CHAPTER III.

No Rest for Russia--Port Arthur--The Russian Forts--Another

Russian Disaster--Second Night Attack--Japanese Daring--Demons

of the Storm--Moral Effect--Bottling up Port Arthur--The

Fireships--Fire and Searchlight--Rain of Shell--Russians Still

in the Woods--The Blockade--Transport Problems--Secrecy of

Japanese Movements--Admirable Arrangements--A Close

Censorship--Japanese Landings--Terrible Weather--At

Ping-Yang--Perfect Organization--At Seoul--The Korean

Emperor--A Japanese Protectorate--Advantage to Japan--Railway

Building--Japanese Rapidity--Dismay at St.

Petersburg--Alexeieff Criticised--General

Kuropatkin--Confessions of Weakness--Desperate Efforts--On the

Yalu--Round Niuchwang--Martial Law Proclaimed.

[Sidenote: No Rest for Russia]

If the Russians at Port Arthur imagined that an enemy so resourceful as

Admiral Togo had shown himself to be would rest quietly upon his oars

after the conspicuous successes of the 8th and 9th of February, they

were greatly mistaken. The first course of action for the victor in

such a case is to keep on striking and to give the harassed foe no

rest--in the striking words of Captain Mahan, to "benumb the victim."

This was precisely the plan of campaign adopted by the Japanese, who

continued to show the same remarkable skill and coolness of

calculation, and the same dash and daring in execution as had

characterized their naval operations from the first. On the other hand,

the disorganization of the Russian fleet, and of the defending force at

Port Arthur generally, showed itself more markedly than ever, and the

incapacity of the Czar's commanders conspired to aid the enterprise of

the Japanese.

[Sidenote: Port Arthur]

Before entering, however, upon a narrative of the attacks upon Port

Arthur which followed in swift succession upon the great battle of the

9th, it may be well to give some description of that famous stronghold.

The inner harbor is oval in shape, and two miles long from east to west

and a mile in breadth from north to south. The shores are protected by

hills, which the Russians had assiduously fortified since they obtained

occupation of the place. Entrance is afforded from the south by a

narrow channel, so narrow indeed that while it has the advantage of

being easily held against an enemy, it has the counteracting

disadvantage of being somewhat difficult of navigation for the ships of

the defending fleet. The mouth of this channel is protected on the

southwest by two dangerous reefs, which would prove a snare to an

unwary foe; while on the eastern shore there stands the hill of

Kwang-chin-shan, 250 feet above the sea level, upon which frown the

guns of several powerful batteries. Upon the lower slopes the Russians

had established two batteries of Canet quick-firing 5.5in. and 7.5mm.

guns, with a torpedo and searchlight station. The entrance channel is

flanked along the northwest by a narrow strip of land which goes by the

expressive name of the "Tiger's Tail," and this strip was fortified

with battery of 7 Canet 5.5in. quick-firing guns. The distance from the

Pinnacle Rock, one of the reefs above mentioned as situated at the

western corner of the entrance passage, to the opposite shore, is

nearly 350 yards. In its course the channel narrows, till at one point

it is only 500 feet in width, but it widens out again at the northern

end. At the northeastern end lies the basin, or East Port. There is

accommodation here for about a dozen large men-of-war, and on the north

side stands the one dry dock for repairing large vessels of which Port

Arthur can boast. On the other side of the channel, which at this point

is 430 yards in width, lies the mouth of the harbor proper, facing the

southeast. To enter it, ships have to round the Tiger's Tail, not a

particularly easy process for men-of-war of the largest size. Nor is

the harbor itself yet fitted to receive a great fleet. When the

Russians took it over they found that it was too shallow for berthing

vessels even of a moderate size; and in spite of the feverish activity

of their engineers in the last year or two, the dredging operations

have not proceeded far enough to allow of accommodations for more than

three battleships, together with minor craft. Hence the Port Arthur

squadron has generally been disposed either in the East Port, or basin,

or in the open roadstead outside the entrance channel. It was indeed

the position of the Russian ships in this latter anchorage that gave

the Japanese the opportunity for their fatal torpedo attack on the 8th.

[Illustration: _THE HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR._]

[Sidenote: The Russian Forts]

The land defences of Port Arthur were exceptionally strong. A range of

forts, of which the Kwang-chin Hill already mentioned was the most

important, commanded the harbor entrance; and another range of

batteries, with the most powerful and up-to-date garrison ordnance,

surmounted the hills which surround the town and protect it on the

other side. Another line of forts guards the entrance channel on the

west side, the most important being Wei-yuen. It seemed, indeed,

undoubted that Port Arthur was impregnable from the sea, though at the

beginning of the war European experts were not inclined to dogmatize as

to the possibilities of its being stormed from the land side. As for

the fleet, if it were lying in the West Harbor or in the East Port

under the shadow of Kwan-chin, it would probably be perfectly safe from

attack; but, on the other hand, it will be seen that there was a danger

that the narrow entrance channel might be blocked up by an enterprising

enemy, in which case the Czar's ships, even if they were the finest in

the world, would be useless for all the essential purposes of naval

warfare. This attempt to "cork up the bottle" was, indeed, nearly

carried out by Admiral Togo in the course of the fortnight following

the outbreak of war.

