The Opposing Armies in Manchuria--The Russian
Advance--Reinforcements for Both Sides--Battle of the
Sha-ho--Two Hundred Hours of Carnage--Awful List of
Casualties--Threat and Counterthreat--The Veil Lifted from Port
Arthur--Capture of Forts--Devices of the Besiegers--The
Undaunted Stoessel--The Gallant Podgorsky--World-Wide
Admiration--Uncertain News.
[Sidenote: The Opposing Armies in Manchuria]
The great battle of Liao-yang was fought in the last week of August and
the first week of September; and for nearly five weeks after that
tremendous struggle the opposing armies remained inactive, or rather
gathered up their exhausted strength for the next desperate encounter.
The Japanese had advanced as far as Yentai, a station about one-third
of the distance--40 miles or so--that separates Liao-yang from Mukden.
The position was valuable as giving the command of the Yentai coal
mines--a most important acquisition to any general with a long line of
railway communication to maintain. The Japanese entrenched themselves
along a front of some 25 miles, stretching from Yentai on the railway
to Pensihu, a village in the hilly country which lies north and south
between the two rivers Taitse and Hun. There they settled down to
replenishing the exhausted supplies, refilling the depleted ranks, and
reorganizing the dislocated commands. Above all did they make speed to
reconstruct the railway behind them, a work which had diligently been
carried on _pari passu_ with the advance. Early in October through
trains of the new 3 ft. 6 in. gauge were running from Dalny to Yentai,
and thus the fighting-line was brought within an easy six days' journey
of Japan. The Russians, on the other hand, in spite of the completion
of the Circum-Baikal railway towards the end of September, were still
from three to five times as distant from their prime base; for if the
express time from Mukden to Moscow was sixteen days, the ordinary troop
train's time was much nearer thirty days. In this all-important matter
of rapidity of communication the Japanese possessed an advantage
inherent to the situation and of the profoundest strategical influence.
While they were recuperating thus at Yentai, the Russians were busy
entrenching themselves behind the Hun-ho, the course of which from
Mukden follows a line, roughly speaking, due east. At first it was
asserted by those in the confidence of the Russian General Staff, that
no determined stand would be made at the Hun-ho, and that Kuropatkin
would only hold the enemy there until the defences at Tieling were
completed. But as the days passed, and the Japanese showed no
disposition to renew their advance, and as reinforcements continued to
pour over the Siberian railway, counsels were modified. In the last
week of September General Stackelberg, attending a banquet at Mukden,
proposed the toast "To the March on Liao-yang"; and this startling
suggestion of a new development in the Russian plan of campaign was
speedily confirmed by a remarkable manifesto to his troops which
General Kuropatkin issued on the 2nd of October. After the usual
high-flown exordium, in which "the arrogant foe" was described as
having suffered repeated repulse--a rather daring travesty of the
facts--Kuropatkin explained that he had not thought the time ripe "to
take advantage of these successes; but", he added, "the time of retreat
was now at an end. Hitherto the enemy in operating has relied on his
great forces and, disposing his armies so as to surround us, has chosen
as he deemed fit his time for attack; but now the moment to go and meet
the enemy, for which the whole army has been longing, has come, and the
time has arrived for us to compel the Japanese to do our will, for the
forces of the Manchurian army are strong enough to begin the forward
movement. Bear in mind the importance of victory to Russia, and, above
all, remember how necessary victory is the more speedily to relieve our
brothers at Port Arthur, who for seven months have heroically
maintained the defence of the fortress entrusted to their care."
[Sidenote: The Russian Advance]
The world was naturally startled by such a pronouncement--so much
easier to explain than to justify; but the Russians and their friends
in France were overjoyed, believing that the time of their tribulation
was at last over. The Muscovite nature has during this war shown an
unrivalled capacity for self-deception; and not only the General Staff,
but Kuropatkin himself seem to have persuaded themselves that the enemy
had been unable to get over the shock of Liao-yang. The perfectly
natural delay of the Japanese in advancing was attributed to the
discouragement caused by the enormous losses sustained in the last
battle and to inability to make these losses good. There were other
influences at work, as Kuropatkin's address shows. "The importance of
victory to Russia", and the necessity of relieving "our brothers in
Port Arthur", were circumstances that evidently dominated Russian
counsels; and in Kuropatkin's mind there was probably another
consideration of a personal nature. After Liao-yang the Czar had
ordered the formation of a Second Manchurian Army under a separate
command, on the ground that the active direction in the field of such
enormous forces as these two armies would represent would be beyond the
capacity of any one man. General Gripenberg, a tried old soldier, was
appointed to command the Second Army, and there was talk of sending out
a Grand Duke to take the supreme direction of the campaign. This would
have meant in degree the suppression of General Kuropatkin, and that
capable soldier may well have looked with dissatisfaction on such a
reward for his signal services. He may have argued with himself that if
he could only achieve a decisive victory at this moment his prestige
would be restored and his paramountcy assured; and, according to the
information which had reached him, that victory was within his grasp.
