THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_Continued_)
IV. THE SECOND PHASE
The flotillas and light cruiser squadrons were now regrouped--some
ahead, some alongside of the battle-cruiser and battleship squadrons,
and the whole steered to the northward, keeping approximately parallel
to and well ahead of the German line. From the time when Scheer came
into action at 4:57 until six o’clock, Sir David Beatty kept the
range at about 14,000 yards. Both sides must have had some anxious
moments during this critical hour. Sir David Beatty knew what Admiral
Scheer did not--for the weather was too thick for the Zeppelins to
give him the much-needed information--that he was falling back on Sir
John Jellicoe, when of course overwhelming force could be brought to
bear. His business was to keep Admiral Scheer in play, while exposing
his ships, especially his battle-cruisers, as little as possible,
consistent with their maintaining an efficient attack upon the
enemy. Sir David was criticized for exposing his ships imprudently.
Is this criticism well founded? Von Hipper’s battle-cruisers were
at the head of the German line, but one had certainly fallen out of
action by five o’clock, and one more was to leave the line in the
course of this holding action. The battle-cruisers, however, did not
affect the situation, for the German Fleet’s speed was that of the
pre-Dreadnoughts in the rear, and this could not have exceeded 18
knots and was probably less. But the slowest ship in Sir David Beatty’s
squadron could make at least 24. Nothing, therefore, could have been
simpler than to have taken the whole force out of reach of Scheer’s
guns whenever he chose. Had there at any stage been the remotest chance
of the lightly armoured battle-cruisers being exposed to smothering
fire from the German battleships, the danger could have been averted by
the expedient of putting on more speed. Beatty’s main preoccupation,
however, was not this. It was undoubtedly the fear that Scheer might
retreat before the Grand Fleet could get up. He had, therefore, first
to act as if he were a promising target, next to be ready with a
counter-stroke if the Germans showed any sign of flight. How did he
meet the first necessity of the position?
By keeping the range at 14,000 yards, at which the heavier projectile
guns of the British artillery would have a distinct advantage over the
German batteries, and by keeping so far ahead that it was impossible
for Admiral Scheer to bring the fire of concentrated broadsides to
bear, not only was an absolute inequality of gunnery conditions
avoided, but it is probable that, so far as tactical disposition
went, Sir David Beatty, as throughout the action, had so handled his
ships as to be actually superior in fighting power over the forces he
was engaging. I say “so far as tactical disposition was concerned,”
advisedly, because a new element came into action at this point which
favoured first one and then the other, and was ultimately to make
long-range gunfire altogether nugatory.
[Illustration: The second phase; Beatty engages the combined German
Fleet, and draws it toward the Grand Fleet]
Already between a quarter past four and half past, light mists had
been driving down, and even before a quarter to five the outlines
of Von Hipper’s squadron were becoming vague and shadowy to the
British gun-layers. Between half-past five and six these conditions
got very much worse. It handicapped the fire-control severely, and
already they were beginning to feel, what the Commander-in-Chief says
was a characteristic of the whole period during which the Grand Fleet
was intermittently in action, viz., the extreme difficulty of using
rangefinders in the shifting and indifferent light. How local and
variable the mist was may be judged from the fact that the British
line was not only free from mist, but was outlined sharply against the
setting sun--thus giving a great advantage to the German rangefinders.
It was this that largely neutralized the advantage which Sir David
Beatty had so skilfully derived from the superior speed of his ships.
No ships were lost on the British side during this part of the action.
But it can hardly be doubted that had the conditions of visibility
been the same for both sides, the head of the German line would have
suffered more severely than it did from the Fifth Battle Squadron’s
15-inch guns. But, as we have seen, one of the battle-cruisers had
to haul out severely damaged, and certain others showed unmistakable
evidence of having suffered severely.
In this phase of the action, as in the first, the British destroyers
made attacks on the German line, and it is believed that one ship, seen
to be hopelessly on fire and emitting huge clouds of smoke and steam,
owed her injuries to a torpedo fired by _Moresby_.
What was Admiral Scheer’s idea in following up the British squadron
as he did? He knew that he had not the speed which would enable him
to catch it. It was almost impossible--for he was now the pursuing
squadron--to hope for any success from a destroyer attack. There was a
risk that he might be caught and forced to engage by the Grand Fleet.
There are, it seems, two explanations of his action. In the first
place, he knew that Von Hipper had already sunk two of the British
vessels. It was worth a considerable effort to try and get more, and in
face of these losses Sir David Beatty’s movements may have looked so
extremely like flight as to make him think that he had, to this extent,
the upper hand, and that the British Admiral would be unlikely to risk
his force again by seeking a close action. Apart from the risk of the
Grand Fleet being out, then, there seemed to be everything to gain and
nothing to lose by carrying on the chase.
But is it quite certain that his action was altogether voluntary?
