The North Sea Outrage--Seizures of Neutrals--The Case of the
"Malacca"--The Baltic Fleet--Departure at Last--Russian
Alarms--In the North Sea--Bringing Home the News--Russian
Allegations--Naval Preparations--Supplementary Information--The
Baltic Fleet Proceeds to Madagascar.
[Sidenote: The North Sea Outrage]
No sooner had the echoes of the terrific battle of the Sha-ho begun to
subside than the attention of the civilized world, which had so long
been concentrated on the vicissitudes of the Titanic struggle in the
Far East, was suddenly focussed on a spot separated from the theatre of
war by more than half the circumference of the globe, and on an
incident fraught, as it seemed, with more direful and tremendous
consequences even than the momentous rupture between Russia and Japan.
On the 15th of October, Russia's Baltic Fleet--which for many months
had been preparing as a reinforcement to the Pacific Squadron--at last
left port on its voyage to the Far East; and within six days of its
departure it had so effectually asserted itself as a factor in the
naval situation that Europe, shocked and startled, woke up one morning
to find itself hanging on the perilous brink of that Armageddon which
has been the nightmare of statesmen for the last twenty years. In
passing through the North Sea, the Russian fleet--for causes which have
yet to be fully elicited--fired on a flotilla of British fishing-boats
engaged in trawling on the Dogger Bank; killed and wounded several of
the fishermen; sunk one of the trawlers, and more or less grievously
injured others. When the news of this amazing outrage was published a
storm of indignation and resentment swept over England such as has not
been known for more than a generation; and feeling was embittered and
intensified to a truly dangerous pitch, first by the callous
indifference displayed by the perpetrators of the outrage, and next by
the indisposition of the Russian Government to offer those immediate
apologies and amends which alone could palliate so wanton a breach of
the comity of nations. It seemed for the moment that Russia had
deliberately designed to provoke England to hostilities, in the hope of
redeeming her own desperate position by extending the area of the
conflict and by dragging into it first the ally of Japan, and by
consequence her own ally, France. The prospect, though almost too
terrible to contemplate, did not for a moment quench the resolution of
the people of England, where men of all parties were found standing
shoulder to shoulder in the demand for ample reparation. What made the
situation especially dangerous was that public patience had at last
been well-nigh exhausted by the repeated provocations of
Russia--provocations which the North Sea outrage was only the crown and
culmination. To understand this fact, it is necessary to go back a
little.
[Sidenote: Seizures of Neutrals]
When Russia found that she could not hope successfully to contest the
supremacy of the sea with Japan, she turned her attention to the
subsidiary enterprise of commerce-raiding. In this task the
Vladivostock Squadron were particularly active, and, unsated by the
destruction of such Japanese transports and trading vessels as they
encountered, seized or sunk many vessels flying neutral flags. On the
16th of June the Vladivostock cruisers seized the _Allanton_, a British
steamer, carrying coal from Hokkaido Island to Singapore. There was
nothing contraband in the cargo or destination of this vessel, as the
subsequent decision of the St. Petersburg Prize Court proved, yet the
_Allanton_ was confiscated, and her crew held prisoners at Vladivostock
for months. The real reason for this high-handed conduct was that the
_Allanton_ had previously carried a cargo of coal from Cardiff to
Japan--but she had been chartered for that voyage before the outbreak
of war. On the 16th of July the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company's
steamer, the _Hispang_, was wantonly sunk in Pigeon Bay by a Russian
torpedo-boat. The _Hispang_ was engaged in a lawful trade; there was no
suggestion that she carried contraband; and indeed no examination of
her cargo was even attempted. She was flying the British flag, and she
stopped directly she was ordered to do so. But in spite of these facts,
a Russian torpedo-boat came straight out to her and sunk her--the
captain, officers, and passengers being rescued with difficulty. It was
afterwards confessed by the Russian officer that did this deed that his
orders were given under the impression that the _Hispang_ was the
steamer _Haimum_, which was being employed by the London _Times_'
correspondent. On the 26th of July an equally gross outrage was
perpetrated by the Vladivostock Squadron, who, besides unjustifiably
seizing the _Chalcas_, deliberately sunk on the 23rd of July the
British steamer _Knight Commander_. This vessel was carrying rails for
Japan; and even if such a cargo could be regarded as contraband, there
was no excuse for sinking the vessel. Such an act, in the words of Mr.
Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, constituted "a grave breach of
international law"; and it was aggravated by the circumstances in which
it was committed. The captain and crew were ordered to get clear of the
vessel in ten minutes, and such was the haste with which they were
compelled to leave the boats in order to save their lives, that nearly
all the personal effects had to be sacrificed. The growing irritation
with these acts was brought to a head in England by the famous case of
the _Malacca_--a P. and O. mail steamship which was seized by Russian
cruisers in the Red Sea on the 19th July. At the beginning of June two
vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet in the Black Sea--the
_Petersburg_ and the _Smolensk_--were "designated for Government
service outside the Black Sea." Even their commanders were kept in the
dark as to their destination and the nature of the service that they
were to perform. The two vessels, which, as warships, would not by
international treaty have been able to leave the Black Sea, passed
through the Dardanelles under the commercial flag, and then steered
straight to the Suez Canal, where the non-belligerent character was
still maintained. But it seems that on reaching Constantinople the
commanders had been informed that their ships had been raised to the
rank of second-class cruisers in the Russian fleet; and no sooner had
the Red Sea been reached than the _Petersburg_ and the _Smolensk_ put
off their commercial disguise and put on the character of ships of war.
They flew the naval flag, and mounted the armament of 5in.
quick-firers, which had been up to that moment securely stowed away.
The Government service for which they had been designated was that of
searching for contraband on neutral vessels, and the _soi-disant_
cruisers lost no time in demonstrating their zeal. All this time, by
the way, the Russian Admiralty was strenuously denying that the
_Petersburg_ and the _Smolensk_ had left the Black Sea at all. On the
15th July the commerce-raiders began operations, rather tactlessly, by
stopping and seizing the German mail steamer, _Prinz Heinrich_, and by
confiscating the Japanese mails. The indignation and astonishment of
the German public had only begun to make itself heard, when it was
distracted by the intelligence that the P. and O. steamer _Malacca_ had
also been stopped, and had been actually brought back to Suez in charge
of a Russian prize crew. The vessel, flying the Russian flag, reached
Suez on the 19th July, and on the 20th the English Government, moved
thereto by the clamor which began to be heard both in Parliament and in
the press, addressed to the Government of the Czar a strongly-worded
protest against the seizure and a demand that the _Malacca_ should be
instantly released. The demand was based on the irregular position of
the _Petersburg_--a vessel which, if a ship of war, ought not to have
passed the Dardanelles, and which, if not a ship of war, had no right
to stop and search neutral vessels. This contention was unanswerable;
for it is evident that if a ship could be permitted to change its
character at will, it could perform all the functions of a ship of war
and still enjoy all the privileges of a non-belligerent at neutral
ports.
[Sidenote: Case of the "Malacca"]
Incidentally it was pointed out in Lord Lansdowne's dispatch that the
ammunition found on board the _Malacca_ belonged to the British
Government, and was intended for the China Squadron. It subsequently
came to light that the seizure of the _Malacca_ was no mere accident;
but that the vessel had been waited for by the Russian cruisers acting
on secret information from Russian agents at Antwerp. For several days
no reply was vouchsafed by the Russian Government, and feeling in this
country rose to such a height that the situation became dangerous.
While the whole British nation was chafing under the indignity and
affront, the _Malacca_ was being navigated by her prize crew, with
almost deliberate insolence, through the Suez Canal on the way to the
Baltic port of Libau. A British liner, in the eyes of the whole world,
was made an ignominious captive, and, like a pickpocket in the clutch
of a police-constable, was dragged away to judgment. The humiliation of
the situation was aggravated by the fact that at Suez--a port of the
English Protectorate of Egypt--the Russian officer in charge of the
_Malacca_ demanded to be supplied with coal, water, and provisions. In
spite of the strong representations which had been made by the British
Government, nothing was done at St. Petersburg to alleviate the
situation. The _Malacca_ reached Suez on the 19th of July and Port Said
on the 20th, and on the 21st she sailed unconcernedly for her
destination, which was ostentatiously announced to be Libau. Then at
last the Russian Government broke the silence. Having inflicted the
greatest possible humiliation on this country, they were pleased to
accept the assurances of the British Government that the prize had no
contraband on board, and to consent that the _Malacca_ should not be
brought before a Prize Court. A claim for damages for detention was to
be admitted, and the vessel was to be handed over to the British
authorities at "some Mediterranean port," after formal examination in
the presence of the British Consul. On the 27th July the terms of this
agreement--so extravagantly indulgent to Russia--were carried out, and
the incident of the _Malacca_ closed; but there remained still
unsettled the fundamental question of the status of the volunteer
cruisers, _Smolensk_ and _Petersburg_. Meanwhile, for the German liner
_Scandia_, which had been seized on the 23rd July, very different
treatment was reserved--she was released on the following day. The only
public recognition of the protests of the British Government which was
given by the Government of the Czar was the publication on the 3rd
August of an official communication declaring that "the special
commission" of the cruisers _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_ had "expired;"
and these vessels promptly disappeared from the Red Sea. But their
mischievous career was not yet at an end. Although the Russian
Government had specifically promised that they should not be employed
in searching neutral shipping any longer, the world was startled at the
end of August to learn that the British steamer _Comedian_ had been
stopped 80 miles from East London and 10 miles only from the coast of
British territory by a mysterious Russian cruiser. The unpleasant
impression in England was deepened when it was discovered that this
strange cruiser was no other than the _Smolensk_ of Red Sea fame. Well
might Mr. Balfour, who received at this moment a deputation of British
shipowners, declare that the incident had produced "a painful
impression" in the minds of the English Government. Representations to
the Russian Government produced the characteristic excuse that the
messages sent to the _Smolensk_ and _Petersburg_ had not reached their
destination. There is, indeed, good reason to believe that the Russian
Admiralty, which had done its best to thwart the Russian Foreign
Office, had taken particularly good care that the messages should be
delayed until the _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_ were out of reach. But
realizing the gravity of the situation, and protesting their own
helplessness, the Russian Government now invited the British Government
itself to communicate to the raiders a cypher message of recall.
