BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (I)
THE CAREER OF VON SPEE (II)
The Battle of the Falkland Islands was fought on December 8th by
a squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir F. Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B.,
C.V.O., C.M.G., against the German China Squadron--less _Emden_,
but strengthened by the addition of the cruiser _Dresden_. Admiral
Sturdee’s despatch was not published until about three months after
the action, but in the meantime several accounts appeared in various
newspapers, and since the despatch was published others have been
printed in different magazines. Of no other action in the war have we
such various or full information as about this. It will perhaps be a
convenient way of dealing with this extremely instructive and important
engagement to reproduce the Vice-Admiral’s despatch textually, and to
supplement it by explanatory notes, and incorporate in these what is
most material of the additional information which is available.
The despatch begins with the tabulation of the sections into which the
despatch is divided:
A. Preliminary Movements.
B. Action with the Armoured Cruisers.
C. Action with the Light Cruisers.
D. Action with the Enemy’s Transports.
“The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships _Invincible_, flying my flag,
Flag Captain Percy T. H. Beamish; _Inflexible_, Captain Richard F.
Phillimore; _Carnarvon_ flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P.
Stoddart, Flag Captain Harry L. d’E. Skipwith; _Cornwall_, Captain
Walter M. Ellerton; _Kent_, Captain John D. Allen; _Glasgow_, Captain
John Luce; _Bristol_, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe; and _Macedonia_,
Captain Bertram S. Evans--arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at
10:30 A.M. on Monday, the 7th December, 1914. Coaling was commenced at
once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for
the enemy’s squadron the next evening, the 8th December.”
The account previously given of the Graf von Spee’s movements leading
up to and subsequent to the action off Coronel, will have made the
general strategic position in the Eastern Pacific and Southern Atlantic
more or less plain. Of his ships, however, this should be added. The
clear light and prevalence of smooth water on the China Station has
always proved an incentive to good gunnery, and indeed the performances
of the _Terrible_, when Vice-Admiral Sir Percy Scott commanded her as
captain, may be regarded as the starting point of all modern gunnery
skill. It is not surprising, therefore, that both of Von Spee’s ships
should have stood, as they in fact did, at the head of the German Fleet
in order of gunnery merit. And it was clear from their performances
that their skill was not merely limited to good gun-laying. Both at
Coronel and at Falkland Islands they gave conclusive evidence of being
perfect masters of such fire control as they possessed, and on the
first occasion shot superbly in very rough weather. They therefore
constituted an extremely formidable combination. The German 8.2
shell of the latest type--with which these ships were armed--fired
a projectile very nearly as heavy as did the British 9.2’s--the
actual weights are 320 pounds and 380. The percentage is roughly 8.4
to 10. These two ships had as scouts and auxiliaries the _Leipzig_,
_Nürnberg_, and _Dresden_, cruisers of similar design; but _Dresden_
was considerably faster than either of her consorts.
After the destruction of the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_, Von Spee
cruised for a short time in the Eastern Pacific, and then made his way
in leisurely fashion round the Horn with the intention of crossing
to South Africa. In a fatal moment he decided to attack the British
Colony at Falkland Islands first, and it was this that brought him
within reach of Admiral Sturdee’s guns. It is clear enough from his
conduct--let alone admissions made by prisoners afterwards--that he had
no idea whatever of the strength of the force that had been sent out to
attack him. He fully expected to find _Canopus_ at Port Stanley, and
he thought it possible that _Carnarvon_ and _Glasgow_ might be there
also. And these ships he was quite prepared to engage. It was quite a
different thing, however, to take on two battle-cruisers that under any
bearing could bring between them a dozen 12-inch guns into action and,
on certain bearings, four more. As will be seen from the despatch, the
moment he realized the strength against him, he adopted what seemed the
only possible course, namely flight.
A. PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS
“At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received from the
signal station on shore:--
“‘A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper
Hill, steering northwards.’
“At this time, the positions of the various ships of the squadron were
as follows:--
“_Macedonia_: At anchor as look-out ship.
“_Kent_ (guardship): At anchor in Port William.
“_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_: In Port William.
“_Carnarvon_: In Port William.
“_Cornwall_: In Port William.
“_Glasgow_: In Port Stanley.
“_Bristol_: In Port Stanley.
“The _Kent_ was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made
to raise steam for full speed.
“At 8:20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke in
sight to the southward, and at 8:45 A.M. the _Kent_ passed down the
harbour and took up a station at the entrance.
“The _Canopus_, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8:47 A.M. that
the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported
at 8:20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles
off.
