working people of Russia. All this talk about intervention to ‘save’
Russia amounts to this, that the capitalists of your countries, are
trying to take back from us what we won from their fellow capitalists
in Russia. Can’t you realize that this is the same war that you have
been carrying on in England and America against the master class? You
hold the rifles, you work the guns to shoot us with, and you are
playing the contemptible part of the scab. Comrade, don’t do it!
“You are kidding yourself that you are fighting for your country. The
capitalist class places arms in your hands. Let the workers cease using
these weapons against each other, and turn them on their sweaters. The
capitalists themselves have given you the means to overthrow them, if
you had but the sense and the courage to use them. There is only one
thing that you can do: arrest your officers. Send a commission of your
common soldiers to meet our own workingmen, and find out yourselves
what we stand for.”
All of which sounds like the peroration of an eloquent address at a
meeting of America’s own I. W. W. in solemn conclave assembled.
Needless to say this was not taken seriously. Soldiers were quick to
punch holes in any propaganda, or at any rate if they could not discern
its falsities, could clench their fists at those whom they believed to
be seeking to “work them.” Fair words and explosive bullets did not
match any more than “guard duty” and “offensive movements” matched.
Lt. Costello, in his volume, “_Why Did We Go To Russia_.”, says: “The
preponderant reason why Americans would never be swayed by this
propaganda drive, lay in their hatred of laziness and their love of
industry. If the Bolsheviki were wasting their time, however, in their
propaganda efforts directed at effects in the field, it must be a
source of great comfort to Lenin and Trotsky, Tchitcherin and Peters
and others of their ilk, to know that their able, and in some case,
unwitting allies in America, who condone Bolshevist atrocities,
apologize for Soviet shortcomings, appear before Congressional
committees and other agencies and contribute weak attempts at defense
of this Red curse are all serving them so well.”
“Seeing red,” we see Red in many things that are really harmless. In
Russia, as in America, many false accusations and false assumptions are
made. We now know that of certainty the Bolshevik, or Communistic party
of Russia was aided by like-minded people in America and vice versa,
but we became rather hysterical in 1919 over those I.W.W.-Red
outbursts, and very nearly let the conflict between Red propaganda and
anti-Red propaganda upset our best traditions of toleration, of free
speech, and of free press. Now we are seeing more clearly. Justice and
toleration and real information are desired. Propaganda to the American
people is becoming as detested as it was to the soldiers. Experience of
the veterans of the North Russian campaign has taught them the
foolishness of propaganda and the wisdom of truth-telling. The Germans,
the Bolsheviks, the British War Office, Our War Department and
self-seeking individuals who passed out propaganda, failed miserably in
the end.
XXX
REAL FACTS ABOUT ALLEGED MUTINY
Mail Bags And Morale—Imaginative Scoop Reporters And Alarmists—Few Men
Lost Heads Or Hearts—Colonel Stewart Cables To Allay Needless Fears—But
War Department Had Lost Confidence Of People—Too Bad Mutiny Allegations
Got Started—Maliciously Utilized—Officially Investigated And
Denied—Secretary Baker’s Letter Here Included—Facts Which Afforded
Flimsy Foundation Here Related—Alleged Mutinous Company Next Day
Gallantly Fighting—Harsh Term Mutiny Not Applied By Unbiased Judges.
Four weeks to nine or twelve weeks elapsed between mailing and
receiving. It is known that both ignorance and indifference were
contributing causes. We know there is in existence a file of courteous
correspondence between American and British G. H. Q. over some bags of
American mail that was left lying for a time at Murmansk when it might
just as well have been forwarded to Archangel for there were no
Americans at that time on the Murmansk.
Many slips between the arrival of mail at Archangel and its
distribution to the troops. How indignant a line officer at the front
was one day to hear a visitor from the American G. H. Q. say that he
had forgotten to bring the mail bags down on his train. Sometimes
delivery by airplane resulted in dropping the sacks in the deep woods
to be object of curiosity only to foxes and wolves and white-breasted
crows, but of no comfort to the lonesome, disappointed soldiers.
