The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send

General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give

him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I

would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and

throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be

done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the

enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed,

and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next

morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to

satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines

until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the

assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the

Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing

fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about

seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no

other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced

Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear

the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. General

Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just

after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might

wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed

knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But

instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he

requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured

works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack

was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under

Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th

corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and

the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock

the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of

the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously

captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four

hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in

with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the

enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The

advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then

proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far

as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of

his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to

get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn

before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this,

at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.

As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I

ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that

were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to

report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was

notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his

present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the

line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with

his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,

the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.

But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold

them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of

his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy

attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected

by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of

the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda

Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against

the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the

enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The

result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's

cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom

he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in

complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our

hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On

the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa

Court House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced

in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by

infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the

latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme

right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and

was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not

having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals

being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and

hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the

north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching

White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at

that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after

heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,

without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army

of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of

the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.

Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot

and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen

miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and

defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station

on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville

Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he

found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not

dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met

the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony

Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he

made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station

(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the

enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the

loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General

Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way

into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,

succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our

left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than

compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by

railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the

Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the

Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of

his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine

that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's

lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and

two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to

the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler

had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched

position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our

lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting

this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting

lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.

The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large

force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the

diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force

back there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of

the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to

relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the

assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps and

Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved

in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and

five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a

regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th

corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,

and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a

detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance

promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason

to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were

immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up

enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),

and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus

held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were

withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what

promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was

retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the

Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he

returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement

of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the

Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river

and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of

navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great

delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,

to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this

purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against

Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning

to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued

immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River

expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time

made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments

from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts,

of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions

of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to

Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.

General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across

the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's

Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards

Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own

command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from

Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the

Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not

sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and

although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,

and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two

division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before

him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance

reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a

reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the

enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost

about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss

was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night.

Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by

telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the

assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the

troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the

enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all

the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright

commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken

at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;

and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of

the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and

several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,

I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies

operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement

against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;

and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between

any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much

as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the

fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave

Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to

return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon

Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was

ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved

down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the

30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,

towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and

with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.

From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down

between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit

messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to

thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be

received showing a different state of facts from those on which they

were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that

must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and

rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise

would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that

some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the

Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle

Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to

Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his

assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time

the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our

forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the

crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy

Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I

hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at

Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the

4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for

myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after

consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following

instructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the

vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and

garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this

concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From

Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the

Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him

wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as

it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a

small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,

detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after

the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force,

the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville

may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best

cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be

instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south

side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In

pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to

go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite

the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for

the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not

desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be

protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army

can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and

we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this

you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the

course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country

through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached

Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to

be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then

at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders

to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on

General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of

instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on

the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to

military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of

Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West

Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle

Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to

temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were

sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at

Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September

were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many

severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were

generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two

armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon

Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--that

either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open

to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances

before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these

circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.

Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake

and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so

indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving

Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so

great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to

telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of

General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I

left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his

headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.

I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army

lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such

confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of

instructions necessary--Go in! For the conveniences of forage, the

teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him

if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on

the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before

daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,

that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to

visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General

Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary

and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated

him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to

Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of

artillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at

Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss

on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through

Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping

the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel

army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of

Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again

returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry

encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with

the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty

prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains

which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork,

and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and

the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries

which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss

and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and

Newtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when

the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in

time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming

the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was

defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and

trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of

his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton

and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the

enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. I

was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, and

to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and

another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the

sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force

for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had

detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the

Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division

of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's

army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the

north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and,

if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six

pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that

were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division

(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this

movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the

18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad. During the day he had

considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made

repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great

loss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the

James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at

Petersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,

while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and

after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces

of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City

Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to

supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of

Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the

enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops

north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the

28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps,

Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to

the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th,

carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below

Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of

artillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments. This success was

followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front

of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy

loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of

this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was

unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so

threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it. The enemy made

several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were

unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th,

General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the

enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of

troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held

the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troops

moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy

in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces

holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked,

but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the

James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and

prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. This

he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was

repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent

out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new

works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to

hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2d

corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in

advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run,

and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, until

the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road

where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant

from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to

reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the

enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful

assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to

withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly.

Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected

with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left

the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals

Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a

desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock

immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove

the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the

north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg

Road, and also on the York River Railroad. In the former he was

unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was

afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former

positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and

Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the

defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for

crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his

detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February,

our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had

been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the

Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively,

by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at

Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering

Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through

Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it

in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston,

finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified

position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.

A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south.

Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and

heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again

disappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville

on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.

While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's

division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts

and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman,

having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in

motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass

at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under General

Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope

Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.

The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General

McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New

Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and

Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and

concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and

McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of

the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank,

and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of

this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the

Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and

get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations,

crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to

Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood

succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming

the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman

in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which

was on the 22d of July. About one P.M. of this day the brave,

accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan

succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this

desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard,

on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized

him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it

impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing

his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main

force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon

roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded,

and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and

Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September

occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted

to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and

driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville,

Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the

Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined

General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a

successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its

branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook,

Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication with

Atlanta. The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,

skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles

during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest

unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying

it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track

railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This

passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of

it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under

Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to

advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat

disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility

of further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he

supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West

Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send

Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.

On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near

Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout

and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly

pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his

designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with

which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for

rest and repairs necessary. In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith,

with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by

General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return

from Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was

directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against

Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has

characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, he met

the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting

continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of

the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General

Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest

annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City,

Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded

by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H., having

but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he

repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General

Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but

received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers,

that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to hold

his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the

question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,

garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st Regiment

Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought

bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy

carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms,

proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before

Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations,

were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan.

With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State

through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June they

attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th

he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy

loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerilla

was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his

command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River

expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent

by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the

date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two

divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left

Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red

River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel

forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the

14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the

enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort

de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with

its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of

artillery, and many small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th

he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On

the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in

which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four

pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel

General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks had assembled

his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the

morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the

7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him

from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight

miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the

8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and

defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an

immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night, General

Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the

9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night, General

Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to

Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious

difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the

expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they

passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now

Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were

constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet

passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable

skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point

Coupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this

expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the

carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the

capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th

army corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red

River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after

driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in

Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.

After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,

General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of

April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red

River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas

County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.

He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d

of May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing

Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable

loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the

"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to

send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,

and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be

necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then

occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General

Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was

collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeated

this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about

forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon

Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with

Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of

August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.

Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,

surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousand

four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces

of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General

Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,

on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en

route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry

force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of

Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those

of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price

and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,

would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attacked

Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to

the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. General

Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such

forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General

Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the

loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of

prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The

impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri

for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how

little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why

General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten

and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the

Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison

at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.

Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and

after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the

railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,

skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day

cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.

On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under

Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the

garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the

vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its

surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He

withdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,

and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without

success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was

handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of

the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved

towards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every

exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest

before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his

escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy

the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of

October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into

his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he

was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command

and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies

in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting

and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from

Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,

allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which

was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the

whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General

Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that

an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt

at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the

army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to

the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded

in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of

his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the

constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he

attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and

destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and

telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River,

twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and

Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by

Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in

Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the

reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I

quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be

reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for

Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi

River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of

the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put

my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,

to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city

of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of

mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing

substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a

proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,

etc.

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood

was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile

and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the

Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought

to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If

you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but

would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such

railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike

for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater

damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there

is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must

trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force

from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will

be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.

I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could

not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all

your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive

than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and

Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one

corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta

with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This

reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain

here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold

cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely

prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga

to Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and

worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing

things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I

believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the

defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he

means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war

is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the

mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the

sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,

you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or

Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to

the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east

and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.

In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had

been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.

General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed

movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.

Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand

Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanley

commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back

to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he

had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save

the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with

through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was

little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,

or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and

beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman

should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he

commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out

point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as

he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force

inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could

reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,

however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only

considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi

River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,

and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the

condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of

Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah

on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's

admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two

expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,

Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of

communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General

Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via

Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.

The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General

E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on

the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad

bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles

of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The

expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The

expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command

of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand

men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad

River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it

moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about

three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a

strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in

our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,

wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the

6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the

Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and

Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which

seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I

had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the

orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the

advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but

failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,

in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of

the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached the

Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.

