THE ENGLISH ARMY ADVANCE TO LINLITHGOW.--BATTLE OF FALKIRK, FROM
THE ACCOUNTS GIVEN BY ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH WRITERS.--MISCELLANEOUS
TRANSACTIONS.
Day broke on the army of England moving onward to Linlithgow in one
long and variegated column. To those whom sanctity of character, or
local situation, enabled to await its approach, the spectacle, which
was now at hand, must have been fearfully interesting. Since the days
of the Romans, the present army was perhaps the largest that had
traversed the plains of Scotland. Many alterations had been introduced
about this time into Europe by the crusaders; and Edward, who was
no inapt scholar in the military art, had, during his residence in
Palestine, and his expeditions to France, availed himself of every
invention that came under his observation. His army, therefore, might
justly be considered as the most perfect in discipline, equipment,
and feudal splendour, that Christendom could boast of at the time.
As it approached, it seemed to lengthen,--the interminable array
issuing, as it were, from some inexhaustible source on the verge of the
horizon: Its glittering mazes occasionally appearing and disappearing
among the inequalities of the road, might be aptly compared to the
undulating movements of one of those enormous serpents that figure in
the pages of romance, some of whose coils are at times seen while its
extremities are concealed amid the darkness of the den from whence it
is represented as issuing forth. Most of the inhabitants fled before
the unwelcome intruders, except a few Carmelite friars, who stopped to
gaze on the warlike pageant.
The confused hum of this living mass increased as it advanced, till the
deserted walls of Linlithgow resounded to the braying of clarions, the
thundering of kettle-drums, and the prancing of war-steeds in flowing
caparisons, bestrode by warriors mailed to the teeth, having long
two-handed swords depending from their girdles, while their right hands
held lances, and their left supported triangular shields painted with
the various devices of their families.
Henry de Lacy, Earl of Lincoln,[19] and Humphry de Bohun, Earl of
Hereford, and Constable of England, led the first division. The second
was under the charge of Bishop Bek, who, having executed the commission
Edward had sent him by John Fitz-Marmaduke, next appeared in this
portentous march, attended by thirty-nine banners; for this proud
ecclesiastic spared no expense to render his retinue as magnificent as
possible. In the third division under the command of the King, besides
the royal standard (_three leopards courant_), there waved, the sacred
banner of St John of Beverley, that of St George (_white with a red
cross_), that of St Edmond, King of the West-Saxons, (_blue with three
gold crowns_), that of St Edward the Confessor, (_blue, with a cross
fleury between five martlets, gold_), and also the ominous standard of
Henry III., by the unfurling of which the army were apprised of the
vicinity of the enemy, and the certainty of an approaching battle.
This gorgeous emblem of war was never displayed, except to announce
a positive intention to fight: it was formed of red satin, bearing
a dragon embroidered in gold, having sapphire eyes, and the tongue
ingeniously contrived to seem continually moving.[20]
Amongst those who followed the royal banner, was Brian Fitz-Alan,[21]
the late Governor of Scotland, attended by his vassals, and those
Scots who still ventured to oppose the liberties of their country. Of
the latter, we find Brian le Jay, preceptor of the Scottish Templars,
who probably joined Edward at Torphichen. What number of knights
accompanied him to the field in this formidable crusade against the
freedom of that people who fostered them, cannot now be ascertained;
we may, however, venture to include _John de Sautre, “Maister de la
Chivalerie de Templi en Ecosse.”_
The immense multitude of Welsh collected by Edward, as being better
acquainted with mountain warfare, were dispersed among the different
divisions of the forces. Being mostly archers, and clothed in white
tunics, they were easily distinguished from the other troops.
Tradition asserts, that this grand army took a whole day to deploy
through the town of Linlithgow. This perhaps may be true respecting the
parties escorting the heavy war-engines, suttlers attending the camp,
and other stragglers; but the advanced guard of the English came in
sight of the Scottish outposts early in the day. The latter occupied
the ridge of a hill; and as the English marched up to attack them, a
thick mist intervened, and prevented the intended rencounter.
When the day cleared up, the Scottish army was discovered in the
distance, taking up their positions, and preparing for battle. Their
numbers did not exceed 30,000--not a third part of the force opposed to
them; and aware of the immense advantages which Edward possessed, and
extremely averse to risk the safety of the country on the issue of a
single battle, the Guardian would gladly have protracted the warfare,
by retiring farther to the north. Divisions, however, prevailed among
the leaders of the Scots; and, before they could agree on the measures
necessary to be adopted, the near approach of the English, and the
great superiority of the latter in cavalry, rendered retreat extremely
hazardous.
