On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his

orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to

hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sent

Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient

officer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,

and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and

capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informed

him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into

Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.

This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march,

the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving

there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I had

some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the

reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been

ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do

something. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his

movements. I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a

detachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to New

Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put

him in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Department

to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in

that quarter, I said to Canby: "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *

informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps

and material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed that

none be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you

that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain

the force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of

repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,

where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to be

co-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I

wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the

country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.

Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to

Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and

everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this,

take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone

you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior

can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any

service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troops

and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;

but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be

the case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being

done to raise troops in the South. Lee dispatched against Sherman the

troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including

those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,

amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured,

to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville what

remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly

as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally,

General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South

though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr.

Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South

Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but before

sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to

see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after

being on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soon

returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New

Bern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite

at Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the

mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the

Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column took their pontoon

bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of

the city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side to

co-operate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of

February. I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case

he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching

North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was

liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. I

also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now

that we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of the

North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had

been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there

without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to

move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his force

by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed in lieu of this

movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push

him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.

Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I

had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his

being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, and

directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on the

12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of South

Carolina, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to send

the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads east

of that. I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with

a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward

Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's

march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th

of February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair and

corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. There was constant

skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this

did not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost

in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south

of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the

destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable river

had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small

garrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay,

however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hampton

left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions

of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the

part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the

Confederates. One thing is certain: as soon as our troops took

possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best

of their ability with the limited means at hand. In any case, the

example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg,

Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of

the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible

for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took

possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National

forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the

protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to the

overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any

conditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, co-operated

with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people

who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he

left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be

distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement

could be made for their future supplies. He remained in Columbia until

the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be

useful to the enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia, Sherman learned

for the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting

him, under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisoned

the place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw

farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy

people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable

property to these two points to be stored. Among the goods sent there

were valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.

I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.

There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,

small-arms and fixed ammunition. These, of course were among the

articles destroyed. While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston's

restoration to command. The latter was given, as already stated, all

troops in North and South Carolina. After the completion of the

destruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his

march and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and without

incident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed

on the way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on

the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straight

for Fayetteville. Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.

Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March. He had dispatched

scouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking

him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other

articles which he enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, and

a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had

asked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those

stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro.

The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was

approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open

to the enemy. Besides, he was confronting all that he had had to

confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the

garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army. Frantic

appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the

ranks of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all

over 35,000 or 40,000 men. The people had grown tired of the war, and

desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the

voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston's

troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and

21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning

of the 22d. Sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed,

wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops at

last reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac;

and there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was

there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting him; but

with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. He

had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I was

holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and

gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements he

now had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold the

Confederates at bay for an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore

with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. He had a

railroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly

protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and

deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee

should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson together

would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. With

the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have

amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina. Johnston's

army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an

offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on

duty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like their

brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave

that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and

dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.

CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS

--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS

THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE

--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called

Confederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg,

and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point. They

proved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy,

Judge Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly

United States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at once

conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which was

very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. I at once

communicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary of

War and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and that

their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the United States

and, as they termed it, the Confederate Government. I was instructed to

retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom he

would designate, should come to meet them. They remained several days

as guests on board the boat. I saw them quite frequently, though I have

no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the

subject of their mission. It was something I had nothing to do with,

and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. For

my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that

they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT. There had been too great

a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. As long

as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and I found

them all very agreeable gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnish

them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort

in every way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restriction

was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they

would not abuse the privileges extended to them. They were permitted to

leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank

and visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them

well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a

particular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always supposed that he was a

very small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very

much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. When he got

down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen

overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South during

the rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had

ever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to his feet,

and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an

average-sized man. He took this off when he reached the cabin of the

boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and

out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch from

Washington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to

meet the President and a member of the cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met them

there and had an interview of short duration. It was not a great while

after they met that the President visited me at City Point. He spoke of

his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there

would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would

recognize, first: that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved,

and second: that slavery must be abolished. If they were willing to

concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations

and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his

signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were

willing to live with us in the Union and be one people. He always

showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I

never heard him abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said about

President Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the

heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition

and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to get

away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. It was on the

occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace

commissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little conversation, he asked

me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's. I replied that I had.

"Well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" I said yes. "Well,"

said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear

that ever you did see?" Long afterwards I told this story to the

Confederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.