But, unfortunately, that information was wholly erroneous. Far from
being dispirited and exhausted, the Japanese forces were on the very
point of advancing to the attack again when Kuropatkin formed his
momentous resolution and issued orders for "the march to Liao-yang". If
his movement was hailed with almost delirious enthusiasm in St.
Petersburg, it was observed with hardly less satisfaction at Tokio,
where it was at once recognized that the enemy were obligingly
releasing Marshal Oyama from the necessity of a long march and another
attack on fortified positions.
[Sidenote: Reinforcements for Both Sides]
By this time Kuropatkin's forces--thanks to the completion of the
Circum-Baikal railway--had reached 250,000, with more than 800 guns.
The Japanese strength, after reinforcements both from Japan and from
the army investing Port Arthur, cannot have been much less; though at
the close of the battle which was about to be fought Marshal Oyama
asserted that at all points his victorious troops had been outnumbered.
However that may be, the Japanese had the advantage of a prepared
position, the key of which was in rugged mountainous country. Unlike
the battle of Liao-yang, of which minute details have already been
furnished, the battle of Yentai, as it was first called, or of Sha-ho,
as it came to be known afterwards, can only be followed in its broad
outline, mainly because the maps available are utterly inadequate. The
place-names which mark the direction of the operations in one official
report rarely agree with those in the other official report, and can
only be vaguely identified. But a rough sketch-map is at least
sufficient to give the general bearings of the operations. The Japanese
front extended in a horseshoe formation from Yentai, on the railway, to
Pensihu, on the Taitse River, with Oku on the left, Nodzu in the
centre, and Kuroki on the right. The plan of Kuropatkin--a plan which
in the light of after events we know to have been beyond the
possibility of achievement--was to attack the right wing of the
Japanese army under Kuroki, and roll it back upon Liao-yang, while the
Japanese left and centre were held in front; then to shut up Oyama and
his troops in Liao-yang, much as Sir George White was shut up in
Ladysmith, while a rapid march southwards was made to the relief of
Port Arthur.
[Sidenote: Battle of the Sha-ho]
On the 5th October the Russian advance began on both sides of the
railway from Mukden, and from Fushan against the Japanese right. The
flank movement, on the success of which all Kuropatkin's schemes were
based, was entrusted to Stackelberg and Rennenkampf--Stackelberg
attacking from the north, and Rennenkampf with his Cossacks, working
round from the northeast. On Sunday, the 9th October, the first contact
between the opposing armies was made, and Stackelberg--much to his own
surprise--was able to occupy Bentsiaputse, a place north of the Yentai
coalmines, commanding the main roads to Fushan, Mukden, and Liao-yang.
It had been expected that the Japanese would make a desperate stand
here, but they retreated after offering only a feeble resistance.
Meanwhile, Rennenkampf fiercely assailed Kuroki's extreme right at
Pensihu, while a force of Cossacks some 3,000 strong daringly crossed
the Taitse River and severed Kuroki's communications in the rear. Up to
this moment everything had seemed to go well with the Russian plan of
attack. Several important positions east of Pensihu were taken by
assault, and Kuroki's situation seemed critical for the moment. But
Marshal Oyama appears never to have doubted the ability of his
well-tried lieutenant to hold his own, and no sooner had the whole
scheme of his enemy been developed than he decided to counter it with a
vigorous offensive. Kuroki was reinforced on the 10th, while a force of
cavalry detached to operate against the Cossacks south of the Taitse-ho
succeeded in driving the enemy off and in restoring the interrupted
communications. As soon as the reinforcements reached Kuroki at Pensihu
he put the possibility of his being "rolled up" beyond all doubt by
fiercely assailing Stackelberg and recapturing the positions which had
temporarily fallen into Russian hands. Thereafter he remained
completely master of the situation, and the desperate but futile
assaults which he sustained in the next few days only resulted in a
tremendous casualty list for the enemy--a list totalling at least
20,000. The decisive repulse of the Russian flanking movement involved
the frustration of the whole of Kuropatkin's plans in advancing from
the Hun-ho. But the battle had only just begun yet, for the Russian
right and centre, which had begun their southward march with such
confidence, now found their _role_ changed from attack to defence; and
instead of the Japanese being, according to program, forced back upon
Liao-yang, it became a question whether the Russians would be able to
make good their retreat on Mukden. General Oku, advancing along the
railway to the west, after two days' hard fighting drove back
Kuropatkin's right to the line of the Shi-li-ho; while General Nodzu on
the east of the railway was equally successful, and signalized his
victory by a considerable capture of guns. Oyama's object now was to
drive his enemy eastwards from the railway and back upon the Hun-ho,
when it would be impossible for him to escape disaster. For some days
this tremendous issue hung in the balance, and the Japanese forces were
within an ace of accomplishing their purpose. But thanks to the dogged
tenacity of the Russian troops, and thanks still more to the terribly
wasting and exhausting effect of a week's continuous fighting, the
impetus of the Japanese attack was not quite sufficient to complete the
promised triumph; and at last the two great armies came to a standstill
some ten miles south of Mukden, incapable of further action.
