It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to

keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right

and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally

speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the

whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to

supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they

could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined

to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of

operation, and on the following day sent another division of his

cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but

Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so

important a command. On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements

for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:

CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is

being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field

in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the

field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow

him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once

started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession

of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field,

give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All

the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of

to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine

directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the

field, operating against Early, and sent me the following very

characteristic dispatch:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in

command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself

south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy

goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to

how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may

have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover,

if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of

"putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the

death" in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor

attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.

I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington," and

soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at

Washington on my way. I found General Hunter's army encamped there,

scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many

hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio

Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at

that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied that

he did not know. He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with

orders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to the

left that he had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and

at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to

push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the

Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but

all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that

way. I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that,

no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very

short time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39) I told him that

Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;

and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at

any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,

and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general

replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He

said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the

position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He

did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a

patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many

major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a

department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular

reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. I

told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come

to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the

troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he

arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union

people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the

Monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been

done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the

written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and

directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being

cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of

the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that

all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than

counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was

soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and

Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the

valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but

not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out

from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces

about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the

north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps,

part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry

were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the

13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number

of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard

fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything

like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present

themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in

command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and

was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and

himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an

effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was

no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no

more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements

being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had

made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to

the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven

hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having

contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one

division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent

the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near

Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take the

raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could

teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would

learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all

troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.

Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out

against him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I

would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and

that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real

danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi

Department. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the

Mississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked

to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in

case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw

him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that

there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,

and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the

field to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going too

fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the

night of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most

of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with

most of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up his

line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the

troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of

the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the

old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A division

was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,

while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River

to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his

supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew

that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road,

though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position,

and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to

connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge

Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops

were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and with

such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of

about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that

source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon

Railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he

made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very

heavy losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were

withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon

Railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after

desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of

artillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession

from the 18th of August to the close of the war.

CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE

SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE

WINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large

force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could

afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through

to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and

detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of

him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being

strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It

kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the Shenandoah

Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee

had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a

considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important that

Sheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information to

Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to

get the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.

The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy

and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of

Snicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making

his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however,

he was thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the

Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive

him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's

army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington

to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such

orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would

suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to

mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly

through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited

there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to

inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions

of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side

pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.

He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out

how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them." Before

starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had

brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his

views and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did not

take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his

stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not

have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions and

rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the

stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.

Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would

have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he

could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday.

"O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday." I told

him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;

and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. After

visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point

on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President

of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when

workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put

it in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to have

standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively but would

try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met

me again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he

might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further

information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have

the road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at the

crossing of Opequon Creek, and won a most decisive victory--one which

electrified the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his

bad generalship and made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's

division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and

about the time I arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but

two in their camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying

the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that point. Early here learned that

I had been with Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot,

started back as soon as he got the information. But his forces were

separated and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back

to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there,

behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanks

and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit.

The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.

Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The

houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with

Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally,

on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at

Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.

Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,

and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;

and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he could

not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to

come back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory

and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being

aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the other

commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of

his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to

have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and

have a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which had

met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the

presidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldly

in Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston. It was a

question whether the government would then have had the power to make

arrests and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive victory

was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in

Washington, and the President became very much frightened about him. He

was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General

Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an

officer of army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the

first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuing

him. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side

of Early and that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridan

was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from

Richmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that I

had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by

attacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with

the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on

Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's

Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautz

with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. They

got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise

the enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's

division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried

an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a

good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens

who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the

same way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with the

guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. Birney's troops

to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were

unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the

new line and extending it to the river. This brought us pretty close to

the enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines

maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.

Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved

upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the

command of the 18th corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops

about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight

additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works

which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All

their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy

loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant

officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties

during these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324

missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an

appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were

kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their

enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other

intrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from

going to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch the

enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an

advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the

main line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of

carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and

lost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed and

wounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again and

established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of

the enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very

considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the

productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies

the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again

entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be

sent where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion, and

ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I further

directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the

advanced position which we would hold with a small force. The troops

were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch

the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into

the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,

contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,

and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.

Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our

troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at

Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,

taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle

before him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his

cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was

pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns

and a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men.

His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th

of October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again

following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if

afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back

again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. But

this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and

when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted

him to do it was something entirely different. Halleck informed

Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a

base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he

should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to

telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and

canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself

ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the

enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those

thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.

If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here

all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your

offensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send

here more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th

leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some

twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning while at Front

Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch

from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter

to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,

arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up

the valley to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night

succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which

fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing

eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. The

right under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling

back to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand. The

cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and

held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright

having ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that

night. The following morning he started to join his command. He had

scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from

the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately

ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to

stop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care of

Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort

directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered

them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.

His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse

frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who

had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant

soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding

their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.

Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to

intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This

was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,

which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one

o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he

seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench

himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He

thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him

unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent his

cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The

contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,

and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to

rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give

way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our

cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,

captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been

lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in

the Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to

Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little

cavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,

and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lost

more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had

commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who

succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable

part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as

well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere

personal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could

write at the time he is said to have done so: "Any officer fit for duty

who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in

Congress, ought to be scalped." Having entered the army as a Major of

Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by

meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry

on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,

wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This was

followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was

repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent

out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new

works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the

South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The

attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not

getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the

impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,

and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of

the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the

Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, but

failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before

turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against

their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course

there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle

was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this

work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day

around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not

interest the general reader if given. All these details can be found by

the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,

Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the

War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the

command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to

Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be

designated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would give him a

large command to co-operate with in the spring. It was my expectation,

at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up

the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being

to make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, with

Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around

Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies

established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the

direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would then

have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,

making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was

assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THE

MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the

Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very

materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east

to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and

Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th

of September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relieved

Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the

initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed

with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted

very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as

he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.

As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,

if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in

detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of

the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not

destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the

enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of

defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and

General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their

loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston

is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this

particular. I had know the general before the war and strongly believed

it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the

purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said,

I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by

the whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to

enable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was already

growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this

difference. In the North the people governed, and could stop

hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a

military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to

back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what

extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the

soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the

people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.

He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly

digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut

them off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,

and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a

hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately

reached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course, that

caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with

Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-west

and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon

the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying

the road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and

Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon

would take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general

in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried

out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up

a garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of

capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,

something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.

Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the

Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops

for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not only

depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in

gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its

subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go

himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly

demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be

impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force

whatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered

to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's

prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or

else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which

Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took

advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation

possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to

break his communications. Something else had to be done: and to

Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning

upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that

something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be

made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We

want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we

give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now

that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it

will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,

whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in

this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or

Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give

up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you can

manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the

Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of

Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a

letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the

Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter

will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I

can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough

for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of

recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My

lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the

James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and

south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly

fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its

great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to

extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or

Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville

Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of

from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,

and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be

assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did

at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of

Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do

with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of

supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where

you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canby

would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command

on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these

forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to

Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed

in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.

Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new

base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so

much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans

matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be

the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be

executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I

will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's

troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a

division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in

the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction

from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Sherman

and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,

the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged

between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I

telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to

be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to

Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.

Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should

take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectation

at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his

supplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so

that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon the

country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile

had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had

been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the

then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of

frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move

against Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came into

command of the army, the last of March 1864. Having the power in my own

hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,

in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move

against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies

operating in the field. Before I came into command, these troops had

been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that

they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in

the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile

to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his

next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer

existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly

wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in

command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.

Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right

commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.

General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.

Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th

and 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.

Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right

wing. About this time they left to take part in the presidential

election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus

and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest

solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to

resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the

sea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did not

return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from

that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western

Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army

General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of

Atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel

commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army

corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army

of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested

battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in

that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,

that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which

he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive

which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to

supersede General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this

for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was

more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should

not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who

could have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences of

opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,

and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command,

however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under

him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand

effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those

remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had

sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any

European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the

machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting

for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were

two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand

men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of

Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.

Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military plan

was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have

done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised his

military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the

appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling

existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded

as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again very

badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw

after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defence

of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold

points between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; in

fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched

positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at

them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men

under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient

volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cut

off from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with great

vigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could

see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his

subordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but

the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be

so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse was

a man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman's

signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block

house at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through the

face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his

determination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this point

probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his

disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the North

would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to

operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy

the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the

latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was

necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road

until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small

rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to

return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move

light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on

the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for

the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving

south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.

I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.

On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely

to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose

from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.

To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered

Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to

report to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two

divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving

the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,

under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive

there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in

the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.

Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at

Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at

Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence. There were

already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,

and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other

departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,

for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted

cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this

time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements

here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether about

seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new

levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood

in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which

Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most frantic

appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by

sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of

the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to

cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But

it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying

supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped

that his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where

he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on

the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;

and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with

the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river

at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it

impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was

navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is

another shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved

down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and

remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and

ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,

because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with

small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had

long since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested to

Sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying

Hood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his

proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender

mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10th

of November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the

real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the

cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,

being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. The

left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than

those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened

Augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and

meet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military

purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to

superintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders

for this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all

sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,

well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.

His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried

with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations were

taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid

movement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to always

keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay

of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance

along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adopted

to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and

culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and

bend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one

side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails

and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. The

ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were

loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When a

sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be

set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,

that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that

they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to

increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of

the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it

around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of

Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a

sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs

and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would

bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last

bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain

place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigade

furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the

command to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued against

pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but

everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. The

supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,

and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same

as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely of

cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and

occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in

collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,

was marvellous. When they started out in the morning, they were always

on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being

mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use

of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return

again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;

indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the

romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,

and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of

the foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of

the fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it was

reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they

discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceeded

to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house,

who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,

saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other

parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.

