_Friends and Fellow Citizens_,
The advocates for the proposed new constitution, having been beaten off
the field of argument, on its merits, have now taken new ground. They
admit it is liable to well-founded objections—that a number of its
articles ought to be amended; that if alterations do not take place, a
door will be left open for an undue administration, and encroachments
on the liberties of the people; and many of them go so far as to say,
if it should continue for any considerable period, in its present
form, it will lead to a subversion of our equal republican forms of
government.——But still, although they admit this, they urge that
it ought to be adopted, and that we should confide in procuring the
necessary alterations after we have received it. Most of the leading
characters, who advocate its reception, now profess their readiness
to concur with those who oppose, in bringing about the most material
amendments contended for, provided they will first agree to accept the
proffered system as it is. These concessions afford strong evidence,
that the opposers of the constitution have reason on their side, and
that they have not been influenced, in the part they have taken,
by the mean and unworthy motives of selfish and private interests
with which they have been illiberally charged.—As the favourers of
the constitution seem, if their professions are sincere, to be in a
situation similar to that of Agrippa, when he cried out upon Paul’s
preaching—“almost thou persuadest me to be a christian,” I cannot
help indulging myself in expressing the same wish which St. Paul
uttered on that occasion, “Would to God you were not only almost,
but altogether such an one as I am.” But alas, as we hear no more of
Agrippa’s christianity after this interview with Paul, so it is much
to [4] be feared, that we shall hear nothing of amendments from most
of the warm advocates for adopting the new government, after it gets
into operation. When the government is once organized, and all the
offices under it filled, the inducements which our great men will
have to support it, will be much stronger than they are now to urge
its reception. Many of them will then hold places of great honour and
emolument, and others will then be candidates for such places. It is
much harder to relinquish honours or emoluments, which we have in
possession, than to abandon the pursuit of them, while the attainment
is held in a state of uncertainty.—The amendments contended for as
necessary to be made, are of such a nature, as will tend to limit and
abridge a number of the powers of the government. And is it probable,
that those who enjoy these powers will be so likely to surrender
them after they have them in possession, as to consent to have them
restricted in the act of granting them? Common sense says—they will
not.
When we consider the nature and operation of government, the idea of
receiving a form radically defective, under the notion of making the
necessary amendments, is evidently absurd.
Government is a compact entered into by mankind, in a state of society,
for the promotion of their happiness. In forming this compact, common
sense dictates, that no articles should be admitted that tend to defeat
the end of its institution. If any such are proposed, they should be
rejected. When the compact is once formed and put into operation,
it is too late for individuals to object. The deed is executed—the
conveyance is made—and the power of reassuming the right is gone,
without the consent of the parties.——Besides, when a government is
once in operation, it acquires strength by habit, and stability by
exercise. If it is tolerably mild in its administration, the people sit
down easy under it, be its principles and forms ever so repugnant to
the maxims of liberty.——It steals, by insensible degrees, one right
from the people after another, until it rivets its powers so as to put
it beyond the ability of the community to restrict or limit it. The
history of the world furnishes many instances of a people’s increasing
the powers of their rulers by persuasion, but I believe it would be
difficult to produce one in which the rulers have been persuaded to
relinquish their powers to [5] the people. Wherever this has taken
place, it has always been the effect of compulsion. These observations
are so well-founded, that they are become a kind of axioms in politics;
and the inference to be drawn from them is equally evident, which is
this,—that, in forming a government, care should be taken not to
confer powers which it will be necessary to take back; but if you err
at all, let it be on the contrary side, because it is much easier, as
well as safer, to enlarge the powers of your rulers, if they should
prove not sufficiently extensive, than it is too abridge them if they
should be too great.
It is agreed, the plan is defective—that some of the powers granted,
are dangerous—others not well defined—and amendments are necessary.
Why then not amend it? why not remove the cause of danger, and, if
possible, even the apprehension of it? The instrument is yet in the
hands of the people; it is not signed, sealed, and delivered, and they
have power to give it any form they please.