[Sidenote: Two Hundred Hours of Carnage]
From the 9th October to the 17th the relentless struggle raged along
this wide front of more than 20 miles. Day and night the devoted troops
on either side flung themselves with reckless bravery on the positions
of their foes; while from nearly 2,000 guns an incessant storm of
shrapnel and shell burst over the contested ground. Liao-yang had been
terrible enough; but from all accounts the artillery duel at the battle
of Sha-ho even eclipsed the terrific incidents of the earlier
engagements. On the 13th the Russian retreat became general, and Oku,
capturing twenty-five Russian guns, succeeded in driving the troops
opposed to him back from the line of the Shi-li-ho to the Sha-ho, where
behind defences which the forethought of Kuropatkin had provided, they
prepared to make their last desperate stand. The forces before Kuroki
had retreated towards Fushan in a northeasterly direction; and those
before Nodzu in the centre, after suffering losses almost as heavy as
Stackelberg's columns had sustained, fell back in something approaching
to disorder on the line of the Sha-ho. The position of Kuropatkin's
army was now exceedingly critical, and it was not without cause that he
issued a general order that the ground occupied must be held at all
costs. It is evident that to make good the retreat Stackelberg's troops
on the extreme east, which were far in advance of the rest of the
Russian line, must be withdrawn first, and that the central army under
Zarubaieff, which again was far in advance of the right wing, must be
drawn back next; and that during these perilous operations General
Bilderling, who commanded the Russian right resting behind the Sha-ho,
must stand firm. By the skin of his teeth, almost, Bilderling just
managed to hold his ground. On the 13th Oku's impetuous assault upon
the Russian lines succeeded so far as to break the Russian centre. Had
that advantage been maintained nothing could have saved the Russian
army. But by a tremendous effort the last reserves were brought up and
recaptured the ground that had been lost. For thirty-six hours the
battle raged with varying fortune at this critical point; but the
Russians held on, and these thirty-six priceless hours being gained,
the Russian centre and left were saved. On the 14th, five days after
the battle had begun, a deluge of rain fell--a deluge precipitated, as
at Liao-yang, by the heavy and incessant firing--and the already
sorely-tried troops of Oku found their further movements grievously
impeded. For several days more, however, the contest on the Sha-ho
raged with unabated fury. Again and again the Russians made fierce
counter-attacks on the Japanese, sustaining terrible losses in
consequence. One position--a dominant elevation on the south bank of
the Sha-ho, known as Lonely-Tree Hill--was the scene of long-continued
and desperate fighting, in which both armies alternately captured and
were driven from the vantage ground. It was here that the one
substantial success of the Russian arms was achieved in the capture of
twelve Japanese guns. During Sunday, the 16th of October the Russians
had delivered no less than seven counter-attacks on Oku's troops, and
all of them had been beaten back with loss. In these engagements a
conspicuous part had been played by a force under Brigadier-General
Yamada, made up of troops from Nodzu's and Oku's commands, which
succeeded in penetrating the Russian line and in capturing two guns.
But in returning to camp after this exploit, Yamada's force had
ventured too far and was enveloped by a Russian division, and was only
able to win through by the sacrifice of its guns, after a fierce
hand-to-hand encounter in which the casualties were nearly 1,000.
[Illustration: JAPANESE OUTPOSTS RELIEVING GUARD NEAR THE SHA-HO.]
