BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (II)
B. ACTION WITH THE ARMOURED CRUISERS
“The fire of the battle-cruisers was directed on the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1:25
P.M., with the _Scharnhorst_ leading, they turned about seven points
to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1:30 P.M.
Shortly afterwards speed was eased to twenty-four knots, and the
battle-cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line
ahead, with the _Invincible_ leading.
“The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased
until at 2 P.M. it had reached 16,450 yards.”
The moment Von Spee found himself under the effective fire of the
battle-cruisers, he took the only course open to him. To delay the
finish by sheer flight would do no good. It was his duty to inflict
some reciprocal injury on his opponent. He was under the fire of at
least eight if not twelve 12-inch guns, and he only had six 8-inch
guns bearing on Admiral Sturdee. To do anything at all effective he
had to turn broadside on. He therefore turned seven-eighths of a right
angle to port, that is, to the left--his course now being almost at
right angles to Admiral Sturdee’s--and six minutes afterwards, when
both his ships were on a steady course, he opened fire. Three minutes
after he began his turn, and therefore three minutes before he opened
fire, Admiral Sturdee turned his ships to port also, but his turn was
not quite so big as the enemy’s, and for about twelve minutes the
range was steadily closing. The effect of these changes of course
was to bring the battle-cruisers to within 11,000 or 12,000 yards of
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. The Germans took full advantage of this
opportunity, and before they had been firing five minutes they had
salvo after salvo straddling the battle-cruisers.
As we have seen, both in the stories of the _Koenigsberg_ and of
the _Emden_, there has been no feature of any gunnery action more
regularly reproduced than the rapidity with which the Germans find
the range at the beginning of an action, or the regularity with which
the projectiles of every broadside fall together. It was strikingly
exemplified in the present instance, so much so indeed that Admiral
Sturdee thought it wise to make a further turn to port, thus increasing
the range, and as he says in this despatch, by the time his total turn
was completed, he brought the range out again to about 13,500 yards.
At this distance the 12-inch guns would have a marked advantage over
the 8.2’s. But for all that the German fire continued surprisingly
accurate, and many hits were made on our ships. The British Admiral
held to his new course and the German ships theirs. This involved the
lengthening of the range. But Von Spee doubtless preferred this to the
confusion of a changing rate. He held on then till he could reach the
British ships no longer. The consequence was that in twenty minutes
the range had increased by a further 2,500 yards, which was far beyond
the capacity of 8.2’s, and a range at which the shooting of even the
12-inch guns might be irregular. Accordingly at about 2 o’clock the
British squadron began a gradual turn towards the enemy, which in about
seven minutes’ time brought them on a course at right angles to their
previous course, and therefore a little less than right angles to the
course which the Germans were steering.
“The enemy then (2:10 P.M.) turned away about ten points to starboard
and a second chase ensued, until, at 2:45 P.M., the battle-cruisers
again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2:53 P.M., to turn into
line ahead to port and open fire at 2:55 P.M.
“The _Scharnhorst_ caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her
fire slackened perceptibly; the _Gneisenau_ was badly hit by the
_Inflexible_.”
In the seven minutes of the beginning of Admiral Sturdee’s turn he
reduced the range by considerably over 1,000 yards, and Von Spee
perceiving the change of course of the British ships, turned about
half a right angle to starboard, that is to the right, as if undecided
whether to go right across the bows, and then a few minutes afterwards
turned much more than a right angle to the right again. This brought
the British squadron dead astern of him and showed that his only
anxiety at this moment was to escape our fire as long as possible. It
appears from various accounts that firing had ceased on both sides for
some little time before Admiral Sturdee began his turn at 2 o’clock,
and Von Spee wished to make the lull in the fighting as long as
possible. There were doubtless many wounded to carry off, damages to be
made good, and so forth. The whole of the first phase of the gunnery
engagement, then, beginning just after half-past one on the German
side, may be supposed to have ended round about ten minutes to two.
