THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_Continued_)
III. THE DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES
In the afternoon of May 31 the main sea forces of Great Britain and
Germany were all in the North Sea. The Grand Fleet, under the command
of Sir John Jellicoe, accompanied by a squadron of battle-cruisers,
two of light cruisers, and three flotillas of destroyers, were to the
north; the Battle Cruiser Fleet--of two squadrons--three squadrons of
light cruisers, and four destroyer flotillas, supported by the Fifth
Battle Squadron, all under the command of Sir David Beatty, were
scouting to the southward.
The British Fleet was out “in pursuance of the general policy of
periodical sweeps through the North Sea.” The disposition of the forces
and the plan of operations were the Commander-in-Chief’s own. Neither
was dictated from Whitehall. The despatches describing the operation
do not--as some of those relating to the events off Heligoland in
August, 1914--say that the ships were following Admiralty instructions.
The fact has considerable importance in view of the fears expressed
earlier in the spring that Whitehall was interfering with the
Commander-in-Chief’s dispositions. Note also that the fleet was here in
pursuit of the general policy followed since the early days of the war.
This hunting for the enemy is not described as taking place at regular
intervals, but as “periodic.” These searching movements would be made
at the times when there was a greater likelihood of there being an
enemy to find.
[Illustration: The official plan of the Battle of Jutland. Note that
the course of the Grand Fleet is not shown to be “astern” of the
battle-cruisers, but parallel to their track]
There was a considerable interval between the forces--just how great
we do not exactly know. But at the point at which the story in the
despatches opens, Sir David Beatty’s force was steering northward,
that is, toward the Grand Fleet. At 2:20 _Galatea_, the flagship of
Commodore Alexander Sinclair, reported the presence of enemy vessels.
The light cruisers were spread out on a line east and west, ahead of
the battle-cruisers. When Sir David Beatty got news that the enemy had
been sighted on the extreme right of his line of cruisers, he at once
altered course from north to S.S.E., that is, rather more of a right
angle and a half, steering for the Horn Reefs, so as to place his force
between the enemy and his base. It is to be noted that the Vice-Admiral
at once adopted not the movement that would soonest bring the enemy to
action, but that which would compel him to action whether he wished it
or not. Observe he does not wait to do this till he has ascertained
the enemy’s strength. A quarter of an hour later smoke was seen to
the eastward--that would be on the port bow--which would confirm the
_Galatea’s_ account that the enemy was still to the north of the line
that Sir David Beatty was steering. The distance of the battle-cruisers
from the Horn Reefs was such that the enemy’s escape from action
would still be impossible, even if he altered course to cut him off
sooner. This, accordingly, he did, steering first due east and then
northeast and, in less than an hour, sighted Von Hipper’s force of five
battle-cruisers, probably almost straight ahead. When, at 2:20, the
battle-cruisers headed for the Horn Reefs, the First and Third Light
Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction also without waiting for
orders, and swept to the eastward, screening the battle-cruisers. The
Fifth Battle Squadron, which we must suppose originally to have been
on Sir David Beatty’s left, was coming up behind the battle-cruisers
as fast as possible. The Second Light Cruiser Squadron, leaving the
screening functions to the First and Third, made full speed to take
station ahead of the battle-cruisers, where two flotillas of destroyers
were already. While these movements were proceeding, a seaplane was
sent up from _Engadine_ which, having to fly low on account of clouds,
pushed to within 3,000 yards of the four light cruisers of Von Hipper’s
advance force. Full and accurate reports were thus received just before
the enemy was sighted in the distance.
At 2:20, when the enemy’s scouting advanced craft were first seen by
_Galatea_, Von Hipper was seemingly to the south of them, and according
to the German account went north and east to investigate. While then
Sir David Beatty was travelling southeast, east, and then northeast,
we shall probably be right in supposing that Von Hipper was executing
an approximately parallel series of movements out of sight to the
northeast of him. Both advance forces were increasing their distance
from their main forces. At any rate, neither was approaching his main
force when they came into sight at 3:30, Von Hipper a few miles north
of Sir David Beatty.
What was the distance at this period that separated the battle-cruisers
of each side from their supporting battle-fleets? At 3:30 the German
battle-cruisers headed straight for their main fleet at full speed, and
met them an hour and a quarter afterward. If Von Hipper’s speed was 26
knots and Admiral Scheer’s 18--he had pre-Dreadnoughts with him, and it
was not likely to have been greater--there would have been fifty-five
sea miles separating the German forces. According to the despatch, Sir
John Jellicoe at 3:30 headed his fleet toward Sir David Beatty, and
came down at full speed. He came into contact with the battle-cruisers
on their return from their excursion to the south at 5:45. Sir David
Beatty would by this time have returned approximately to the same
latitude he was on at 3:30. Had he then at 3:30 closed Sir John
Jellicoe at full speed, he would have come in contact with him in, say,
fifty minutes. The British fleets at 3:30, then, may have been between
forty and forty-five sea miles apart, against the German fifty-five.
