On the supposition that the people of the United States have learned the

lesson of the Lusitania, so far as an understanding of the issues at

stake in this gigantic war is concerned, can they also get from it any

guidance in regard to their own relation to the fateful struggle?

Apparently, not yet. With practical unanimity the American people will

henceforth heartily desire the success of the Allies, and the decisive

defeat of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. With practical unanimity

they will support whatever action the Administration at Washington shall

decide to take in the immediate emergency; but at present they do not

feel that they know whether they can best promote the defeat of the

Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey by remaining

neutral or by taking active part in the conflict. Unless a dismemberment

of Austria-Hungary is brought about by Italy and Rumania or some other

Balkan State entering the war on the side of the Allies, it now seems as

if neither party would acknowledge defeat until exhausted or brought to

a sudden moral collapse. Exhaustion in war can best be prevented by

maintaining in activity the domestic industries and general

productiveness of the nation involved in war and those of the neutral

nations which are in position to feed it, and manufacture for it

munitions, clothing, and the other supplies that war demands. While

remaining strictly neutral, North and South America can be of great

service to the Allies. To be sure, as a neutral the United States will

be obliged to give some aid to Germany and her allies, such, for

example, as harboring the interned commercial fleet of Germany; but this

aid will be comparatively insignificant. The services which the American

republics can thus render to the cause of liberty and civilization are

probably more considerable than any they could render by direct

contributions of military or naval force. Kept free from the drain of

war, the republics will be better able to supply food, clothing,

munitions, and money to the Allies both during the war and after the

conclusion of peace.

On the whole, the wisest thing the neutral nations can do, which are

remote from the theatres of war, and have no territorial advantages to

seek at the coming of peace, is probably to defend vigorously and with

the utmost sincerity and frankness all the existing rights of neutrals.

By acting thus in the present case they will promote national

righteousness and hinder national depravity, discourage, for the future,

domination by any single great power in any part of the world, and help

the cause of civilization by strengthening the just liberty and

independence of many nations--large and small, and of different

capacities and experiences--which may reasonably hope, if the Prussian

terror can be abolished, to live together in peaceful co-operation for

the common good.

Appeals for American Defense

Need of Further Protecting Neutral Rights Set Forth.

By GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.

_Formerly United States Attorney General._

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The destruction of the Lusitania by the Germans, and the wanton killing

of American men, women, and children, without warning, brings sharply

before the American people the question of how long the present sexless

policy of the conduct of our affairs is to be continued. Germany has

apparently decided to run amuck with civilization. It is now for the

American people to decide whether this nation has any virility left, or

if it is content to sink to the level of China.

A very clear course, it seems to me, is open for us to pursue: We should

cancel all diplomatic relations with a country which has declared war

upon civilization, recall our Ambassador from Berlin, and hand Count

Bernstorff his passports. Congress should be summoned in extra session,

and an appropriation of at least $250,000,000 asked to put us in a

condition to protect our rights as a neutral civilized power. At the

same time we should invite all neutral nations of the world to join us

in a council of civilization to agree upon the steps to be taken to

protect the interests of all neutral powers and their citizens from such

wanton acts of destruction of life and property as those which Germany

has been committing and which have culminated in the destruction of the

Lusitania and of so many of her passengers.

Until now the National Administration has been proceeding not only on

the basis of "safety first," but of safety first, last, and all the

time. The time has arrived when we must remember the truth of what

Lowell so well expressed, that

'Tis man's perdition to be safe, when for the truth he ought

to die.

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.

BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE.

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 11, 1915.]

_The army, navy, and coast defenses of the United States are declared to

be inadequate in an open letter signed by Joseph H. Choate, Alton B.

Parker, Henry L. Stimson, and S. Stanwood Menken, which was given out

yesterday in support of the plans of the National Security League. This

organization, which maintains offices at 31 Pine Street, has embarked on

a national campaign for better war defenses, and its appeal for members

and supporters is expressed by the catch-phrase, "a first defense army

of 1,000,000 workers."_

_The letter of Messrs. Choate, Parker, Stimson, and Menken contains most

of the arguments put forth by the league in asking public support and

enrollment. Its text follows:_

Careful investigation by our committees who have looked into the

question of national defense brings to light the following conditions of

affairs:

According to official Government reports, there are barely 30,000 mobile

troops in continental United States. These are distributed among

fifty-two widely scattered posts, which would make it impossible to

mobilize quickly at any given point. Even this small force is short of

officers, ammunition, and equipment. Furthermore, it has no organized

reserve.

Our National Guard, with negligible exceptions, is far below its paper

strength in men, equipment, and efficiency.

Our coast defenses are inadequate, our fortifications insufficiently

manned and without adequate organized reserves.

Our navy is neither adequate nor prepared for war. This, our first line

of defense, is inadequately manned, short of ammunition, and has no

organized reserve of trained men. Our submarine flotilla exists chiefly

upon paper. Fast scout cruisers, battle cruisers, aeroplanes, mine

layers, supply ships, and transports are lacking. Target practice has

been neglected or altogether omitted.

In view of this condition of affairs, and since there is no assurance

that the United States will not again become involved in war, "and since

a peaceful policy even when supported by treaties, is not a sufficient

guarantee against war, of which the subjugation of Belgium and the

present coercion of China by a foreign power are noteworthy examples;

and the United States cannot safely intrust the maintenance of its

institutions and nationality to the mere negations of peace, and since

we are not adequately prepared to maintain our national policies, and

since the present defenseless condition of the nation is due to the

failure of Congress not only to follow the carefully considered plans of

our naval and military advisers, but also to provide any reasonable

measure for gradually putting such plans into practice, it is manifest

that until a workable plan for a world alliance has been evolved and

agreed to by the principal nations, with proper guarantee of good faith,

the United States must undertake adequate military preparations for its

defense."

In the meantime the National Security League feels impelled to call

public attention to our deplorable condition of unpreparedness. At the

same time the league issues an appeal for public support in behalf of

the following program for better national defense:

1. Legislation correcting present wasteful methods of military

appropriations and disbursement.

2. Adoption of a definite military policy.

3. A stronger, better balanced navy.

4. An effective mobile army.

5. Larger and better equipped National Guard.

6. The creation of an organized reserve for each branch of our military

service.

All those interested in the work of the league are invited to send their

names and contributions to the National Security League, 31 Pine

Street, New York City.

[The letter is addressed to "present and former members of the Cabinet,

to members of Congress, to Governors of our States and Territories, to

Mayors of all American cities, to Chambers of Commerce and Boards of

Trade, to merchants' associations, to colleges and universities, to

university clubs and alumni associations, to all patriotic

organizations, to all women's clubs, and to all American citizens."

"Until a satisfactory plan of disarmament has been worked out and agreed

upon by the nations of the world," says a statement, "the United States

must be adequately prepared to defend itself against invasion. A

military equipment sufficient for this purpose can be had without

recourse to militarism. The league was formed as a preparation not for

war, but against war."]

BY THE NAVY LEAGUE.

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 12, 1915.]

The Navy League of the United States, of which General Horace Porter is

President and which includes in its membership Herbert L. Satterlee,

George von L. Meyer, Beekman Winthrop, J. Pierpont Morgan, Governor

Emmet O'Neal of Alabama, Senator James D. Phelan of California, Cardinal

Gibbons, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Edward T. Stotesbury, Benjamin

Ide Wheeler, Joseph H. Choate, George B. Cortelyou, C. Oliver Iselin,

Seth Low, Myron T. Herrick, Alton B. Parker, and scores of other men

prominent in the public and business life of the country, through its

Executive Committee adopted a resolution yesterday calling upon

President Wilson to call Congress in extra session to authorize a bond

issue of $500,000,000, which sum, it is stated, is "needed to provide

this country with adequate means of naval defense."

[Illustration: RAYMOND POINCARÉ

President of the French Republic Since Feb. 18, 1913

_(Photo from P.S. Rogers.)_]

[Illustration: THE RIGHT HON. H.H. ASQUITH

Prime Minister of Great Britain and Ireland

_(Photo from Brown Bros.)_]

The resolution, which was adopted at a session at which members of the

Executive Committee consulted by long-distance telephone, some of them

being in Washington and others in New York at the Union League Club,

read:

"In view of the crisis in our foreign relations, we, as

representatives of the Navy League of the United States, express our

emphatic belief that Congress should be immediately assembled and that

measures should be taken at once to strengthen our national defense. Our

most pacific country should, because of its supreme love of peace,

possess preponderant naval strength and adequate military strength. A

large bond issue of, if necessary, $500,000,000 should be authorized at

once. These bonds would be rapidly absorbed by the American people for

such a purpose. Equipped with a mighty fleet, American life and

American rights would be scrupulously respected by all belligerents. In

such case there would be no thought of our entering into war.

"GENERAL HORACE PORTER,

President;

"ROBERT M. THOMPSON,

Chairman Executive Committee;

"CHARLES A. FOWLER,

"PERRY BELMONT,

"JOHN C. O'LAUGHLIN,

"FRANK J. SYMES."

The Drowned Sailor

By MAURICE HEWLETT.

[From "Sing Songs of the War."]

Last night I saw my true love stand

All shadowy by my bed.

He had my locket in his hand;

I knew that he was dead.

"Sweetheart, why stand you there so fast,

Why stand you there so grave?"

"I think," said he, "this hour's the last

That you and I can have.

"You gave me this from your fair breast,

It's never left me yet;

And now it dares not seek the nest

Because it is so wet.

"The cold gray sea has covered it,

Deep in the sand it lies;

While over me the long weeds flit

And veil my staring eyes.

"And there are German sailors laid

Beside me in the deep;

We have no need of gun nor blade,

United in our sleep."

"Dear heart, dear heart, come to my bed,

My arms are warm and sweet!"

"Alack for you, my love," he said,

"My limbs would wet the sheet.

"Cold is the bed that I lie on

And deep beneath the swell;

No voice is left to make my moan

And bid my love farewell."

Now I am widow that was wife--

Would God that they could prove

What law should rule, without the strife

That's robbed me of my love!

War With Poisonous Gases

The Gap at Ypres Made by German Chlorine Vapor Bombs

Reports by the Official "Eyewitness"

and

Dr. J.S. Haldane, F.R.S.

_Dr. John Scott Haldane, F.R.S., who has conducted the investigation for

the British War Office, is a brother of Lord Haldane. He is a graduate

in medicine of Edinburgh University and an M.A. of Oxford and an LL.D.

of Birmingham. For many years he has been engaged in scientific

investigation, and has contributed largely to the elucidation of the

causes of death in colliery and mine explosions He is the author of a

work on the physiology of respiration and air analysis._

_Professor Baker, F.R.S., who is carrying out chemical investigations

into the nature of the gases, is Professor of Chemistry in the Imperial

College of Science and Technology, London. He was a Scholar in Natural

Science at Balliol. He has conducted important experiments into the

nature of gases._

_Sir Wilmot Herringham, M.D. Oxon., is a physician to St. Bartholomew's

Hospital and Vice Chancellor of the London University._

_Lieutenant McNee, M.B., M. Ch. Glasgow, a Carnegie Research Fellow, is

assistant to the Professor of Pathology in Glasgow University and has

conducted many investigations of an important character in pathology and

chemical pathology._

General Headquarters,

British Expeditionary Force,

April 27, 1915.

To Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War.

My Lord: I have the honor to report that, as requested by you yesterday

morning, I proceeded to France to investigate the nature and effects of

the asphyxiating gas employed in the recent fighting by the German

troops. After reporting myself at General Headquarters I proceeded to

Bailleul with Sir Wilmot Herringham, Consulting Physician to the British

Force, and examined with him several men from Canadian battalions who

were at the No. 2 Casualty Clearing Station suffering from the effects

of the gas.

These men were lying struggling for breath and blue in the face. On

examining the blood with the spectroscope and by other means, I

ascertained that the blueness was not due to the presence of any

abnormal pigment. There was nothing to account for the blueness

(cyanosis) and struggle for air but the one fact that they were

suffering from acute bronchitis, such as is caused by inhalation of an

irritant gas. Their statements were that when in the trenches they had

been overwhelmed by an irritant gas produced in front of the German

trenches and carried toward them by a gentle breeze.

One of them died shortly after our arrival. A post-mortem examination

was conducted in our presence by Lieutenant McNee, a pathologist by

profession, of Glasgow University. The examination showed that death was

due to acute bronchitis and its secondary effects. There was no doubt

that the bronchitis and accompanying slow asphyxiation were due to the

irritant gas.

Lieutenant McNee had also examined yesterday the body of a Canadian

Sergeant who had died in the clearing station from the effects of the

gas. In this case, also, very acute bronchitis and oedema of the lungs

caused death by asphyxiation.

A deposition by Captain Bertram, Eighth Canadian Battalion, was

carefully taken down by Lieutenant McNee. Captain Bertram was then in

the clearing station, suffering from the effects of the gas and from a

wound. From a support trench, about 600 yards from the German lines, he

had observed the gas. He saw, first of all, a white smoke arising from

the German trenches to a height of about three feet. Then in front of

the white smoke appeared a greenish cloud, which drifted along the

ground to our trenches, not rising more than about seven feet from the

ground when it reached our first trenches. Men in these trenches were

obliged to leave, and a number of them were killed by the effects of the

gas. We made a counter-attack about fifteen minutes after the gas came

over, and saw twenty-four men lying dead from the effects of the gas on

a small stretch of road leading from the advanced trenches to the

supports. He was himself much affected by the gas still present, and

felt as if he could not breathe.

The symptoms and the other facts so far ascertained point to the use by

the German troops of chlorine or bromine for purposes of asphyxiation.

There are also facts pointing to the use in German shells of other

irritant substances, though in some cases at least these agents are not

of the same brutally barbarous character as the gas used in the attack

on the Canadians. The effects are not those of any of the ordinary

products of combustion of explosives. On this point the symptoms

described left not the slightest doubt in my mind.

Professor H.B. Baker, F.R.S., who accompanied me, is making further

inquiries from the chemical side.

I am, my Lord, your obedient servant,

J.S. HALDANE.

_The following announcement was issued by the British War Office on

April 29, 1915:_

Thanks to the magnificent response already made to the appeal in the

press for respirators for the troops, the War Office is in a position to

announce that no further respirators need be made.

THE "EYEWITNESS" STORY.

_The following descriptive account was communicated by the British

Official Eyewitness present with General Headquarters, supplementing his

continuous narrative of the movements of the British force and the

French armies in immediate touch with it:_

April 27, 1915.

Since the last summary there has been a sudden development in the

situation on our front, and very heavy fighting has taken place to the

north and northeast of Ypres, which can be said to have assumed the

importance of a second battle for that town. With the aid of a method of

warfare up to now never employed by nations sufficiently civilized to

consider themselves bound by international agreements solemnly ratified

by themselves, and favored by the atmospheric conditions, the Germans

have put into effect an attack which they had evidently contemplated and

prepared for some time.

Before the battle began our line in this quarter ran from the

cross-roads at Broodseinde, east of Zonnebeke on the Ypres-Moorslede

Road to the cross-roads half a mile north of St. Julien, on the

Ypres-Poelcapelle Road, roughly following the crest of what is known as

the Grafenstafel Ridge. The French prolonged the line west of the

Ypres-Poelcapelle Road, whence their trenches ran around the north of

Langemarck to Steenstraate on the Yperlee Canal. The area covered by the

initial attack is that between the canal and the Ypres-Poelcapelle Road,

though it was afterward extended to the west of the canal and to the

east of the road.

An effort on the part of the Germans in this direction was not

unexpected, since movements of troops and transport behind their front

line had been detected for some days. Its peculiar and novel nature,

however, was a surprise which was largely responsible for the measure of

success achieved. Taking advantage of the fact that at this season of

the year the wind not infrequently blows from the north, they secretly

brought up apparatus for emitting asphyxiating vapor or gas, and

distributed it along the section of their front line opposite that of

our allies, west of Langemarck, which faced almost due north. Their plan

was to make a sudden onslaught southwestward, which, if successful,

might enable them to gain the crossings on the canal south of Bixschoote

and place them well behind the British left in a position to threaten

Ypres.

The attack was originally fixed for Tuesday, the 20th, but since all

chances of success depended on the action of the asphyxiating vapor it

was postponed, the weather being unfavorable. On Thursday, the 22d, the

wind blew steadily from the north, and that afternoon, all being ready,

the Germans put their plan into execution. Since then events have moved

so rapidly and the situation has moved so frequently that it is

difficult to give a consecutive and clear story of what happened, but

the following account represents as nearly as can be the general course

of events. The details of the gas apparatus employed by them are given

separately, as also those of the asphyxiating grenades, bombs, and

shells of which they have been throwing hundreds.

At some time between 4 and 5 P.M. the Germans started operations by

releasing gases with the result that a cloud of poisonous vapor rolled

swiftly before the wind from their trenches toward those of the French

west of Langemarck, held by a portion of the French Colonial Division.

Allowing sufficient time for the fumes to take full effect on the troops

facing them, the Germans charged forward over the practically

unresisting enemy in their immediate front, and, penetrating through the

gap thus created, pressed on silently and swiftly to the south and west.

By their sudden irruption they were able to overrun and surprise a large

proportion of the French troops billeted behind the front line in this

area and to bring some of the French guns as well as our own under a hot

rifle fire at close range.

The first intimation that all was not well to the north was conveyed to

our troops holding the left of the British line between 5 and 6 P.M. by

the withdrawal of some of the French Colonials and the sight of the wall

of vapor following them. Our flank being thus exposed the troops were

ordered to retire on St. Julien, with their left parallel to but to the

west of the highroad. The splendid resistance of these troops, who saved

the situation, has already been mentioned by the Commander in Chief.

Meanwhile, apparently waiting till their infantry had penetrated well

behind the Allies' line, the Germans had opened a hot artillery fire

upon the various tactical points to the north of Ypres, the bombardment

being carried out with ordinary high-explosive shell and shrapnel of

various calibres and also with projectiles containing asphyxiating gas.

About this period our men in reserve near Ypres, seeing the shells

bursting, had gathered in groups, discussing the situation and

questioning some scattered bodies of Turcos who had appeared; suddenly a

staff officer rode up shouting "Stand to your arms," and in a few

minutes the troops had fallen in and were marching northward to the

scene of the fight.

Nothing more impressive can be imagined than the sight of our men

falling in quietly in perfect order on their alarm posts amid the scene

of wild confusion caused by the panic-stricken refugees who swarmed

along the roads.

In the meantime, to the north and northeast of the town, a confused

fight was taking place, which gave proof not only of great gallantry and

steadiness on the part of the troops referred to above, but of

remarkable presence of mind on the part of their leaders. Behind the

wall of vapor, which had swept across fields, through woods, and over

hedgerows, came the German firing line, the men's mouths and noses, it

is stated, protected by pads soaked in a solution of bicarbonate of

soda. Closely following them again came the supports. These troops,

hurrying forward with their formation somewhat broken up by the

obstacles encountered in their path, looked like a huge mob bearing down

upon the town. A battery of 4.7-inch guns a little beyond the left of

our line was surprised and overwhelmed by them in a moment. Further to

the rear and in a more easterly direction were several field batteries,

and before they could come into action the Germans were within a few

hundred yards. Not a gun, however, was lost.

One battery, taken in flank, swung around, fired on the enemy at

point-blank range, and checked the rush. Another opened fire with the

guns pointing in almost opposite directions, the enemy being on three

sides of them. It was under the very heavy cannonade opened about this

time by the Germans, and threatened by the advance of vastly superior

numbers, that our infantry on our left steadily, and without any sign of

confusion, slowly retired to St. Julien, fighting every step.

Help was not long in arriving, for some of our reserves near Ypres had

stood to arms as soon as they were aware of the fact that the French

line had been forced, and the officers on their own initiative, without

waiting for orders, led them forward to meet the advancing enemy, who,

by this time, were barely two miles from the town. These battalions

attacked the Germans with the bayonet, and then ensued a mêlée, in which

our men more than held their own, both sides losing very heavily.

One German battalion seems to have been especially severely handled, the

Colonel being captured among several other prisoners. Other

reinforcements were thrown in as they came up, and, when night fell, the

fighting continued by moonlight, our troops driving back the enemy by

repeated bayonet charges, in the course of which our heavy guns were

recaptured.

By then the situation was somewhat restored in the area immediately

north of Ypres. Further to the west, however, the enemy had forced their

way over the canal, occupying Steenstraate and the crossing at Het

Sast, about three-quarters of a mile south of the former place, and had

established themselves at various points on the west bank. All night

long the shelling continued, and about 1:30 A.M. two heavy attacks were

made on our line in the neighborhood of Broodseinde, east of Zonnebeke.

These were both repulsed. The bombardment of Ypres itself and its

neighborhood had by now redoubled in intensity and a part of the town

was in flames.

In the early morning of Friday, the 23d, we delivered a strong

counter-attack northward in co-operation with the French. Our advance

progressed for some little distance, reaching the edge of the wood about

half a mile west of St. Julien and penetrating it. Here our men got into

the Germans with the bayonet, and the latter suffered heavily. The

losses were also severe on our side, for the advance had to be carried

out across the open. But in spite of this nothing could exceed the dash

with which it was conducted. One man--and his case is typical of the

spirit shown by the troops--who had had his rifle smashed by a bullet,

continued to fight with an intrenching tool. Even many of the wounded

made their way out of the fight with some article of German equipment as

a memento.

About 11 A.M., not being able to progress further, our troops dug

themselves in, the line then running from St. Julien practically due

west for about a mile, whence it curved southwestward before turning

north to the canal near Boesinghe. Broadly speaking, on the section of

the front then occupied by us the result of the operations had been to

remove to some extent the wedge which the Germans had driven into the

allied line, and the immediate danger was over. During the afternoon our

counter-attack made further progress south of Pilkem, thus straightening

the line still more. Along the canal the fighting raged fiercely, our

allies making some progress here and there. During the night, however,

the Germans captured Lizerne, a village on the main road from Ypres to

Steenstraate.

