From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in

such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except

as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan

advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found

the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line

across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of

getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front

and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and

fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main

line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and

Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of

an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.

The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our

extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be

penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,

therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General

Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and

turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the

enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week

before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The

enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the

lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that

it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at

once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General

Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.

On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting

possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To

accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,

which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the

2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back

upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d

corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with

heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan

advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five

Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced

the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him

back towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed

great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the

main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed

his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of

the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of

wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture

he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back

slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one

division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.

Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could

hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions

of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.

Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,

because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and

precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,

General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on

Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his

strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between

five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin

relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report

of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind

lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling

upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from

his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this,

General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,

and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the

morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.

General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping

everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing

many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by

two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division

of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near

Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,

and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while

General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General

Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's

main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his

inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,

returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's

lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's

corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the

most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially

shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The

enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,

where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement

ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened

by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station

towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front

of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our

hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main

road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy

evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On

the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed

for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General

Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for

Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along

that road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville

Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court

House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of

General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached

Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the

following communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach

Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him

last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at

twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number

one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at

Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so,

push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job

with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to

strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able

to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic

points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west

of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his

cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his

reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,

while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon

several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord

advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of

infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General

Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the

head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and

detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.

This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to

get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy

immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan

struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of

artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th

corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,

which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among

whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and

General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except

one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;

the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on

Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon found

that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so

close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common

bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately

crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at

Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I

addressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the

hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern

Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my

duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of

blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate

States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville

the following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not

entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further

resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate

your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before

considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition

of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,

asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of

Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peace

being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon

--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for

taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until

properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet

any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable

to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the

surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade

followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the

cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by

General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's

advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was

unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General

Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from

there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,

and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During

this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight

received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of

yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of

Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be

frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender

of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object

of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.

I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army

of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the

Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration

of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the

old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and

immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to

treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day

could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am

equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains

the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well

understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that

most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of

millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our

difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I

subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corps

reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate

effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown

in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of

hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the

following from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,

whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were

embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender

of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer

contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is

set forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the

8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern

Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and

men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be

designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers

as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not

to take up arms against the Government of the United States until

properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like

parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public

property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers

appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of

the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each

officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be

disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their

paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the terms

of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As

they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the

8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper

officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,

and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox

Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,

and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army

immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his

example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately

under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and

their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly

against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,

which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The

day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at

Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and

General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a

suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject

to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the

President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your

instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the

morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your

orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the

termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th

another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,

which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army

upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the

20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the

railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force striking

it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying

the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually

destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for

Greensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and

destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between

Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along

it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and

defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen

pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four

prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he

destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.

Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for

a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,

commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps,

Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to

Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved

from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving

thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General

Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from

Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially

invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a

part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the

enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the

9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These

successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to

approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was

evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of

the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting

of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until

March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April,

General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near

Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred

prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the

Cahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of

Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,

destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast

quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th

he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the

Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to

General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the

14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five

steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on

Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted

and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand five

hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the

navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public

property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four

guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the

20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one

thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General

Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to

make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him

on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby

all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby

Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,

and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on

the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General

Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This

surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the

rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of

first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate

plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the

government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them

arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been

surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had

surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio

Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to

defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting

great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final

triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly

set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and

brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not

as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully

refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have

occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East

fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference

in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in

battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in

the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant

of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of

the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the

Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old

antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendid

achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all

sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too

much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have

followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud

record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other

for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over

every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope

for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however

mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.

GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________

FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to

General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to

the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have

more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming the

return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,

so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his

services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and

General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a

great many years before the Mexican war to have established in

the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of

the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He

recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his

annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any

hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made

assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied

by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and

appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum

thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,

sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled

the fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fund

were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded

in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some

$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the

war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to

have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury

of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he

had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the

Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,

Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never

had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,

Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high

office. It made also governors of States, members of the

cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both

in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in

a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican

war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results

to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side

of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort

whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a

Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the

fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few

people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.

W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in

the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from

General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. At

the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates

had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's

landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near

Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.

Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might

happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his

position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends

it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg

landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile

west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our

right rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises

General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his

letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter

was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the

4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and

suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a

company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at

the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that

they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and

from the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has

been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at

the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more

experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,

would take the particular road that he did start upon in the

absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent

dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found

that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front

and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very

much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back

had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up

to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the

road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff

officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am

not competent to say just what order the General actually

received.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at

Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and

a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace

early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the

Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road

which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right

than the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.

(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote

for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,

who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some

unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because

of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,

also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice

to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a

point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the

6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the

passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep

in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only

marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the

rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle of

the second day and did as good service as its position

allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a

conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest

commendation from division commanders in the Army of the

Tennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes

mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family

which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these

circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook

injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent

one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do

any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I

am always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the

time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my

recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were

promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th

Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,

M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and

John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate

battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,

the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his

vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew

her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.