“At 8:50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in
sight to the southward.
“The _Macedonia_ was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the
other ships, and await orders.”
Here the signal, it will be observed, says “a four-funnel and
two-funnel man of war.” The ships were probably end on when they were
seen, and in the _Nürnberg_ there was a considerable gap between the
after-funnel and the two forward funnels. Seen from a point a little
off the direct keel line, she would seem therefore to have two funnels
only.
Port William and Port Stanley are two inlets with a tongue of land
between them, and opposite this tongue of land is the channel to the
sea. Port Stanley is in the more southerly division of the harbour,
which is also the larger of the two. _Canopus_ was anchored to the
eastward of the town of Port Stanley, so that her guns could fire
over the low-lying land between her and the sea. The land rises to
the north as it creeps round towards the mouth of the harbour, and on
this higher land there was an observation station where arrangements
had been made by which the fire of _Canopus_ could be directed out to
sea at any squadron that threatened to attack. The reader is therefore
to imagine the _Macedonia_ lying in the outside mouth of the harbour;
_Kent_ anchored in the channel half way between _Macedonia_ and where
the harbour divides Port Stanley to the south and Port William to the
north; with _Inflexible_, _Invincible_, and _Carnarvon_ anchored in
line in Port William; the _Bristol_ and _Glasgow_ in the southern bay,
with Port Stanley behind them to the westward, and _Canopus_ behind
them to the east.
The Vice-Admiral wasted no time. As a fact, all his ships were then
coaling. And the officers not engaged in this were making plans for
a day’s shooting over the rough moors in the neighbourhood of the
town--where hares and partridges were to be found--and were many of
them in mufti, and most of them at breakfast when the startling and
welcome news of the advent of the enemy came to them. Everything, of
course, gave way to the necessity of getting out of harbour with the
utmost speed. Colliers were cast off. The furnaces were fed, and all
hands were started to clean first the ships and then themselves. At
eight the first ships seemed to be probably twenty miles off. Twenty
minutes later, a further detachment came into sight; half an hour later
than that, the last of the Germans were seen upon the horizon.
Round about 9 o’clock _Kent_ was outside the harbour, while
_Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_ were approaching at about twenty knots.
3. “At 9:20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy (_Gneisenau_ and
_Nürnberg_), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within
range of the _Canopus_, who opened fire at them across the low land at
a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and
turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible
from the upper bridge of the _Invincible_ at a range of approximately
17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.
“A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though
to close the _Kent_ at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time
it seems that the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ were seen over the
land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join
their consorts.
“The _Glasgow_ weighed and proceeded at 9:40 A.M. with orders to join
the _Kent_ and observe the enemy’s movements.”
The Germans, as we have seen, expected possibly to find _Canopus_
at the Falkland Islands, but not that she would be concealed from
their fire behind the low-lying ground. Their astonishment then to
find themselves under the fire of 12-inch guns at twenty minutes past
nine was considerable. They therefore turned, not with the intention
of running away but clearly to throw out the fire control that was
directing the big guns at them, for it must have been about this time
that they saw the county cruiser _Kent_ in the offing, and their first
thought was to go in and finish her off. But a very few moments after
there opened up over the line of vision the tripod masts of the two
battle-cruisers, and the _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_, that had been
coming due north for the attack, now turned round to the east, and
went full speed to join their approaching consorts, who were cutting
off the corner made by the first two ships.
Two quite important questions arise at this point. Was it good policy
on the part of Admiral Sturdee to allow _Canopus_ to open fire and
so drive the Germans away? If, indeed, it was _Canopus_ that drove
them off. He knew, of course, that it would take him at least half an
hour to forty minutes before all his squadron could be clear of the
harbour, and ready to begin the chase. Would it have been wiser if he
had allowed the Germans to come right up and so to have made sure of
having them within easy range when he did come out? The answer to this
criticism is obvious. _Gneisenau_ was a great deal more than a match
for _Kent_, and no British ship could have got out to her assistance
in time to prevent her destruction if _Gneisenau_ had been allowed to
close. The speed of Admiral Sturdee’s battle-cruisers was such--he
had certainly a five, if not a six knot advantage over the armoured
cruisers--that he knew he had it well within his power with the whole
day before him, to give the Germans forty minutes’ start, and catch
them and finish them off before evening. And it was his business to
do this, if he could, with the smallest possible loss of life and the
least possible damage to his ships. That is the first point. But next,
it was quite within the possibilities of the case that _Canopus’s_ guns
would make a hit either on _Gneisenau_ or _Nürnberg_. Indeed, so close
did the fourth and fifth rounds go that it was thought on shore that
there had been a hit; but this was afterwards proved to be a mistake.