Ships foundered off the coast of Norway with tons of mail. Sleds in the
winter were captured by the Bolos on the lines of communication. These
troubles in getting mail into Russia led the soldiers to think that
there might be equal difficulty in their letters reaching home. And it
certainly looked that way when cablegrams began insistently inquiring
for many and many a soldier whose letters had either not been written,
or destroyed by the censor, or lost in transit.
And that leads to the discussion of what were to the soldier rather
terrifying rules of censorship. Intended to contribute to his safety
and to the comfort and peace of mind of his home folks the way in which
the rules were administered worked on the minds of the soldiers. Let it
be said right here that the American soldier heartily complied in most
cases with the rules. He did not try to break the rules about giving
information that might be of value to the enemy. And when during the
winter there began to come into North Russia clippings from American
and British newspapers which bore more or less very accurate and
descriptive accounts of the locations and operations, even down to the
strategy, of the various scattered units, they wondered why they were
not permitted after the Armistice especially, to write such things
home.
And if as happened far too frequently, a man’s batch of ancient letters
that came after weeks of waiting, contained a brace of scented but
whining epistles from the girl he had left behind him and perhaps a
third one from a man friend who told how that same girl was running
about with a slacker who had a fifteen-dollar a day job, the man had to
be a jewel and a philosopher not to become bitter. And a bitter man
deteriorates as a soldier.
To the credit of our veterans who were in North Russia let it be said
that comparatively very few of them wrote sob-stuff home. They knew it
was hard enough for the folks anyway, and it did themselves no good
either. The imaginative “Scoops” among the cub reporters and the
violently inflamed imaginations and utterances of partisan politicians
seeking to puff their political sails with stories of hardships of our
men in North Russia, all these and many other very well-meaning people
were doing much to aggravate the fears and sufferings of the people at
home. Many a doughboy at the front sighed wearily and shook his head
doubtfully over the mess of sob-stuff that came uncensored from the
States. He sent costly cablegrams to his loved ones at home to assure
them that he was safe and not “sleeping in water forty degrees below
zero” and so forth.
Not only did the screeching press articles and the roars of certain
congressmen keep the homefolks in perpetual agony over the soldiers in
Russia, but the reports of the same that filtered in through the mails
to our front line campfires and Archangel comfortable billets caused
trouble and heart-burnings among the men. It seems incredible how much
of it the men fell for. But seeing it in their own home paper, many of
the men actually believed tales that when told in camp were laughed off
as plain scandalous rumor.
War is not fought in a comfortable parlor or club-room, but some of the
tales which slipped through the censor from spineless cry-babies in our
ranks of high and low rank, and were published in the States and then
in clippings found their way back to North Russia, lamented the fact of
the hardship of war in such insidious manner as to furnish the most
formidable foe to morale with which the troops had to cope while in
Russia. The Americans only laughed at Bolshevik propaganda which they
clearly saw through. To the statement that the Reds would bring a
million rifles against Archangel they only replied, “Let ’em come, the
thicker grass the heavier the swath.”
But when a man’s own home paper printed the same story of the million
men advancing on Archangel with bloody bayonets fixed, and told of the
horrible hardships the soldier endured—and many of them were indeed
severe hardships although most of the news stories were over-drawn and
untruthful, and coupled with these stories were shrieks at the war
department to get the boys out of Russia, together with stories of
earnest and intended-to-help petitions of the best people of the land,
asking and pleading the war department to get the boys out of Russia,
then the doughboy’s spirit was depressed.
