for under certain conditions it is a most useful system, and at
all times a mine should be equipped with tanks against accident
to the pumps. Where the amount of water is limited,--up to, say,
50,000 gallons daily,--and where the ore output of the mine permits
the use of the winding-engine for part of the time on water haulage,
there is in the method an almost total saving of capital outlay.
Inasmuch as the winding-engine, even when the ore haulage is finished
for the day, must be under steam for handling men in emergencies,
and as the labor of stokers, engine-drivers, shaft-men, etc., is
therefore necessary, the cost of power consumed by bailing is not
great, despite the low efficiency of winding-engines.
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS.--If it is assumed that flexibility,
reliability, mechanical efficiency, and capital cost can each be
divided into four figures of relative importance,--_A_, _B_, _C_,
and _D_, with _A_ representing the most desirable result,--it is
possible to indicate roughly the comparative values of various
pumping systems. It is not pretended that the four degrees are of
equal import. In all cases the factor of general power conditions
on the mine may alter the relative positions.
====================================================================
|Direct|Compressed| |Steam-| |
|Steam | Air |Electricity|Driven|Hydraulic|Bailing
|Pumps | | | Rods | Columns | Tanks
-------------|------|----------|-----------|------|---------|-------
Flexibility. | _A_ | _A_ | _B_ | _D_ | _B_ | _A_
Reliability. | _B_ | _B_ | _B_ | _A_ | _D_ | _A_
Mechanical | | | | | |
Efficiency.| _C_ | _D_ | _B_ | _A_ | _C_ | _D_
Capital Cost | _A_ | _B_ | _B_ | _D_ | _D_ | --
====================================================================
As each mine has its special environment, it is impossible to formulate
any final conclusion on a subject so involved. The attempt would lead
to a discussion of a thousand supposititious cases and hypothetical
remedies. Further, the description alone of pumping machines would
fill volumes, and the subject will never be exhausted. The engineer
confronted with pumping problems must marshal all the alternatives,
count his money, and apply the tests of flexibility, reliability,
efficiency, and cost, choose the system of least disadvantages,
and finally deprecate the whole affair, for it is but a parasite
growth on the mine.
CHAPTER XIV.
Mechanical Equipment (_Concluded_).
MACHINE DRILLING: POWER TRANSMISSION; COMPRESSED AIR _VS_. ELECTRICITY;
AIR DRILLS; MACHINE _VS_. HAND DRILLING. WORK-SHOPS. IMPROVEMENT
IN EQUIPMENT.
For over two hundred years from the introduction of drill-holes
for blasting by Caspar Weindel in Hungary, to the invention of
the first practicable steam percussion drill by J. J. Crouch of
Philadelphia, in 1849, all drilling was done by hand. Since Crouch's
time a host of mechanical drills to be actuated by all sorts of
power have come forward, and even yet the machine-drill has not
reached a stage of development where it can displace hand-work
under all conditions. Steam-power was never adapted to underground
work, and a serviceable drill for this purpose was not found until
compressed air for transmission was demonstrated by Dommeiller
on the Mt. Cenis tunnel in 1861.
The ideal requirements for a drill combine:--
a. Power transmission adapted to underground conditions.
b. Lightness.
c. Simplicity of construction.
d. Strength.
e. Rapidity and strength of blow.
f. Ease of erection.
g. Reliability.
h. Mechanical efficiency.
i. Low capital cost.
No drill invented yet fills all these requirements, and all are
a compromise on some point.
POWER TRANSMISSION; COMPRESSED AIR _vs_. ELECTRICITY.--The only
transmissions adapted to underground drill-work are compressed
air and electricity, and as yet an electric-driven drill has not
been produced which meets as many of the requirements of the metal
miner as do compressed-air drills. The latter, up to date, have
superiority in simplicity, lightness, ease of erection, reliability,
and strength over electric machines. Air has another advantage in
that it affords some assistance to ventilation, but it has the
disadvantage of remarkably low mechanical efficiency. The actual
work performed by the standard 3-3/4-inch air-drill probably does
not amount to over two or three horse-power against from fifteen to
eighteen horse-power delivered into the compressor, or mechanical
efficiency of less than 25%. As electrical power can be delivered to
the drill with much less loss than compressed air, the field for a
more economical drill on this line is wide enough to create eventually
the proper tool to apply it. The most satisfactory electric drill
produced has been the Temple drill, which is really an air-drill
driven by a small electrically-driven compressor placed near the
drill itself. But even this has considerable deficiencies in mining
work; the difficulties of setting up, especially for stoping work,
and the more cumbersome apparatus to remove before blasting are
serious drawbacks. It has deficiencies in reliability and greater
complication of machinery than direct air.
AIR-COMPRESSION.--The method of air-compression so long accomplished
only by power-driven pistons has now an alternative in some situations
by the use of falling water. This latter system is a development
of the last twelve years, and, due to the low initial outlay and
extremely low operating costs, bids fair in those regions where
water head is available not only to displace the machine compressor,
but also to extend the application of compressed air to mine motors
generally, and to stay in some environments the encroachment of
electricity into the compressed-air field. Installations of this
sort in the West Kootenay, B.C., and at the Victoria copper mine,
Michigan, are giving results worthy of careful attention.
Mechanical air-compressors are steam-, water-, electrical-, and
gas-driven, the alternative obviously depending on the source and
cost of power. Electrical- and gas- and water-driven compressors
work under the disadvantage of constant speed motors and respond
little to the variation in load, a partial remedy for which lies
in enlarged air-storage capacity. Inasmuch as compressed air, so
far as our knowledge goes at present, must be provided for drills,
it forms a convenient transmission of power to various motors
underground, such as small pumps, winches, or locomotives. As stated
in discussing those machines, it is not primarily a transmission
of even moderate mechanical efficiency for such purposes; but as
against the installation and operation of independent transmission,
such as steam or electricity, the economic advantage often compensates
the technical losses. Where such motors are fixed, as in pumps
and winches, a considerable gain in efficiency can be obtained by
reheating.
It is not proposed to enter a discussion of mechanical details of
air-compression, more than to call attention to the most common
delinquency in the installation of such plants. This deficiency
lies in insufficient compression capacity for the needs of the
mine and consequent effective operation of drills, for with under
75 pounds pressure the drills decrease remarkably in rapidity of
stroke and force of the blow. The consequent decrease in actual
accomplishment is far beyond the ratio that might be expected on
the basis of mere difference of pressure. Another form of the same
chronic ill lies in insufficient air-storage capacity to provide
for maintenance of pressure against moments when all drills or
motors in the mine synchronize in heavy demand for air, and thus
lower the pressure at certain periods.
AIR-DRILLS.--Air-drills are from a mechanical point of view broadly
of two types,--the first, in which the drill is the piston extension;
and the second, a more recent development for mining work, in which
the piston acts as a hammer striking the head of the drill. From an
economic point of view drills may be divided into three classes.
First, heavy drills, weighing from 150 to 400 pounds, which require
two men for their operation; second, "baby" drills of the piston type,
weighing from 110 to 150 pounds, requiring one man with occasional
assistance in setting up; and third, very light drills almost wholly
of the hammer type. This type is built in two forms: a heavier
type for mounting on columns, weighing about 80 pounds; and a type
after the order of the pneumatic riveter, weighing as low as 20
pounds and worked without mounting.
The weight and consequent mobility of a drill, aside from labor
questions, have a marked effect on costs, for the lighter the drill
the less difficulty and delay in erection, and consequent less
loss of time and less tendency to drill holes from one radius,
regardless of pointing to take best advantage of breaking planes.
Moreover, smaller diameter and shorter holes consume less explosives
per foot advanced or per ton broken. The best results in tonnage
broken and explosive consumed, if measured by the foot of drill-hole
necessary, can be accomplished from hand-drilling and the lighter
the machine drill, assuming equal reliability, the nearer it
approximates these advantages.
The blow, and therefore size and depth of hole and rapidity of
drilling, are somewhat dependent upon the size of cylinders and
length of stroke, and therefore the heavier types are better adapted
to hard ground and to the deep holes of some development points.
Their advantages over the other classes lie chiefly in this ability
to bore exceedingly hard material and in the greater speed of advance
possible in development work; but except for these two special
purposes they are not as economical per foot advanced or per ton
of ore broken as the lighter drills.
The second class, where men can be induced to work them one man per
drill, saves in labor and gains in mobility. Many tests show great
economy of the "baby" type of piston drills in average ground over
the heavier machines for stoping and for most lateral development.
All piston types are somewhat cumbersome and the heavier types
require at least four feet of head room. The "baby" type can be
operated in less space than this, but for narrow stopes they do
not lend themselves with the same facility as the third class.
The third class of drills is still in process of development, but
it bids fair to displace much of the occupation of the piston types
of drill. Aside from being a one-man drill, by its mobility it
will apparently largely reproduce the advantage of hand-drilling
in ability to place short holes from the most advantageous angles
and for use in narrow places. As compared with other drills it
bids fair to require less time for setting up and removal and for
change of bits; to destroy less steel by breakages; to dull the
bits less rapidly per foot of hole; to be more economical of power;
to require much less skill in operation, for judgment is less called
upon in delivering speed; and to evade difficulties of fissured
ground, etc. And finally the cost is only one-half, initially and
for spares. Its disadvantage so far is a lack of reliability due to
lightness of construction, but this is very rapidly being overcome.
This type, however, is limited in depth of hole possible, for,
from lack of positive reverse movement, there is a tendency for
the spoil to pack around the bit, and as a result about four feet
seems the limit.
The performance of a machine-drill under show conditions may be
anything up to ten or twelve feet of hole per hour on rock such
as compact granite; but in underground work a large proportion of
the time is lost in picking down loose ore, setting up machines,
removal for blasting, clearing away spoil, making adjustments,
etc. The amount of lost time is often dependent upon the width of
stope or shaft and the method of stoping. Situations which require
long drill columns or special scaffolds greatly accentuate the loss
of time. Further, the difficulties in setting up reflect indirectly
on efficiency to a greater extent in that a larger proportion of
holes are drilled from one radius and thus less adapted to the
best breaking results than where the drill can easily be reset from
various angles.
The usual duty of a heavy drill per eight-hour shift using two men
is from 20 to 40 feet of hole, depending upon the rock, facilities
for setting up, etc., etc.[*] The lighter drills have a less average
duty, averaging from 15 to 25 feet per shift.
[Footnote *: Over the year 1907 in twenty-eight mines compiled
from Alaska to Australia, an average of 23.5 feet was drilled per
eight-hour shift by machines larger than three-inch cylinder.]
MACHINE _vs_. HAND-DRILLING.--The advantages of hand-drilling over
machine-drilling lie, first, in the total saving of power, the
absence of capital cost, repairs, depreciation, etc., on power,
compresser and drill plant; second, the time required for setting
up machine-drills does not warrant frequent blasts, so that a number
of holes on one radius are a necessity, and therefore machine-holes
generally cannot be pointed to such advantage as hand-holes. Hand-holes
can be set to any angle, and by thus frequent blasting yield greater
tonnage per foot of hole. Third, a large number of comparative
statistics from American, South African, and Australian mines show
a saving of about 25% in explosives for the same tonnage or foot
of advance by hand-holes over medium and heavy drill-holes.