Accordingly the cruisers on the Cape Station were sent out to find the
delinquents; and on the 5th September they were discovered coaling in
the territorial waters of Zanzibar with German colliers in attendance.
Their whereabout was at any rate sufficiently well known for them to
command the means to replenish their bunkers, and as soon as they saw a
British warship, they prepared for instant flight. But H.M.S. _Forte_
managed to communicate to them the orders of their own Government, and
as these were too unequivocal to be disregarded, the raiding career of
the _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_ forthwith came to an end. But they had
done enough, in conjunction with the Vladivostock Squadron, to rouse
feeling in England to a high pitch of irritation; and to make it
ill-prepared to endure with patience or forbearance the greater and
still more wanton outrage with which the Baltic Fleet was to inaugurate
its voyage to the Far East.
[Sidenote: The Baltic Fleet]
The dispatch of this fleet had been the feverish pre-occupation of the
Russian Admiralty from the moment that the first disasters befell the
Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur. Naval reinforcements were on the way,
it will be remembered, at the outbreak of war, and had reached the Red
Sea; but they were recalled when the news of the successful torpedo
attack on the Port Arthur Fleet reached Europe. It was realized how
vital must be the command of the sea to the achievement of victory; and
Russia at once set about preparing an Armada which should restore to
her the naval preponderance so suddenly lost. At first the intention,
which was so loudly proclaimed, was not taken quite seriously; but it
was decidedly encouraged as the weeks went on and as the resisting
power of Port Arthur to assault gave hopes that the new fleet might
still find a warm-water port to receive it. At first the departure of
the Baltic Fleet was announced for June; though everyone knew the
design, only formed perhaps to reassure public opinion in Russia, was
incapable of fulfilment. Then June came, and the date of departure was
again postponed; and in July the world was informed that there was "no
hurry;" and that it had been thought advisable to "test thoroughly" the
new ships and to familiarize the officers and crews with their work.
All through the summer the game of fixing the day of departure and then
postponing it went merrily on; but on the 15th August Admiral
Rozhestvensky, on whom supreme command of the fleet had been bestowed,
went on board the flagship with his staff; and received from the Port
Admiral at Kronstadt by signal a formal message of farewell. But
nothing more happened, except that on the 20th August it was announced
that the Baltic Fleet would not leave before the 28th September.
[Illustration: HUGE SIEGE GUNS BEFORE PORT ARTHUR.]
[Sidenote: Departure at Last]
On the 26th August the fleet went for a trial trip with the most
discouraging results, for several of the new ships broke down and the
battleship _Orel_ ran aground, inflicting structural injuries on
herself. Early in September there was another false alarm. Danish
pilots had been procured, and on the 11th September the fleet again put
to sea; but it only got as far as the port of Libau, and the next news
was that it would remain there "some weeks longer" for firing practice
and manoeuvres. The next definite date fixed was the 7th October; but
two days later than that the fleet had only got as far as Reval, where
it was inspected and blessed by the Czar in person. On the 15th
October, however, the long delay at last came to an end, and the fleet,
consisting of thirty-six vessels, actually left Russian waters.
It is necessary now to describe the fleet in which Russia had placed so
many of her hopes. The class and character of the principal vessels is
best realized from a table:--
Displace- Indic'd Nom'l Gun W'ght of
ment in horse- speed in Protec'n b'side fire
BATTLESHIPS. tons. power. knots. in inches. in lbs.
Kniaz Suvaroff
(flagship) 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426
Alexander III 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426
Borodino 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426
Orel 13,516 16,800 18 11.6 4,426
Ossliabia 12,674 14,500 18 10.5 2,672
Sissoi Veliky
(flagship) 8,880 10,400 16 12.5 3,186
Navarin 9,476 18,206 16 12.5 3,404
Displace- Indic'd Nom'l Gun W'ght of
ment in horse- speed in Protec'n b'side fire
tons. power. knots. in inches. in lbs.
ARMORED CRUISERS.
