OBSERVATIONS ON THE GREEKS IN GENERAL.—THEIR INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPALITIES.—THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM.—CAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR
BETWEEN TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND IN 1806.—THOSE WHICH OCCASIONED THE
FAILURE OF THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINOPLE.—SUBSEQUENT CHANGES
OF POLICY OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT.—PEACE WITH ENGLAND.—PEACE WITH
RUSSIA, AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MOSTLY CONTRIBUTED TO IT.—HOSPODARS
CALLIMACKI AND CARADJA.—PRINCE DEMETRIUS MOUROUSI’S DEATH.—CARADJA’S
FLIGHT FROM WALLACHIA.—REFLECTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PORTE RELATIVE
TO THE TWO PRINCIPALITIES.
None of the events that had influenced the political existence, and
undermined the public spirit of the Wallachian and Moldavian nations,
proved more ruinous to them than the system of policy introduced by the
Greeks of the Fannar[28], when they were placed at the head of the
principalities.
Humiliated, degraded, and oppressed as the Greeks were, since they had
ceased to be a nation, civilisation degenerated among them, in
proportion to the weight and barbarism of the yoke that had been imposed
on them, and they had insensibly contracted those habits of corruption,
and servile obedience, which must be inseparable from a state of slavery
similar to theirs. Dissimulation and falsehood became the most prominent
features of their character; and, in short, the force of the causes
which acted upon them incessantly, familiarised them, by degrees, to
every thing that could be degrading and humiliating to man.
The ambition of certain Greeks, leading an obscure life at
Constantinople, was, however roused, when the office of
state-interpreter at the Porte, assumed an important appearance under
the direction of their countryman, Alexander Mavrocordato, who, from a
petty merchant at the island of Scio, rose by degrees to that station,
and was sent in the quality of Ottoman plenipotentiary to the congress
of Carlowitz, where he distinguished himself as an able negotiator. He
caused his son Nicholas to be raised to the governments of Moldavia and
Wallachia, and he suggested to the Porte a new mode of appointment to
those principalities, after the elective right had been entirely set
aside. The Ottoman court thenceforward appropriated those two dignities
to individuals who had once served in the quality of state-interpreter
to its satisfaction, not so much as a reward for their services, as on
account of the knowledge obtained of their personal character and extent
of abilities.
On another hand, the repeated demonstrations of servitude on the part of
the Greeks, and the apparent impossibility of their ever becoming a
nation again, seemed to render them the fittest tools of the Porte’s new
system of government in the principalities; for, although it could not
trample upon the whole of their privileges at once, yet, in giving them
princes who should be entirely devoted to its interests, and slaves to
its will, the existence of those privileges was rendered nugatory.
No sooner was the possibility of sharing in the public administration
manifested to the Greeks, than such as were versed in the Turkish and
European languages, abandoning all other pursuits, formed themselves
into a distinct class, which assumed the title of nobility, and the
exclusive right of being called to the service of the state.
In a short time, however, the number of competitors increased
considerably; all equally eager and impatient to reach the same objects,
they introduced a system of intrigue and bribery, which gave rise to
continual changes in the government of the principalities, and
accustomed the Porte to look upon these as farms which were to be let
out to the highest bidders; the farmer-princes were therefore deposed
and recalled, whenever the offers and promises of others of their
countrymen appeared more advantageous.
From the period at which this system was introduced, to the beginning of
the present century, being a space of ninety years, Wallachia alone has
passed through the hands of forty different princes, independently of
the time it was occupied by the Russians, from 1770 to 1774; by the
Austrians and Russians, from 1789 to 1792, and by the Russians again,
from 1806 to 1812.
The evils which naturally arose from such a state of things, weighed so
heavily upon the two nations, that the court of Russia, already
authorised by the treaty of Kaïnargik[29], to interfere in their behalf,
insisted at the peace of Yassi in 1792, that the Porte should engage to
maintain the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia in their respective
stations, for the space of seven years, and not to molest them in any
manner previous to the expiration of that term. This agreement was then
legally entered into by the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, but in the sequel
it was not regularly observed by the Porte, whose frequent infractions
of it became the subject of continual remonstrance on the part of the
court of Russia. In 1802, however, Prince Ipsilanti was appointed to the
government of Wallachia, and Prince Alexander Mourousi to that of
Moldavia, with the express condition which was obtained through the
negotiations of the Russian minister at the Porte, that neither of them
should be removed from office previous to the term stipulated in the
treaty, if they were not proved guilty of an offence that the Russian
minister should allow to be of a nature which justified their
deposition.[30]
In 1805, the intrigues of Buonaparte, who sought to involve Turkey in
his continental system, prevailed upon the Porte to adopt a line of
conduct which Russia could not otherwise interpret, than as a systematic
violation of its existing engagements, and an approaching alliance with
France, notwithstanding that a public audience of the Sultan was given
to the Russian envoy, Mr. d’Italinsky, in which a formal exchange of
ratifications took place of a late treaty of defensive alliance
concluded between the two powers.