He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens laughed

immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners,

passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little

incidents. On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting

Washington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration,

the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left

and then going to the south, got in east of us. Before their presence

was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were

grazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they were

sufficiently needed by the Confederates. It was only retaliating for

what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of

supplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten.

As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five

thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River near

Port Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in

the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion

was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of

the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at

the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I

would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing

was left but a picket line. He had his railroad by the way of Danville

south, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores

and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for

his immediate defence. I knew he could move much more lightly and more

rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind

so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the

war might be prolonged another year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was

possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were.

There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much sooner

than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called

Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course,

have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army. When it

was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once

began to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were taking

place, not only among those who were with General Lee in the

neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy. I

remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to

this, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find great

difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though I

am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave."

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man

between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a

law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen,

calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be

called the senior reserves. The latter were to hold the necessary

points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.

General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they

were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I

afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they

were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire

army, by desertions alone. Then by casualties of war, sickness, and

other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. It was a mere

question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while

that rate of depletion was going on. Of course long before their army

would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field

would have been able to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the great

number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so

gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as

earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they

were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. Many of them were

making application to be sent North where they might get employment

until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time

to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly

believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which

detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy

rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It was

necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move

the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army

operating in the enemy's country. The other consideration was that

General Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was

operating on the north side of the James River, having come down from

the Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me,

and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the

James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early between

Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his

entire command. Early and some of his officers escaped by finding

refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come to

White House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains

had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. He

had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across

some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have

to get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot

there open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon it because the

James River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two

divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merritt

was acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very light, carrying

only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee,

salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.

They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad

back toward Lynchburg. He also sent a division along the James River

Canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. All mills and factories along the

lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march

to White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined therefore to

fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to

Richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. He did this,

destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as

near Richmond as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes

had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they

assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the

canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started,

because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He had captured most

of Early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. When he

reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. He resisted

their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South

and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time

he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to be

got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would

probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he

would pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from

where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the

earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come

up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as

the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down

somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting,

until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join

me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were

necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However,

having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to

make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was

aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join

with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the

1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops around

Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should

not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was

undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General

Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and

Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them,

and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, were

waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it

possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening

to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than he

would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an

assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg. The night of the

24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon was

assigned to the execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedman

and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected

as the point of his attack. The attack was to be made at night, and the

troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where

they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left,

create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my

lines. Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an

opportunity of escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution of

it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our

line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at

which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our

picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our

main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to

charge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before the

deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their

arms with them, and this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantage

of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through

to ours as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once took

possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the main

line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. This plan

was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the

troops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the north

side of the James River and, by some accident on the railroad on their

way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to

be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy

passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Then

turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery,

with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they also

carried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turned

toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his

line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. Parke,

however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place,

telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that the

general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable

promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. General

Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them

in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground

between the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with his

division, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breach

headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into

Fort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into the

intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve

were retaken by Willcox early in the morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and

batteries, and communication was once more established. The artillery

fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the

Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to

join them. They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. This

effort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their

killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our

troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line,

which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but a short

distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days

later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of

March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.

Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to

move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the

James River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.

He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda

Hundred and the north of the James River. The engineer brigade was to

be left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg.

(*42)

Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our

extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on the

arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to

cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object

being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side

Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad. There was considerable

fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in

which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the

losses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.

CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE AND

WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His horses, of

course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days of

rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod

and put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's

arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which I

had decided upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of the

month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out of

my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself

--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. In

preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is

to say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and

Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.

But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the

prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate

except by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire

success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in

these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the

Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the

country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it,

across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that

road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these

combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already

had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg

and Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat

disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from

the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies

of the enemy. I said to him: "General, this portion of your

instructions I have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason

for doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter of

fact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and

that he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and

slapping his hand on his leg he said: "I am glad to hear it, and we can

do it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks until

he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, and

when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south,

Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at

Dabney's Mills. He met some of my staff officers outside, and was

highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he

believed this would prove the final and successful effort. Although my

chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position

about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan

to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them.

Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not

been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had

what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him.