Admiral Nakhimoff 8,500 9,000 16.7 6 944
Dmitri Donskoi 5,893 7,000 16 6.2 444
PROTECTED
Oleg 6,675 19,500 23 4 872
Aurora 6,630 11,600 20 4.5 632
Svietlana 3,828 8,500 20 4 476
Almaz 3,285 7,500 19 -- 184
Jemtchug 3,200 7,000 24 -- 184
Izumrud 3,200 7,000 24 -- 184
[Sidenote: Strength of Baltic Fleet]
In addition to these ships there was a torpedo flotilla of 7 destroyers
of 28 knots speed, and 8 torpedo-boats; the following vessels of the
Volunteer Fleet: _Kiev_, _Vladimir_, _Voronej_ (each of 10,500 tons and
with a speed of 12 knots), _Tambov_, and _Yawslar_ (each of 8,640 tons
and with a speed of 12 knots); 13 transports armed with light guns; and
a hospital ship, the _Orel_--not to be confused with the battleship of
the same name. On paper, at least, this was a very formidable fleet;
but its fighting efficiency appears much reduced on analysis. There
were four modern battleships of a powerful type and of homogeneous
design; but their value is much discounted by the fact that some of
their consorts are distinctly less powerful; and in naval warfare the
manoeuvring power of a fleet becomes that of its weakest item. This
was proved very signally on the occasion of the engagement between
Admiral Kamimura and the Vladivostock Squadron, when the Russian
cruisers _Gromoboi_ and _Rossia_ suffered most severely from having to
stand by the _Rurik_, the lame duck of the squadron. The _Ossliabia_,
it is true was not much inferior to the battleships of the _Kniaz
Suvaroff_ class. She was a sister ship to the _Peresviet_ and
_Pobieda_, sunk in the harbor of Port Arthur, and was launched in 1898.
But the _Sissoi Veliky_ and the _Navarin_ both dated from 1891, and
were distinctly inferior in the all-important matter of speed, even
their nominal speed never having been attained. The only armored
cruisers with the Baltic Fleet--the _Admiral Nakhimoff_ and the _Dmiti
Donskoi_--were barely entitled to their description, as they have a low
speed, light armor, and comparatively small gun power. Certainly they
were not fit, like the best armored cruisers of to-day, to lie in the
line of battle. Some of the other cruisers were little more than armed
merchantmen, and none of them were formidable warships. Another
circumstance that detracted from the fighting value of this fleet was
the character of the officers and crews. All Russia's best and most
highly-trained sailors and marine engineers were sent out before the
war to the Pacific Squadron; and she had no adequate reserve to draw
on. The modern man-of-war's-man--whether he is in the engine-room or on
the gun-deck--is a highly specialized product, and he cannot be turned
out at a moment's notice. Stokers, artificers, engineers, as well as
torpedo lieutenants, gunners, and even admirals, have to be carefully
trained for years before they become efficient, and the inefficiency
and inexperience of the scratch crews and raw officers put on board the
Baltic Fleet was the main cause of the long delay in that fleet's
departure and of the disaster that occurred immediately after the start
had been made, and that nearly brought the voyage to a tragic and
ignominious conclusion. When all these circumstances were taken into
consideration, it became obvious that the Baltic Fleet was hopelessly
inferior to the fleet which, on reaching Far Eastern waters, it would
have to encounter in order to wrest from the Japanese their command of
the sea. But one question, even more urgent than that of the fate which
would befall the fleet on arrival, was how it was to overcome the
difficulties of the voyage. Russia had no coaling stations; and coaling
at sea from attendant colliers has not yet become a feasible operation
for a great fleet. The larger vessels would require from 5,000 to 6,000
tons of coal each, and the smaller cruisers from 2,000 to 3,000 tons in
the course of a voyage of nearly 13,000 miles, occupying at least 100
days, and very possibly 30 days more. But the coaling difficulty proved
less insuperable than it had appeared, and Russia's energy and
ingenuity in overcoming it were the first symptoms that she meant the
Baltic Fleet to be taken seriously. Negotiations for the supply of coal
were opened with English firms; but our Foreign Office ruled that such
contracts would be an infringement of neutrality. The Germans, however,
were much more complaisant; and their attitude of "benevolent
neutrality," as Count Von Bulow called it, enabled them to meet all
demands of Russia. Large orders for English coal to be delivered to
German consignees at neutral ports were received at Cardiff; and this
coal was then transferred to the ports at which the Baltic Fleet was to
call. According to the strict interpretation of international law these
facilities for coaling in port ought not to have been extended to the
fleet of a belligerent. But Russia was a close neighbor of the Powers
concerned, and the ally of one of them, while her enemy was a long way
off; and so it happened that Admiral Rozhdestvensky suffered no more
inconvenience than if he had been engaged on a yachting cruise. He and
his fleet put into any port that they fancied, and stayed, practically,
as long as they had a mind to!
[Sidenote: Russian Alarms]
The Baltic Fleet was divided into three divisions, and on the 16th-18th
October the first division left Libau. The daring surprise attacks of
the Japanese torpedo-boats at Port Arthur had filled the minds of the
Russian naval authorities with every kind of misgiving; and by some
means not yet disclosed, they had become possessed of the idea that the
Japanese meditated an attempt on the Baltic Fleet during its passage
through the narrow waters of the Danish Straits and the North Sea.