[Sidenote: Another Russian Disaster]

Two days after the great attack another disaster befell the hapless

Russians. With this the Japanese fleet, which had retired temporarily

to the Elliot Islands in the Korean Gulf to refit and repair injuries,

had nothing to do. It was solely due to carelessness and mischance; and

while illustrating the state of demoralization that existed at Port

Arthur, it contributed to spread that demoralization still further

among the already sufficiently harassed forces of the defenders. The

mine transport _Yenesei_, which, with her sister ship the _Amur_, was

engaged in superintending the mine defences of the harbor entrance,

observing a submarine mine which had become detached floating on the

surface of the water, approached it for the purpose of firing upon it

and thus removing an obvious danger to the ships lying at anchor.

Unfortunately, in the excitement of the process, Captain Stepanoff, who

was in command, allowed his ship to drift upon a neighboring mine. A

terrific explosion followed, and the _Yenesei_, with a yawning hole in

her bows, began at once to settle down. An attempt was made to lower

the boats, but the catastrophe was so sudden and unexpected that little

could be done. Captain Stepanoff went down with his ship, and there

perished also, either from the direct effects of the explosion or from

drowning, the engineer, two midshipmen and ninety-two men of lower

rank. Not only was this terrible disaster damaging to the _morale_ of

the fleet, but it deprived Admiral Alexeieff of a valuable ship and of

stores which he could ill spare. The _Yenesei_ was built at Kronstadt

in 1898. She was of 2,500 tons displacement, with a speed of 17-1/2

knots; was armed with five 4.7-inch and six smaller quick-firing guns,

and was capable of carrying 500 mines. It is, of course, possible that

she had not that full number on board at the time of the explosion, but

in any case the loss in this respect alone must have been very severe.

The accident throws an instructive and rather terrifying light upon the

possible dangers of submarine mines, not only to the enemy who are

attacking a fortified port, but also to the defenders themselves.

[Sidenote: Second Night Attack]

Before the Russians at Port Arthur had recovered from this

nerve-shaking disaster the tireless foe flew at their throat once more.

On the night of the 13th a flotilla of Japanese torpedo-boat destroyers

started out to make another dash at the survivors of the Czar's fleet,

which were still lying in the open roadstead, presenting for a daring

and resourceful enemy a tempting object of attack. The flotilla was

under the command of Captain Nagai. A blinding snowstorm was raging at

the time, and it was no wonder in the circumstances that the vessels

became separated from one another and that some lost their way

altogether. But two, more fortunate than their fellows, hit the right

course. These were the _Asagiri_, under Captain Iakawa, and the

_Hayatori_, commanded by Captain Takanouchi. A snowstorm on that coast

is enough to tax the skill and the courage of the most intrepid sailor,

but the Japanese officers and crews were equal to the occasion. Right

in the teeth of the awful blizzard, their decks sheeted with ice and

snow, but with hearts on board hot with the fire of heroic adventure,

the gallant little craft held steadily on their way. The navigating

lieutenants had to find their course more by instinct than by

calculation, for it was impossible to see anything clearly ahead

through the pitch-darkness and the relentless snow. On, however, they

crept through the terrible night, each working independently of the

other, for under such conditions no concerted plan of attack was

possible.

[Sidenote: Japanese Daring]

At three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, the _Asagiri_ reached the

harbor mouth, and in she dashed regardless of the searchlights, which

made broad, livid tracks even through the storm of snow. A hot fire at

once broke out from the fortress and the ships, but the aim of the

gunners was wild, and, undaunted by the perils of his situation,

Captain Iakawa drove his boat right up to the Russian torpedo flotilla,

and discharged a torpedo at one of the larger vessels, from whose

funnels smoke was seen ascending. The deadly weapon went home, and

after waiting to see that it exploded, the _Asagiri_ engaged in a smart

exchange of shots with the enemy's torpedo boats and destroyers, in the

course of which she sent a "scout" to the bottom. Then, and not till

then, did her brave commander withdraw. Turning out to sea once more,

and still hotly replying to the Russian fire until she was out of

range, the _Asagiri_ safely escaped, covered with honor.

[Sidenote: Demons of the Storm]

Two hours later the _Hayatori_ arrived upon the scene and performed the

same gallant feat. Still facing the terrors of the storm, she

approached the harbor entrance and stealthily crept up to the fleet,

which lay helplessly at anchor. At last the audacious little destroyer

was discovered. Two vessels opened a fierce fire upon her, but without

hesitation, though at the same time with the most deliberate coolness

and perfect aim, she discharged a torpedo at the nearest ship. The

missile was seen to explode, and then, like her consort, the _Asagiri_,

fled safely to sea once more, after spiritedly returning the hot

fusillade directed upon her from all quarters.

