PHILADELPHIA, }
October 10, 1787. }
Of all the memorable æras that have marked the progress of men from
the savage state to the refinements of luxury, that which has combined
them into society, under a wise system of government, and given
form to a nation, has ever been recorded and celebrated as the most
important. Legislators have ever been deemed the greatest benefactors
of mankind—respected when living, and often deified after their death.
Hence the fame of Fohi and Confucius—of Moses, Solon and Lycurgus—of
Romulus and Numa—of Alfred, Peter the Great, and Mango Capac; whose
names will be celebrated through all ages, for framing and improving
constitutions of government, which introduced order into society and
secured the benefits of law to millions of the human race.
This western world now beholds an æra important beyond conception,
and which posterity will number with the age of Czar of Muscovy, and
with the promulgation of the Jewish laws at Mount Sinai. The names
of those men who have digested a system of constitutions for the
American empire, will be enrolled with those of Zamolxis and Odin, and
celebrated by posterity with the honors which less enlightened nations
have paid to the fabled demi-gods of antiquity.
[6] But the origin of the AMERICAN REPUBLIC is distinguished by
peculiar circumstances. Other nations have been driven together by
fear and necessity—the governments have generally been the result of
a single man’s observations; or the offspring of particular interests.
In the formation of our constitution, the wisdom of all ages is
collected—the legislators of antiquity are consulted—as well as the
opinions and interests of the millions who are concerned. In short, it
is _an empire of reason_.
In the formation of such a government, it is not only the _right_, but
the indispensable _duty_ of every citizen to examine the principles of
it, to compare them with the principles of other governments, with a
constant eye to our particular situation and circumstances, and thus
endeavor to foresee the future operations of our own system, and its
effects upon human happiness.
Convinced of this truth, I have no apology to offer for the following
remarks, but an earnest desire to be useful to my country.
In attending to the proposed Federal Constitution, the first thing
that presents itself to our consideration, is the division of the
legislative into two branches. This article has so many advocates
in America, that it needs not any vindication.(3)—But it has its
opposers, among whom are some respectable characters, especially in
Pennsylvania; for which reason, I will state [7] some of the arguments
and facts which incline me to favor the proposed division.
On the first view of men in society, we should suppose that no man
would be bound by a law to which he had not given his consent. Such
would be our first idea of political obligation. But experience, from
time immemorial, has proved it to be impossible to unite the opinions
of all the members of a community, in every case; and hence the
doctrine, that the opinions of a _majority_ must give law to the _whole
State_: a doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth.
Another idea that naturally presents itself to our minds, on a slight
consideration of the subject, is, that in a perfect government, all the
members of a society should be present, and each give his suffrage in
acts of legislation, by which he is to be bound. This is impracticable
in large states; and even were it not, it is very questionable whether
it would be the _best_ mode of legislation. It was however practised
in the free states of antiquity; and was the cause of innumerable
evils. To avoid these evils, the moderns have invented the doctrine of
_representation_, which seems to be the perfection of human government.
Another idea, which is very natural, is, that to complete the mode
of legislation, all the representatives should be collected into
_one body_, for the purpose of debating questions and enacting laws.
Speculation would suggest the idea;
[8] and the desire of improving upon the systems of government in the
old world, would operate powerfully in its favor.
But men are ever running into extremes. The passions, after a violent
constraint, are apt to run into licentiousness; and even the reason of
men, who have experienced evils from the _defects_ of a government,
will sometimes coolly condemn the _whole system_.
Every person, moderately acquainted with human nature, knows that
public bodies, as well as individuals, are liable to the influence of
sudden and violent passions, under the operation of which, the voice of
reason is silenced. Instances of such influence are not so frequent,
as in individuals; but its effects are extensive in proportion to the
numbers that compose the public body. This fact suggests the expediency
of dividing the powers of legislation between the two bodies of men,
whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on each other;
that, if at any time, one part should appear to be under any undue
influence, either from passion, obstinacy, jealousy of particular
men, attachment to a popular speaker, or other extraordinary causes,
there might be a power in the legislature sufficient to check every
pernicious measure. Even in a small republic, composed of men, equal
in property and abilities, and all meeting for the purpose of making
laws, like the old Romans in the field of Mars, a division of the
body into two independent branches, would be a necessary step to
prevent the disorders, which arise from [9] the pride, irritability
and stubborness of mankind. This will ever be the case, while men
possess passions, easily inflamed, which may bias their reason and lead
them to erroneous conclusions.
Another consideration has weight: A single body of men may be led
astray by one person of abilities and address, who, on the first
starting a proposition, may throw a plausible appearance on one side of
the question, and give a lead to the whole debate. To prevent any ill
consequence from such a circumstance, a separate discussion, before a
different body of men, and taken up on new grounds, is a very eligible
expedient.
Besides, the design of a senate is not merely to check the legislative
assembly, but to collect wisdom and experience. In most of our
constitutions, and particularly in the proposed federal system, greater
age and longer residence are required to qualify for the senate,
than for the house of representatives. This is a wise provision. The
house of representatives may be composed of new and unexperienced
members—strangers to the forms of proceeding, and the science of
legislation. But either positive institutions, or customs, which may
supply their place, fill the senate with men venerable for age and
respectability, experienced in the ways of men, and in the art of
governing, and who are not liable to the bias of passions that govern
the young. If the senate of Rhode Island is an exception to this
observation, it is a proof that the mass of the people are corrupted,
and that the senate should be elected [10] ess frequently than the
other house: Had the old senate in Rhode Island held their seats for
three years; had they not been chosen, amidst a popular rage for paper
money, the honor of that state would probably have been saved. The
old senate would have stopped the measure for a year or two, till the
people could have had time to deliberate upon its consequences. I
consider it as a capital excellence of the proposed constitution, that
the senate can be wholly renewed but once in six years.
Experience is the best instructor—it is better than a thousand
theories. The history of every government on earth affords proof of
the utility of different branches in a legislature. But I appeal
only to our own experience in America. To what cause can we ascribe
the absurd measures of Congress, in times past, and the speedy
recision of whole measures, but to the want of some check? I feel
the most profound deference for that honorable body, and perfect
respect for their opinions; but some of their steps betray a great
want of consideration—a defect, which perhaps nothing can remedy,
but a division of their deliberations. I will instance only their
_resolution_ to build a _Federal Town_. When we were involved in a
debt, of which we could hardly pay the interest, and when Congress
could not command a shilling, the very proposition was extremely
absurd. Congress themselves became ashamed of the resolution, and
rescinded it with as much silence as possible. Many other acts of that
body are equally reprehensible—but respect forbids me to mention them.