Rumors of mysterious Japanese agents, endeavoring to charter vessels in
obscure Danish and Norwegian ports filled the Russian newspapers. On
the 14th October Admiral Wirenius, the Chief of the Russian Admiralty,
solemnly declared to an interviewer that the narrow waters of the Belt
and the Sound were particularly favorable for a surprise attack; that
officers of the Japanese Navy were known to have left for Europe; and
that there was reason to apprehend an attempt to throw mines in the
track of the Russian Squadron in the Danish Straits. The state of
"nerves" to which the Russian naval officers had been reduced by these
apprehensions was shown when, as the Russian fleet passed through the
Kattegat, an attempt was made to deliver to the Russian Admiral a
cypher dispatch that had arrived from St. Petersburg. Two fishermen
were sent out with the dispatch in a motor-launch, but when their
vessel approached the flagship the searchlights were turned on, and
blank charges fired to forbid a nearer approach. The dispatch was taken
in by a boat launched by the battleship for the purpose.
[Sidenote: In the North Sea]
On the 19th of October the first division of the fleet passed through
the Kattegat; and by the 21st of October all the ships had left Danish
waters and entered on their course down the North Sea. Immediately
followed an occurrence almost without parallel in naval history--an
occurrence that was only saved from inextinguishable ridicule and
contempt by the tragic consequences which it unhappily involved. On
this memorable night of Friday, the 21st of October, some fifty vessels
of the Hull fishing fleet were engaged in trawling on the Dogger
Bank--one of the places in the North Sea most frequented by the
fishermen not only of Great Britain, but of Germany, Denmark, Holland
and Norway. It is a prominent figure in all charts of the North Sea,
and to every sailor and seafaring man its situation and character are
perfectly familiar. The Hull fishermen, of the Gamecock and Great
Northern Fleets, had their trawls down and were thus deprived of the
possibility of rapid movement, when about midnight they sighted a
number of warships steaming from the northeast. At first they did not
suspect that it was the Russian Baltic Fleet that had come their way,
because in that event the fleet must have been navigating some 40 miles
out of the true course; but very soon their ignorance was enlightened.
While the men were watching the passing warships, searchlights were
suddenly flashed on the trawlers, and then, to the horror and amazement
of these innocent fishermen engaged peaceably in their lawful
occupations, a sudden storm of shot and shell broke upon them from
unknown men-of-war. The steam-trawler _Crane_ was sunk and its skipper
and mate were decapitated by a shell, and all but one of the crew were
injured; while the trawlers _Moulmein_ and _Mino_ were seriously
damaged, the latter vessel having no fewer than sixteen holes in her.
From the evidence given at the subsequent inquiries the following facts
were elicited: All the trawlers had their own lights up--namely, a
lantern showing a white light ahead, a green light on the starboard
side, a red light on the port side. Several vessels also had lights in
the fishing pound so that the men could work on deck. None of the
trawlers were without lights. As the approaching vessels came nearer
they were seen to signal to one another in a way that conveyed to the
minds of the trawlers that they were warships. Some of the vessels were
in advance of the others. The exact number was very difficult to tell,
but in the first division there were probably four or five. They passed
the trawlers to the westward, where the admiral's trawler, the _Ruff_,
was, and to the eastward of a few of the trawlers. One of them, at any
rate, showed a searchlight. They passed on, and nothing happened. It
was noticed that they were signalling to the other vessels behind, and
that the other vessels were repeating the signals and signalling to
each other. These other vessels then came on to the eastward of the
admiral's ship, _Ruff_, but there were trawlers on both sides of them.
Then, without any warning to the trawlers, these vessels opened fire.
The crews on the trawlers were at first under the impression that it
was a sham fight in some manoeuvres, but they soon discovered that it
was live shot. Some of the warships fired from both port and starboard
side. After the firing had begun, this second division of vessels came
more to the west, and there were others which came down more to the
east. The third division, which came furthest to the eastward, came
near some of the outlying trawlers, who were more to the south and
east. They turned their searchlights upon them. A great many of the
trawlers, in the attempt to get away from the firing when it began,
lost their trawls or damaged them.
[Illustration: THIRSTY JAPANESE TROOPS CROSSING THE SHA-HO.]