[Sidenote: Moral Effect]

In the characteristically restrained dispatch in which Admiral Togo

described this brilliant feat of arms by the _Asagiri_ and the

_Hayatori_, he remarked:--"It is impossible to state the definite

material results, owing to the darkness, but the moral effect was

certainly considerable." From other sources, however, something was

learned of the character of the material damage done to the Russian

fleet Not only was a scout destroyed, but the cruiser _Boyarin_ was

injured by one of the torpedoes, and the Volunteer Fleet steamer

_Kayan_ had her upper works knocked about by a shell from one of the

Russian guns. The exact amount of the damage done was not revealed on

the Russian side, but there can at all events be no doubt that, in the

words of the Japanese Admiral, the moral effect was considerable. It is

clear from the safe return of these two small destroyers out of the

very jaws of the enemy, that the Russian gunners had become

demoralized, and the ineffectiveness of Admiral Alexeieff's own torpedo

flotilla in the face of an attack which it was peculiarly designed to

meet points strongly in the same direction.

[Illustration: RUSSIAN FLEET TRYING TO LEAVE PORT ARTHUR.]

[Sidenote: Bottling up Port Arthur]

But still a third harassing attack was in store for the Russian fleet.

While one division of his torpedo-boat destroyers was thus carrying

confusion and dismay into the ranks of his opponents, Admiral Togo,

holding his main fleet within the shelter of the Elliot Islands, was

quietly preparing for a larger and more far-reaching _coup_. This was

to be nothing less than the operation of "corking up the bottle," in

other words sinking ships at the entrance to Port Arthur Harbor, and

blocking the fairway against passage of the Russian ships. It was an

enterprise in some ways similar to the famous exploit of Lieutenant

Hobson of the _Merrimac_ at Santiago-de-Cuba during the

Spanish-American War, but in the present case the blockading fleet

attained less success.

[Sidenote: The Fire Ships]

Five old steamers were chartered for the purpose. Their names were the

_Tenshin Maru_, the _Bushu Maru_, the _Buyo Maru_, the _Hokoku Maru_,

and the _Jinsen Maru_. Two of these, under the names of the _Rohilla_

and the _Brindisi_, were formerly in the service of the Peninsular and

Oriental Company. It may here be remarked that the spirit animating all

ranks of the Japanese in this war was shown by the numbers of

volunteers who came forward for the dangerous task of manning the

doomed steamers. The difficulty, indeed, was not to find sufficient

men, but to select the limited force required without giving offence to

the remainder of the host who sought to share in the glorious risk. At

last, however, the officers and crews were chosen, and the vessels,

having been carefully filled with heavy stones and explosives, left for

Port Arthur on the morning of the 23rd of February, escorted by a

flotilla of torpedo boats and destroyers.

[Sidenote: Fire and Searchlight]

In the darkness of the early morning of the 24th, they reached the

roadstead outside Port Arthur, the _Tenshin Maru_ leading the way. The

Russians, however, were more vigilant than on former occasions, and

their searchlights soon revealed the renewed presence of their

insatiable enemy. The _Tenshin Maru_, steering too far to the left,

came within the fire of the batteries on the Tiger's Tail at close

range. She was disabled by a shell, ran upon the rocks three miles to

the southwest of the harbor entrance, and there blew up. The other

steamers changed their course to the northeast, but the attentions of

the Russian searchlight operators rendered their progress highly

difficult and dangerous, and they were soon the object of a positive

storm of fire from the forts on the Tiger's Tail, Golden Hill, and

Electric Cliff, and also from the damaged _Retvisan_, which lay

grounded at the entrance to the channel. The _Bushu Maru_ was the first

to suffer from the cannonade. Her steering gear was carried away, and,

staggering blindly to the west, she grounded close to the _Tenshin

Maru_, blew up, and sank. The fate of the _Buyo Maru_ was no better.

She was raked fore and aft by the Russian shells, and before she could

reach the coveted entrance she also exploded and sank beneath the

waters.

[Sidenote: Rain of Shells]

The _Hokoku Maru_ and the _Jinsen Maru_ were more successful. They made

a rush together for the harbor channel, and got close up to the

_Retvisan_. Disregarding the heavy fire directed upon them from the

disabled but still dangerous monster, the adventurous volunteers calmly

anchored their vessels upon the spot previously selected. Then only did

they set the match to the fuses. Cheering loudly, but with no undue

precipitation, they now took to the boats and pulled away in perfect

order, in spite of the rain of shells and bullets showered around them

on every side. The abandoned steamers blew up immediately afterwards

and sank close to the lighthouse at the channel mouth. The activity of

the Russian searchlights and the hot fire from the guns of the

_Retvisan_ and the forts compelled the men in the boats to take a very

roundabout course, and they could not regain the Japanese torpedo

fleet, which in the meantime had successfully picked up the crews of

the other sunken ships. But the situation of the sailors of the _Hokoku

Maru_ and the _Jinsen Maru_ was full of peril. To add to their

difficulties, the wind rose to a gale towards daybreak, and they were

driven out of their course. But they struggled bravely on, and, after

enduring great hardships, they managed to reach the main fleet about

three o'clock in the afternoon. According to the Japanese Admiral's

report, all engaged returned in safety from this dangerous enterprise,

an achievement comparable to the most daring "cutting-out" expeditions

of olden times. It should be added that not a single destroyer or

torpedo-boat was injured.