But it is contended, adopt it first, and then amend it. I ask, why not
amend, and then adopt it? Most certainly the latter mode of proceeding
is more consistent with our ideas of prudence in the ordinary concerns
of life. If men were about entering into a contract respecting their
private concerns, it would be highly absurd in them to sign and seal
an instrument containing stipulations which are contrary to their
interests and wishes, under the expectation, that the parties, after
its execution, would agree to make alterations agreeable to their
desire.——They would insist upon the exceptionable clauses being
altered before they would ratify the contract. And is a compact for
the government of ourselves and our posterity of less moment than
contracts between individuals? certainly not. But to this reasoning,
which at first view would appear to admit of no reply, a variety of
objections are made, and a number of reasons urged for adopting the
system, and afterwards proposing amendments.—Such as have come under
my observation, I shall state, and remark upon.
I. It is insisted, that the present situation of our country is such,
as not to admit of a delay in forming a new government, or of time
sufficient to deliberate and agree upon the amendments which are
proper, without involving ourselves in a state of anarchy and confusion.
[6] On this head, all the powers of rhetoric, and arts of description,
are employed to paint the condition of this country, in the most
hideous and frightful colors. We are told, that agriculture is
without encouragement; trade is languishing; private faith and credit
are disregarded, and public credit is prostrate; that the laws
and magistrates are contemned and set at naught; that a spirit of
licentiousness is rampant, and ready to break over every bound set
to it by the government; that private embarrassments and distresses
invade the house of every man of middling property, and insecurity
threatens every man in affluent circumstances: in short, that we are
in a state of the most grievous calamity at home, and that we are
contemptible abroad, the scorn of foreign nations, and the ridicule
of the world. From this high-wrought picture, one would suppose that
we were in a condition the most deplorable of any people upon earth.
But suffer me, my countrymen, to call your attention to a serious
and sober estimate of the situation in which you are placed, while I
trace the embarrassments under which you labor, to their true sources.
What is your condition? Does not every man sit under his own vine and
under his own fig-tree, having none to make him afraid? Does not every
one follow his calling without impediments and receive the reward of
his well-earned industry? The farmer cultivates his land, and reaps
the fruit which the bounty of heaven bestows on his honest toil. The
mechanic is exercised in his art, and receives the reward of his
labour. The merchant drives his commerce, and none can deprive him of
the gain he honestly acquires; all classes and callings of men amongst
us are protected in their various pursuits, and secured by the laws
in the possession and enjoyment of the property obtained in those
pursuits. The laws are as well executed as they ever were, in this or
any other country. Neither the hand of private violence, nor the more
to be dreaded hand of legal oppression, are reached out to distress us.
It is true, many individuals labour under embarrassments, but these are
to be imputed to the unavoidable circumstances of things, rather than
to any defect in our governments. We have just emerged from a long and
expensive war. During its existence few people were in a situation to
increase their fortunes, but many to diminish them. Debts contracted
before the war were left unpaid [7] while it existed, and these were
left a burden too heavy to be borne at the commencement of peace.
Add to these, that when the war was over, too many of us, instead of
reassuming our old habits of frugality, and industry, by which alone
every country must be placed in a prosperous condition, took up the
profuse use of foreign commodities. The country was deluged with
articles imported from abroad, and the cash of the country has been
sent to pay for them, and still left us labouring under the weight of a
huge debt to persons abroad. These are the true sources to which we are
to trace all the private difficulties of individuals: But will a new
government relieve you from these? The advocates for it have not yet
told you how it will do it—And I will venture to pronounce, that there
is but one way in which it can be effected, and that is by industry and
economy; limit your expences within your earnings; sell more than you
buy, and everything will be well on this score. Your present condition
is such as is common to take place after the conclusion of a war.
Those who can remember our situation after the termination of the war
preceding the last, will recollect that our condition was similar to
the present, but time and industry soon recovered us from it. Money was
scare, the produce of the country much lower than it has been since the
peace, and many individuals were extremely embarrassed with debts; and
this happened although we did not experience the ravages, desolations,
and loss of property, that were suffered during the late war.