[Illustration: U. S. OFFICIAL PHOTO
_Pioneer Platoon Has Fire at 455._]
[Illustration: U S. OFFICIAL PHOTO (158856)
_310th Engineers Near Bolsheozerki._]
[Illustration: U.S. OFFICIAL
_Hospital “K. P.’s”_]
[Illustration: U.S. OFFICIAL PHOTO
_Red Cross Nurses._]
[Illustration: U.S. OFFICIAL
_Bartering._]
[Illustration: U.S. OFFICIAL PHOTO
_Mascots._]
[Illustration: U. S. OFFICIAL PHOTO
_Col. Dupont (French) at Verst 455, Bestows Many Croix de Guerre
Medals._]
[Illustration: U. S. OFFICIAL PHOTO
_Polish Artillery and Mascot._]
[Illustration: U. S. OFFICIAL PHOTO (158870)
_Russian Artillery, Verst 18._]
Suffer he did occasionally. Many of his comrades had a lot of suffering
from cold. But aside from the execrable boot that Sir Shakleton had
dreamed into existence, he himself possessed more warm clothing than he
liked to carry around with him. But not a few soldiers forgot to look
around and take sober stock of their actual situation and fell prey to
this sob-stuff. Fortunately for the great majority of them, and this
goes for every company, the great rank and file of officers and men
never lost their heads and their stout hearts.
And now we may as well deal with the actual facts in regard to the
alleged mutiny of American troops in North Russia. There was no mutiny.
In February Colonel Stewart had cabled to the War Department that “The
alarmist reports of condition of troops in North Russia as published in
press end of December are not warranted by facts. Troops have been well
taken care of in every way and my officers resent these highly
exaggerated reports, feeling that slur is cast upon the regiment and
its wonderful record. Request that this be given to the press and
especially to Detroit and Chicago papers to allay any unnecessary
anxiety.”
He was approximately correct in his statements. His intent was a
perfectly worthy one. But it was not believed by the wildly excited
people back home. Perhaps if the war department had been entirely frank
with the people in cases, say, like the publication of casualty reports
and reports of engagements, then its well-meant censorship and its
attempts to allay fear might have done some good.
As it was the day, March 31st, 1919, came when a not unwilling British
cable was scandalled and a fearsome press and people was startled with
the story of an alleged mutiny of a company of American troops in North
Russia. The “I-told-you-so’s” and the “wish-they-would’s” of the States
were gratified. The British War Office was, too, and made the most of
the story to propagandize its tired veterans and its late-drafted
youths who had been denied part in war by the sudden Armistice. Those
were urged to volunteer for service in North Russia, where it was
alleged their English comrades had been left unsupported by the
mutinous Yanks. Yes, there was a pretty mess made of the story by our
own War Department, too, who first was credulous of this really
incredulous affair, tried to explain it in its usually stupid and
ignorant way of explaining affairs in North Russia, only made a bad
matter worse, and then finally as they should have done at first, gave
the American Forces in North Russia a Commanding General, whose report
as quoted from the _Army and Navy Journal_ of April 1920, will say:
“The incident was greatly exaggerated, but while greatly regretting
that any insubordination took place, he praised the general conduct of
the 339th Infantry. Colonel Richardson states that the troops were
serving under very trying conditions, and that much more serious
disaffections appeared among troops of the Allies on duty in North
Russia. He further says the disaffection in the company of the 339th
Infantry, U. S. A., was handled by the regimental commander with
discretion and good judgment.”
Colonel Stewart, himself, stated to the press when he led his troops
home the following July:
“I did not have to take any disciplinary action against either an
officer or soldier of the regiment in connection with the matter, so
you may judge that the reports that have appeared have been very, very
greatly exaggerated. Every soldier connected with the incident
performed his duty as a soldier. And as far as I am concerned, I think
the matter should be closed.”
In a letter to a member of Congress from Michigan, Secretary Baker
refers to the alleged mutiny as follows:
“A cablegram, dated March 31, 1919, received from the American Military
Attache at Archangel, read in part as follows:
“‘Yesterday morning, March 30th, a company of infantry, having received
orders to the railroad front, was ordered out of the barracks for the
purpose of packing sleds for the trip across the river to the railroad
station. The non-commissioned officer that was in charge of the packing
soon reported to the officers that the men refused to obey. At this
some of the officers took charge, and all except one man began
reluctantly to pack after a considerable delay. The soldier who
continued to refuse was placed in confinement. Colonel Stewart, having
been sent for, arrived and had the men assembled to talk with them.
