de V. M. impériale et royale. Le général-en-chef de l’armée du nord
s’est refusé à m’envoyer aucune rapport disant, et écrivant qu’il
n’avait aucun ordre à cet égard. M. le maréchal commandant en chef
l’armée du midi n’a encore répondu à aucune des lettres que je
lui ai écrites ou fait écrire depuis cette époque. M. le maréchal
commandant-en-chef l’armée d’Arragon ne m’envoye aucune rapport, et
reste entièrement isolé de moi. M. le maréchal commandant-en-chef
l’armée de Portugal m’a fait beaucoup de demandes auxquelles il
savait parfaitement que je ne pouvais satisfaire, comme celles des
troupes de l’armée du nord, des vivres, &c. Sa conduite est tellement
indécente qu’elle n’est pas concevable. V. M. I. et R. pourra en
juger par mes dépêches au prince de Neufchatel.————Sire, en acceptant
le commandement des armées françaises à l’époque ou je l’ai reçu,
j’ai cru remplir un devoir que tous les liens qui m’attachent à V.
M. I. et R. et à la France m’imposaient parceque j’ai pensé pouvoir
être utile, mais j’étais persuadé que V. M. I. et R. me confiant un
dépôt si précieux les généraux-en-chef s’empresseraient d’obéir à
la volonté de V. M. Il n’en est pas ainsi, je m’adresse donc à elle
pour qu’elle veuille bien écrire ou faire écrire aux généraux-en-chef
qu’elle est sa volonté pour qu’elle leur fasse déclarer que leur
désobeissance à mes ordres les mettrait dans le cas d’être renvoyés
en France où ils trouveraient un juge juste mais sévère dans V. M.
I. et R. Si V. majesté ne trouve pas le moyen de persuader à ces
messieurs que sa volonté est que je sois obéi, je la supplie de
considérer que le role auquel je suis exposé est indigne de mon
caractère et du nom de V. M. Si la guerre du nord a lieu, je ne
puis être utile ici qu’autant que je suis obéi, et je ne puis être
obéi qu’autant que ces messieurs sauront que j’ai le droit de les
remplacer; je ne puis infliger, moi, d’autre punition que celle là
à un général-en-chef. Si je ne suis pas obéi, et que V. M. aille au
nord, l’Espagne sera évacué honteusement par les troupes impériales,
et le nom que je porte aura présidé inutilement à cette époque
désastreuse.
Le mal est grand, mais il n’est au-dessus ni de mon devouement ni
de mon courage. C’est à votre majesté à les rendre efficaces par
la force dont il est indispensable qu’elle m’entoure; le salut des
armées impériales et de l’Espagne independent.
* * * * *
No. VI.
TARIFA.
[The anonymous extracts are from the memoirs and letters of different
officers engaged in the siege. The Roman characters mark
different sources of information.]
SECTION 1.
_Number and conduct of the French._
A.
“As to the numbers of the French; the prisoners, the intercepted
letters, the secret information from Chiclana, all accounts, in fact,
concurred in stating that the troops employed _exceeded nine thousand
men_!”
_Extracts from colonel Skerrett’s despatch._
“The enemy’s force employed in the siege is stated at _ten thousand,
probably this is in some degree exaggerated_.”
B.
“The fact of the enemy, with _eleven thousand experienced soldiers_,
not having made another effort after his assault of the 31st, &c.”
_Lord Wellington’s despatch._
“_January 19, 1812._
“By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th December, I learn
that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force of _about five thousand
men_ on the 20th December, covering their operation against that
place by another corps at Vejer.”
_Conduct of the French._
A.
“There was not, on the part of the leading French officer (an old
lieutenant of the 94th) or of his followers, any appearance of panic
or perturbation. Their advance was serene, steady, and silent, worthy
of the 5th corps, of their Austrian laurels, of their ‘_vielles
moustaches_.’”
SECTION 2.
_Conduct of the Spanish soldiers._
B.
“At the assault general Copons himself was the only person who shewed
his head above the parapet. The precaution of outflanking him by
three companies of the 47th regiment remedied the chance of evil,
which so lamentable a want of chivalry might have occasioned, but the
knights of older times were probably better fed than were our poor
distressed friends.”
SECTION 3.
_Conduct of colonel Skerrett._
A.
“It is necessary to advert to the 18-pounder mounted on the Gusmans’
tower, as Southey’s History contains some strange misrepresentation
on the subject.” “The French made the 18-pounder an early object
of attack, but they did not succeed in crushing it. Unfortunately
one of the spherical case shot, not precisely fitting its old and
worn calibre, burst in passing over the town, and killed or wounded
a person in the street. This produced some alarm and complaint
amongst the inhabitants for a moment, and in the first feeling of
that moment, Skerrett, with characteristic impetuosity, directed
the gun to be placed ‘_hors de service_.’ There was no ambiguity in
his command, ‘_Let it be spiked_.’” “Had he referred the case to
the commanding officer of artillery, the order would not have been
executed, means would have been found to remove the first impression
and tranquillize the people, without the sacrifice of the gun which
might have added materially to the offensive powers of the garrison,
particularly if the siege had been prolonged.”
B.
“On the 29th of December, colonel Skerrett with a rare activity,
dismounted a 32-pound carronade, that looked into the enemy’s
batteries at the distance of about four hundred yards, and he
succeeded in spiking and knocking off the trunnion of an 18-pounder,
borrowed from the Stately. This gun was mounted on the tower of the
Gusmans.”
_General Campbell to lord Liverpool._
“_January 3, 1812._
“Annexed is a letter received last night from colonel Skerrett; and,
notwithstanding the despondency therein expressed, which has been
equally so in other letters that I have received from him, my opinion
remains the same as formerly.”
A.
“At the crisis produced by Skerrett’s desire to retire from the town,
and desire to leave the island also, general Campbell sent express
instructions that the town should not be abandoned without the
concurrence of the commanding officers of artillery and engineers;
and accompanied these instructions with a positive command that every
officer and soldier belonging to Gibraltar should, in future, be
stationed in the island, to insure at all events the preservation of
that port.”
SECTION 4.
_Sir C. Smith’s conduct._
“Smith never tolerated the idea of surrender—never admitted the
possibility of defeat.”
“Comprehending from the first the resources and capabilities of
his post, and with a sort of intuition anticipating his assailant,
he covered the weak points while he concealed its strength; and so
conducted the skirmish which preceded the investment, that he, as it
were, dictated the whole plan of attack, and in reality pointed out
with his finger the position of the breaching battery.”
“Had the dictates of his vigorous mind and enterprising spirit been
duly listened to within, the defence would have been more active and
more brilliant.”
SECTION 5.
(Extracts.)
_Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool._
“_January 9, 1812._
“From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it
appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy will be
equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the
island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object colonel Skerrett’s
detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don’t believe that
the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without
which the town will be entirely useless to them, and, indeed, if
they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to
retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them
with which general Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of
Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their
neighbourhood to protect them.”
_Lord Wellington to major-general Cooke._
“_February 1, 1812._
“SIR,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and
of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had,
with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders, which
you had given colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I
conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of
state with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty
to recal colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a
proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient
that you should give colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From
the report of colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby, and other information
which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders
that you gave to colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject
is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right
to expect that his majesty’s officers and troops will perform
their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect
that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town
of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in
every direction, and unprovided with artillery and the walls scarcely
cannon proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace infinitely
to the honour of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is
useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you
should now come to an understanding with general Campbell regarding
the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under
colonel Skerrett.”
_Ditto to Ditto._
“_February 25, 1812._
“I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my
opinion regarding Tarifa, I do not think that captain Smith’s letter
throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be
the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a
small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of
Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island
depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide
only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to
me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring,
and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison
that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon
either by the Spanish government or by the governor of Gibraltar
you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I
made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send
a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for
purposes connected with the operations of general Ballesteros, I
conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such
detachments, if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the
governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government, it is better not
to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not
obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa
permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place
which he conceives to be under his orders; but, according to all the
rules of his majesty’s service, the senior officer should command the
whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the
island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the
governor of Gibraltar.”
_Extract from the notes of an officer engaged in the siege._
“Though the duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes
of general Cooke, colonel Skerrett, and lord Proby, yet his
characteristic and never failing sagacity seems to have suggested
to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed.
A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation
and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island,
but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity in
fact of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts
to conviction now, that the island, particularly during the winter,
half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from
bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against
an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring
heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution,
and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original
and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether
frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz
and the fostering of the patriotic flame. It is demonstrable that,
had the duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the old walls of
Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian
coast, would soon have displayed the banner of king Joseph, and the
struggle in the south of Spain was over.”
_General Campbell to lord Liverpool._
“_Gibraltar, April 2, 1812._
“MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
lordship’s letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to
refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the
report of captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove
that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight
grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of
colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed
the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut
off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the
Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island; the two first
of these points being connected by a field-work, and the whole
mounting twenty-nine pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of
what remained in the town: the enemy’s batteries being completely
kept in check during such an operation by the island and the castle
of the Guzmans. My lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion
respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that
of captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps
as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-general
Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when
he authorised him to abandon his post, for the major-general was
unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to
expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should
not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost, my
lord, by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any
other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon
me, as having taken up the position; I am happy, however, that its
capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and
that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa
has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply
concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military
stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my
authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this
additional force.
“After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded
I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification
for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but
I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the
prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers,
they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty’s arms must
have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on
that occasion, I have only to observe that, considering the post of
Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively
for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were
appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this
with the approbation of both governments, these circumstances, added
to what I have seen on similar occasions, put it past a doubt in
my mind, and colonel Skerrett having applied to me for ‘precise
orders,’ shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord,
I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa
from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter,
unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not,
according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have
heard that the case has been referred to lord Wellington, who was of
the same opinion. This, however, I only take the liberty to advance
in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion
formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I
trust, therefore, I shall be excused in the eyes of government in
declaring, without reserve, that if I had not retained the command
the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our
enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free
communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report
that I have made the necessary communication with major-general
Cooke, in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa
shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me,
in answer thereto, that he has communicated with lord Wellington,
as he has not received orders to that effect, nor has he the means
at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is
aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case
of need.” &c. &c.————P.S. “Should your lordship wish any further
information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring
to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where commodore Penrose
and colonel sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me.”
_Extract from captain C. F. Smith’s report._
“_Tarifa, December 14, 1811._
“I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the
resources of the place, and consider them as such as ought to make a
good and ultimately successful defence.”
_Ditto ditto._
“_December 24, 1811._
“My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable,
and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent
in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an
outwork.”
* * * * *
No. VII.
STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.
[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of
officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The
Roman characters mark different sources of information.]
SECTION 1.—CIUDAD RODRIGO.
A.
“The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the
convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel Colborne and to major
Napier,[2] commanding the storming-party of the light division, the
spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, _‘Now
do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive
at the breach without noise or confusion?_’ He was answered, ‘_Yes,
perfectly_.’ Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, ‘Why
don’t you load?’ He answered, ‘No, if we can’t do the business
without loading we shall not do it at all.’ The duke of Wellington
immediately said, ‘Leave him alone.’
————“The caçadores under colonel Elder were to carry hay-bags to
throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given, and
the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait
for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered,
had not yet arrived; but from no fault of colonel Elder or his
gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to any thing
they were ordered to do.
“The troops jumped into the ditch; the ‘_fausse braye_’ was faced
with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of
the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was attained.
Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn
hope, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with
a wound on the head, but sprang up again, and joined major Napier,
captain Jones 52d regt., Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43d, and some other
officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the
breach together.”
————“Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder,
formed the fifty-second on the top of the rampart, and led them
against the enemy.”
“The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended,
that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely
exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when
colonel M‘Leod of the forty-third poured a heavy flank fire upon the
enemy defending it.”
FOOTNOTE:
[2] Brother to the author of this work.
B.
“The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry
to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the
glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin, under a heavy
fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face
of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer
officer called out, ‘_You are wrong, this is the way to the breach,
or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack_.’”
————“We ascended the breach of the fausse braye, and then the breach
of the body of the place, without the aid of ladders.”
————“We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the
entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede
our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayonetted, amongst the
number some deserters, who were found in arms defending the breach.”
————“Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked
by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about
two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting
they were not loaded, as the major had not permitted them, snapped
all their firelocks.”
————“No individual could claim being the first that entered the
breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The
forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in
fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for
the point of attack.
“Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by
major Napier; that is, the fifty-second to the left, the forty-third
to the right. The forty-third cleared the ramparts to the right, and
drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it
arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy’s defences
were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried,
and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses being on it were
loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly
upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into
the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so
as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force
it without some other aid than a front attack.”
————“The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot
described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the
trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove
the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third
division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired
a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on
the rampart near the great breach. It was in my opinion next to
impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a
front attack as long as the enemy held their defences, but the moment
the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly
carried.”
_Abstract of the journal of general Harvey, Portuguese
service._
“I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The
great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division
opened their fire heavily, and it was returned heavily, but there was
a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there
was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the
ramparts.”
SECTION 2.
BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA.
C.
“An engineer officer, who led the attack, told me, two days after,
‘that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the
intelligence of these men (a detachment from the light division) in
absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which
was literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of
the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the fifty-second was shot through
the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate.’”
