Russia Bluffing--Japan's Navy--"Nisshin" and "Kasaga"--New and
Efficient--Japan's Dockyards--Opposing Figures--Russian
Navy--Belated Help--Japan's Superiority--Russian
Harbor--Japan on Land--Russia's Army--East of Baikal--Weak
Communications--Port Arthur--Korea as Base--Command of the
Sea--The First Blow--World-Wide Interest--A Graphic
Account--Russian Losses--The Fight of February 9th--Russian
Bravery--Japanese Modesty--Damage Understated--Only One
Repairing Dock--Alexeieff's Reason for Casualties--The Fight
at Chemulpo--The First Shot--Japanese Disembarkation--A Brave
Russian Captain--A Target for Japanese Gunners--The Plucky
"Korietz"--Wounding and Burning--Japan's Handicap.
[Sidenote: Russia Bluffing]
The growing menace of the situation in the Far East had been for months
attracting the anxious attention of the whole world, and at the
beginning of 1904 it became evident that war was inevitable, unless one
or other of the disputants was prepared to make a complete surrender of
its essential claims. The unlikelihood of this remote possibility being
fulfilled was confirmed by the steady and, on the Russian side at
least, the feverish preparations for hostilities which were carried on
as an accompaniment to the repeated protestations of pacific intentions
by the Czar's Government and its diplomatic agents abroad. Those who
still believed in peace were sustained by the conviction that one of
the parties to the dispute was bluffing. Sympathizers with Russia
pointed to the tremendous power and inexhaustible resources of the
Northern Empire, and asked whether it were possible that a young and
small country like Japan should dare to try conclusions with so
gigantic an antagonist. On the other hand, the friends of Japan
emphasized the weakness of the Russian position in the Far East and the
well-known financial embarrassments beneath which her Exchequer was
laboring. It is, therefore, apropos to survey at this point the
military and strategic position in the Far East which revealed itself
immediately before the final rupture of diplomatic negotiations and the
beginning of active hostilities.
[Sidenote: Japan's Navy]
In any conflict between Russia and Japan it was obvious that the first
struggle must be for the mastery of the sea, and it is, therefore,
interesting to consider primarily the relative naval strength of the
two Powers in Far Eastern waters. The navy of Japan has been built, not
only on English models, but for the most part in English yards; and
since the Chino-Japanese War it has been increased by a number of
vessels of the latest and most powerful type. The result is that the
most formidable feature of Japan's naval strength is its complete
homogeneity. The tabular statement on page 41, gives the names and
principal characteristics of what may be called Japan's first fighting
line at sea.
[Sidenote: "Nisshin" and "Kasaga"]
Towards the close of 1903 the Japanese Government, with great
enterprise, managed to secure a powerful accession to this fleet by
purchasing from Argentina two freshly constructed cruisers of the most
modern and efficient type. These two vessels, which have been
re-christened the _Nisshin_ and _Kasaga_, were hastily equipped for sea
at Genoa, and, commanded for the time being by retired English officers
and manned by English crews, started in January for the long voyage to
the Far East. Although war had not yet been declared, it was clearly
imminent, and the Russian squadron in the Mediterranean received orders
to watch the new cruisers closely, with the object, of course, of
capturing them in case hostilities broke out before the vessels had
reached Japan. The taste of their quality, however, which the _Nisshin_
and _Kasaga_ were able to give to the Russians proved how valuable an
addition they were to the Japanese navy, for they easily outdistanced
their slow-footed pursuers, and what promised at one time to be an
exciting race degenerated practically into a walk over. The new
cruisers arrived safely at Yokohama on February 16th, and were at once
sent into dock to refit and prepare for active service. These splendid
fighting machines must, therefore, be added to the list.
JAPAN'S UP-TO-DATE NAVY.
BATTLESHIPS.
Nominal Gun Weight of
Name Displacement I.H.P. Speed Protection Broadside Fire
Hatsuse 15,000 15,000 18.0 14--6 4,240
Asahi 15,000 15,000 18.0 14--6 4,240
Shikishima 15,000 15,000 18.0 14--6 4,240
Mikasa 15,200 16,000 18.0 14--6 4,225
Yashima 12,300 13,000 18.0 14--6 4,000
Fuji 12,300 13,000 18.0 14--6 4,000
ARMORED CRUISERS.
Tokiwa 9,750 18,000 21.5 6--6 3,568
Asama 9,750 18,000 21.5 6--6 3,568
Yakuma 9,850 16,000 20.0 6--6 3,368
Adzuma 9,436 17,000 21.0 6--6 3,368
Idzumo 9,800 15,000 24.7 6--6 3,568
Iwate 9,800 15,000 24.7 6--6 3,568
PROTECTED CRUISERS.