[Illustration: POSITION OF THE OPPOSING FLEETS AT 3.30 P.M.]
It has been said that both sides fell into a strategical error in
dividing their forces. This criticism has been prominent in the neutral
Press; but it arises from a confusion of thought. On neither side
were the battle-cruisers considered as anything but scouting forces,
which in all sea campaigns have been, because it is a necessity of the
case, maintained at suitable distances from the main force. The only
division of forces proper on the British side was the presence of four
battleships with Sir David Beatty. But as we see from the despatch, for
some reason a squadron of three of Sir David’s battle-cruisers was with
the main fleet, and the Fifth Battle Squadron seems to have been taking
its place.
The only evidences of a strategical blunder in the disposition would
be, first, a failure of the chosen plan to bring the Germans to action,
next a failure to defeat them when brought to action, because of
inability to concentrate the requisite strength for the purpose at the
critical point. It is surely a sufficient reply to say that the German
Fleet was brought to action, and that any incompleteness in the victory
arose, not from there being insufficient forces present, but owing
to circumstances making it impossible to employ them to the greatest
advantage.
THE ACTION: FIRST PHASE
When the enemy was sighted at 3:30, Sir David formed his ships for
action in a line of bearing, so that, in the northeasterly wind, the
smoke of one ship should not interfere with the fire of the rest. His
course was east-southeast, and he was converging on that of the enemy,
who was steering rather more directly south. By the time the line was
formed the range was about 23,000 yards, and at twelve minutes to four
had been closed to 18,500, when both sides opened fire simultaneously.
When the range had closed to about 14,000 yards or less, parallel
courses were steered and kept until the end of this phase of the
engagement. The Fifth Battle Squadron, consisting of four ships of the
_Queen Elizabeth_ class, under the command of Admiral Evan-Thomas, at
the time when Sir David formed his battle-line, was about 10,000 yards
off--not straight astern of the battle-cruisers, but bearing about half
a right angle to port. The course that would bring them immediately
into the line of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, then, was not parallel to
that steered by Sir David Beatty, but a course converging on to it. It
was this that enabled them, with their inferior speed, to come into
action at eight minutes past four, though only then at the very long
range of 20,000 yards.
The interval had been singularly unfortunate for the British side.
_Indefatigable_ (Captain Sowerby) had the misfortune to be hit
by a shell in a vulnerable spot. The destruction of the ship was
instantaneous, and almost the entire personnel, including the ship’s
very gallant Captain, was lost. An exactly similar misfortune later
befell _Queen Mary_. Neither ship had, in any sense of the word, been
overwhelmed by the gunfire of the enemy. Indeed, when _Queen Mary_ went
down, the enemy’s fire, which had been singularly accurate and intense
in the first phase of the action had, as the Vice-Admiral says in his
despatch, slackened. The superior skill, due chiefly to the wider
experience of the British fire-control organizations, had already begun
to tell--the enemy’s fire-control being evidently unable to survive the
damage, and losses of action.
[Illustration: The first phase; from Von Hipper’s coming into view,
until his juncture with Admiral Scheer]
Sir David Beatty’s main force was thus reduced first by one-sixth,
and then by one-fifth of its number, so that he was now left with four
ships against the German five. But three of these ships disposed of
broadsides of 13.4’s, the fourth employing a gun equal to the most
powerful in the German armament. In weight and power of broadside the
British cruisers still had the advantage, and it is clear that their
rate of fire was faster, and their aiming and range-keeping more
effective.
Just as the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action at ten minutes past
four, a brisk and dramatic encounter took place between the light
craft of the two sides. Two flotillas of destroyers and one squadron
of light cruisers, it will be remembered, were stationed well ahead of
the British flagship. Eight units of the Thirteenth Flotilla, together
with two of the Tenth and two of the Ninth, had been designated for
making an attack on the enemy’s line as soon as an opportunity offered.
The opportunity came at 4:15. A destroyer attack is of course a torpedo
attack, and is delivered by the flotilla engaged in steering a course
converging toward that of the enemy. The destroyers must be well ahead
of their targets if the attack is to be effective, so that the torpedo
and the ship attacked shall be steering toward each other. These boats
proceeded then, at 4:15, to initiate this manœuvre toward the enemy.