The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens

again they were tempted and one of them replied: "The rebellion must be

suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and

proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,

prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who

took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.

Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. On

one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its

mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a

strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our

orders are to kill every bloodhound." "But this is not a bloodhound,"

said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if

we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would

seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging

considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any

supplies except such as the country afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right

wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards Savannah

destroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remained

over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,

etc., before resuming its march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now

fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all the

State officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away

even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to

fall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed to

Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the

command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.

Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to

even retard the progress of Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successful

invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college

and added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated the

State convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the

army. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed

to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other

Southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as

could be found in every community, North and South--who took advantage

of their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but little

danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him

as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were

starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without

object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection

of our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effect

upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons

particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.

Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I

could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would

comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion for

alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with him, such a

commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country.

He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started

out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get

to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could

return North. I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who

would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's

army, that Sherman was all right: "Grant says they are safe with such a

general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can

crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized a

legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the

legislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates were

exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at

that time, particularly the State of Georgia. They went so far as to

repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of

secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way of

Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where the

two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. The left wing

moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off

so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming

for. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that

direction. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of

surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but

they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles.

At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and

swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman.

Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him.

It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with

which to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising some

troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne,

had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention.

Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which

Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman

was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed the

following day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent

to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also trying to

raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a

force it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardee's whole

force probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but

very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. This

answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an

addition to the soldier's rations. No further resistance worthy of note

was met with, until within a few miles of Savannah. This place was

found to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on his

arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed

torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or

beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the

animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly

that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to

the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode

the torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then,

before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the

place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet,

which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts

of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort

McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he

might find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister was

soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.

Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture of

Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of

life. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by

crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a

steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails

for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of.

General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North

Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before he

had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining

what assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to his

own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman

siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of

clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be

found outside. The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had been

collected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, who

went in charge of it. On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff

(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating no

great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which had

been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special

Agent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockading

squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on

the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from

congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been

struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. The

enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching

against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve

or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington.

I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that

place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are

making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do

not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition

off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will

not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for

future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your

views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your

veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from

east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The

condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding

any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington

falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon

him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the

main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was

undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. It did not look so,

however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.

In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet

that Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news you

will learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is

likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the

coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with

me.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the

events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investment

and insure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah is

low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to

the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a

comparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must have

resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with the

chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete

investment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, he

summoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in command,

replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as

Sherman had described. He said he was in full communication with his

department and was receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the

west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south.

On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, through

which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee had

no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated

plank road starting from the west bank of the river. Sherman, receiving

this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General

Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose of

making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the

numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South

Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, and

thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if

not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the

plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his

staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before.

This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the place

Hardee had blown up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been destroyed,

as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he

left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton,

railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several

thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which

Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.

Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortly

after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing

up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.

It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until

he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new

occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his

vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march to

the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I

want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised

between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which

Sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he

necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of

success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad

back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as

he did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved,

although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even when

it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the

propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the

President, induced no doubt by his advisers. This went so far as to

move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two

until I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though I find

no record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish I

did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else

the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.

However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from

Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and to

him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardly

possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a

new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.

(*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to

me. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as

I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed

to the authorities at Washington to stop it.

CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River between

Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomas

sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades

of Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November

Hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby

turning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded

respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These, with his

cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all

arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, for

Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle

if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on

Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the

enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. As

soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to the

rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to

Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. From

this place Schofield then retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagons

in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect

them. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went

into camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill,

where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation,

though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. On

the morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the

same day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederate

generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them

was of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severity

until long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off.

General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, and

whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but

maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750

buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702

prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189

killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed

to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there.

He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which

the latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.

The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at

Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Thomas had

previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two

divisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's division

and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. His

quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized

and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.

Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general

supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost

without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so

that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops

enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was

unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so

that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy

strongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was very

bad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground

was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.

But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas

and manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I

apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was

afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off

if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate

and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City

Point(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, the

administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would

take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.

It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas

saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he

was making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas

that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He

replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing

him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to

proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not to

deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas

had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by

telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I

became restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as

Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas

announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of

his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was

successful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. General

Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and

telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union

troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next

day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men

in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,

leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on

the field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had

fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that

they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy

retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to

get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road,

but too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but a

few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's

cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which

they were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and

fighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven

in great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the

pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemy

already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a

chase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia,

where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as

all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days before

had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges.

Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or

otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to

Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward

Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in

building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of

course Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was

useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming

upon him again.

CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THE

EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of

Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was of

immense importance to the Confederates, because it formed their

principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in

from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce

at home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not

only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure

a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments,

particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening that

unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease

to recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the

concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition

against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will

mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall.