Slowly, reluctantly, after fitful recrudescences, the great battle wore
itself out, and by the 20th October the two armies were left facing
each other on either side of the Sha-ho--a line 15 miles north of that
which the Japanese had occupied before the engagement began. The net
result, therefore, was a decided gain of ground for the Japanese, and
the infliction of losses greater than had been sustained in any
previous battle on the Russian army. Telegraphing to Tokio on the 15th,
Marshal Oyama thus summed up the results of the fighting as far as it
had gone--a summary which further events did not alter:--
"As a sequel to a fight lasting continuously for five days, we have
driven back the superior forces of the enemy at every point, pursuing
him and forcing him to the south bank of the Hun. We have inflicted
heavy losses, and captured over thirty guns and hundreds of prisoners.
We have defeated his plans and converted an offensive operation into a
radical failure."
[Sidenote: Awful List of Casualties]
"Radical failure" in war means far more than defeated plans. It carries
with it an awful and immediate penalty levied in killed and wounded,
and when the tale of losses came to be counted it was found to exceed
even the most pessimistic anticipations. The Russian dead left on the
field alone numbered no less than 13,333; and as the wounded, at the
lowest estimate, cannot have been less than four to one, it is apparent
that the total casualties suffered by General Kuropatkin's troops must
have been between 60,000 and 70,000. An index to the severity of the
fighting is afforded by an analysis of these returns, which shows that
more than 5,000 Russian dead were found before both Oku's army and
Kuroki's. Even the Russian General Staff, which has shown a decided
tendency to minimize losses, did not venture to place those sustained
at Sha-ho at less than 45,000 rank and file and 800 officers. The total
Japanese losses, on the other hand, though heavy, were but a fraction
of their foe's. Oyama placing them at 15,879. But the loss in life was
not the only disastrous result of the battle for the army of the Czar.
The Japanese captured 709 prisoners and 45 guns, with large quantities
of arms and ammunition; and against these captures are to be set the
twelve guns lost at Lonely-Tree Hill, rechristened by the Russians
Putiloff Hill in honor of the officer who achieved the success, and who
was immediately decorated by the Czar. In one sense the battle of the
Sha-ho may be regarded as indecisive, in that it left the two
contending armies again at a deadlock. At Liao-yang the strategy of
both generals had failed, and in a less degree the same result was
reached at Sha-ho; for Oyama's initial success could not be followed up
to its legitimate and triumphant conclusion. But, on the other hand,
Kuropatkin's effort to march to Liao-yang and make a diversion in favor
of Port Arthur had signally failed; and the army which he had
ostentatiously declared to be strong enough to take the offensive and
had been hurled back by "the arrogant foe," who were at last to be
"compelled to do the Russian will." It was in that circumstance that
the real measure of the Japanese victory was to be found--that after
eight months of war the armies of the Czar were still unequal to the
task committed to them. Had Kuropatkin been even in a measure
successful in this, his first great offensive movement, the moral
effect could not have failed to be incalculable. As it was, it
inflicted one more discouragement on troops that had experienced
nothing but retreats and reverses from the opening of the campaign. The
temper in which the Japanese accepted the new laurels which their army
had won was eminently characteristic of a nation which has, in spite of
all temptations to vainglory and exultation, comforted itself with
perfect sobriety and self-restraint. The Mikado issued a rescript to
his people, the terms of which are worth giving, if only for the
contrast which they offer to some of the addresses issued from St.
Petersburg and the headquarters of Alexeieff:--
"Since the outbreak of the war our army and our navy have demonstrated
their bravery and loyalty, while both officials and people have acted
in unison to support the cause. So far, success has attended our cause,
but, the ultimate accomplishment being yet far distant, it is necessary
to be patient and steadfast in the pursuance of our action, and thus
aim at the final accomplishment of our purpose."
[Sidenote: Threat and Counterthreat]
Another and even more striking testimony to the inflexible
determination of the Japanese people was supplied by the Army rescript
issued at the end of September in connection with the expansion of the
Japanese military system. The Government of the Czar had demonstrated
its intention to prosecute the war unflinchingly by the creation of a
second Manchurian Army. Japan's answer to this menace was to extend the
period of service with the colors in the Japanese army from nine to
fourteen years, by which act the available reserves for the army in
Manchuria were increased at a stroke by nearly half a million men. But
though Japan could answer promptly and adequately the steps which her
foe had taken to strengthen his armies in the field, it was not so easy
to recompense herself for the elimination of a source of weakness in
her enemy's counsels. Admiral Alexeieff, whose fatal influence had been
as valuable as several battleships and army corps to the Japanese, was
finally recalled to St. Petersburg at the end of October. On the 26th
of that month the Viceroy issued an address to the troops, announcing,
in his usually inflated style, that on his own request he had been
relieved of the duties of Commander-in-Chief, while being retained in
the office of Viceroy and assured of the continuance of the Imperial
confidence and favor. In less than a week from the issue of that
manifesto, it was announced that Alexeieff and his staff were on the
way to St. Petersburg by express train, and that there was no
probability of their return, while Kuropatkin was left in supreme
command.
