3. What would be our situation, if after rejecting this, all our
efforts to obtain a better should prove fruitless?
The men, who formed this plan are Americans, who had long deserved
and enjoyed our confidence, and who are as much interested in having
a good government as any of us are, or can be. They were appointed
to that business at a time when the States had become very sensible
of the derangement of our national affairs, and of the impossibility
of retrieving them under the existing Confederation. Although well
persuaded that nothing but a good national government could oppose
and divert the tide of evils that was flowing in upon us, yet those
gentlemen met in Convention with minds perfectly unprejudiced in
favour of any particular plan. The minds of their Constituents were
at that time equally unbiased, cool and dispassionate. All agreed in
the necessity of doing something, but no one ventured to say decidedly
what precisely ought to be done—opinions were then fluctuating and
unfixed, and whatever might have been the wishes of a few individuals,
yet while the Convention deliberated, the people remained in [12]
silent suspence. Neither wedded to favourite systems of their own, nor
influenced by popular ones abroad, the members were more desirous to
receive light from, than to impress their private sentiments on, one
another. These circumstances naturally opened the door to that spirit
of candour, of calm enquiry, of mutual accommodation, and mutual
respect, which entered into the Convention with them, and regulated
their debates and proceedings.
The impossibility of agreeing upon any plan that would exactly quadrate
with the local policy and objects of every State, soon became evident;
and they wisely thought it better mutually to concede, and accommodate,
and in that way to fashion their system as much as possible by the
circumstances and wishes of different States, than by pertinaciously
adhering, each to his own ideas, oblige the Convention to rise without
doing anything. They were sensible that obstacles arising from local
circumstances, would not cease while those circumstances continued to
exist; and so far as those circumstances depended on differences of
climate, productions, and commerce, that no change was to be expected.
They were likewise sensible that on a subject so comprehensive, and
involving such a variety of points and questions, the most able, the
most candid, and the most honest men will differ in opinion. The same
proposition seldom strikes many minds exactly in the same point of
light; different habits of thinking, different degrees and modes of
education, different prejudices and opinions early formed and long
entertained, conspire with a multitude of other circumstances, to
produce among men a diversity and contrariety of opinions on questions
of difficulty. Liberality therefore as well as prudence, induced them
to treat each other’s opinions with tenderness, to argue without
asperity, and to endeavor to convince the judgment without hurting
the feelings of each other. Although many weeks were passed in these
discussions, some points remained, on which a unison of opinions could
not be effected. Here again that same happy disposition to unite and
conciliate, induced them to meet each other; and enabled them, by
mutual concessions, finally to complete and agree to the plan they have
recommended, and that too with a degree of unanimity which, considering
the variety of discordant views and ideas, they had to reconcile, is
really astonishing.
They tell us very honestly that this plan is the result of
accommodation—they do not hold it up as the best of all possible ones,
but only as [13] the best which they could unite in, and agree to. If
such men, appointed and meeting under such auspicious circumstances,
and so sincerely disposed to conciliation, could go no further in their
endeavors to please every State, and every body, what reason have we at
present to expect any system that would give more general satisfaction?
Suppose this plan to be rejected, what measures would you propose
for obtaining a better? Some will answer, let us appoint another
Convention, and as everything has been said and written that can well
be said and written on the subject, they will be better informed than
the former one was, and consequently be better able to make and agree
upon a more eligible one.
This reasoning is fair, and as far as it goes has weight; but it
nevertheless takes one thing for granted, which appears very doubtful;
for although the new Convention might have more information, and
perhaps equal abilities, yet it does not from thence follow that they
would be equally _disposed to agree_. The contrary of this position
is the most probable. You must have observed that the same temper and
equanimity which prevailed among the people on the former occasion,
no longer exists. We have unhappily become divided into parties; and
this important subject has been handled with such indiscreet and
offensive acrimony, and with so many little unhandsome artifices and
misrepresentations, that pernicious heats and animosities have been
kindled, and spread their flames far and wide among us. When therefore
it becomes a question who shall be deputed to the new Convention;
we cannot flatter ourselves that the talents and integrity of the
candidates will determine who shall be elected. Federal electors
will vote for Foederal deputies, and anti-Foederal electors for
anti-Foederal ones. Nor will either party prefer the most moderate
of their adherents, for as the most staunch and active partizans
will be the most popular, so the men most willing and able to carry
points, to oppose, and divide, and embarrass their opponents, will be
chosen. A Convention formed at such a season, and of such men, would be
but too exact an epitome of the great body that named them. The same
party views, the same propensity to opposition, the same distrusts and
jealousies, and the same unaccommodating spirit which prevail without,
would be concentred and ferment with still greater violence within.