[Sidenote: Russians Still in the Wood]

Owing to the failure of three of the steamers to reach the entrance of

the channel, and the insufficient size of the two which were

successfully sunk there, the main object of the scheme was not

attained, but it is thought that some temporary inconvenience was

caused to the Russians, especially as the position of the grounded

_Retvisan_ herself was already something of an impediment to

navigation. Extraordinary jubilation was created in the Czar's

dominions, particularly in the Capital, by the failure of the Japanese

expeditions. It was at first thought by the defending force, in the

darkness and confusion, that the merchant steamers were men-of-war, and

a grandiloquent account was sent to St. Petersburg by an imaginative

correspondent announcing no less a disaster to the Japanese than the

destruction of four of their battleships, after a severe engagement in

which the wounded _Retvisan_ had covered herself with glory. The news

was quickly transmitted abroad by the semi-official agency, and the

greatest excitement was caused in every capital in Europe. Cool-headed

people, nevertheless, waited for some confirmation of this remarkable

story, and when the truth came out the partisans of Russia were

chagrined to find what a different complexion the real facts wore.

Admiral Alexeieff, however, after the previous disasters which had

befallen his fleet, was to be pardoned, perhaps, for the somewhat

exultant tone of his dispatch to the Czar, in which he attributed what

he called "the complete derangement of the enemy's plan" to "the

brilliant resistance and destructive fire of the _Retvisan_."

[Sidenote: The Blockade]

Undiscouraged by the failure of this attempt to bottle up the enemy,

Admiral Togo continued to maintain a strict blockade of the port, and

to pursue the policy of alternate torpedo attacks and heavy

bombardments at frequent intervals. But before proceeding with the

story of these damaging and disconcerting operations, it will be

convenient to describe the course which events were taking in other

quarters of the theatre of war.

[Sidenote: Transport Problems]

The signal success of Japan at sea had reduced to comparatively simple

proportion the problem of the transport of her forces to the seat of

war on land, where the curtain was about to rise on the most desperate

act in the great drama. With half the Russian fleet at Port Arthur

disabled, with the other half confined to the harbor by strict

blockade, and with the Vladivistock cruiser squadron reduced to

ineffective isolation, the Mikado's military advisers were able to

choose the most convenient landing-places in Korea with a freedom which

was only limited by the difficulties of the winter season. This indeed

was a serious impediment to the movement of troops in large numbers.

Not only were most of the available harbors both in Korea and on the

Liao-tung Peninsula blocked by the ice, but when the invading force

landed it found the roads in such a state as to render them almost

impassable. The country was covered with snow several inches deep; the

frost was biting; and even when milder weather began to prevail the

conditions did not at once prove more favorable to marching operations

and to the conveyance of heavy artillery. For the time being, in fact,

they grew worse rather than better, for the thaw produced a perfect sea

of mud, which made progress northwards a terribly slow and painful

business. Anyone who has tried to cross a ploughed field during the

break up of a prolonged frost can form some idea--faint, however, at

the best--of the pleasures of marching in Korea at the beginning of

spring.

[Sidenote: Secrecy of Japanese Movements]

In spite, nevertheless, of all the natural difficulties of the

situation, the Japanese proceeded steadily and systematically to "weave

the crimson web of war." Nothing has been more remarkable in the course

of these operations both by sea and by land than the complete secrecy

with which the Mikado's strategists have veiled all their important

movements until the calculated blow has been struck. In this, of

course, they have been aided by their speedy acquisition of the command

of the sea. All the correspondents who have proceeded to the seat of

war agree in paying mortified tributes to the thoroughness of the

Japanese press censorship. For weeks together a great army of

"specials" were condemned idly to kick their heels at Nagasaki, while

before their eyes transport after transport, crowded with soldiery, was

leaving that port for unknown destinations. It was, however, generally

evident on the face of the broad facts of the situation, that the main

objective of the Japanese armies at that time was the west coast of

Korea; for though the ports in the district were undoubtedly difficult

of access on account of the ice, the condition of things on the

Liao-tung Peninsula, the other probable place of disembarkation, was

very much worse.