The duty of a skilled white man, single-handed, in rock such as
is usually met below the zone of oxidation, is from 5 to 7 feet
per shift, depending on the rock and the man. Two men hand-drilling
will therefore do from 1/4 to 2/3 of the same footage of holes
that can be done by two men with a heavy machine-drill, and two
men hand-drilling will do from 1/5 to 1/2 the footage of two men
with two light drills.
The saving in labor of from 75 to 33% by machine-drilling may or
may not be made up by the other costs involved in machine-work.
The comparative value of machine- and hand-drilling is not subject
to sweeping generalization. A large amount of data from various
parts of the world, with skilled white men, shows machine-work
to cost from half as much per ton or foot advanced as hand-work
to 25% more than handwork, depending on the situation, type of
drill, etc. In a general way hand-work can more nearly compete
with heavy machines than light ones. The situations where hand-work
can compete with even light machines are in very narrow stopes where
drills cannot be pointed to advantage, and where the increased
working space necessary for machine drills results in breaking more
waste. Further, hand-drilling can often compete with machine-work
in wide stopes where long columns or platforms must be used and
therefore there is much delay in taking down, reërection, etc.
Many other factors enter into a comparison, however, for
machine-drilling produces a greater number of deeper holes and
permits larger blasts and therefore more rapid progress. In driving
levels under average conditions monthly footage is from two to
three times as great with heavy machines as by hand-drilling, and
by lighter machines a somewhat less proportion of greater speed.
The greater speed obtained in development work, the greater tonnage
obtained per man in stoping, with consequent reduction in the number
of men employed, and in reduction of superintendence and general
charges are indirect advantages for machine-drilling not to be
overlooked.
The results obtained in South Africa by hand-drilling in shafts,
and its very general adoption there, seem to indicate that better
speed and more economical work can be obtained in that way in very
large shafts than by machine-drilling. How far special reasons
there apply to smaller shafts or labor conditions elsewhere have
yet to be demonstrated. In large-dimension shafts demanding a large
number of machines, the handling of long machine bars and machines
generally results in a great loss of time. The large charges in
deep holes break the walls very irregularly; misfires cause more
delay; timbering is more difficult in the face of heavy blasting
charges; and the larger amount of spoil broken at one time delays
renewed drilling, and altogether the advantages seem to lie with
hand-drilling in shafts of large horizontal section.
The rapid development of special drills for particular conditions
has eliminated the advantage of hand-work in many situations during
the past ten years, and the invention of the hammer type of drill
bids fair to render hand-drilling a thing of the past. One
generalization is possible, and that is, if drills are run on 40-50
pounds' pressure they are no economy over hand-drilling.
WORKSHOPS.
In addition to the ordinary blacksmithy, which is a necessity,
the modern tendency has been to elaborate the shops on mines to
cover machine-work, pattern-making and foundry-work, in order that
delays may be minimized by quick repairs. To provide, however,
for such contingencies a staff of men must be kept larger than
the demand of average requirements. The result is an effort to
provide jobs or to do work extravagantly or unnecessarily well.
In general, it is an easy spot for fungi to start growing on the
administration, and if custom repair shops are available at all,
mine shops can be easily overdone.
A number of machines are now in use for sharpening drills.
Machine-sharpening is much cheaper than hand-work, although the drills
thus sharpened are rather less efficient owing to the difficulty of
tempering them to the same nicety; however, the net results are
in favor of the machines.
IMPROVEMENT IN EQUIPMENT.
Not only is every mine a progressive industry until the bottom
gives out, but the technology of the industry is always progressing,
so that the manager is almost daily confronted with improvements
which could be made in his equipment that would result in decreasing
expenses or increasing metal recovery. There is one test to the
advisability of such alterations: How long will it take to recover
the capital outlay from the savings effected? and over and above
this recovery of capital there must be some very considerable gain.
The life of mines is at least secured over the period exposed in
the ore-reserves, and if the proposed alteration will show its
recovery and profit in that period, then it is certainly justified.
If it takes longer than this on the average speculative ore-deposit,
it is a gamble on finding further ore. As a matter of practical
policy it will be found that an improvement in equipment which
requires more than three or four years to redeem itself out of
saving, is usually a mechanical or metallurgical refinement the
indulgence in which is very doubtful.
CHAPTER XV.
Ratio of Output to the Mine.
DETERMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE MAXIMUM; LIMITING FACTORS; COST OF
EQUIPMENT; LIFE OF THE MINE; MECHANICAL INEFFICIENCY OF PATCHWORK
PLANT; OVERPRODUCTION OF BASE METAL; SECURITY OF INVESTMENT.
The output obtainable from a given mine is obviously dependent
not only on the size of the deposit, but also on the equipment
provided,--in which equipment means the whole working appliances,
surface and underground.
A rough and ready idea of output possibilities of inclined deposits
can be secured by calculating the tonnage available per foot of
depth from the horizontal cross-section of the ore-bodies exposed
and assuming an annual depth of exhaustion, or in horizontal deposits
from an assumption of a given area of exhaustion. Few mines, at the
time of initial equipment, are developed to an extent from which
their possibilities in production are evident, for wise finance
usually leads to the erection of some equipment and production before
development has been advanced to a point that warrants a large or
final installation. Moreover, even were the full possibilities of
the mine known, the limitations of finance usually necessitate a
less plant to start with than is finally contemplated. Therefore
output and equipment are usually growing possibilities during the
early life of a mine.
There is no better instance in mine engineering where pure theory
must give way to practical necessities of finance than in the
determination of the size of equipment and therefore output. Moreover,
where finance even is no obstruction, there are other limitations
of a very practical order which must dominate the question of the
size of plant giving the greatest technical economy. It is, however,
useful to state the theoretical considerations in determining the
ultimate volume of output and therefore the size of equipments,
for the theory will serve to illuminate the practical limitations.
The discussion will also again demonstrate that all engineering
is a series of compromises with natural and economic forces.
OUTPUT GIVING LEAST PRODUCTION COST.--As one of the most important
objectives is to work the ore at the least cost per ton, it is
not difficult to demonstrate that the minimum working costs can
be obtained only by the most intensive production. To prove this,
it need only be remembered that the working expenses of a mine
are of two sorts: one is a factor of the tonnage handled, such as
stoping and ore-dressing; the other is wholly or partially dependent
upon time. A large number of items are of this last order. Pumping
and head-office expenses are almost entirely charges independent
of the tonnage handled. Superintendence and staff salaries and
the like are in a large proportion dependent upon time. Many other
elements of expense, such as the number of engine-drivers, etc., do
not increase proportionately to increase in tonnage. These charges,
or the part of them dependent upon time apart from tonnage, may be
termed the "fixed charges."
There is another fixed charge more obscure yet no less certain.
Ore standing in a mine is like money in a bank drawing no interest,
and this item of interest may be considered a "fixed charge," for
if the ore were realized earlier, this loss could be partially
saved. This subject is further referred to under "Amortization."
If, therefore, the time required to exhaust the mine be prolonged
by the failure to maintain the maximum output, the total cost of
working it will be greater by the fixed charges over such an increased
period. Conversely, by equipping on a larger scale, the mine will
be exhausted more quickly, a saving in total cost can be made, and
the ultimate profit can be increased by an amount corresponding
to the time saved from the ravages of fixed charges. In fine, the
working costs may be reduced by larger operations, and therefore
the value of the mine increased.
The problem in practice usually takes the form of the relative
superiority of more or of fewer units of plant, and it can be considered
in more detail if the production be supposed to consist of units
averaging say 100 tons per day each. The advantage of more units
over less will be that the extra ones can be produced free of fixed
charges, for these are an expense already involved in the lesser
units. This extra production will also enjoy the interest which
can be earned over the period of its earlier production. Moreover,
operations on a larger scale result in various minor economies
throughout the whole production, not entirely included in the type
of expenditure mentioned as "fixed charges." We may call these
various advantages the "saving of fixed charges" due to larger-scale
operations. The saving of fixed charges amounts to very considerable
sums. In general the items of working cost alone, mentioned above,
which do not increase proportionately to the tonnage, aggregate
from 10 to 25% of the total costs. Where much pumping is involved,
the percentage will become even greater.
The question of the value of the mine as affected by the volume
of output becomes very prominent in low-grade mines, where, if
equipped for output on too small a scale, no profits at all could
be earned, and a sufficient production is absolutely imperative
for any gain. There are many mines in every country which with
one-third of their present rate of production would lose money.
That is, the fixed charges, if spread over small output, would be
so great per ton that the profit would be extinguished by them.
In the theoretical view, therefore, it would appear clear that
the greatest ultimate profit from a mine can be secured only by
ore extraction under the highest pressure. As a corollary to this
it follows that development must proceed with the maximum speed.
Further, it follows that the present value of a mine is at least
partially a factor of the volume of output contemplated.
FACTORS LIMITING THE OUTPUT.
Although the above argument can be academically defended, there
are, as said at the start, practical limitations to the maximum
intensity of production, arising out of many other considerations
to which weight must be given. In the main, there are five principal
limitations:--
1. Cost of equipment.
2. Life of the mine.
3. Mechanical inefficiency of patchwork plant.
4. Overproduction of base metal.
5. Security of investment.
COST OF EQUIPMENT.--The "saving of fixed charges" can only be obtained
by larger equipment, which represents an investment. Mining works,
shafts, machinery, treatment plants, and all the paraphernalia cost
large sums of money. They become either worn out or practically
valueless through the exhaustion of the mines. Even surface machinery
when in good condition will seldom realize more than one-tenth of its
expense if useless at its original site. All mines are ephemeral;
therefore virtually the entire capital outlay of such works must
be redeemed during the life of the mine, and the interest on it
must also be recovered.
The certain life, with the exception of banket and a few other
types of deposit, is that shown by the ore in sight, plus something
for extension of the deposit beyond exposures. So, against the
"savings" to be made, must be set the cost of obtaining them, for
obviously it is of no use investing a dollar to save a total of
ninety cents. The economies by increased production are, however,
of such an important character that the cost of almost any number
of added units (within the ability of the mine to supply them)
can be redeemed from these savings in a few years. For instance,
in a Californian gold mine where the working expenses are $3 and
the fixed charges are at the low rate of 30 cents per ton, one
unit of increased production would show a saving of over $10,000
per annum from the saving of fixed charges. In about three years
this sum would repay the cost of the additional treatment equipment.
If further shaft capacity were required, the period would be much
extended. On a Western copper mine, where the costs are $8 and the
fixed charges are 80 cents per ton, one unit of increased production
would effect a saving of the fixed charges equal to the cost of
the extra unit in about three years. That is, the total sum would
amount to $80,000, or enough to provide almost any type of mechanical
equipment for such additional tonnage.