The Scottish army, which consisted principally of spearmen or lancers,
was arranged in four divisions or schiltrons. Those in the centre held
their long spears perpendicular, and stood ready to fill up a vacancy,
while each intervening rank gradually sloped their weapons till they
came to a level. The front rank kneeling, and the whole closely wedged
together, presented to the enemy the appearance of four enormous,
impenetrable porcupines, the space between each being filled up with
archers.
Edward, on seeing these dispositions for battle, hesitated to give
orders for the attack, and proposed that his followers should pitch
their tents, and allow the soldiers and horses time for rest and
refreshment. This was opposed by his officers, as being unsafe in
their present situation,--a small rivulet only intervening between
the two armies. “What, then, would you advise?” exclaimed Edward. “An
immediate advance!” was the reply; “the field and the victory will be
our’s.”--“In God’s name, then, let it be so!” said the King.
The Earls of Lincoln and Hereford, accordingly, led the first squadron
to the attack. Their progress, however, was retarded by an extensive
morass, which covered the front of the Scots, and obliged their enemies
to make a circuit to the west. While thus employed, the powerful
squadron under the Bishop of Durham managed to get in front of the
enemy. Bek, however, on observing the formidable appearance of his
opponents, wished to delay the charge till supported by the column
under the command of the King. “Stick to thy mass, Bishop,” said Ralf
Basset of Drayton, “and teach us not what to do in the face of an
enemy.”--“On, then,” said Bek, “Set on, in your own way; we are all
soldiers to-day, and bound to do our duty.” Instantly they rushed
forward, and soon became engaged with the first schiltron, which was
almost simultaneously attacked on the opposite quarter by the first
division which had cleared the morass. The cavalry of the Scots, and a
large body of the vassals of John Cumyn, immediately wheeled about, and
left the field without awaiting the attack. The schiltrons of spearmen,
however, stood firm, and repulsed all the efforts of their numerous and
heavy-armed assailants, who recoiled again and again from before the
mass of spears which their enemies presented. Baffled in their attack,
the cavalry of Edward charged upon the archers, who, less able to
stand their ground against the weight of their mail-clad adversaries,
gave way. In the confusion, Sir John Stewart of Bonkill, brother to
the Steward of Scotland, was thrown to the ground, while attempting
to rally his vassals, the archers of Selkirk; and though many of them
rushed forward to his assistance, their exertions were in vain:--their
gallant leader fell, surrounded by the bodies of his faithful tenantry.
Though heavy squadrons of cavalry were continually pushed forward
against the Scottish spearmen, still the latter maintained their ranks,
and displayed such admirable discipline and stubborn resolution, that
Edward, convinced of the inability of breaking their array, suspended
the charges of his horsemen, and ordered all his archers and slingers
to advance.[22]
Langtoft thus describes the conduct and appearance of the Scottish
infantry.
“Ther formast conrey, ther bakkis togidere sette,
Ther speres poynt ouer poynt, so sare & o thikke
& fast togidere joynt, to se it was ferlike.
Als a castelle thei stode, that were walled with stone,
Thei wende no man of blode thorgh tham suld haf gone
Ther folk was so mykelle, so stalworth & so clene,
Ther foyntes forward prikelle, nonhut wild thei wene,
That if alle Inglond fro Berwik vnto Kent,
The folk therin men fond had bien thider sent,
Stength suld non haf had, to perte tham thorgh oute,
So wer thei set sad with poyntes rounde aboute.”
_Vol. ii. p. 304, 305._
The formation of these Scottish schiltrons was admirably adapted for
defence; and had they been supplied with a sufficient body of cavalry
to have protected them from the assaults of the archers, they might
have kept their ground, in defiance of every effort of the enemy. But,
deserted by their own cavalry, they now stood helplessly exposed to a
storm of missiles which assailed them in all directions; for though
those in the centre bravely pressed forward to fill up the chasms in
front, cloud after cloud of arrows, mingled with stones, continued to
descend among their ranks with increasing and deadly effect, till the
ground was encumbered around them; while their former assailants sat
with their horses on the rein, ready to burst in upon them at the first
opening that would offer. The Scots at last became unsteady, under the
incessant and murderous discharge of the English artillery. The cavalry
then dashed forward, and breaking in upon their ranks, completed the
confusion.