With regard to our public and national concerns, what is there in our
condition that threatens us with any immediate danger? We are at peace
with all the world; no nation menaces us with war; nor are we called
upon by any cause of sufficient importance to attack any nation. The
state governments answer the purposes of preserving the peace, and
providing for present exigencies. Our condition as a nation is in no
respect worse than it has been for several years past. Our public debt
has been lessened in various ways, and the western territory, which has
been relied upon as a productive fund to discharge the national debt
has at length been brought to market, and a considerable part actually
applied to its reduction. I mention these things to shew, that there is
nothing special, in our present situation, as it respects our national
affairs, that should induce us to accept the prof- [8] fered system,
without taking sufficient time to consider and amend it. I do not mean
by this, to insinuate, that our government does not stand in need of a
reform. It is admitted by all parties, that alterations are necessary
in our federal constitution, but the circumstances of our case do by
no means oblige us to precipitate this business, or require that we
should adopt a system materially defective. We may safely take time to
deliberate and amend, without in the meantime hazarding a condition, in
any considerable degree, worse than the present.
But it is said that if we postpone the ratification of this system
until the necessary amendments are first incorporated, the consequence
will be a civil war among the states. On this head weak minds
are alarmed with being told, that the militia of Connecticut and
Massachusetts, on the one side, and of New Jersey and Pennsylvania on
the other, will attack us with hostile fury; and either destroy us from
the face of the earth, or at best divide us between the two states
adjoining on either side. The apprehension of danger is one of the
most powerful incentives to human action, and is therefore generally
excited on political questions: But still, a prudent man, though he
foreseeth the evil and avoideth it, yet he will not be terrified by
imaginary dangers. We ought therefore to enquire what ground there is
to fear such an event?—There can be no reason to apprehend, that the
other states will make war with us for not receiving the constitution
proposed, until it is amended, but from one of the following causes:
either that they will have just cause to do it, or that they have a
disposition to do it. We will examine each of these:—That they will
have no just cause to quarrel with us for not acceding, is evident,
because we are under no obligation to do it, arising from any existing
compact or previous stipulation. The confederation is the only compact
now existing between the states: By the terms of it, it cannot be
changed without the consent of every one of the parties to it. Nothing
therefore can be more unreasonable than for part of the states to claim
of the others, as matter of right, an accession to a system to which
they have material objections. No war can therefore arise from this
principle, but on the contrary, it is to be presumed, it will operate
strongly the opposite way.—The states will reason on the subject in
the following manner: On this momentous question, every state has an
in- [9] dubitable right to judge for itself: This is secured to it by
solemn compact, and if any of our sister states disagree with us upon
the question, we ought to attend to their objections, and accommodate
ourselves as far as possible to the amendments they propose.
As to the inclination of the states to make war with us, for declining
to accede, until it is amended, this is highly improbable, not only
because such a procedure would be most unjust and unreasonable in
itself, but for various other reasons.
The idea of a civil war among the states is abhorrent to the principles
and feelings of almost every man of every rank in the union. It is so
obvious to every one of the least reflection, that in such an event
we should hazard the loss of all things, without the hope of gaining
anything, that the man who should entertain a thought of this kind,
would be justly deemed more fit to be shut up in Bedlam, than to be
reasoned with. But the idea of one or more states attacking another,
for insisting upon alterations upon the system, before it is adopted,
is more extravagent still; it is contradicting every principle of
liberty which has been entertained by the states, violating the most
solemn compact, and taking from the state the right of deliberation.
Indeed to suppose, that a people, entertaining such refined ideas
of the rights of human nature as to be induced to wage war with the
most powerful nation on earth, upon a speculative point, and from the
mere apprehension of danger only, should be so far lost to their
own feelings and principles as to deny to their brethren, who were
associated with them in the arduous conflict, the right of deliberation
on a question of the first importance to their political happiness and
safety, is equally an insult to the character of the people of America,
and to common sense, and could only be suggested by a vicious heart and
a corrupt mind.
The idea of being attacked by the other states, will appear visionary
and chimerical, if we consider that tho’ several of them have adopted
the new constitution, yet the opposition to it has been numerous and
formidable. The eastern states from whom we are told we have most
to fear, should a civil war be blown up, would have full employ to
keep in awe those who are opposed to it in their own governments.