With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the

New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf

and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade

on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of

Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied

me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that

of some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I

proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect

that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river

to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated

on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman

came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would

like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut

the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move

I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position

voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or

a long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country,

with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points

strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an

axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an

enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would

guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out

all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign

proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to

make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground

could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there

and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being

always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I

said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that

was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad

from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To

this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the

lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election

went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary

enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and

conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far

as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of

supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor

supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us

was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was

lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had

to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,

embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and

asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals

upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I

did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was

not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned

between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I

remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and

consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a

copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of

my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between

us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply

friendly advice which the relations between us fully

justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a

success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered

by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression

which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's

prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to

Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in

person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further

instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly

desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad

between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from

communication with the South, but being confronted by a large

force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is

to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to

Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,

if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above

Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or

thereabouts.

U. S. GRANT

Maj.-Gen'l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's

position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being

provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the

mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot

be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you

understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him

strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a

crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of

Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the

heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your

chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern

extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can

concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The

troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your

left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend

fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of

one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This

division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the

most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your

effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your

advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and

moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The

junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will

be at once established between the two armies by roads on the

south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on

those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily

held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have

there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's

corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at

Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday

night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower

down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness

for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will

be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one

hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry

soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see

that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You

will call on the engineer department for such preparations as

you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery

over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform

after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying

the ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel

with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel

and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have

instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in

the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will

be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the

rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the

left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's

position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small

force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where

he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with

all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable

road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,

December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga

is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,

my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,

courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great

difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you

all,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,

subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General

Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The

scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running

nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the

names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at

Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and

Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the

government at Washington.

(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on

account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be

granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible

that Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK

General-in-Chief.

(OFFICIAL.)

(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.

(*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me

to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts

of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For

your information I now write you my programme, as at present

determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up

his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to

turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the

navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New

Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to

hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the

number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number

necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less

than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand

men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations

against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him

to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate

against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This

will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.

F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore

the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,

increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five

thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,

wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,

under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the

other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to

move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about

Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will

be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand

men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up

and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as

you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war

resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but

simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave

you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,

as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he

can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the

18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is

concentrating now. None will move from their places of

rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to

move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct

is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have

difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to

where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish

it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do

not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I

can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad

Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move

directly to his front. In this way he must get through to

inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from

one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,

if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one

else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,

Appendix.

(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,

April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE

Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations

for the coming campaign, the following is communicated

confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and

towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn

over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the

navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and

to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to

move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other

movements. From the scattered condition of his command,

however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans

before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same

time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army

being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate

aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to

Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of

the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his

front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making

preparations for it. Two columns of his command will make south

at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from

ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the

other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under

Brig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach

the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,

and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and

return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join

you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward

to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries which

would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to

within easy hauling distance of every position the army could

occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if

he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather

interior to the one I would have to take in following. A

movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all

that was done would have to be done with the supplies and

ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter

plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies

possible to take with us was considered. The country over which

we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that

we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not

entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West

Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of

four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an

attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he

was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any

part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's

raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,

and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself

into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him

before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at

Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of

the Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passage

southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and

Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting

Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South

Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000

men into the field directly to his front. The force will be

commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,

Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from

the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous

with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,

there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in

doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above

or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the

other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is

cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on

a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done

whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from

Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the

other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies

until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more

fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce

you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after

the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from

Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable

you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the

front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and

transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall

back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and

yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing

baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a

regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should

be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and

ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division

headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make

arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded

to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this

contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there

is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or

elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made

for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred

rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the

amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of

the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave

our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and

estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and

General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman

the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and

was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity of

forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my

two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,

representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and

three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the

enemy."

(*27)

UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.

Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.

Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.

Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.

First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.

Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.

First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.

Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.

Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.

Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.

Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.

First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.

Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.

Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.

Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.

Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.

First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.

Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.

First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.

First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.

Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.

First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.

Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.

Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.

First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.

Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.

First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.

Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.

Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......

Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.

Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)

Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's "

" Eppa Hunton's "

" Wm. R. Terry's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)

Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade

" E. M. Law's (c) "

" John Bratton's "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)

Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade

" B. G. Humphreys' "

" Goode Bryan's "

" Kershaw's (Old) "

Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)

" John Pegram 's " (f)

" Gordon's " (g)

Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's "

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.

Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)

Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)

" Geo H. Stewart's " (h)

" L. A. Stafford's " (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.

Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)

" Geo. Dole's " (k)

" S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.

" C. A. Battle's "

" R. D. Johnston's " (f)

Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)

Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.

Mahone's "

Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m)

" A. R. Wright's "

" Joseph Finegan's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)

" James H. Lane's "

" Sam'l McCowan's "

" Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)

Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.

" John R. Cooke's "

" D. McRae's "

" J. J. Archer's "

" H. H. Walker's "

_unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division

Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade

" L. L. Lomax's "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.

" P. M. B. Young's "

" Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.

Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.

" J. R. Chambliss's "

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*

Cabell's Battalion.

Manly's Battery.

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.

Carleton's Battery.

Calloway's Battery.

Haskell's Battalion.

Branch's Battery.

Nelson's "

Garden's "

Rowan "

Huger's Battalion.

Smith's Battery.

Moody "

Woolfolk "

Parker's "

Taylor's "

Fickling's "

Martin's "

Gibb's Battalion.

Davidson's Battery.