[Sidenote: The Veil Lifted from Port Arthur]
No sooner had the echoes of the great battle of the Sha-ho died down
than the attention of the world was turned again to Port Arthur, where
the long and desperate siege was continuing with undiminished
determination on the part of the attack and invincible heroism on the
part of the defence. For months together little authentic news of the
progress of events had been allowed to leak out; but suddenly, in the
beginning of November, the Japanese censor removed his restrictions,
and a vivid and circumstantial narrative of the operations was allowed
to come through. By the end of June the Japanese forces of investment
had occupied a line across the Kwang-tung Peninsula running from
Ingentsi Bay, on the north, southeastwards to a point on the south
coast-line some ten miles east of Dalny. After another month's diligent
assault they had advanced the line nearly five miles--from
Vostikorablei Bay on the north to Takhe Bay on the south. Another
advance in the beginning of August brought the extreme right of their
line down to Louisa Bay on the west, and roughly round in a semicircle
to Takhe Bay, confronting the main line of the formidable Russian
defences. The great assault of the 28th August was, on the whole,
unsuccessful, and achieved nothing on the east. But on the west the
line of investment was drawn still further south until it rested on
Pigeon Bay. It is now necessary to understand more exactly the nature
of the task with which the Japanese army of investment was confronted.
Port Arthur lies in a sort of amphitheatre formed by ranges of hills
varying in height from 1,300 feet to 1,500 feet. These hills sweep
round from Golden Hill--the promontory which on the east commands the
entrance to the harbor--northwards for a distance of nearly three
miles. Then, where the railway line and road pass through them, they
turn westwards and southwards, extending down the toe of the Kwang-tung
promontory to a point parallel with the base of the Tiger's Tail; while
further south still is the formidable Liao-tie-shan range, some 1,500
feet high. On all these hills the Russians had constructed huge
fortifications strengthened with every device which the military
engineer's art could suggest, and armed with the most powerful
artillery. It is true that some of the correspondents who paid hurried
visits to the great naval fortress before the actual outbreak of
hostilities were inclined to belittle the strength of the defences.
Thus Mr. Bennet Burleigh, of the London _Telegraph_, in a most
interesting account expressed his belief that the Russian stronghold
was over-fortified, and that it would be possible for those who
captured outlying defence to command the inner forts. On the other
hand, it must be remembered that the most skilful engineers in the
world had been employed by the Russians in the construction of the
forts, and the fact that such a magnificent and substantial resistance
was offered to ten times the number of soldiers as cleared out the
Chinese in a few days, proves that the soundest military principles
were adhered to. The main positions were defended by advanced works
surrounded by deep moats, in which were built bombproof defences,
roofed with steel plates, and by fanfasses, or mines filled with huge
stones, which could be exploded by the pressure of an electric button.
The approaches were rendered almost inaccessible by barbed-wire
entanglements, pits planted with sharpened stakes, and by transverse
works and trenches which commanded with an enfilading fire every
possible line of advance. The broad scheme of the fortifications may be
easily grasped. Fronting Takhe Bay on the east is the Petushan group of
forts, with the Keekwan-Urlong forts commanding the approaches from the
north and the northeast, and preventing the Petushan forts from being
taken in reverse. West of these forts and on the other side of the
parade-ground and railway are the Antszshan and the Etseshan forts,
which prevent any attack from the northwest, while a chain of forts
from Antszshan to Sunghslwo, running southeastwards down to the inner
harbor, command the parade-ground and railway line. Another line of
forts stretches due south from Etseshan to White Wolf Hill on the west
side of the west port, while yet another series of heavy fortifications
surmounts the high ground along the Tiger's Tail. Well might the
Russians boast that their fortress was impregnable, for if any place of
arms could be justly so described, Nature and military ingenuity had
combined to earn that title for Port Arthur. At the outset of the
investment, Port Arthur's garrison numbered, all told, some 35,000 men.