Massachusetts, after a long and dubious contest [10] in their
convention, has adopted it by an inconsiderable majority, and in the
very act has marked it with a stigma in its present form. No man of
candour, judging from their public proceedings, will undertake to say
on which side the majority of the people are. Connecticut, it is true,
have acceded to it, by a large majority of their convention; but it
is a fact well known, that a large proportion of the yeomanry of the
country are against it:—And it is equally true, that a considerable
part of those who voted for it in the convention, wish to see it
altered. In both these states the body of the common people, who always
do the fighting of a country, would be more likely to fight against
than for it: Can it then be presumed, that a country divided among
themselves, upon a question where even the advocates for it, admit the
system they contend for needs amendments, would make war upon a sister
state, who only insist that that should be done before they receive it,
which it is granted ought to be done after, and where it is confessed
no obligation lies upon them by compact to do it. Can it, I say, be
imagined, that in such a case, they would make war on a sister state?
The idea is preposterous and chimerical.
It is further urged we must adopt this plan because we have no chance
of getting a better. This idea is inconsistent with the principles of
those who advance it. They say, it must be altered, but it should
be left until after it is put in operation. But if this objection is
valid, the proposal of altering, after it is received, is mere delusion.
It is granted, that amendments ought to be made; that the exceptions
taken to the constitution, are grounded on just principles, but it
is still insisted, that alterations are not to be attempted until
after it is received: But why not? Because it is said, there is no
probability of agreeing in amendments previous to the adoption, but
they may be easily made after it. I wish to be informed what there is
in our situation or circumstances that renders it more probable that
we shall agree in amendments better after, than before submitting to
it? No good reason has as yet been given; it is evident none can be
given: On the contrary, there are several considerations which induce
a belief, that alterations may be obtained with more ease before than
after its reception, and if so, every one must agree [11] it is much
the safest. The importance of preserving an union, and of establishing
a government equal to the purpose of maintaining that union, is a
sentiment deeply impressed on the mind of every citizen of America.
It is now no longer doubted, that the confederation, in its present
form, is inadequate to that end: Some reform in our government must
take place: In this, all parties agree: It is therefore to be presumed,
that this object will be pursued with ardour and perseverance, until
it is attained by all parties. But when a government is adopted that
promises to effect this, we are to expect the ardour of many, yea,
of most people, will be abated;—their exertions will cease or be
languid, and they will sit down easy, although they may see that the
constitution which provides for this, does not sufficiently guard the
rights of the people, or secure them against the encroachments of their
rulers. The great end they had in view, the security of the union, they
will consider effected, and this will divert their attention from that
which is equally interesting, safety to their liberties. Besides, the
human mind cannot continue intensely engaged for any great length of
time upon one object. As after a storm, a calm generally succeeds, so
after the minds of a people have been ardently employed upon a subject,
especially upon that of government, we commonly find that they become
cool and inattentive: Add to this that those in the community who urge
the adoption of this system, because they hope to be raised above the
common level of their fellow citizens; because they expect to be among
the number of the few who will be benefitted by it, will more easily
be induced to consent to the amendments before it is received than
afterwards. Before its reception they will be inclined to be pliant and
condescending; if they cannot obtain all they wish, they will consent
to take less. They will yield part to obtain the rest. But when the
plan is once agreed to, they will be tenacious of every power, they
will strenuously contend to retain all they have got; this is natural
to human nature, and it is consonant to the experience of mankind.
For history affords us no examples of persons once possessed of power
resigning it willingly.
The reasonings made use of to persuade us, that no alterations can be
agreed upon previous to the adoption of the system, are as curious as
they are futile. It is alledged [12], that there was great diversity of
sentiments in forming the proposed constitution; that it was the effect
of mutual concessions and a spirit of accommodation, and from hence it
is inferred, that farther changes cannot be hoped for. I should suppose
that the contrary inference was the fair one. If the convention,
who framed this plan, were possessed of such a spirit of moderation
and condescension, as to be induced to yield to each other certain
points, and to accommodate themselves to each other’s opinions, and
even prejudices, there is reason to expect, that this same spirit will
continue and prevail in a future convention, and produce an union of
sentiments on the points objected to. There is more reason to hope for
this, because the subject has received a full discussion, and the minds
of the people much better known than they were when the convention sat.