When the morning of the 24th came the situation remained much the same,

but the enemy, who had thrown several bridges across the canal,

continued to gain ground to the west. On our front the Germans, under

cover of their gas, made a further attack between 3 and 4 A.M. to the

east of St. Julien and forced back a portion of our line. Nothing else

in particular occurred until about mid-day, when large bodies of the

enemy were seen advancing down the Ypres-Poelcapelle road toward St.

Julien. Soon after a very strong attack developed against that village

and the section of the line east of it. Under the pressure of these

fresh masses our troops were compelled to fall back, contesting every

inch of ground and making repeated counter-attacks; but until late at

night a gallant handful, some 200 to 300 strong, held out in St. Julien.

During the night the line was re-established north of the hamlet of

Fortuin, about 700 yards further to the rear. All this time the fighting

along the canal continued, the enemy forcing their way across near

Boesinghe, and holding Het Sast, Steenstraate, and Lizerne strongly. The

French counter-attacked in the afternoon, captured fifty prisoners, and

made some further progress toward Pilkem. The Germans, however, were

still holding the west bank firmly, although the Belgian artillery had

broken the bridge behind them at Steenstraate.

On the morning of Sunday, the fourth day of the battle, we made a strong

counter-attack on St. Julien, which gained some ground but was checked

in front of the village. To the west of it we reached a point a few

hundred yards south of the wood which had been the objective on the 23d

and which we had had to relinquish subsequently. In the afternoon the

Germans made repeated assaults in great strength on our line near

Broodseinde. These were backed up by a tremendous artillery bombardment

and the throwing of asphyxiating bombs; but all were beaten off with

great slaughter to the enemy, and forty-five prisoners fell into our

hands. When night came the situation remained unchanged.

This determined offensive on the part of the enemy, although it has

menaced Ypres itself, has not so far the appearance of a great effort to

break through the line and capture the Channel ports, such as that made

in October. Its initial success was gained by the surprise rendered

possible by the use of a device which Germany pledged herself not to

employ. The only result upon our troops has been to fill them with an

even greater determination to punish the enemy and to make him pay

tenfold for every act of "frightfulness" he has perpetrated.

Along the rest of the British front nothing of special importance has

occurred.

WHAT THE GERMANS SAY.

_The comments of the German newspapers on the advance of the imperial

army north of Ypres readily admitted and justified the use of

asphyxiating gases. The leading Prussian military organ, the Kreuz

Zeitung, said:_

The moral success of our victory is quite upon a level with its

strategic value. It has again been proved that in the west also we are

at any time in a position to take the offensive, and that,

notwithstanding their most violent efforts, it is impossible for the

English and the French to throw back or to break through our battle

line.

_In another article the Kreuz Zeitung said:_

When the French report says that we used a large number of asphyxiating

bombs, our enemies may infer from this that they always are making a

mistake when by their behavior they cause us to have recourse to new

technical weapons.

_Dealing with the same subject in a leading article, the Frankfurter

Zeitung declared:_

It is quite possible that our bombs and shells made it impossible for

the enemy to remain in his trenches and artillery positions, and it is

even probable that missiles which emit poisonous gases have actually

been used by us, since the German leaders have made it plain that, as

an answer to the treacherous missiles which have been used by the

English and the French for many weeks past, we, too, shall employ gas

bombs or whatever they are called. The German leaders pointed out that

considerably more effective materials were to be expected from German

chemistry, and they were right.

But, however destructive these bombs and shells may have been, do the

English and the other people think that it makes a serious difference

whether hundreds of guns and howitzers throw hundreds of thousands of

shells on a single tiny spot in order to destroy and break to atoms

everything living there, and to make the German trenches into a terrible

hell as was the case at Neuve Chapelle, or whether we throw a few shells

which spread death in the air? These shells are not more deadly than the

poison of English explosives, but they take effect over a wider area,

produce a rapid end, and spare the torn bodies the tortures and pains of

death.

_The Frankfurter Zeitung then compared the results achieved as

follows:_

The shells of Neuve Chapelle cost the Germans a trench and a village,

but on the edge of the ruin the German ring remained firm and strong.

How was it at Ypres? The enemy was thrown back on a front of more than

five and a half miles. Along this whole front we gained two miles. These

figures would signify little in comparison with the distance to the sea,

but our next goal is Ypres, and on the north we are now only a few

kilometers from this stronghold.

_The Cologne Gazette referred to Sir John French's reports as follows:_

It is delightful to read the complaints about the use of shells

containing asphyxiating gases. This sounds particularly well out of the

mouth of the Commander in Chief of a nation which for centuries past has

trodden every provision of international law under foot.

The Canadians at Ypres

[From the Canadian Record Officer.]

_The full narrative of the part played by the Canadians at Ypres is

given in a communication from the Record Officer now serving with the

Canadian Division at the front and published in the British press on May

1, 1915. The division was commanded by a distinguished English General,

but these "amateur soldiers of Canada," as the narrator describes them,

were officered largely by lawyers, college professors, and business men

who before the war were neither disciplined nor trained. Many striking

deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice were performed in the course of

their brilliant charge and dogged resistance, which, in the words of Sir

John French, "saved the situation" in the face of overwhelming odds._

On April 22 the Canadian Division held a line of, roughly, 5,000 yards,

extending in a northwesterly direction from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to

the Ypres-Poelcapelle road, and connecting at its terminus with the

French troops. The division consisted of three infantry brigades in

addition to the artillery brigades. Of the infantry brigades the First

was in reserve, the Second was on the right, and the Third established

contact with the Allies at the point indicated above.

The day was a peaceful one, warm and sunny, and except that the previous

day had witnessed a further bombardment of the stricken town of Ypres,

everything seemed quiet in front of the Canadian line. At 5 o'clock in

the afternoon a plan, carefully prepared, was put into execution against

our French allies on the left. Asphyxiating gas of great intensity was

projected into their trenches, probably by means of force pumps and

pipes laid out under the parapets. The fumes, aided by a favorable wind,

floated backward, poisoning and disabling over an extended area those

who fell under their effect.

The result was that the French were compelled to give ground for a

considerable distance. The glory which the French Army has won in this

war would make it impertinent to labor the compelling nature of the

poisonous discharges under which the trenches were lost. The French did,

as every one knew they would do, all that stout soldiers could do, and

the Canadian Division, officers and men, look forward to many occasions

in the future in which they will stand side by side with the brave

armies of France.

[Illustration: POSITION BEFORE DISCHARGE OF GAS

Contrast this with:

POSITION AFTER DISCHARGE OF GAS]

The immediate consequences of this enforced withdrawal were, of course,

extremely grave. The Third Brigade of the Canadian Division was without

any left, or, in other words, its left was in the air. Rough diagrams

may make the position clear.

It became imperatively necessary greatly to extend the Canadian lines to

the left rear. It was not, of course, practicable to move the First

Brigade from reserve at a moment's notice, and the line, extending from

5,000 to 9,000 yards, was naturally not the line that had been held by

the Allies at 5 o'clock, and a gap still existed on its left. The new

line, of which our recent point of contact with the French formed the

apex, ran quite roughly as follows:

[Illustration: POSITION ON FRIDAY MORNING]

As shown above, it became necessary for Brig. Gen. Turner, commanding

the Third Brigade, to throw back his left flank southward to protect his

rear. In the course of the confusion which followed upon the

readjustments of position, the enemy, who had advanced rapidly after his

initial successes, took four British 4.7 guns in a small wood to the

west of the village of St. Julien, two miles in the rear of the original

French trenches.

The story of the second battle of Ypres is the story of how the Canadian

Division, enormously outnumbered--for they had in front of them at least

four divisions supported by immensely heavy artillery--with a gap still

existing, though reduced, in their lines, and with dispositions made

hurriedly under the stimulus of critical danger, fought through the day

and through the night, and then through another day and night; fought

under their officers until, as happened to so many, those perished

gloriously, and then fought from the impulsion of sheer valor because

they came from fighting stock.

The enemy, of course, was aware--whether fully or not may perhaps be

doubted--of the advantage his breach in the line had given him, and

immediately began to push a formidable series of attacks upon the whole

of the newly-formed Canadian salient. If it is possible to distinguish

when the attack was everywhere so fierce, it developed with particular

intensity at this moment upon the apex of the newly formed line, running

in the direction of St. Julien.

It has already been stated that four British guns were taken in a wood

comparatively early in the evening of the 22d. In the course of that

night, and under the heaviest machine-gun fire, this wood was assaulted

by the Canadian Scottish, Sixteenth Battalion of the Third Brigade, and

the Tenth Battalion of the Second Brigade, which was intercepted for

this purpose on its way to a reserve trench. The battalions were

respectively commanded by Lieut. Col. Leckie and Lieut. Col. Boyle, and

after a most fierce struggle in the light of a misty moon they took the

position at the point of the bayonet. At midnight the Second Battalion,

under Colonel Watson, and the Toronto Regiment, Queen's Own, Third

Battalion, under Lieut. Col. Rennie, both of the First Brigade, brought

up much-needed reinforcement, and though not actually engaged in the

assault were in reserve.

All through the following days and nights these battalions shared the

fortunes and misfortunes of the Third Brigade. An officer who took part

in the attack describes how the men about him fell under the fire of the

machine guns, which, in his phrase, played upon them "like a watering

pot." He added quite simply, "I wrote my own life off." But the line

never wavered. When one man fell another took his place, and with a

final shout the survivors of the two battalions flung themselves into

the wood. The German garrison was completely demoralized, and the

impetuous advance of the Canadians did not cease until they reached the

far side of the wood and intrenched themselves there in the position so

dearly gained. They had, however, the disappointment of finding that the

guns had been blown up by the enemy, and later on in the same night a

most formidable concentration of artillery fire, sweeping the wood as a

tropical storm sweeps the leaves from a forest, made it impossible for

them to hold the position for which they had sacrificed so much.

The fighting continued without intermission all through the night, and,

to those who observed the indications that the attack was being pushed

with ever-growing strength, it hardly seemed possible that the

Canadians, fighting in positions so difficult to defend and so little

the subject of deliberate choice, could maintain their resistance for

any long period. At 6 A.M. on Friday it became apparent that the left

was becoming more and more involved, and a powerful German attempt to

outflank it developed rapidly. The consequences, if it had been broken

or outflanked, need not be insisted upon. They were not merely local.

It was therefore decided, formidable as the attempt undoubtedly was, to

try and give relief by a counter-attack upon the first line of German

trenches, now far, far advanced from those originally occupied by the

French. This was carried out by the Ontario First and Fourth Battalions

of the First Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Mercer, acting in combination

with a British brigade.

It is safe to say that the youngest private in the rank, as he set his

teeth for the advance, knew the task in front of him, and the youngest

subaltern knew all that rested upon its success. It did not seem that

any human being could live in the shower of shot and shell which began

to play upon the advancing troops. They suffered terrible casualties.

For a short time every other man seemed to fall, but the attack was

pressed ever closer and closer.