Upon the condition that the prisoner above mentioned was released, the
men agreed to go. This was done, and the company then proceeded to the
railway station and entrained there for the front. That they would not
go to the front line positions was openly stated by the men, however,
and they would only go to Obozerskaya. They also stated that general
mutiny would soon come if there was not some definite movement
forthcoming from Washington with regard to the removal of American
troops from Russia at the earliest possible date.’
“The War Department on April 10, 1919, authorized the publication of
this cablegram, and on April 12, 1919, authorized the statement that
the report from Murmansk was to the effect that the organization which
was referred to was Company “I” of the 339th Infantry, and that the
dispatch stated:
“‘It is worthy to note that the questions that were put to the officers
by the men were identical with those that the Bolshevik propaganda
leaflets advised them to put to them.’
“If reports differing from the above appeared in the newspapers, they
were secured from sources other than the War Department and published
without its authority.
“On March 16, 1920, Brigadier General Wilds P. Richardson, U. S. Army,
was ordered by the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces,
to proceed to North Russia and to assume command of the American Forces
in that locality. General Richardson arrived at Murmansk on April 8,
1920, where it was reported to him that a company of American troops at
Archangel had mutinied and that his presence there was urgently needed.
He arrived at Archangel on April 17, 1920, and found that conditions
had been somewhat exaggerated, especially in respect to the alleged
mutiny of the company of the 339th Infantry. General Richardson
directed an investigation of this matter by the Acting Inspector
General, American Forces in North Russia. This officer states the facts
to be as follows:
“‘Company “I”, 339th Infantry, was in rest area at Smallney Barracks,
in the outskirts of Archangel, Russia, when orders were received to go
to the railroad point and relieve another company. The following
morning the first sergeant ordered the company to turn out and load
sleds. He reported to the captain that the men did not respond as
directed. The captain then went to the barracks and demanded of the men
standing around the stove: “Who refuses to turn out and load sleds?” No
reply from the men. The captain then asked the trumpeter, who was
standing nearby, if he refused to turn out and load the sleds, and the
trumpeter replied he was ready if the balance were, but that he was not
going out and load packs of others on the sleds by himself, or words to
that effect. The captain then went to the phone and reported the
trouble as “mutiny” to Col. Stewart, the Commanding Officer, American
Forces in North Russia. Col. Stewart directed him to have the men
assemble in Y. M. C. A. hut and he would be out at once and talk to
them. The colonel arrived and read the Article of War as to mutiny and
talked to the men a few minutes. He then said he was ready to answer
any questions the men cared to ask. Some one wanted to know ‘What are
we here for and what are the intentions of the U. S. Government?’ The
colonel answered this as well as he could. He then asked if there was
anyone of the company who would not obey the order to load the sleds;
if so, step up to the front. No one moved. The colonel then directed
the men to load the sleds without delay, which was done.
“‘The testimony showed that the captain commanding Company “I”, 339th
Infantry, did not order his company formed nor did he ever give a
direct order for the sleds to be loaded. He did not report this trouble
to the commanding officer (a field officer) of Smallney Barracks, but
hastened to phone his troubles to the Commanding Officer, American
Forces in North Russia.’
“The inspector further states that the company was at the front when
the investigation was being made (May, 1919) and that the service of
all concerned, at that time, was considered satisfactory by the
battalion commander.
“The conclusions of the inspector were that from such evidence as could
be obtained the alleged mutiny was nothing like as serious as had been
reported, but that it was of such a nature that it could have been
handled by a company officer of force.
“The inspector recommended to the Commanding General, American Forces,
North Russia, that the matter be dropped and considered closed. The
Commanding General, American Forces, North Russia, concurred in this
recommendation.
“General Richardson, in his report of operations on the American Forces
in North Russia, referring to this matter states:
“‘MORALE. Archangel and North Russia reflected in high degree during
the past winter the disturbed state of the civilized world after four
years of devastating war. The military situation was difficult and at
times menacing.