The first result of vigorous development is to increase the ore in
sight,--the visible life of the mine. When such visible life has
been so lengthened that the period in which the "saving of fixed
charges" will equal the amount involved in expansion of equipment,
then from the standpoint of this limitation only is the added
installation justified. The equipment if expanded on this practice
will grow upon the heels of rapid development until the maximum
production from the mine is reached, and a kind of equilibrium
establishes itself.
Conversely, this argument leads to the conclusion that, regardless
of other considerations, an equipment, and therefore output, should
not be expanded beyond the redemption by way of "saving from fixed
charges" of the visible or certain life of the mine. In those mines,
such as at the Witwatersrand, where there is a fairly sound assurance
of definite life, it is possible to calculate at once the size of
plant which by saving of "fixed charges" will be eventually the
most economical, but even here the other limitations step in to
vitiate such policy of management,--chiefly the limitation through
security of investment.
LIFE OF THE MINE.--If carried to its logical extreme, the above
program means a most rapid exhaustion of the mine. The maximum output
will depend eventually upon the rapidity with which development
work may be extended. As levels and other subsidiary development
openings can be prepared in inclined deposits much more quickly
than the shaft can be sunk, the critical point is the shaft-sinking.
As a shaft may by exertion be deepened at least 400 feet a year on
a going mine, the provision of an equipment to eat up the ore-body
at this rate of sinking means very early exhaustion indeed. In
fact, had such a theory of production been put into practice by
our forefathers, the mining profession might find difficulty in
obtaining employment to-day. Such rapid exhaustion would mean a
depletion of the mineral resources of the state at a pace which
would be alarming.
MECHANICAL INEFFICIENCY OF PATCHWORK PLANT.--Mine equipments on
speculative mines (the vast majority) are often enough patchwork,
for they usually grow from small beginnings; but any scheme of
expansion based upon the above doctrine would need to be modified
to the extent that additions could be in units large in ratio to
previous installations, or their patchwork character would be still
further accentuated. It would be impossible to maintain mechanical
efficiency under detail expansion.
OVERPRODUCTION OF BASE METAL.--Were this intensity of production of
general application to base metal mines it would flood the markets,
and, by an overproduction of metal depress prices to a point where
the advantages of such large-scale operations would quickly vanish.
The theoretical solution in this situation would be, if metals
fell below normal prices, let the output be reduced, or let the
products be stored until the price recovers. From a practical point
of view either alternative is a policy difficult to face.
In the first case, reduction of output means an increase of working
expenses by the spread of fixed charges over less tonnage, and
this in the face of reduced metal prices. It may be contended,
however, that a falling metal market is usually the accompaniment
of a drop in all commodities, wherefore working costs can be reduced
somewhat in such times of depression, thereby partially compensating
the other elements making for increased costs. Falls in commodities
are also the accompaniment of hard times. Consideration of one's
workpeople and the wholesale slaughter of dividends to the then
needy stockholders, resulting from a policy of reduced production,
are usually sufficient deterrents to diminished output.
The second alternative, that of storing metal, means equally a
loss of dividends by the investment of a large sum in unrealized
products, and the interest on this sum. The detriment to the market
of large amounts of unsold metal renders such a course not without
further disadvantages.
SECURITY OF INVESTMENT.--Another point of view antagonistic to
such wholesale intensity of production, and one worthy of careful
consideration, is that of the investor in mines. The root-value of
mining stocks is, or should be, the profit in sight. If the policy
of greatest economy in production costs be followed as outlined
above, the economic limit of ore-reserves gives an apparently very
short life, for the ore in sight will never represent a life beyond
the time required to justify more plant. Thus the "economic limit
of ore in reserve" will be a store equivalencing a period during
which additional equipment can be redeemed from the "saving of
fixed charges," or three or four years, usually.
The investor has the right to say that he wants the guarantee of
longer life to his investment,--he will in effect pay insurance for
it by a loss of some ultimate profit. That this view, contradictory
to the economics of the case, is not simply academic, can be observed
by any one who studies what mines are in best repute on any stock
exchange. All engineers must wish to have the industry under them
in high repute. The writer knows of several mines paying 20% on
their stocks which yet stand lower in price on account of short
ore-reserves than mines paying less annual returns. The speculator,
who is an element not to be wholly disregarded, wishes a rise in
his mining stock, and if development proceeds at a pace in advance
of production, he will gain a legitimate rise through the increase
in ore-reserves.
The investor's and speculator's idea of the desirability of a proved
long life readily supports the technical policy of high-pressure
development work, but not of expansion of production, for they
desire an increasing ore-reserve. Even the metal operator who is
afraid of overproduction does not object to increased ore-reserves.
On the point of maximum intensity of development work in a mine all
views coincide. The mining engineer, if he takes a Machiavellian
view, must agree with the investor and the metal dealer, for the
engineer is a "fixed charge" the continuance of which is important
to his daily needs.
The net result of all these limitations is therefore an invariable
compromise upon some output below the possible maximum. The initial
output to be contemplated is obviously one upon which the working
costs will be low enough to show a margin of profit. The medium
between these two extremes is determinable by a consideration of
the limitations set out,--and the cash available. When the volume
of output is once determined, it must be considered as a factor
in valuation, as discussed under "Amortization."
CHAPTER XVI.
Administration.
LABOR EFFICIENCY; SKILL; INTELLIGENCE; APPLICATION COORDINATION;
CONTRACT WORK; LABOR UNIONS; REAL BASIS OF WAGES.
The realization from a mine of the profits estimated from the other
factors in the case is in the end dependent upon the management.
Good mine management is based upon three elementals: first, sound
engineering; second, proper coördination and efficiency of every human
unit; third, economy in the purchase and consumption of supplies.
The previous chapters have been devoted to a more or less extended
exposition of economic engineering. While the second and third
requirements are equally important, they range in many ways out of
the engineering and into the human field. For this latter reason
no complete manual will ever be published upon "How to become a
Good Mine Manager."
It is purposed, however, to analyze some features of these second
and third fundamentals, especially in their interdependent phases,
and next to consider the subject of mine statistics, for the latter
are truly the microscopes through which the competence of the
administration must be examined.
The human units in mine organization can be divided into officers
and men. The choice of mine officers is the assembling of specialized
brains. Their control, stimulation, and inspiration is the main work
of the administrative head. Success in the selection and control of
staff is the index of executive ability. There are no mathematical,
mechanical, or chemical formulas for dealing with the human mind
or human energies.
LABOR.--The whole question of handling labor can be reduced to
the one term "efficiency." Not only does the actual labor outlay
represent from 60 to 70% of the total underground expenses, but
the capacity or incapacity of its units is responsible for wider
fluctuations in production costs than the bare predominance in
expenditure might indicate. The remaining expense is for supplies,
such as dynamite, timber, steel, power, etc., and the economical
application of these materials by the workman has the widest bearing
upon their consumption.
Efficiency of the mass is the resultant of that of each individual
under a direction which coördinates effectively all units. The
lack of effectiveness in one individual diminishes the returns
not simply from that man alone; it lowers the results from numbers
of men associated with the weak member through the delaying and
clogging of their work, and of the machines operated by them.
Coördination of work is a necessary factor of final efficiency. This
is a matter of organization and administration. The most zealous
stoping-gang in the world if associated with half the proper number
of truckers must fail to get the desired result.
Efficiency in the single man is the product of three factors,--skill,
intelligence, and application. A great proportion of underground
work in a mine is of a type which can be performed after a fashion
by absolutely unskilled and even unintelligent men, as witness the
breaking-in of savages of low average mentality, like the South
African Kaffirs. Although most duties can be performed by this
crudest order of labor, skill and intelligence can be applied to
it with such economic results as to compensate for the difference
in wage. The reason for this is that the last fifty years have seen
a substitution of labor-saving machines for muscle. Such machines
displace hundreds of raw laborers. Not only do they initially cost
large sums, but they require large expenditure for power and up-keep.
These fixed charges against the machine demand that it shall be
worked at its maximum. For interest, power, and up-keep go on in
any event, and the saving on crude labor displaced is not so great
but that it quickly disappears if the machine is run under its
capacity. To get its greatest efficiency, a high degree of skill
and intelligence is required. Nor are skill and intelligence alone
applicable to labor-saving devices themselves, because drilling and
blasting rock and executing other works underground are matters
in which experience and judgment in the individual workman count
to the highest degree.
How far skill affects production costs has had a thorough demonstration
in West Australia. For a time after the opening of those mines
only a small proportion of experienced men were obtainable. During
this period the rock broken per man employed underground did not
exceed the rate of 300 tons a year. In the large mines it has now,
after some eight years, attained 600 to 700 tons.
How far intelligence is a factor indispensable to skill can be well
illustrated by a comparison of the results obtained from working
labor of a low mental order, such as Asiatics and negroes, with those
achieved by American or Australian miners. In a general way, it may
be stated with confidence that the white miners above mentioned
can, under the same physical conditions, and with from five to ten
times the wage, produce the same economic result,--that is, an
equal or lower cost per unit of production. Much observation and
experience in working Asiatics and negroes as well as Americans
and Australians in mines, leads the writer to the conclusion that,
averaging actual results, one white man equals from two to three
of the colored races, even in the simplest forms of mine work such
as shoveling or tramming. In the most highly skilled branches,
such as mechanics, the average ratio is as one to seven, or in
extreme cases even eleven. The question is not entirely a comparison
of bare efficiency individually; it is one of the sum total of
results. In mining work the lower races require a greatly increased
amount of direction, and this excess of supervisors consists of
men not in themselves directly productive. There is always, too,
a waste of supplies, more accidents, and more ground to be kept
open for accommodating increased staff, and the maintenance of
these openings must be paid for. There is an added expense for
handling larger numbers in and out of the mine, and the lower
intelligence reacts in many ways in lack of coördination and inability
to take initiative. Taking all divisions of labor together, the
ratio of efficiency as measured in amount of output works out from
four to five colored men as the equivalent of one white man of the
class stated. The ratio of costs, for reasons already mentioned,
and in other than quantity relation, figures still more in favor
of the higher intelligence.
The following comparisons, which like all mine statistics must
necessarily be accepted with reservation because of some dissimilarity
of economic surroundings, are yet on sufficiently common ground
to demonstrate the main issue,--that is, the bearing of inherent
intelligence in the workmen and their consequent skill. Four groups
of gold mines have been taken, from India, West Australia, South
Africa, and Western America. All of those chosen are of the same
stoping width, 4 to 5 feet. All are working in depth and with every
labor-saving device available. All dip at about the same angle and
are therefore in much the same position as to handling rock. The
other conditions are against the white-manned mines and in favor of
the colored. That is, the Indian mines have water-generated electric
power and South Africa has cheaper fuel than either the American or
Australian examples. In both the white-manned groups, the stopes
are supported, while in the others no support is required.