Previous to the meeting of the convention, the subject of a new form
of government had been little thought of, and scarcely written upon at
all. It is true, it was the general opinion, that some alterations were
requisite in the federal system. This subject had been contemplated by
almost every thinking man in the union. It had been the subject of many
well-written essays, and it was the anxious wish of every true friend
to America. But it was never in the contemplation of one in a thousand
of those who had reflected on the matter, to have an entire change in
the nature of our federal government—to alter it from a confederation
of states, to that of one entire government, which will swallow up that
of the individual states. I will venture to say, that the idea of a
government similar to the one proposed, never entered the minds of the
legislatures who appointed the convention, and of but very few of the
members who composed it, until they had assembled and heard it proposed
in that body: much less had the people any conception of such a plan
until after it was promulgated. While it was agitated, the debates of
the convention were kept an impenetrable secret, and no opportunity
was given for well informed men to offer their sentiments upon the
subject. The system was therefore never publicly discussed, nor indeed
could be, because it was not known to the people until after it was
proposed. Since that, it has been the object of universal attention—it
has been thought of by every reflecting man—been discussed in a
public and private manner, in conversation and in print; [13] its
defects have been pointed out, and every objection to it stated; able
advocates have written in its favour, and able opponents have written
against it. And what is the result? It cannot be denied but that the
general opinion is, that it contains material errors, and requires
important amendments. This then being the general sentiment, both of
the friends and foes of the system, can it be doubted, that another
convention would concur in such amendments as would quiet the fears of
the opposers, and effect a great degree of union on the subject?—An
event most devoutly to be wished. But it is farther said, that there
can be no prospect of procuring alterations before it is acceded to,
because those who oppose it do not agree among themselves with respect
to the amendments that are necessary. To this I reply, that this may
be urged against attempting alterations after it is received, with as
much force as before; and therefore, if it concludes anything, it is
that we must receive any system of government proposed to us, because
those who object to it do not entirely concur in their objections.
But the assertion is not true to any considerable extent. There is
a remarkable uniformity in the objections made to the constitution,
on the most important points. It is also worthy of notice, that very
few of the matters found fault with in it, are of a local nature, or
such as affect any particular state; on the contrary, they are such as
concern the principles of general liberty, in which the people of New
Hampshire, New York and Georgia are equally interested.
It would be easy to shew, that in the leading and most important
objections that have been made to the plan, there has been and is an
entire concurrence of opinion among writers, and in public bodies
throughout the United States.
I have not time to fully illustrate this by a minute narration of
particulars; but to prove that this is the case, I shall adduce a
number of important instances.
It has been objected to that the new system, that it is calculated to,
and will effect such a consolidation of the States, as to supplant and
overturn the state governments. In this the minority of Pennsylvania,
the opposition in Massachusetts, and all the writers of any ability or
note in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston concur. It may be added,
that this appears to have been the opinion of the Massachusetts
convention, and gave rise to that article in [14] the amendments
proposed, which confines the general government to the exercise only of
powers expressly given.
It has been said that the representation in the general legislature
is too small to secure liberty, or to answer the intention of
representation. In this there is an union of sentiments in the opposers.
The constitution has been opposed, because it gives to the legislature
an unlimited power of taxation both with respect to direct and indirect
taxes, a right to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises of
every kind and description, and to any amount. In this there has been
as general a concurrence of opinion as in the former.
The opposers to the constitution have said that it is dangerous,
because the judicial power may extend to many cases which ought to be
reserved to the decision of the State courts, and because the right
of trial by jury is not secured in the judicial courts of the general
government, in civil cases. All the opposers are agreed in this
objection.
The power of the general legislature to alter and regulate the time,
place and manner of holding elections, has been stated as an argument
against the adoption of the system. It has been argued that this power
will place in the hands of the general government, the authority,
whenever they shall be disposed, and a favorable opportunity offers,
to deprive the body of the people in effect, of all share in the
government. The opposers to the constitution universally agree in this
objection, and of such force is it, that most of its ardent advocates
admit its validity, and those who have made attempts to vindicate it,
have been reduced to the necessity of using the most trifling arguments
to justify it.
The mixture of legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the
senate; the little degree of responsibility under which the great
officers of government will be held; and the liberty granted by the
system to establish and maintain a standing army without any limitation
or restriction, are also objected to the constitution; and in these
there is a great degree of unanimity of sentiment in the opposers.