Takasago 4,300 15,500 24.0 4-1/2--2 800
Kasagi 4,784 15,500 22.5 4-1/2 800
Chitose 4,784 15,500 22.5 4-1/2 800
Itsukushima 4,277 5,400 16.7 11--4 1,260
Hashidate 4,277 5,400 16.7 11--4 1,260
Matsushima 4,277 5,400 16.7 11--4 1,260
Yoshino 4,180 15,750 23.0 -- 780
Naniwa 3,727 7,120 17.8 -- 1,196
Takachiho 3,727 7,120 17.8 -- 1,196
Akitsushima 3,150 8,400 19.0 -- 780
Niitaka 3,420 9,500 20.0 -- 920
Tsushima 3,420 9,500 20.0 -- 920
Suma 3,700 8,500 20.0 -- 335
Akashi 2,700 8,500 20.0 -- 335
[Sidenote: New and Efficient]
The table, it will be observed, does not include a number of coast
defence vessels, nor--more important for offensive purposes--the
torpedo flotilla, which is of great strength and of remarkable
efficiency, and includes over a score of 30-knot destroyers of the most
modern type. The first four battleships in the list were completed less
than two years before the war, while the armored cruisers were built
between 1899 and 1901. The protected cruisers include several of the
vessels that defeated the Chinese fleet at the battle of the Yalu.
[Sidenote: Japan's Dockyards]
For the accommodation of her fleet Japan possesses four well-equipped
dockyards, capable not only of repairing damaged vessels of any class,
but of constructing new ones; and this is, perhaps, the greatest
advantage which the island kingdom has over Russia in the present
struggle.
[Sidenote: Opposing Figures]
The naval strength of Russia in the Far East at the outbreak of
hostilities is shown in the tabular statement appearing on page 44,
which, again, does not include vessels of the smallest class nor the
torpedo-boat flotilla.
[Sidenote: Russian Navy]
It will be remarked that the Russian battleships offered a great
variety in design and fighting power--a serious disadvantage, for in
manoeuvring the efficiency of the whole squadron sinks to the level
of that of the least effective vessel it contains. The _Czarevitch_ and
the _Retvisan_, which were the latest vessels to arrive at Port Arthur,
were also the most powerful members of the fleet. The former vessel was
built in France after the latest French model, and the latter in
Philadelphia. This fleet was divided, at the outbreak of war, between
Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the four powerful cruisers, _Gromoboi_,
_Bogatyr_, _Rossia_, and _Rurik_ being stationed at the latter port.
[Sidenote: Belated Help]
While negotiations were still proceeding, though at a critical point,
Russia prepared to send out very formidable reinforcements to the Far
East from her Mediterranean Fleet. These reinforcements included the
_Osliabia_, a battleship of over 12,000 tons displacement, with a speed
of 19 knots; the _Dmitri Donskoi_, an armored cruiser of 6,000 tons
displacement and a speed of 15 knots; the _Aurora_, a swift protected
cruiser of the largest class; several cruisers of the volunteer fleet,
with troops, naval drafts, and supplies; and a number of torpedo craft.
This squadron had begun to assemble at Port Said before the outbreak of
war, and the vessels at once began to pass through the Canal. But
before they were ready to sail for the China seas, war broke out, and
the departure was delayed. The initial Russian reverses at sea made it
practically impossible for this reinforcing fleet to proceed to the
seat of war, as it would have been liable to interception by the
Japanese fleet in overwhelming strength. Accordingly, after cruising
aimlessly about in the Red Sea for some weeks, the ships were ordered
to return to the Baltic; and in the beginning of March they passed
through the Suez Canal again on their way north.
RUSSIA'S AVAILABLE NAVY.
BATTLESHIPS.
Nominal Gun Weight of
Name Displacement I.H.P. Speed Protection Broadside Fire
Tons Knots. In. Lbs.
Poltava 10,950 11,200 17.0 10--5 3,367
Petropavlovsk 10,950 11,200 17.0 10--5 3,367
Sevastopol 10,950 11,200 17.0 10--5 3,367
Peresviet 12,674 14,500 19.0 10--5 2,672
Pobieda 12,674 14,500 19.0 10--5 2,672
Retvisan 12,700 16,000 18.0 10--5 3,434
Czarevitch 13,100 16,300 18.0 11--6-3/4 3,516
ARMORED CRUISERS.
Nominal Gun Weight of
Name Displacement I.H.P. Speed Protection Broadside Fire
Tons Knots. In. Lbs.
Bogatyr 6,750 19,500 23.0 5--4 872
Askold 6,500 9,500 23.0 -- 772
Varyag 6,500 20,000 23.0 5 510
Diana 6,630 11,600 20.0 4-1/2 632
Pallada 6,630 11,600 20.0 4-1/2 632
Boyarin 3,200 11,500 22.0 -- 180
Novik 3,000 18,000 25.0 -- 180
ARMORED CRUISERS.