=======================================================================
| Tons of | Average |Tons |
| Material | Number of Men | per |Cost per
Group of Mines | Excavated | Employed | Man | Ton of
|over Period|---------------| per |Material
|Compiled[5]|Colored| White |Annum| Broken
----------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|-----|--------
Four Kolar mines[1] | 963,950 | 13,611| 302 | 69.3| $3.85
Six Australian mines[2] | 1,027,718 | -- | 1,534 |669.9| 2.47
Three Witwatersrand mines[3]| 2,962,640 | 13,560| 1,595 |195.5| 2.68
Five American mines[4] | 1,089,500 | -- | 1,524 |713.3| 1.92
=======================================================================
[Footnote 1: Indian wages average about 20 cents per day.]
[Footnote 2: White men's wages average about $3 per day.]
[Footnote 3: About two-fifths of the colored workers were negroes,
and three-fifths Chinamen. Negroes average about 60 cents, and
Chinamen about 45 cents per day, including keep.]
[Footnote 4: Wages about $3.50. Tunnel entry in two mines.]
[Footnote 5: Includes rock broken in development work.
In the case of the specified African mines, the white labor is
employed almost wholly in positions of actual or semi-superintendence,
such as one white man in charge of two or three drills.
In the Indian case, in addition to the white men who are wholly
in superintendence, there were of the natives enumerated some 1000
in positions of semi-superintendence, as contractors or headmen,
working-gangers, etc.]
One issue arises out of these facts, and that is that no engineer
or investor in valuing mines is justified in anticipating lower
costs in regions where cheap labor exists.
In supplement to sheer skill and intelligence, efficiency can be
gained only by the application of the man himself. A few months ago
a mine in California changed managers. The new head reduced the number
employed one-third without impairing the amount of work accomplished.
This was not the result of higher skill or intelligence in the men,
but in the manager. Better application and coördination were secured
from the working force. Inspiration to increase of exertion is
created less by "driving" than by recognition of individual effort,
in larger pay, and by extending justifiable hope of promotion. A
great factor in the proficiency of the mine manager is his ability
to create an _esprit-de-corps_ through the whole staff, down to
the last tool boy. Friendly interest in the welfare of the men
and stimulation by competitions between various works and groups
all contribute to this end.
CONTRACT WORK.--The advantage both to employer and employed of
piece work over wage needs no argument. In a general way, contract
work honorably carried out puts a premium upon individual effort,
and thus makes for efficiency. There are some portions of mine
work which cannot be contracted, but the development, stoping,
and trucking can be largely managed in this way, and these items
cover 65 to 75% of the total labor expenditure underground.
In development there are two ways of basing contracts,--the first
on the footage of holes drilled, and the second on the footage
of heading advanced. In contract-stoping there are four methods
depending on the feet of hole drilled, on tonnage, on cubic space,
and on square area broken.
All these systems have their rightful application, conditioned upon
the class of labor and character of the deposit.
In the "hole" system, the holes are "pointed" by some mine official
and are blasted by a special crew. The miner therefore has little
interest in the result of the breaking. If he is a skilled white
man, the hours which he has wherein to contemplate the face usually
enable him to place holes to better advantage than the occasional
visiting foreman. With colored labor, the lack of intelligence in
placing holes and blasting usually justifies contracts per "foot
drilled." Then the holes are pointed and blasted by superintending
men.
On development work with the foot-hole system, unless two working
faces can be provided for each contracting party, they are likely
to lose time through having finished their round of holes before the
end of the shift. As blasting must be done outside the contractor's
shifts, it means that one shift per day must be set aside for the
purpose. Therefore not nearly such progress can be made as where
working the face with three shifts. For these reasons, the "hole"
system is not so advantageous in development as the "foot of advance"
basis.
In stoping, the "hole" system has not only a wider, but a sounder
application. In large ore-bodies where there are waste inclusions,
it has one superiority over any system of excavation measurement,
namely, that the miner has no interest in breaking waste into the
ore.
The plan of contracting stopes by the ton has the disadvantage
that either the ore produced by each contractor must be weighed
separately, or truckers must be trusted to count correctly, and to
see that the cars are full. Moreover, trucks must be inspected for
waste,--a thing hard to do underground. So great are these detailed
difficulties that many mines are sending cars to the surface in
cages when they should be equipped for bin-loading and self-dumping
skips.
The method of contracting by the cubic foot of excavation saves
all necessity for determining the weight of the output of each
contractor. Moreover, he has no object in mixing waste with the ore,
barring the breaking of the walls. This system therefore requires
the least superintendence, permits the modern type of hoisting,
and therefore leaves little justification for the survival of the
tonnage basis.
Where veins are narrow, stoping under contract by the square foot
or fathom measured parallel to the walls has an advantage. The miner
has no object then in breaking wall-rock, and the thoroughness of
the ore-extraction is easily determined by inspection.
BONUS SYSTEMS.--By giving cash bonuses for special accomplishment,
much the same results can be obtained in some departments as by
contracting. A bonus per foot of heading gained above a minimum,
or an excess of trucks trammed beyond a minimum, or prizes for
the largest amount done during the week or month in special works
or in different shifts,--all these have a useful application in
creating efficiency. A high level of results once established is
easily maintained.
LABOR UNIONS.--There is another phase of the labor question which
must be considered and that is the general relations of employer
and employed. In these days of largely corporate proprietorship,
the owners of mines are guided in their relations with labor by
engineers occupying executive positions. On them falls the
responsibility in such matters, and the engineer becomes thus a
buffer between labor and capital. As corporations have grown, so
likewise have the labor unions. In general, they are normal and
proper antidotes for unlimited capitalistic organization.
Labor unions usually pass through two phases. First, the inertia
of the unorganized labor is too often stirred only by demagogic
means. After organization through these and other agencies, the
lack of balance in the leaders often makes for injustice in demands,
and for violence to obtain them and disregard of agreements entered
upon. As time goes on, men become educated in regard to the rights
of their employers, and to the reflection of these rights in ultimate
benefit to labor itself. Then the men, as well as the intelligent
employer, endeavor to safeguard both interests. When this stage
arrives, violence disappears in favor of negotiation on economic
principles, and the unions achieve their greatest real gains. Given
a union with leaders who can control the members, and who are disposed
to approach differences in a business spirit, there are few sounder
positions for the employer, for agreements honorably carried out
dismiss the constant harassments of possible strikes. Such unions
exist in dozens of trades in this country, and they are entitled to
greater recognition. The time when the employer could ride roughshod
over his labor is disappearing with the doctrine of "_laissez faire_,"
on which it was founded. The sooner the fact is recognized, the
better for the employer. The sooner some miners' unions develop
from the first into the second stage, the more speedily will their
organizations secure general respect and influence.[*]
[Footnote *: Some years of experience with compulsory arbitration
in Australia and New Zealand are convincing that although the law
there has many defects, still it is a step in the right direction,
and the result has been of almost unmixed good to both sides. One
of its minor, yet really great, benefits has been a considerable
extinction of the parasite who lives by creating violence.]
The crying need of labor unions, and of some employers as well,
is education on a fundamental of economics too long disregarded
by all classes and especially by the academic economist. When the
latter abandon the theory that wages are the result of supply and
demand, and recognize that in these days of international flow of
labor, commodities and capital, the real controlling factor in
wages is efficiency, then such an educational campaign may become
possible. Then will the employer and employee find a common ground
on which each can benefit. There lives no engineer who has not
seen insensate dispute as to wages where the real difficulty was
inefficiency. No administrator begrudges a division with his men
of the increased profit arising from increased efficiency. But
every administrator begrudges the wage level demanded by labor
unions whose policy is decreased efficiency in the false belief
that they are providing for more labor.
CHAPTER XVII.
Administration (_Continued_).
ACCOUNTS AND TECHNICAL DATA AND REPORTS; WORKING COSTS; DIVISION
OF EXPENDITURE; INHERENT LIMITATIONS IN ACCURACY OF WORKING COSTS;
WORKING COST SHEETS. GENERAL TECHNICAL DATA; LABOR, SUPPLIES, POWER,
SURVEYS, SAMPLING, AND ASSAYING.
First and foremost, mine accounts are for guidance in the distribution
of expenditure and in the collection of revenue; secondly, they
are to determine the financial progress of the enterprise, its
profit or loss; and thirdly, they are to furnish statistical data to
assist the management in its interminable battle to reduce expenses
and increase revenue, and to enable the owner to determine the
efficiency of his administrators. Bookkeeping _per se_ is no part
of this discussion. The fundamental purpose of that art is to cover
the first two objects, and, as such, does not differ from its
application to other commercial concerns.
In addition to these accounting matters there is a further type
of administrative report of equal importance--that is the periodic
statements as to the physical condition of the property, the results
of exploration in the mine, and the condition of the equipment.
ACCOUNTS.
The special features of mine accounting reports which are a development
to meet the needs of this particular business are the determination
of working costs, and the final presentation of these data in a
form available for comparative purposes.
The subject may be discussed under:--
1. Classes of mine expenditure.
2. Working costs.
3. The dissection of expenditures departmentally.
4. Inherent limitations in the accuracy of working costs.
5. Working cost sheets.
In a wide view, mine expenditures fall into three classes, which
maybe termed the "fixed charges," "proportional charges," and "suspense
charges" or "capital expenditure." "Fixed charges" are those which,
like pumping and superintendence, depend upon time rather than
tonnage and material handled. They are expenditures that would not
decrease relatively to output. "Proportional charges" are those
which, like ore-breaking, stoping, supporting stopes, and tramming,
are a direct coefficient of the ore extracted. "Suspense charges" are
those which are an indirect factor of the cost of the ore produced,
such as equipment and development. These expenditures are preliminary
to output, and they thus represent a storage of expense to be charged
off when the ore is won. This outlay is often called "capital
expenditure." Such a term, though in common use, is not strictly
correct, for the capital value vanishes when the ore is extracted,
but in conformity with current usage the term "capital expenditure"
will be adopted.
Except for the purpose of special inquiry, such as outlined under
the chapter on "Ratio of Output," "fixed charges" are not customarily
a special division in accounts. In a general way, such expenditures,
combined with the "proportional charges," are called "revenue
expenditure," as distinguished from the capital, or "suspense,"
expenditures. In other words, "revenue" expenditures are those
involved in the daily turnover of the business and resulting in
immediate returns. The inherent difference in character of revenue
and capital expenditures is responsible for most of the difficulties
in the determination of working costs, and most of the discussion
on the subject.
WORKING COSTS.--"Working costs" are a division of expenditure for
some unit,--the foot of opening, ton of ore, a pound of metal,
cubic yard or fathom of material excavated, or some other measure.
The costs per unit are usually deduced for each month and each
year. They are generally determined for each of the different
departments of the mine or special works separately. Further, the
various sorts of expenditure in these departments are likewise
segregated.