From these remarks it appears, that the opponents to the system accord
in the great and material points on which they wish amendments. For the
truth of the assertion [15], I appeal to the protest of the minority
of the convention of Pennsylvania, to all the publications against the
constitution, and to the debates of the convention of Massachusetts. As
a higher authority than these, I appeal to the amendments proposed by
the Massachusetts; these are to be considered as the sense of that body
upon the defects of the system. And it is a fact, which I will venture
to assert, that a large majority of the convention were of opinion,
that a number of additional alterations ought to be made. Upon reading
the articles which they propose as amendments, it will appear that
they object to indefinite powers in the legislature—to the power of
laying direct taxes—to the authority of regulating elections—to the
extent of the judicial powers, both as it respects the inferior court
and the appellate jurisdiction—to the smallness of the representation,
&c.—It is admitted that some writers have advanced objections that
others have not noticed—that exceptions have been taken by some, that
have not been insisted upon by others, and it is probable, that some
of the opponents may approve what others will reject. But still these
difference are on matters of small importance, and of such a nature
as the persons who hold different opinions will not be tenacious of.
Perfect uniformity of sentiment on so great a political subject is not
to be expected. Every sensible man is impressed with this idea, and is
therefore prepared to make concessions and accommodate on matters of
small importance. It is sufficient that we agree in the great leading
principles, which relate to the preservation of public liberty and
private security. And on these I will venture to affirm we are as well
agreed, as any people ever were on a question of this nature. I dare
pronounce that were the principal advocates for the proposed plan to
write comments upon it, they would differ more in the sense they would
give the constitution, than those who oppose it do, in the amendments
they would wish. I am justified in this opinion, by the sentiments
advanced by the different writers in favour of the constitution.
It is farther insisted, that six states have already adopted the
constitution; that probably nine will agree to it; in which case it
will be put in operation. That it is unreasonable to expect that those
states which have acceded [16] to it will reconsider the subject in
compliance with the wishes of a minority.
To perceive the force of this objection it is proper to review the
conduct and circumstances of the states which have acceded it. It
cannot be controverted, that Connecticut and New Jersey were very
much influenced in their determinations on the questions, by local
considerations. The duty of impost laid by this state, has been a
subject of complaint by those states. The new constitution transfers
the power of imposing these duties from the state to the general
government, and carries the proceeds to the use of the union, instead
of that of those state. This is a popular matter with the people of
those states, and at the same time, is not advanced by the sensible
opposers to the system in this state as an objection to it.—To excite
in the minds of the people of these states an attachment to the new
system, the amount of the revenue arising from our impost has been
magnified to a much larger sum than it produces; it has been stated
to amount to from sixty to eighty thousand pounds lawful money; and a
gentleman of high eminence in Connecticut has lent the authority of his
name to support it. It has been said, that Connecticut pays a third of
this sum annually for impost, and Jersey nearly as much. It has farther
been asserted, that the avails of the impost were applied to the
separate use of the state of New York. By these assertions the people
have been grossly imposed upon, for neither of them are true.
The amount of the revenue from impost for two years past, has
not exceeded fifty thousands pounds currency, per annum, and a
drawback of duties is allowed by law, upon all goods exported to the
beforementioned states, in casks or packages unbroken.
The whole of this sum, and more, has been paid into the federal
treasury for the support of the government of the union. All the states
therefore have actually derived equal benefit with the state of New
York, from the impost. It may be said, I know, that this state has
obtained credit for the amount, upon the requisitions of Congress: It
is admitted, but still it is a fact, that other states, and especially
those who complain, have paid no part of the monies required of them,
and have scarcely made an effort to do it. The fact therefore is, that
they have received [17] as much advantage from the impost of this state
as we ourselves have. The proposed constitution directs to no mode,
in which the deficiencies of states on former requisitions, are to be
collected, but seems to hold out the idea, that we are to start out
anew, and all past payments be forgotten. It is natural to expect, that
selfish motives will have too powerful an influence on men’s minds,
and that too often, they will shut the eyes of a people to their best
and true interest. The people of those states have been persuaded to
believe, that this new constitution will relieve them from the burden
of taxes, by providing for all the exigencies of the union, by duties
which can be raised only in the neighbouring states. When they come to
be convinced, that this promise is a mere delusion, as they assuredly
will, by finding the continental tax-gatherer knocking at their doors,
if not before, they will be among the first to urge amendments, and
perhaps the most violent to obtain them. But notwithstanding the
local prejudices which operate upon the people of these states, a
considerable part of them wish for amendments. It is not to be doubted
that a considerable majority of the people of Connecticut wish for
them, and many in Jersey have the same desires, and their numbers are
increasing. It cannot be disputed, that amendments would accord with
the sentiments of a great majority in Massachusetts, or that they
would be agreeable to the greater part of the people of Pennsylvania:
There is no reason to doubt but that they would be agreeable to
Delaware and Georgia—If then, the states who have already ratified the
constitution, are desirous to have alterations made in it, what reason
can be assigned why they should not cordially meet with overtures for
that purpose from any state, and concur in appointing a convention to
effect it? Mankind are easily induced to fall into measures to obtain
an object agreeable to them. In this case, the states would not only
be moved by this universal principle of human nature, but by the
strong and powerful motive of uniting all the states under a form of
government agreeable to them.
