These remarks are not based upon mere speculation. We are well

assured that, during the last few months, much progress has

been made towards a thorough fusion of the two sections of the

Conservative party, upon clear and common grounds. All difficulties

would by this time probably have been removed, but for the scruples

of two or three gentlemen who are supposed to possess the private

confidence of Sir Robert Peel, and who have hitherto identified

themselves with his fortunes. Now, as it must be perfectly apparent

to any man of common reflection, that the bulk of the Conservatives

never can, under any circumstances, consent to act under the

leadership of Peel; as he himself has, over and over again, publicly

stated that no motive or consideration would induce him to return

to power--it is absolutely incomprehensible to us how such scruples

can exist in the minds of the individuals to whom we allude, if

they really believe in the sincerity of this last declaration of

their leader. No one wants him to take office, and he says that

he will not accept it. So far all are agreed. If we believed that

any one of these distinguished and honourable men is convinced

that the commercial policy of the last three years has been wise

and sound, and that, with any amount of trial, it can terminate

otherwise than fatally for the interests of the country, we should

have no right to address them upon a subject so momentous as this,

and certainly no desire for one moment to gain their co-operation.

But we can very well distinguish betwixt a feeling of strong

attachment to an individual whose talents they have been accustomed

to respect, but whose views they have only partially penetrated,

and a settled conviction in the soundness of the policy which it

has been his destiny to originate. We believe that, hitherto, the

former sentiment, and not the latter one, must be taken as the true

explanation of their conduct--that they are unwilling to abandon

the man, although they have lost their faith in the efficacy of his

measures. Now, if this be the case, how can they justify themselves

for opposing, upon such slender grounds, the reconstruction of the

Conservative party? They must be well aware that Sir Robert Peel has

forfeited for ever the confidence of a large majority of those who,

a few years ago, were his most steadfast and faithful followers,

and that far more through his own deliberate acknowledgment of

double-dealing, than from a mere change of opinion upon any one

point of commercial policy, however important it might appear. It

may be the misfortune of Peel, rather than his fault, that he cannot

estimate the proper value of plain manly confidence and unshrinking

candour; that he has invariably declined the straight for the

crooked path; and that an excess of ingenuity--a vast misfortune

for a statesman--has tempted him to meddle, repeatedly and almost

incessantly, with interests far too important to be approached except

with extreme deliberation. These are the considerations which must

preclude him from being restored to his former rank as leader of the

great Conservative party; and we notice them now, not as matter of

blame to him, but in explanation of the general feeling. And we go

further than this. We say that, in order to render the Conservative

union enduring, it will be absolutely necessary to reconstruct the

party upon clear, avowed, solid, and proclaimed principles, so that

no doubt whatever may be left as to the course which in future is to

be pursued. Instead of that shifting and wavering policy which has

paralysed our colonies, terrified our merchants, and depressed the

money market, we must resolve upon a definite plan for the future,

which shall restore confidence, and secure us, so far as may be,

against the recurrence of similar disasters. We must also determine

whether the present currency laws are to be maintained, or whether

they shall undergo such alterations as shall prevent them from

aggravating the pressure in circumstances of unforeseen difficulty.

On all these points Sir Robert Peel stands strongly and unfortunately

committed. Even since he has been in opposition, he has shown no

symptoms of the slightest relaxation of his last adopted ideas; and

it is quite impossible for us to forget that, through his influence,

the Whigs were enabled to carry that bill which is universally

acknowledged to be the death-warrant of our West Indian colonies.

Under these circumstances, the devotion of his few adherents is not

only an act of Quixotry, but a serious injury to the party which has

a right to expect their services and their aid; and, however much we

may respect the talents of the gentlemen to whom we have alluded, we

must tell them that the period for a definite selection has arrived,

and that, by standing in the way of Conservative reconciliation and

union, they are not performing their proper duty either to their

country or their Queen.

With such financiers as Goulburn and Herries in the Commons,--with

such eminent statesmen as Lords Stanley, Lyndhurst, and Aberdeen in

the House of Peers,--there can be no doubt of the strength and the

success of the Conservative party if once more thoroughly united.

We have always regarded the unfortunate division as one of the most

serious disasters that ever befell the country, not only because it

destroyed the cohesion and severed the councils of a body which,

under any circumstances, would have been strong enough to keep both

the Whigs and the Radicals in check, but also because it engendered

much apathy and some disgust amongst men who were the most valuable

supporters of Conservative principles, and who, in consequence,

ceased for a time to take any active interest in public affairs. The

unseemly election contests which repeatedly took place in England,

between parties mutually designating themselves Protectionists and

Peelites,--sometimes terminating in the defeat of both, or in the

triumph, through their idle rivalry, of a liberal candidate, who

otherwise never could have succeeded--did a great deal to widen the

breach, and to lessen the mass of the opposition; and we revert with

considerable pride and satisfaction to the fact, that in Scotland no

such unnatural dissension was exhibited, but that men belonging to

every shade of Conservatism were eager to act in concert, whenever a

candidate appeared. We can make allowance for some exasperation on

both sides, under such very peculiar and novel circumstances; but we

hope that we have seen the last of these discreditable and weakening

contests.