The Fourth Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularly

withering fire. For a moment--not more--it wavered. Its most gallant

commanding officer, Lieut. Col. Burchill, carrying, after an old

fashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men and, at the

very moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head of

his battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward, (for,

indeed, they loved him,) as if to avenge his death. The astonishing

attack which followed--pushed home in the face of direct frontal fire

made in broad daylight by battalions whose names should live for ever in

the memories of soldiers--was carried to the first line of German

trenches. After a hand-to-hand struggle the last German who resisted was

bayoneted, and the trench was won.

The measure of this success may be taken when it is pointed out that

this trench represented in the German advance the apex in the breach

which the enemy had made in the original line of the Allies, and that it

was two and a half miles south of that line. This charge, made by men

who looked death indifferently in the face, (for no man who took part in

it could think that he was likely to live,) saved, and that was much,

the Canadian left. But it did more. Up to the point where the assailants

conquered, or died, it secured and maintained during the most critical

moment of all the integrity of the allied line. For the trench was not

only taken, it was held thereafter against all comers, and in the teeth

of every conceivable projectile, until the night of Sunday, the 25th,

when all that remained of the war-broken but victorious battalions was

relieved by fresh troops.

It is necessary now to return to the fortunes of the Third Brigade,

commanded by Brig. Gen. Turner, which, as we have seen, at 5 o'clock on

Thursday was holding the Canadian left, and after the first attack

assumed the defense of the new Canadian salient, at the same time

sparing all the men it could to form an extemporized line between the

wood and St. Julien. This brigade also was at the first moment of the

German offensive, made the object of an attack by the discharge of

poisonous gas. The discharge was followed by two enemy assaults.

Although the fumes were extremely poisonous, they were not, perhaps

having regard to the wind, so disabling as on the French lines, (which

ran almost east to west,) and the brigade, though affected by the fumes,

stoutly beat back the two German assaults.

Encouraged by this success, it rose to the supreme effort required by

the assault on the wood, which has already been described. At 4 o'clock

on the morning of Friday, the 23d, a fresh emission of gas was made both

upon the Second Brigade, which held the line running northeast, and upon

the Third Brigade, which, as has been fully explained, had continued the

line up to the pivotal point, as defined above, and had then spread down

in a southeasterly direction. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that two

privates of the Forty-eighth Highlanders who found their way into the

trenches commanded by Colonel Lipsett, Ninetieth Winnipeg Rifles, Eighth

Battalion, perished in the fumes, and it was noticed that their faces

became blue immediately after dissolution.

The Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, and the

Forty-eighth Highlanders, Fifteenth Battalion, were more especially

affected by the discharge. The Royal Highlanders, though considerably

shaken, remained immovable upon their ground. The Forty-eighth

Highlanders, which, no doubt, received a more poisonous discharge, was

for the moment dismayed, and, indeed, their trench, according to the

testimony of very hardened soldiers, became intolerable. The battalion

retired from the trench, but for a very short distance, and for an

equally short time. In a few moments they were again their own men. They

advanced upon and occupied the trenches which they had momentarily

abandoned.

In the course of the same night the Third Brigade, which had already

displayed a resource, a gallantry, and a tenacity for which no eulogy

could be excessive, was exposed (and with it the whole allied case) to a

peril still more formidable.

[Illustration: The German rush across the Yser-Ypres Canal was checked

at Lizerne and opposite Boesinghe. The shaded area on the map marks the

scene of the battle. Within this area are Steenstraate, Het Sast,

Pilkem, St. Julien, and Langemarck, all of which the Germans claimed to

have captured.]

It has been explained, and, indeed, the fundamental situation made the

peril clear, that several German divisions were attempting to crush or

drive back this devoted brigade, and in any event to use their enormous

numerical superiority to sweep around and overwhelm its left wing. At

some point in the line which cannot be precisely determined the last

attempt partially succeeded, and in the course of this critical struggle

German troops in considerable though not in overwhelming numbers swung

past the unsupported left of the brigade, and, slipping in between the

wood and St. Julien, added to the torturing anxieties of the long-drawn

struggle by the appearance, and indeed for the moment the reality, of

isolation from the brigade base.

In the exertions made by the Third Brigade during this supreme crisis it

is almost impossible to single out one battalion without injustice to

others, but though the efforts of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal,

Thirteenth Battalion, were only equal to those of the other battalions

who did such heroic service, it so happened by chance that the fate of

some of its officers attracted special attention.

Major Norsworth, already almost disabled by a bullet wound, was

bayoneted and killed while he was rallying his men with easy

cheerfulness. The case of Captain McCuaig, of the same battalion, was

not less glorious, although his death can claim no witness. This most

gallant officer was seriously wounded, in a hurriedly constructed

trench, at a moment when it would have been possible to remove him to

safety. He absolutely refused to move and continued in the discharge of

his duty.

But the situation grew constantly worse, and peremptory orders were

received for an immediate withdrawal. Those who were compelled to obey

them were most insistent to carry with them, at whatever risk to their

own mobility and safety, an officer to whom they were devotedly

attached. But he, knowing, it may be, better than they, the exertions

which still lay in front of them, and unwilling to inflict upon them the

disabilities of a maimed man, very resolutely refused, and asked of them

one thing only, that there should be given to him, as he lay alone in

the trench, two loaded Colt revolvers to add to his own, which lay in

his right hand as he made his last request. And so, with three revolvers

ready to his hand for use, a very brave officer waited to sell his life,

wounded and racked with pain, in an abandoned trench.

On Friday afternoon the left of the Canadian line was strengthened by

important reinforcements of British troops amounting to seven

battalions. From this time forward the Canadians also continued to

receive further assistance on the left from a series of French

counter-attacks pushed in a northeasterly direction from the canal bank.

But the artillery fire of the enemy continually grew in intensity, and

it became more and more evident that the Canadian salient could no

longer be maintained against the overwhelming superiority of numbers by

which it was assailed. Slowly, stubbornly, and contesting every yard,

the defenders gave ground until the salient gradually receded from the

apex, near the point where it had originally aligned with the French,

and fell back upon St. Julien.

Soon it became evident that even St. Julien, exposed to fire from right

and left, was no longer tenable in the face of overwhelming numerical

superiority. The Third Brigade was therefore ordered to retreat further

south, selling every yard of ground as dearly as it had done since 5

o'clock on Thursday. But it was found impossible, without hazarding far

larger forces, to disentangle the detachment of the Royal Highlanders of

Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, and of the Royal Montreal Regiment,

Fourteenth Battalion. The brigade was ordered, and not a moment too

soon, to move back. It left these units with hearts as heavy as those

with which his comrades had said farewell to Captain McCuaig. The

German tide rolled, indeed, over the deserted village, but for several

hours after the enemy had become master of the village the sullen and

persistent rifle fire which survived showed that they were not yet

master of the Canadian rearguard. If they died, they died worthily of

Canada.

The enforced retirement of the Third Brigade (and to have stayed longer

would have been madness) reproduced for the Second Brigade, commanded by

Brig. Gen. Curry, in a singularly exact fashion, the position of the

Third Brigade itself at the moment of the withdrawal of the French. The

Second Brigade, it must be remembered, had retained the whole line of

trenches, roughly 2,500 yards, which it was holding at 5 o'clock on

Thursday afternoon, supported by the incomparable exertions of the Third

Brigade, and by the highly hazardous deployment in which necessity had

involved that brigade. The Second Brigade had maintained its lines.

It now devolved upon General Curry, commanding this brigade, to

reproduce the tactical maneuvres with which, earlier in the fight, the

Third Brigade had adapted itself to the flank movement of overwhelming

numerical superiority. He flung his left flank around south, and his

record is, that in the very crisis of this immense struggle he held his

line of trenches from Thursday at 5 o'clock till Sunday afternoon. And

on Sunday afternoon he had not abandoned his trenches. There were none

left. They had been obliterated by artillery. He withdrew his undefeated

troops from the fragments of his field fortifications, and the hearts of

his men were as completely unbroken as the parapets of his trenches were

completely broken. In such a brigade it is invidious to single out any

battalion for special praise, but it is, perhaps, necessary to the story

to point out that Lieut. Col. Lipsett, commanding the Ninetieth Winnipeg

Rifles, Eighth Battalion of the Second Brigade, held the extreme left of

the brigade position at the most critical moment.

The battalion was expelled from the trenches early on Friday morning by

an emission of poisonous gas, but, recovering in three-quarters of an

hour, it counter-attacked, retook the trenches it had abandoned, and

bayoneted the enemy. And after the Third Brigade had been forced to

retire Lieut. Col. Lipsett held his position, though his left was in the

air, until two British regiments filled up the gap on Saturday night.

The individual fortunes of these two brigades have brought us to the

events of Sunday afternoon, but it is necessary, to make the story

complete, to recur for a moment to the events of the morning. After a

very formidable attack the enemy succeeded in capturing the village of

St. Julien, which has so often been referred to in describing the

fortunes of the Canadian left. This success opened up a new and

formidable line of advance, but by this time further reinforcements had

arrived. Here, again, it became evident that the tactical necessities of

the situation dictated an offensive movement as the surest method of

arresting further progress.

General Alderson, who was in command of the reinforcements, accordingly

directed that an advance should be made by a British brigade which had

been brought up in support. The attack was thrust through the Canadian

left and centre, and as the troops making it swept on, many of them

going to certain death, they paused an instant, and, with deep-throated

cheers for Canada, gave the first indication to the division of the warm

admiration which their exertions had excited in the British Army.

The advance was indeed costly, but it could not be gainsaid. The story

is one of which the brigade may be proud, but it does not belong to the

special account of the fortunes of the Canadian contingent. It is

sufficient for our purpose to notice that the attack succeeded in its

object, and the German advance along the line, momentarily threatened,

was arrested.

We had reached, in describing the events of the afternoon, the points at

which the trenches of the Second Brigade had been completely destroyed.

This brigade, the Third Brigade, and the considerable reinforcements

which this time filled the gap between the two brigades, were gradually

driven fighting every yard upon a line running, roughly, from Fortuin,

south of St. Julien, in a northeasterly direction toward Passchendaele.

Here the two brigades were relieved by two British brigades, after

exertions as glorious, as fruitful, and, alas! as costly as soldiers

have ever been called upon to make.

Monday morning broke bright and clear and found the Canadians behind the

firing line. This day, too, was to bring its anxieties. The attack was

still pressed, and it became necessary to ask Brig. Gen. Curry whether

he could once more call upon his shrunken brigade. "The men are tired,"

this indomitable soldier replied, "but they are ready and glad to go

again to the trenches." And so once more, a hero leading heroes, the

General marched back the men of the Second Brigade, reduced to a quarter

of its original strength, to the very apex of the line as it existed at

that moment.

This position he held all day Monday; on Tuesday he was still occupying

the reserve trenches, and on Wednesday was relieved and retired to

billets in the rear.