At ten minutes past two the enemy began his new flight, necessitating
a reproduction by the British squadron of their tactics of two hours
before. It was a chase, not on the direct track of the Germans, but on
a course parallel to them and coming round on their port or left-hand
side. Von Spee’s retreat had naturally increased the range, carried it
out indeed considerably beyond 16,000 yards, but by a quarter to three
it had been reduced once more to 15,000 yards, and when the British
ships reopened fire, after less than ten minutes of it the enemy turned
to bring his broadside into action, just as he had done at 1:25.
“At 3:30 P.M. the _Scharnhorst_ led round about ten points to
starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one
shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and
it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her
starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the _Scharnhorst_
became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and
also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to
appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of
flame. At 4:4 P.M. the _Scharnhorst_, whose flag remained flying to the
last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became
clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very rapidly
until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4:17 P.M. she disappeared.”
There was this difference between the enemy’s manœuvres on this
occasion and that of an hour and a half before. At 1:25 he simply
turned sufficiently to bring his broadside to bear. This time he turned
not less but much more than a right angle, and Admiral Sturdee was
considerably behind him when he opened fire at a quarter to three.
Had the British squadron not turned shortly afterwards, the Germans
could have closed the range to collision point. As a matter of fact,
immediately after the Germans turned, Admiral Sturdee turned too, but
not so large an angle, and the consequence was that at 3 o’clock
the range had been reduced to 12,000 yards, and at one time it had
shortened down to about 9,000. It was apparently Von Spee’s intention
at this stage to shorten the range to an extent that would give his
guns the opportunity of doing some real damage to our ships. This is of
course the proper policy to adopt if a squadron has inferior gun-power
and is unable to escape by flight.
But it will be observed that Von Spee did not persist in this manœuvre,
and it is obvious that he adopted it too late. He missed his first
opportunity of inflicting serious and possibly decisive injury, when
he failed to engage the British ships as they were coming out of
harbour. He missed the second when, on Admiral Sturdee turning away
from him at 1:45, he held on his course and allowed the range to be
increased. He missed it again when at 2:10, instead of holding on his
course and going across Admiral Sturdee’s bows, he began his second and
necessarily futile flight. When the fourth chance came it was probably
too late. Both ships had been hit and _Scharnhorst_ seriously. But for
about twenty minutes the German Admiral did now close the range and
come in almost direct pursuit of the British. So much so that shortly
after a quarter past three Admiral Sturdee turned away from him, and
describing a kind of circle with his ships from left to right, brought
his squadron round so as to be directly behind the German ships. He had
two reasons for making this turn. His course was straight up wind, so
that gunnery conditions were bad, and the turn brought him to the most
favourable possible position for concentrating fire upon the enemy,
while they had only a minimum number of guns bearing. This position Von
Spee found intolerable. Both his ships were suffering, and one of the
_Scharnhorst’s_ funnels was carried away. It must have been evident
to him that the end was not far off when he turned at half past three.
Never since the first twenty minutes had the enemy’s fire been really
good, and now the thing was assuming the dimensions of a military
execution. The second phase of gunfire between a quarter to three and
half past had been decisive as far as the _Scharnhorst_ was concerned.
A curious incident in this interval should be noted. Just as the firing
began in this second phase, a full-rigged sailing ship was observed
about four miles off to the southeast from the leading British ship.
She is not identified in any of the reports of the action that I have
seen, nor has any account appeared that I know of, of what those on
board saw. But it must have been an astonishing experience for a
peaceful trading sailing vessel, beating down quietly towards the Horn,
to find herself suddenly in the middle of so grim a business as this.
Those on board saw a thing at that time unprecedented in the history of
the world. A sea battle in which ships as fast as the swiftest Atlantic
liners were using an armament twice as powerful as that carried by any
battleship that had ever been used in war before.
The last moments of _Scharnhorst_ were curiously dramatic. Till now
she had led _Gneisenau_ throughout the fight. Just before she sank
she turned a half circle past _Gneisenau_ in the reverse direction,
and before anybody in the British ships could guess whether this was
an intentional manœuvre or purely involuntary, she turned over on her
side, her bows plunged downwards, and after standing upright for a
second or two with her screws whirring high in the air, vanished from
sight. It is probable that coincident with one shot inflicting such
injuries that she was flooded, another had smashed up her steering
gear, and jammed her helm hard a-port.