What would Sir David Beatty’s action have been had Scheer attempted
to renounce the fight? There can be no hesitation in answering this
question, for we only have to look at what Sir David actually did at
six o’clock, when the Germans got news of the Grand Fleet’s approach
and had to change tactics immediately. We shall find in this the clue
to what would have happened had Scheer attempted to change course and
withdraw earlier in the action.
The governing factors of the situation were, first, Beatty’s superior
speed; secondly, his superior concentration of gun power, and, lastly,
the greater efficacy of his guns at long range. The difference between
the speed of the slowest ships in the British fast division, say 24½
knots, and that of the slowest in the German main squadron, say 18, was
6½ knots at least.
If Scheer had attempted simply to withdraw, he must have reversed
the course of his fleet, either by turning his ships together or in
succession. In the first case, the simplest of manœuvres would have
brought the British Fleet into the T position across the German rear.
And with a six-knot advantage in speed, Sir David could even have
attempted the final tactics of Admiral Sturdee at the Falkland Islands,
and pursued the flying force with his four battle-cruisers, engaging
them from one side, and the Fifth Battle Squadron attacking them from
the other. So disastrous, indeed, must this manœuvre have been to the
Germans that it need not be considered as thinkable. The alternative
was to lead round from the head of the line, when the choice would have
arisen between a gradual change of course and a reverse of course,
viz., a sixteen-point turn. The objections to the sixteen-point turn
were precisely similar to those to turning the fleet together, with,
perhaps, the added objection that the British would have had two
lines of ships to fire into instead of only one--an advantage which
would not have been counterbalanced by the enemy keeping one or two
broadsides bearing, for they would be the broadsides of ships under
full helm, and it is highly improbable that their fire would have
been effective. When Scheer actually did break off battle, we shall
find that he turned his fleet in succession through an angle of 135°.
There were special reasons that made it obligatory he should do this,
and special conditions which made it possible. Until he met the Grand
Fleet, there was nothing to force him to turn, and the counter-stroke
on which he relied to rob the turn of its chief dangers would not have
been operative against the two squadrons of fast ships under Sir David
Beatty’s command.
Had Scheer attempted such a turn as he actually made at 6:45, or had
he initiated and continued such a manœuvre as he began at six o’clock,
Beatty’s speed advantage would have enabled him to maintain his
dominating position ahead of the German line. He could either have
manœuvred to get round between Scheer and his bases, with a view to
heading him north again, or, if he judged it hopeless to expect the
Grand Fleet to reach the scene in daylight, could himself have reversed
course and pounded the weak ships at the end of the German line
unmercifully.
In any event, while it would be an exaggeration to say that he had the
whip-hand of the enemy, it is no exaggeration to say that his force was
so formidable and so fast as to make escape from it anything but a safe
or a simple problem. The utmost Scheer could have hoped for would have
been a long defensive action until darkness made attack impossible, or
winning the mine-fields made pursuit too dangerous.
These considerations cannot be ignored in asking why it was that Scheer
followed the British Admiral so obediently in the hour and a quarter
between 4:57 and 6 P.M. But still less must we forget that had Scheer
known earlier that the Grand Fleet was out, he would certainly have
preferred the risk of a pursuit by Beatty to the chance of having to
take on the whole of Sir John Jellicoe’s battle fleet.
At twenty-five minutes to six Admiral Scheer began hauling round to
the east, changing his course, that is to say, gradually away from the
British line. Sir David supposes that he had by this time received
information of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This information might
have come from Zeppelins, though in the weather conditions this would
seem to have been improbable; or it might have come from some of his
cruisers, which were well ahead, and had made contact with Hood’s
scouts. But is this quite consistent with what Admiral Jellicoe says of
Hood’s movements?
“At 5:30 this squadron observed flashes of gun-fire and heard the sound
of guns to the southwestward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent _Chester_ to
investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light cruisers
at about 5:45.”
It is not stated that Rear-Admiral Hood saw the German light cruisers,
and it seems improbable, then, that they saw him. Admiral Scheer could
not have changed course at 5:35, because of the action of his scouts
with _Chester_ at 5:45. But her presence may have been signalled to
him as soon as she was seen, and he may have concluded that the news
could have but one significance, viz., that the Grand Fleet was coming
down from the north. But is it altogether impossible that Scheer began
his gradual easterly turn before suspecting that the Grand Fleet was
out? Was he not, perhaps, already aware of the dangers of getting too
far afield, and beginning that gradual turn which might keep Sir David
Beatty’s ships in play as long as daylight lasted, without giving the
openings which a direct attempt at flight would offer? Whatever the
explanation of the movements, the enemy began this gradual turn and Sir
David turned with him, increasing speed, so as to maintain his general
relation to the head of the German line. At ten minutes to six some of
the Grand Fleet’s cruisers were observed ahead, and six minutes later
the leading battleships came into view. The moment for which every
movement since 2:20 had been a preparation had now arrived--the Grand
Fleet and the German Fleet were to meet.