Such, in the most general outline, is the story of a great and glorious

feat of arms. A story told so soon after the event, while rendering bare

justice to units whose doings fell under the eyes of particular

observers, must do less than justice to others who played their

part--and all did--as gloriously as those whose special activities it is

possible, even at this stage, to describe. But the friends of men who

fought in other battalions may be content in the knowledge that they,

too, shall learn, when time allows the complete correlation of diaries,

the exact part which each unit played in these unforgettable days. It is

rather accident than special distinction which had made it possible to

select individual battalions for mention.

It would not be right to close even this account without a word of

tribute to the auxiliary services. The signalers were always cool and

resourceful. The telegraph and telephone wires being constantly cut,

many belonging to this service rendered up their lives in the discharge

of their duty, carrying out repairs with the most complete calmness in

exposed positions. The dispatch carriers, as usual, behaved with the

greatest bravery. Theirs is a lonely life, and very often a lonely

death. One cycle messenger lay upon the ground, badly wounded. He

stopped a passing officer and delivered his message, together with some

verbal instructions. These were coherently given, but he swooned almost

before the words were out of his mouth.

The artillery never flagged in the sleepless struggle in which so much

depended upon its exertions. Not a Canadian gun was lost in the long

battle of retreat. And the nature of the position renders such a record

very remarkable. One battery of four guns found itself in such a

situation that it was compelled to turn two of its guns directly about

and fire upon the enemy in positions almost diametrically opposite.

It is not possible in this account to attempt a description of the

services rendered by the Canadian Engineers or the Medical Corps. Their

members rivaled in coolness, endurance, and valor the Canadian infantry,

whose comrades they were, and it is hoped in separate communications to

do justice to both these brilliant services.

No attempt has been made in this description to explain the recent

operations except in so far as they spring from, or are connected with,

the fortunes of the Canadian Division. It is certain that the exertions

of the troops who reinforced and later relieved the Canadians were not

less glorious, but the long, drawn-out struggle is a lesson to the whole

empire. "Arise, O Israel!" The empire is engaged in a struggle, without

quarter and without compromise, against an enemy still superbly

organized, still immensely powerful, still confident that its strength

is the mate of its necessities. To arms, then, and still to arms! In

Great Britain, in Canada, in Australia there is need, and there is need

now, of a community organized alike in military and industrial

co-operation.

That our countrymen in Canada, even while their hearts are still

bleeding, will answer every call which is made upon them, we well know.

The graveyard of Canada in Flanders is large; it is very large. Those

who lie there have left their mortal remains on alien soil. To Canada

they have bequeathed their memories and their glory.

On Fame's eternal camping ground

Their silent tents are spread,

And Glory guards with solemn round

The bivouac of the dead.

Vapor Warfare Resumed

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S REPORT.

_The British Press Bureau authorized the publication of the following

report, dated May 3, by Field Marshal Sir John French on the employment

by the Germans of poisonous gases as weapons of warfare:_

The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the trenches,

and also produced by the explosion of shells specially manufactured for

the purpose. The German troops who attacked under cover of these gases

were provided with specially designed respirators which were issued in

sealed patent covers.

This all points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale. A

week before the Germans first used this method they announced in their

official _communiqué_ that we were making use of asphyxiating gases. At

the time there appeared to be no reason for this astounding falsehood,

but now, of course, it is obvious that it was part of the scheme. It is

a further proof of the deliberate nature of the introduction by the

Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and shows that they recognized its

illegality, and were anxious to forestall neutral and possibly domestic

criticism.

Since the enemy has made use of this method of covering his advance with

a cloud of poisoned air, he has repeated it both in offense and defense

whenever the wind has been favorable. The effect of this poison is not

merely disabling or even painlessly fatal as suggested in the German

press. Those of its victims who do not succumb on the field and who can

be brought into hospital suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of

cases die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little

better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a permanent

character, and reduces them to a condition which points to their being

invalids for life.

These facts must be well known to the German scientists who devised this

new weapon and to the military authorities who have sanctioned its use.

I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these gases

as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless.

THE "EYEWITNESS" STORY.

_The following descriptive account, communicated by the British

Eyewitness present with General Headquarters, continues and supplements

the narrative published on April 29 of the movements of the British

force and the French armies in immediate touch with it:_

April 30, 1915.

As will have been gathered from the last summary, assaults accompanied

with gas were not made on every position of the front held by the

British to the north of Ypres at the same time. At one point it was not

until the early morning of Saturday, April 24, that the Germans brought

this method into operation against a section of our line not far from

our left flank.

Late on Thursday afternoon the men here saw portions of the French

retiring some distance to the west, and observed the cloud of vapor

rolling along the ground southward behind them. Our position was then

shelled with high explosives until 8 P.M. On Friday also it was

bombarded for some hours, the Germans firing poison shells for one hour.

Their infantry, who were intrenched about 120 yards away, evidently

expected some result from their use of the latter, for they put their

heads above the parapets, as if to see what the effect had been on our

men, and at intervals opened rapid rifle fire. The wind, however, was

strong and dissipated the fumes quickly, our troops did not suffer

seriously from their noxious effect, and the enemy did not attempt any

advance.

On Saturday morning, just about dawn, an airship appeared in the sky to

the east of our line at this point, and dropped four red stars, which

floated downward slowly for some distance before they died out. When our

men, whose eyes had not unnaturally been fixed on this display of

pyrotechnics, again turned to their front it was to find the German

trenches rendered invisible by a wall of greenish-yellow vapor, similar

to that observed on the Thursday afternoon, which was bearing down on

them on the breeze. Through this the Germans started shooting. During

Saturday they employed stupefying gas on several occasions in this

quarter, but did not press on very quickly. One reason for this, given

by a German prisoner, is that many of the enemy's infantry were so

affected by the fumes that they could not advance.

To continue the narrative from the night of Sunday, April 25. At 12:30

A.M., in face of repeated attacks, our infantry fell back from a part of

the Grafenstafel Ridge, northwest of Zonnebeke, and the line then ran

for some distance along the south bank of the little Haanebeek stream.

The situation along the Yperlee Canal remained practically unchanged.

When the morning of the 26th dawned the Germans, who had been seen

massing in St. Julien, and to the east of the village on the previous

evening, made several assaults, which grew more and more fierce as the

hours passed, but reinforcements were sent up and the position was

secured. Further east, however, our line was pierced near Broodseinde,

and a small body of the enemy established themselves in a portion of our

trenches. In the afternoon a strong, combined counter-attack was

delivered by the French and British along the whole front from

Steenstraate to the east of St. Julien, accompanied by a violent

bombardment. This moment, so far as can be judged at present, marked the

turning point of the battle, for, although it effected no great change

in the situation, it caused a definite check to the enemy's offensive,

relieved the pressure, and gained a certain amount of ground.

During this counter-attack the guns concentrated by both sides on this

comparatively narrow front poured in a great volume of fire. From the

right came the roar of the British batteries, from the left the rolling

thunder of the _soixante-quinze_, and every now and then above the

turmoil rose a dull boom as a huge howitzer shell burst in the vicinity

of Ypres. On the right our infantry stormed the German trenches close to

St. Julien, and in the evening gained the southern outskirts of the

village. In the centre they captured the trenches a little to the south

of the Bois des Cuisinirs, west of St. Julien, and still further west

more trenches were taken. This represented an advance of some 600 or 700

yards, but the gain in ground could not at all points be maintained.

Opposite St. Julien we fell back from the village to a position just

south of the place, and in front of the Bois des Cuisinirs and on the

left of the line a similar retirement took place, the enemy making

extensive use of his gas cylinders and of machine guns placed in farms

at or other points of vantage. None the less, the situation at nightfall

was more satisfactory than it had been. We were holding our own well all

along the line and had made progress at some points. On the right the

enemy's attacks on the front of the Grafenstafel Ridge had all been

repulsed.

In the meantime the French had achieved some success, having retaken

Lizerne and also the trenches round Het Sast, captured some 250

prisoners, and made progress all along the west bank of the canal. Heavy

as our losses were during the day, there is little doubt that the enemy

suffered terribly. Both sides were attacking at different points, the

fighting was conducted very largely in the open, and the close

formations of the Germans on several occasions presented excellent

targets to our artillery, which did not fail to seize its opportunities.

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON

Commanding the Allied Expeditionary Forces Operating Against the

Dardanelles

_(Photo from P.S. Rogers.)_]

[Illustration: ANDREW BONAR LAW

The Canadian-born Leader of the Opposition in the British House of

Commons

_(Photo by Bassano.)_]

Nothing in particular occurred during the night.

The morning of the 27th found our troops occupying the following

positions: North of Zonnebeke the right of the line still held the

eastern end of the Grafenstafel Ridge, but from here it bent

southwestward behind the Haanebeek stream, which it followed to a point

about half a mile east of St. Julien. Thence it curved back again to the

Vamheule Farm, on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, running from here in a

slight southerly curve to a point a little west of the Ypres-Langemarck

road, where it joined the French. In the last mentioned quarter of the

field it followed generally the line of a low ridge running from west to

east. On the French front the Germans had been cleared from the west

bank of the canal, except at one point, Steenstraate, where they

continued to hold the bridgehead.

About 1 P.M. a counter-attack was made by us all along the line between

the canal and the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, and for about an hour we

continued to make progress. Then the right and centre were checked. A

little later the left was also held up, and the situation remained very

much as it had been on the previous day. The Germans were doubtless much

encouraged by their initial success, and their previous boldness in

attack was now matched by the stubborn manner in which they clung on to

their positions. In the evening the French stormed some trenches east of

the canal, but were again checked by the enemy's gas cylinders.

The night passed quietly, and was spent by us in reorganizing and

consolidating our positions. The enemy did not interfere. This is not

surprising, in view of the fact that by Tuesday evening they had been

fighting for over five days. Their state of exhaustion is confirmed by

the statements of the prisoners captured by the French, who also

reported that the German losses had been very heavy.

On Wednesday, the 28th, there was a complete lull on this sector of our

line, and the shelling was less severe. Some fighting, however, occurred

along the canal, the French taking over 100 prisoners.

Nothing of any importance has occurred on other parts of the front. On

the 27th, at the Railway Triangle opposite Guinchy, the south side of

the embankment held by the Germans was blown up by our miners. On the

28th a hostile aeroplane was forced to descend by our anti-aircraft

guns. On coming down in rear of the German lines, it was at once fired

upon and destroyed by our field artillery. Another hostile machine was

brought down by rifle fire near Zonnebeke.

Splendid work has been done during the past few days by our airmen, who

have kept all the area behind the hostile lines under close observation.

On the 26th they bombed the stations of Staden, Thielt, Courtrai,

Roubaix, and other places, and located an armored train near Langemarck,

which was subsequently shelled and forced to retire. There have been

several successful conflicts in the air, on one occasion a pilot in a

single seater chasing a German machine to Roulers, and forcing it to

land.