I shall now dismiss the consideration of objections made to attempting
alterations previous to the adoption of the plan, but before I close,
I beg your indulgence, while I make some remarks on the splendid
advantages which the advocates of this system say are to be derived
from it.—Hope and fear are two of the most active principles of [18]
our nature: We have considered how the latter is addressed on this
occasion, and with how little reason: It will appear that the promises
it makes, are as little to be relied upon as its threatenings. We are
amused with the fair prospects that are to open, when this government
is put into operation—Agriculture is to flourish, and our fields to
yield an hundred fold—Commerce is to expand her wings, and bear our
productions to all the ports in the world—Money is to pour into our
country through every channel—Arts and manufactures are to rear their
heads, and every mecanic find full employ—Those who are in debt, are
to find easy means to procure money to pay them—Public burdens and
taxes are to be lightened, and yet all our public debts are soon to
be discharged.—With such vain and delusive hopes are the minds of
many honest and well meaning people fed, and by these means are they
led inconsiderately to contend for a government, which is made to
promise what it cannot perform; while their minds are diverted from
contemplating its true nature, or considering whether is will not
endanger their liberties, and work oppression.
Far be it from me to object to granting the general government the
power of regulating trade, and of laying imposts and duties for that
purpose, as well as for raising a revenue: But it is as far from me
to flatter people with hopes of benefits to be derived from such a
change in our government which can never be realized. Some advantages
may accrue from vesting in one general government, the right to
regulate commerce, but it is a vain delusion to expect anything like
what is promised. The truth is, this country buys more than it sells:
It imports more than it exports. There are too many merchants in
proportion to the farmers and manufacturers. Until these defects are
remedied, no government can relieve us. Common sense dictates, that
if a man buys more than he sells, he will remain in debt; the same is
true of a country.—And as long as this country imports more goods than
the exports——the overplus must be paid for in money or not paid at
all. These few remarks may convince us, that the radical remedy for the
scarcity of cash is frugality and industry. Earn much and spend little,
and you will be enabled to pay your debts, and have money in your
pockets; and if you do not follow [19] this advice, no government that
can be framed, will relieve you.
As to the idea of being relieved from taxes by this government, it
is an affront to common sense, to advance it. There is no complaint
made against the present confederation more justly founded than this,
that it is incompetent to provide the means to discharge our national
debt, and to support the national government. Its inefficacy to these
purposes, which was early seen and felt, was the first thing that
suggested the necessity of changing the government; other things,
it is true, were afterwards found to require alterations; but this
was the most important, and accordingly we find, that while in some
other things the powers of this government seem to be in some measure
limited, on the subject of raising money, no bounds are set to it.
It is authorised to raise money to any amount, and in any way it
pleases. If then, the capital embarrassment in our present government
arises from the want of money, and this constitution effectually
authorises the raising of it, how are the taxes to be lessened by it?
Certainly money can only be raised by taxes of some kind or other;
it must be got either by additional impositions on trade, by excise,
or by direct taxes, or what is more probable, by all together. In
either way, it amounts to the same thing, and the position is clear,
that as the necessities of the nation require more money than is
now raised, the taxes must be enhanced. This you ought to know, and
prepare yourselves to submit to.—Besides, how is it possible that the
taxes can be decreased when the expences of your government will be
greatly advanced? It does not require any great skill in politics, or
ability at calculation to shew, that the new government will cost more
money to administer it, than the present. I shall not descend to an
estimate of the cost of a federal town, the salaries of the president,
vice-president, judges, and other great officers of state, nor
calculate the amount of the pay the legislature will vote themselves,
or the salaries that will be paid the innumerable and subordinate
officers. The bare mention of these things is sufficient to convince
you, that the new government will be vastly more expensive than the
old: And how is the money to answer these purposes to be obtained?