“‘Our troops in this surrounding, facing entirely new experiences and
uncertain as to the future, bore themselves as a whole with courageous
and creditable spirit. It was inevitable that there should be unrest,
with some criticism and complaint, which represented the normal per
cent chargeable to the human equation under such conditions. This
culminated, shortly before my arrival, in a temporary disaffection of
one of the companies. This appears not to have extended beyond the
privates in ranks, and was handled by the regimental commander with
discretion and good judgment.
“‘This incident was given wide circulation in the States, and I am
satisfied from my investigation that an exaggerated impression was
created as to its seriousness. It is regrettable that it should have
happened at all, to mar in any degree the record of heroic and valiant
service performed by this regiment under very trying conditions.’ “The
above are the facts in regard to this matter, and it is hoped that this
information may meet your requirements.
“Very sincerely yours,
“NEWTON D. BAKER,
“Secretary of War.”
However, as a matter of history the facts must be told in this volume.
“I” Company of the 339th Infantry, commanded by Captain Horatio G.
Winslow, was on the 30th of March stationed at Smolny Barracks,
Archangel, Russia. It had been resting for a few days there after a
long period of service on the front. The spirit of the men had been
high for the most part, although as usual in any large group of
soldiers at rest there was some of what Frazier Hunt, the noted war
correspondent, calls “good, healthy grousing.” The men had the night
before given a fine minstrel entertainment in the Central Y. M. C. A.
Group psychology and atmospheric conditions have to be taken into
consideration at this point. By atmospheric conditions we mean the
half-truths and rumors and expressions of feeling that were in the air.
A sergeant of the company questioned carefully by the writer states
positively that the expressions of ugliness were confined to
comparatively few members of the company. The feeling seemed to spread
through the company that morning that some of the men were going to
speak their minds.
Here another fact must be introduced. A few nights before this there
had been a fire in camp that spread to their barracks and burned the
company out, resulting in the splitting of the company into two
separated parts, and in giving the little first sergeant and commanding
officer inconvenience in conveying orders and directions to the men.
And it was rumored in the morning in one barracks that the men of the
other barracks were starting something. The platoon officer in command
there had gone to the front to make arrangements for the billeting and
transportation of troops, who were to start that day for the front some
several miles south of Obozerskaya. Now the psychology began to work.
Why hurry the loading, let’s see what the men of that platoon now will
do.
The captain notices the delay in proceedings. He has heard a little
something of what is in the air. It is nothing serious, yet he is
nervous about it. His first sergeant, a nervous and a nervy little man
too, for Detroit has seen the _Croix de Guerre_ he won, showed anxiety
over the dilatoriness of the men in loading the sleighs. And the men
were only just human in wanting to see what the captain was going to do
about that other platoon that was rumored to be starting something. Of
course in the psychology of the thing it was not in their minds that
they would be called upon to express themselves. The others were going
to do that.
But when the captain went directly to the men and asked them what they
were thinking and feeling they found themselves talking to him. Here
and there a man spoke bitterly about the Russian regiments in Archangel
not doing anything but drill in Archangel. Of course he had only
half-truth. That is the way misunderstandings and bad feelings feed. At
that moment a company of the Archangel Regiment was at a desperate
front, Bolsheozerki, standing shoulder to shoulder with “M” Company out
of “I” Company’s own battalion. But these American soldiers at that
moment with their feelings growing warmer with expression of them,
thought only of the drilling Russian soldiers in Archangel and of the
S. B. A. L. soldiers who had mutinied earlier in the winter and been
subdued by American soldiers in Archangel. And so if the truth be told,
those soldiers spoke boldly enough to their captain to alarm him. He
thought that he really had a serious condition before him.
From remarks by the men he judged that for the sake of the men and the
chief commanding officer, Colonel Stewart, it would be well to have a
meeting in the Y. M. C. A. where they could be properly informed, where
they could see ALL that was going on and not be deluded by the rumors
that other groups of the company were doing something else, and where
the common sense of the great, great majority of the men would show
them the foolishness of the whole thing. And he invited the colonel to
appear.