The raid on Courtrai unfortunately cost the nation a very gallant life,

but it will live as one of the most heroic episodes of the war. The

airman started on the enterprise alone in a biplane. On arrival at

Courtrai he glided down to a height of 300 feet and dropped a large bomb

on the railway junction. While he did this he was the target of hundreds

of rifles, of machine guns, and of anti-aircraft armament, and was

severely wounded in the thigh. Though he might have saved his life by at

once coming down in the enemy's lines, he decided to save his machine at

all costs, and made for the British lines. Descending to a height of

only 100 feet in order to increase his speed, he continued to fly and

was again wounded, this time mortally. He still flew on, however, and

without coming down at the nearest of our aerodromes went all the way

back to his own base, where he executed a perfect landing and made his

report. He died in hospital not long afterward.[A]

[Footnote A: The obituary columns of The Times of April 30 contained the

following notice under "Died of Wounds":

RHODES-MOORHOUSE.--On Tuesday, the 27th April, of wounds

received while dropping bombs on Courtrai the day before,

WILLIAM BARNARD RHODES RHODES-MOORHOUSE, Second Lieutenant,

Royal Flying Corps, aged 27, dear elder son of Mr. and Mrs.

Edward Moorhouse of Parnham House, Dorset, and most loved

husband of Linda Rhodes-Moorhouse.]

The outstanding feature of the action of the past week has been the

steadiness of our troops on the extreme left; but of the deeds of

individual gallantry and devotion which have been performed it would be

impossible to narrate one-hundredth part. At one place in this quarter a

machine gun was stationed in the angle of a trench when the German rush

took place. One man after another of the detachment was shot, but the

gun still continued in action, though five bodies lay around it. When

the sixth man took the place of his fallen comrades, of whom one was his

brother, the Germans were still pressing on. He waited until they were

only a few yards away, and then poured a stream of bullets on to the

advancing ranks, which broke and fell back, leaving rows of dead. He was

then wounded himself.

Under the hot fire to which our batteries were subjected in the early

part of the engagement telephone wires were repeatedly cut. The wire

connecting one battery with its observing officer was severed on nine

separate occasions, and on each occasion repaired by a Sergeant, who did

the work out in the open under a perfect hail of shells.

_On May 5 the following account of the British Official Eyewitness,

continuing the report of April 30, was published:_

About 5 P.M. a dense cloud of suffocating vapors was launched from their

trenches along the whole front held by the French right and by our left

from the Ypres-Langemarck road to a considerable distance east of St.

Julien. The fumes did not carry much beyond our front trenches. But

these were to a great extent rendered untenable, and a retirement from

them was ordered.

No sooner had this started than the enemy opened a violent bombardment

with asphyxiating shells and shrapnel on our trenches and on our

infantry as they were withdrawing. Meanwhile our guns had not been idle.

From a distance, perhaps owing to some peculiarity of the light, the gas

on this occasion looked like a great reddish cloud, and the moment it

was seen our batteries poured a concentrated fire on the German

trenches.

Curious situations then arose between us and the enemy. The poison belt,

the upper part shredding into thick wreaths of vapor as it was shaken by

the wind, and the lower and denser part sinking into all inequalities of

the ground, rolled slowly down the trenches. Shells would rend it for a

moment, but it only settled down again as thickly as before.

Nevertheless, the German infantry faced it, and they faced a hail of

shrapnel as well. In some cases where the gas had not reached our lines

our troops held firm and shot through the cloud at the advancing

Germans. In other cases the men holding the front line managed to move

to the flank, where they were more or less beyond the affected area.

Here they waited until the enemy came on and then bayoneted them when

they reached our trenches.

On the extreme left our supports waited until the wall of vapor reached

our trenches, when they charged through it and met the advancing Germans

with the bayonet as they swarmed over the parapets.

South of St. Julien the denseness of the vapor compelled us to evacuate

trenches, but reinforcements arrived who charged the enemy before they

could establish themselves in position. In every case the assaults

failed completely. Large numbers were mown down by our artillery. Men

were seen falling and others scattering and running back to their own

lines. Many who reached the gas cloud could not make their way through

it, and in all probability a great number of the wounded perished from

the fumes.

It is to that extent, from a military standpoint, a sign of weakness.

Another sign of weakness is the adoption of illegal methods of fighting,

such as spreading poisonous gas. It is a confession by the Germans that

they have lost their former great superiority in artillery and are, in

any cost, seeking another technical advantage over their enemy as a

substitute.

Nevertheless, this spirit, this determination on the part of our enemies

to stick at nothing must not be underestimated. Though it may not pay

the Germans in the long run, it renders it all the more obvious that

they are a foe that can be overcome only by the force of overwhelming

numbers of men and guns.

Further to the east a similar attack was made about 7 P.M. which seems

to have been attended with even less success, and the assaulting

infantry was at once beaten back by our artillery fire.

It was not long before all our trenches were reoccupied and the whole

line re-established in its original position. The attack on the French

met with the same result.

_The Eyewitness then relates incidents showing the steadiness of the

Indian troops, who, he says, "advanced under a murderous fire, their war

cry swelling louder and louder above the din."_

Prisoners captured in the recent fighting, the narrative continues,

stated that one German corps lost 80 per cent. of its men in the first

week; that the losses from our artillery fire, even during days when no

attacks were taking place, had been very heavy and that many of their

own men had suffered from the effects of the gas.

_The writer concludes as follows:_

In regard to the recent fighting on our left, the German offensive,

effected in the first instance by surprise, resulted in a considerable

gain of ground for the enemy. Between all the earlier German efforts,

the only difference was that on this latest occasion the attempt was

carried out with the aid of poisonous gases.

There is no reason why we should not expect similar tactics in the

future. They do not mean that the Allies have lost the initiative in the

Western theatre, nor that they are likely to lose it. They do mean,

however, and the fact has been repeatedly pointed out, that the enemy's

defensive is an active one, that his confidence is still unshaken and

that he still is able to strike in some strength where he sees the

chance or where mere local advantage can be secured.

The true idea of the meaning of the operations of the Allies can be

gained only by bearing in mind that it is their primary object to bring

about the exhaustion of the enemy's resources in men.

In the form now assumed by this struggle--a war of attrition--the

Germans are bound ultimately to lose, and it is the consciousness of

this fact that inspires their present policy. This is to achieve as

early as possible some success of sufficient magnitude to influence the

neutrals, to discourage the Allies, to make them weary of the struggle

and to induce the belief among the people ignorant of war that nothing

has been gained by the past efforts of the Allies because the Germans

have not yet been driven back. It is being undertaken with a political

rather than a strategical object.

_The official British Eyewitness, under date of May 11, 1915, gives an

account of the German attempts on the previous Saturday and Sunday to

break the British lines around Ypres, and of the beginning of the

Anglo-French offensive north of Arras. He said:_

The calm that prevailed Thursday and Friday proved to be only the lull

before the storm. Early Saturday morning it became apparent that the

Germans were preparing an attack in strength against our line running

east and northeast from Ypres, for they were concentrating under cover

of a violent artillery fire, and at about 10 o'clock the battle began in

earnest.

At that hour the Germans attacked our line from the Ypres-Poelcappelle

road to within a short distance of the Menin highroad, it being

evidently their intention while engaging us closely on the whole of this

sector to break our front in the vicinity of the Ypres-Roulers Railway,

to the north and to the south of which their strongest and most

determined assaults were delivered.

Under this pressure our front was penetrated at some points around

Frezenberg, and at 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon we made a

counter-attack between the Zonnebeke road and the railway in order to

recover the lost ground. Our offensive was conducted most gallantly, but

was checked before long by the fire of machine guns.

Meanwhile, the enemy launched another attack through the woods south of

the Menin road, and at the same time threatened our left to the north of

Ypres with fresh masses. Most desperate fighting ensued, the German

infantry coming on again and again and gradually forcing our troops

back, though only for a short distance, in spite of repeated

counter-attacks.

During the night the fighting continued to rage with ever-increasing

fury. It is impossible to say at exactly what hour our line was broken

at different points, but it is certain that at one time the enemy's

infantry poured through along the Poelcappelle road, and even got as far

as Wieltje at 9 P.M.

There was also a considerable gap in our front about Frezenberg, where

hostile detachments had penetrated. At both points counter-attacks were

organized without delay. To the east of the salient the Germans first

were driven back to Frezenberg, but there they made a firm stand, and

under pressure of fresh reinforcements we fell back again toward

Verlorenhoek.

Northeast of the salient a counter-attack carried out by us about 1 A.M.

was more successful. Our troops swept the enemy out of Wieltje at the

bayonet's point, leaving the village strewn with German dead and,

pushing on, regained most of the ground to the north of that point. And

so the fight surged to and fro throughout the night. All around the

scene of the conflict the sky was lit up by the flashes of the guns and

the light of blazing villages and farms, while against this background

of smoke and flame, looking out in the murky light over the crumbling

ruins of the old town, rose the battered wreck of the cathedral town

and the spires of Cloth Hall.

When Sunday dawned there came a short respite, and the firing for a time

died down. The comparative lull enabled us to reorganize and consolidate

our position on the new line we had taken up and to obtain some rest

after the fatigue and strain of the night. It did not last long,

however, and in the afternoon the climax of the battle was reached, for,

under the cover of intense artillery fire, the Germans launched no less

than five separate assaults against the east of the salient.

To the north and northeast their attacks were not at first pressed so

hard as on the south of the Menin road, where the fighting was

especially fierce. In the latter direction masses of infantry were

hurled on with absolute desperation and were beaten off with

corresponding slaughter.

At one point, north of the town, 500 of the enemy advanced from the

wood, and it is affirmed by those present that not a single man of them

escaped.

On the eastern face, at 6:30 P.M., an endeavor was made to storm the

grounds of the Château Hooge, a little north of the Menin road, but the

force attempting it broke and fell back under the hail of shrapnel

poured upon them by our guns. It was on this side, where they had to

face the concentrated fire of guns, Maxims and rifles again and again in

their efforts to break their way through, that the Germans incurred

their heaviest losses, and the ground was literally heaped with dead.

They evidently, for the time being at least, were unable to renew their

efforts, and as night came on the fury of their offensive gradually

slackened, the hours of darkness passing in quietness.

During the day our troops saw some of the enemy busily employed in

stripping the British dead in our abandoned trenches, east of the Hooge

Château, and several Germans afterward were noticed dressed in khaki.

So far as the Ypres region is concerned, this for us was a most

successful day. Our line, which on the northeast of the salient had,

after the previous day's fighting, been reconstituted a short distance

behind the original front, remained intact. Our losses were

comparatively slight, and, owing to the targets presented by the enemy,

the action resolved itself on our part into pure killing.

The reason for this very determined effort to crush our left on the part

of the Germans is not far to seek. It is probable that for some days

previously they had been in possession of information which led them to

suppose that we intended to apply pressure on the right of our line, and

that their great attack upon Ypres on the 7th, 8th, and 9th was

undertaken with a view to diverting us from our purpose.

In this the Germans were true to their principles, for they rightly hold

that the best manner of meeting an expected hostile offensive is to

forestall it by attacking in some other quarter. In this instance their

leaders acted with the utmost determination and energy and their

soldiers fought with the greatest courage.

The failure of their effort was due to the splendid endurance of our

troops, who held the line around the salient under a fire which again

and again blotted out whole lengths of the defenses and killed the

defenders by scores. Time after time along those parts of the front

selected for assault were parapets destroyed, and time after time did

the thinning band of survivors build them up again and await the next

onset as steadily as before.

