so much had the army been reduced by sickness,
death, and the detachments left to garrison the places we had passed
through--viz., Bukkur, Shikarpore, Quetta, and Candahar.
Exclusive of these, of course, were the Shah's troops, whose
contingent, in case of an action, would, it was conjectured, be fully
employed in watching the numerous Afghan rabble which flocked around
Shah Soojah. These had now swelled to a large amount by the daily
influx of armed horsemen, who were as likely to be spies and adherents
of Dost Mahomed, as friends of Shah Soojah.
At the best, the bare suspicion of treachery from this armed host
rendered it necessary to keep a force on the watch, and the contingent
must have been used for that purpose in case of a general engagement.
On the morning of the 22nd of July, Sir John Keane and the engineers
were actively employed in reconnoitring the fortress.
Captain Thompson, the chief engineer, having completed his
observations, and remarked that a communication was kept up by the
garrison with the exterior, through the Caubul gateway, gave it as
his opinion that apparently the most practicable means of assault
were presented by a coup-de-main, in lieu of a regular assault, (for
which we were not provided,) and suggested as a method to attain this
purpose, that the Caubul gate should be destroyed by bags of powder.
Some officers were in favour of an immediate escalade, but as that
method would necessarily involve a greater loss, and might still remain
in reserve, in case of the failure of the former and more expeditious
method, Sir John Keane resolved on adopting Captain Thompson's
suggestion.
During the morning of the 22nd, we were most of us endeavouring to make
amends for the two days and nights of almost unremitting vigilance
that had been exercised, when the shrill tones of the alarm trumpet
rang confusedly from many quarters of the camp, and caused us all to
start up and prepare for the saddle. A smart rattling fire of musketry,
interrupted by the occasional roar of cannon, was heard, apparently
near the foot of the hills, on our left flank, and a hurried report
ran along the lines, that Dost Mahomed, with his whole army, had come
suddenly upon us.
We were now become too well used to our harness to take long in
preparing, and a very few minutes served to show us formed, on our
alarm posts.
The Bengal cavalry brigade were immediately dispatched at a round pace
towards the scene of action. The ground we passed over was rough and
undulating, and in many places covered with crops of high standing
corn, which completely intercepted our view; but the nearer rattle of
musketry indicated we were not far from the field of strife.
Having ridden over about two miles of country, of the above
description, we came upon an open and barren plain, which extended
to the foot of the hills, where we descried some of Shah Soojah's
contingent, accompanied by two or three guns, closely engaged with a
body of two or three thousand Afghans.
On our approach, the Afghans commenced a retreat upon the hills,
pressed hard by the Shah's troops, who were unable, however, to bring
their guns far up the hill-side.
The cavalry brigade were detached by wings of regiments to the flanks
and rear of the heights, in order to intercept the enemy, should the
infantry succeed in dislodging them.
The Afghans having ascended to the summit of the hill, took up a hasty
order for battle, and awaited their enemies. A deep ravine skirted
the base of their position, and its crest was occupied by a party of
matchlock-men, thus enfilading the approach by the only practicable
ascent. The Shah's troops were not inclined to storm this strong
defensible position, but halted behind the ravine, and under cover of
rocks and broken ground endeavoured to drive the enemy from the heights
by musketry; but the distance between the skirmishing parties, to admit
of either fire being very galling, was much too considerable.
We remained watching the skirmish taking place on the heights, in
expectation of seeing a reinforcement arrive from camp, which would
enable the infantry to dislodge their enemies, and force them into
collision with us; but the commander-in-chief refused the application
for reinforcements, being resolved to keep the infantry fresh for the
work which awaited them on the morrow, and Shah Soojah would not part
with any more of his guards. A body of cavalry, as a last resource,
endeavoured to mount the hill side, and take the Afghans in reverse,
but after ascending a few hundred yards, the rocks and ravines became
so numerous that the ascent was quite impracticable, and they
reluctantly descended under a harmless salute from the enemy on the
summit.
At sunset, the forces were withdrawn to camp, having killed about sixty
Afghans, and taken fifty prisoners, with a loss of only a few wounded
on the side of the British.
The prisoners being brought into the presence of Shah Soojah, declared
they were Ghazees, or Crusaders, bound by a religious vow to take
his head, and that the oath of the party would sooner or later be
accomplished, although they had not been successful in the present
attempt.
"I will, at all events, secure your head now," replied the indignant
monarch; and beckoning to his executioner, (who was never far from his
master's side, knowing the Shah's predilection for the office,) the
speaker's head rapidly disappeared.
The comrades of the decapitated being loth to part with this useful
article, showed signs of resistance, when the brave and zealous
attendants of his majesty rushed upon the unarmed prisoners,
unrestrained by word or gesture of their king, and massacred their
victims.
One old man, it is said, escaped to tell his comrades in the mountains
the fate of the captives. And this act was perpetrated in the midst of
the first Christian army which had set foot in Afghanistan since the
creation of the world.
Let it not be supposed that the suppression of the murder lay in the
power of the British authorities; there was not, I believe, one British
officer present, and the whole merit rests with Shah Soojah; but he was
viewed as a mere puppet in our hands, and on us, throughout Asia, will
rest the obloquy of this savage massacre. No doubt the Afghans have
done as bloody deeds, but it became, therefore, more incumbent to show
a better example.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 28: This gallant soldier fell at the battle of Sobraon.]
[Footnote 29: In the subjugation of this country in 1840, this tribe of
Ghilzies were found the most obstinate and inveterate foes to British
influence. Khelat-i-Ghilzie was gallantly held by a native infantry
regiment (which now bears the name) against frequent attacks of the
Ghilzies during the insurrection.]
[Footnote 30: Captain Graves and Lieutenant M'Mullen, 16th Native
Infantry.]