Wallace now saw that retreat was the only expedient left by which he
could save the remnant of his countrymen; and having, with incredible
efforts, rallied a number of his most determined adherents, he attacked
the foremost of the pursuers, and by that means covered the retreat
of the fugitives. Amongst the slain, Brian le Jay[23] is particularly
mentioned. The death of this Templar, which took place in Callender
wood, damped the ardour of his companions, and enabled the Scots to
make good their retreat. In this sanguinary conflict, 15,000 Scots
are said to have been left on the field; the most distinguished of
whom were Sir John Graham of Dundalk, Sir John Stewart of Bonkill, and
MacDuff, grand-uncle to the Earl of Fife. The extent of the English
loss, from the stubborn opposition of their enemies, must also have
been considerable. After the battle, Wallace fell back on Stirling,
which he burnt, in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of
the English.
Respecting this battle, Scottish authors give a very different account
from the preceding, which is chiefly taken from the pages of English
historians. According to the former, the envy of the nobles towards
Wallace, and the dissensions incident thereto, were the chief, if
not the sole occasion of the disaster. The Scottish army, say they,
consisted of three divisions of ten thousand men each, under the
command of Sir John Cumyn, Lord of Badenoch, chief of the powerful clan
of that name; Sir John Stewart, brother to the Lord of Bute, who, in
addition to his own tenantry, headed those of his absent brother; and
Sir William Wallace,--three of the most powerful men in the country,
the two former from their birth and influence, the latter from the
great fame acquired by his military achievements. On the brink of the
engagement, an imprudent and unfortunate disagreement arose among the
leaders. Stewart insisted upon taking command of the army, being, as
he conceived, entitled to that honour, as the representative of his
brother, who was Lord High Steward of Scotland; Cumyn claiming it,
in his own right, on account of high birth, and near relationship to
the crown; and Wallace, as Guardian of the kingdom, refused to admit
the pretensions of either to a command which he, as representative of
their absent sovereign, conceived himself every way entitled to, even
though he had not earned that honour by former services. Stewart, in
the heat of the altercation, is said to have upbraided Wallace with
the lowness of his birth, and charged him with encroaching on the
rights of the nobility, which reminded him, he said, “of the owl in
the fable, who, having borrowed a feather from one bird, and a feather
from another, became vain of his plumage, and endeavoured to lord it
over his betters. The application is not difficult,” continued he;
“for, if every nobleman in Scotland were to claim his part of those
vassals which now follow your banners, your own personal retainers
would make but a sorry appearance in support of your high-flown
pretensions.” Wallace heard, with stern composure, those ill-timed
remarks of the haughty chieftain. “I am not ignorant,” said he, “of
the source whence this insulting language has proceeded; and since
you, my Lord, condescend to utter their sentiments, you may be also
induced to imitate their example: and even this,” glancing a look of
indignation at Cumyn, “I am not altogether unprepared for. Your fable
of the owl is not quite applicable; for I always showed myself in the
face of day, asserting the liberty and independence of my country,
while some others, like owls, courted concealment, and were too much
afraid of losing their _roosts_, to leave them for such a cause. As to
my followers, I wish no man to follow me who is not sound at the heart
in the cause of his country; and either at the head or in the ranks
of these, I will always consider it my glory to be found. In the mean
time, till it appear who are entitled to that character, I will make an
alteration in my position.” Having thus spoken, he removed those under
his command to a strong position on the face of a hill immediately
behind.
Edward, as if aware of the feud that thus existed in the Scottish camp,
and though suffering from the effects of his late accident, ordered
the Earl of Hereford, Constable of England, to advance with a body
of thirty thousand men, to attack the division under Cumyn; who, on
seeing them approach, turned his banners, and marched off the field,
leaving Stewart and his Brandanes (as the inhabitants of Bute were then
called), and the archers of Selkirk, his immediate vassals, exposed
to all the fury of the charge. They sustained it with the firmest
resolution; but the great mass of assailants against whom they were
engaged, left them little chance of success. Stewart, in the early
part of the battle, while giving orders to a body of archers, was
thrown from his horse and slain. His followers, however, far from being
discouraged by the loss of their chief, continued the conflict with
the greatest bravery. Macduff, with a great part of his retainers, were
cut off, in their endeavours to retrieve the fortunes of the day, yet
numbers forced their way through the ranks of the English, and joined
the division under Wallace. This was observed by Edward, who, impatient
at the resistance he had already met with, ordered Robert Bruce and
the Bishop of Durham to advance with the forces under their command.