D.
ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.
“For the descent of the light and fourth division into the ditch
only _five ladders_ were placed, and those five ladders were close
to each other. The _advance_ (or storming-party) of the eighth
division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no
part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first
great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that
explosion took place; but observe that although the _advance_ of the
light division preceded the _advance_ of the fourth division, I only
mean by that, that the head of the light division entered the ditch
sooner than the _head_ of the fourth division, for the main bodies of
the two divisions joined at the ladders, and were descending into the
ditch at the same time.
“I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously
attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault,
therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there
were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach
in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it,
and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the
approach to it was made extremely difficult by _deep cuts_, and I
think it passed unobserved except by a straggling few.”
————“I consider that ‘_chevaux de frise_’ were placed upon the summit
of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at day-break.
The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty
of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which
to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field,
where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from
the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the
curtain.”
_Extract from a memoir by captain Barney, Chasseurs Britanniques,
acting engineer at the siege._
“The explosion of the ‘_Bariques foudroyantes_’ resembled
‘_fougasses_,’ and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to
pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire,
who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion, he
seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in an offensive
position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On
examining this breach at day-light I found a Portuguese grenadier,
whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this
breach.”
————“Twice the bugles sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire
diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to
the attack of general Picton, and found but _two ladders_, one only
just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several
of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had
the enemy thrown shells among them, I do not think it could have
been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of
the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from
the castle I met general Picton, and told him the castle was full of
men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered
sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be
kept towards Christoval.”————“Passing in front of the battery where
lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till
I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the
prince of Orange, carrying an order for colonel Barnard to occupy the
breach. The enemy’s fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party
knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just
come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached
the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible,
and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such
numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them.”
“Here I also found but _three ladders_, one broken so as to render it
useless. On arriving at the _curtain-breach_, some men of the light
division assisted me in removing from the top _the chevaux de frise
of sword-blades and pikes_.”
_Extract from a memoir on the escalade of St. Vincent, by
captain Edward P. Hopkins, fourth regiment._
“The column halted a few yards from a breast-work surmounted with a
stockade and a ‘_chevaux de frise_’ concealing a guard-house on the
covered way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place,
followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. ‘That is at the
breaches,’ was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety
to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were
equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French
soldiers talking in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting
the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said,
‘_now is the time_;’ the column instantly moved to the face of the
gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us,
and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two
companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down,
and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence
did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who
occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders
moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breast-work was
instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow
of two men entering abreast.”————“The engineer officer was by this
time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss
was most severely felt at this early period of the attack.”
————“The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several
ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment
amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too
short.”————“The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every
way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, &c. together with an
_enfilading_ fire.
“We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place
being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly
placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three
persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in
at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant
death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for
one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure.”
“Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and colonel Piper
was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while general Walker,
at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the
right,” &c. &c.
“The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and colonel
Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the
town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the
town it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing
for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares
were brilliantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with
numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable, not
a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buz and whisper
around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently
open and re-shut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene
of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the
bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and
officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots
came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors.
We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort
of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to
take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made
several prisoners leading some mules laden with loose ball-cartridges
in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying
from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners,
ammunition, &c., we moved from the square with the intention of
forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards
them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss.
We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came
up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter.
He said our troops had attacked the castle, and had failed, but
that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period
rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the
square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was
victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French
officers of rank, their wives, and children, ran into the square in
a state of frenzy, holding little caskets containing their jewels
and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of
these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I
believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now
unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed
all that can be imagined; drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the
loss of many lives, and great destruction of property, was one boon
for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in
the town; those who had got drunk and had satisfied themselves with
plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I
saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with
a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand
from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned
round and said, damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman. An
officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for
the possession of a canary bird, was shot dead by one of these insane
drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we
have forgotten the distressing part of the scene, never was there a
more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some
in court-dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money,
plate from the churches; the military chest was even got at by the
soldiers.”
* * * * *
No. VIII.
SECTION 1.
ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND
MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.
_Colonel Le Mesurier, commandant of Almeida, to brigadier-general
Trant._
“_Almeida, March 28, 1812._
“When I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found
not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want
of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a
single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened
in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in
an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only
one front of my covered way pallisaded, and the face of one of my
ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout
the whole of the nearly repaired fronts not being more than one-third
or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been
remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts,
the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot-piles, and with
a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our
powder and ordnance-cartridge being distributed in bomb proofs; we
have formed a respectable entrenchment on the top of the breach of
the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with pallisades, but
the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to
complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert way with those
essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though
the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being
secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if
the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops.”
_Extract from a memoir of general Trant._
“Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from
Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least five
thousand infantry, some reports made his force seven thousand, and
he had five or six hundred cavalry. My distrust of the militia with
regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted,
had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room-door,
in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case
on the night of the 13th April, 1812, for the very first intimation
I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own
servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak of the 14th. He said
such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were
assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat
to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer
who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry
at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side
more than elsewhere), retired. He had cut off the outposts without
their firing a shot, and, had he only dashed headlong into the town,
must have captured Wilson’s and my militia divisions without losing
probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and
he was not then four hundred yards from it, retiring at a slow pace.
I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few
dragoons in observation. When at a couple of miles distant Marmont
drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he
expected infantry.”
_Lord Wellington to sir N. Trant._
“_Castello Branco, April 17, 1812._
“DEAR SIR,—I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford
received your letter of the 13th upon the road, and I received that
of the 12th from general Bacellar this morning. We shall move on
as soon as the troops come up: it would appear that the French are
collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care
of yourselves on Guarda if they should collect two divisions at or
in the neighbourhood of Sabugal: Guarda is the most treacherous
position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should
prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the
Mondego behind. Have you saved my magazines at Celerico? I enclose
a letter for the commissary there and one for don Carlos d’Espagna.
Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to
Celerico. Shew this letter to general Bacellar: I don’t write to him
as I have no Portuguese with me.” &c. &c.
“WELLINGTON.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Pedrogao, April 1812._
“DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see
by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and
that of general Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened,
and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact, troops
ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned
if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that
principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree
with me that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal. I can
only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you
have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early
decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which
you made for the retreat from it.
“As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt
to put it in execution, and it is useless to say any thing about it.
I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz. that
the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war,
particularly in our situation and with such troops as we, and you in
particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You
could not have succeeded in that attempt, and you would have lost
your division and that of general Wilson. I give you my opinion very
freely upon your plans and operations as you have written me upon
them, begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the
difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that
both you and general Wilson did every thing that officers should do
with such circumstances, and that I attribute to you the safety of
the two divisions. I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day;
and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each
other.” &c. &c.
“WELLINGTON.”