On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,

on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight

transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,

and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats

becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to

prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and

a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in

storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and

crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,

moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of

the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached

Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and

was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch

the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general

engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from

Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas,

retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the

purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of

reinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by

General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works

repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every

instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven

hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three

thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general

officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two

thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy

met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.

During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This

left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily

abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought

together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his

line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee

River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was

ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's

command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this

reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in

position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from

the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his

artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it

appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased

upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the

Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and

give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the

necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to

superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I

received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,

and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted.

All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but

that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before

Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with

his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his

cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it

impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of

Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that

distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by

cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon

many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of

December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his

escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North

Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,

General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee

River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th

Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,

capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's

pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found

clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from

Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured

Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio

Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and

pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large

amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and

captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of

fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the

Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and

large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public

property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under

General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November

he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and

several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command,

retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to

near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.

Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated

the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station to

operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia

--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia

as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of

December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's

forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under

Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,

capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight

prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and

the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force

under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of

Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to

attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He

then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works

at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of

artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he

returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left

to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton

and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of

great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to

seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature

of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for

so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New

Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close

the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a

land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the

assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most

formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.

This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that

of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and

very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of

the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers

both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.

This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of

November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant

Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and

went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,

where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required

and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was

regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely

arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,

if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone

to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I

deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its

destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to

make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who

had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might

not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is

to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this,

the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable

grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of

the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in

Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of

the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where

they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object

of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land

between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to

the river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds

Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then

the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the

navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our

hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would

be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is

built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it

will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and

surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the

expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer

immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or

near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against

Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for

this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,

military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go

through him. They were so sent, but General Weitzel has since

officially informed me that he never received the foregoing

instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General

Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my

indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General

Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off

from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel

had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather

formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness

the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was

detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the

powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any

delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General

Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at

the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening

of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having

put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming

rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and

coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to

replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to

the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded on

the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from

Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern

newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of

the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a

reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards

the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this

reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions

given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the

expedition. The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the

27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them Brevet

Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis,

First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers,

First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George

Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when

recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could

have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the

Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me

that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction

that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural

supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition,

the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on

the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I

would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This

time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to

command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same

that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade,

numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. The

latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to

the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out

to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington

ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little

delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and

report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,

commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should

exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore,

that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part

to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may

be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid

down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you

can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I

would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own

responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm

position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which

you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the

practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself

against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open

to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort

Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or

another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a

portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it

operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut

it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession

of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in

readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be

drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.

When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as

you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to

Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.

You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to

Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be

brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard

from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet

brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition,

was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from

those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was

there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely

to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,

arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to

the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,

when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under

cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the

morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without

loss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred

yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and

turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from

the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the

work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of

the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was

captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by

the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important

successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten;

wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the 17th the

enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's

Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire

control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and

Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and

North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force

which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it,

I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's

surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other

movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops,

not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for

orders. On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was

assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General

Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This

direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps

reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to

Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the 26th he was directed to send General

A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General

Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its

destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department,

and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders

of Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:-- * * * Your movements are intended as co-operative

with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The

first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will

then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern,

or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',

you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place

with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind

you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give

General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second,

to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon,

therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or

New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior,

you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage

for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of

these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior

as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received

some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing

supplies for his army. You will learn what steps he has taken, and be

governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores

will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments

in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every

opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a

special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by

telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those

required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative

duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid

Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting

for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing.

The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to

you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already

fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be

looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to

the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be

supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already

been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a

day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,

accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself

the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry

and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army

entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the

Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to

re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture

of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the

rebellion--I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that

after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to

include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point

with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and

utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the

great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over

two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might

not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from

where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views

as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a

communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging

the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations

to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also

that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to

Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;

but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of

Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of

January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to

march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my

letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make

preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the

railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating

against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the

23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered

about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight

thousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington was

captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to

New Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points

would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his

movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run

out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came

into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce

Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral

Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. Fort

Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was

occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after

our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the

morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during

the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'

in two columns--one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern--and to

repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply

General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became

necessary. The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March,

at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred

prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched

position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the

night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied,

and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington

reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on

the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from

Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence

moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the

latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General

Schofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march

on Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a

severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this

engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater.