It was made up of the 3rd, 4th and 7th East Siberian Rifle Brigades,
with part of the 6th, and with the East Siberian Rifle Artillery
Division, and, of course, with the crews of all the men-o'-war lying
imprisoned in the harbor. The numbers were none too great to man
adequately the great chain of works behind which Port Arthur's security
lay; but the troops were of the best quality, and they had the
invaluable inspiration of such a leader as General Stoessel, with such
a capable and gallant lieutenant as General Fock. Stoessel, the hero of
the Russian army in the present war, is descended from an old military
family. His grandfather was a general in the Swedish army, who
afterwards settled in Russia. Stoessel himself, who was born in 1848,
entered the Russian army as a cadet at the age of ten, and received his
commission eight years later, at the same time, curiously enough, as
Kuropatkin. He served with distinction in the Russo-Turkish War, and
afterwards held important commands in Siberia, while since 1899 he had
been stationed at Port Arthur. To the assault and investment of the
fortress, the Japanese, under Nogi, brought up at first 60,000 men,
and, as the operations advanced, large reinforcements which not only
made good the enormous losses sustained, but swelled the fighting
strength to nearly 100,000 men. This number fluctuated to some extent,
for at least two divisions were drawn off from the siege to reinforce
Oyama at the battle of the Sha-ho; but at no time can the total forces
before Port Arthur have been less than 60,000, and then superiority in
numbers to the defence gradually increased until from a proportion of
two to one, it had reached the proportion of six or seven to one. This
growing disparity, of course, was due to the fact that while the
Japanese could replenish their exhausted ranks, the Russian garrison
could not fill the gaps caused by wounds and sickness; while a further
reduction of at least 5,000 men in the forces at Stoessel's command was
made by the naval sortie on August 10th. That feat, of course, deprived
Port Arthur of the services of the crews of all the vessels that
escaped to neutral ports.
[Illustration: JAPANESE SCALING FORT AT PORT ARTHUR.]
[Sidenote: Capture of Forts]
In the great assault of the 19th-26th August the Japanese lost 14,000
men, and succeeded only in capturing the Banjushan fort, which is east
of the Urlungshan forts. General Nogi then settled down to steady siege
operations, drawing his parallels nearer and nearer to the Russian main
position, and capturing the all-important Kuropatkin fort early in
September. This fort, which stands on Division Hill half-way between
Wolf Hill and the harbor, not only commanded the parade-ground, but
gave the Japanese the possession of the waterworks from which the
garrison drew the main water supply. Up to this moment General Nogi's
heaviest guns had been 4.7 and 6in. pieces of the naval type, and they
had been quite unequal to the heavy guns of the position mounted in the
Russian works. But now heavy siege guns and 11in. howitzers arrived
from Japan, and immediately their effect began to make itself felt, so
that by the 19th September another assault was resolved on. This was
directed against three points of the ring of defensive works--against
the metre-hill forts on the west, and (the outworks, as it were of the
great Etseshan and Antszshan forts) against the advanced works of
Urlungshan on the northeast, and against the lunettes in the Shuishi
Valley which connects the Antszshan and the Urlungshan forts. At this
last point some of the fiercest fighting of the whole siege took place.
The Shuishi Valley was defended by a series of strong lunettes
connected by advance works, within fifty yards of which the Japanese
had advanced their parallels. On the evening of the 19th September four
desperate assaults were delivered against the westernmost lunette. All,
however, were beaten back. At dawn the assault was renewed with greater
strength, and the western lunette was carried, mainly by the employment
of dynamite grenades. The Russian garrison were driven out of the
trenches, losing three quick-firers, four machine guns, and two
mortars, but inflicting on the victors losses amounting to over 400
killed and wounded. At the same time a determined assault was made on
203 Metre Hill and the adjoining ridge by three regiments of the right
division. The assaulting parties reached the dead ground beneath the
ridge, but there they were compelled to remain during the night. At
dawn on the 20th a terrific bombardment on the position began and
continued till evening; and when the night had fallen the Japanese
rushed the trenches on the eastern extremity of the crest line after a
fierce hand-to-hand fight in which not only bayonets but even stones
were used. But only part of the work had been won. The fort on the
southwestern slopes of the ridges was still untaken, and though a small
party of the besiegers penetrated the defences here, they were driven
out again next day, and four more assaults delivered during the next
two days proved equally unavailing though terribly costly in life--the
casualty list at this point alone amounting to 2,000. The defences of
this advance fort on 203 Metre Hill were typical of the obstacles which
the Japanese had to overcome in the prosecution of their assaults. The
bomb-proofs connecting the network of trenches which seared the slopes
of the hill were made of steel plates covered with earth, and a triple
row of wire entanglements made the ground in front of the trenches
impassable. In the operations from the 19th to the 26th September the
Japanese lost more than 4,000 killed and wounded. In the assault at the
same time on the advanced works of Urlungshan the parallels of the
Japanese had been carried to within fifty yards of the defences, but
the assault still proved a costly business. Again and again the
assaulting rushes were swept back by rifle and machine-gun fire; but
the indomitable spirit of the Mikado's troops at length prevailed, and
the redoubt was carried at the point of the bayonet. The position thus
gained in front of Urlungshan enabled the Japanese to mount their heavy
howitzers in such a way as to bombard not only the main forts but the
harbor with great effect; and in the course of a few days several of
the warships lying at anchor were severely damaged by the high-angle
fire. By hard fighting and diligent sapping the investing army now
continued to make steady progress against the Urlungshan forts which
lie just east of the road and railway and command their approach to
Port Arthur. On the 10th October the attack managed to establish itself
on the crest of the East Urlungshan fort, and on the 16th the
entrenched hill between Urlungshan and Banjushan, the latter of which
was already in Japanese hands, was taken by storm. On the 25th October
the glacis of East Urlungshan was stormed and held in spite of repeated
counter-attacks on the part of the Russians. In front of these forts on
the northeastern side the fiercest fighting continued all through the
latter part of October and the early part of November, the general
result being that the Japanese saps were brought within less than 300
yards of the main positions while the fire from the howitzers finally
silenced the great forts of Urlungshan and Shunshusan. But these
successes, though considerable, were insufficient to make a really
serious breach in the main lines of the defence, as long as the great
forts on the west--Antszshan and Etseshan--held out, and forthwith the
Japanese attack was diverted to the latter of those two strongholds.