[11] Several states, since the war, have experienced the necessity of a
division of the legislature. Maryland was saved from a most pernicious
measure, by her senate. A rage for paper money, bordering on madness,
prevailed in their house of delegates—an emission of £.500,000 was
proposed; a sum equal to the circulating medium of the State. Had the
sum been emitted, every shilling of specie would have been driven from
circulation, and most of it from the state. Such a loss would not have
been repaired in seven years—not to mention the whole catalogue of
frauds which would have followed the measure. The senate, like honest,
judicious men, and the protectors of the interests of the state, firmly
resisted the rage, and gave the people time to cool and to think. Their
resistance was effectual—the people acquiesced, and the honor and
interest of the state were secured.
The house of representatives in Connecticut, soon after the war, had
taken offence at a certain act of Congress. The upper house, who
understood the necessity and expediency of the measure, better than the
people, refused to concur in a remonstrance to Congress. Several other
circumstances gave umbrage to the lower house; and to weaken or destroy
the influence of the senate, the representatives, among other violent
proceedings, resolved, not merely to remove the seat of government,
but to make every county town in the state the seat of government, by
rotation. This foolish resolution would have disgraced school-boys—the
senate saved the honor of the state, by rejecting it with disdain— [12]
and within two months, every representative was ashamed of the conduct
of the house. All public bodies have these fits of passion, when their
conduct seems to be perfectly boyish; and in these paroxisms, a check
is highly necessary.
Pennsylvania exhibits many instances of this hasty conduct. At
one session of the legislature, an armed force is ordered, by a
precipitate resolution, to expel the settlers at Wioming from their
possessions—at a succeeding session, the same people are confirmed
in their possessions. At one session, a charter is wrested from a
corporation—at another, restored. The whole state is split into
parties—everything is decided by party—any proposition from one side
of the house, is sure to be damned by the other—and when one party
perceives the other has the advantage, they play truant—and an officer
or a mob hunt the absconding members in all the streets and alleys
in town. Such farces have been repeated in Philadelphia—and _there
alone_. Had the legislature been framed with some check upon rash
proceedings, the honor of the state would have been saved—the party
spirit would have died with the measures proposed in the legislature.
But now, any measure may be carried by party in the house; it then
becomes a law, and sows the seeds of dissension throughout the state.(4)
[13] A thousand examples similar to the foregoing may be produced, both
in ancient and modern history. Many plausible things may be said in
favor of pure democracy—many in favor of uniting the representatives
of the people in one single house—but uniform experience proves both
to be inconsistent with the peace of society, and the rights of freemen.
The state of Georgia has already discovered such inconveniences in its
constitution, that a proposition has been made for altering it; and
there is a prospect that a revisal will take place.
People who have heard and read of the European governments, founded on
the different ranks of _monarch, nobility and people_, seem to view the
_senate_ in America, where there is no difference of ranks and titles,
as a useless branch—or as a servile imitation of foreign constitutions
of government, without the same reasons. This is a capital mistake.
Our senates, it is true, are not composed of a different order of
men; but the same reasons, the same necessity for distinct branches of
the legislature exists in all governments. But in most of our American
constitutions, we have all the advantages of checks and balance,
without the danger which may arise [14] from a superior and independent
order of men.
It is worth our while to institute a brief comparison between our
American forms of government, and the two _best constitutions_ that
ever existed in Europe, the _Roman_ and the _British_.
In England, the king or supreme executive officer, is hereditary. In
America, the president of the United States, is elective. That this is
an advantage will hardly be disputed.
In ancient Rome, the king was elective, and so were the consuls, who
were the executive officers in the republic. But they were elected
by the body of the people, in their public assemblies; and this
circumstance paved the way for such excessive bribery and corruption
as are wholly unknown in modern times. The president of the United
States is also elective; but by a few men—chosen by the several
legislatures—under their inspection—separated at a vast distance—and
holding no office under the United States. Such a mode of election
almost precludes the possibility of corruption. Besides, no state
however large, has the power of chusing a president in that state; for
each elector must choose at least one man, who is not an inhabitant of
that State to which he belongs.
The crown of England is hereditary—the consuls of Rome were chosen
annually—both these extremes are guarded against in our proposed
constitution. The president is not dis- [15] missed from his office, as
soon as he is acquainted with business—he continues four years, and is
re-eligible, if the people approve his conduct. Nor can he canvass for
his office, by reason of the distance of the electors; and the pride
and jealousy of the states will prevent his continuing too long in
office.
The age requisite to qualify for this office is thirty-five
years.(5) The age requisite for admittance to the Roman consulship
was forty-three years. For this difference, good reasons may be
assigned—the improvements in science, and particularly in government,
render it practicable for a man to qualify himself for an important
office, much earlier in life, than he could among the Romans;
especially in the early part of their commonwealth, when the office was
instituted. Besides it is very questionable whether any inconvenience
would have attended admission to the consulship at an earlier age.(6)
The powers vested in the president resemble the powers of the supreme
magistrates in Rome. They are not so extensive as those of the British
king; but in one instance, the president, with concurrence of the
senate, has powers exceeding those of the Roman consuls; I mean in the
appointment of judges and other subordinate executive officers. The
prætors or judges in Rome were chosen annually by the people. This was
a defect in the Roman government. [16] One half the evils in a state
arise from a lax execution of the laws; and it is impossible that an
executive officer can act with vigor and impartiality, when his office
depends on the popular voice. An annual popular election of executive
officers is the sure source of a negligent, partial and corrupt
administration. The independence of the judges in England has produced
a course of the most just, impartial and energetic judicial decisions,
for many centuries, that can be exhibited in any nation on earth. In
this point therefore I conceive the plan proposed in America to be an
improvement on the Roman constitution. In all free governments, that
is, in all countries, where _laws govern_, and not _men_, the supreme
magistrate should have it in his power to execute any law, however
unpopular, without hazarding his person or office. The laws are the
sole _guardians_ of right, and when the magistrate dares not act, every
person is insecure.
Let us now attend to the constitution and the powers of the senate.
The house of lords in England is wholly independent on(7) the people.
The lords spiritual hold their seats by office; and the people at
large have no voice in disposing of the ecclesiastical dignities. The
temporal lords hold their seats by hereditary right or by grant from
the king: And it is a branch of the king’s prerogative to make what
peers he pleases.
[17] The senate in Rome was elective; but a senator held his seat for
life.(8)
[18] The proposed senate in America is constituted on principles more
favorable to liberty: The members are elective, and by the separate
legislatures: They hold their seats for six years—they are thus
rendered sufficiently dependent on their constituents; and yet are not
dismissed from their office as soon as they become acquainted with the
forms of proceeding.
It may be objected by the larger states, that the representation is not
equal; the smallest states having the privilege of sending the same
number of senators as the largest. To obviate this objection, I would
suggest but two or three ideas.