Here, in May, in defense of the same historic town, have our

incomparable infantry repeated the great deeds their comrades performed

half a year ago and beaten back most desperate onslaughts of hostile

hordes backed by terrific artillery support.

The services rendered by our troops in this quarter cannot at present be

estimated, for their full significance will only be realized in the

light of future events. But so far their devotion has indirectly

contributed in no small measure to the striking success already achieved

by our allies.

Further south, in the meantime, on Sunday another struggle had been in

progress on that portion of the front covered by the right of our line

and the left of the French, for when the firing around Ypres was

temporarily subsiding during the early hours of the morning another and

even more tremendous cannonade was suddenly started by the artillery of

the Allies some twenty miles to the south.

The morning was calm, bright, and clear, and opposite our right, as the

sun rose, the scene in front of our line was the most peaceful

imaginable. Away to the right were Guinchy, with its brickfields and the

ruins of Givenchy. To the north of them lay low ground, where, hidden by

trees and hedgerows, ran the opposing lines that were about to become

the scene of the conflict, and beyond, in the distance, rose the long

ridge of Aubers, the villages crowning it standing out clear cut against

the sky.

At 5 o'clock the bombardment began, slowly at first and then growing in

volume until the whole air quivered with the rush of the larger shells

and the earth shook with the concussion of guns. In a few minutes the

whole distant landscape disappeared in smoke and dust, which hung for a

while in the still air and then drifted slowly across the line of

battle.

Shortly before 6 o'clock our infantry advanced along our front between

the Bois Grenier and Festubert. On the left, north of Fromelles, we

stormed the German first line trenches. Hand-to-hand fighting went on

for some time with bayonet, rifle, and hand grenade, but we continued to

hold on to this position throughout the day and caused the enemy very

heavy loss, for not only were many Germans killed in the bombardment,

but their repeated efforts to drive us from the captured positions

proved most costly.

On the right, to the north of Festubert, our advance met with

considerable opposition and was not pressed.

Meanwhile, the French, after a prolonged bombardment, had taken the

German positions north of Arras on a front of nearly five miles, and had

pushed forward from two to three miles, capturing 2,000 prisoners and

six guns. This remarkable success was gained by our allies in the course

of a few hours.

As may be supposed from the nature of the fighting which has been in

progress, our losses have been heavy. On other parts of the front our

action was confined to that of the artillery, but this proved most

effective later, all the communications of the enemy being subjected to

so heavy and accurate a fire that in some quarters all movement by

daylight within range of our lines was rendered impracticable. At one

place opposite our centre a convoy of ammunition was hit by a shell,

which knocked out six motor lorries and caused two to blow up. Opposite

our centre we fired two mines, which did considerable damage to the

enemy's defenses.

During the day also our aeroplanes attacked several points of

importance. One of our airmen, who was sent to bomb the canal bridge

near Don, was wounded on his way there, but continued and fulfilled his

mission. Near Wytschaete, one of our aviators pursued a German aeroplane

and fired a whole belt from his machine gun at it. The Taube suddenly

swerved, righted itself for a second, and then descended from a height

of several thousand feet straight to the ground.

On the other hand, a British machine unfortunately was brought down over

Lille by the enemy's anti-aircraft guns, but it is hoped that the

aviator escaped.

_In regard to the German allegation, that the British used gas in their

attacks on Hill 60, the Eyewitness says:_

No asphyxiating gases have been employed by us at any time, nor have

they yet been brought into play by us.

To Certain German Professors of Chemics

[From Punch, May 5, 1915.]

When you observed how brightly other tutors

Inspired the yearning heart of Youth;

How from their lips, like Pilsen's foaming pewters,

It sucked the fount of German Truth;

There, in your Kaiserlich laboratory,

"We, too," you said, "will find a task to do,

And so contribute something to the glory

Of God and William Two.

"Bring forth the stink-pots. Such a foul aroma

By arts divine shall be evoked

As will to leeward cause a state of coma

And leave the enemy blind and choked;

By gifts of culture we will work such ravages

With our superbly patriotic smells

As would confound with shame those half-baked savages,

The poisoners of wells."

Good! You have more than matched the rival pastors

That tute a credulous Fatherland;

And we admit that you are proved our masters

When there is dirty work in hand;

But in your lore I notice one hiatus:

Your Kaiser's scutcheon with its hideous blot--

You've no corrosive in your apparatus

Can out that damnéd spot!

O.S.

Seven Days of War East and West

Fighting of the Second Week in May on French and Russian Fronts.

[By a Military Expert of THE NEW YORK TIMES.]

The sinking of the Lusitania has, for the week ended May 15, so

completely absorbed the attention of the press and the interest of the

public that the military operations themselves have not received the

notice that otherwise would have been awarded them. The sinking of this

ship, with the delicate diplomatic situation between Germany and the

United States which the act brought about, is not a military or naval

operation as such, and comments on it have no place in this column. At

the same time there is an indirect effect of the drowning of hundreds of

British citizens which will have a very direct bearing on Britain's

military strength and policy.

The British public is notably hard to stir, are slow to act, and almost

always underrate their adversary. In almost every war, from 1775 down to

and including the South African war, England, with a self-assurance that

could only be based on ignorance of true conditions, has started with

only a small force, and it has been only when this force has been

defeated and used up that the realization of the true needs of the

situation has dawned. Then, and then only, has recruiting been possible

at a pace commensurate with the necessity.

In the Boer war, for example, every one in England, official and

civilian, believed that 30,000 men would be more than enough to defeat

the South African burghers. Yet ten times 30,000 British soldiers were

operating in the Transvaal and Orange Free State before the war ended.

In the present conflict Lord Kitchener himself admits that there are

many times the number of British soldiers in France than was thought

would be necessary when war was declared. And even up to May 6 the

British public was not thoroughly aroused. Many of the peasants in the

back counties hardly believed the war was a reality. Recruiting was

slow, there was but little enthusiasm, and Lord Haldane's thinly veiled

hint that a draft might soon become necessary was almost unnoticed.

But the sinking of the Lusitania has brought the war home to England as

nothing else has or could have done, and all England is aflame with a

bitterness against Germany which is already increasing the flow of

recruits and cannot but add to the fighting efficiency of the men now at

the front. The effect will be far-reaching throughout the British

Empire, and will do much to solve the problem which faced the organizers

of Great Britain's forces of how to get sufficient volunteers to swell

the volume of the French expeditionary force and to replace the

casualties.

To turn to the direct military operations in the various theatres of

war, no week since last Fall has witnessed more important activities or

offensive movements conducted on such a scale. On both western and

eastern fronts truly momentous actions involving great numbers of men

have been under way, and though not yet concluded, have advanced so far

as to give a reasonable basis for estimating the results.

ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

On the western front the principal scenes of action have been the front

from Nieuport to Arras, the Champagne district, and the southern side of

the German wedge from its apex at St. Mihiel to Pont-à-Mousson. On the

northern part of the Allies' line from Ypres to Nieuport the Germans

have been the aggressors. They have selected as the principal points of

attack the Belgian line back of the Yser just south of Nieuport and the

point of juncture of the British with the Belgian lines.

Both attacks have the same general object--the bending back of the line

between these two points with a vision, for the future, of Dunkirk and

Calais. The attack along the Yser has not been pushed to any extent, and

what advantage there is rests with the Belgians. In fact, the Belgians

have advanced somewhat and have been able to throw a bridge across the

Yser near St. George, just east of Nieuport, on the Nieuport-Bruges

road.

Around Ypres the fighting has been more than usually fierce and

desperate. Blow after blow has been struck, first by one side, then by

the other. Both German and British have admittedly suffered enormous

losses, but the positions of their respective lines are almost unchanged

from those occupied a week ago. The German gains of last week in the

vicinity of Steenstraate produced in the British lines around Ypres a

sharp salient, and it is against the sides of this salient that the

Germans have been hurling their forces.

The town of Ypres is now in complete ruins, and, although it would

normally be of importance because of the fact that it is the point of

crossing of a number of roads, this importance is destroyed by the fact

that it is entirely dominated by the German artillery. As long as this

state of affairs exists the town has practically no strategic value. All

that the Germans can accomplish if they take Ypres will have been a

flattening out of the British salient.

Germany cannot be content with occasional bending of the Allies' line.

The process is too slow and too costly. Germany has almost, if not

quite, reached her maximum strength, and the losses she now suffers will

be difficult to replace. Viewing the situation entirely from the German

standpoint, success can only mean breaking through and attacking the two

exposed flanks at the point pierced. This would force a retreat as in

the case of the Russian lines along the Dunajec, which will be taken up

later on. No other form of action can be decisive, though it might

permit a little more of Belgian or French territory to change hands.

This would, of course, in case the war were declared a draw, give

Germany an additional advantage in the discussion of terms of peace,

especially if the rule of uti posseditis were applied as a basis from

which to begin negotiations. But this contingency is too remote for

present consideration.

As to the probability of German success around Ypres, it seems to grow

less as time passes. After the first rush was over and the British lines

had time to re-form Germany has accomplished nothing. Moreover, it is

certain that in back of the short twenty-five miles of line held by the

British troops there is a reserve of almost a half million men. No other

portion of the battle line in either theatre has such great latent

strength ready to be thrown in when the critical moment comes. Just why

it has not been used so far is a mystery, the solution of which can be

found only in the brain of Sir John French. But it is known to be in

France and is there for a purpose.

From Loos to Arras the French have undertaken the most ambitious and the

most successful offensive movement made in the west since Winter set in.

The entire French line along this front of twenty-five miles, taking the

Germans by surprise, has gone forward a distance varying from one-half

to two and a half miles. The attack was launched at an extremely

opportune moment. The Germans were, in the first place, extremely busy

in the north at Ypres, and were making every effort to drive that attack

home. The probabilities were, therefore, that the line in front of the

Arras-Loos position was none too strong, and that such reserves as could

be spared had been sent north. Then, again, it would tend to divert

attention from the Ypres line, and so relieve somewhat the pressure on

the British lines at that point.

The objective of the French attack seems to have been the town of Lens,

which is the centre of the coal district of France. Loos, which is

about three miles north of Lens, has been one of the centres of

fighting. This indicates how close the French are to their objective.

Lens is an important railroad centre, and is the point of junction of

many roads which radiate in all directions. As yet the French advance is

not sufficient to denote anything, but another step in the "nibbling"

process by means of which the French have kept the Germans occupied for

some months.

In the German angle, from Etain to St. Mihiel to Pont-à-Mousson, the

French achieved what will probably prove to be the greatest local

success of the past week. That is, the complete occupation of the Le

Prêtre woods. Sooner or later the continual French encroachments on the

German area of occupation must cause the straightening out of this line

and the retirement of the Germans to the supporting forts of Metz. The

object of all the French moves against this angle has been the town of

Thiancourt, on the German supply line from Metz. The capture of the last

German line of trenches in the Prêtre Forest brings the French within

six miles of this town. When the French reach the northern edge of this

forest, and they must be very close to it now, it will be a simple

matter to drop shells into Thiancourt and seriously endanger every train

that comes in.