Meanwhile, the heavy and incessant fire directed on the harbor and the
town had been most destructive. The naval repairing works had to be
abandoned, and both the old and the new Chinese towns were rendered
uninhabitable where their buildings were not razed to the ground or
consumed by the fires started by the bursting shells.
[Sidenote: Devices of the Besiegers]
For the first time in history a fortress constructed according to the
latest principles of military science, and defended by modern
long-range artillery, was being besieged; and like the old walled
cities of the 17th and 18th centuries, its defences could only be
overcome by sap and mine and parallel. So much the assailants had
learnt to their cost in their earlier and futile attempts at taking the
place by storm. The exigencies of these operations led to the adoption
of many ingenious devices by the forces on both sides--such, for
instance, as a steel bullet-proof shield to protect the pioneer engaged
in cutting wire entanglements; and the deadly grenade charged with
dynamite, flung into the enemy's trenches by the hand or by means of
wooden mortars bound with bamboo. At first the Japanese had chosen the
night time for their assaults, but this plan had to be abandoned owing
to the effective employment by the Russians of searchlights and star
shells, the former having the effect not only of exposing the
assaulting troops to the fire of the defenders, but blinding them in
their advance on their objective. Throughout the siege the defenders
had shown not only indomitable courage, but inexhaustible resource, and
in spite of all the discouragement which the steady and inexorable
advance of the Japanese might have been supposed to inflict, they
continued equal to every demand on their fortitude. From time to time
supplies reached them by means of blockade-runners, but this was but a
precarious and inadequate means of replenishing the stores on which
such a long and severe strain had been made. And yet, in spite of all
rumors to the effect that ammunition was running short, the great guns
continued to hurl their defiance at the Japanese artillery, and never
in any single instance was the defence weakened by a failure of powder
and shot. Though the Russians had failed to foresee many things which
the course of the war has proved to have been fairly obvious, no one
can pretend that they failed to equip their great stronghold in the Far
East in a manner worthy of its claim to rank as "the Gibraltar of the
East." After nearly six months of close investment and almost
continuous bombardment, the fortress still held at bay an enemy who had
proved himself, not only before the defences of Port Arthur, but in
many a stricken field beside, to possess fighting qualities rarely
equalled and never surpassed in the world's history of warfare--an
enemy, too, who possessed every resource of military science, and who
had studied in the best military schools. The fact that the Japanese,
who had confidently expected to take Port Arthur before the end of the
summer had not even by the middle of November made a decisive breach in
its main defences, speaks volumes for the character of those defences.
But even the strongest fortifications that human ingenuity can
construct are only formidable when men of high spirit man them; and the
chief credit for having baffled so long the most desperate efforts of
Japanese skill and courage must ever be given to General Stoessel and
the men who, serving under him, became infected with his spirit and
inspired by his example. By the middle of November the Japanese lines
had, indeed, been drawn very close round the devoted citadel of the
Czar. They were in possession of the eastern ridge, and held
practically at their mercy that great ring of fortified hills which
shuts in Port Arthur from the Dalny side. They had cut the main water
supply of the garrison, and they had possessed themselves of important
ground to the north of the old town, and their siege guns were able to
render the dockyards and the harbor untenable for ships of war. To the
west the advance had been less signal, and their foothold on the great
ridge which commands the fortress on the western side was at best
slight and precarious; while not even the faintest impression had been
made on the great chain of fortifications at Liau-tie-shan, in the
extreme south corner of the peninsula.