Two English blockade runners came in at night. Their commanders, not

supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet

and got into the river unobserved. They then signalled the fort,

announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had

been there before and who understood these signals. He informed General

Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as

he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious

that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even after

they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation

for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were

occupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels and

cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the

expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commanded

the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was

situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our

troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the

expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with

powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it

would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. Admiral

Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with

the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy was

therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I

had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;

but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities

at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. The

steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with

powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of

Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was

all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864). Very heavy storms

prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and

prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advance

arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been already

assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufort

for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully

prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who

had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself

out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to

replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost

before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as

near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by her

own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. There

the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time,

was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put

out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two

o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more

effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a

boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed when the

troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the

bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear

River. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavily

wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across this

peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea

coast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of 21 guns

and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. At that

time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light

battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men

with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula.

General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and General

Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced calling

for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The Governor

of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet

and shoot a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or three

hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five or

six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops

arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric

circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest

the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels

could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred

and fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by these

shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the

fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the

men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek

shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ames

effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. This

was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose,

and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. They

formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and

part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushed

forward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at

what was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel accompanied him to

within a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not

been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault.

Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves.

These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke's

division of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the rest

would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the

peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been a

man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet.

Curtis had got within a few yards of the works. Some of his men had

snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a

horse from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler informed Porter

of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his

purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.

Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more

ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would

keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty

yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some brave

fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken

the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's

brigade, and started back. In doing this, Butler made a fearful

mistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command

of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a

landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be

effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a

regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against

interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in

as soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to have

lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroe

on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Many

of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the

expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it.

After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather

were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect

himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complained

bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was

nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back

again to cooperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heard

this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.

I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment,

and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander,

with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received.

I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the

additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on

their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A.

H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and

the troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. The

object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a

secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to

whom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry had not

the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He

simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with

him, which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire

harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would

require the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived off

Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at

Fort Fisher until the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack about

as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time

five miles away. Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to

draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions.

This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and

fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident

signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and

at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the

fort with a respectable _abatis_ in front of his line. His artillery was

all landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ame's

division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less

than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other

way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day.

The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate

with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At day

light the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for the

assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the

assaulting column moved at 3.30. Porter landed a force of sailors and

marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames's

assault. They were under Commander Breese of the navy. These sailors

and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards

of the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assault

was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly

handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some

of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach

the fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon

reached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. The

other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who

commanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. But

the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work would

have been but very little protection to those inside except when they

were close up under it. Traverses had, therefore, been run until really

the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. The

rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven

from these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long after

night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10

o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement the

sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered

the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus

enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet

kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still

occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed where

to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the

opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on

Smith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full

supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. In addition to these,

there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110

killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was

killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off

Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promoted

all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous

gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been

confirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a

brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for

this victory.

CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO

MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,

distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Among

others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the

result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New

York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public

property that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned

over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his

own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.

I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)

with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the

general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which

contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in

co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march

northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally

of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North

Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except

such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a

move. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to

carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so

informed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to

prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to

collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north

through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for if

successful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had

thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had

completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of

it. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as

capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison

at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,

to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that

section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of

both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore at

once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the

wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman

would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions

than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the

sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the

enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their

previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now

become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate

army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to

save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start

with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part

of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,

commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the

sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of

Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,

in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward

progress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he

would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. This

letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I

happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of

January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate

with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by

giving my reply to this letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,

1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City

Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I

cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of

recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six

P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary

and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have

Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered

Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand)

will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly

as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps

numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this because

I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His

pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would

never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance

of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far

behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had

reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from

whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is

possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is

not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it

was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the

enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma

under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether

he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.

No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively

from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.

Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his

troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will

have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of

eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It is

rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am

inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy

were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th

Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be

sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two

points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation with

your movements. From either point, railroad communications can be run

out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of

those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.

Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is

not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about

two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication

with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will

watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to

evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a

halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to

your support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.

A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of

twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern

or Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return

with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for

you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the

sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the

news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result,

although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for

permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State

of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however,

as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and

his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,

commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,

and taking up all obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, so

that it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all

his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his

movement with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by

the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,

threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right

wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water. This

column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not

determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.

South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South

for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of

the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there

was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely

entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,

and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a

heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive results

that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from

condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out. To pass

into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the

city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so

situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have

held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.

Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final

march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;

Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or

neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be

determined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from

about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty

direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threaten

Charleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had

received before starting out on his march. We already had New Bern and

had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did

other points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now in

readiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed

Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to

move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of

destroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the 8th of February I ordered

Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as

the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or

about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as

soon as the roads would permit, saying: "As soon as it is possible to

travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg

with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad

and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the

rebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from East

Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;

one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile

Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter

pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large

army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will be wanted

to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to

overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated

on Tuesday last."