While Wallace was engaged in securing the retreat of his unfortunate
countrymen, Bruce made a circuit round the hill which he occupied, and
gaining the ascent, obliged him to quit his position, and endeavour
to force his way through the enemy beneath. The charge of this fresh
body of Scots, composed of the stoutest and best disciplined warriors
in the country, was but ill sustained by the division they attacked,
which, giving way before their impetuous descent, was thrown into
confusion; and Wallace, availing himself of their disorder, directed
his troops to cross the Carron, and occupy a post which commanded the
ford. In the meantime, with a small but choice body of his friends, he
kept in the rear, and continued to charge and repulse those that were
most forward in the pursuit. In one of these efforts, Wallace advanced
alone from the midst of his little band, and, with a single blow,
slew Sir Brian le Jay, a knight templar[24] of high military renown,
who had shown himself most active in harassing the retreating Scots.
This action rendered the others more cautious in their approaches. Sir
John Graham, however, giving way to a gallant but imprudent ardour,
advanced too far amongst the enemy, where he was surrounded and slain;
and Wallace, after repeated endeavours to revenge the death of his
friend, rejoined his followers. This he effected with great difficulty,
from the influx of the tide, and the weakness of his horse, which is
said to have been so worn out with the fatigues of the day, and the
wounds it had received, that the noble animal expired as soon as it had
placed its master beyond the reach of his pursuers. By the attention
of his trusty follower Kerlé, who stood an anxious spectator on the
danger of his chief, Wallace was furnished with a fresh horse; and
the two friends, as they moved slowly along the banks of the river,
were gazing with silent and sorrowful interest on the scene of carnage
they had left, when Bruce, from the opposite bank, having recognised
the Guardian, raised his voice, and requested an interview. This was
readily granted, and the warriors approached each other from opposite
sides of the river, at a place narrow, deep and rocky. When on the
margin of the stream, Wallace waved his hand, to repress the curiosity
of his followers, while he eyed his misled countryman with stern, but
dignified composure. Bruce felt awed by the majestic appearance and
deportment of the patriot, and his voice, though loud, became tremulous
as he thus addressed him:--“I am surprised, Sir William, that you
should entertain thoughts, as it is believed you do, of attaining to
the crown of Scotland; and that, with this chimerical object in view,
you should thus continue to expose yourself to so many dangers. It
is not easy, you find, to resist the King of England, who is one of
the greatest princes in the world. And were you even successful in
your attempts, are you so vain as to imagine, that the Scots will
ever suffer you to be their King?” The Guardian did not allow him to
say more. “No,” replied he, “my thoughts never soared so high, nor
do I intend to usurp a crown I very well know my birth can give me
no right to, and my services can never merit. I only mean to deliver
my country from oppression and slavery, and to support a just cause,
which you have abandoned. You, my lord, whose right may entitle you
to be King, ought to protect the kingdom; ’tis because you do it not,
that I must, and will, while I breathe, endeavour the defence of that
country I was born to serve, and for which, if Providence will have
it so, to die. As for you, who, in place of exerting your talents to
turn the tide of battle in your country’s favour, choose rather to
live a slave, if with safety to your life and fortune, than free,
with the hazard of losing the latter, you may remain in possession of
what you so much value, while the hollow praises of our enemies may
blind you to the enormity of your conduct; but remember, my lord, they
whom you are thus aiding to bind the yoke of slavery on the necks of
your countrymen, will not long consider that conduct praise-worthy in
you, which they would condemn as infamous in themselves; and if they
are successful in rivetting our chains, you will find your reward in
the well-earned contempt of the oppressor, and the hearty execrations
of the oppressed. Pause, therefore, and reflect; if you have but the
heart to claim the crown, you may win it with glory, and wear it with
justice. I can do neither; but what I can I will--live and die a free
born man.” These generous sentiments, uttered in a clear, manly, and
determined tone of voice, came home to the heart of Bruce, with all
the sternness of deserved reproof; and he was about to reply, when the
ringing of harness, followed by the appearance of a number of helmets,
over-topping the ridge of a neighbouring hillock, made it prudent to
break off the conference.