SECTION 2.
FRENCH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND
MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.
_Translated. Extracts from Soult’s intercepted despatches._
“_Seville, April 14, 1812._
“I enclose copies of a letter from the duke of Ragusa, dated 22d
February, and another from general Foy, dated Velvis de Jara, 28th
February, which announced positively that three divisions of infantry
and one division of cavalry of the army of Portugal would join me if
Badajos was attacked; but those divisions, fifteen days afterwards,
marched into Old Castile at the moment when they knew that all the
English army was moving upon Badajos, and at the instant when I,
in virtue of your highness’s (Berthier’s) orders, had sent five
regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, and my skeleton regiments
to Talavera. It is certain that if those three divisions had remained
in the valley of the Tagus the enemy would not have attacked Badajos,
where they could have been fought to advantage.
“The contrary has arrived. I have been left to my own forces, which
have been reduced by fifteen thousand men, as I have stated above,
and not even a military demonstration has been made, much less
succour, because the attack on Beira could not influence the siege,
and did not.”——“Badajos fell by a ‘_coup de fortune_,’ because it
was not in human foresight to think that five thousand men defending
the breach successfully, would suffer a surprise on a point where
no attack was directed, and when I was within a few marches with
twenty-four thousand men strongly organized.
“If I had received your highness’s letter when I was before the
English, I might, although unaided by M. Marmont and numerically
inferior, have given battle to save Badajos; but I should probably
have been wrong, and I should have lost the force I left in
Andalusia, where not only Seville was invested and my communications
cut, but a general insurrection was commencing. Happily I heard
in time of the fall of Badajos; but I have not even yet opened
my communications with New Castile, Grenada, or Malaga. I have,
however, prepared in time to deliver a great battle on my own
ground—Andalusia.
“The emperor, of course, cannot foresee all things, and in his orders
naturally meant that his generals should act with discretion on such
occasions; hence if Marmont had only made demonstrations on Beira
with a part of his army, and had crossed the Tagus to unite with
my troops, the siege would have been raised before the breach was
practicable. Marmont had nothing before him, and he knew Wellington
had passed the Guadiana and commenced the siege: I say that all the
English army had passed the Guadiana, and this was its disposition.
“General Graham commanding the first corps of observation had the
sixth and seventh divisions of infantry and Cotton’s cavalry two
thousand five hundred strong, with thirty guns. This corps pushed
my right wing to Granja and Azagua at the ‘_debouche_’ of Fuente
Ovejuna, while Hill, with the second and third divisions, twelve
hundred cavalry under Erskine, and twelve guns, moved on my extreme
right in the direction of La Lerena from Belendenzer.
“Wellington carried on the siege in person, having the fourth
division, part of the third division, a Portuguese corps; and I am
assured he has also two or three thousand Spaniards, which made round
the place eighteen thousand men.
“The fifth division remained at first on the right bank of the Tagus
with a brigade of cavalry; but they were also called up and came to
Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best accounts gave Wellington
thirty thousand men, and some make him as high as forty thousand,
at the moment when I was before him at Villalba; and if the army of
Portugal had joined me with twenty-five thousand men, Badajos would
have been saved or retaken: and a great victory would throw the
English back into their lines. I was not strong enough alone; and
besides the loss I should have suffered, I could not have got back in
time to save my troops in Andalusia.
“The English did not hide their knowledge that Marmont was gathering
in Leon; but they knew he had no battering-train, and that the wasted
state of the country would not permit him to penetrate far into
Portugal. So measured, indeed, were their operations, that it is to
be supposed they had intercepted some despatch which explained the
system of operation and the irresolution of Marmont.
“Your highness tells me I ‘should not have left Hill after his last
movement in December on Estremadura, nor have permitted him to take
my magazines:’ I say he has taken nothing from me. The advanced guard
at Merida lived from day to day on what was sent to them from La
Lerena. I know not if some of this has fallen into his hands; but it
can be but little. But at this period Wellington wished to besiege
Badajos, and only suspended it because of the rain, which would not
let him move his artillery, and because three divisions of the army
of Portugal were in the valley of the Tagus. If they had remained
the siege would not have been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for
on the 22d February he wrote to me to say that, independent of those
three divisions under Foy, which he destined to send to the aid of
Badajos, he himself would act so as to surmount the difficulties
which the state of his munitions opposed to his resolution to defeat
the enemy’s projects.
“If your highness looks at the states of the 14th April, you will
see that I had not, as you suppose by your letter of 19th February,
forty thousand men; I had only thirty-five thousand, including the
garrison of Badajos, out of which I had brought with me twenty-four
thousand, the rest being employed before Cadiz at Seville, in Grenada
and Murcia, and against Ballesteros. You must consider that fifteen
days before the English passed the Guadiana I had sent five regiments
of infantry, two of cavalry, and many skeletons upon Talavera, in
all fifteen thousand men; and since two years I have sent many other
skeleton regiments to France, being more than fifteen thousand men
changing their destination or worn out, without having yet received
the troops from the interior destined for my army, although these are
borne on the states: besides which, I have four thousand men unfit
for the field, who ought to go to France, but I am forced to employ
them in the posts. Ballesteros has, besides the army of Murcia, ten
thousand men; and in Murcia the Spaniards are strong, because the
fugitives from Valencia had joined two divisions which had not been
engaged there, and thus, including the garrisons of Alicant and
Carthagena, they had fifteen thousand men. Suchet’s operations have
certainly produced great results, but for _the moment_ have hurt
me, because all who fly from him come back upon my left flank at a
moment when I have only three battalions and four hundred cavalry to
oppose them at Grenada only. I have sent my brother there in haste
to support them. The English, Portuguese, and Spanish at Cadiz,
Gibraltar, and on the ocean could also at any time descend with ten
or twelve thousand men on any part of my line, and I want at least as
many to oppose them and guard my posts. I may therefore be accused of
having carried too many men to the relief of Badajos; and that army
was not strong enough, though excellent in quality.
“I cannot hold twenty thousand men, as your highness desires, on
the Guadiana, unless I am reinforced, especially since the fall of
Badajos; but as soon as I know the English have repassed that river,
all my right under d’Erlon, _i.e._ nine regiments of infantry and
four of cavalry, and twelve guns, shall march into the interior of
Estremadura, and occupy Medellin, Villafranca, and even Merida, and,
if possible, hold in check the garrison of Badajos and the English
corps left in Alemtejo, and so prevent any grand movement up the
valley of the Tagus against Madrid.
“Since my return here the demonstrations of the English appear
directed to invade Andalusia so far as to have obliged me to
unfurnish many points, and even in a manner raise the siege of Cadiz,
Graham has come to Llerena, and Cotton to Berlanga, where we had an
affair and lost sixty men.” “I have ordered d’Erlon to repass the
Guadalquivir and come to me to fight the English if they advance; if
not, he shall go on again, and I think the English general will not
commit the fault of entering the mountains, though he says he will!”