In metal mining the ton is the universal unit of distribution for
administrative purpose, although the pound of metal is often used
to indicate final financial results. The object of determination of
"working costs" is fundamentally for comparative purposes. Together
with other technical data, they are the nerves of the administration,
for by comparison of detailed and aggregate results with other mines
and internally in the same mine, over various periods and between
different works, a most valuable check on efficiency is possible.
Further, there is one collateral value in all statistical data not
to be overlooked, which is that the knowledge of its existence
induces in the subordinate staff both solicitude and emulation.
The fact must not be lost sight of, however, that the wide variations
in physical and economic environment are so likely to vitiate
conclusions from comparisons of statistics from two mines or from
two detailed works on the same mine, or even from two different
months on the same work, that the greatest care and discrimination
are demanded in their application. Moreover, the inherent difficulties
in segregating and dividing the accounts which underlie such data,
render it most desirable to offer some warning regarding the limits
to which segregation and division may be carried to advantage.
As working costs are primarily for comparisons, in order that they
may have value for this purpose they must include only such items
of expenditure as will regularly recur. If this limitation were more
generally recognized, a good deal of dispute and polemics on the
subject might be saved. For this reason it is quite impossible that
all the expenditure on the mine should be charged into working costs,
particularly some items that arise through "capital expenditure."
THE DISSECTION OF EXPENDITURES DEPARTMENTALLY.--The final division
in the dissection of the mine expenditure is in the main:--
/(1) General Expenses. / Ore-breaking. \
| | Supporting Stopes. | Various
_Revenue._< (2) Ore Extraction. < Trucking Ore. | expenditures
| \ Hoisting. | for labor,
\(3) Pumping. | supplies, power,
/ Shaft-sinking. | repairs, etc.,
| Station-cutting. > worked out per
| Crosscutting. | ton or foot
/(4) Development. < Driving. | advanced
_Capital | | Rising. | over each
or < | Winzes. | department.
Suspense._ | \ Diamond Drilling. /
|
| (5) Construction and \ Various Works.
\ Equipment. /
The detailed dissection of expenditures in these various departments
with view to determine amount of various sorts of expenditure over
the department, or over some special work in that department, is
full of unsolvable complications. The allocation of the direct
expenditure of labor and supplies applied to the above divisions or
special departments in them, is easily accomplished, but beyond this
point two sorts of difficulties immediately arise and offer infinite
field for opinion and method. The first of these difficulties arises
from supplementary departments on the mine, such as "power," "repairs
and maintenance," "sampling and assaying." These departments must
be "spread" over the divisions outlined above, for such charges
are in part or whole a portion of the expense of these divisions.
Further, all of these "spread" departments are applied to surface
as well as to underground works, and must be divided not only over
the above departments but also over the surface departments,--not
under discussion here. The common method is to distribute "power" on
a basis of an approximation of the amount used in each department;
to distribute "repairs and maintenance," either on a basis of shop
returns, or a distribution over all departments on the basis of
the labor employed in those departments, on the theory that such
repairs arise in this proportion; to distribute sampling and assaying
over the actual points to which they relate at the average cost
per sample or assay.
"General expenses," that is, superintendence, etc., are often not
included in the final departments as above, but are sometimes "spread"
in an attempt to charge a proportion of superintendence to each
particular work. As, however, such "spreading" must take place
on the basis of the relative expenditure in each department, the
result is of little value, for such a basis does not truly represent
the proportion of general superintendence, etc., devoted to each
department. If they are distributed over all departments, capital
as well as revenue, on the basis of total expenditure, they inflate
the "capital expenditure" departments against a day of reckoning when
these charges come to be distributed over working costs. Although it
may be contended that the capital departments also require supervision,
such a practice is a favorite device for showing apparently low
working costs in the revenue departments. The most courageous way
is not to distribute general expenses at all, but to charge them
separately and directly to revenue accounts and thus wholly into
working costs.
The second problem is to reduce the "suspense" or capital charges
to a final cost per ton, and this is no simple matter. Development
expenditures bear a relation to the tonnage developed and not to
that extracted in any particular period. If it is desired to preserve
any value for comparative purposes in the mining costs, such outlay
must be charged out on the basis of the tonnage developed, and such
portion of the ore as is extracted must be written off at this
rate; otherwise one month may see double the amount of development
in progress which another records, and the underground costs would
be swelled or diminished thereby in a way to ruin their comparative
value from month to month. The ore developed cannot be satisfactorily
determined at short intervals, but it can be known at least annually,
and a price may be deduced as to its cost per ton. In many mines
a figure is arrived at by estimating ore-reserves at the end of
the year, and this figure is used during the succeeding year as a
"redemption of development" and as such charged to working costs,
and thus into revenue account in proportion to the tonnage extracted.
This matter is further elaborated in some mines, in that winzes
and rises are written off at one rate, levels and crosscuts at
another, and shafts at one still lower, on the theory that they
lost their usefulness in this progression as the ore is extracted.
This course, however, is a refinement hardly warranted.
Plant and equipment constitute another "suspense" account even
harder to charge up logically to tonnage costs, for it is in many
items dependent upon the life of the mine, which is an unknown
factor. Most managers debit repairs and maintenance directly to
the revenue account and leave the reduction of the construction
outlay to an annual depreciation on the final balance sheet, on the
theory that the plant is maintained out of costs to its original
value. This subject will be discussed further on.
INHERENT LIMITATIONS IN ACCURACY OF WORKING COSTS.--There are three
types of such limitations which arise in the determination of costs
and render too detailed dissection of such costs hopeless of accuracy
and of little value for comparative purposes. They are, first, the
difficulty of determining all of even direct expenditure on any
particular crosscut, stope, haulage, etc.; second, the leveling effect
of distributing the "spread" expenditures, such as power, repairs,
etc.; and third, the difficulties arising out of the borderland
of various departments.
Of the first of these limitations the instance may be cited that
foremen and timekeepers can indicate very closely the destination of
labor expense, and also that of some of the large items of supply,
such as timber and explosives, but the distribution of minor supplies,
such as candles, drills, picks, and shovels, is impossible of accurate
knowledge without an expense wholly unwarranted by the information
gained. To determine at a particular crosscut the exact amount of
steel, and of tools consumed, and the cost of sharpening them,
would entail their separate and special delivery to the same place
of attack and a final weighing-up to learn the consumption.
Of the second sort of limitations, the effect of "spread" expenditure,
the instance may be given that the repairs and maintenance are done by
many men at work on timbers, tracks, machinery, etc. It is hopeless
to try and tell how much of their work should be charged specifically
to detailed points. In the distribution of power may be taken the
instance of air-drills. Although the work upon which the drill is
employed can be known, the power required for compression usually
comes from a common power-plant, so that the portion of power debited
to the air compressor is an approximation. The assumption of an
equal consumption of air by all drills is a further approximation.
In practice, therefore, many expenses are distributed on the theory
that they arise in proportion to the labor employed, or the machines
used in the various departments. The net result is to level down
expensive points and level up inexpensive ones.
The third sort of limitation of accounting difficulty referred
to, arises in determining into which department are actually to be
allocated the charges which lie in the borderland between various
primary classes of expenditure. For instance, in ore won from
development,--in some months three times as much development may
be in ore as in other months. If the total expense of development
work which yields ore be charged to stoping account, and if cost
be worked out on the total tonnage of ore hoisted, then the stoping
cost deduced will be erratic, and the true figures will be obscured.
On the other hand, if all development is charged to 'capital account'
and the stoping cost worked out on all ore hoisted, it will include
a fluctuating amount of ore not actually paid for by the revenue
departments or charged into costs. This fluctuation either way
vitiates the whole comparative value of the stoping costs. In the
following system a compromise is reached by crediting "development"
with an amount representing the ore won from development at the
average cost of stoping, and by charging this amount into "stoping."
A number of such questions arise where the proper division is simply
a matter of opinion.
The result of all these limitations is that a point in detail is
quickly reached where no further dissection of expenditure is justified,
since it becomes merely an approximation. The writer's own impression
is that without an unwarrantable number of accountants, no manager
can tell with any accuracy the cost of any particular stope, or
of any particular development heading. Therefore, aside from some
large items, such detailed statistics, if given, are to be taken
with great reserve.
WORKING COST SHEETS.--There are an infinite number of forms of
working cost sheets, practically every manager having a system of
his own. To be of greatest value, such sheets should show on their
face the method by which the "spread" departments are handled, and
how revenue and suspense departments are segregated. When too much
detail is presented, it is but a waste of accounting and consequent
expense. Where to draw the line in this regard is, however, a matter
of great difficulty. No cost sheet is entirely satisfactory. The
appended sheet is in use at a number of mines. It is no more perfect
than many others. It will be noticed that the effect of this system
is to throw the general expenses into the revenue expenditures,
and as little as possible into the "suspense" account.
GENERAL TECHNICAL DATA.
For the purposes of efficient management, the information gathered
under this head is of equal, if not superior, importance to that
under "working costs." Such data fall generally under the following
heads:--
LABOR.--Returns of the shifts worked in the various departments
for each day and for the month; worked out on a monthly basis of
footage progress, tonnage produced or tons handled per man; also
where possible the footage of holes drilled, worked out per man
and per machine.
SUPPLIES.--Daily returns of supplies used; the principal items
worked out monthly in quantity per foot of progress, or per ton
of ore produced.
POWER.--Fuel, lubricant, etc., consumed in steam production, worked
out into units of steam produced, and this production allocated to
the various engines. Where electrical power is used, the consumption
of the various motors is set out.
SURVEYS.--The need of accurate plans requires no discussion. Aside
from these, the survey-office furnishes the returns of development
footage, measurements under contracts, and the like.
SAMPLING AND ASSAYING.--Mine sampling and assaying fall under two
heads,--the determination of the value of standing ore, and of
products from the mine. The sampling and assaying on a going mine
call for the same care and method as in cases of valuation of the
mine for purchase,--the details of which have been presented under
"Mine Valuation,"--for through it, guidance must not only be had to
the value of the mine and for reports to owners, but the detailed
development and ore extraction depend on an absolute knowledge of
where the values lie.
CHAPTER XVIII.
ADMINISTRATION (_Concluded_).
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS.
In addition to financial returns showing the monthly receipts,
expenditures, and working costs, there must be in proper administration
periodic reports from the officers of the mine to the owners or
directors as to the physical progress of the enterprise. Such reports
must embrace details of ore extraction, metal contents, treatment
recoveries, construction of equipment, and the results of underground
development. The value of mines is so much affected by the monthly
or even daily result of exploration that reports of such work are
needed very frequently,--weekly or even daily if critical work is
in progress. These reports must show the width, length, and value
of the ore disclosed.
The tangible result of development work is the tonnage and grade
of ore opened up. How often this stock-taking should take place
is much dependent upon the character of the ore. The result of
exploration in irregular ore-bodies often does not, over short
periods, show anything tangible in definite measurable tonnage,
but at least annually the ore reserve can be estimated.