Each deputy would recollect _who_ sent [14] him, and _why_ he was sent;
and be too apt to consider himself bound in honor, to contend and
act vigorously under the standard of his party, and not hazard their
displeasure by prefering compromise to victory. As vice does not sow
the seeds of virtue, so neither does passion cultivate the fruits of
reason. Suspicions and resentments create no disposition to conciliate,
nor do they infuse a desire of making partial and personal objects
bend to general union and the common good. The utmost efforts of that
excellent disposition were necessary to enable the late Convention to
perform their task; and although contrary causes sometimes operate
similar effects, yet to expect that discord and animosity should
produce the fruits of confidence and agreement, is to expect “grapes
from thorns, and figs from thistles.”
The States of Georgia, Delaware, Jersey, and Connecticut, have adopted
the present plan with unexampled unanimity; they are content with
it as it is, and consequently their deputies, being apprized of the
sentiments of their Constituents, will be little inclined to make
alterations, and cannot be otherwise than averse to changes which they
have no reason to think would be agreeable to their people—some other
States, tho’ less unanimous, have nevertheless adopted it by very
respectable majorities; and for reasons so evidently cogent, that even
the minority in one of them, have nobly pledged themselves for its
promotion and support. From these circumstances, the new Convention
would derive and experience difficulties unknown to the former. Nor are
these the only additional difficulties they would have to encounter.
Few are ignorant that there has lately sprung up a sect of politicians
who teach and profess to believe that the extent of our nation is too
great for the superintendance of one national Government, and on that
principle argue that it ought to be divided into two or three. This
doctrine, however mischievous in its tendency and consequences, has its
advocates; and, should any of them be sent to the Convention, it will
naturally be their policy rather to cherish than to prevent divisions;
for well knowing that the institution of any national Government, would
blast their favourite system, no measures that lead to it can meet with
their aid or approbation.
Nor can we be certain whether or not any and what foreign influence
would, on such an occasion, be indirectly exerted, nor for what
purposes—delicacy forbids an ample discussion of this question. Thus
much [15] may be said, without error or offence, viz. That such foreign
nations as desire the prosperity of America, and would rejoice to see
her become great and powerful, under the auspices of a Government
wisely calculated to extend her commerce, to encourage her navigation
and marine, and to direct the whole weight of her power and resources
as her interest and honour may require, will doubtless be friendly to
the Union of the States, and to the establishment of a Government able
to perpetuate, protect and dignify it. Such other foreign nations, if
any such their be, who, jealous of our growing importance, and fearful
that our commerce and navigation should impair their own—who behold
our rapid population with regret, and apprehend that the enterprising
spirit of our people, when seconded by power and probability of
success, may be directed to objects not consistent with their policy
or interests, cannot fail to wish that we may continue a weak and a
divided people.
These considerations merit much attention, and candid men will judge
how far they render it probable that a new Convention would be able
either to agree in a better plan, or with tolerable unanimity, in any
plan at all. Any plan forcibly carried by a slender majority, must
expect numerous opponents among the people, who, especially in their
present temper, would be more inclined to reject than adopt any system
so made and carried. We should in such case again see the press teeming
with publications for and against it; for as the minority would take
pains to justify their dissent, so would the majority be industrious
to display the wisdom of their proceedings. Hence new divisions, new
parties, and new distractions would ensue, and no one can foresee or
conjecture when or how they would terminate.
Let those who are sanguine in their expectations of a better plan from
a new Convention, also reflect on the delays and risque to which it
would expose us. Let them consider whether we ought, by continuing
much longer in our present humiliated condition, to give other nations
further time to perfect their restrictive systems of commerce, to
reconcile their own people to them, and to fence and guard and
strengthen them by all those regulations and contrivances in which a
jealous policy is ever fruitful. Let them consider whether we ought to
give further opportunities to discord to alienate the hearts of our
citizens from one another, and thereby encourage new Cromwells to bold
exploits. Are we cer- [16] tain that our foreign creditors will continue
patient, and ready to proportion their forbearance to our delays? Are
we sure that our distresses, dissentions and weakness will neither
invite hostility nor insult? If they should, how ill prepared shall we
be for defence! without Union, without Government, without money, and
without credit!