* * * * *
No. IX.
SECTION 1.
SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT DIFFERENT
PERIODS, EXCLUSIVE OF DRUMMERS AND ARTILLERY-MEN.
October 1, 1811.—Cavalry.
Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total.
British 3571 1114 947 298 5930
Portuguese 1373 256 1140 — 2769
------------------------------------------
Total Cavalry 4944 1370 2087 298 8699
------------------------------------------
Infantry.
British 29530 17974 2663 1684 51851
Portuguese 23689 6009 1707 75 31480
-------------------------------------------
Total
Infantry 53219 23983 4370 1759 83331
-------------------------------------------
General Total, including serjeants, 58263 sabres and bayonets in the
field.
January 8, 1812.—Cavalry.
British 4949 841 741 — 6531
Portuguese 613 43 275 — 391
------------------------------------------
Total Cavalry 5562 884 1016 — 7462
------------------------------------------
Infantry.
British 30222 11414 2827 — 14463
Portuguese 20455 4849 2360 51 27715
-------------------------------------------
Total
Infantry 50677 16263 5187 51 72178
-------------------------------------------
General Total, including sergeants, 56239 sabres and bayonets in the
field.
Note. The abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry had been so
great that one division was suppressed.
April 5, 1812.—Cavalry.
Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total.
British 4299 564 755 3 6048
Portuguese 347 9 492 — 808
------------------------------------------
Total Cavalry 4646 573 1247 3 6896
------------------------------------------
Infantry.
British 26897 11452 2779 2 40703
Portuguese 20224 5532 1507 18 27281
-------------------------------------------
Total
Infantry 47121 16984 4286 20 67984
-------------------------------------------
Sabres and bayonets 51767
Field artillery-men 1980
Gunners in the batteries 900
-----
General Total 54647
-----
Note. The heavy German cavalry were in the rear at Estremos, and two
Portuguese regiments were in Abrantes.
TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS, APRIL, 1812.
British.
Light division 2679
Third division 2882
Fourth division 2579
Fifth division 2896
---- 11036
Portuguese.
Hamilton’s division 4685
Light division 858
Third division 976
Fourth division 2384
Fifth division 1845
---- 10748
-----
Total 21,784
------
ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812.
Cavalry under general Hill.—Left Wing.
British 783
Portuguese 347
---- 1130
Infantry ditto.
British 6156
Portuguese 2385
---- 8541
-----
Total under general Hill 9671
-----
Cavalry under general Graham.—Right Wing.
British 3517
Portuguese —
---- 3517
Infantry ditto.
British 10154
Portuguese 5896
----- 16050
-----
Total under general Graham 19567
-----
General Total of the covering army, exclusive of the artillery-men
and the heavy German cavalry, who remained in the rear at Estremos,
29238 sabres and bayonets.
SECTION 2.
SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT
BADAJOS, 1812.
ASSAULT.
_British Loss._
Killed. Wounded.
Generals — 5
Staff 1 11
Officers. Soldiers.
Artillery 2 20
Engineers 5 5
-- --
Total 7 25
-- --
Light division.--_Line._
Officers. Soldiers. Total.
43d 18 329 347 } 670
52d 18 305 323 }
95th, 1st bat. 14 179 193
95th, 3d bat. 8 56 64
-- --- ---
Total 58 849 927
-- --- ---
Third division.
5th 4 41 45 }
45th 14 83 97 }
74th 7 47 54 }
77th 3 10 13 } 490
83d 8 62 70 }
88th 10 135 145 }
94th 2 154 173 }
-- --- ---
48 442 490
-- --- ---
Fourth division.
Officers. Soldiers. Total.
7th 17 163 180
23rd 17 134 151
27th 15 170 185
40th 16 124 140
48th 19 154 173
-- --- ---
84 745 829
-- --- ---
Fifth division.
1st 2 — 2
4th 17 213 230
9th — — —
30th 6 126 132
38th 5 37 42
44th 9 95 104
-- --- ---
39 471 510
-- --- ---
60th[3] 4 30 34
Brunswick Oels[3] 2 33 35
FOOTNOTE:
[3] These regiments were attached by companies to the third,
fourth, and fifth divisions.
Total British loss at the assault.
Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total.
51 40 560 killed }
213 153 1983 wounded } 3022
— 1 21 missing }
Total Portuguese loss at the assault.
8 6 141 killed }
45 32 468 wounded } 730
— — 30 missing }
--- --- ---- ----
Grand Total 317 232 3203 3752
--- --- ---- ----
British loss during the whole siege.
Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total.
60 45 715 killed }
251 178 2578 wounded } 3860
— 1 32 missing }
Portuguese loss during the whole siege.
12 6 137 killed }
55 38 687 wounded } 965
— — 30 missing }
--- --- ---- ----
General Total 378 268 4179 4825
--- --- ---- ----
SECTION 3.--SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT
PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS
Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Pris. Men. Horses.
August 1811 262,276 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 00 354,418 35,348
Reinforcements train 13,190
in March 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 00 18,423 3,929
------------------------------------------------------
Total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 00 372,841 52,467
------------------------------------------------------
January 1812 258,156 41,049 22,805 5,434 42,056 00 324,933 42,348
------------------------------------------------------
April 1812 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,314 33,504 ” 286,440 40,161
Reserve 4,038 157 36 35 865 ” 4,939 192
at Bayonne
------------------------------------------------------
Total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 ” 291,379 40,653
------------------------------------------------------
_Observation._--In September 1811 an army of reserve, consisting of
two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, in all
20,287 under arms, was formed for the armée du midi.
1st August, 1811.
Under arms. Detached. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.
1,195 }
Armée du Midi 50,597 10,008 32,043 5,359 11,836 94,508 ----- } 4,608
3,413 }
3,236 }
du centre 16,540 3,729 391 64 1,781 18,712 ----- } 3,793
557 }
6,692 }
de Portugal 38,392 5,826 7,901 3,100 10,424 56,733 ----- } 8,926
2,334 }
3,667 }
d’Aragon 45,102 5,718 1,397 388 5,458 51,957 ----- } 6,106
2,439 }
3,531 }
du Nord 88,092 11,020 7,617 1,805 6,654 102,413 ----- } 12,825
4,294 }
1,268 }
de Catalogne 23,553 1,368 1,153 153 5,305 30,095 ----- } 1,521
253 }
-----------------------------------------------------------
35,348 }
Total 262,270 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 354,418 ----- } 48,538
13,190 }
Reinforcements 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 18,423 3,929
-----------------------------------------------------------
39,277 }
General total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 372,841 ----- } 52,467
13,190 }
-----------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARDS.