In mines owned by companies, the question arises almost daily as
to how much of and how often the above information should be placed
before stockholders (and therefore the public) by the directors. In
a general way, any company whose shares are offered on the stock
exchange is indirectly inviting the public to become partners in the
business, and these partners are entitled to all the information
which affects the value of their property and are entitled to it
promptly. Moreover, mining is a business where competition is so
obscure and so much a matter of indifference, that suppression
of important facts in documents for public circulation has no
justification. On the other hand, both the technical progress of
the industry and its position in public esteem demand the fullest
disclosure and greatest care in preparation of reports. Most
stockholders' ignorance of mining technology and of details of
their particular mine demands a great deal of care and discretion
in the preparation of these public reports that they may not be
misled. Development results may mean little or much, depending
upon the location of the work done in relation to the ore-bodies,
etc., and this should be clearly set forth.
The best opportunity of clear, well-balanced statements lies in
the preparation of the annual report and accounts. Such reports
are of three parts:--
1. The "profit and loss" account, or the "revenue account."
2. The balance sheet; that is, the assets and liabilities
statement.
3. The reports of the directors, manager, and consulting
engineer.
The first two items are largely matters of bookkeeping. They or
the report should show the working costs per ton for the year.
What must be here included in costs is easier of determination
than in the detailed monthly cost sheets of the administration;
for at the annual review, it is not difficult to assess the amount
chargeable to development. Equipment expenditure, however, presents
an annual difficulty, for, as said, the distribution of this item
is a factor of the life of the mine, and that is unknown. If such
a plant has been paid for out of the earnings, there is no object
in carrying it on the company's books as an asset, and most
well-conducted companies write it off at once. On the other hand,
where the plant is paid for out of capital provided for the purpose,
even to write off depreciation means that a corresponding sum of
cash must be held in the company's treasury in order to balance
the accounts,--in other words, depreciation in such an instance
becomes a return of capital. The question then is one of policy
in the company's finance, and in neither case is it a matter which
can be brought into working costs and leave them any value for
comparative purposes. Indeed, the true cost of working the ore
from any mine can only be told when the mine is exhausted; then
the dividends can be subtracted from the capital sunk and metal
sold, and the difference divided over the total tonnage produced.
The third section of the report affords wide scope for the best
efforts of the administration. This portion of the report falls
into three divisions: (_a_) the construction and equipment work
of the year, (_b_) the ore extraction and treatment, and (_c_)
the results of development work.
The first requires a statement of the plant constructed, its object
and accomplishment; the second a disclosure of tonnage produced,
values, metallurgical and mechanical efficiency. The third is of
the utmost importance to the stockholder, and is the one most often
disregarded and obscured. Upon this hinges the value of the property.
There is no reason why, with plans and simplicity of terms, such
reports cannot be presented in a manner from which the novice can
judge of the intrinsic position of the property. A statement of
the tonnage of ore-reserves and their value, or of the number of
years' supply of the current output, together with details of ore
disclosed in development work, and the working costs, give the
ground data upon which any stockholder who takes interest in his
investment may judge for himself. Failure to provide such data
will some day be understood by the investing public as a _prima
facie_ index of either incapacity or villainy. By the insistence of
the many engineers in administration of mines upon the publication
of such data, and by the insistence of other engineers upon such
data for their clients before investment, and by the exposure of
the delinquents in the press, a more practicable "protection of
investors" can be reached than by years of academic discussion.
CHAPTER XIX.
The Amount of Risk in Mining Investments.
RISK IN VALUATION OF MINES; IN MINES AS COMPARED WITH OTHER COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISES.
From the constant reiteration of the risks and difficulties involved
in every step of mining enterprise from the valuation of the mine
to its administration as a going concern, the impression may be
gained that the whole business is one great gamble; in other words,
that the point whereat certainties stop and conjecture steps in
is so vital as to render the whole highly speculative.
Far from denying that mining is, in comparison with better-class
government bonds, a speculative type of investment, it is desirable
to avow and emphasize the fact. But it is none the less well to
inquire what degree of hazard enters in and how it compares with
that in other forms of industrial enterprise.
Mining business, from an investment view, is of two sorts,--prospecting
ventures and developed mines; that is, mines where little or no ore is
exposed, and mines where a definite quantity of ore is measurable or can
be reasonably anticipated. The great hazards and likewise the Aladdin
caves of mining are mainly confined to the first class. Although all
mines must pass through the prospecting stage, the great industry
of metal production is based on developed mines, and it is these
which should come into the purview of the non-professional investor.
The first class should be reserved invariably for speculators, and
a speculator may be defined as one who hazards all to gain much.
It is with mining as an investment, however, that this discussion
is concerned.
RISK IN VALUATION OF MINES.--Assuming a competent collection of
data and efficient management of the property, the risks in valuing
are from step to step:--
1. The risk of continuity in metal contents beyond sample
faces.
2. The risk of continuity in volume through the blocks
estimated.
3. The risk of successful metallurgical treatment.
4. The risk of metal prices, in all but gold.
5. The risk of properly estimating costs.
6. The risk of extension of the ore beyond exposures.
7. The risk of management.
As to the continuity of values and volumes through the estimated
area, the experience of hundreds of engineers in hundreds of mines
has shown that when the estimates are based on properly secured
data for "proved ore," here at least there is absolutely no hazard.
Metallurgical treatment, if determined by past experience on the
ore itself, carries no chance; and where determined by experiment,
the risk is eliminated if the work be sufficiently exhaustive. The
risk of metal price is simply a question of how conservative a
figure is used in estimating. It can be eliminated if a price low
enough be taken. Risk of extension in depth or beyond exposures
cannot be avoided. It can be reduced in proportion to the distance
assumed. Obviously, if no extension is counted, there is nothing
chanced. The risk of proper appreciation of costs is negligible where
experience in the district exists. Otherwise, it can be eliminated
if a sufficiently large allowance is taken. The risk of failure to
secure good management can be eliminated if proved men are chosen.
There is, therefore, a basic value to every mine. The "proved"
ore taken on known metallurgical grounds, under known conditions
of costs on minimum prices of metals, has a value as certain as
that of money in one's own vault. This is the value previously
referred to as the "_A_" value. If the price (and interest on it
pending recovery) falls within this amount, there is no question
that the mine is worth the price. What the risk is in mining is
simply what amount the price of the investment demands shall be
won from extension of the deposit beyond known exposures, or what
higher price of metal must be realized than that calculated in
the "_A_" value. The demands on this _X, Y_ portion of the mine
can be converted into tons of ore, life of production, or higher
prices, and these can be weighed with the geological weights and
the industrial outlook.
MINES COMPARED TO OTHER COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES.--The profits from
a mining venture over and above the bed-rock value _A_, that is,
the return to be derived from more extensive ore-recovery and a
higher price of metal, may be compared to the value included in
other forms of commercial enterprise for "good-will." Such forms of
enterprise are valued on a basis of the amount which will replace
the net assets plus (or minus) an amount for "good-will," that is,
the earning capacity. This good-will is a speculation of varying
risk depending on the character of the enterprise. For natural
monopolies, like some railways and waterworks, the risk is less
and for shoe factories more. Even natural monopolies are subject
to the risks of antagonistic legislation and industrial storms.
But, eliminating this class of enterprise, the speculative value
of a good-will involves a greater risk than prospective value in
mines, if properly measured; because the dangers of competition
and industrial storms do not enter to such a degree, nor is the
future so dependent upon the human genius of the founder or manager.
Mining has reached such a stage of development as a science that
management proceeds upon comparatively well-known lines. It is
subject to known checks through the opportunity of comparisons
by which efficiency can be determined in a manner more open for
the investor to learn than in any other form of industry. While
in mining an estimate of a certain minimum of extension in depth,
as indicated by collateral factors, may occasionally fall short,
it will, in nine cases out of ten, be exceeded. If investment in
mines be spread over ten cases, similarly valued as to minimum of
extension, the risk has been virtually eliminated. The industry,
if reduced to the above basis for financial guidance, is a more
profitable business and is one of less hazards than competitive
forms of commercial enterprises.
In view of what has been said before, it may be unnecessary to refer
again to the subject, but the constant reiteration by wiseacres
that the weak point in mining investments lies in their short life
and possible loss of capital, warrants a repetition that the _A,
B, C_ of proper investment in mines is to be assured, by the "_A_"
value, of a return of the whole or major portion of the capital.
The risk of interest and profit may be deferred to the _X, Y_ value,
and in such case it is on a plane with "good-will." It should be said
at once to that class who want large returns on investment without
investigation as to merits, or assurance as to the management of the
business, that there is no field in this world for the employment
of their money at over 4%.
Unfortunately for the reputation of the mining industry, and metal
mines especially, the business is often not conducted or valued on
lines which have been outlined in these chapters. There is often
the desire to sell stocks beyond their value. There is always the
possibility that extension in depth will reveal a glorious Eldorado.
It occasionally does, and the report echoes round the world for years,
together with tributes to the great judgment of the exploiters. The
volume of sound allures undue numbers of the venturesome, untrained,
and ill-advised public to the business, together with a mob of
camp-followers whose objective is to exploit the ignorant by preying
on their gambling instincts. Thus a considerable section of metal
mining industry is in the hands of these classes, and a cloud of
disrepute hangs ever in the horizon.
There has been a great educational campaign in progress during the
past few years through the technical training of men for conduct
of the industry, by the example of reputable companies in regularly
publishing the essential facts upon which the value of their mines
is based, and through understandable nontechnical discussion in
and by some sections of the financial and general press. The real
investor is being educated to distinguish between reputable concerns
and the counters of gamesters. Moreover, yearly, men of technical
knowledge are taking a stronger and more influential part in mining
finance and in the direction of mining and exploration companies.
The net result of these forces will be to put mining on a better
plane.
CHAPTER XX.
The Character, Training, and Obligations of the Mining Engineering
Profession.
In a discussion of some problems of metal mining from the point
of view of the direction of mining operations it may not be amiss
to discuss the character of the mining engineering profession in
its bearings on training and practice, and its relations to the
public.
The most dominant characteristic of the mining engineering profession
is the vast preponderance of the commercial over the technical in
the daily work of the engineer. For years a gradual evolution has
been in progress altering the larger demands on this branch of the
engineering profession from advisory to executive work. The mining
engineer is no longer the technician who concocts reports and blue
prints. It is demanded of him that he devise the finance, construct
and manage the works which he advises. The demands of such executive
work are largely commercial; although the commercial experience
and executive ability thus become one pier in the foundation of
training, the bridge no less requires two piers, and the second
is based on technical knowledge. Far from being deprecated, these
commercial phases cannot be too strongly emphasized. On the other
hand, I am far from contending that our vocation is a business
rather than a profession.
For many years after the dawn of modern engineering, the members
of our profession were men who rose through the ranks of workmen,
and as a result, we are to this day in the public mind a sort of
superior artisan, for to many the engine-driver is equally an engineer
with the designer of the engine, yet their real relation is but as
the hand to the brain. At a later period the recruits entered by
apprenticeship to those men who had established their intellectual
superiority to their fellow-workers. These men were nearly always
employed in an advisory way--subjective to the executive head.