[Sidenote: Admirable Arrangements]

Before the end of February over forty transports sailed from Nagasaki,

and a still larger embarkation went on at Ujina, near Hiroshima, where

a great force of horse, foot, and artillery were steadily detrained

every day and sent on board. The admirable arrangements made by the

Japanese directors of mobilization and transport were the theme of

universal praise among unprejudiced observers. Everything had been

carefully thought out beforehand; all the necessary material was ready;

and consequently, when war broke out, there was no confusion, no undue

haste--only the ordered bustle of men who knew exactly what they had to

do and how it was to be done, down to the veriest detail. Special

wharves had been prepared and were in position within a few days, with

railway lines laid upon them, connecting them with the main lines over

which the troops travelled from the interior, so that the trains could

be brought down almost to the water's edge. Here the soldiers were

detrained, and, after a meal, embarked upon lighters and steam

launches, and were conveyed swiftly to the ships to which they were

assigned. These transports averaged 6,000 tons in burden, and were

excellently fitted up for their purpose. An important part of the

vessels' equipment in each case was a number of large surf-boats or

sampans, about the most useful form of boat possible for landing troops

in the shoal waters of the Korean harbors.

[Sidenote: A Close Censorship]

What was taking place in the meanwhile on the other side of the

channel, and particularly upon the western coast of the Hermit Kingdom?

We now know something of the strength and the disposition of the

Japanese forces, although right up to the last moment before the

general advance only the smallest items of information were allowed to

pass through the narrow-meshed net of the censorship.

[Sidenote: Japanese Landings]

According to the most trustworthy accounts, however, there seems little

doubt that the chief point of disembarkation of the Mikado's army was

Chinampo, a small and obscure treaty port situated about 150 miles

north of Chemulpo. We have already related the landing of the Japanese

advance guard at Chemulpo on February 8th, before the naval battle

which resulted in the destruction of the _Varyag_ and the _Korietz_.

This force, which belonged to the 12th Infantry Division under General

Inouye, and consisted of 2,500 men, was billeted at once in the little

town, and was followed during the next few days by the remainder of the

Division, with transport corps, train, and engineers. When the Mikado's

advisers had been assured of the success of the initial naval

operations and of Admiral Togo's supremacy at sea, a small expedition

was immediately landed near Haiju, a place situated about half-way

between Chemulpo and Chinampo, and sent forward by the Seoul-Wiju road

to seize Ping-Yang, a strategical point the importance of which was

amply demonstrated in the Chino-Japanese war. The main body of General

Inouye's Division followed with all possible speed from Chemulpo.

[Sidenote: Terrible Weather]

The hardships which these troops had to face were terrible indeed. The

weather was at its worst. Heavy rain was succeeded by frost, and on the

top of the frost came snow, and cruel blinding blizzards, in the teeth

of which the little Japs, each man burdened with a weight of 100 lbs.,

had to struggle as best they could. In the circumstances the

achievement of these forerunners of the Mikado's main army did an

admirable piece of work. They did a steady march of 25 miles a day,

bivouacking in the dirty Korean villages by night. At last, after four

or five days, the force reached Ping-Yang and proceeded with all

expedition to fortify it against possible attack. By the end of

February a considerable body of troops was in occupation of Ping-Yang,

and patrols were being pushed northwards to Anju.

[Sidenote: At Ping-Yang]

The seizure of this strong position, providing as it did against any

immediate danger from the north, enabled the Japanese to land higher up

the coast than Chemulpo, and henceforth the main work of disembarkation

in this quarter was carried on at Chinampo, access to which is gained

by an arm of the sea called the Ping-Yang Inlet.

[Sidenote: Perfect Organization]

Here we find the complement of the operations which at Nagasaki and

Ujina excited such keen admiration on the part of foreign critics.

Perfect order and discipline characterized the disembarkation of the

Japanese, as it had characterized their embarkation. The Pink-Yang

Inlet is difficult of navigation at the best of times, but the inherent

difficulties were enormously enhanced at this period of the year by the

drift ice, which rendered landing an awkward and, in some cases, a

hazardous undertaking. But the Japanese showed that admirable

forethought which has characterized every step they have taken, and the

transports brought with them large numbers of pontoon wharves, which

enabled the troops to disembark from the sampans at some distance from

the shore, and to march easily on to firm land. Here the hardy

Japanese, in spite of the severe cold, bivouacked for the most part in

the open, and were then pushed forward with all possible rapidity

towards Ping-Yang. By the middle of March, as far as can be estimated,

at least 80,000 men had landed in Korea ready to advance northwards as

soon as the weather would permit; General Kuroki, commanding the 1st

Army Corps, assuming the direction of affairs until the arrival of

Baron Kodama, the Chief of the General Staff, who had been appointed

Commander-in-Chief.

[Illustration: RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE DESTROYERS AT CLOSE QUARTERS, MARCH

9TH.]

[Sidenote: At Seoul]

In the meanwhile a strong force, under General Inouye, had marched upon

Seoul, and without difficulty overawed the feeble Emperor and his

corrupt Court. On the 12th of February M. Pavloff, whose name had for

so long been a word to conjure with in Korea, left the capital for

Chemulpo under the humiliating protection of a Japanese guard. M.