Such are the particulars of this memorable battle, as related, with
some trifling variations, by most of, if not by all, our old Scottish
historians. As modern commentators, however, consider themselves
justified in denying some of the material points; particularly the
feud among the leaders--the presence of Bruce in the engagement--and,
consequently, his conference with Wallace, we shall in this place
devote a few pages to their consideration.
These objections are chiefly founded on the authority of Hemingford and
Trevit, two English monks, who are said to have had their information
from eye-witnesses. This may be all true; but when we find one of them
(Hemingford) asserting, that “_fifty thousand Scots were slain in the
battle, many drowned, three hundred thousand foot taken prisoners,
besides a thousand horse_,” we may reasonably suppose the possibility
of the _eye-witnesses_ being so much occupied in counting their killed
and captured enemies, that matters of such comparatively trifling
importance may not have had the requisite share of their attention.
Lord Hailes, however, lends the weight of his highly respectable name
in support of those who deny the truth of this portion of our national
annals, and thus expresses himself on the points in question: “It would
be tedious and unprofitable to recite all that has been said on this
subject by our own writers, from Fordun to Abercrombie, how Wallace,
Stewart, and Comyn quarrelled on the punctilio of leading the van of
an army, which stood on the defensive; how Stewart compared Wallace
to an owl, with borrowed feathers; how the Scottish leaders, busied
in this frivolous altercation, had no leisure to form their army; how
Comyn traitorously withdrew with ten thousand men; how Wallace, from
resentment, followed his example; how, by such disastrous incidents,
the Scottish army was enfeebled, and Stewart and his party abandoned
to destruction. Our histories abound in trash of this kind. There is
scarcely one of our writers who has not produced an invective against
Comyn, or an apology for Wallace, or a lamentation for the deserted
Stewart. What dissensions may have prevailed among the Scottish
commanders, it is impossible to know. It appears not to me, that their
dissensions had any influence on their conduct in the day of battle.
The truth seems to be this:--The English cavalry greatly exceeded the
Scotch in numbers--were infinitely better equipped, and more adroit.
The Scottish cavalry were intimidated and fled:--Had they remained in
the field, they might have preserved their honour, but never could have
turned the chance of that day. It was natural, however, for such of
their party as survived the engagement, to impute the disaster to the
defection of the cavalry:--National pride would ascribe their flight
to treachery rather than to pusillanimity. It is not improbable, that
Comyn commanded the cavalry; hence a report may have spread, that
Comyn betrayed his country: the report has been embellished by each
successive relation. When men are seized with a panic, their commander
_must_ of necessity, or _will_ from prudence, accompany them in their
flight. Earl Warren fled with his army from Stirling to Berwick, yet
Edward did not punish him as a traitor or a coward.
“The tale of Comyn’s treachery and Wallace’s ill-timed resentment, may
have gained credit, because it is a pretty tale, and not improbable
in itself; but it always amazes me that the story of the _congress_
of Bruce and Wallace, after the battle of Falkirk, should have gained
credit. I lay aside the full evidence which we now possess, ‘that
Bruce was not at that time of the English party, nor present at the
battle’--for it must be admitted, that our historians knew nothing
of those circumstances which demonstrate the impossibility of the
_congress_--but the wonder is, that men of sound judgment should not
have seen the absurdity of a long conversation between the commander of
a flying army, and one of the leaders of a victorious army. When Fordun
told the story, he placed ‘a narrow but inaccessible glen’ between the
speakers. Later historians have substituted the river Carron, in place
of an inaccessible glen; and they make Bruce and Wallace talk across
the river like two young declaimers from the pulpits in a school of
rhetoric.”