[Sidenote: The Undaunted Stoessel]
Tremendous efforts had been made to achieve the capture of the place by
the 3rd November, the birthday of the Mikado; but that auspicious day
passed without the fall of Port Arthur seeming to be in any degree
nearer, while General Stoessel continued to send cheerful and undaunted
messages to his Imperial master whenever a boat succeeded in running
the blockade of the Japanese fleet and in reaching Chifu. Through all
these protracted and strenuous operations, the losses of the Japanese
had been very severe; they cannot have been less than 40,000 men, and
they may have been considerably more. The garrison had suffered less
severely, but in the absence of reserves their losses were even more
serious, and by the middle of November the total effective force was
little more than 10,000 men. It will ever be a mystery how a force so
utterly inferior to its enemy, defending, a wide perimeter of
fortifications, every point of which was daily liable to fierce assault
and bombardment, could for so many weeks endure the awful strain to
which it was subjected. Yet the indomitable garrison was never
quiescent or passive in its resistance. Besides repelling assault, it
engaged in continual sorties and counter-attacks, and often, when
driven from an essential position succeeded in recapturing it at the
point of the bayonet. A remarkable instance of this offensive capacity
was furnished in the course of the great assault from the 19th
September to the 26th September. In operating from the north against
the defences of the Shuishi Valley, which lies between Antszshan and
Urlungshan, the Japanese, after their first success, pressed on against
High Hill, a position of the most vital importance to the defence, as
it permitted the principal forts on the west of the town to be taken in
reverse. As any attempt to retake the hill must be a desperate
enterprise, General Stoessel refused to issue an order for its
recapture, but called for volunteers. The requisite number were at once
forthcoming, and led by Lieutenant Podgorsky, they attacked the
Japanese with grenades and drove them from the position which they had
already begun to entrench.
In his dispatch of the 23rd September, this is how General Stoessel
reports the affair:--
[Sidenote: The Gallant Podgorsky]
"The last assault on High Hill was repulsed to-day at 5 o'clock in the
morning. The enemy had actually occupied some of the defences of the
High Hill position and had placed machine-guns in them, which they
directed against our troops. Lieutenant Podgorsky was dispatched to
this part of the field by General Kondrachenko with a force of
chasseurs and engineers, who under the direction of Colonel Irmann
hurled grenades filled with pyroxiline into the works held by the
Japanese. These exploded among the enemy, who fled in panic. Captain
Sytcheff, of the 5th Regiment, pursued the flying foe with chasseurs.
Colonel Irmann attributes the principal share in the work of compelling
the enemy to withdraw entirely from High Hill to Lieutenant Podgorsky.
The Japanese lost over 10,000 men. All our troops distinguished
themselves. General Kondrachenko, Colonel Irmann, Captain Sytcheff, and
Lieutenant Podgorsky won special distinction. The troops fought
heroically, particularly the 5th Regiment. The whole garrison down to
the last man is resolved to defend Russia's bulwark in the Far East to
the last drop of blood."
[Sidenote: World-wide Admiration]
But even the greatest heroism cannot achieve the impossible; and in
spite of Stoessel's persistent optimism, it became evident that his
powers of resistance were daily diminishing. An attempt on the part of
the Japanese General to induce the garrison to capitulate in spite of
their leader, met with no response; but throughout the civilized world,
whose sympathy and admiration had been deeply stirred by the heroic
stand of Port Arthur's garrison, voices were lifted to urge that no
more useless sacrifice of noble life should be permitted; and that the
men who had done so much for the honor of the Czar should be spared at
least the last mortal agony of the struggle with the inevitable.
[Sidenote: Uncertain News]
On the 15th, however, a Russian torpedo-boat bearing dispatches from
Stoessel managed to elude the blockade and to reach Chifu, pursued by
Japanese destroyers. The boat was warned that it must leave the neutral
harbor within twenty-four hours or be disarmed, and rather than submit
to either of these alternatives, the officer in command blew his vessel
up. But his work had been done; and his dispatches containing the
latest accounts of the position at Port Arthur reached St. Petersburg.
Immediately afterwards the report arrived that General Kuropatkin had
been empowered to treat for terms of capitulation for Port Arthur. But
whether that was in fact the result of Stoessel's message, or whether
the Czar's Government received from it encouragement in the belief that
Port Arthur could hold out till the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, is a
question which is still unanswered.
[Illustration: THE REMNANT OF A REGIMENT--AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE
SHA-HO.]