[Sidenote: Bringing Home the News]
On Sunday night, the 23rd of October, two steam trawlers, one of them
flying her flag at half-mast, and both riddled with shot, entered St
Andrew's Dock at Hull. Their own condition, and the lifeless and
mutilated bodies that they brought with them, were ghastly confirmation
of the amazing tidings that they had to tell; and next morning, not
only England, but all the world, was ringing with the news of the
Baltic fleet's first warlike exploit. Amazement quickly gave place to
indignation--an indignation of passionate intensity; and with one voice
the people of England cried aloud for retribution at any cost on the
perpetrators of so wanton an outrage. Nor was this indignation confined
to the countrymen of the victims. In the United States, in France, and
even in Germany, unsparing reprobation of a deed so unjustifiable was
freely uttered; and the belief was confidently expressed that the only
possible explanation was to be found in the undiscipline and probable
drunken frenzy of the Russian naval officers. Be it remembered, too,
that the heinousness of the offence was infinitely increased by the
fact that the Russian ships, whose commanders must have discovered
their grievous blunder before leaving the neighborhood of the Dogger
Bank, made no effort to ascertain the injury they had inflicted, or to
render help to their innocent victims. Neither did the Russian Admiral
condescend to make the least report of the circumstances. He and his
fleet proceeded on their way as if the sinking of fishing-boats and the
slaughtering of fishermen were too trifling an incident to engage
serious attention and notice; and when the news of the outrage reached
London, the Baltic Squadron had already been sighted in the Channel. No
Government could sit down under such provocation as this, and the
English ministers, who realized well enough the dangerous pitch to
which public feeling had been wrought, lost no time in addressing the
strongest demands for immediate redress to St. Petersburg, accompanied
by the intimation that the situation was one not admitting of delay.
Their action was emphasized by that of King Edward himself, who, in
sending a subscription of 200 guineas for the relief of the sufferers,
declared that he had heard with profound sorrow of the "unwarrantable
action" to which the North Sea fishing-fleet had been subjected. The
principal witnesses of the outrage were summoned at once to the Foreign
Office, and Lord Lansdowne had long audience of the King, while the
Prime Minister, who happened to be in Scotland, came back post-haste to
London. On the 25th of October Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, called at the British Embassy in St. Petersburg
and requested the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, to convey
to King Edward and the British Government a message from the Czar, who,
while he had received no message from the Admiral in command of the
Baltic Fleet, could only attribute "the incident in the North Sea to a
very regrettable misunderstanding". It was added that the Czar wished
to express his sincere regret for the sad loss of life that had
occurred, and to say that he would take steps to afford complete
satisfaction to the sufferers as soon as the circumstances of the case
were cleared up. These assurances, though far from adequate, would have
done something to calm the temper of public opinion in England if they
had been accompanied by any sign of a similar spirit in the Czar's
advisers. But the latter seemed inclined to be as intractable as the
Russian press was impenitent. While the Russian Government pursued a
policy of delay and evasion, the Russian newspapers roundly denied that
any blame attached to the Baltic Fleet, and scouted all idea of
reparation; and all the time Admiral Rozhdestvensky was proceeding
serenely on his voyage. On the 26th of October his battleships arrived
at Vigo Harbor, where at last he took the trouble to communicate his
report of what had happened to St. Petersburg. The statement is such an
amazing one that it may be given in full. It was communicated to the
world under the authority of the Russian Naval General Staff, and ran
as follows:--
"1.--The incident in the North Sea was provoked by two torpedo-boats
which, without showing any lights, under cover of darkness, advanced to
attack the vessel steaming at the head of the detachment. When the
detachment began to sweep the sea with its searchlights and opened
fire, the presence was also discovered of several small steam vessels
resembling small steam fishing-boats. The detachment endeavored to
spare these boats and ceased fire as soon as the torpedo-boats were out
of sight.
"The English press is horrified at the idea that the torpedo-boats of
the squadron, left by detachment until the morning on the scene of the
occurrence, did not render assistance to the victims. Now, there was
not a single torpedo-boat with the detachment and none were left on the
scene of the occurrence. In consequence, it was one of the two
torpedo-boats which was not sunk, but which was only damaged, which
remained until the morning near the small steam craft. The detachment
did not assist the small steam craft because it suspected them of
complicity, in view of their obstinate persistence in cutting the line
of advance of the warships. Several of them did not show any lights at
all. The others showed them very late.
"2.--Having met several hundreds of fishing-boats, the squadron showed
them every consideration, except where they were in company of the
foreign torpedo-boats, one of which disappeared, while the other,
according to the evidence of the fishermen themselves, remained among
them until the morning. They believed her to be a Russian vessel, and
were indignant that she did not come to the assistants of the victims.
She was, however, a foreigner, and remained until the morning looking
for the other torpedo-boat, her companion, either with the object of
repairing her damage or from fear of betraying herself to those who
were not accomplices.
"If there were also on the scene of the occurrence fishermen
imprudently involved in this enterprise, I beg, in the name of the
whole fleet, to express our sincere regret for the unfortunate victims
of circumstances in which no warship could, even in time of profound
peace, have acted otherwise."