The Hospodars, Ipsilanti and Mourousi, were suddenly recalled, without
the participation of the Russian embassy; the latter was replaced by
Charles Callimacki, and the former by Alexander Sutzo, a man who was
looked upon as a partisan of Buonaparte, and who had always been
obnoxious to the interests of Russia.
Previous to this circumstance, a certain degree of coolness already
existed between the courts of St. Petersburgh and Constantinople; it
originated in the Porte’s sudden resolution of suppressing foreign
protections, in abolishing all letters-patent, until then granted to
individuals, natives of Turkey, who were authorised by such letters to
place themselves under the protection of foreign courts, although
residing and trading in the Ottoman dominions. More particularly in
carrying that resolution into effect, by forcibly and publicly
compelling all such individuals, protected by Russia, to give up their
titles, without paying the least regard to the representations of the
Russian embassy.
Ipsilanti’s and Mourousi’s deposition brought things to a crisis. A
Russian army was immediately sent to the frontiers to enforce the
treaties, and having occupied the fortresses of Bender and Hotim, the
Porte looked upon the measure as a declaration of war, and the Mufti
issued his _Fetvaa_[31], which declared it legal to repel force by
force.
The rupture was soon followed by another with England, who had joined
Russia to oppose the increasing influence of Buonaparte over the Porte.
When, in 1805, the English ambassador, Mr. Charles Arbuthnot, arrived at
Constantinople, the Porte expressed a wish of renewing the treaty of
accession made in 1799, the term of which (eight years) was drawing to
its end. That treaty, framed upon the wisest principles, completed the
triple alliance between England, Russia, and Turkey, from which so many
important advantages have accrued to the common cause.
Mr. Arbuthnot not being invested with full powers for that particular
object, wrote home for instructions, and received them a short time
after; and when on their arrival an offer was made to the Turkish
ministers to commence the work, they very unexpectedly began to draw
back, and an actual recantation took place, which naturally created the
greatest surprise.
The intrigues of the French ambassador, and Buonaparte’s progressive
encroachments in Europe, had made on the minds of the Sultan and his
ministers such an impression, that no remonstrance, no threat could now
induce them to perform what they themselves had shown so much wish for
before.
On the other hand, the British embassy could not remain indifferent to
the recall of the Hospodars, and to the manner in which the foreign
protections had been suppressed.
From an impulse of official regard to the complaints and interests of
those individuals who were patentees under the English protection, and
in consequence of the Russian envoy’s solicitations that their efforts
might be joined for the purpose of resisting the violent measures
pursued by the Turkish government, the British ambassador made many
representations to the Porte against its proceedings, and although
impartial in principle as to the practice of granting protection to
natives of the country, he, at all events, recommended moderation, and a
less offensive mode of carrying the new system into execution. But
having soon discovered and ascertained beyond a doubt, that all
interference was of no avail, that the resolution of the Turkish cabinet
was such as to hazard all, sooner than withdraw from the adopted plan,
he deemed it expedient to advise the British patentees to proceed, as if
from their own accord, and give up their titles to the Porte, and in the
mean time recommended in a private manner, the property and personal
safety of such individuals, who, by this means, not only avoided the
resentment of the Turkish government, but were all well treated, and
some taken into favour.
The British ambassador, however, showed less disposition to compliance
with regard to the other proceedings of the Porte, and having insisted
with Russia on the immediate reinstatement of the Hospodars Ipsilanti
and Mourousi, the subject was discussed at the divan, where the general
opinion inclined to a firm resistance of those pretensions; but the
Sultan finally declared, that however humiliating might be the
alternative of ceding to them, he was resolved to recur to it rather
than break with England.