15th August, 1811.
Under arms. Detached. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.
12,797 3,193 3,944 14 1,189 17,613 3,179
-------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE GARRISON OF BADAJOS.
16th May, 1811.--Fifth battalion.
2,887 239 361 ” 380 3,725 239
1st March, 1812.
4,893 44 ” ” 478 5,034 44
-------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
15th December, 1811.
1,764 19 ” ” 130 1,956 19
-------------------------------------------------------
Return of numbers, by armies, 1st October, 1811.
Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp.Pris. Men. Horses.
9,251 }
Armée du Midi 66,912 11,757 7,539 2,232 13,398 ” 88,033 ---- } 12,644
train 3,393 }
5,196 }
du centre 19,125 6,262 511 84 1,685 ” 21,321 ---- } 5,749
553 }
6,909 }
de Portugal 50,167 11,662 1,283 858 10,012 ” 61,462 ---- } 11,615
4,706 }
3,322 }
d’Aragon 28,966 5,303 6,583 308 4,424 ” 39,953 ---- } 5,282
1,960 }
6,769 }
du Nord 87,913 10,821 6,201 1,069 9,414 ” 10,528 ---- } 10,955
4,186 }
1,150 }
de Catalogne 26,954 1,365 993 168 11,186 ” 39,241 ----- } 1,439
289 }
Total 280,017 47,270 23,110 4,717 50,119 ” 353,538 37,684
-----------------------------------------------------------
Reinforcements 9,232 689 1,226 10,458 516
-----------------------------------------------------------
General Total 289,249 47,959 23,110 4,717 51,345 ” 363,996 38,200
-----------------------------------------------------------
15th April, 1812.
Under arms. Detached. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.
Armée du Midi 55,797 11,014 2,498 70 6,065 64,360 11,714
du centre 19,148 3,293 144 51 624 19,916 4,044
de Portugal 56,937 8,108 4,394 2,278 7,706 69,037 10,386
d’Aragon 14,786 3,269 2,695 658 1,467 18,948 8,927
de l’Ebre 16,830 1,873 21 6 3,425 20,276 1,879
de Catalogne 28,924 1,259 1,163 49 5,540 35,627 1,308
du Nord 48,232 7,074 1,309 72 8,677 58,276 7,213
--------------------------------------------------------
Total 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,814 33,534 286,440 40,461
Reserve a
Bayonne 4,038 157 36 35 865 4,939 192
-------------------------------------------------------
Grand total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 291,379 40,653
-------------------------------------------------------
END OF VOL. IV.
MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.
* * * * *
PUBLISHED BY
T. AND W. BOONE,
29, NEW BOND STREET.
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* * * * *
COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS
THIRD VOLUME,
FORMING A
SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,
AND CONTAINING SOME
_NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO_
THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.
“There was a man in Islington,
And he was wondrous wise,
He jumped into a quickset hedge
And scratched out both his eyes.”
8vo. price 1_s._ 6_d._
_The above are printed uniformly with the History._
“In comprehensiveness, breadth, vigour, originality, and
penetration, the first place among military historians must be
conceded to Napier; and it is now established beyond all dispute,
that his historical honesty is equal to his intellectual power
and professional erudition. Indeed, the marvel is, that in a work
treating of a subject so eminently disputable, and in a manner,
too, which could not fail to provoke the bitterest hostility, _so
little_ has been challenged; and it is still more wonderful, that
of that _little_, nothing of any importance has been proved to be
substantially erroneous.”——_Caledonian Mercury._
* * * * *
HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA,
AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE;
From the Year 1807 to the Year 1814.
BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.
Colonel Forty-Third Regiment; Member of the Royal Swedish Academy
of Military Sciences.
_New Editions_, with plans, of Volumes I. II. and III. price 20_s._
each.
* * * * *
SKETCHES IN SPAIN,
During the Years 1829-30-31 and 32;
Containing Notices of some Districts very little known; of the Manners
of the People, Government, Recent Changes, Commerce, Fine Arts,
and Natural History.
BY CAPTAIN COOK, R.N. K.T.S. F.G.S.
Two vol. 8vo. price 21_s._
“Volumes of great value and attraction; we would say, in a word,
they afford us the most complete account of Spain in every respect
which has issued from the press.”——_Literary Gazette._
“The value of the book is in its matter and its facts. If written
upon any country it would have been useful, but treating of one
like Spain, about which we know almost nothing, but of which it
is desirable to know so much, Captain Cook’s Sketches must be
considered an acquisition to the library.”——_Spectator._
* * * * *
MEMOIR
BY GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART.
OF HIS PROCEEDINGS
AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN,
AND THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.
In one vol. 8vo. price 9_s._ boards.
“The care bestowed upon this subject by Sir Hew Dalrymple is
evident in the publication before us, which is unquestionably
a most dignified, clear, and satisfactory vindication of Sir
Hew’s motives and conduct, and forms, with the documents in the
Appendix, a very valuable and authentic addition to the materials
for the history of the period in question. Without a participation
in the facts it discloses, the records of the war, as far as
regards this particular subject, are, in fact, incomplete or
distorted.”——_United Service Journal._
“These volumes, the work of a gentleman of high and varied
accomplishments, whose opportunities of observation have been
unusually extensive and well-improved, will command and repay
attention. They contain by far the best account of Spain which has
yet issued from the press.”——_United Service Gazette._
* * * * *
ADVENTURES IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE
IN THE
PENINSULA, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS,
From the Year 1809 to 1815;
BY CAPTAIN JOHN KINCAID, FIRST BATTALION.
One vol. post 8vo. price 10_s._ 6_d._ boards.
“We do not recollect one, among the scores of personal narratives,
where the reader will find more of the realities of a Soldier’s
Life, or of the horrors that mark it; all is told gaily, but not
unfeelingly.”——_New Monthly Magazine, July._
“His book has one fault, the rarest fault in books, it is too
short.”——_Monthly Magazine, April._
“His book is one of the most lively histories of Soldiers’
Adventures which have yet appeared; their entire freedom from
affectation will sufficiently recommend them to a numerous class of
readers.”——_Athenæum._
“_Kincaid’s Adventures in the Rifle Brigade_ is written with all
the frankness and freedom from study which bespeaks the gallant
soldier, one to whom the sword is more adapted than the pen, but
who, as now _cedunt arma togæ_, has, in these ‘piping times’ of
peace determined ‘to fight all his battles over again,’ and he
fights them in a style interesting and graphic. The remarks on the
decisive termination of the Battle of Waterloo are striking and
convincing; and to them and the whole book we refer our readers for
much amusement and information.”——_The Age._
* * * * *
THE HISTORY
OF THE
KING’S GERMAN LEGION,
FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS
DISSOLUTION IN 1816.