[Sidenote: Naval Preparations]
But before this preposterous and long-delayed explanation was
vouchsafed, the British Government had taken steps to prove that they
were not in the mood to be trifled with, and that the subjects of the
greatest naval power in the world were not to be shot down with
impunity. To the intense satisfaction of the whole nation, an instant
mobilization of the British fleets in European waters was ordered. The
Home Fleet, which had been cruising away to the north of Scotland, was
ordered south; the Channel Fleet, lying at Gibraltar, was warned to be
in instant readiness for active service; and the Mediterranean Fleet
was instructed to join up with the Channel Fleet with all speed. The
naval dockyards were kept working night and day to prepare the reserve
fleet for commission, and to be ready for the demands which an
immediate outbreak of war might involve. In forty-eight hours every
requisite preparation had been completed, and three fleets, any one of
them capable of dealing faithfully with Admiral Rozhdestvensky's
squadron, were ready for instant action. Directly in the path of the
Baltic Fleet, now assembled at Vigo, lay the Channel Fleet under the
command of Lord Charles Beresford, and so acute was the crisis that it
seemed as if at any moment that fleet might be ordered to take the sea.
Among the secret preparations made was the dispatch of four battleships
from the Channel Squadron at Gibraltar to Portland and the assembly of
all available submarines at Dover. What made the situation especially
dangerous was the conflict which in this hour of desperate emergency
was being waged between the Russian Admiralty and the Russian Foreign
Office. The former department, which had done so much to aggravate the
case of the _Malacca_ and to flout the assurances which had been given
as to the withdrawal of the _Petersburg_ and _Smolensk_, was now
determined that no surrender should be made to the British demands for
satisfaction in the matter of the North Sea outrage; and for several
days the more pacific Foreign Office wrestled with these fire-eaters in
vain. War between England and Russia, with the prospect of indefinite
extension to other countries, seemed inevitable; but thanks largely to
the friendly offices of the French Government, who, as the ally of
Russia and the friend of Great Britain, had exceptional claims to act
as an intermediary between the disputants, a settlement was at length
arrived at. On the 28th of October, Mr. Balfour was able to announce to
the world that that morning an agreement had been arrived at which
averted all further apprehension of the rupture of peaceful relations.
Great Britain and Russia had consented to refer the case in dispute to
an impartial International Tribunal of Inquiry; the terms of the
Convention, which were signed after much further negotiation on the
24th of November, being as follows:--
1.--The Commission is to consist of five members, namely, officers of
Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and France. The fifth
Commissioner is to be selected by agreement between them. If they
cannot agree, the choice to be entrusted to the king of a country
subsequently to be determined upon.
2.--The Commission is to report on all the circumstances relating to
the disaster and to establish the responsibility.
3.--The Commission is to have power to settle all questions of
procedure.
4.--The parties bind themselves to supply the Commission with all
necessary information, facilities, &c.
5.--The Commission is to meet at Paris as soon as possible after the
signature of the Convention.
6.--The report of the Commission is to be officially communicated to
the respective Governments.
[Sidenote: Russian Allegations]
Not the least interesting part of Mr. Balfour's statement was that in
which he examined and dealt with the justification which Admiral
Rozhdestvensky had put forward, and in particular with the allegation
that the Russian fleet had been attacked by torpedo-boats. This
allegation, as Mr. Balfour pointed out, involved a charge of bad faith
on the part of Great Britain, and such a charge he indignantly
resented. If only one torpedo-boat was sunk, what, he pertinently
asked, had become of the other? The world did not require to be
convinced of the essential absurdity of this story; but the Russians
persisted in it with determination. The most circumstantial narratives
were presently forthcoming from the four officers who had been detained
to give evidence before the International Commission. One narrator
stated that information of the presence of Japanese torpedo-boats in
the Norway fiords, and of the Japanese having hired fishing vessels in
Hull, Southampton, Hamburg, and Christiania, had been received by the
Russians. He proceeded as follows: "We lodged information of the
Japanese intentions with the Governments of those countries where the
Japanese were making their preparations, but it was only in Denmark and
Germany that we found any readiness to interfere with them.... Before
leaving the Scaw the Russians received a number of alarming messages
from their agents. All these messages agreed in stating that in one
very deep Norwegian fiord four Japanese torpedo-boats had been seen,
and that these vessels were afterwards observed a short distance to the
west of the Scaw. The Russians left the Scaw in the morning, proceeding
in different divisions. All the torpedo craft went on ahead, in two
divisions, making for Cherbourg. Next came Admiral Folkersahm with the
four older battleships making for Tangier. The small cruisers were
under orders to proceed to Arosa, 40 miles north of Vigo, while the
large cruisers with the transport _Kamchatka_, under the command of
Admiral Enquist, had instructions to make for Tangier like Admiral
Folkersahm.