This decision was at the time carried into execution, to the extreme
disappointment of the French ambassador, Sebastiani, whose great object
was to kindle the fire he had raised. But very soon after, advices being
received that the Russian troops had already entered the Moldavian
territory, affairs underwent a total change; the Russian envoy was
dismissed, and the Grand Vezier took the field.
To represent these events in a more proper point of view, it is
necessary to observe, that it was neither the intention of England, nor
the wish of Russia, to engage in a serious war with Turkey. Their object
was to bring the Porte to a sense of its true interests, in diverting it
from a line of conduct which bore every appearance of a change in its
political system, and was every way calculated to confirm the suspicion
that the Sultan was contracting an alliance with Buonaparte.
In order to separate the Porte from the French party, and induce it to
return to the connexions which had formerly existed with the allies of
Turkey, a plan of coercive measures had been found necessary; and, to
give them a greater weight, it had been determined that Russia should
send an army from the north, and England a fleet from the south.
When the English fleet appeared before Constantinople, it naturally
occasioned the greatest confusion and alarm. The Sultan lost no time in
sending on board to offer terms of peace, and negotiations were
commenced with Mr. Arbuthnot, who was in the flag-ship, the Royal
Sovereign. But they were carried on with much less vigour than it was
necessary to give them, and left time to the French intrigues to gain
the advantage. Buonaparte’s active agents, General Sebastiani and
Franchini[32], were the more anxious to counteract the operations of the
English plenipotentiary, as they were aware that the first result of his
success would have been the expulsion of the French embassy from
Constantinople. They employed for that purpose every means in their
power, and they succeeded by the following stratagem.
The chief of the Janissaries, Pehlivan-Aga, had formerly been colonel of
a regiment, which had acted once as guard of honour, given to a French
embassy at the Porte. Having remained some time in that station, he had
contracted a lasting connexion with the French, to whose party, since
that period, he devoted himself. When General Sebastiani saw that peace
with England was on the point of being concluded, he sent Franchini to
him to suggest a plan which the Turkish officer carried into immediate
execution. He went to the seraglio[33], as if in great haste, and having
obtained audience of the Sultan, he thus addressed his imperial chief:—
“May God preserve your sacred person and the Ottoman empire from every
possible evil. A pure sense of duty brings me before your Royal Person,
to represent that so strong and general a fermentation has arisen
amongst my Janissaries since the appearance of the infidel’s fleet
before your royal palace: they express so great a discontent at the
measures pursued by your ministers in negotiating with the English, from
a shameful fear that the appearance of that fleet has thrown them into;
that a general insurrection is on the point of breaking out, unless the
negotiations be laid aside, and all offers of peace be rejected with
scorn. They declare that it is beneath the dignity and fame of the
Ottoman empire, to submit to such an act of humiliation, as to sign a
treaty, because a few ships have come to bully its capital, and dictate
their own terms to the Ottoman sovereign. Your brave Janissaries will
not suffer so disgraceful a stain to tarnish the splendour of the
Ottoman arms. They are all ready to sacrifice themselves in defence of
your residence, and in vindication of the honour and faith of the
Ottoman nation. But they can never consent to stand tacit witnesses of a
submission so ignominious to the Turkish name.”
Sultan Selim, a prince naturally timid and credulous, no sooner heard a
message of this sort delivered in the name of the Janissaries, then in
good understanding with the chiefs of government, and apparently united
with the troops of the Nisam-y-gedid[34], than he ordered all
communications with the English fleet to be suspended, and immediate
preparations of defence to be made, in the event of its commencing
hostilities.
This manœuvre, unknown at the time, and with which very few persons are
yet acquainted, was the true cause of the failure of the negotiations
which, at the commencement, bore so sure a prospect of success.
The fleet returned without even having made a show of hostile
intentions, and left to the triumphant French party the most decided
influence in the Seraglio.
Before we enter into further observations on the events which followed,
it may not be amiss to make a few remarks on the character of those who
were then at the head of the Turkish administration, as it is to them
that the whole change of system of the Porte is to be attributed.
Haffiz-Ismaïl Pashah, Grand Vezier, appointed early in 1805, was a
low-bred, ignorant man, so poor and thirsty after money, that the moment
he was elevated to his station, he formed the plan of operating a change
in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, although the time
prescribed by the treaties was not yet near, with a view of getting a
subsidy, and securing to himself an income which the candidates, who
took no small advantage of the Vezier’s inexperience and selfish views,
had promised to allow him when the appointment should have taken place.