It was almost simultaneously countered by an identical movement by
the enemy, who had a considerable preponderance of force--fifteen
destroyers and a cruiser against the British twelve destroyers. These
two forces met before either had reached a position for effecting its
main purpose, viz., the torpedo attack on the capital ships. A very
spirited engagement followed. It was a close-quarters affair, and was
carried through by the British destroyers in the most gallant manner
and with great determination. Two of the enemy’s destroyers were sunk,
and what was far more important, it was made quite impossible for him
to carry through a torpedo attack. None of our boats went down. But
just as the enemy’s boats had been unable to get a favourable position
for attacking our battle-cruisers, so, too, the English boats, delayed
by this engagement, were unable to get the desired position on the
enemy’s bow for employing their torpedoes to the best advantage. Three
of them, however, though unable to attack from ahead, pressed forward
for a broadside attack on Von Hipper’s ships, and naturally came under
a fierce fire from the secondary armament of these vessels. One of
them, _Nomad_, was badly hit, and had to stop between the lines. She
was ultimately lost. _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ held on between the lines
until the German Battle Fleet was met.
For a full half hour these two boats had been either fighting an
almost hand-to-hand action with the enemy’s boats, or had been under
the close-range fire of Von Hipper’s battle-cruisers. They now found
themselves faced by the German Battle Fleet. But they were at last in
the right position for an attack. Both closed, in spite of the fire,
to 3,000 yards and fired their torpedoes. It is believed that one hit
was made. _Nicator_ escaped and rejoined the Thirteenth Flotilla, but
_Nestor_, though not sunk, was stopped, and had to be numbered amongst
the losses when the action was over.
While this had been going forward, the artillery action between the
two squadrons of battle-cruisers continued fierce and resolute. Sir
Evan-Thomas’s battleships did their best with the rear of the enemy’s
line, but were unable to reduce the range below 20,000 yards, if,
indeed, they were unable to prevent the enemy increasing it. At 4:18
a second palpable evidence that the British fire was taking effect
was afforded by the third of Von Hipper’s ships bursting into flames.
The first evidence was, of course, the falling off in the rate of the
enemy’s fire, and the still more marked deterioration in its accuracy.
It will be remembered that the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, under
Commodore Goodenough, had got to its action station ahead of Sir David
Beatty’s line a little while before the engagement opened with Von
Hipper at half-past three. This squadron maintained its position well
ahead, and at 4:38 reported the advent of Scheer with a German battle
squadron from the south. They would then be from 20,000 to 24,000 yards
off. Until _Southampton_ sent in her message at 4:38, the British
Admiral had no reason for knowing that the enemy Battle Fleet was out.
Not that the knowledge would have affected the plan he actually carried
out, for the immediate attack on Von Hipper was right in either event.
But it was obvious that, with only four battle-cruisers, it was out of
the question continuing the action as if the forces were equal. The
Fifth Battle Squadron was out of range, and the Vice-Admiral’s first
business was to concentrate his force, and then to judge how to impose
his will upon the enemy in the matter of forcing him up to action with
the Grand Fleet. The junction with Admiral Evan-Thomas could obviously
not be delayed; as obviously the manœuvre was a dangerous one, for
as each ship turned it would be exposed to the enemy’s fire without
being able to reply. Had only speed of junction to be considered, the
battle-cruisers could have been turned together when the rear ship
on the old course would have become the leading ship on the new. The
turn could probably be accomplished in less than three minutes. But
seriously as the German fire had depreciated, it was not a thing with
which liberties could be taken. Sir David Beatty, therefore, turned
his ships one by one, thus keeping three in action while the first was
turning; two while the second was turning--the first and second coming
into action on a reverse course as the third and fourth turned from the
old. At no time, then, was the fire of the British squadron reduced
below that of two ships.
No sooner had Sir David turned than Von Hipper followed his example,
and as the Vice-Admiral led up on the new course, he met Evan-Thomas
with his four battleships directing a fierce fire on Von Hipper. These
two squadrons were on opposite courses, and the change of range was
rapid. The conditions for hitting were extremely difficult. Evan-Thomas
was not yet in sight of the German Battle Fleet, and the Vice-Admiral
told him to turn, as he had done, and to form up behind him. By the
time this manœuvre was completed--that is, within a quarter of an hour
of Sir David Beatty having begun his own turn--the head of Admiral
Scheer’s line had got within range, and a brisk action opened between
the leading German ships and the rear ships on the British side.
During this quarter of an hour, Commodore Goodenough in _Southampton_
pushed south to ascertain the precise numbers and composition of
the German force. It was of course of great moment, not only to the
Vice-Admiral but to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy’s strength
should be ascertained as accurately and as soon as possible. But to do
this the Commodore had to take his squadron under the massed fire of
the German Dreadnoughts. He held on until a range of about 13,000 yards
was reached and, having got the information he wanted, returned to
form up with the Cruiser Fleet on its northerly course. His squadron
was hardly hit: for though the fire was intense, here, too, the change
of range was rapid, and far too difficult for the German fire-control
to surmount.