_Compiled from Manuscript Documents._
BY N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, Esq. F.R.S.late Major unattached.
Vol. I. 8vo. with coloured plates; price 20_s._ boards; to be
completed in two volumes.
“Of the late war we have had histories, partial or complete, in
countless abundance; but we have not seen one, displaying more
moderation, more diligence in investigating the truth, or more
shrewdness in deciding between conflicting statements. Though
professedly merely a history of the services of the German Legion,
it is, in fact, a history of the entire war; for, from ‘what
glorious and well-foughten field,’ can we record the absence of
German Chivalry? The work is not like others we could name—a mere
compilation from newspapers and magazines. Major Beamish has left
no source of information unexplored; and the access he obtained
to manuscript journals has enabled him to intersperse his general
narrative with interesting personal anecdotes, that render this
volume as delightful for those who read for amusement, as those who
read for profit.”——_Athenæum._
“We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily
recommend it to the British public.”——_Literary Gazette._
* * * * *
AN ESSAY
ON THE
PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION
OF
MILITARY BRIDGES,
_AND THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS_.
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.
K.S.C., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. &c.
The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates,
8vo. price 20_s._ boards.
* * * * *
NAVAL EVOLUTIONS;
A MEMOIR,
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.
K.S.C. &c. &c.
Refuting Mr. CLERK’S claims to the manœuvre of breaking the Line
during Lord Rodney’s Engagement on the 12th of April, 1782.
Also,
REMARKS ON MR. CLERK’S WORK ON NAVAL TACTICS,
AND ON
NAVAL EVOLUTIONS IN GENERAL.
In 8vo. with plates, price 10_s._
* * * * *
TRACTS ON VAULTS AND BRIDGES;
CONTAINING
OBSERVATIONS ON THE VARIOUS FORMS OF VAULTS,
ON THE TAKING DOWN AND REBUILDING
LONDON BRIDGE;
And
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ARCHES:
Illustrated by extensive Tables of Bridges. Also, containing the
PRINCIPLES OF PENDANT BRIDGES,
With reference to the Properties of the Catenary, applied to the
Menai Bridge, and a Theoretical Investigation of the Catenary.
BY SAMUAL WARE.
With 20 copper-plates and 10 wood-cuts, royal 8vo. price 20_s._ boards.
_This book will be found of the highest importance to Military as well
as Civil Engineers, being the only practical work on the subject of
Suspension Bridges._
BY THE SAME AUTHOR,
A DESIGN FOR A TUNNEL UNDER THE THAMES, from Horslydown to St.
Katharine’s, with Letter-press Description. Price 3s.
ALSO, BY THE SAME AUTHOR,
REMARKS ON THEATRES; and on the Propriety of _Vaulting them
with Brick and Stone_: with Observations on the CONSTRUCTION OF
DOMES; and the Vaults of the Free and Accepted Masons. With 3
copper-plates, royal 8vo. sewed, price 6_s._
* * * * *
HAVERHILL;
OR,
MEMOIRS OF AN OFFICER IN THE ARMY OF WOLFE.
BY JAMES ATHEARN JONES.
Three vol. post 8vo. price £1: 11: 6 boards.
“The author of Haverhill is evidently an informed man, an original
thinker, an acute observer, and a vigorous writer. He is no
imitator; he thinks for himself; he puts his trust in his own
feelings, and writes as he thinks and feels; he is no mere literary
echo. The fruit with which he presents us is indigenous, and bears
the aroma, fresh and fragrant, of its own native soil. Those
portions of the book which are really matters of history cannot
well be surpassed. They teem with ‘thoughts that breathe and words
that burn.’ We recommend it to all that desire to admire, and be
instructed as well as amused.”——_Athenæum._
“It is to the full as earnest and impressive, and conceived in
nearly as philosophical a spirit as _Lawrie Todd_, while it is more
full of adventure, character, and historical details.”——_Atlas._
* * * * *
ATTILA,
A Tragedy;
AND OTHER POEMS,
Post 8vo. price 10_s._ 6_d._ boards.
“This is a volume of very sweet poetry.”——_Metropolitan._
“The eminent qualities which it exhibits of dramatic poetry, and
the probability which it affords that the same talents stimulated
by the prospect of a fair estimate on the stage, might add to the
rich store of our permanent acting drama.”——_Old England._
“The Author of Attila is a man who has seen much, and has brought
to aid him, in writing the above, talents of a high character,
much observation, and keen insight into the characters of men, and
vigorous powers of imagination.”——_Weekly Visitor._
* * * * *
LA COQUETTERIE;
OR,
SKETCHES OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM.
“_La Coquetterie? c’est ce que les hommes méprisent et ce qui les
attire._”——DE GENLIS.
Three vol. post 8vo. price £1: 7: 0 boards.
“To delineate continental character and domestic manners has
been the chief aim of the Author of La Coquetterie; and a long
residence abroad, and intimacy with his subject, have enabled him
to complete the picture which he sketched in imagination. We have
seldom met with a work in which the characters converse, and act,
and live with more elegance and genteel ease. The work is certainly
clever.”——_Athenæum._
“It is decidedly original, and not in style only, but in plot,
character, and incidents. There is a lively and earnest tone
pervading the book, and an interest thrown into the persons and
actions of nearly all the dramatis personæ, that pleases us far
more than most novels of this class. We like and recommend the
work, both for its purpose, its moral, and its characters, with
some of whom we had well nigh fallen in love.”——_National Omnibus._
* * * * *
LENT LECTURES.
I. On the Life of Christ. II. On the Life of St. Paul. III. On the
Lord’s Prayer. IV. On the Liturgy of the Church of England.
V. On the Creeds and Sacraments of the Church of
England.
Preached in the Church of St. Mary, Bryanston Square,
BY THE REVEREND T. F. DIBDIN, D.D. RECTOR.
Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty, and Editor of the Sunday Library.
Two vols, post 8vo. price 1_l._ 1_s._ bound in cloth.
“These lectures, some of them the earliest pulpit productions of
the Author, display much ability and often eloquence. In principle
Dr. Dibdin shews himself to be a true and loyal son of the church,
whose excellencies he warmly defends, while he allows that, as in
every earthly thing, evils may have crept in which it would be wise
to reform, especially at this crisis now threatened by clamour,
misrepresentation, and violence.”——_Literary Gazette._
* * * * *
NEW VOLUME OF
BAMPTON LECTURES.
The Analogy of Revelation and Science established in a Series of
Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in the
Year 1833.
BY FREDERICK NOLAN, LL.D., F.R.S.
Vicar of Prittlewell, Essex, and formerly Student of Exeter College,
Oxford.
One thick volume 8vo. price 15_s._
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
THE TIME OF THE
MILLENIUM INVESTIGATED;
AND
ITS NATURE DETERMINED ON SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS.