Dickenson's "

Otey's "

BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

Braxton's Battalion.

Lee Battery.

1st Md. Artillery.

Stafford "

Alleghany "

Cutshaw's Battalion.

Charlotteville Artillery.

Staunton "

Courtney "

Carter's Battalion.

Morris Artillery.

Orange "

King William Artillery.

Jeff Davis "

Nelson's Battalion.

Amherst Artillery.

Milledge "

Fluvauna "

Brown's Battalion.

Powhatan Artillery.

2d Richmond Howitzers.

3d " "

Rockbridge Artillery.

Salem Flying Artillery.

COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

Cutt's Battalion.

Ross's Battery.

Patterson's Battery.

Irwin Artillery.

Richardson's Battalion.

Lewis Artillery.

Donaldsonville Artillery.

Norfolk Light "

Huger "

Mclntosh 's Battalion.

Johnson's Battery.

Hardaway Artillery.

Danville "

2d Rockbridge Artillery.

Pegram's Battalion.

Peedee Artillery.

Fredericksburg Artillery.

Letcher "

Purcell Battery.

Crenshaw's Battery.

Poague's Battalion.

Madison Artillery.

Albemarle "

Brooke "

Charlotte "

NOTE.

(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at

above date.

(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also

contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by

Colonel P. D. Bowles.

(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not

indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.

(e) Constituting York's Brigade.

(f) In Ramseur's Division.

(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and

containing 12th Georgia Battalion.

(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's

Division.

(i) Grimes' Brigade.

(k) Cook's "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;

name not indicated.

(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.

(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four

brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not

indicated.

(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,

Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the

artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and

6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in

a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.

will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with

Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and

vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as

close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any

diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any

opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my

mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely

successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been

heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,

May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,

Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under

cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the

enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the

enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible

vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let

your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost

secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,

in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the

direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you

and General Hancock with instructions to render you every

assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold

their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage

of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will

push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and

four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,

including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of

artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the

last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a

company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division

(Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from

the enemy.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,

Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for

gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'

battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and

Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.

S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York

Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,

to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.

S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His

services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this

recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the

claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but

recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also

ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth

Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General

Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.

He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I

have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by

promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the

honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally

gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at

this time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's

right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg

road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox

Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little

River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps

and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford

and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th

corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges

above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are

held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army

with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of

the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short

distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and

near to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter

of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the

enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on

account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by

the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna

River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to

the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined

therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near

Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and

leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,

belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of

that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river

and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark

this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced

march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The

balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and

follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw

from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of

the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we

now take show it, and the action of his army shows it

unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments

cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE

over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be

mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already

assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have

forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling

of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the

enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and

Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north

of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to

import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected

at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on

down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it

advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port

Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change

at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there

in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to

hold it.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,

suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it

vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful

point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you

are in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,

D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be

impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would

protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that

road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long

vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our

strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of

his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My

idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible

north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of

communication on the north side of the James River to transfer

the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or

follow him south if he should retreat.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it

of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now

have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or

feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where

in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.

Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to

make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of

the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by

the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable

circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be

sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about

Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this

is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James

River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to

City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on

north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and

most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest

class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all

sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the

canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be

lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make

the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south

side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they

can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels

can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our

army is not only confident of protecting itself without

intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever

and whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

Commanding Dept. W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with

instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence

there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way

as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and

of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.

According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your

guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It

would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for

a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the

enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met

as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see,

in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of

your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route

should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so

understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The

direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you

in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately

turn east by the most practicable road. From thence move

eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely

and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the work

laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,

proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in

General Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed

back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem

it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.

Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. | KILLED. | WOUNDED. | MISSING. |

AGGREGATE. |

Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |

Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|

North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |

Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold

Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |

Total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |

(*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864. 11 A.M.

MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.

* * * * * * *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned

their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt

expected troops from north of the James River to take their

place before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of

this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road

between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain

possession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their

commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the

last five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays

being allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieut.-General.

(*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from

Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from

an attack there. The chances they think will be better on

Burnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to

concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's

line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully

impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond

the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating

it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they

should not succeed in breaking through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery

possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front

during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the

support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought

on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,

ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and

infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in

readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or

to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One

thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If

they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it

to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they

should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without

waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can

co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five

thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce

you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox

and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not

attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy

the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if

possible.

* * * * * * *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at

Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up....

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

(*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.

(*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will

lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to

abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is

all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he

fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster

employees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville

with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon

ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at

Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to

Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy

where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the

best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer

incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily

disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to

attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no

peace.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to

where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be

getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after

Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens

him in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864--4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your

cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign

back to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the

enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are

scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the

contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat

to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of

States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he

should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except

in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities

ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the

enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at

your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that

will resound from one end of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be

witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you

will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let

there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn

battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he

retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of

his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day

announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or

reinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from

Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go

no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is

entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many

privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for

future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take

them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now

expected.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,

March 24th, Appendix.

(*43) See Appendix.

(*44) NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender

inserted at this place, was copied from the original document

furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.

Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time

of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold

order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations

and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of

General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General

Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to

General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General

Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General

Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the

original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and

Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the

form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor

of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and

General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and

handed it to General Grant.