Nominal Gun Weight of
Name Displacement I.H.P. Speed Protection Broadside Fire
Tons Knots. In. Lbs.
Gromoboi 12,336 18,000 20.0 6--3/4 1,197
Bayan 7,800 17,000 22.0 7--3 952
Rossia 12,200 18,000 20.0 2 1,348
Rurik 10,940 3,500 18.0 3 1,345
[Sidenote: Japan's Superiority]
Though nominally the fleets of the two Powers were fairly equal, Japan
possessed several very considerable advantages which, in the opinion of
experts, changed that paper equality to marked superiority on her side.
In the first place, the Chino-Japanese war only ten years ago had given
her naval officers and men an invaluable experience of fighting on the
grand scale under modern conditions; in the next place, their fleet was
much more of a pattern; and in the third place it was operating from a
base fully capable of providing all the needs and reinforcements
entailed by losses in war, including a ready coal supply.
[Sidenote: Russia's Harbors]
Russia, on the other hand, had for its only bases Port Arthur and
Vladivostock, the one inadequate to the multifarious needs of her
fleet, and the other ice-bound in winter, and so situated
geographically as to be completely isolated from what promised to be
the main scene of operations. Although Port Arthur had been rendered
almost impregnable as a fortress, the Russians had not had time to
complete it as a naval dockyard, and at the outbreak of war it
possessed only one dry dock, and that not capable of accommodating
vessels of the largest size. At Vladivostock the channel out of the
harbor could only be kept free by ice-breakers. In the event of naval
disasters, Russia, therefore, had no possibility of repairing her lame
ducks, while the radius of her fleet's activity was limited by the fact
that her only supplies of coal were to be obtained at Port Arthur. In
the situation, therefore, which presented itself at the outbreak of
war, this powerful naval force was practically deprived of mobility. It
could not leave Port Arthur for more than a short cruise; and while it
remained there it must be specially vulnerable to attack, lying in an
open roadstead and huddled together in order to enjoy the protection of
the guns of the fortress.
[Sidenote: Japan on Land]
With regard to the land forces of the two belligerent Powers, it was
only possible to reckon with certainty those of Japan; for it remained
doubtful, until the progress of active operations revealed the facts,
how much of Russia's enormous military strength had been concentrated
in the Far East. Broadly speaking, Japan could put into the field in
the last resort an army of between 400,000 and 450,000 men. The
standing army amounts to almost 200,000 men, and it was immediately
available for mobilization. To this number another 35,000 men was added
by the reserve, while the militia of all arms could be reckoned at
200,000 men. The Japanese infantry soldier is armed with the Midji
magazine rifle, and the artillery with the Arisaka quick-firing gun;
but the adoption of this latter weapon has been so recent that the
whole of the artillery is not yet supplied with it, and in this one
respect at least the Russian gunners are believed to possess a very
great advantage. The Japanese army has been organized largely on German
models. It proved its efficiency as a fighting machine in the
Chino-Japanese War; while the Japanese troops that took part in the
relief of the Peking Legations earned the unstinted praise of all the
military experts who watched their behavior. Until the present war,
however, the Japanese army had never undergone the supreme ordeal of
facing a European adversary.
[Sidenote: Russia's Army]
Of the Russian military organization, the strength and weakness have
long been known to the world, and the great question for strategists in
contemplating the present hostilities was the number of troops which
the Northern Power could bring into the field to confront her foe.
Various estimates had been given, from the overwhelming army of 400,000
men confidently claimed by Russia's partisans, to a force of little
more than a quarter of that strength. But though the actual figures
were in doubt, it was possible by collating the information from
various sources to arrive at an approximate estimate of the truth. At
the time of the Boxer outbreak in 1900 Russia had 35,000 men in the Far
East, and that force was, within little more than a year, trebled.
Since the possibility of trouble with Japan had loomed on the horizon,
reinforcements had been steadily dribbling over the Trans-Siberian
Railway and over seas in the volunteer transports, until the army under
the command of the Viceroy of the Far East could not number much less
than 150,000 men of all arms, with 286 guns. Of this force, at least a
half must have been absorbed in the defence of the long line of railway
communications and in garrisoning fortresses; but the troops available
for active operations consisted largely of Russia's most formidable
fighting material--namely, the Cossacks, who possess an endurance and
mobility which must be of the utmost value in such a country as that in
which the present war was to be fought out.
[Illustration:
ADMIRAL TOGO. ADMIRAL KAMIMURA.
ADMIRAL MAKAROFF.
ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF. ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY.
JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ADMIRALS.]
[Sidenote: East of Baikal]
In the latter part of January the well-informed correspondent of the
London _Times_ at Peking telegraphed an estimate of the Russian forces
east of Lake Baikal, which, in its circumstantiality and
exhaustiveness, bore the evidence of truth. According to this
authority, Russia had available at that time a total of 3,115 officers,
147,479 men, and 266 guns; and these numbers included the railway
guards over the whole of the Manchurian railways and the garrisons of
the principal fortresses. The infantry of this force numbered 108,000
officers and men, and the cavalry 22,000 officers and men, of whom
nearly the whole were Cossacks. The garrisons of Port Arthur and
Vladivostock alone absorbed 45,000 men, and remembering that the
railway line to be guarded, east of Lake Baikal, was over 1,500 miles
in length, and traverses a country of which the inhabitants were more
or less hostile, it is evident that the troops available to take the
field at the end of January could not have exceeded, on this estimate,
more than 50,000 men. Lake Baikal is 400 miles in length, and though a
railway round its southern extremity was in course of construction, it
was far from completion at the outbreak of hostilities. The lake is
frozen over during the winter months, when transit has to be effected
by sledges. But in the emergency the Russians laid railway lines across
the lake, and thus by the end of February had established a through
service of sorts. But even then the number of reinforcements and the
quantity of supplies that could be moved up to the theatre of war were
strictly limited by the delays inseparable from the working of a single
track railway, and it is doubtful whether more than 25,000 men at the
outside had been added to the field force by the beginning of March.
[Sidenote: Weak Communications]
The strategical problem which presented itself at the outbreak of
hostilities was a comparatively simple one--for Japan at any rate. The
power of Russia in the Far East depended on the maintenance of two
great arteries of communication with the heart of the Russian Empire.
One of these was the over-sea passage from the Black Sea or the Baltic
through the Suez Canal and the East Indian Archipelago--a voyage
occupying six weeks at least, and however feasible in time of peace,
rendered particularly difficult and even precarious under war
conditions owing to the possibility of interception and the absence of
any intermediate coaling stations. The other connecting link between
Port Arthur and St. Petersburg was the Trans-Siberian Railway, that
gigantic enterprise which, completed in 1899, brought the capital of
Russia within 15 days' journey of its furthermost outpost in the Yellow
Sea. From Moscow to Port Arthur is a distance of some 4,000 miles, but
at two-thirds of its length the railway is interrupted by the great
inland sea known as Lake Baikal. At this point transshipment across the
lake had to take place, a circumstance that offered an insurmountable
hindrance to rapid transit. In the building of the railway, too,
soundness had been sacrificed to rapidity of construction; the line was
only a single track one, with stations and sidings at intervals of
about 25 miles; and even when the whole service was monopolized for
military purposes the number of trains that could be passed over the
railway in one day was a fixed and very limited quantity. Even with
this line open, therefore, the rate at which Russia could reinforce her
troops in the Far East had to be determined by other circumstances than
military urgency, and the number of her reinforcements also had to be
governed by the capacity of the line to bring up not only men, but
supplies; for Manchuria itself does not provide the means of support
for a large army. The experience of the American Army in Cuba and of
the British Army in South Africa proved what tremendous difficulties
may be encountered in carrying supplies to a large force at a distance
much less remote from its base than Russia's was. For years past Russia
has sent out her troops and supplies to the Far East mainly by sea. For
twelve months before the war broke out a constant stream of transports,
colliers and supply ships had passed from the Black Sea to the Gulf of
Pechili, and this stream was only interrupted on the outbreak of war--a
significant admission of the incompleteness of the Russian
preparations, as well as of the inadequacy of the Trans-Siberian
Railway to supply her needs.
[Sidenote: Port Arthur]
It was evident, therefore, that Japan's first object was to shut off
Port Arthur from the sea, and her next to cut the railway communication
to the North. This done, the Russian fortress, however impregnable to
assault, must ultimately fall to investment. From Port Arthur, which,
as a glance at the map will show, lies at the very tip of Liao-tung
Peninsula, the railway runs due north for six hundred miles through
Niuchwang and Mukden to Harbin, where it joins the branch line to
Vladivostock. Though Russia has for several years been in occupation of
this territory, her hold upon it is by no means secure. The population
is distinctly unfriendly, and for the mere defence of the line
thousands of troops are necessary. Indeed, it was this necessity that
Russia urged as an excuse for her military occupation of Manchuria.