One vol. 8vo. price 8_s._ boards.
SUPPLEMENT TO AN INQUIRY INTO THE
INTEGRITY OF THE GREEK VULGATE;
OR,
RECEIVED TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT;
Containing the Vindication of the Principles employed in its Defence.
A
HARMONICAL GRAMMAR
OF THE
GREEK LANGUAGE.
8vo. sewed, price 4s.
Ditto of the Latin. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the French. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the Italian. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the Spanish. 8vo. price 4_s._
Printed verbatim from a Harmonical Grammar of the principal ancient
and modern languages. Each language is treated upon a _uniform
plan_, and analyzed on new and simple principles; short and
comprehensive rules are given, for attaining a just pronunciation,
for determining the gender, and inflecting the noun and verb;
together with a Syntax and Prosody, fully exemplified, and a
classed vocabulary of the most useful and necessary words.
THE EXPECTATIONS FORMED BY THE ASSYRIANS, THAT A GREAT DELIVERER
WOULD APPEAR, ABOUT THE TIME OF OUR LORD’S ADVENT, DEMONSTRATED.
8vo. price 10_s._ boards.
_And all the other Works of the same Author._
* * * * *
MOMENTS OF IDLENESS;
OR,
A PEEP INTO THE WORLD WE CALL “_OURS_.”
“Il y en a qui ne font rien,—il y en a d’autres qui font des riens.”
In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7_s._
“Will prove a pleasant source of mental employment at a leisure
hour.”——_Monthly Review._
“The author is clever and thinks, which is what very few people
actually achieve.”——_New Monthly Magazine._
“He is worth any man’s perusal (we have read him every bit); and,
besides many striking reflections, gives numerous evidences of a
benevolent and social disposition.”——_True Sun._
“This is a very remarkable volume, and it is one of great merit;
and he who devotes to it his ‘Moments of Idleness’ will be idle
no longer, or then it will be his own fault. We have seldom met,
indeed, with a volume containing so many and such substantial
materials for thinking, in so small a compass, and combining at the
same time so much intellectual employment with so much literary
amusement.”——_Liverpool Chronicle._
* * * * *
WALTER;
OR,
A WORD MORE TO THE WISE.
“Still he comes,
Summer or winter, frost or rain. I’ve seen
The snow upon a level with the hedge,
Yet there was Master Walter.”
_Hunchback, Act_ 1. _Scene_ 2.
BY THE AUTHOR OF “MOMENTS OF IDLENESS.”
In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7_s._
* * * * *
A TREATISE
ON THE
GAME OF WHIST,
BY THE LATE
ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY,
Author of Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific, &c.
_Second Edition._ 18mo. boards, price 2_s._
“The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most
plain, and what the Author considers the most safe principles. I
have limited my endeavours to the most necessary instructions,
classing them as much as the subject enabled me, under separate
heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended and easily
remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I
have studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my
endeavouring more to make the principles of the game, and the
rationality of them intelligible, than to furnish a young player
with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might go blindly right.”
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Footnote [3] has two anchors on page 587.
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
To save space in the wide tables in Note IX of the Appendix, the
heading ‘Hospital.’ has been abbreviated to ‘Hosp.’.
In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some
corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e,
and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling have been left unchanged.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Table of Contents:
Pg iii: ‘on the Orbigo’ replaced by ‘on the Orvigo’.
Pg iii: ‘General Leval’ replaced by ‘General Laval’.
Pg v: ‘the mili ary force’ replaced by ‘the military force’.
Main text:
Pg 5: ‘by sea to St. Ander’ replaced by ‘by sea to Santander’.
Pg 13: ‘he surprized some’ replaced by ‘he surprised some’.
Pg 33: ‘embarrasments thus’ replaced by ‘embarrassments thus’.
Pg 48: ‘and Legre rivers’ replaced by ‘and Segre rivers’.
Pg 51: ‘to war down’ replaced by ‘to wear down’.
Pg 61: ‘Promothean touch’ replaced by ‘Promethean touch’.
Pg 135: ‘commucating with the alledged’ replaced by
‘communicating with the alleged’.
Pg 141: ‘were they all’ replaced by ‘where they all’.
Pg 162: ‘the admistration’ replaced by ‘the administration’.
Pg 164: ‘Mr. Suart and’ replaced by ‘Mr. Stuart and’.
Pg 169: ‘acknowleged that’ replaced by ‘acknowledged that’.
Pg 169: ‘a proponderance to’ replaced by ‘a preponderance to’.
Pg 170: ‘Rio Janeiro’ replaced by ‘Rio de Janeiro’.
Pg 196: ‘aid-du-camp’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp’.
Pg 231: ‘Miunte reports of’ replaced by ‘Minute reports of’.
Pg 243: ‘Aldea Ponte’ replaced by ‘Aldea de Ponte’.
Pg 245: ‘behind the Soita’ replaced by ‘behind Soita’.
Pg 268: ‘which caanot now’ replaced by ‘which cannot now’.
Pg 296, image caption: ‘The Seige’ replaced by ‘The Siege’.
Pg 309: ‘also an artifical’ replaced by ‘also an artificial’.
Pg 310: ‘and Catalayud to’ replaced by ‘and Calatayud to’.
Pg 314: ‘were straightened’ replaced by ‘were straitened’.
Pg 319: ‘a confidental’ replaced by ‘a confidential’.
Pg 319: ‘the Guadalquiver’ replaced by ‘the Guadalquivir’.
Pg 330, image caption: ‘SEIGE of’ replaced by ‘SIEGE of’.
Pg 342: ‘at Bergem-op-Zoon’ replaced by ‘at Bergen-op-Zoom’.
Pg 345: ‘from the Pyrennees’ replaced by ‘from the Pyrenees’.
Pg 373: ‘round St. Ander’ replaced by ‘round Santander’.
Pg 373: ‘de St. Ander’ replaced by ‘de Santander’.
Pg 383: missing ‘3º.’ inserted before ‘Left attack’.
Pg 388: ‘all loop-hooled’ replaced by ‘all loop-holed’.
Pg 403: ‘third divison’ replaced by ‘third division’.
Pg 419: ‘unususally still’ replaced by ‘unusually still’.
Pg 425: ‘semed like the’ replaced by ‘seemed like the’.
Pg 438: ‘Fuentes Overjuña’ replaced by ‘Fuente Obejuna’.
Pg 472: ‘not be irrelevent’ replaced by ‘not be irrelevant’.
Pg 502: ‘circnmstances, and’ replaced by ‘circumstances, and’.
Pg 549: ‘September 1’ replaced by ‘Septembre 1’.
Pg 572: ‘were loop-holded’ replaced by ‘were loop-holed’.
Pg 588: ‘13,190 train’ replaced by ‘train 13,190’.