“The _Gneisenau_ passed on the far side of her late flagship, and
continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle
cruisers.
“At 5:8 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting
against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and
her fire slackened very much.
“At 5:15 P.M. one of the _Gneisenau’s_ shells struck the _Invincible_;
this was her last effective effort.
“At 5:30 P.M. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to
starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape
pipes, and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this
time I ordered the signal ‘Cease fire,’ but before it was hoisted the
_Gneisenau_ opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time
with a single gun.
“At 5:40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the _Gneisenau_, and, at
this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled
down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.
“At 5:50 P.M. ‘Cease fire’ was made.
“At 6 P.M. the _Gneisenau_ heeled over very suddenly, showing the men
gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a
minute on her beam ends before sinking.”
The _Gneisenau_, at 4:17, still had all her guns in action, and
seemed indeed to have suffered very little. Had the fire of both
battle-cruisers hitherto been concentrated chiefly on the flagship? If
so, the effect was really rather unfortunate, for with one ship going
strong, it was impossible for the Vice-Admiral to attempt the rescue of
the people in _Scharnhorst_. Rain had set in. There were signs of mist
and thick weather. At any moment the light might fail. The conditions
of the morning had been ideal for the control of guns at long range.
These conditions had long since vanished. No doubt it went greatly
against the grain to leave the brave fellows of the _Scharnhorst_ in
their hopeless struggle, but the necessities of the situation gave
no choice. For that matter, when the loss of life that took place in
the _Gneisenau_ is considered, it is highly probable that had the
British ships stopped to look for people of the _Scharnhorst_ they
would have found none. For she turned over and sank, not as _Gneisenau_
subsequently did, so slowly that the people on board were able to
muster on deck and then clamber on to the ship’s sides as she heeled
over, but with such fearful rapidity that it is said that a salvo which
_Carnarvon_ had fired at her when she was still afloat and showed no
signs of immediate collapse, actually pitched in the water where she
had sunk! If this story is true she must have turned over and vanished
from sight in from ten to fifteen seconds. In this instance there can
have been few if any survivors left swimming in the water, and those
must have perished before help could reach them.
With the disappearance of _Scharnhorst_ Admiral Sturdee made a double
turn with his ships to bring them more or less into the wake of
_Gneisenau_ and adopted a new disposition. He followed _Gneisenau_ on
the starboard side himself, in _Invincible_, and sent _Inflexible_ to
take up a corresponding position on the port quarter. This brought both
ships within a range of about 12,000 yards of the _Gneisenau_, who for
the next forty minutes was subjected to a double attack, one on each
side. At 5:15 she made her last effort. She hit _Invincible_ amidships.
[Illustration: Plan of the action between the British battle-cruisers
and the German armoured cruisers]
It is curious that after 5:30, when every gun but one was out of action
and the ship had a heavy list, that she should still have been able
to fire her last surviving piece. But such incidents are common to
all naval actions. It is said that, at the battle of Tuschima, when
_Savaroff_ had not only been shot to pieces, but seemed to be red hot
from stem to stern, one of the 6-inch casemates kept at work quite
steadily throughout, the last shot being fired when the ship was on her
beam ends, in the act of sinking, so that the shell must have been shot
straight up into the air.
“The prisoners of war from the _Gneisenau_ report that by the time the
ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The
surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide
themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in
the water.
“When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some two hundred
unwounded survivors in the water, but owing to the shock of the cold
water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.
“Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by
boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered,
but only a proportion could be rescued. The _Invincible_ alone rescued
108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought
on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full
military honours.”
Some of the German prisoners believed that _Gneisenau_ was not sunk
by gun-fire at all, and said that the commander had had the Kingston
valves opened as soon as the ammunition was exhausted and there was no
possibility of carrying on the fight.