[Sidenote: Korea as Base]
Within the triangle of which Harbin is the apex, of which the lines to
Port Arthur and Vladivostock are sides, and of which the course of the
Yalu River is the base, the sphere of immediate military operations
practically had to be confined, as the ice-bound condition of the coast
to the west of Port Arthur made a landing in force there impossible
till the spring. The necessity of maintaining communications tied the
Russian forces very largely to the railway lines. But for either
belligerent the helpless kingdom of Korea, which lies south of a line
drawn between Port Arthur and Vladivostock, for aggressive operations,
afforded the most convenient line of advance. Through Korea Russia
could menace Japan, and through Korea Japan could most easily march
against Port Arthur. Naturally, therefore, Russia's first care was to
mass her available troops on the line of the Yalu, and concentrate
reinforcements at Harbin ready to be moved to whatever point might
prove the objective of the Japanese attack.
[Sidenote: Command of the Sea]
But the command of the sea was the essential condition to attack by
land by either combatant. With the Russian fleet masked or destroyed,
Japan could choose as a landing-place for her armies any of the
numerous ports on the western coast of Korea, and so approach in force
the Yalu River, which divides Korea from Manchuria and the Liao-tung
Peninsula. With imperfect command of the sea, Japan would have a second
resource. She could land her troops at Masampo, separated only by a
hundred miles of sea from her own ports, or she could, at a push, land
her forces on the east coast of Korea, at Yuen San or Gensan. But the
former plan of operations would have entailed a long overland march
before the objective was reached, and the latter the maintenance of
communications over difficult and mountainous country. Evidently, then,
immeasurable importance attached to the result of the first naval
engagements, and to their influence in giving the command of the sea to
the one or the other of the two belligerent Powers.
[Sidenote: The First Blow]
On February 5th M. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at the Court of St.
Petersburg, announced to the Government of the Czar that Japan could
wait no longer for the long-delayed Russian reply, and that further
negotiations were broken off. This startling news reached Europe and
America on the evening of Sunday, February 7th; and while its
significance was still being anxiously discussed in every capital, and
while statesmen and jurists were still trying to convince one another
that the rupture of diplomatic negotiations did not necessarily imply
the beginning of war, there burst like a thunder-clap the further news
that the first grim and irretrievable blow had been struck. Having
decided that the arbitrament of war was inevitable, Japan acted on her
decision with swift and terrible effect. On the night of Monday,
February 8th, a daring attack by torpedo-boats was made on the Russian
fleet lying at anchor in the Port Arthur roadstead, and at one fell
swoop the boasted might of Russia at sea was hopelessly broken. This
astounding intelligence was first conveyed to the world in an official
telegram from Admiral Alexeieff to the Czar, couched in the following
terms:--
"I most devotedly inform your Majesty that about midnight between the
26th and 27th of January (February 8th and 9th) Japanese torpedo-boats
delivered a sudden mine attack on the squadron lying in the Chinese
roads at Port Arthur, the battleships _Retvisan_ and _Czarevitch_ and
the cruiser _Pallada_ being holed. The degree of seriousness of the
holes has to be ascertained. Particulars will be forwarded to your
Imperial Majesty."
[Sidenote: World-wide Interest]
The stunning effect of this news was only enhanced when fuller details
of the incident so baldly and laconically announced came to hand. No
news of the movements of the Japanese fleet had been allowed to leak
out, and its presence before Port Arthur was wholly unexpected by
others as well as the Russians. On the 3rd of February the Russian
fleet had put to sea, and for twenty-four hours the world was agog with
the news of so momentous a movement. But the speculation died suddenly
when it appeared that the fleet had returned immediately to its
anchorage. The Japanese, with characteristic alertness, realized the
splendid opportunity which the necessarily exposed position of the
Russian ships afforded to an enterprising enemy.
[Sidenote: A Graphic Account]
While everything was still tranquil at Port Arthur, and the Russian
authorities were confidently announcing that the foe could not be
expected for three or four days, the blow fell. According to the
graphic account of an eye-witness, every one at Port Arthur had settled
down for the night, when suddenly across the bay reverberated the shock
of three violent and successive explosions. In a moment all was bustle
and confusion on the Russian warships. Searchlights flashed
bewilderingly and without purpose across the waters, and quick-firing
guns from vessel after vessel began a panic fusillade, which Admiral
Alexeieff, in his official report, euphemistically described as "a well
concentrated fire at the right time."
[Sidenote: Russian Losses]
It was midnight, and in the darkness and confusion it was impossible
for any one to know exactly what was happening; but when the morning
light broke over Port Arthur the two proudest possessions of the
Russian fleet, the powerful battleships _Retvisan_ and _Czarevitch_,
were seen passing slowly towards the harbor entrance, across which they
presently lay in evidently a badly damaged condition. The cruiser
_Pallada_ followed, listing heavily to port, and she also was grounded
outside the entrance to the harbor.