It seems necessary to remind you, that some time must yet elapse,
before all the States will have decided on the present plan. If they
reject it, some time must also pass before the measure of a new
Convention, can be brought about and generally agreed to. A further
space of time will then be requisite to elect their deputies, and send
them on to Convention. What time they may expend when met, cannot be
divined, and it is equally uncertain how much time the several States
may take to deliberate and decide on any plan they may recommend—if
adopted, still a further space of time will be necessary to organize
and set it in motion:—In the mean time our affairs are daily going on
from bad to worse, and it is not rash to say that our distresses are
accumulating like compound interest.
But if for the reasons already mentioned, and others that we cannot
now perceive, the new Convention, instead of producing a better plan,
should give us only a history of their disputes, or should offer us
one still less pleasing than the present, where should we be then? The
old Confederation has done its best, and cannot help us; and is now
so relaxed and feeble, that in all probability it would not survive
so violent a shock. Then “to your tents Oh Israel!” would be the word.
Then every band of union would be severed. Then every State would be
a little nation, jealous of its neighbors, and anxious to strengthen
itself by foreign alliances, against its former friends. Then
farewell to fraternal affection, unsuspecting intercourse; and mutual
participation in commerce, navigation and citizenship. Then would arise
mutual restrictions and fears, mutual garrisons,—and standing armies,
and all those dreadful evils which for so many ages plagued England,
Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, while they continued disunited, and were
played off against each other.
Consider my fellow citizens what you are about, before it is too
late—consider what in such an event would be your particular case. You
know the geography of your State, and the consequences of your local
position. Jersey and Connecticut, to whom your impost laws have been
[17] unkind—Jersey and Connecticut, who have adopted the present plan,
and expect much good from it—will impute its miscarriage and all the
consequent evils to you. They now consider your opposition as dictated
more by your fondness for your impost, than for those rights to which
they have never been behind you in attachment. They cannot, they will
not love you—they border upon you, and are your neighbors; but you
will soon cease to regard their neighborhood as a blessing. You have
but one port and outlet to your commerce, and how you are to keep that
outlet free and uninterrupted, merits consideration.—What advantage
Vermont in combination with others, might take of you, may easily be
conjectured; nor will you be at a loss to perceive how much reason the
people of Long Island, whom you cannot protect, have to deprecate being
constantly exposed to the depredations of every invader.
These are short hints—they ought not to be more developed—you
can easily in your own mind dilate and trace them through all their
relative circumstances and connections.—Pause then for a moment, and
reflect whether the matters you are disputing about, are of sufficient
moment to justify your running such extravagant risques. Reflect that
the present plan comes recommended to you by men and fellow citizens
who have given you the highest proofs that men can give, of their
justice, their love for liberty and their country, of their prudence,
of their application, and of their talents. They tell you it is the
best that they could form; and that in their opinion, it is necessary
to redeem you from those calamities which already begin to be heavy
upon us all. You find that not only those men, but others of similar
characters, and of whom you have also had very ample experience, advise
you to adopt it. You find that whole States concur in the sentiment,
and among them are your next neighbors; both whom have shed much blood
in the cause of liberty, and have manifested as strong and constant
a predilection for a free Republican Government as any State in the
Union, and perhaps in the world. They perceive not those latent
mischiefs in it, with which some double-sighted politicians endeavor to
alarm you. You cannot but be sensible that this plan or constitution
will always be in the hands and power of the people, and that [18]
if on experiment, it should be found defective or incompetent, they
may either remedy its defects, or substitute another in its room.
The objectionable parts of it are certainly very questionable, for
otherwise there would not be such a contrariety of opinions about
them. Experience will better determine such questions than theoretical
arguments, and so far as the danger of abuses is urged against the
institution of a Government, remember that a power to do good, always
involves a power to do harm. We must in the business of Government
as well as in all other business, have some degree of confidence, as
well as a great degree of caution. Who on a sick bed would refuse
medicines from a physician, merely because it is as much in his power
to administer deadly poisons, as salutary remedies.