I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was

imbued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value that

feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a

movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen

after I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders were

given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a few

days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving

indications that the time had come when we could move. On that date I

moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to

hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again however,

and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for

teams, and almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be

standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would

sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would

sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so

common in that part of Virginia and other southern States. It became

necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we

advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed

to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done

very rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress

to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry

over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading

north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the

west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or Five

Forks. The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches

was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were

themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left

when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and

thrown into line between him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the

enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to

protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be

successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make

this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached

me of Sheridan's success. He was to move under cover as close to the

enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to

get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as

soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. These roads

were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond

and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of

retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend

them. He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce

Five Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two or

three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in

readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call. He

came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right

flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th,

and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He had only his

cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a

very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until in

the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops

besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and

stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly,

and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to him

that it was impossible to send Wright's corps because that corps was

already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault

when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but

the 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left

and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank

of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the

31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with

Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in

moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next

morning. When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on

arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent

rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knew

of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as

possible, sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or at

least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now felt that he

could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed

to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their

rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move

forward without him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's corps

reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time

separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly

under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole

of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the

afternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a

severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the

fighting. This did not continue long, however; the division was brought

back and with Ayres's division did most excellent service during the

day. Crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther

off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was

late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.

Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in

advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon

Five Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have

it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be

untenable for him in bivouac during the night. Unless the assault was

made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie

Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get

Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff

officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general

to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events

Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he went

himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to

the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the

assault successfully made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in the

battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time,

that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail

Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick

perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer,

under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had before

discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very

prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before

us. He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.

He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might

occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do

while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention to

these defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, now

was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand

in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not

to hesitate. It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed

Warren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still

more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another

field of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the

enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such

manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the

surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every

direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms

in large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were

pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under

Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridan

halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the

enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps

across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing them

toward it. Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of

Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of

April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four

o'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the 2d corps, General

Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to

hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken

from weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in fact

I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because

he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to

relieve his mind as much as I could. I notified Weitzel on the north

side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the

enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to

promptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of so

much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it,

risking everything upon the cast of a single die. It was for this

reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as

I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps

commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not

see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But we

kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line

including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to

move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed

the _abatis_ from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of

musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they

mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line.

Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very

considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the

outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of

Petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a

very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence

of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweeping

everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured

line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to

another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. As

you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther

from the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly

two miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of

artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they

had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning,

in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before

Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of

the enemy's intrenchments. The second corps soon followed; and the

outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,

never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher's

Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outside

of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I received

the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact to

all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and

those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City

Point. Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the

additional news to these points. Finding at length that they were all

in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.

When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright's

three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside by

General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground.

Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort.

Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James

River thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his

extreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and

directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff,

commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they

found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this

would separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg,

coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from the

Appomattox River below the city to the same river above. At eleven

o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two

brigades from City Point. With this additional force he completed his

captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as

to protect his flank. He also carried in and made an _abatis_ between

himself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery

against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with

very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to

Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort

Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by

assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by

Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by two

brigades from Ord's command. The battle was desperate and the National

troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and

immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns

of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding

officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In moving to

execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the

White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The enemy fell back to

Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles.

This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly

intrenched. Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him to

make the assault, which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got

through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed

command over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sent

an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg.

This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The

latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back

a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys

to send a division back to his relief. He went himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merritt

with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had

assembled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River.

Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side

from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a

large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the

remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan

followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.

Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had

carried so handsomely by assault. I cannot explain the situation here

better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:

BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours

will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river

above. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not

captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or

because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps

is above them. Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak

Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met

them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whether

Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another

division from here. The whole captures since the army started out

gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably

fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and guns

accurately however. * * * I think the President might come out and pay

us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the river

above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the

next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock;

but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.

CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG--THE

CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took

a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's

musketry which was flying thick and fast there. As we would

occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the

Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the

Confederate army. I did not have artillery brought up, because I was

sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately

in pursuit. At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery

upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture

them soon.

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came in

who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern

Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a

strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when

forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was

actually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond, and falling back

into this prepared work. This statement was made to General Meade and

myself when we were together. I had already given orders for the

movement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading

off Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he

thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against

Lee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have

been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams

like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as

those of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming together

as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up

in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or

possibility of reinforcement. It would only have been a question of

days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him

by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender

his army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your

antagonist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate

Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow

the Danville Road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that

road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee was

going that way we would follow him. My reply was that we did not want

to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he

would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that

time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the

Danville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still

found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward

and close him up. That we would then have all the advantage we could

possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if he

remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to

start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing that

Lee would be gone during the night. During the night I strengthened

Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during the

day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible

for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long.