During the last few decades, the advance of science and the complication
of industry have demanded a wholly broader basis of scientific and
general training for its leaders. Executive heads are demanded who
have technical training. This has resulted in the establishment of
special technical colleges, and compelled a place for engineering
in the great universities. The high intelligence demanded by the
vocation itself, and the revolution in training caused by the
strengthening of its foundations in general education, has finally,
beyond all question, raised the work of application of science to
industry to the dignity of a profession on a par with the law,
medicine, and science. It demands of its members equally high mental
attainments,--and a more rigorous training and experience. Despite
all this, industry is conducted for commercial purposes, and leaves
no room for the haughty intellectual superiority assumed by some
professions over business callings.
There is now demanded of the mining specialist a wide knowledge
of certain branches of civil, mechanical, electrical, and chemical
engineering, geology, economics, the humanities, and what not; and
in addition to all this, engineering sense, executive ability,
business experience, and financial insight. Engineering sense is
that fine blend of honesty, ingenuity, and intuition which is a
mental endowment apart from knowledge and experience. Its possession
is the test of the real engineer. It distinguishes engineering as
a profession from engineering as a trade. It is this sense that
elevates the possessor to the profession which is, of all others,
the most difficult and the most comprehensive. Financial insight can
only come by experience in the commercial world. Likewise must come
the experience in technical work which gives balance to theoretical
training. Executive ability is that capacity to coördinate and command
the best results from other men,--it is a natural endowment. which
can be cultivated only in actual use.
The practice of mine engineering being so large a mixture of business,
it follows that the whole of the training of this profession cannot
be had in schools and universities. The commercial and executive
side of the work cannot be taught; it must be absorbed by actual
participation in the industry. Nor is it impossible to rise to
great eminence in the profession without university training, as
witness some of our greatest engineers. The university can do much;
it can give a broad basis of knowledge and mental training, and can
inculcate moral feeling, which entitles men to lead their fellows. It
can teach the technical fundamentals of the multifold sciences which
the engineer should know and must apply. But after the university
must come a schooling in men and things equally thorough and more
arduous.
In this predominating demand for commercial qualifications over
the technical ones, the mining profession has differentiated to
a great degree from its brother engineering branches. That this
is true will be most apparent if we examine the course through
which engineering projects march, and the demands of each stage
on their road to completion.
The life of all engineering projects in a general way may be divided
into five phases:[*]--
[Footnote *: These phases do not necessarily proceed step by step.
For an expanding works especially, all of them may be in process
at the same time, but if each item be considered to itself, this
is the usual progress, or should be when properly engineered.]
1. Determination of the value of the project.
2. Determination of the method of attack.
3. The detailed delineation of method, means, and tools.
4. The execution of the works.
5. The operation of the completed works.
These various stages of the resolution of an engineering project
require in each more or less of every quality of intellect, training,
and character. At the different stages, certain of these qualities
are in predominant demand: in the first stage, financial insight;
in the second, "engineering sense"; in the third, training and
experience; in the fourth and fifth, executive ability.
A certain amount of compass over the project during the whole
five stages is required by all branches of the engineering
profession,--harbor, canal, railway, waterworks, bridge, mechanical,
electrical, etc.; but in none of them so completely and in such
constant combination is this demanded as in mining.
The determination of the commercial value of projects is a greater
section of the mining engineer's occupation than of the other
engineering branches. Mines are operated only to earn immediate
profits. No question of public utility enters, so that all mining
projects have by this necessity to be from the first weighed from
a profit point of view alone. The determination of this question
is one which demands such an amount of technical knowledge and
experience that those who are not experts cannot enter the
field,--therefore the service of the engineer is always demanded in
their satisfactory solution. Moreover, unlike most other engineering
projects, mines have a faculty of changing owners several times
during their career, so that every one has to survive a periodic
revaluation. From the other branches of engineering, the electrical
engineer is the most often called upon to weigh the probabilities
of financial success of the enterprise, but usually his presence
in this capacity is called upon only at the initial stage, for
electrical enterprises seldom change hands. The mechanical and
chemical branches are usually called upon for purely technical
service on the demand of the operator, who decides the financial
problems for himself, or upon works forming but units in undertakings
where the opinion on the financial advisability is compassed by some
other branch of the engineering profession. The other engineering
branches, even less often, are called in for financial advice,
and in those branches involving works of public utility the
profit-and-loss phase scarcely enters at all.
Given that the project has been determined upon, and that the enterprise
has entered upon the second stage, that of determination of method of
attack, the immediate commercial result limits the mining engineer's
every plan and design to a greater degree than it does the other
engineering specialists. The question of capital and profit dogs
his every footstep, for all mines are ephemeral; the life of any
given mine is short. Metal mines have indeed the shortest lives of
any. While some exceptional ones may produce through one generation,
under the stress of modern methods a much larger proportion extend
only over a decade or two. But of more pertinent force is the fact
that as the certain life of a metal mine can be positively known in
most cases but a short period beyond the actual time required to
exhaust the ore in sight, not even a decade of life to the enterprise
is available for the estimates of the mining engineer. Mining works
are of no value when the mine is exhausted; the capital invested
must be recovered in very short periods, and therefore all mining
works must be of the most temporary character that will answer.
The mining engineer cannot erect a works that will last as long as
possible; it is to last as long as the mine only, and, in laying
it out, forefront in his mind must be the question, Can its cost
be redeemed in the period of use of which I am certain it will
find employment? If not, will some cheaper device, which gives
less efficiency, do? The harbor engineer, the railway engineer,
the mechanical engineer, build as solidly as they can, for the
demand for the work will exist till after their materials are worn
out, however soundly they construct.
Our engineer cousins can, in a greater degree by study and
investigation, marshal in advance the factors with which they have
to deal. The mining engineer's works, on the other hand, depend at
all times on many elements which, from the nature of things, must
remain unknown. No mine is laid bare to study and resolve in advance.
We have to deal with conditions buried in the earth. Especially in
metal mines we cannot know, when our works are initiated, what
the size, mineralization, or surroundings of the ore-bodies will
be. We must plunge into them and learn,--and repent. Not only is
the useful life of our mining works indeterminate, but the very
character of them is uncertain in advance. All our works must be in
a way doubly tentative, for they are subject to constant alterations
as they proceed.
Not only does this apply to our initial plans, but to our daily
amendment of them as we proceed into the unknown. Mining engineering
is, therefore, never ended with the initial determination of a method.
It is called upon daily to replan and reconceive, coincidentally with
the daily progress of the constructions and operation. Weary with
disappointment in his wisest conception, many a mining engineer
looks jealously upon his happier engineering cousin, who, when he
designs a bridge, can know its size, its strains, and its cost,
and can wash his hands of it finally when the contractor steps
in to its construction. And, above all, it is no concern of his
whether it will pay. Did he start to build a bridge over a water,
the width or depth or bottom of which he could not know in advance,
and require to get its cost back in ten years, with a profit, his
would be a task of similar harassments.
As said before, it is becoming more general every year to employ
the mining engineer as the executive head in the operation of mining
engineering projects, that is, in the fourth and fifth stages of
the enterprise. He is becoming the foreman, manager, and president
of the company, or as it may be contended by some, the executive
head is coming to have technical qualifications. Either way, in
no branch of enterprise founded on engineering is the operative
head of necessity so much a technical director. Not only is this
caused by the necessity of executive knowledge before valuations
can be properly done, but the incorporation of the executive work
with the technical has been brought about by several other forces.
We have a type of works which, by reason of the new conditions
and constant revisions which arise from pushing into the unknown
coincidentally with operating, demands an intimate continuous daily
employment of engineering sense and design through the whole history
of the enterprise. These works are of themselves of a character
which requires a constant vigilant eye on financial outcome. The
advances in metallurgy, and the decreased cost of production by
larger capacities, require yearly larger, more complicated, and
more costly plants. Thus, larger and larger capitals are required,
and enterprise is passing from the hands of the individual to the
financially stronger corporation. This altered position as to the
works and finance has made keener demands, both technically and in
an administrative way, for the highly trained man. In the early
stages of American mining, with the moderate demand on capital and
the simpler forms of engineering involved, mining was largely a
matter of individual enterprise and ownership. These owners were
men to whom experience had brought some of the needful technical
qualifications. They usually held the reins of business management
in their own hands and employed the engineer subjectively, when
they employed him at all. They were also, as a rule, distinguished
by their contempt for university-trained engineers.
The gradually increasing employment of the engineer as combined
executive and technical head, was largely of American development.
Many English and European mines still maintain the two separate
bureaus, the technical and the financial. Such organization is open
to much objection from the point of view of the owner's interests,
and still more from that of the engineer. In such an organization the
latter is always subordinate to the financial control,--hence the
least paid and least respected. When two bureaus exist, the technical
lacks that balance of commercial purpose which it should have. The
ambition of the theoretical engineer, divorced from commercial
result, is complete technical nicety of works and low production
costs without the regard for capital outlay which the commercial
experience and temporary character of mining constructions demand.
On the other hand, the purely financial bureau usually begrudges
the capital outlay which sound engineering may warrant. The result
is an administration that is not comparable to the single head with
both qualifications and an even balance in both spheres. In America,
we still have a relic of this form of administration in the consulting
mining engineer, but barring his functions as a valuer of mines, he
is disappearing in connection with the industry, in favor of the
manager, or the president of the company, who has administrative
control. The mining engineer's field of employment is therefore not
only wider by this general inclusion of administrative work, but
one of more responsibility. While he must conduct all five phases
of engineering projects coincidentally, the other branches of the
profession are more or less confined to one phase or another. They
can draw sharper limitations of their engagements or specialization
and confine themselves to more purely technical work. The civil
engineer may construct railway or harbor works; the mechanical
engineer may design and build engines; the naval architect may
build ships; but given that he designed to do the work in the most
effectual manner, it is no concern of his whether they subsequently
earn dividends. He does not have to operate them, to find the income,
to feed the mill, or sell the product. The profit and loss does
not hound his footsteps after his construction is complete.
Although it is desirable to emphasize the commercial side of the
practice of the mining engineer's profession, there are other sides
of no less moment. There is the right of every red-blooded man to
be assured that his work will be a daily satisfaction to himself;
that it is a work which is contributing to the welfare and advance
of his country; and that it will build for him a position of dignity
and consequence among his fellows.
There are the moral and public obligations upon the profession.