"Last of all we put to sea with the four best battleships, _Suvaroff_,
_Alexander III._, _Borodino_, and _Orel_. Our destination was Brest,
where we were to coal. Observe, therefore, that there was not with us a
single torpedo-boat or a single small vessel. All such were far ahead
of us.... On the 8th of October, at 8 o'clock in the evening, when it
was already quite dark, we received a wireless message stating that 30
miles behind us was the transport _Kamchatka_, which had fallen behind
her consorts (the cruisers _Dmitri Donskoi_ and _Aurora_) in
consequence of an injury to her engines, and that several torpedo-boats
were following her closely, but had not discharged any torpedoes.
Admiral Enquist, who was in front with the two cruisers, was at once
ordered by wireless message to slacken speed and wait for the
_Kamchatka_, or to continue his course in order not to expose himself
to the torpedo-boats, which, of course, also received our messages, but
did not know from what spot they were sent. The Japanese, however,
attempted to find out our whereabouts. While we were exchanging
messages with the _Kamchatka_ we suddenly received a succession of
telegrams, in excellent Russian, purporting to come from the
_Kamchatka_: 'Where is the squadron?' 'Give your latitude and
longitude.' 'Where is the _Suvaroff_?' These telegrams appeared to us
suspicious, and, in order to assure ourselves that they were really
sent by the _Kamchatka_, instead of answering we asked for the name of
one of the officers of the _Kamchatka_. To this no answer was returned,
and we continued our conversation with the _Kamchatka_ in cypher. At
12.55 A. M. we suddenly saw in front of us ... two long dark
silhouettes, emitting quantities of smoke and evidently steaming at high
speed. At the same time we saw a yellow-red rocket, such as is
generally sent up by vessels in distress. A moment later a searchlight
was thrown upon us from ahead.... We at once turned our searchlights on
the torpedo-boats and opened fire on them. As soon as they saw that
they were discovered, they turned aside, but came under the fire of the
_Alexander III._, _Borodino_, and _Orel_, which were following us.
About the same time our searchlights began to fall from time to time on
some small vessels, apparently fishing craft, whose behavior, however,
was very suspicious. They showed no lights, there was not a man on
their decks, and they obstinately remained under the bows of our ships,
barring their course. They were thus in a position to launch floating
mines. In spite of this, however, the Admiral, as soon as he caught
sight of them, ordered that the searchlights on board the _Suvaroff_
should be turned skywards, which was a signal to cease firing.
"To remain where we were after the torpedo-boats had disappeared in
order to aid the steamers would have been the height of imprudence. We
should have risked the most formidable part of our fleet, and as there
were several steamers they were in a position to aid each other. As far
as could be perceived, one of the enemy's torpedo-boats was sunk."
The narrator argued that either the fishing vessels were accomplices or
the Japanese took advantage of their proximity without their knowledge.
He inclined to the former alternative, and asked, "Why Hull fishing
boats so far from England--almost off the Danish coast?"
The best commentary on this narrative was supplied by the Russian
Government themselves, who, six weeks after the North Sea outrage,
published the following significant admission of facts, which had, of
course, been perfectly well known to them almost from the first:--
[Sidenote: Supplementary Information]
"According to supplementary information from Admiral Rozhdestvensky
concerning the North Sea incident of the 21st of October, after the
_Kniaz Suvaroff_ had ceased firing there suddenly appeared on the left
of the ironclad division the two searchlights of the cruisers _Dmitri
Donskoi_ and _Aurora_, lighting up the division. The _Dmitri Donskoi_
showed her night signals, whereupon for fear lest projectiles from the
hindmost ships of the division should hit our own vessels, either
directly or by ricochet, a general signal to cease fire was made from
the ironclad _Kniaz Suvaroff_, and was at once carried out. The whole
of the firing lasted less than ten minutes. Communications by wireless
telegraph stated that five projectiles had struck the cruiser _Aurora_,
some ricocheting and others hitting her direct. Three were
75-millimètre and two 47-millimètre shells. The chaplain was seriously
injured, and a petty officer was slightly wounded. The former
subsequently succumbed at Tangier."
[Illustration: FIGHT IN STREET OF LIN-SHIN-PU, BATTLE OF SHAK-KE RIVER.]
This communication bears out the theory advanced in the first instance
that the Russians in the panic had mistaken their own ships for hostile
torpedo-boats, and had opened fire on the "two long, dark silhouettes
emitting quantities of smoke" without stopping to ascertain what they
belonged to.
[Sidenote: The Baltic Fleet Proceeds to Madagascar]
After leaving Vigo, the Baltic Fleet divided into two squadrons--one
proceeding down the West Coast of Africa, and the other through the
Suez Canal. By the end of December (two months and a half from leaving
Libau) they had completed barely one-half of their voyage; and by that
time, not only was Vladivostock frost-bound, but Port Arthur was
dominated by Japanese guns, and the remnants of the Pacific Fleet lay
shell-riddled on the mud of the harbor. Before the International
Commission of Inquiry met for business, all hope of the Baltic Fleet's
achieving any serious purpose had been dissipated; for while it was
still mustering at Madagascar, the news arrived that the fall of Port
Arthur was at last an accomplished fact.