With all due deference to his Lordship, we conceive that the strength
of his first objection lies chiefly in adhering too literally to the
words “_leading the van_,” made use of by some of our old writers;
others, who mention the quarrel, do not so express themselves. Now,
we do not see any thing so improbable in a discussion arising among
these chiefs, who considered themselves independent of each other,
about who should have the supreme command in directing the operations
of the day, which, we presume, is all that is to be understood in this
instance by “_leading the van_.” The obvious advantage of having a
commander-in-chief in so momentous an occasion, could not have escaped
the merest tyro in military tactics; and that no person was appointed
to this office, even his Lordship does not deny. That Wallace, from
past services, as well as from being Guardian of the kingdom, had
reason to consider himself entitled to this distinction, cannot be
disputed; and it is not likely, from the talents and foresight he
had displayed on former occasions, that he would have come to the
field against so powerful and so experienced an adversary, without
having previously formed some plan for conducting the operations of
the day, so as to counteract the great superiority of force, which
the English monarch had brought into the field. The thwarting of his
plans, by the envy and hauteur of his colleagues, affords a plain
and obvious solution of his conduct; and his resignation of the
Guardianship after the battle, (which his Lordship does not deny,) very
strongly corroborates the account given by our Scottish historians,
of the treatment which he received on the field; and this treatment
must have been attended with circumstances which convinced him of
the utter hopelessness of his being able to direct the resources of
the country to advantage. Strong indeed must have been the reasons
which induced this brave, intrepid, and prudent pilot, to relinquish
the helm of affairs at so critical a juncture. That an unfortunate
animosity existed, we have the most ample testimony; and though his
Lordship conceives it to have been so very trifling in its nature,
as not to influence the parties in the discharge of their duty, yet
we have respectable and incontrovertible evidence that it not only
did so, but was the principal, if not the sole cause of the disasters
which overwhelmed the country. Wyntown thus expresses himself, on the
occasion:
“For dyspyt and gret inwy
The Comynys Kyn all hályly
Fyrst left the Feld; and, as behowyd,
Syne Willame Walayis hym remowyd:
For he persáwyd gret malys
Agayne hym scharpyd mony wys.”
And again,
“Before than couth ná man say,
Ná nevyr wes sene befor that day,
Sá hále wencust the Scottis men:
Ná it had noucht fallyn then,
Had noucht Falshed and Inwy
Devysyd theme sá syndryly.”
Here there is no national pride interfering, to conceal the extent
of the discomfiture of the Scots; and it is surprising his Lordship
should conceive, that any one would think it necessary to invent what
he calls a “_pretty tale_,” for the purpose of soothing the national
feelings. Thirty thousand Scots, we presume, may be defeated by ninety
or a hundred thousand English, without being _very_ much disgraced by
the affair; whereas the English authorities may have been silent on
circumstances which tended to diminish the glory of their victory, even
had they come to their knowledge.
That Cumyn commanded the cavalry is merely a conjecture of his
Lordship; but allowing it to have been the case, we conceive there is
a material difference between a leader joining in the general flight
of his army, and one riding off with part of the forces, and leaving
the rest to stand the brunt of the engagement. If Warren had acted
so, we presume he would either have been punished as a traitor, or
cashiered as a coward. That Cumyn was afterwards elected one of the
regents of the kingdom, affords no satisfactory evidence of his having
acted correctly. He was at the head of the only entire body of troops
in the country, and his faction unbroken--of course, there could be no
opposition to his election. And the wonder is, considering the ambition
of the man, that under these circumstances he was not appointed sole
regent, in place of sharing a divided authority, as will be seen
in the sequel, with one who was his inferior in birth, talents, and
influence.
We cannot see any great improbability of the “_congress_” (as his
Lordship calls it) having taken place in the manner described, provided
that _Bruce was present_. Wallace had already secured his troops from
immediate pursuit. Bruce might think it a favourable opportunity to
palliate his conduct at Irvine; and Wallace, who was seldom afraid to
come in juxtaposition with any one, might have been easily induced to
stand when he hailed him. His Lordship’s objection is founded chiefly
on the length of the conversation. Now, if any one will peruse it, even
in the most verbose of our historians, he will find that it could not
have occupied more than five minutes, which certainly cannot be called
“a long conversation,” or at least so long as to afford any thing like
a plausible objection to its occurrence. As to Fordun having placed “a
narrow inaccessible glen” between the parties, it does not in the least
affect the credibility of the account. Few glens are to be found in
Scotland, without a river or stream of some description running through
them; and in speaking of any of these, it is no uncommon thing for one
person to allude to the glen, and another to the river or stream so
connected with it.
That all our ancient authors should agree in the circumstance of
Bruce being present at the battle, is very singular, provided he
was not there. How they should all be in this state of ignorance is
rather unaccountable, considering the facility they had of informing
themselves; as some of them must have written from authority, if not of
eye-witnesses, at least of those who derived their accounts from such.