1. If each state had a representation and a right in deciding
questions, proportional to its property, three states would almost
command the whole. Such a constitution would gradually annihilate the
small states; and finally melt down the whole United States into one
undivided sovereignty. The free states of Spain and the heptarchy in
England, afford striking examples of this.
[19] Should it be said that such an event is desirable, I answer; the
states are all entitled to their respective sovereignties, and while
they claim independence in international jurisdiction, the federal
constitution ought to guarantee their sovereignty.
Another consideration has weight—There is, in all nations, a
tendency toward an accumulation of power in some point. It is the
business of the legislator to establish some barriers to check the
tendency. In small societies, a man worth £.100,000 has but one vote,
when his neighbors, who are worth but fifty pounds, have each one
vote likewise. To make property the sole basis of authority, would
expose many of the best citizens to violence and oppression. To make
the number of inhabitants(9) in a state, the rule of apportioning
power, is more equitable; and were the United States one indivisible
interest, would be a perfect rule for representation. But the detached
situation of the states has created some separate interests—some local
institutions, which they will not resign nor throw into the hands of
other states. For these peculiar interests, the states have an _equal_
attachment—for the preservation and enjoyment of these, an _equal_
sovereignty is necessary; and the sovereignty of each state would not
be secure, had each state, in both branches of the legislature an
authority in passing laws, proportioned to its inhabitants.
3. But the senate should be considered as representing the confederacy
in a body. It is a [20] false principle in the vulgar idea of
representation, that a man delegated by a particular district in
a state, is the representative of that district only; whereas in
truth a member of the legislature from any town or county, is the
representative of the whole state. In passing laws, he is to view the
whole collective interest of the state, and act from that view; not
from a partial regard to the interest of the town or county where he is
chosen.
The same principle extends to the Congress of the United States.
A delegate is bound to represent the true local interest of his
constituents—to state in its true light to the whole body—but when
each provincial interest is thus stated, every member should act
for the _aggregate interest_ of the whole confederacy. The design
of representation is to bring the collective interest into view—a
delegate is not the legislator of a single state—he is as much the
legislator of the whole confederacy as of the particular state where
he is chosen; and if he gives his vote for a law which he believes to
be beneficial to his own state only, and pernicious to the rest, he
betrays his trust and violates his oath. It is indeed difficult for a
man to divest himself of local attachments and act from an impartial
regard to the general good; but he who cannot for the most part do
this, is not a good legislator.
These considerations suggest the propriety of continuing the senators
in office, for a longer period, than the representatives. They
gradually lose their partiality, generalize their views, [21] and
consider themselves as acting for the whole confederacy. Hence in the
senate we may expect union and firmness—here we may find the _general
good_ the object of legislation, and a check upon the more partial and
interested acts of the other branch.
These considerations obviate the complaint, that the representation
in the senate is not equal; for the senators represent the whole
confederacy; and all that is wanted of the members is information
of the true situation and interest of each state. As they act under
the direction of the several legislatures, two men may as fully and
completely represent a state, as twenty; and when the true interest
of each state is known, if the senators perform the part of good
legislators, and act impartially for the whole collective body of the
United States, it is totally immaterial where they are chosen.(10)
[22] The house of representatives is the more immediate voice of the
separate states—here the states are represented in proportion to
their number of inhabitants—here the separate interests will operate
with their full force, and the violence of parties and the jealousies
produced by interfering interests, can be restrained and quieted only
by a body of men, less local and dependent.
It may be objected that no separate interests should exist in a state;
and a division of the legislature has a tendency to create them.
But this objection is founded on mere jealousy, or a very imperfect
comparison of the Roman and British governments, with the proposed
federal constitution.
The house of peers in England is a body originally and totally
independent on(11) the people—the senate in Rome was mostly composed of
patrician or noble families, and after the first election of a senator,
he was no longer dependent on the people—he held his seat for life.
But the senate of the United States can have no separate interests from
the body of the people; for they live among them—they are chosen by
them—they _must_ be dismissed from their place once in six years and
_may_ at any time be impeached for mal-practices—their property is
si- [23]tuated among the people, and with their persons, subject to the
same laws. No title can be granted, but the temporary titles of office,
bestowed by the voluntary election of the people; and no pre-eminence
can be acquired but by the same means.
The separation of the legislature divides the
power—checks—restrains—amends the proceedings—at the same time,
it creates no division of interest, that can tempt either branch to
encroach upon the other, or upon the people. In turbulent times, such
restraint is our greatest safety—in calm times, and in measures
obviously calculated for the general good, both branches must always be
unanimous.
A man must be thirty years of age before he can be admitted into
the senate—which was likewise a requisite in the Roman government.
What property was requisite for a senator in the early ages of
Rome, I cannot inform myself; but Augustus fixed it at six hundred
sestertia—between six and seven thousand pounds sterling. In the
federal constitution, money is not made a requisite—the places of
senators are wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit,
and who have been citizens of the United States for nine years; a term
in which foreigners may acquire the feelings and acquaint themselves
with the interests, of the native Americans.
The house of representatives is formed on very equitable principles;
and is calculated to guard the privileges of the people. The English
[24] house of commons is chosen by a small part of the people of
England, and continues for seven years. The Romans never discovered the
secret of representation—the whole body of citizens assembled for the
purposes of legislation—a circumstance that exposed their government
to frequent convulsions, and to capricious measures. The federal house
of representatives is chosen by the people qualified to vote for state
representatives,(12) and continues two years.
[25] Some may object to their continuance in power _two years_. But I
cannot see any danger arising from this quarter. On the contrary, it
creates less trouble for the representatives, who by such choice are
taken from their professions and obliged to attend Congress, some of
them at the distance of at least seven hundred miles. While men are
chosen by the people, and responsible to them, there is but little
danger from ambition or corruption.
If it should be said that Congress may in time become triennial, and
even septennial, like the English parliaments, I answer, this is not
in their power. The English parliament had power to prolong the period
of their existence—but Congress will be restrained by the different
legislatures, without whose constitutional concurrence, no alteration
can be made in the proposed system.
The fourth section, article I, of the new constitution declares that
“The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature
thereof; _but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such
regulations, except as to the places of chusing senators_.” Here let
us pause——What did the convention mean by giving Congress power to
_make regulations_, prescribed by the legislatures? Is this expression
accurate or intelligible? But the word _alter_ is very intelligible,
and the clause puts the election of representatives _wholly_, and [26]
the senators _almost wholly_, in the power of Congress.