Pavloff, it is said, was thunderstruck by the news of the disasters to

the Russian navy, and by the sudden revelation of the real strength of

the hitherto despised Island Empire. It was now clear to the world, and

not least to his dupes, the Koreans, that the diplomatic bluff in which

he, in common with his administrative chief, Admiral Alexeieff, had

been indulging for so long was ludicrously out of proportion to the

naval and military preparations which would ultimately have to support

it. But the power of this able man at the Court of Seoul, though broken

for the moment, was not by any means destroyed. So well had he done his

work that even in the hour of Japan's triumph he still managed to find

tools in the corrupt servants of the Emperor, and when he had taken his

departure for Shanghai more than one attempt to communicate with him

had to be frustrated by the Japanese.

[Sidenote: The Korean Emperor]

For the time being, however, the star of Japan was unquestionably in

the ascendant at Seoul. The Emperor hastened to congratulate the Mikado

on the victory of his fleet, and assured him that in view of Korea's

position her satisfaction equalled that of the Japanese. At the same

time the Korean local officials were ordered by the central Government

to give every facility to the invading troops.

[Sidenote: A Japanese Protectorate]

But a more definite acknowledgment of Japanese supremacy followed. On

February 23rd an important agreement was signed at Seoul by M. Hayashi,

the Minister of the Mikado, and General Yi-Chi-Yong, the Korean

Minister for Foreign Affairs. By the terms of this Protocol, Korea,

"convinced of Japan's friendship," undertook to adopt the advice of the

Japanese Government in regard to administrative reform "with a view to

consolidating the peace of the Orient." On the other hand, Japan

guaranteed the safety of the Imperial family and the independence and

territorial integrity of Korea. In pursuance of this provision, the

fourth Article declared that an encroachment by a third Power, or an

internal disturbance resulting in danger to either of these interests,

would justify prompt measures on the part of Japan, who would receive

assistance from Korea, and in order to give effect to such action Japan

might occupy strategical points in Korea if necessary.

[Sidenote: Advantage to Japan]

The object of this agreement was, of course, to regularize Japan's

position in the eyes of the Powers and at the same time to give a sop

to the dignity of Korea. Its most important point, as far as the future

was concerned, was the definite guarantee on the part of Japan of the

independence and territorial integrity of the Hermit Kingdom. The

significance of this action of the Mikado's Government, as foretelling

the lines of their permanent policy in the event of a final victory

over the forces of the Czar, was heightened by the visit to Seoul a few

weeks afterwards, on a special mission, of Japan's most famous

statesman, the Marquis Ito. The attention was reciprocated by the

dispatch of a special envoy from the Korean Court to Tokio. The most

important immediate effect, however, of the complete ascendancy now

acquired by Japan at Seoul was of military rather than of civil

interest. This was the granting of a concession to the Japanese under

Article 4 of the Protocol, for the construction of the projected

railway between Seoul and Wiju, on the Yalu River, while at the same

time arrangements were made for the completion of the southern portion

of the line between Seoul and Fusan, a port at the southern extremity

of Korea.

[Sidenote: Railway Building]

Here the marvelous organization of the Japanese War Office came into

evidence once more. All the preparations for acting upon this

concession had already been made. The material which had been intended

for the construction of some unimportant railways in Japan was at hand

ready to be transferred to the seat of war, and the engineer and

pioneer corps only waited for the conclusion of the necessary

formalities to begin operations. On March 8th a body of 8,000 men

started work on the line between Seoul and Wiju, and the enterprise was

conducted at high pressure, the material being conveyed with all

possible speed by steamers from Japan. The value of this railway for

strategical purposes will be obvious to anyone who studies the map;

and, more fortunate than the Russians, the Japanese, provided that they

could hold the northern part of Korea at all, were not likely to be

faced with the difficulties which had proved so embarrassing to their

enemy, in the shape of brigands and train-wreckers, in Manchuria. The

completion of the whole line as far as Fusan would furthermore make

them practically independent of sea transport for men as well as

supplies, except, of course, as far as the narrow Korean Channel is

concerned.

[Sidenote: Japanese Rapidity]

It will thus be seen that, considering the inevitable delay due to the

severity of the season, the preparations for a general advance by the

Japanese army had been conducted with remarkable celerity and success,

and that by the middle of March great progress had been made.

We must now turn to the Russian side of the war.

[Sidenote: Dismay at St. Petersburg]

One of the first consequences of the reverses at Port Arthur was a

change in the commands. The unexpected collapse of the Russian navy

under the attacks of the despised Japanese caused grave searchings of

heart at St. Petersburg, and there can be no doubt that the Czar

himself was greatly shocked by the revelation both of the lack of

readiness of his fleet and of the strange paralysis of enterprise on

the part of the Admiral in command. It was not long before the Imperial

displeasure was visited upon this officer, Admiral Starck. On the 16th

of February he was formally superseded, and Admiral Makaroff,

Commander-in-Chief at Kronstadt, and a sailor of proved energy and

skill, was appointed to the command of the Pacific Fleet in his place.