Let, then, the short period which is left between the present time

and the reassembling of Parliament be employed by all the friends

of the old Conservative cause for the promotion of union, and the

establishment of a thoroughly good understanding amongst ourselves.

Let all former causes of offence be cordially forgiven: let us

consider what we are to do, and whom we are to follow; and, these

dispositions made, let them be adhered to with integrity and honour.

The Whig faction is utterly effete and incapable of maintaining

its ground. The free-traders stand before the nation as detected

charlatans and impostors. There is no enemy to fear, if we only go

on boldly and do our duty. But if we hesitate and hang back at the

present crisis, and decline to assume a position which might soon

enable us to apply an effectual remedy to the most pressing disorders

of the country, can we be surprised if the masses, irritated and

provoked, seeing no one great party in the state ready to come to

their assistance, should begin to clamour for organic changes; or if

the colonies, weary of their suffering, and despairing of sympathy,

should question the worth of the bonds which bind them to the mother

country?

Thus far we have thought it our duty to speak in all sincerity and

plainness. We know well that these sentiments are far from being

confined to ourselves. We feel assured that many of the wisest and

best men who ever adorned her Majesty's councils, or those of her

royal predecessors, are deeply desirous that the present anomalous

state of party should be corrected, and unwholesome separation be

superseded by cordial union. This, we firmly believe, could be

effected without any sacrifice of principle, and the sooner it is

accomplished the better.

There is but one topic more to which we would fain allude before

concluding the present article. The late rebellious outbreaks in

Ireland seem, in certain quarters, to have revived the notion of the

expediency of a state endowment of the Roman Catholic priesthood.

We place very little faith in the sincerity of an announcement

which some time ago was put forth, on hierarchical authority, in

the public prints, to the effect that, even were such an endowment

to be offered, it would be peremptorily and indignantly refused.

But, sincere or not, that statement may serve as an answer to the

writer in the last Number of the _Quarterly Review_, who supports

the endowment scheme with an unction which we were certainly not

prepared to expect. His argument, from first to last, implies the

same unhappy yielding to agitation and terrorism, which, when applied

to civil matters, has ended in open rebellion, and which, if applied

to ecclesiastical affairs, would infallibly result in the total

overthrow and annihilation of the Protestant Church in Ireland. Does

he really believe that--to assume no argument of a graver nature--the

people of Great Britain will be ready, in the present desperate state

of their finances, to submit to additional taxation for the purpose

of establishing, in permanent comfort, the true instigators of the

disturbances which have caused us so much anxiety and pain? Why, if

such endowment can be vindicated upon any intelligible principle, is

it to be confined to the Roman Catholic clergy of Ireland alone, and

not extended to the dissenting denominations throughout the width

and breadth of the land? On what plea could the Free and Episcopal

churches in Scotland, or the Wesleyan Methodists of England, be

excluded, if such a proposition were for a moment to be seriously

maintained? The reviewer professes to reject, _in toto_, any idea

of the confiscation of existing church property, and therefore he

must fall back, as his sole resource, upon government endowment,

which means simply a new tax on the people of Great Britain, for the

benefit of Ireland--a country which is already exempted from her

share of our heaviest burdens, and annually receiving eleemosynary

aid to an amount which has grievously contributed to increase our

late monetary pressure. It may be that some such project is in

contemplation, for we never have been able to comprehend, without

some such motive as this, the extraordinary anxiety exhibited by

the present Whig government in carrying through their bill for

the establishment of Diplomatic relations with Rome, at the very

moment when the last fragment of temporal power was passing from the

hands of the Pope. But whether this be so or not--whether this is a

mere private crotchet, or a prepared scheme, to come forth in due

season--we are perfectly satisfied that it will be met throughout

the country with a righteous storm of indignation. The Protestantism

of Britain has been its strength and its glory; and it was only when

called upon to choose between that sacred principle and the hardly

less revered one of loyalty, that our forefathers thought themselves

justified in summoning an alien to the British throne. What cost us

then both tears and blood is an operating principle now; and if,

through the grace of God, we have seen order maintained and rebellion

crushed at home, at a period when half of Europe is plunged in the

horrors of anarchy, we do not fear the charge of bigotry, if we

attribute our preservation as much to the religious establishments

of the land, as to the free institutions which Protestantism has

enabled us to maintain. Loyalty is not a thing to be bought: it is a

spontaneous feeling, unpurchaseable at any price; and if the Irish

Catholic clergy have it not now, the most liberal endowment will work

no change in their political feelings.