The views of the convention I believe to be perfectly upright—They
might mean to place the election of representatives and senators beyond
the reach of faction—They doubtless had good reasons, in _their_
minds, for the clause—But I see no occasion for any power in Congress
to interfere with the choice of their own body—They will have power
to suppress insurrections, as they ought to have; but the clause in
_Italics_ gives _needless_ and _dangerous_ powers—I hope the states
will reject it with decency, and adopt the whole system, without
altering another syllable.(13)
The method of passing laws in Congress is much preferable to that of
ancient Rome or modern Britain. Not to mention other defects in Rome,
it lay in the power of a single tribune to obstruct the passing of
a law. As the tribunes were popular magistrates, the right was often
exercised in favor of liberty; but it was also abused, and the best
regulations were prevented, to gratify the spleen, the ambition, or the
resentment of an individual.
The king of Great-Britain has the same power, but seldom exercises it.
It is however a dangerous power—it is absurd and hazardous to lodge in
_one man_ the right of controlling the will of a state.
Every bill that passes a majority of both houses of Congress, must be
sent to the president for [27] his approbation; but it must be returned
in ten days, whether approved by him or not; and the concurrence of
two thirds of both houses passes the bill into a law, notwithstanding
any objections of the president. The constitution therefore gives the
supreme executive a check but no negative, upon the sense of Congress.
The powers lodged in Congress are extensive; but it is presumed that
they are not too extensive. The first object of the constitution is
to _unite_ the states into one _compact society_, for the purpose of
government. If such _union_ must exist, or the states be exposed to
foreign invasions, internal discord, reciprocal encroachments upon each
others property—to weakness and infamy, which no person will dispute;
what powers must be collected and lodged in the supreme head or
legislature of these states. The answer is easy: This legislature must
have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters in which the states have a
mutual interest. There are some regulations in which all the states
are equally concerned—there are others, which in their operation,
are limited to one state. The first belongs to Congress—the last
to the respective legislatures. No one state has a right to supreme
control, in any affair in which the other states have an interest,
nor should Congress interfere in any affair which respects one state
only. This is the general line of division, which the convention have
endeavored to draw, between the powers of Congress and the rights of
the individual states. The only question therefore is, whether the new
constitution delegates to Congress any powers which [28] do not respect
the general interest and welfare of the United States. If these powers
intrench upon the present sovereignty of any _state_, without having
for an object the _collective interest_ of the whole, the powers are
too extensive. But if they do not extend to all concerns, in which
the states have a mutual interest, they are too limited. If in any
instance, the powers necessary for protecting the _general_ interest,
interfere with the constitutional rights of an _individual state_, such
state has assumed powers that are inconsistent with the safety of the
United States, and which ought instantly to be resigned. Considering
the states as individuals, on equal terms, entering into a social
compact, no state has a right to any power which may prejudice its
neighbors. If therefore the federal constitution has collected into the
federal legislature no more power than is necessary for the _common
defence and interest_, it should be recognized by the states, however
particular clauses may supersede the exercise of certain powers by the
individual states.
This question is of vast magnitude. The states have very high ideas
of their separate sovereignty; altho’ it is certain, that while each
exists in its full latitude, we can have no _Federal sovereignty_.
However flattered each state may be by its independent sovereignty, we
can have no union, no respectability, no national character, and what
is more, no national justice, till the states resign to one _supreme
head_ the exclusive power of _legislating, judging and executing_,
in all matters of a general nature. Every thing of [29] a private or
provincial nature, must still rest on the ground of the respective
state constitutions.
After examining the limits of the proposed congressional powers, I
confess I do not think them too extensive—I firmly believe that the
life, liberty and property of every man, and the peace and independence
of each state, will be more fully secured under such a constitution
of federal government, than they will under a constitution with more
limited powers; and infinitely more safe than under our boasted
distinct sovereignties. It appears to me that Congress will have no
more power than will be necessary for our union and general welfare;
and such power they must have or we are in a wretched state. On the
adoption of this constitution, I should value real estate twenty per
cent. higher than I do at this moment.
I will not examine into the extent of the powers proposed to be
lodged in the supreme federal head; the subject would be extensive
and require more time than I could bestow upon it. But I will take up
some objections, that have been made to particular points of the new
constitution.
Most of the objections I have yet heard to the constitution, consist
in mere insinuations unsupported by reasoning or fact. They are thrown
out to instil groundless jealousies into the minds of the people, and
probably with a view to prevent all government; for there are, in
every society, some turbulent geniuses whose importance [30] depends
solely on faction. To seek the insidious and detestable nature of
these insinuations, it is necessary to mention, and to remark on a few
particulars.
1. The first objection against the constitution is, that the
legislature will be more expensive than our present confederation.
This is so far from being true, that the money we actually lose by our
present weakness, disunion and _want of government_ would support the
civil government of every state in the confederacy. Our public poverty
does not proceed from the expensiveness of Congress, nor of the civil
list; but from want of power to command our own advantages. We pay more
money to foreign nations, in the course of business, and merely for
_want of government_, than would, under an efficient government, pay
the annual interest of our domestic debt. Every man in business knows
this to be _truth_; and the objection can be designed only to delude
the ignorant.
2. Another objection to the constitution, is the division of the
legislature into two branches. Luckily this objection has no advocates
but in Pennsylvania; and even here their number is dwindling. The
factions that reign in this state, the internal discord and passions
that disturb the government and the peace of the inhabitants, have
detected the errors of the constitution, and will some time or other
produce a reformation. The division of the legislature has been the
subject of discussion in the beginning of this essay; and will be
deemed, by nineteen-twentieths of [31] the Americans, one of the
principal excellencies of the constitution.
3. A third insinuation, is that the proposed federal government will
annihilate the several legislatures. This is extremely disingenuous.
Every person, capable of reading, must discover, that the convention
have labored to draw the line between the federal and provincial
powers—to define the powers of Congress, and limit them to those
general concerns which _must_ come under federal jurisdiction, and
which _cannot_ be managed in the separate legislatures—that in all
internal regulations, whether of civil or criminal nature, the states
retain their sovereignty, and have it guaranteed to them by this very
constitution. Such a groundless insinuation, or rather mere surmise,
must proceed from dark designs or extreme ignorance, and deserves the
severest reprobation.
4. It is alledged that the liberty of the press is not guaranteed by
the new constitution. But this objection is wholly unfounded. The
liberty of the press does not come within the jurisdiction of federal
government. It is firmly established in all the states either by law,
or positive declarations in _bills of right_; and not being mentioned
in the federal constitution, is not—and cannot be abridged by
Congress. It stands on the basis of the respective state-constitutions.
Should any state resign to Congress the exclusive jurisdiction of a
certain district, which should include any town where presses are
already established, it is in the power of the state to reserve [32]
the liberty of the press, or any other fundamental privilege, and make
it an immutable condition of the grant, that such rights shall never
be violated. All objections therefore on this score are “_baseless
visions_.”