The official reason, indeed, which was given out for Admiral Starck's

recall was "ill-health," but this ingenious euphemism deceived nobody,

the less so because the same mysterious complaint simultaneously seized

hold of Rear-Admiral Molas, his second Chief of the Staff, who was

recalled in the same Imperial Ukase.

[Sidenote: Alexeieff Criticized]

The Viceroy himself did not escape criticism at the hands of the

Russian public, and in official circles at St. Petersburg keen censure

was bestowed upon him for his share in the disasters which had befallen

the fleet under his control; but he still appeared to retain the

confidence of his master the Czar. It soon became apparent, however,

that the military problem in Manchuria presented difficulties of its

own hardly less embarrassing than those which were being experienced at

sea, and as the magnitude of the task dawned upon the Czar and his

advisers, it was deemed necessary to take drastic measures. On February

21st, therefore, the celebrated General Kuropatkin, Minister for War,

and the first Russian military strategist of the day, was appointed

Commander-in-Chief of the land forces in the Far East. It was carefully

explained that Admiral Alexeieff, as a naval officer, could not be

expected to conduct great operations on land, but it was apparent to

everyone that as these land operations were now destined finally to

decide the issue of the great conflict, the direction of the whole war

on the Russian side had virtually passed to General Kuropatkin.

[Sidenote: General Kuropatkin]

Some slight account of this famous captain may not be out of place

here. Like so many of Russia's distinguished men, both in the past and

in the present, Alexis Nikolaievitch Kuropatkin has owed his rise

rather to merit than to influence. His family was indeed a noble one,

but it was little known, and his early advancement in the service was

due to his own ability and industry, and not to high connections. When

quite young, however, he was fortunate enough to attract the attention

of the celebrated Skobeleff, and he became a great favorite as well as

a zealous disciple of that famous cavalry leader. His opportunity came

in the Russo-Turkish War, where he displayed notable dash and

gallantry, risking his life recklessly in the terrible conflict at

Plevna. In crossing the Balkans he captured a large Turkish force, and

was promoted to the command of a division. Towards the close of the war

he became Chief of the Staff to Skobeleff, and in the campaign against

the Turkomans, which followed, and which resulted in the conquest of

Turkestan, he served that great General in the same capacity. His rise

was indeed remarkably rapid; promotion came to him while he was young

and active enough to make the best use of it; and although he had held

the highest position in the army--the Ministry for War--for some years,

his age was now only fifty-six. Like most successful men, he was not

without his critics and detractors--it was said indeed that among these

was to be found Admiral Alexeieff himself, and that there was no love

lost between the two--but there can be no doubt of the General's

immense popularity with the army. His appointment to the supreme

command caused a universal feeling of relief to spread not only

throughout the Service, but throughout all classes of society in

Russia, while at the same time it proved that the real seriousness of

the task which lay then in the Far East had at last been grasped by the

Czar's Government.

[Sidenote: Confessions of Weakness]

For a time indeed the haughty disdain of their puny foe, which had

characterized Russian official circles before the war, was succeeded by

a feeling of acute pessimism. To prepare the public for the worst, an

official _communique_ was issued at St. Petersburg, in which, after an

outburst of well affected indignation against the so-called treachery

of the enemy, the people were warned that much time was necessary in

order to strike at Japan blows "worthy of the dignity and might of

Russia," while the state of unpreparedness on land as well as at sea

was revealed in the phrase, "the distance of the territory now attached

and the desire of the Czar to maintain peace were the causes of the

impossibility of preparations for war being made a long time in

advance." Simultaneously with the issue of this extraordinary

confession came the news that Admiral Alexeieff with his staff had left

Port Arthur and proceeded to Harbin, at the junction of the Manchurian

railway and the branch line to Vladivostock, there to effect a

concentration of all the available Russian forces.

[Sidenote: Desperate Efforts]

These facts combined were generally taken as indicating the intention

of the Czar's Government to abandon Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria,

for the time being, to their fate, and to make the first real stand

against the enemy on the borders of Eastern Siberia. Desperate,

however, as the situation appeared to be in these early days of the

war, it undoubtedly improved somewhat in the next few weeks, and the

delay which the severe climatic conditions imposed upon the Japanese

advance necessarily aided the Russians. General Linevitch, commander of

the Siberian Army Corps, to whom the direction of military affairs was

entrusted pending the arrival of General Kuropatkin, made desperate

exertions to collect an effective force as far south as possible, and

it was regarded as highly probable, from such scraps of news as were

allowed to creep through the censorship, that by the third week of

March he had at his disposal in Southern Manchuria a force of about

50,000 men, the bulk of which was concentrated at Liao-Yang, some forty

or fifty miles below Mukden.