On the rest of the western front there have been a number of isolated

actions, notably in the Champagne district, in the Argonne Forest and

north of Flirey, between St. Mihiel and Pont-à-Mousson. They have been

of no particular advantage however, and seem to have had no definite

purpose beyond making additions to the casualty lists.

Considering the results of the week's operations in the west, therefore,

it is safe to say that the advantage lies with the Allies. That part of

the line which has been thrown on the defensive has more than held its

own, while the French offense has resulted in a considerable advance

over a wide front. If we may draw any comparison at all from this, it

must be that the German line is not nearly so impenetrable as the

British, and that when the Allies think the attempt will justify the

losses that will be inevitably sustained, the German line can be broken

even though the rupture may be quickly healed.

IN THE EASTERN THEATRE.

In the eastern theatre interest still centres in the battles in Galicia.

In Western Galicia, between the Dunajec and the San, the Russian forces

are steadily giving way before the attacks of the Germanic allies. Their

retreat, which, during the past week, has been rapid, has been well

protected by heavy rear guard actions, which have temporarily delayed

the pursuing Austrians at various points. At the same time, however, but

little respite was given to the Russians.

German and Austrian reports as to the number of prisoners and amount of

booty will bear scrutiny, and, taken into consideration with recent

disturbances in Italy, may safely be discounted. The surrender of such

large bodies of troops, even in the Russian Army, cannot be forced when

the lines of retreat are open or when sufficient notice is given that

such lines are dangerously menaced. It is only when troops are

surrounded or when a large hostile force is thrust in between units, as

happened some months ago with the Tenth Russian Army in the Masurian

Lakes district, that such surrenders occur.

This does not apply, of course, to the wounded, and in the present case

the Russians, through the enforced rapidity of their retreat, must

necessarily in many instances have left their wounded on the field of

battle to fall into the hands of the pursuing enemy. Certainly the

Russian losses were heavy. Equally certain is it that the battle for the

Carpathian passes is now history.

This is evident from a brief review of the Russian position on the

Carpathian front, with particular reference to the necessary lines of

communications and an outline of the present Russian position as

accurately as it can at present be determined. It must be stated at this

point, however, that this position is a matter of doubt, as reports

from Vienna and from Petrograd are greatly at variance as to what has

been accomplished.

It was noted last week that the Russian line formed a huge crescent, the

longer arc of which (and this was the Carpathian front) extended from

Bartfeld north, then east along the Carpathian crests, north of Uzsok to

a point on the Stryi River. This line is over 100 miles long. It was

dependent for supplies on five roads, three of which were fairly good

dirt roads, the other two railroads; of the latter one runs through

Uzsok, and is so far east that only a small section of the line was

reached by it.

The main line, however, has been supplied from the remaining four, all

of which turn off either from the one lateral railroad from Przemysl to

Jaslo or from the dirt road between Jaslo and Sanok, and run south to

the various passes. As this latter road simply loops the railroad

between these two points, the entire Russian Carpathian line may be

considered to have been supplied by the lateral railroad from Sanok to

Jaslo. In proportion to the number of troops that had to be fed and

supplied, these lines were only too few, and the marvel is that Russia

was able to keep up the necessary flow of food and ammunition throughout

her effort against the Carpathian passes. The possession of all of these

roads was the sine qua non of Russian success. The loss of any one of

them would affect so many miles of her line that the whole line would

have felt the influence.

The Austrian troops are said to have reached the lower San, but no

particular point is mentioned. Nothing is said about the upper San or

the stretch of Galicia between the two. It may, therefore, be assumed

that the Russian left is on the Vistula, near the confluence of the San,

and that the general line runs from there south, probably through

Rzeszow along the valley of the Wistok River, occupying the wooded hills

east of that river, and bending eastward slightly toward the upper San.

This means that all of the lines of communication that supplied the

Carpathian front except the line through Uzsok Pass are now in Austrian

hands.

Russia still clings tenaciously to Uzsok, however, doubtless having

under consideration the possibility that Italy may enter the war, and

that another advance against the Carpathians may then be made. In such a

contingency the Russian losses in the various engagements around Uzsok

would not have been in vain.

Russia has answered the Austrian drive from the west by a vigorous

offense against the defenses of Bukowina Province. The Austrian forces

east of the San River are divided--one part which has been extremely

active against the Russians being on the east bank of the Stryi, and the

other, which has been quiescently defensive, along the Bistritza, the

latter line running almost due east and west. This latter force the

Russians struck, using large bodies of Cossack cavalry in a flanking

movement from the north. The Austrian retreat has been more precipitate,

and the losses greater in proportion than in the Russian retreat from

the Dunajec.

If in addition the Rumanians came across Transylvania and caught the

Austrians in the rear the defeat would almost offset that of the

Russians in the west. Rumania's advent into the war is, however, still a

matter of doubt, and any conclusions predicated on that assumption are

entirely speculative.

The two known facts in regard to the Galician situation are that in

Western Galicia the Russian Dunajec line is retreating, uncovering and

therefore involving in its retreat the troops in the Carpathians, and in

Eastern Galicia the Russians seem to have the greater measure of

success. Of the two, however, the operations in Western Galicia are of

infinitely greater importance. Eventually the Russian retreat will

probably reach the general line of the San River north of Jaroslau,

where there will be an opportunity to re-form on a much shorter line,

and after recuperation of men and supplies preparations for a new

offense may be begun.

[Illustration: Operation on the Russian Front

This map records the action for the week ended May 15. In the extreme

north, in the Russian Baltic Province of Courland, the Germans still

held the port of Libau, (1,) and a fierce battle was in progress south

of Shavli, (2,) where the Russians stopped the raid toward Mitau.

In South Poland and West Galicia the changes brought about by the great

Austro-German drive of 1,500,000 men from Cracow are shown by the heavy

dotted and solid lines. The dotted line shows the approximate position

of the German battle front when the drive began and the solid line its

approximate position according to latest advices from Berlin and Vienna,

Jaroslau (3) being the latest important position reported captured.

In extreme Eastern Galicia the situation was reversed, the dotted line

showing roughly the position of the Russian line when the counter-drive

by the Czar's forces was launched and the solid line its position, so

far as was ascertainable, on May 15.]

Their defeat, however, has been a severe blow, and has cost Russia a

terrible price in men and in guns, the latter of which she could less

afford to lose. On the other hand, they have inflicted terrible

punishment on the victors, so that the victory partakes of a Pyrrhian

character.

In the meantime operations in the Dardanelles are being pressed, but are

not reported with sufficient definiteness to give an idea as to the

probable result.

Austro-German Success

By Major E. Moraht.

_Major E. Moraht, the military expert of the Berliner Tageblatt,

discussed the operations on the eastern war front as follows in the

Tageblatt of April 30:_

Austria-Hungary, through its latest decision to create a supplementary

Landsturm service law, has given notice that it desires under any

circumstances to be able to wage the war for a longer time, if

conditions should compel it to do so. Thus are contradicted all the

reports spread by ill-informed correspondents of foreign newspapers, who

sought to create the impression that Austria-Hungary was tired and had

not the energy to face the situation such as it is. Furthermore, the

acceptance of the supplementary Landsturm service gave testimony, in the

Hungarian Parliament, of the unanimity in which the Hungarian Nation

unites as soon as it is a question of furthering the armed preparedness

of the army.

The Landsturm law heretofore had two defects--it included in its scope

only the once-trained men liable to Landsturm service up to the age of

42 years, and restricted the use of certain Landsturm troops to certain

areas. Hereafter it will be possible to use the men capable of bearing

arms up to the fiftieth year, though, to be sure, only in case the

younger classes have in general already been exhausted. It will also be

possible to draw Hungarian formations and Austrian Landsturm troops in

such a manner that the area available will offer no more difficulties.

Even though the new law will presumably hold good only during the

present war, the impression created by the decision of the

Austro-Hungarian Government on the enemy and on neutrals cannot be a

slight one. We in Germany can only congratulate the peoples of our ally,

so willing to make sacrifices, upon this resolve, and no one among us

will be able to deny recognition thereof, the less because we ourselves,

according to human calculations will not have to adopt such an extension

of Landsturm service.

Our northeastern army has again been heard of. After a considerable time

the situation has again changed, and that, too, in our favor. The

battles northeast and east of Suwalki have again revived and have given

into our hands the Russian trenches along a front of twenty kilometers.

Between Kovno and Grodno, both situated on the Niemen, we must note in

our battle line the towns of Mariampol, Kalwarya, and the territory east

of Suwalki. This front has opposed to it the two Russian fortresses

mentioned and between them the bridgeheads at Olita and Sereje. Owing to

the brevity of the latest report, it cannot be told whether our attack

found an end in the Russian positions. It may be that the attack went

further and won territory at least twenty kilometers wide toward the

Niemen. Moreover, we have learned that the Russians still held on north

of Prasznysz, where on April 27 they lost prisoners and machine guns.

No answer is given by the sparse reports from the eastern army to the

question of the entire foreign press: "Where has Hindenburg been keeping

himself?" Wishes and speculations may thus busy themselves as much as

they like with the answering of that question. In the Russian version

of the war situation there is reference to advance guard skirmishes in

the territory of Memel, a brief interruption of the quiet southeast of

Augustowa and before Ossowicz. The Russians are clearly worried by the

possibility of an undertaking of the navy against the Russian Baltic

coast.

The territory of the fighting in the Carpathians still claims the chief

interest--especially because everywhere where the general position and

the weather conditions and topographical conditions permitted the

Austro-Hungarian-German offensive has begun. As has been emphasized on

previous occasions, the eagerness for undertaking actions on the part of

our allies had never subsided at any point, in spite of the strenuous

rigors of a stationary warfare. As early as April 14 an advance

enlivened the territory northwest of the Uzsok Pass. The position on the

heights of Tucholka has been won. The heights west and east of the

Laborez valley are in the hands of the Austro-German allies, and each

day furnishes new proofs of the forward pressure. Of especial importance

is the capture of Russian points of support southeast of Koziouwa, east

of the Orawa valley. The advance takes its course against the Galician

town of Stryi. The progress which the Austro-German southern army made

has so far been moving in the same direction, and one can understand why

the Russians instituted the fiercest counter-attacks in order to force

the allied troops to halt in this territory. The counter-attacks,

however, ended with a collapse of the Russians, and the resultant

pursuit was so vigorous that twenty-six more trenches were wrested from

the foe. Daily our front is being advanced in a northeasterly direction,

and there is little prospect for the Russians of being able to oppose

successful resistance to our pressure. For it is not a matter of the

success of a single fighting group that has been shoving forward like a

wedge from the great line of attack, but of a strategic offensive led as

a unit, and everywhere winning territory, the time for which seems to

have arrived.

It is an important fact that the eastern group of the Austro-Hungarian

army will clearly not be shattered. At Zaleszcyki a stand is being

maintained, and at Boyan on the Pruth the Austrian mortars have driven

the Russians out of their next-to-the-last positions before the

Bessarabian frontier.