5. It is insinuated that the constitution gives Congress the power of
levying internal taxes at pleasure. This insinuation seems founded on
the eighth section of the first article, which declares, that “Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,
to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States.”
That Congress should have power to collect duties, imposts and
excises, in order to render them uniform throughout the United States
will hardly be controverted. The whole objection is to the right of
levying internal taxes.
But it will be conceded that the supreme head of the states must have
power, competent to the purposes of our union, or it will be, as it now
is, a _useless body_, a mere expense, without any advantage. To pay our
public debt, to support foreign ministers and our own civil government,
money must be raised; and if the duties and imposts are not adequate to
these purposes, where shall the money be obtained? It will be answered,
let Congress apportion the sum to be raised, and leave the legislatures
to collect the money. Well this is all that is intended by the clause
under consideration; with the addition of a fe- [33] deral power that
shall be sufficient to oblige a delinquent state to comply with the
requisition.(14) Such power must exist somewhere, or the debts of the
United States can never be paid. For want of such power, our credit is
lost and our national faith is a bye-word.
For want of such power, one state now complies fully with a
requisition, another partially, and a third absolutely refuses or
neglects to grant a shilling. Thus the honest and punctual are doubly
loaded—and the knave triumphs in his negligence. In short, no honest
man will dread a power that shall enforce an equitable system of
taxation. The dis-honest are ever apprehensive of a power that shall
oblige them to do what honest men are ready to do voluntarily.
Permit me to ask those who object to this power of taxation, how shall
money be raised to discharge our honest debts which are universally
acknowledged to be just? Have we not already experienced the inefficacy
of a system without power? Has it not been proved to demonstration,
that a voluntary compliance with the demands of the union can never
be expected? To what expedient shall we have recourse? What is the
resort of all governments in cases of delinquency? Do not the states
vest in the legislature, or even in the governor and council, a power
to enforce laws, even with the militia of the states? And how rarely
does there exist the necessity of exerting such a power? Why should
such a power be more dangerous in Congress than in a legislature? Why
should [34] more confidence be reposed in a member of one legislature
than of another? Why should we choose the best men in the state
to represent us in Congress, and the moment they are elected arm
ourselves against them as against tyrants and robbers? Do we not, in
this conduct, act the part of a man, who, as soon as he has married
a woman of unsuspected chastity, locks her up in a dungeon? Is there
any spell or charm, that instantly changes a delegate to Congress
from an honest man into a knave—a tyrant? I confess freely that I am
willing to trust Congress with any powers that I should dare lodge in a
state-legislature. I believe life, liberty, and property is as safe in
the hands of a federal legislature, organized in the manner proposed by
the convention, as in the hands of any legislature, that has ever been
or ever will be chosen in any particular state.
But the idea that Congress can levy taxes _at pleasure_ is false, and
the suggestion wholly unsupported. The preamble to the constitution
is declaratory of the purposes of our union and the assumption of
any powers not necessary to _establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity_, will be unconstitutional, and endanger the existence of
Congress. Besides, in the very clause which gives the power of levying
duties and taxes, the purposes to which the money shall be appropriated
are specified, viz. _to pay the debts and provide for the common
de-_ [35] _fence and general welfare of the United States_.(15) For these
purposes money must be collected, and the power of collection must be
lodged, sooner or later, in a federal head; or the common defence and
general welfare must be neglected.
The states in their separate capacity, cannot provide for the common
defence; nay in case of a civil war, a state cannot secure its own
existence. The only question therefore is, whether it is necessary to
unite, and provide for our _common defence and general welfare_. For
this question being once decided in the affirmative, leaves no room to
controvert the propriety of constituting a power over the whole United
States, adequate to these general purposes.
The states, by granting such power, do not throw it out of their own
hands—they only throw, each its proportion, into a common stock—they
merely combine the powers of the several states into one point, where
they _must_ be collected, before they _can_ be exerted. But the powers
are still in their own hands; and cannot be alienated, till they create
a body independent of them- [36] selves, with a force at their command,
superior to the whole yeomanry of the country.
6. It is said there is no provision made in the new constitution
against a standing army in time of peace. Why do not people object
that no provision is made against the introduction of a body of
Turkish Janizaries; or against making the Alcoran the rule of faith
and practice, instead of the Bible? The answer to such objections is
simply this—_no such provision is necessary_. The people in this
country cannot forget their apprehensions from a British standing
army, quartered in America; and they turn their fears and jealousies
against themselves. Why do not the people of most of the states
apprehend danger from standing armies from their own legislatures?
Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe, are the only states that
have provided against this danger at all events. Other states have
declared that “no standing armies shall be kept up without the consent
of the legislature.” But this leaves the power entirely in the hands of
the legislature. Many of the states however have made _no provision_
against this evil. What hazards these states suffer! Why does not a
man pass a law in his family, that no armed soldier shall be quartered
in his house by his consent? The reason is very plain: no man will
suffer his liberty to be abridged, or endangered—his disposition and
his power are uniformly opposed to any infringement of his rights. In
the same manner, the principles and habits, as well as the power of
the Americans are directly opposed to standing armies: and there is as
little [37] necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions,
as to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion. But the
constitution provides for our safety; and while it gives Congress power
to raise armies, it declares that no appropriation of money to their
support shall be for a longer term than two years.
Congress likewise are to have power to provide for organizing, arming
and disciplining the militia, but have no other command of them, except
when in actual service. Nor are they at liberty to call out the militia
at pleasure—but only, to execute the laws of the union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions. For these purposes, government must
always be armed with a military force, if the occasion should require
it; otherwise laws are nugatory, and life and property insecure.
7. Some persons have ventured to publish an intimation, that by the
proposed constitution, the trial by jury is abolished in all _civil
cases_. Others very modestly insinuate, that it is in _some cases_
only. The fact is, that trial by jury is not affected in _any_ case,
by the constitution; except in cases of impeachment, which are to be
tried by the senate. None but persons in office in or under Congress
can be impeached; and even after a judgment upon an impeachment, the
offender is liable to a prosecution, before a common jury, in a regular
course of law. The insinuation therefore that trials by jury are to
be abolished, is groundless, and beyond conception, wicked. It must
be wicked, because the circu- [38] lation of a barefaced falsehood,
respecting a privilege, dear to freemen, can proceed only from a
depraved heart and the worst intentions.
8. It is also intimated as a probable event, that the federal courts
will absorb the judiciaries of the federal states. This is a mere
suspicion, without the least foundation. The jurisdiction of the
federal states is very accurately defined and easily understood.
It extends to the cases mentioned in the constitution, and to the
execution of the laws of Congress, respecting commerce, revenue, and
other general concerns.