[Sidenote: On the Yalu]

At the same time a smaller body of troops held the Yalu River, and

patrols were sent southwards. As early as February 28th, one of these

patrols, consisting of three Cossacks under the command of Lieutenant

Lonchakoff, came into touch with a Japanese patrol outside Ping-Yang.

The Japanese retreated, and the Russians, after advancing within 700

paces of the town, retired also before the sharp fire directed upon

them from the walls. This was the first land skirmish of the war; it

was a small affair of outposts only; and a long interval was to elapse

before a more serious conflict could become possible.

[Sidenote: Round Niuchwang]

Important, however, as were the events occurring in Korea, it was felt

by experts in Europe that the most momentous developments on land were

destined to take place on the western shore of the Liao-tung Peninsula,

and that the advance upon the Yalu was really intended to cover a blow

at a spot more vital to Russia's power. But here, by the nature of

things, the movements of the Japanese could not be so rapid. As already

indicated, the ice-bound condition of the Liao-tung coast prevented any

landing operations in that quarter before the end of March or the

beginning of April, when the frozen belt usually begins to break up. As

soon as the advancing spring brought about the changed state of affairs

it was apparent that a descent in force would become practicable to the

Japanese both at Kinchau in Society Bay, where the peninsula narrows

down to a mere neck of land, and, more important still, at Niuchwang,

the treaty port at the north of the gulf. At either of these spots it

would be comparatively easy to cut the Manchurian railway and sever

communication between Port Arthur and the Russian headquarters, but the

seizure of Niuchwang would be of much greater consequence than that of

Kinchau, as it would place the invading army within easy striking

distance of Mukden itself. Furthermore, the very process of the break

up of the ice at Niuchwang, as long as it lasts, is favorable in some

respects to the landing of an army. In winter the river is frozen out

to sea for a considerable distance, and thus, when the spring arrives,

the estuary presents the appearance of several square miles of moving

ice-floes, tossed hither and thither by the swift and devious currents,

and rendering the task of laying mines for the defence of the port

practically impossible. Another advantage possessed by the Japanese in

attacking from this quarter lay in the physical character of the

country and in the friendliness of its inhabitants. The boggy nature of

the land threatened to deprive the Russian cavalry of half its

usefulness, while it was eminently suited for the movements of

infantry, in which Japan found her greatest strength; on the other

hand, the Japanese had made themselves very popular with the

inhabitants during their war with China, and could depend upon the

natives for ample supplies.

[Illustration: THE CZAR.]

[Illustration: THE MIKADO.]

[Sidenote: Martial Law Proclaimed]

The extreme probability on all these grounds of a Japanese descent upon

Niuchwang was doubtless evident to the Russians themselves, for they

made great exertions to put the port into a state of defence, and their

concentration at Liao-Yang, fifty miles or so to the north, was clearly

designed to meet danger from this quarter. Niuchwang itself, however,

is not very easily defended against a strong force attacking from the

sea. The forts are of little avail against the guns of powerful

men-of-war; and therefore, although General Kondrotovitch, the able

officer in command, had done his best to strengthen the defences of the

town, and was said to have some twenty or thirty thousand troops at his

disposal by the end of March, it seemed clear that this was a vitally

weak spot in Russia's extended front. On Monday, March 28th, the

Russian authorities at Niuchwang declared martial law in this "neutral

port" in the following terms:

According to an order issued by the Viceroy of his Imperial Majesty in

the Far East, the Port of Ying-kow has been proclaimed under martial

law. Until the publication of the order the following regulations will

be enforced, and will be brought into immediate operation:

(1) Martial law extends over the town and port of Ying-kow, over the

whole population, without distinction of nationalities.

(2) All passengers and cargoes arriving must undergo examination. For

this purpose steamers, sailing vessels and junks, having entered the

mouth of the river, must anchor at a distance of six miles below the

fort. A steam-launch, during daylight, with a naval and Customs officer

on board, will meet the vessels at that spot. They will examine the

vessels and conduct them to berths allotted by the Customs officers.

(3) The import of arms and ammunition is prohibited.

(4) It is prohibited to export to any ports of Japan or Korea articles

of military contraband.

(5) When exporting articles to neutral ports the shipper must deposit

with the Customs security equal to the value of the cargo, as a

guarantee that the cargo shall not be reshipped from a neutral port to

Japanese or Korean ports.

(6) Lightships and leading marks will temporarily cease to be used at

the mouth of the river.

(7) When dealing with articles of contraband of war, the regulations

sanctioned by his Majesty on February 14th, 1904, are to serve for the

guidance of the military and civil authorities of the town and port of

Ying-kow, who must be guided by the published regulations defending the

administration of the provinces.

(8) If beans and beancake are exported, a sum equal to twice their

value must be deposited with the Customs.

(Signed) VICTOR GROSSE.

The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far East · 第 3 / 20 章