On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston,

attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it

back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance

ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front,

arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited

reinforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the

enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our

hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been

occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten

miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got

possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a

junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston,

South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th

of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to

send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee,

to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the

railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was

able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing

our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter,

however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no

doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could

collect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so

late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed

out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed

General Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of

last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.

This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the

enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy

being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt

a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the

following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile

and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty

thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent

to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry

already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.

Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave

it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by

the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large

portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the

Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days

since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South

Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not

true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and

leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable,

therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,

and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold:

first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure

success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications

and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces

brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the

points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so

important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion

should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,

according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the

objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what

number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five

thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It

is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one

leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do

not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as

I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from

me, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as

possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce

the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the

extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with

less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think

you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the

20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the

armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the

city, north of James River, should be cut off. The enemy having

withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it

south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce

Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers

to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah,

which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly

the latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as

follows:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no

difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From

there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as

to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be

left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information

you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the

streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and join

General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from

East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry,

one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from

Eastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay,

with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter

pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large

army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted

to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to

overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated

on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where

Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as

to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,

North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition

he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have

to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I

think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has

passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on

his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be

guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before

you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from

Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one

or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from

his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two

divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st of

March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,

across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered

Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thence

he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an

intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a

reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,

and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses

and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with

subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners,

under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.

Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the

railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here

he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and

Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south

forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. This

necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.

On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent

one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New

Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.

From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to

obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,

but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned

the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved

down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst

Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,

uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his

pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the

bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South

Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,

the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base

at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market

he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,

destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever

practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the

whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent

through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a

request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the

night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get

possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from

Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,

he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and

many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the

Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the

railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and

fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as

required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about

all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you

in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North

Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets

into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be

caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an

adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General

Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry

expeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson

against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East

Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and

assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to

commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's

cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were

confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and

Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of

General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making

preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith

and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was

concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard

against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it

was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the

greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would

leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of

uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or

I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March,

General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at

Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in

front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent

forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement

of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond

will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy

out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success

of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same

time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville

railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first

in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest

where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving

towards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under

General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the

Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the

Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.

General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions

which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army

of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military

Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of

service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the

defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of

all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,

subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the

Potomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present

line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If,

however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the

left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held

by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to the

left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest

notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or

so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the

present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further

orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will

follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored

division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel

will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army

of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the

night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum

number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main

army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be

started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,

under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about

Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and

therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They

should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared

from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses

the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should

Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be

instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads

between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon

being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to

destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south

of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in

haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as

possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'

supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his

commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at

the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of

ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the

transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of

other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to

operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken

with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at

the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation

may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should be

massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an

unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready

and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,

without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole

of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the

balance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have

rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General

Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all

practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success

north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An

attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has

detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the

enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence

of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north

of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after

a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against

Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only

chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of

advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the

moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon

commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur

without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out

to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive

evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly

enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the

enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding

officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move

promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin

the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of

their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of

following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front

of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our

left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and

left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort

against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the

reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy

loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.

Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,

and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the

other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.

Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched

picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and

thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this

line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two

killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven

missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about

Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them

perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated

that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the

10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should

become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in

co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.

General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,

by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or

thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville

Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies

operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was

directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions

in the meantime. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to

commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely

successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the

Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further

supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and

Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report

that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced

that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to

leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive

campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By

moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and

would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the

concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy

to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore

determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the

24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the

25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie's

cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing

instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run

on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were

given to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.

to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about

three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the

right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.

Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being

confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest

roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or

through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you

can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched

position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and

attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your

entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army

will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the

field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not

do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched

line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find it

practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between

Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not

advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which

I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make

your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then

pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in

like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which

are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this

army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North

Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course,

get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send

orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry

was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended

to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.

The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan,

Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture

of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore

addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having

previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid

contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.

We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road

to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After

getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the

enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker

Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing

about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing

on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before

going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the

enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you

can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry

may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one

army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The

signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a

cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,

taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."