One of the arguments most commonly urged by those who advocate this

system of endowment, is, we think, both erroneous in its assumption

and weak in its application. They maintain that the Catholic clergy,

if in the pay of the state, would have less power over the peasantry

of Ireland than at present. Is that altogether a state of matters

which it would be desirable to bring about? Would it be well to sap

the influence of this moral police? There is not a Roman Catholic

priest in Ireland at this moment who does not know, that were he to

give open countenance to rebellion, he would not only be amenable

to the laws of his country, but, under a firm executive government,

would be selected as the earliest example. The situation of Ireland

is such, that we can never calculate upon the loyalty of a large

portion of its population. Centuries have rolled by, and still

the Celtic race persist in being aliens from our own. We cannot

tame them, cannot cultivate them, cannot win their hearts by any

imaginable sacrifice. They persist in their cry of Ireland for

the Irish, and will not see that the thing is as impossible as the

re-establishment of the Saxon heptarchy, and, were it possible,

would be tantamount to delivering them over to the horrors of a

barbarian war. It is no use disguising the fact--we must deal with

men as they are; and who can doubt that there does exist a great

amount of rooted disaffection among the peasantry of Ireland? And

now it is seriously proposed to cure that disaffection, by taking

means calculated to weaken the influence of the priesthood over the

peasantry! In other words, to give up the only hostages we hold, and

leave the most turbulent and uneducated population of Europe, freed

even from religious control, to be worked up to frenzy by the first

lay demagogue who has the art to make them believe that treason is a

synonymous term with patriotism. Even worldly wisdom would repudiate

such a surrender, and the argument is so weak, that it bears with it

its own refutation.

We have gained nothing whatever by tampering with Roman Catholicism

in Ireland. Neither the moral nor the social condition of the people

has been improved thereby; on the contrary, each successive step

towards conciliation has been met by augmented turbulence. We cannot

afford to push the experiment farther; and surely it would be a

strange thing, if, while the Romish clergy themselves distinctly

repudiate such an arrangement, and refuse to become the stipendiaries

of the British government, any body of men who may be called to the

responsible situation of her Majesty's advisers, should persist in

tendering the obnoxious and repugnant boon: least of all do we expect

that any such proposal can emanate from the Conservatives. We know

that upon this point various opinions have been expressed, and that

Lord George Bentinck was at one time supposed to be not unfavourable

to such a scheme. No man, we firmly believe, ever had the good of

Ireland more thoroughly at heart; and, had his plan for ameliorating

the Irish distress been adopted last year, and the money which was

uselessly squandered, been applied to the construction of permanent

works eminently calculated to open up and develop the resources of

the country, we might ere this time have seen the foundation laid of

a new era of social and industrial prosperity. But the Whig Cabinet,

perverse to the last, could not bring themselves to acknowledge that

the political sagacity of an opponent was greater than their own;

and, therefore the money which we gave with so lavish a hand, has

disappeared without leaving the smallest trace of its employment.

But, in ecclesiastical matters, Lord George Bentinck professed a

latitudinarianism which was not responded to by the great bulk of his

party. They were not disposed to unchristianise the high assembly of

Britain by the introduction of men who openly avowed their denial

of the faith of the Saviour; nor would they consent to put forth

their hands against the ark of the national churches. And therefore

it was that, upon more than one occasion, the Protestant party,

while cheerfully acknowledging the great public services of the late

departed nobleman, did not attempt to conceal that, upon points so

serious as these, there could be no sympathy of opinion between him

and them.

The single arrow may be easily splintered, but, to use the memorable

words of Genghis-Khan, "So long as the sheaf is bound together in

three places--in love, honesty, and good accord--no man can have

power to grieve us; but, if we be divided from these three places,

that one of us help not the other, we shall be destroyed and brought

to nothing." We recommend the moral contained in the apologue of the

old Asiatic chief to the serious consideration of all men belonging

to the Conservative party; for this they may rely upon, that, not

only is prolonged discord an act of egregious folly, but that any one

who refuses, in the present troublous times, to lend a hand to the

reknitting of the severed tie, cannot, in the estimation of good men,

be considered a friend to his country. And if this be so, what faith

can we repose in him who cut the cords asunder?

_Printed by William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh._

* * * * *

Transcriber's Notes:

Obvious typographical errors were repaired, but valid archaic

spellings were retained.

Hyphenation variants have been standardized.

P. 570, "summons to a sick funnel": original read "sick funuel."

P. 612, "and looking on the vigorous and growing": original showed

"oking" with extra space before it.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 64, No. 397, November 1848 · 第 21 / 21 段