[Sidenote: The Fight of Feb. 9th]
It was at ten o'clock the next day, the 9th of February, that the
Russians obtained their first glimpse of the enemy. In the distance
three Japanese cruisers were described hanging observant upon the
Russian fleet, and immediately what remained of that once powerful
squadron put to sea in pursuit of the audacious enemy. But, as before,
this bold movement had no result, and the Russian ships returned to
anchor. Scarcely had they done so when the Japanese squadron of sixteen
vessels, including six battleships and four first-class cruisers,
steamed into view in fighting formation. As the leading vessels at a
distance of some three miles came into line with the harbor entrance
the flash of their great guns broke through the mist, and for nearly an
hour the Japanese shells continued to burst over the forts, along the
beach and among the Russian ships, who replied vigorously, and whose
fire was assisted by that of the powerful land batteries. Again the
Russian squadron steamed out to meet the enemy.
[Sidenote: Russian Bravery]
Some of the cruisers advanced towards the Japanese fleet with great
gallantry, the _Novik_, the _Diana_, and the _Askold_ particularly
distinguishing themselves, with the result that they were all rather
seriously hit by the Japanese fire and were compelled to retire upon
the main squadron. Several other of the Russian ships were damaged
before the Japanese fleet drew off.
[Sidenote: Japanese Modesty]
The official dispatch of Admiral Togo to his Government upon the
momentous achievements of his fleet during these two days was a model
of modesty and self-restraint. Dated "February 10th, at Sea," it ran:--
"After the combined fleet left Sasebo, on the 6th, everything went off
as planned. At midnight on the 8th the advance squadron attacked the
enemy's advance squadron, the latter being mostly outside the bay. The
_Poltava_, _Askold_ and others were apparently struck by torpedoes.
"At noon on the 9th the fleet advanced to the offing of Port Arthur Bay
and attacked the enemy for forty minutes, I believe doing considerable
damage. I believe the enemy were greatly demoralized. They stopped
fighting at one o'clock, and appeared to retreat to the harbor.
[Illustration:
GENERAL KUROKI. GENERAL OKU.
MARSHAL OYAMA.
GENERAL NODZU. GENERAL NOGI.
JAPANESE GENERALS.]
"The Japanese fleet suffered but very slight damage, and its fighting
strength is not decreased. Our casualties were 4 killed and 54 wounded.
The Imperial Princes on board suffered no harm.
"The conduct of the officers was cool, and not unlike their conduct at
manoeuvres.
"This morning, owing to heavy south wind, detailed reports from the
vessels have not been received, so I merely report the above fact."
[Sidenote: Damage Understated]
This dispatch, as we know both from the Russian official accounts and
from independent witnesses, really understated the extent of the blow
which the Japanese Admiral had dealt to the Russian fleet; the vessels
torpedoed were not cruisers only, but the two crack battleships upon
which Admiral Alexeieff necessarily placed peculiar dependence, and the
"considerable damage" which Admiral Togo believed had been done by the
subsequent bombardment had put out of action, for the time being, the
battleship _Poltava_ and the cruisers _Diana_, _Askold_ and _Novik_. Of
these the _Poltava_ and the _Novik_ were badly hit on the water
line--damage the seriousness of which needs no comment.
[Sidenote: Only One Repairing Dock]
The most significant confession, indeed, of the crushing character of
the blow which at the very commencement of the war the Japanese had
succeeded in dealing to their powerful adversary was contained in a
subsequent dispatch from the Viceroy to the Czar. Telegraphing on
February 11th, Admiral Alexeieff reported "the _Czarevitch_ and the
_Pallada_ were brought on the 9th inst. into the inner harbor. The leak
in the _Retvisan_ is being temporarily stopped. _The repairing of an
ironclad is a complicated business, the period for the completion of
which it is hard to indicate._" This guarded language must be read in
the light of the fact that the Russians had only one repairing dock
capable of holding a large ship at Port Arthur, and the terrible
character of the disaster which within forty-eight hours had befallen
the naval power of the haughty Muscovite in the Far East will be
realized. The losses in men were not very serious, amounting in all to
10 men killed and 2 officers and 41 men wounded, but the injury to the
fleet was practically irreparable. Seven out of Russia's best vessels
had been placed _hors de combat_, her battleships' strength being
reduced to 4, namely, the _Petropavlovsk_, _Peresviet_, _Pobieda_ and
_Sevastopol_ (the last two being themselves under repair when the war
broke out), and her already small cruiser force being reduced to two,
namely, the _Bayan_ and the _Boyarin_. The following is the list of the
damaged ships:--
_Czarevitch_, battleship, torpedoed.
_Retvisan_, battleship, torpedoed.
_Poltava_, battleship, shelled on the water-line.