Davis was at church when he received Lee's dispatch. The congregation

was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service.

The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of

the 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, his

object being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crush

Sherman before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of this I

notified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad

to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. He

replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I then

ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the

same road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same road, and

the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran

alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair

the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a 5 feet

gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge;

consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up

throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of

our cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days.

I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt a

strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might

not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many

disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. But

when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and

bidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr.

Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his

arrival. I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that

after the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen,

not even an animal in the streets. There was absolutely no one there,

except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. We

had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the

President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm

congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the

army which had accomplished it, was: "Do you know, general, that I have

had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do

something like this." Our movements having been successful up to this

point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all

my movements, and the objects I had in view. He remained for some days

near City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by

telegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at a

fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's army. I told him

that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish their

old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant

attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. The Western

armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the

territory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and

were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking

admittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be even

upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be

given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from

the section of country which those troops hailed from. It might lead to

disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East and

those of the West in some of their debates. Western members might be

throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the

rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much

in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the

Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them,

and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been

engaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before,

because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came

from so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years'

record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it had to fight

was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to

found a nation upon the territory of the United States. Its loss would

be the loss of the cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the

Confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. Everything else

would go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to

maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the

South in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between the

soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none

between the politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought of the

liability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse and

started on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started to

join the army, now a good many miles in advance. Up to this time I had

not received the report of the capture of Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from General

Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at

about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had

found the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utter

confusion. The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the

liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the

Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. The city

had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any

notice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to the very

hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee had

gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee's army,

there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. The

city was on fire. Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames,

which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by some

one connected with the retreating army. All authorities deny that it

was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were

leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it

was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their

enemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames,

and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, were cut

off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry

so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition,

clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along

up the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the

command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out. We

had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the

roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked

up the road so that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, our

cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the

orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever

they appeared. This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left

back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying

to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when

they did start they would be uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was far

ahead, was also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting them up

through the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were

so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a

victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to

running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. So the march

was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven them

north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to

cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from

Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at

Farmville. This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of

following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go

farther west, by the way of Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this and

directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could

reach Lee. He responded that he had already sent Crook's division to

get upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face

north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought

Crook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly for

Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on

the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced march

with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's corps across from the

road they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the

Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was

repairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph office,

they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations

from Danville. The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent a

special messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded from

there. In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had

reached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of

the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between

the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the

Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank. They picked up

a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance north

of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. The country

was very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers scattered a

great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others

never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville,

and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again ordered Meade up

with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a

little cavalry confronting Lee's entire army. Meade, always prompt in

obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was

himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. Humphreys moved at two,

and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have

said, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side Railroad. On

the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade was

making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee. We had now no other

objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the

thing up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about ten

miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I then

received from Sheridan the following dispatch:

"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on this

side of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on their

right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons.

We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be

thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at

Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last

night. General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person. They are out of

rations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad towards

Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point."

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to his

provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards

Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies

found the movement had already commenced. He attacked and drove away

their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and

burning 180 wagons. He also captured five pieces of artillery. The

Confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have

handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of

cavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharp

engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the

enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon,

but in advance of all his troops. The head of Humphreys's corps

followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the troops as

they came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick. He

extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the

left of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right. The cavalry by

this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the

left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the

enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that if time was

given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring to

wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him

by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I was

there myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, and

signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to his mother, and showed the

demoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the

information as here related of the movements of that day. I received a

second message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more

emphatically the importance of my presence. This was brought to me by a

scout in gray uniform. It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up

in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a precaution

taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this

tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. It

would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing

tobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received. I gave Ord

directions to continue his march to Burkesville and there intrench

himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all

the roads between there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of

cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's army. The

distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress

was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. However, we

got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some

little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted

in to where Sheridan was bivouacked. We talked over the situation for

some little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was

trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the

right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and

putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about

midnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the

enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow

the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee was

moving right then. Meade changed his orders at once. They were now

given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in the

morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the

railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out

still farther to the left.

CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH

GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west

from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, and

then trends north-westerly. Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream,

running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridge

and Jetersville. Near the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to

Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge. The railroad

runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and

from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. The roads

coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross the Appomattox River

there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and

Petersburg Railroad well to the left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all the

roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon, and

never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting

that might be going on in his rear. In this way he came very near

succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at

least part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our

army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them. There was

a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached. Our cavalry

charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in

order to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued, in which we

captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded.

There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in

these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,

notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy engagement took

place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into

action. Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the

enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every

advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. Our firing was

also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat

westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he

fired. The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded

as in captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in this

engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This engagement

was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat

and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked

upon the ground where the night had overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, I

ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to

the left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, and

ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the

right. The object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's,

next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously

and so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's direct

command until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward

between Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th he

sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to

destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he

prepared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn had

started Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel

Read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and

bring him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee's

column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was,

and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not

get through. Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. He

rode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found his

return cut off, and Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's

army. Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now

consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode

along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the

same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to charge.

This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but

inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire

number. Colonel Read fell mortally wounded, and then Washburn; and at

the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most

of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. The remainder

then surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the advance of

a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench;

so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a

strong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following.

Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the High

Bridge, and attempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but the

flames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corps

and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it

was being burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss,

and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmville

with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a position which was very

strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys was alone,

confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position.

He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was

not assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's Court

House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between

Griffin and the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry and Wright's

corps pushed on west of Farmville. When the cavalry reached Farmville

they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had

already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our

troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat,

although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did

not get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north side of

the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after

them. Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and a

portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry

forded the stream and drove them away. Wright built a foot-bridge for

his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the

roads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night. I had stopped

the night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then pretty

much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and Ord's

command was extended from that point towards Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army,

who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of the

prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got

across the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty

of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still

had a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently,

however. Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim

anything. He said further, that for every man that was killed after

this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little

better than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender

his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped

he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day.

Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south. Meade was

back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as before

stated. After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House,

Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at

Appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a

forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could

secure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact, together

with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the

idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the

surrender of his army. I therefore wrote to him on this day, as

follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of

further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this

struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from

myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of

you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known

as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL: I have received your note of this day. Though not

entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further

resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate

your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before

considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition

of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the U. S.

This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letter

and wrote him as follows:

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the

condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern

Virginia is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my

great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely:

that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking

up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly

exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any

officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to

you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the

surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had enlisted

from that part of the State where they now were, and were continually

dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know that I

occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had

probably been used as a Confederate hospital. The next morning when I

came out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and

said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel

of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said that

when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the

regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now

wanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay there and he would not

be molested. That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee's

force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with

alacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the end of what

they had been fighting four years for. Nothing seemed to fatigue them.

They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until

the end. Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival

for the front. The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry

could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of Appomattox

Station, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to get

west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They got there

the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men

had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running

off three of the trains. The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the

9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near.

The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of

the trains. However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping

to recover them. In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one

of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. Custer then ordered

the other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the fight

continued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged.

Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt

expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our infantry

had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they

found Griffin's corps and the Army of the James confronting them. A

sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag.

CHAPTER LXVII.

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE

TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE

SURRENDER.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee. I was

suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse

on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. I spent

the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting

mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be

cured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter

of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following

morning. (*43) But it was for a different purpose from that of

surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat on

the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day could

lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally

anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same

feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By

the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable

event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of

property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties

may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,

etc.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the

headache, to get to the head of the column. I was not more than two or

three miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct I

would have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it. I had

therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from

another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was in

this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and consequently could

not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee had

done. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and one

to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for

the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his

army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be

communicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting

had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders

hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. They

were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of Northern

Virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. They,

however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours

to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if

possible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would

probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back

within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel

lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message

through his lines to me.

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket-line

whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were

embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender

of this army. I now request an interview in accordance with the offer

contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT Commanding U. S. Armies.

When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick

headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured. I

wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received, in

consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to

the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four miles

west of Walker's Church and will push forward to the front for the

purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish

the interview to take place will meet me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troops

drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by. They

were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a

ruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away. They said they

believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee

was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now

were in five minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had no doubt

about the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he

was. I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court

House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my

arrival. The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of

which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it

from that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line

of battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I will

give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they

are believed to be true. The war of the rebellion was no exception to

this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions

based on a slight foundation of fact. As I have said, there was an apple

orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces.

Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point,

ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on

that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment.

General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met

General Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the

road below and his back resting against the tree. The story had no

other foundation than that. Like many other stories, it would be very

good if it was only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in the

Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and

rank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally remember

him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in

the Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the result

that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. I was

without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, and

wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank

to indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I found

General Lee. We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our

seats. I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room

during the whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man of much

dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he

felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the

result, and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they were

entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had

been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and

depressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall

of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much

for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for

which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least

excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of

those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and

was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which

had been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was an

entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in

the field. In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with

the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very

strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of

faultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of until

afterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He remarked that

he remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as a

matter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in

our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our

ages), I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his

attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long

interval. Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the

object of our meeting. After the conversation had run on in this style

for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our

meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose

of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I said that I

meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them

up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly

exchanged. He said that he had so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign

to the subject which had brought us together. This continued for some

little time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of the

conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army

ought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary on my

staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following

terms:

APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Comd'g C. S. A.

GEN: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th

inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the

following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made

in duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the

other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.

The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms

against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged,

and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men

of their commands. The arms, artillery and public property to be parked

and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive

them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their

private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be

allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States

authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force

where they may reside.

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Lt. Gen.

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that I

should make use of in writing the terms. I only knew what was in my

mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no

mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the

officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important

to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary

humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself,

either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. He

appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had

a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in

writing to make it. When he read over that part of the terms about side

arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with

some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his

army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to me

again that their army was organized a little differently from the army

of the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were two

countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned

their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who

so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. I told him

that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers

were permitted to take their private property. He then, after reading

over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle of

the war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I took it that most of

the men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been so

raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able

to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next

winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The United

States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the officers I

left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the

Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to

his home. Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the terms of

the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As

they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the

8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper

officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General. LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generals

present were severally presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back,

this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance.

The word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until I

wrote it in the terms. There was no premeditation, and it did not occur

to me until the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it,

and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in

the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers

retaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave,

remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and

that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some

days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for

rations and forage. I told him "certainly," and asked for how many men

he wanted rations. His answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and I

authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to

Appomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of

the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, we

had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to carry into

effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for their

homes--General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for

them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. Lee and I then

separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and

all went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA., April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on

terms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondence

will show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced

firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. I at once

sent word, however, to have it stopped. The Confederates were now our

prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting a

stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other useless

outlay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought I (*44) would like

to see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our lines

towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer

carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We had there

between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of

over half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the South

was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four

times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do

it as they could no longer resist us. He expressed it as his earnest

hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and

sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. I then

suggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacy

whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as

his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies I

had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. But Lee said,

that he could not do that without consulting the President first. I

knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of

what was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to

have a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines. They finally

asked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their

old army friends, and the permission was granted. They went over, had a

very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back

with them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to the

house of Mr. McLean. Here the officers of both armies came in great

numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been

friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same

flag. For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the

war had escaped their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in this

way I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,

for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by this

time been repaired.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH

--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT

LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac and the

James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the National

troops had greatly improved. There was no more straggling, no more rear

guards. The men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as

I have already stated, striving to get to the front. For the first time

in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when

they could return to their homes with their country saved. On the other

hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Their

despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the

battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantly

increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to

the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. I have already instanced

the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met

at Farmville. As a result of these and other influences, when Lee

finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and

men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. It was

probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes

made, North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men than

what the official figures show. As a matter of official record, and in

addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March

29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say nothing of

Lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of

desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight.

The same record shows the number of cannon, including those at

Appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of

troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between

the sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged

and belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in many

instances, into the same error. I have often heard gentlemen, who were

thoroughly loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South

had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with

their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve

four being colored slaves, non-combatants. I will add to their

argument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered

under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government. It was not

bound by any constitutional restrictions. The whole South was a

military camp. The occupation of the colored people was to furnish

supplies for the army. Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced

every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those

physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of

civil officers of State and intended National government. The old and

physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, the

non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the

field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. Children

from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not

much older when they began to hold the plough. The four million of

colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number

in the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the

soil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North,

and children attended school.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North. Towns and cities grew

during the war. Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to

increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field.

In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had been

set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion

had been successful. No rear had to be protected. All the troops in

service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground

threatened with invasion. The press of the South, like the people who

remained at home, were loyal to the Southern cause.