You cannot be certain, that by rejecting the proposed plan you would
not place yourself in a very awkward situation. Suppose nine States
should nevertheless adopt it, would you not in that case be obliged
either to separate from the Union, or rescind your dissent? The first
would not be eligible, nor could the latter be pleasant—A mere hint is
sufficient on this topic—You cannot but be aware of the consequences.
Consider then, how weighty and how many considerations advise and
persuade the people of America to remain in the safe and easy path
of Union; to continue to move and act as they hitherto have done, as
a _band of brothers_; to have confidence in themselves and in one
another; and since all cannot see with the same eyes, at least to
give the proposed Constitution a fair trial, and to mend it as time,
occasion and experience may dictate. It would little become us to
verify the predictions of those who ventured to prophecy, that _peace_:
instead of blessing us with happiness and tranquility, would serve only
as the signal for factions, discords and civil contentions to rage in
our land, and overwhelm it with misery and distress.
Let us also be mindful that the cause of freedom greatly depends on
the use we make of the singular opportunities we enjoy of governing
ourselves wisely; for if the event should prove, that the people of
this [19] country either cannot or will not govern themselves, who
will hereafter be advocates for systems, which however charming in
theory and prospect, are not reducible to practice. If the people of
our nation, instead of consenting to be governed by laws of their own
making, and rulers of their own choosing, should let licentiousness,
disorder, and confusion reign over them, the minds of men every where,
will insensibly become alienated from republican forms, and prepared
to prefer and acquiesce in Governments, which, though less friendly to
liberty, afford more peace and security.
_Receive this Address with the same candor with which it is written;
and may the spirit of wisdom and patriotism direct and distinguish your
councils and your conduct._
_A citizen of New York._
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-York: / Showing
the necessity of making / Amendments / to the / Constitution, proposed
for the United States, / previous to its Adoption. / By a Plebeian. /
Printed in the State of New York; / M,DCC,LXXX,VIII.
8vo., pp. 26.
Written by Melancthon Smith of New York, a member of the Continental
Congress, (1785-88), and of the New York State Convention, in which
he opposed, but ultimately voted for the ratification of the new
Constitution.
“This address begins with several assertions that are not
fully proved. It declares that ‘the advocates for the proposed
constitution, having been beaten off the field of argument, on its
merits, have taken new ground—admit that it is liable to well founded
objections—that a number of its articles ought to be amended—that
if alterations do not take place a door will be left open for an
undue administration, and encroachments on the liberties of the
people—and many of them go so far as to say, if it should continue
for any considerable period, in its present form, it will lead to a
subversion of our equal republican forms of government.’
“These assertions, it is presumed are too general to be true. _Some_
friends (upon the whole) to the proposed government, may have
acknowledged all this; but the _most enlightened ones_ declare that,
in their opinion, the constitution is as little defective as can ever
be obtained—that it is _not liable to well founded objections_—that
it will _preserve_ our equal republican forms of government; nay,
that it is their only firm support, and the guarantee of their
existence—and if they consent to the additions and alterations
proposed by the Massachusetts Convention, it is not so much because
they think the constitution will be _better_ for them; but because
they think these additions will reconcile the opposition and unite
all parties in a desirable harmony, without making the constitution
_worse_.
“The writer, to show the happy situation of the citizens of this
State, enquires, ‘_Does not every man sit under his own vine and
his own fig tree?_’ Yes, it may be answered, and under the rich
vines and fig trees of his neighbors too, ‘_having none to make him
afraid?_’ This was probably written before the late riot: And if the
inhabitants of this State are not afraid of their neighbors, whose
_vines and fig trees_ they are enjoying, they must be very ignorant
or very insensible.
“‘_Does not every one follow his own calling without impediment
and receive the reward of his well earned industry? The farmer and
mechanic reap the fruits of their labor. The merchant drives his
commerce and none can deprive him of the gain he honestly acquires._’
Had the last assertion been mere queries, the writer might have
saved his reputation. While the _war-worn veteran_ is paid for his
services, at a fourth or fifth of their value; while numbers of
mechanics have no employment; while commerce is restricted abroad,
and tender laws and depreciated paper money exist at home, the public
will not be disposed to believe themselves very happy—no, not even in
this State. In other States, where riots and rebellion have violated
private property, disturbed government and end in bloodshed, the
inhabitants will be more incredulous, and wish for the adoption of
the proposed constitution.”—[Noah Webster] in _American Magazine_ for
April, 1788.