_Novik_, cruiser, shelled on the water-line.
_Askold_, cruiser, shelled on the water-line.
_Diana_, cruiser, shelled on the water-line.
_Pallada_, cruiser, torpedoed.
It should be added that the repairs to the _Askold_ were quickly
executed, and that she was able to take part in the subsequent
operations a few days later.
[Sidenote: Alexeieff's Reason for Casualties]
Admiral Alexeieff's dispatch to the Czar stated that the majority of
the wounded belonged to the _Pallada_. The reason for this was that
they were "poisoned by gases produced by the explosion of the torpedo
charged with melinite."
The Japanese fleet, naturally, did not emerge from such an action
unscathed. Its losses in men were officially reported as 4 killed and
54 wounded; and although the fighting efficiency of the fleet was not
seriously impaired, two armored cruisers, the _Iwote_ and the _Yakumo_,
were injured, and, as the casualties show, several other vessels were
struck. But the most remarkable circumstance was that the torpedo-boats
by which the night attack had been delivered escaped scot-free.
[Sidenote: The Fight at Chemulpo]
While the Russian capital was still reeling under the shock of this
unexpected disaster, there came the news of a fresh blow struck by the
Japanese arms in another quarter of the theatre of war. This was the
naval engagement at Chemulpo--a port on the northwest coast of
Korea--in which two of the Czar's warships and one transport steamer
were destroyed. It is true that only one of these vessels had any
fighting capacity, and that the conflict in itself was of much less
consequence than the battle at Port Arthur, but the incident gave a
further and mortifying revelation of the disorganization of the naval
forces of Russia in the Far East, and of the total absence of anything
like a bold and definite plan of operations from the minds of her
commanders. In spite of the critical position in which the negotiations
between the two Powers had been standing for weeks, the Russian fleet
in the Yellow Sea was unconcentrated and generally unprepared for war.
The outbreak of hostilities found two vessels, the _Varyag_, a
protected cruiser of 6,500 tons, and the _Korietz_, a gunboat, old,
indeed, but not without some use for coast defence, quietly stationed
at Chemulpo, a ready prey for a Japanese squadron.
[Sidenote: The First Shot]
On the 8th instant a Russian steamer called the _Sungari_, which was
employed for the transport of stores, entered the harbor with the news
that a large fleet, which her captain believed to be Japanese, was fast
approaching. The _Korietz_ was sent out to reconnoitre. The columns of
smoke on the horizon did indeed come from the funnels of the enemy's
ships. The advancing squadron consisted of a first-class battleship
flying the flag of Admiral Uriu, and the cruisers _Akashi_,
_Takachiho_, _Naniwa_ and _Chiyoda_, as well as seven torpedo-boats,
the whole convoying transports with 2,500 Japanese troops on board. The
_Korietz_ cleared her decks for action and fired--one account says that
the shot was accidental--upon the rapidly approaching foe. The latter
replied by discharging two torpedoes at the daring gunboat, which then
retreated back into harbor. It is interesting to note that, whether the
gunner of the _Korietz_ acted under orders or not, he fired the first
shot in the war, for the incident occurred several hours before the
torpedo attack upon Port Arthur.
[Sidenote: Japanese Disembarkation]
The Japanese took no further notice of the Russian ships until the
disembarkation of their troops had been carried out, a process which
was commenced immediately and was carried out through the night with
great celerity and in the most perfect order. In this matter, indeed,
as in all the preliminary stages of the war, the operations of the
Mikado's forces showed how carefully thought out were the plans of his
naval and military advisers. Not a detail appeared to have been
omitted, every eventuality had been skilfully calculated beforehand,
and as a result the whole machinery of warfare moved like clockwork.
By four o'clock on the morning of the 9th the process of disembarkation
had been successfully completed, and the soldiers had all found their
pre-arranged billets on shore. The Japanese squadron then put out to
sea once more, and waited for daylight before taking any action. At
seven o'clock, however, the captain of the _Varyag_ was served with an
ultimatum from Admiral Uriu declaring that hostilities had broken out
between Russia and Japan, and summoning him to leave the harbor by
midday. Should he refuse to do so, then the Japanese fleet would be
compelled to attack the _Varyag_ and the _Korietz_ within the harbor. A
correspondent of a London paper who was present on the spot states that
the commanders of the other warships stationed at Chemulpo--namely, the
British cruiser _Talbot_, the Italian _Elba_ and the French _Pascal_,
held a meeting and drew up a strong protest addressed to the Japanese
Admiral against his proposal to attack the Russian vessels in a neutral
port. The message was sent out in the _Talbot's_ launch.