With respect to other civil and criminal actions, the powers and
jurisdiction of the several judiciaries of each state, remain
unimpaired. Nor is there anything novel in allowing appeals to
the supreme court. Actions are mostly to be tried in the state
where the crimes are committed—But appeals are allowed under our
present confederation, and no person complains; nay, were there no
appeal, every man would have reason to complain, especially when a
final judgement, in an inferior court, should affect property to a
large amount. But why is an objection raised against an appellate
jurisdiction in the supreme court, respecting _fact_ as well as _law_?
Is it less safe to have the opinions of two juries than of one? I
suspect many people will think this is no defect in the constitution.
But perhaps it will destroy a material requisite of a good jury, viz.
their vicinity to the cause of action. I have no doubt, that when
causes were tried, in periods prior to the Christian æra, before [39]
twelve men, seated upon twelve stones, arranged in a circular form,
under a huge oak, there was great propriety in submitting causes to
men _in the vicinity_. The difficulty of collecting evidence, in those
rude times, rendered it necessary that juries should judge mostly
from their own knowledge of facts or from information obtained out of
court. But in these polished ages, when juries depend almost wholly
on the testimony of witnesses; and when a complication of interests,
introduced by commerce and other causes, renders it almost impossible
to collect men, in the vicinity of the parties, who are wholly
disinterested, it is no disadvantage to have a cause tried by a jury of
strangers. Indeed the latter is generally the most eligible.
But the truth is, the creation of all inferior courts is in the power
of Congress; and the constitution provides that Congress may make such
exceptions from the right of appeals as they shall judge proper. When
these courts are erected, their jurisdictions will be ascertained, and
in small actions, Congress will doubtless direct that a sentence in a
subordinate court shall, to a certain amount, be definite and final.
All objections therefore to the judicial powers of the federal courts
appear to me as trifling as any of the preceding.
9. But, say the enemies of slavery, negroes may be imported for
twenty-one years. This exception is addressed to the quakers; and a
very pitiful exception it is.
[40] The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the importation of
slaves during that period; but the laws against the importation into
particular states, stand unrepealed. An immediate abolition of slavery
would bring ruin upon the whites, and misery upon the blacks, in the
southern states. The constitution has therefore wisely left each
state to pursue its own measures, with respect to this article of
legislation, during the period of twenty-one years.
Such are the principal objections that have yet been made by the
enemies of the new constitution. They are mostly frivolous, or founded
on false constructions, and a misrepresentation of the true state of
facts. They are evidently designed to raise groundless jealousies
in the minds of well meaning people, who have little leisure and
opportunity to examine into the principles of government. But a little
time and reflection will enable most people to detect such mischievous
intentions; and the spirit and firmness which have distinguished the
conduct of the Americans, during the conflict for independence, will
eventually triumph over the enemies of union, and bury them in disgrace
or oblivion.
But I cannot quit this subject without attempting to correct some of
the erroneous opinions respecting _freedom_ and _tyranny_, and the
principles by which they are supported. Many people seem to entertain
an idea, that liberty consists in _a power to act without any control_.
This is more liberty than even the savages enjoy. But in civil society,
political liberty consists in [41] _acting conformably to a sense
of a majority of the society_. In a free government every man binds
himself to obey the _public voice_, or the opinions of a majority; and
the _whole society_ engages to _protect each individual_. In such a
government a man is _free_ and safe. But reverse the case; suppose
every man to act without control or fear of punishment—every man would
be free, but no man would be sure of his freedom one moment. Each would
have the power of taking his neighbor’s life, liberty, or property; and
no man would command more than his own strength to repel the invasion.
The case is the same with states. If the states should not unite into
one compact society, every state may trespass upon its neighbor, and
the injured state has no means of redress but its own military force.
The present situation of our American states is very little better
than a state of nature—Our boasted state sovereignties are so far
from securing our liberty and property, that they, every moment,
expose us to the loss of both. That state which commands the heaviest
purse and longest sword, may at any moment, lay its weaker neighbor
under tribute; and there is no superior power now existing, that can
regularly oppose the invasion or redress the injury. From such liberty,
O(16) Lord, deliver us!
But what is tyranny? Or how can a free people be deprived of their
liberties? Tyranny is the exercise of some power over a man, which is
not warranted by law, or necessary for the public safety. A people can
never be deprived of [42] their liberties, while they retain in their
own hands, a power sufficient to any other power in the state. This
position leads me directly to enquire, in what consists the power of a
nation or of an order of men?
In some nations, legislators have derived much of their power from the
influence of religion, or from that implicit belief which an ignorant
and superstitious people entertain of the gods, and their interposition
in every transaction of life. The Roman senate sometimes availed
themselves of this engine to carry their decrees and maintain their
authority. This was particularly the case, under the aristocracy which
succeeded the abolition of the monarchy. The augurs and priests were
taken wholly from patrician families.(17) They constituted a distinct
order of men—had power to negative any law of the people, by declaring
that it was passed during the taking of the auspices.(18)(19) This
influence derived from the authority of opinion, was less perceptible,
but as tyrannical as a military force. The same influence constitutes,
at this day, a principal support of federal governments on the Eastern
continent, and perhaps in South America. But in North America, by a
singular concurrence of circumstances, the possibility of establishing
this influence, as a pillar of government, is totally precluded.
[43] Another source of power in government is a military force. But
this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force that exists among
the people, or which they can command: for otherwise this force would
be annihilated, on the first exercise of acts of oppression. Before a
standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in
almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot
enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people
are armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular
troops that can be, on any pretence, raised in the United States. A
military force, at the command of Congress, can execute no laws, but
such as the people perceive to be just and constitutional; for they
will possess the _power_, and jealousy will instantly inspire the
_inclination_, to resist the execution of a law which appears to them
unjust and oppressive. In spite of all the nominal powers, vested in
Congress by the constitution, were the system once adopted in its
fullest latitude, still the actual exercise of them would be frequently
interrupted by popular jealousy. I am bold to say, that _ten_ just
and constitutional measures would be resisted, where _one_ unjust or
oppressive law would be enforced.
The powers vested in Congress are little more than _nominal_; nay
_real_ power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but in the
_people_. The source of power is in the _people_ of this country, and
cannot for ages, and probably never will, be removed.(20)
In what then does _real_ power consist? The answer is short and
plain—in _property_. Could [44] we want any proofs of this, which are
not exhibited in this country, the uniform testimony of history will
furnish us with multitudes. But I will go no farther for proof, than
the two governments already mentioned, the Roman and the British.