It is not at all probable that Bruce, who is universally acknowledged
to have been a monarch of great political sagacity, would have allowed
a tale, so likely to injure him in the opinion of his subjects, to get
into general circulation, while the contrary statement, _if true_,
would have tended to exalt him in their estimation. There appear so
many irreconcilable circumstances involved in the belief of this
opinion, that we feel much inclined to suspect some little discrepancy
in the evidence to which his Lordship so confidently alludes,[25] more
particularly as Wyntowne, whose authority is highly appreciated by all
writers, is so very pointed in asserting the presence of Bruce in the
English army. The words are,
“Bot yhit the lele Scottis men,
That in that feld ware feychtand then,
To-gyddyr stwd sá fermly
Strykand before thame manlykly,
Swá that náne thare thyrl thame mycht,
Bot Robert the Brows than wyth a slycht,
(_He thare wes wyth this King Edwart,
Set he oure Kyng wes eftyrwart_)
Wyth Schyre Anton the Bek a wyly man,
Of Durame Byschape he wes than,
A-bowt ane hill a well fere way
Owt of that stowre than prikyd thay;
Behynd bakkis alsá fast
Thare thai come on, and layid on fast;
Swá made thai the dyscumfytowre.”
Here our author, not satisfied with stating, that “Robert de Brows” was
with “_King Edwart_;” but, in order to establish the identity of the
person, and guard against his being confounded with the elder Robert
Bruce, or any other of the same name, he says expressly,
“_Set he oure Kyng wes eftyrwart._”
If Bruce was at this time on the side of the patriots, as his
Lordship says, it is singular that he did not appear among them on
this eventful day, in a manner becoming his birth, talents, and great
territorial influence. When all the chiefs of the party had collected
their followers for a grand national struggle, Bruce is represented
as employed in guarding, what his Lordship, for the sake of _effect_,
calls the “important castle of Ayr,” which, it seems in those days,
“_kept the communication open with Galloway, Argyllshire, and the
Isles_.”[26] Had the possession of this “important castle” been of
any use to an army stationed between Linlithgow and Falkirk, it
certainly could have been defended by a person of less consequence than
Bruce, whose military talents and numerous vassals would have been of
infinitely greater service in the field. When Wallace was straining
every nerve to collect the strength of the country, to oppose the
formidable invaders, and with his utmost efforts could not muster more
than 30,000 soldiers, can it be supposed, that he would have failed
to summon to the standard of liberty a baron of such influence as the
Earl of Carrick, if he thought there were a chance of the summons being
obeyed?
Though his Lordship asserts that Bruce had deserted the cause of
Edward, yet he does not attempt to show that any communication took
place between him and the Scottish army; nor by what authority he
assumed the defence of the castle of Ayr, which was a fortress at that
time belonging to the Crown. If Hemingford, on whose authority his
Lordship chiefly relies, could have gone so egregiously astray from
every thing like probability in the account he gives of the casualties
of the battle, we may, without injustice, receive his testimony on
this, or on any other subject, with suspicion; particularly when
it goes to contradict historians of acknowledged veracity, who had
opportunities of being at least equally well informed on the subject as
himself. It has been advanced by the learned annalist, in evidence of
the truth of Hemingford’s statement, that lands and castles belonging
to Bruce were plundered and taken by the English army. By a parity
of reasoning, if these lands and castles had been exempt from the
general outrage, it would have proved that Bruce was in the interest
of England; and the Guardian and Barons of Scotland would thereby have
stood convicted of the unparalleled folly of allowing lands to be
occupied, and castles to be held, in the very centre of the country, by
the open and declared partisan of their enemy. That the title of Bruce
to his Scottish estates was in abeyance, and his castles garrisoned for
the safety of the commonwealth of Scotland, is the most probable state
of the affair. When the half-famished soldiers of Edward, therefore,
pillaged the lands, and attacked the castles of Bruce, they did what
their King, under such circumstances, neither could nor would restrain,
whether his vassal had renounced his allegiance or not. This conduct on
the part of the English, therefore, can afford no evidence whatever of
Bruce being at the time “in arms against England.”
These observations the writer has thought it expedient to make, in
support of the relation given of the battle of Falkirk by the ancient
historians of Scotland. As the talents, however, which Lord Hailes
has displayed in his researches into Scottish history, are held by
the public in high, and in many instances, deserved estimation; and
though it is with reluctance that we differ from one whose opinions in
general are entitled to credit; yet, as we find him in this instance
at variance with most of our ancient Scottish authorities, we have
thought it our duty to endeavour to lay both sides of the question
fairly before the reader, in order that he may be able to form his own
opinion of the matter.