There are to-day the demands upon the engineers which are the demands
upon their positions as leaders of a great industry. In an industry
that lends itself so much to speculation and chicanery, there is the
duty of every engineer to diminish the opportunity of the vulture
so far as is possible. Where he can enter these lists has been
suggested in the previous pages. Further than to the "investor"
in mines, he has a duty to his brothers in the profession. In no
profession does competition enter so obscurely, nor in no other
are men of a profession thrown into such terms of intimacy in
professional work. From these causes there has arisen a freedom of
disclosure of technical results and a comradery of members greater
than that in any other profession. No profession is so subject to
the capriciousness of fortune, and he whose position is assured
to-day is not assured to-morrow unless it be coupled with a
consideration of those members not so fortunate. Especially is
there an obligation to the younger members that they may have
opportunity of training and a right start in the work.
The very essence of the profession is that it calls upon its members
to direct men. They are the officers in the great industrial army.
From the nature of things, metal mines do not, like our cities and
settlements, lie in those regions covered deep in rich soils. Our
mines must be found in the mountains and deserts where rocks are
exposed to search. Thus they lie away from the centers of comfort
and culture,--they are the outposts of civilization. The engineer
is an officer on outpost duty, and in these places he is the camp
leader. By his position as a leader in the community he has a
chieftainship that carries a responsibility besides mere mine
management. His is the responsibility of example in fair dealing
and good government in the community.
In but few of its greatest works does the personality of its real
creator reach the ears of the world; the real engineer does not
advertise himself. But the engineering profession generally rises
yearly in dignity and importance as the rest of the world learns
more of where the real brains of industrial progress are. The time
will come when people will ask, not who paid for a thing, but who
built it.
To the engineer falls the work of creating from the dry bones of
scientific fact the living body of industry. It is he whose intellect
and direction bring to the world the comforts and necessities of
daily need. Unlike the doctor, his is not the constant struggle
to save the weak. Unlike the soldier, destruction is not his prime
function. Unlike the lawyer, quarrels are not his daily bread.
Engineering is the profession of creation and of construction, of
stimulation of human effort and accomplishment.
INDEX.
Accounts.
Administration.
Administrative reports.
Air-compression.
-drills.
Alteration, secondary.
Alternative shafts to inclined deposit.
Amortization of capital and interest.
Animals for underground transport.
Annual demand for base metals.
report.
Artificial pillars.
Assay foot.
inch.
of samples.
plans.
Assaying.
A value of mine.
Averages, calculation.
Bailing.
Balance sheet.
Basic price.
value of mine.
Benches.
Bend in combined shafts.
Bins.
Blocked-out ore.
Blocks.
Bonanzas, origin.
Bonus systems, of work.
Breaking ore.
Broken Hill, levels.
ore-pillars.
Bumping-trough.
Cable-ways.
Cages.
Calculation of averages.
of quantities of ore.
Capital expenditure.
Caving systems.
Churn-drills.
Chutes, loading, in vertical shaft.
Classification of ore in sight.
Combined shaft.
stopes.
Commercial value of projects, determination.
Compartments for shaft.
Compressed-air locomotives.
-air pumps.
_vs_. electricity for drills.
Content, average metal, determining.
metal, differences.
Contract work.
Copper, annual demand.
deposits.
ores, enrichment.
Cost of entry into mine.
of equipment.
production.
per foot of sinking.
working.
Cribs.
Crosscuts.
Cross-section of inclined deposit which must be attacked in depth.
showing auxiliary vertical outlet.
Crouch, J. J.
Cubic feet per ton of ore.
foot contents of block.
Deep-level mines.
Demand for metals.
Departmental dissection of expenditures.
Deposits, _in situ_.
ore, classes.
regularity.
size.
structure.
Depth of exhaustion.
Determination of average metal contents of ore.
Development in early prospecting stage.
in neighboring mines.
of mines.
Diamond-drilling.
Diluting narrow samples to a stoping width.
Dip.
Direct-acting steam-pumps.
Distribution of values.
Dividend, annual, present value.
Dommeiler.
Down holes.
Drainage.
comparison of different systems.
systems.
Drifts.
Drill, requirements.
Drilling.
Drives.
Dry walling with timber caps.
Efficiency, factors of.
of mass.
Electrical haulage.
pumps.
Electricity for drills.
Engine, size for winding appliances.
Engineer, mining, as executive.
Engineering projects, phases of.
Enrichment.
at cross-veins.
Entry, to mine.
to vertical or horizontal deposits.
Equipment, cost.
improvements.
mechanical.
Erosion.
Error, percentage in estimates from sampling.
Escape.
Examination of mining property.
Excavation, supporting.
Exhaustion, depth.
Expenditures, departmental dissection.
mine.
Extension in depth.
Factor of safety in calculating averages of samples.
Filling.
system combined with square-setting.
with broken ore subsequently withdrawn.
waste.
Fissure veins.
Fissuring.
depth.
Fixed charges.
Flat-back stope.
Flexibility in drainage system.
Floors.
Folding.
Foot-drilled system of contract work.
-hole system of contract work.
of advance system of contract work.
value.
Fraud, precautions against in sampling.
General expenses.
Gold deposits.
deposits, alteration.
enrichment.
Hammer type of drill.
Hand-drilling.
-trucking.
Haulage, electrical.
equipment in shaft.
mechanical.
Hole system of contract work.
Horizons of ore-deposits.
Horizontal deposits, entry.
stope.
filled with waste.
Hydraulic pumps.
Impregnation deposits.
Inch, assay.
Inclined deposits to be worked from outcrop or near it.
deposits which must be attacked in depth.
shaft.
Inclines.
capacity.
Infiltration type of deposits.
Intelligence as factor of skill.
Interest calculations in mine valuation.
Intervals, level.
Inwood's tables.
Iron hat.
leaching.
Ivanhoe mine, West Australia.
Kibble.
Labor, general technical data.
handling.
unions.
Lateral underground transport.
Le Roi mine.
Lead, annual demand.
deposits.
enriching.
prices, 1884-1908.
-zinc ores, enrichment.
Lenses.
Levels.
intervals.
of Broken Hill.
protection.
Life, in sight.
of mine.
Locomotives, compressed-air.
Lode mines, valuation.
Lodes.
Long-wall stope.
Machine-drill, performance.
drilling.
_vs_. hand-drilling.
Management, mine.
Matte.
Mechanical efficiency of drainage machinery.
equipment.
Men for underground transport.
Metal content, determining.
contents, differences.
demand for.
mine, value.
price.
Mines compared to other commercial enterprises.
equipment.
expenditures.
Mines--_continued._
life of.
metal, value of.
of moderate depths.
to be worked to great depths.
valuation.
Mining engineering profession.
Mt. Cenis tunnel.
Morgan gold mine.
Normal price.
Obligations of engineering profession.
Openings, position in relation to secondary alteration.
Ore, average width in block.
blocked-out.
-bodies.
shapes.
-breaking, methods.
calculation of quantities of.
-chutes in shrinkage-stoping.
-deposits, classes.
determination of average metal contents.
developed.
developing.
expectant.
in sight.
sight, classification.
-pillars.
support in narrow stopes.
-shoots.
weight of a cubic foot.
width for one sample.
Origin of deposit.
Outcrop mines.
Output, factors limiting.
giving least production cost.
maximum, determination.
Overhand stapes.
Overproduction of base metal.
Oxidation.
Patchwork plant, mechanical inefficiency of.
Pay areas, formation.
Pillars, artificial.
Positive ore.
value of metal mine.
Possible ore.
Power conditions.
general technical data.
sources.
transmission.
Preliminary inspection.
Previous yield.
Price of metals.
Probable ore.
Producing stage of mine.
Production, cost.
Profit and loss account.
factors determining.
in sight.
Proportional charges.
Prospecting stage of mine.
Prospective ore.
value.
Protection of levels.
Proved ore.
Pumping systems.
Pumps, compressed-air.
electrical.
hydraulic.
rod-driven.
Ratio of output to mine.
Recoverable percentage of gross assay value.
Recovery of ore.
Rectangular shaft.
Redemption of capital and interest.
Reduction of output.
Regularity of deposit.
Reliability of drainage system.
Replacement.
Reports.
administrative.
Resuing.
Revenue account.
Rill-cut overhand stope.
method of incline cuts.
-stopes.
filled with waste.
-stoping.
Rises.
Risk in mining investments.
in valuation of mines.
Roadways, protecting in shrinkage-stoping.
Rod-driven pumps.
Rotary steam-pumps.
Round vertical shafts.
Runs of value.
test-treatment.
Safety, factor of, in calculating averages of samples.
Sample, assay of.
average value.
narrow, diluting to a stoping width.
sections.
taking, physical details.
manner of taking.
Sampling.
accuracy.
percentage of error in estimates from.
precautions against fraud.
Saving of fixed charges.
Secondary alteration.
enrichment.
Security of investment.
Self-dumping skip.
Sets.
Shafts.
arrangement for very deep inclined shafts.
compartments.
different depths.
haulage.
location.
number.
output capacity.
shape.
size.
Shrinkage-stope.
-stoping.
advantages.
disadvantages.
when applicable.
Silver deposits.
deposits, enrichment.
prices.
Sinking, speed.
Size of deposit.
Skill, effect on production cost.
Skips.
balanced.
haulage in vertical shaft.
Sollars.
Solubility of minerals.
Specific volume of ores.
Speculative values of metal mine.
value of mine.
Spelter, annual demand.
Square-set.
-set timbering.
Stations.
arrangement for skip haulage in vertical shaft.
Steam-pumps, direct.
Steepening winzes and ore passes.
Stope filled with broken ore.
minimum width.
Stoping.
contract systems.
Storing metal.
Structural character of deposit.
Structure of deposit.
Stull and waste pillars.
support with waste reënforcement.
-supported stope.
Stulls.
wood.
Subheading.
Sublevel caving system.
Subsidiary development.
Superficial enrichment.
Supplies, general technical data.
Support by pillars of ore.
Supporting excavation.
Surveys.
Suspense charges.
Test parcels.
sections.
-treatment runs.
Timber, cost.
Timbered shaft design.
Timbering.
Tin, annual demand.
deposits.
ore, migration and enrichment.
Tools.
Top slicing.
Tracks.
Transport in stopes.
Tunnel entry.
feet paid for in 10 years.
size.
Underhand stopes.
Uppers.
Valuation, mine.
of lode mines.
mines, risk in.
mines with little or no ore in sight.
on second-hand data.
Value, average, of samples.
discrepancy between estimated and actual.
distribution.
of extension in depth, estimating.
positive, of metal mine.
present, of an annual dividend.
of $1 or £1, payable in -- years.
runs of.
speculative, of metal mine.
Valuing ore in course of breaking.
Ventilation.
Vertical deposits, entry.
interval between levels.
shafts.
capacity.
Volume, specific, of ores.
Waste-filled stope.
Water-power.
Weight per cubic foot of ore.
Weindel, Caspar.
Whiting hoist.
Width of ore for one sample.
Winding appliances.
Winzes.
in shrinkage-stoping.
to be used for filling.
Working cost.
inherent limitations in accuracy of.
sheets.
Workshops.
Yield, previous.
Years of life required to yield --% interest.
Zinc deposits.
leaching.
End of Project Gutenberg's Principles of Mining, by Herbert C. Hoover