[Sidenote: A Brave Russian Captain]
The protest, however, was not needed, for the captain of the _Varyag_,
in spite of the overwhelming disparity of forces, determined to face
his enemies in the open. It was an act of conspicuous gallantry, only
to be expected, it must be said, from the representative of a country
whose sons, whatever their faults, have never been slow to die for her
sake. The manner, too, in which the _Varyag_ set about her voyage to
inevitable destruction was well worthy of the finest naval traditions
of all countries and all ages. We are told that as the drums beat to
quarters, and as the doomed ship steamed out amid the cheers of the
foreign crews in the port, the band was massed upon her deck and burst
into the strains of the Russian Hymn, the National Anthem. It was like
that "flourish of insulting trumpets" with which Raleigh faced the guns
of Cadiz, and the bravado of which Stevenson said he liked "better than
the wisest dispositions to ensure victory; it comes from the heart and
goes to it." No one, indeed, who is capable of generous emotions can
fail to be uplifted by the story of the _Varyag's_ passage to death. It
is well to know that the cold science of modern naval warfare and all
those mathematical calculations and inventions which have displaced the
ancient ascendency of brawn and muscle at close quarters have not
quenched the eager spirit of the sailor, or diminished his "heroic
superstitions and his strutting and vainglorious style of fight." It
was with a spirit not less high and intrepid that the captain of the
little _Korietz_, disregarding the orders of his superior officer to
remain within the shelter of the harbor, followed in his wake and
strove desperately to meet the same fate.
[Sidenote: A Target for Japanese Gunners]
Slowly but steadily the two ships held on their course towards the
Polynesian Archipelago, where lay in wait their powerful foe. The
_Varyag_ had reached Round Island, when at a distance of nearly two
miles the Japanese flagship opened fire with one of her big guns. The
aim of the gunners was true. Right amidships burst the great missile,
doing terrible execution, and shell after shell followed with
relentless rapidity. The _Varyag_, wheeling around in a small circle,
responded dauntlessly with her 6-inch guns, but with little or no
effect upon the battleship, and now Admiral Uriu's cruisers joined in
the cannonade. Within half an hour of this fearful raking fire her
bridge was shot away and her sides were gaping with holes, but she kept
afloat and still withstood the onslaught, endeavoring heroically but in
vain to find an opening by which to break through and escape out to
sea. At last, after an hour's terrible pounding, she was compelled
reluctantly to give up the attempt as hopeless, and, taking refuge
among the islands, with difficulty crept back into Chemulpo harbor,
disabled beyond repair and with her decks reduced to veritable
shambles. Her desperate struggle had not left the enemy utterly
scathless, for there seems no doubt that one of the Japanese cruisers
received a good deal of damage.
[Sidenote: The Plucky "Korietz"]
In the meanwhile the little _Korietz_, with extraordinary bravery, but
with absolutely pathetic ineffectiveness, had been attempting to
imitate the manoeuvres of her consort and to do some injury to the
big ships of the enemy. As well might a warrior with a popgun try to
engage a battery of field artillery. It was magnificent, it certainly
was not war. The range was hopelessly beyond her powers, and perhaps it
was the bitterest drop in the cup of her commander and crew that the
Japanese soon ceased to pay her any attention at all, concentrating all
their efforts upon the more dangerous _Varyag_. When that vessel
retreated at length into harbor, the _Korietz_ followed her unharmed
but undisgraced.
[Sidenote: Wounding and Burning]
The wounded of the _Varyag_, numbering 4 officers and 214 men, were
removed in boats to the British, Italian and French warships. The dead
were left on board, for it was decided to scuttle the ship. At the same
time arrangements were made to blow up the _Korietz_. Just as the
Japanese fleet again appeared in sight the latter vessel blew up, and
the shattered hull, after one great burst of flame and smoke, sank
beneath the waters. The _Varyag_ refused to sink so easily, and the
Russian sailors therefore again boarded her to set her on fire. After a
little more than an hour she had burned down to the water's edge and,
heeling over, disappeared. The _Sungari_ was the next to meet its fate,
the Russians setting fire to it also to prevent its falling into the
hands of the enemy.
The Japanese fleet then steamed out to sea once more, having left
behind it no further obstacle to the landing of troops on the west
coast of Korea.
[Sidenote: Japan's Handicap]
Thus within forty-eight hours of the rupture of diplomatic relations,
the first decisive action in the struggle for sea-supremacy had been
fought, and the result left to the enterprising and intrepid Navy of
Japan not only the immense moral value of a victory well contrived and
unerringly accomplished, but the solid material advantage of a
superiority in fighting strength which was incontestable.
[Illustration:
GENERAL LINEVITCH. GENERAL GRIPENBERG.
GENERAL KUROPATKIN.
GENERAL KAULBARS. GENERAL RENNENKAMPFF.
RUSSIAN GENERALS]