Rome exhibited a demonstrative proof of the inseparable connexion
between property and dominion. The first form of its government was an
elective monarchy—its second, an aristocracy; but these forms could
not be permanent, because they were not supported by property. The
kings at first and afterwards the patricians had nominally most of the
power; but the people, possessing most of the lands, never ceased to
assert their privileges, till they established a commonwealth. And the
kings and senate could not have held the reigns of government in their
hands so long as they did, had they not artfully contrived to manage
the established religion, and play off the superstitious credulity of
the people against their own power. “Thus this weak constitution of
government,” says the ingenious Mr. Moyle, speaking of the aristocracy
of Rome, “not founded on the true _center of dominion_, _land_, nor on
any standing foundation of authority, nor rivetted in the esteem and
affections of the people; and being attacked by strong passion, general
interest and the joint forces of the people, mouldered away of course,
and pined of a lingering consumption, till it was totally swallowed
up by the prevailing faction, and the nobility were moulded into the
mass of the people.”(21) The people, notwithstanding [45] the nominal
authority of the patricians, proceeded regularly in enlarging their
own powers. They first extorted from the senate, the right of electing
_tribunes_, with a negative upon the proceedings of the senate.(22)
They obtained the right of proposing and debating laws; which before
had been vested in the senate; and finally advanced to the power of
enacting laws, without the authority of the senate.(23) They regained
the rights of election in their comitia, of which they had been
deprived by Servius Tullius.(24) They procured a permanent body of laws,
collected from the Grecian institutions. They destroyed the influence
of augurs, or diviners, by establishing the _tributa comitia_, in which
they were not allowed to consult the gods. They increased their power
by large accessions of conquered lands. They procured a repeal of the
law which prohibited marriages between the patricians and plebians.(25)
The Licinian law limited all possessions to five hundred acres of
land; which, had it been fully executed, would have secured the
commonwealth.(26)
The Romans proceeded thus step by step to triumph over the aristocracy,
and to crown their privileges, they procured the right of being elected
to the highest offices of the state. By acquiring _the property_ of the
plebians, the nobility, several times, held most of the power of the
state; but the people, by reducing the interest of money, abolishing
debts, or by forcing [46] other advantages from the patricians,
generally held the power of governing in their own hands.
In America, we begin our empire with more popular privileges than the
Romans ever enjoyed. We have not to struggle against a monarch or an
aristocracy—power is lodged in the mass of the people.
On reviewing the English history, we observe a progress similar to
that in Rome—an incessant struggle for liberty from the date of
Magna Charta, in John’s reign, to the revolution. The struggle has
been successful, by abridging the enormous power of the nobility.
But we observe that the power of the people has increased in an
exact proportion to their acquisitions of property. Wherever the
right of primogeniture is established, property must accumulate and
remain in families. Thus the landed property in England will never be
sufficiently distributed, to give the powers of government wholly
into the hands of the people. But to assist the struggle for liberty,
commerce has interposed, and in conjunction with manufacturers,
thrown a vast weight of property into the democratic scale. Wherever
we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that _property_ is the basis of
_power_; and this, being established as a cardinal point, directs
us to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws, irrevocable
laws in every state, destroying and barring entailments; leave real
estates to revolve from hand to hand, as time and accident may
direct; and no family influence can be acquired and established for
a series of genera- [47] tions—no man can obtain dominion over a
large territory—the laborious and saving, who are generally the best
citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and thus
the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, in the _body
of the people_.
_A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property is the
whole basis of national freedom_: The system of the great Montesquieu
will ever be erroneous, till the words _property or lands in fee
simple_ are substituted for _virtue_, throughout his _Spirit of Laws_.
_Virtue_, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will
be, till mens’ natures are changed, a fixed, permanent principle and
support of government. But in an agricultural country, a general
possession of land in fee simple, may be rendered perpetual, and the
inequalities introduced by commerce, are too fluctuating to endanger
government. An equality of property, with a necessity of alienation,
constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is
the very _soul of a republic_—While this continues, the people will
inevitably possess both _power_ and _freedom_; when this is lost, power
departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will inevitably assume
some other form.
The liberty of the press, trial by jury, the Habeas Corpus writ,
even Magna Charta itself, although justly deemed the palladia of
freedom, are all inferior considerations, when compared with a general
distribution of real property among [48] every class of people.(27)
The power of entailing estates is more dangerous to liberty and
republican government, than all the constitutions that can be written
on paper, or even than a standing army. Let the people have property,
and they _will_ have power—a power that will for ever be exerted to
prevent a restriction of the press, and abolition of trial by jury,
or the abridgement of any other privilege. The liberties of America,
therefore, and her forms of government, stand on the broadest basis.
Removed from the fears of a foreign invasion and conquest, they are
[49] not exposed to the convulsions that shake other governments; and
the principles of freedom are so general and energetic, as to exclude
the possibility of a change in our republican constitutions.
But while _property_ is considered as the _basis_ of the freedom of
the American yeomanry, there are other auxiliary supports; among which
is the _information of the people_. In no country, is education so
general—in no country, have the body of the people such a knowledge of
the rights of men and the principles of government. This knowledge,
joined with a keen sense of liberty and a watchful jealousy, will guard
our constitutions, and awaken the people to an instantaneous resistance
of encroachments.
But a principal bulwark of freedom is the _right of election_. An
equal distribution of property is the _foundation_ of a republic; but
_popular elections_ form the _great barrier_, which defends it from
assault, and guards it from the slow and imperceptible approaches of
corruption. Americans! never resign that right. It is not very material
whether your representatives are elected for one year or two—but the
_right_ is the Magna Charta of your governments. For this reason,
expunge that clause of the new constitution before mentioned, which
gives Congress an influence in the election of their own body. The
_time_, _place_ and _manner_ of chusing senators or representatives are
of little or no consequence to Congress. The number of members and time
of meeting in Congress are fixed; but the _choice_ should rest with the
several states. [50] I repeat it—reject the clause with decency, but
with unanimity and firmness.(28)
Excepting that clause the constitution is good(29)—it guarantees the
_fundamental principles_ of our several constitutions—it guards our
rights—and while it vests extensive powers in Congress, it vests no
more than are necessary for our union. Without powers lodged somewhere
in a single body, fully competent to lay and collect equal taxes
and duties—to adjust controversies between different states—to
silence contending interests—to suppress insurrections—to regulate
commerce—to treat with foreign nations, our confederation is a
cobweb—liable to be blown asunder by every blast of faction that is
raised in the remotest corner of the United States.
Every motive that can possibly influence men ever to unite under civil
government, now urges the unanimous adoption of the new constitution.