Ibraïm-Aga, Kiaya-Béÿ, or minister of the interior, a man of little
experience and great ambition, under the idea of ingratiating himself
with his master, and rendering, as he thought, a signal service to the
state, undertook the affair of protections which he treated in a manner
so insulting and provoking, that it was impossible for any foreign
power, jealous of its own dignity, to suffer it to remain unnoticed.
The Mufti, Sheriff-Zaadé-Attaa-Effendi, and the chief of the
Janissaries, Pehlivan-Mehmet Aga, were entirely devoted to the French
party. They willingly seconded the adoption of any measures which tended
to alienate the Porte from England and Russia, and appeared calculated
to promote Buonaparte’s scheme of overthrowing the triple alliance.
Galib Reïs-Effendi, minister of foreign affairs, and Yussuf-Aga,
Validay-Kiayassi or chancellor to the Emperor’s mother, were the only
two men in power friendly to the common cause. They disapproved of the
measures pursued, but their opinion was over-ruled, and they both
thought it prudent to retire from business, in order to screen
themselves from responsibility with respect to the consequences they
foresaw.
The military operations on the Danube be between the Russians and the
Turks, which followed the first acts of hostility, were not more
successful with regard to the object that brought them on, than the
threats of the English fleet.
The peace of Tilsit took place; and the Porte, which had reason to
expect an effective interference on the part of Buonaparte in behalf of
its differences with Russia, gained no other advantage than the
conclusion of a long armistice, the first condition of which was the
retreat of the Russian armies from the principalities, whence, however,
they did not remove. Negotiations for peace were, notwithstanding, set
on foot; and the great revolutions, which overthrew the Sultan Selim,
and consigned him to death, finally established a new order of things at
Constantinople, and operated a complete change in the political system
of the Turkish cabinet. The Porte remained no longer blind to the
equivocal conduct of Buonaparte since his reconciliation with Russia,
and began to look upon its state of hostility with England not only as
useless, but even injurious to the interests of the country.
In 1808, an English[35]plenipotentiary had been for the second time[36]
sent to treat at the Dardanelles, and peace was definitively signed in
the month of December of the same year.
At the same time the Turkish plenipotentiaries, sent to Bukorest during
the armistice, were endeavouring to adjust the differences with Russia;
but the interview of the Emperor Alexander with Buonaparte took place at
Erfurth, and the failure of their joint proposals to the court of
London[37] was followed by instructions to Prince Prosoroffsky,
commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in Moldavia and Wallachia, to
signify to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries that, as the Emperor Alexander
had acceded to the Continental System, the chief object of which was a
continual state of warfare with England, he could no longer enter upon
terms of peace with Turkey, unless the English ambassador, lately
admitted at Constantinople, were sent out of the Ottoman dominions.
The Turkish ministers expressed astonishment at the versatility of the
court of Russia, which, having made the first overtures for a
negotiation, had not then in any manner alluded to England; they
demanded time, however, for the arrival of instructions which were
necessary to regulate their official reply to a communication so
unexpected. They dispatched a messenger to Constantinople for that
purpose, and he was accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Prince
Prosoroffsky, Colonel Bock, who, on his arrival, signified to the Porte
the Emperor’s ultimatum, through the channel of the French minister
Latour Maubourg.
The Ottoman government, without much hesitation, recalled the Turkish
plenipotentiaries from the congress of Bukorest, and hostilities were
renewed.
A plan of partition had been formed at Erfurth between the emperors
Alexander and Napoleon, by which the Turkish provinces were to fall to
the share of Russia, and Spain to that of France. It was after this
understanding between the two sovereigns that overtures were made to
England. The English negotiation took time, and before it came to a
decided issue, Buonaparte declared to his senate that the principalities
of Wallachia and Moldavia were annexed to the dominions of his friend
and ally the Emperor Alexander. When, however, Buonaparte found England
determined to treat upon no basis which did not expressly admit of the
evacuation of Spain, and that by entering into such terms he left a
decided advantage to Russia with respect to Turkey, without reaping any
benefit to himself from the political bargain made at Erfurth, he
changed his views. The continental system, which he endeavoured to
justify in attributing the general calamities of Europe to a tyrannical
perseverance in war on the part of England, furnished him with a
sufficient pretext for engaging Russia to continue her war against
Turkey, who had just entered into terms of friendship with England. On
the other hand, he prevailed upon the Turkish government to insist on
the restitution of the principalities occupied by the Russian armies,
and to continue hostilities so long as the Russian court should withhold
its consent to that measure. His desire of keeping these two powers at
variance with each other could not but increase when he had subsequently
formed the plan of invading Russia, who, molested on one side by the
Turks, and on the other by the Persians, was thus forced to employ
considerable armies on distant frontiers.