It is obvious, it must be taken out of the pockets of the people, by
taxes, in some mode or other.
[20] Having remarked upon the arguments which have been advanced, to
induce you to accede to this government, without amendments, and I
trust refuted them, suffer me to close with an address dedicated by the
affection of a brother, and the honest zeal of a lover of his country.
_Friends, countrymen, and fellow-citizens_,
The present is the most important crisis at which you ever have
arrived. You have before you a question big with consequences,
unutterably important to yourselves, to your children, to generations
yet unborn, to the cause of liberty and of mankind; every motive of
religion and virtue, of private happiness and public good, of honour
and dignity, should urge you to consider cooly and determine wisely.
Almost all the governments that have arisen among mankind, have
sprung from force and violence. The records of history inform us of
none that have been the result of cool and dispassionate reason and
reflection: It is reserved for this favoured country to exhibit to
mankind the first example.——This opportunity is now given us, and we
are to exercise our rights in the choice of persons to represent us in
convention, to deliberate and determine upon the constitution proposed:
It will be to our everlasting disgrace to be indifferent on such a
subject; for it is impossible, we can contemplate anything that relates
to the affairs of this life of half the importance.
You have heard that both sides on this great question, agree, that
there are in it great defects; yet the one side tell you, choose such
men as will adopt it, and then amend it——while the other say, amend
previous to its adoption.——I have stated to you my reasons for the
latter, and I think they are unanswerable.—Consider you the common
people the yeomanry of the country, for to such I principally address
myself, you are to be the principal losers, if the constitution should
prove oppressive; When a tyranny is established, there are always
masters as well as slaves; the great and well-born are generally the
former, and the middling class the latter—Attempts have been made,
and will be repeated, to alarm you with the fear of consequences;
but reflect there are consequences on both sides, and none can be
apprehended more dreadful, than entailing on ourselves and posterity
[21] a government which will raise a few to the height of human
greatness and wealth, while it will depress the many to the extreme of
poverty and wretchedness. Consequences are under the controul of that
all-wise and all-powerful being, whose providence conducts the affairs
of all men: Our part is to act right, and we may then have confidence
that the consequences will be favourable. The path in which you should
walk is plain and open before you; be united as one man, and direct
your choice to such men as have been uniform in their opposition to the
proposed system in its present form, or without proper alterations:
In men of this description you have reason to place confidence, while
on the other hand, you have just cause to distrust those who urge
the adoption of a bad constitution, under the delusive expectation
of making amendments after it is acceded to. Your jealousy of such
characters should be the more excited, when you consider that the
advocates for the constitution have shifted their ground. When men are
uniform in their opinions, it affords evidence that they are sincere:
When they are shifting, it gives reason to believe, they do not change
from conviction. It must be recollected, that when this plan was first
announced to the public, its supporters cried it up as the most perfect
production of human wisdom; It was represented either as having no
defects, or if it had, they were so trifling and inconsiderable, that
they served only, as the shades in a fine picture, to set off the
piece to the greater advantage. One gentleman in Philadelphia went so
far in the ardour of his enthusiasm in its favour, as to pronounce,
that the men who formed it were as really under the guidance of Divine
Revelation, as was Moses, the Jewish lawgiver. Their language is now
changed; the question has been discussed; the objections to the plan
ably stated, and they are admitted to be unanswerable. The same men
who held it almost perfect, now admit it is very imperfect; that it is
necessary it should be amended. The only question between us, is simply
this: Shall we accede to a bad constitution, under the uncertain
prospect of getting it amended, after we have received it, or shall we
amend it before we adopt it? Common sense will point out which is the
most rational, which is the most secure line of conduct. May heaven
inspire you with wisdom, union, moderation and firmness [22], and give
you hearts to make a proper estimate of your invaluable privileges, and
preserve them to you, to be transmitted to your posterity unimpaired,
and may they be maintained in this our country, while Sun and Moon
endure.