But in America we are urged to it by a singular necessity. By the local
situation of the several states _a few_ command _all_ the advantages of
commerce. Those states which have no advantages, made equal exertions
for independence, loaded themselves with immense debts, and now are
utterly(30) unable to discharge them; while their richer neighbors
are taxing them for their own benefit, merely because they _can_. I
can prove to a demonstration that Connecticut, which has the heaviest
internal or state debt, in proportion to its number of inhabitants,
of any in the union, cannot discharge its debt, on any principles of
taxation ever yet practised. Yet [51] the state pays in duties, at
least 100,000 dollars annually, on goods consumed by its own people,
but imported by New York. This sum, could it be saved to the state by
an equal system of revenue, would enable that state to gradually sink
its debt.(31)(32)
New Jersey and some other states are in the same situation, except
that their debts are not so large, in proportion to their wealth and
population.
The boundaries of the several states were not drawn with a view to
independence; and while this country was subject to Great Britain,
they produced no commercial or political inconveniences. But the
revolution has placed things on a different footing. The advantages
of some states, and the disadvantages of others are so great—and so
materially affect the business and interest of each, that nothing but
an equalizing system of revenue, that shall reduce the advantages
to some equitable proportion, can prevent a civil war and save the
national debt. Such a system of revenue is the _sine qua non_ of public
justice and tranquillity.
It is absurd for a man to oppose the adoption of the constitution,
because _he_ thinks some part of it defective or exceptionable.
Let every man be at liberty to expunge what _he_ judges to be
exceptionable, and not a syllable of the constitution [52] will
survive the scrutiny. A painter, after executing a masterly piece,
requested every spectator to draw a pencil mark over the part that
did not please him; but to his surprise, he soon found the _whole
piece_ defaced. Let every man examine the most perfect building by his
_own_ taste, and like some microscopic critics, condemn the _whole_
for small deviations from the rules of architecture, and not a part
of the _best_ constructed fabric would escape. But let _any_ man take
a _comprehensive view_ of the whole, and he will be pleased with the
general beauty and proportions, and admire the structure. The same
remarks apply to the new constitution. I have no doubt that _every_
member of the late convention has exceptions to _some part_ of the
system proposed. Their constituents have the same, and if _every_
objection must be removed, before we have a national government, the
Lord have mercy on us.
Perfection is not the lot of humanity. Instead of censuring the small
faults of the constitution, I am astonished that so many clashing
interests have been reconciled—and so many sacrifices made to the
_general interest_! The mutual concessions made by the gentlemen of the
convention, reflect the highest honor on their candor and liberality;
at the same time, they prove that their minds were deeply impressed
with a conviction, that such mutual sacrifices are _essential to
our union_. They _must_ be made sooner or later by every state; or
jealousies, local interests and prejudices will unsheath the sword, and
some Cæsar or Cromwell will avail himself [53] of our divisions, and
wade to a throne through streams of blood.
It is not our duty as freemen, to receive the opinions of any men
however great and respectable, without an examination. But when
we reflect that(33) some of the greatest men in America, with the
venerable FRANKLIN and the illustrious WASHINGTON at their head; _some_
of them the _fathers_ and _saviors_ of their country, men who have
labored at the helm during a long and violent tempest, and guided us to
the haven of peace—and _all_ of them distinguished for their abilities
their acquaintance with ancient and modern governments, as well as
with the temper, the passions, the interests and the wishes of the
Americans;—when we reflect on these circumstances, it is impossible to
resist impressions of respect, and we are almost impelled to suspect
our own judgements, when we call in question any part of the system,
which they have recommended for adoption. Not having the same means of
information, we are more liable to mistake the nature and tendency of
particular articles of the constitution, or the reasons on which they
were admitted. Great confidence therefore should be reposed in the
abilities, the zeal and integrity of that respectable body. But after
all, if the constitution should, in its future operation, be found
defective or inconvenient, two-thirds of both houses of Congress or the
application of two-thirds of the legislatures, may open the door for
amendments. Such improvements may then be made, as experience shall
dictate.
[54] Let us then consider the _New Federal Constitution_, as it really
is, an _improvement_ on the _best_ constitutions that the world ever
saw. In the house of representatives, the people of America have
an equal voice and suffrage. The choice of men is placed in the
freemen or electors at large; and the frequency of elections, and the
responsibility of the members, will render them sufficiently dependent
on their constituents. The senate will be composed of older men;
and while their regular dismission from office, once in six years,
will preserve their dependence on their constituents, the duration
of their existence will give firmness to their decisions, and temper
the factions which must necessarily prevail in the other branch. The
president of the United States is elective, and what is a capital
improvement on the best governments, the mode of chusing him excludes
the danger of faction and corruption.(34) As the supreme executive, he
is invested with power to enforce the laws of the union and give energy
to the federal government.
The constitution defines the powers of Congress; and every power
not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the several
state-legislatures. The sovereignty and the republican form of
government of each state is guaranteed by the constitution; and the
bounds of jurisdiction between the federal and respective state
governments, are marked with precision. In theory, it has all the
energy and freedom of the British and Roman governments, without their
defects. In short, the privileges of freemen are [55] interwoven into
the feelings and habits of the Americans; _liberty_ stands on the
immoveable basis of a general distribution of property and diffusion
of knowledge; but the Americans must cease to contend, to fear, and
to hate, before they can realize the benefits of independence and
government, or enjoy the blessings, which heaven has lavished, in rich
profusion, upon this western world.
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-York / On the
Subject of the / Constitution, / Agreed upon at Philadelphia, / The
17th of September, 1787. / New-York: / Printed by Samuel Loudon, /
Printer to the State. [1788].
Sm. 4to., pp. 19.
By John Jay, member of the New York State Convention. The pamphlet has
been partially reprinted in Elliot, I, 496.
“The good sense, forcible observations, temper and moderation with
which the pamphlet is written, cannot fail, I should think, of making
a serious impression upon the anti-federal mind, where it is not under
the influence of such local views as will yield to no argument, no
proof.”—George Washington.
“I likewise send you a small pamphlet written by John Jay about
ten days since, and which has had a most astonishing influence in
converting anti-federalism to a knowledge and belief that the new
Constitution was their only political salvation.”—S. B. Webb, 27
April, 1788.
“This pamphlet contains a brief recapitulation of the most striking
arguments in favor of adopting the proposed Federal Constitution.
Several of the observations are new, and all are penned with such
moderation of temper, and sound judgment, that they cannot fail to make
an impression favorable to the Constitution on minds which are open to
conviction. It is wished that every friend to good order and government
might ‘receive this address with the same candor with which it is
written,’ as it is believed the author’s arguments against appointing
a new general Convention, for the purpose of altering and amending the
constitution, are altogether unanswerable.” [Noah Webster] in _American
Magazine_ for April, 1788.
See Jay’s _Life of Jay_, I, 362; _The Federalist_, LXXXV; and
the “Postcript” of _An Address to the People of the State of New
York_.—_By a Plebian_, infra.