The exhausted state of Turkey, the mediation of England, and the
impatience of Russia, who was pressed by the hostile preparations of
France, evidently intended against her, hastened the conclusion of peace
in 1812 between the Mussulman powers and the Russians; but, critical as
the circumstances were, the Court of St. Petersburgh signed a most
advantageous treaty with both.
Galib Effendi, who, since the great changes of government at
Constantinople, had resumed the functions of minister of foreign
affairs, was chief plenipotentiary at the congress of Bukorest in 1811
and 1812; but the Greek prince Demetrius Mourousi, who, in his quality
of state-interpreter, was present at the negotiations, conducted the
greatest part of them, and was indeed intrusted with extensive power. He
had, with his two brothers, been invariably attached to the Russian
party since the beginning of his public career, and his hopes of being
appointed to one of the principalities, the greatest objects of his
ambition, after the restoration of peace, appeared grounded upon the
best foundation. His office, his services at the congress, and the
support of the court of Russia, were, in fact, considerations which
appeared to render his nomination certain.
The cession of Wallachia and Moldavia could not, therefore, by any
means, suit his views, and he combated it with energy and success; but,
in rendering so important a service to the Porte, some proof of
attachment to Russia was also necessary on his part; and although by
insisting on the entire restitution of the principalities, no doubt but
the Russian plenipotentiaries, who were instructed to hasten the
conclusion of peace upon any terms not beyond that restitution, would
have consented without hesitation, Mourousi, who was aware of it,
finally settled the conditions by ceding to Russia the finest part of
Moldavia, that which is situated between the rivers Dniester and Pruth,
thus fixing the future line of demarcation of the Russian frontiers by
the direction of the latter river.
The vigilant agents of Buonaparte at Constantinople did not suffer the
conduct of Mourousi to remain unnoticed. When, after the signing of the
treaty, they saw themselves frustrated in the hope of inducing the Porte
to continue the war, they sought to bring the Mourousi family into
disgrace, that they might, at least, prevail upon the Ottoman government
to place at the head of the principalities persons of their own
choosing. They represented the Prince Demetrius as a traitor who had
been bribed by the Russians to serve their interests, at a time when it
was in his power to obtain the most advantageous terms of peace.
Meanwhile hostilities commenced between France and Russia, and the Porte
having evinced a resolution of remaining neutral, unwilling to give
umbrage to either of the contending powers in the choice of the new
Hospodars, resolved to fix upon two individuals whose political
principles had never been connected with foreign parties. A great number
of candidates offered their services, but none of them being qualified
for the appointments, their claims were rejected. Halett-Effendi,
intimate counsellor of the sultan, was instructed to make a choice, and
he fixed it on the prince Charles Callimacki[38] for Moldavia, and Yanco
Caradja for Wallachia. Halett-Effendi had been several years before
Turkish secretary to Callimacki’s father, whilst at the head of the
Moldavian government, and on terms of intimate friendship with Caradja,
who had also a subaltern employment under the same prince. Being
perfectly acquainted with the personal character of both, he recommended
them to the sultan as the fittest persons in those circumstances, and
they were appointed in August 1812.
Demetrius Mourousi, who, with Galib Effendi, had not yet departed from
Wallachia, received the news of the nominations at a time that he
expected with confidence that of his own. He was at the same time
secretly informed that his return to Constantinople would expose him to
the greatest dangers, and advised to retire into a Christian country.
Offers were made him of an asylum in Russia, with a considerable pension
from the government; but, fearful that his flight might direct the
vengeance of the Porte on his family, who had remained in the power of
the Turks, and in the hope of justifying his conduct, since the whole
responsibility of the transactions at the congress ought properly to
have fallen on Galib Effendi, he made up his mind to accompany that
minister back to the capital. He little suspected, however, that the
Turkish minister, whose conduct had been disapproved of, had removed
every unfavourable impression relative to himself from the mind of the
Sultan, by attributing the conditions of peace to which he had
subscribed, to the intrigues and treachery of Mourousi; and that he had,
in consequence, received secret orders to arrest the Greek prince the
moment they crossed the Danube together, and send him prisoner to the
Grand Vezier, who had not yet removed his head-quarters from Shumla.
Mourousi, still more encouraged by the friendly assurances of Galib
Effendi, left Bukorest in September, and from Rustehiuk was conveyed
under an escort to Shumla, where, on entering the gates of the Vezier’s
dwelling, he was met by several Chiaoushes[39] who fell upon him with
their sabres and cut him in pieces. His head was sent to Constantinople,
where it was exposed three days at the gates of the Seraglio, with that
of his brother Panayotti Mourousi, who, during the absence of Demetrius
had filled his place at the Porte, and was accused of having been his
accomplice in betraying the Ottoman interests.
The Hospodars Caradja and Callimacki took possession of their respective
governments on the 3d of October, 1812, the day fixed for the
restitution of the principalities; and the Porte, whose present security
on the side of Russia, in a great measure depends on the strictest
adherence to its treaties with that power, has made no attempt of
removing the princes previous to the expiration of the seven years.
The Hospodar Caradja, however, having in the course of six years’
residence in Wallachia, amassed immense wealth, apprehensive of being
called to account on his return to Constantinople for laying aside so
many riches for his own use, judged it prudent to make a timely retreat,
and to settle in some Christian country of Europe beyond the reach of
Turkish influence. He remitted all his money to European banks, and one
day in October, 1818, he assembled some of the principal Boyars,
consigned to them the reins of government, and left Bukorest with all
his family for Kronstadt in the Austrian dominions, where he arrived in
safety after a short journey.[40]
After his departure, the Boyars petitioned the Sultan that he would no
longer appoint Greek princes to govern Wallachia, but confide the
administration to the members of the divan, who engaged to accept and
maintain any tributary conditions that he would think proper to
prescribe to them. The Ottoman cabinet, however, did not conceive it
prudent to listen to the proposal; and after communicating with the
Russian ambassador, appointed to the principality the same Alexander
Sutzo, who had been so strongly opposed by the Russian Envoy in 1805.
Russia had no longer reasons to object to his nomination; and no doubt
but the Prince Sutzo, who is an enlightened and well-thinking statesman,
will acquit himself of his charge as well as the circumstances in which
he is situated, will permit. But the harassing and ruinous system of
government, still maintained in the principalities, offers, it must be
confessed, no small matter of regret on the indifference of the Porte
with regard to the adoption of measures better calculated for their
welfare and prosperity.
The Ottoman court has often witnessed the consequences of the dread with
which the Greeks employed in its service are impressed, and has felt on
various occasions how much its policy must tend to alienate from the
Turks every sentiment of good-will of the inhabitants of those
provinces, and make them desirous and ready to throw themselves into the
arms of the first nation whose armies approach their territory to make
war on Turkey; and yet it continues in the same system. Greek princes,
however devoted to the interests of the Porte, would certainly do little
without armies, in the event of an unexpected revolution in Wallachia
and Moldavia. Their presence alone is by no means sufficient to maintain
in them the Turkish authority. The fortified places on the Danube, are
the only guarantees of the fidelity of the principalities. In suffering
the two nations to be governed entirely by their own natural
authorities, would the Ottoman supremacy incur the least diminution of
power? and would it not continue to maintain the same commanding
advantages?
The inattention of the Turkish cabinet is not to be exclusively ascribed
to the general system of governing the empire, but chiefly to the
selfish views and personal avidity of the ministers who compose it. They
have accustomed themselves to look upon Wallachia and Moldavia as two
rich provinces over which they have but a momentary authority; and,
instead of seeking the means most calculated to secure a permanent
possession of them, they shorten the possibility by a systematic
devastation of all their resources.
The Sultan himself, who takes a much more active part in the affairs of
state than many of his predecessors have done; whose talents and liberal
sentiments would claim equality with those of any other sovereign, were
they not so much restrained by the religious prejudices and stubborn
ignorance of his Mahometan subjects: and whose chief attention has of
late years been directed to a new organization of the empire,
unfortunately seems equally averse to any changes which might tend to
improve the condition of Wallachia and Moldavia.