There was a good chance then of laming one of them and so making a
quick capture certain. Finally, it was not altogether the fire of
_Canopus_ but the sight of the battle-cruisers’ masts that decided Von
Spee, or rather the Captain of _Gneisenau_, to retreat.
It is more pertinent to ask whether it would not have been better
policy on the part of the Germans to have got inside the range of
_Canopus_--for obviously if she had fired over the hills she would
not be able to use her guns at short range--and then bring the
British squadron under an accurate bombardment just when they were
coming out of harbour and unable to use their armament to effect. The
same considerations that weighed with Admiral Sturdee in deciding
to allow _Canopus_ to open fire with the possible result of driving
them off, should have weighed with the German captain and made him
realize that once the battle-cruisers were out of harbour, there was
no possible escape either for his ship or for the flagship. And it is
undoubtedly certain that whether they could have succeeded in sinking
and destroying any British ships before being destroyed themselves,
they must have done vastly greater damage than they were, in fact, able
to inflict in an action which, as we shall see, the British Admiral
was able to fight on his own conditions from first to last. The main
features of the final issue--that is, the destruction of the two
armoured cruisers--could certainly not have been prevented, but had
they closed the range, and fought the British ships as they came out,
the complete escape of the light cruisers could have been assured, and
it is certain that they could have done very great damage before being
destroyed themselves.
4. “At 9:45 A.M. the squadron--less the _Bristol_--weighed, and
proceeded out of harbour in the following order: _Carnarvon_,
_Inflexible_, _Invincible_, and _Cornwall_. On passing Cape Pembroke
Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the
southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was
calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the
northwest.”
At 9:45, when the squadron got clear of the harbour and was working up
to full speed, the Germans, whose main squadron was about 8½ sea miles
off at 9:30, while _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_ were three miles closer
in, were probably about twelve or thirteen miles off. There was then
a gap of five or six miles to be made up before action range could be
reached, and to make this good in three hours the British squadron
would have to produce a speed greater by some two knots.
“At 10:20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The
battle-cruisers quickly passed ahead of the _Carnarvon_ and overtook
the _Kent_. The _Glasgow_ was ordered to keep two miles from the
_Invincible_, and the _Inflexible_ was stationed on the starboard
quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11:15 A.M.
to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the
enemy’s funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.”
It will be observed that the British Admiral was carrying on his chase
on a wide front and at full speed--probably twenty-four knots. Only
_Glasgow_, _Kent_, and the two battle-cruisers could maintain this,
which meant that _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_ were falling very much
behind. The Admiral therefore, after an hour, dropped his speed to
twenty knots to enable his two cruisers to catch up. Why did he do this?
In the first place, his burst at full speed had probably shown him that
instead of having an advantage of only two knots in speed over his
enemy, he could beat him by at least five knots when he chose. And he
reasoned that if he drove at the five German ships with only four of
his own, it was possible for the German ships to scatter and so for
one or more of them to escape. It was of the essence of his tactics
that the enemy should keep his fleet together as long as possible, and
it was a vital matter that when the dispersion took place the pursuit
of the light cruisers should be undertaken by his own light cruisers
with the best possible prospects of bringing all of them to action. As
we shall see by the next paragraph, this measure did not attain its
desired end.
“The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided at
12:20 P.M. to attack with the two battle-cruisers and the _Glasgow_.
“At 12:47 P.M. the signal to ‘Open fire and engage the enemy’ was made.
“The _Inflexible_ opened fire at 12:55 P.M. from her fore turret at the
right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the
_Invincible_ opened fire at the same ship.
“The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at
the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too
threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1:20 she
(the _Leipzig_) turned away, with the _Nürnberg_ and _Dresden_, to the
southwest. These light cruisers were at once followed by the _Kent_,
_Glasgow_, and _Cornwall_, in accordance with my instructions.
“The action finally developed into three separate encounters besides
the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.”
It is plain from this that when the speed was limited by that of its
slowest ship, that is, the _Carnarvon_, the squadron was unable to
gain on the Germans at all. The time, therefore, had come to force
the enemy to a decision, and full speed was once more ordered. The
British squadron from now until the next decisive move was taken,
must be pictured in this way--the two battle-cruisers and _Glasgow_
racing along at twenty-six or twenty-seven knots; _Cornwall_ and _Kent_
following along at their best speed--probably a knot and a half or two
knots less--and _Carnarvon_ bringing up the rear. She must soon have
been left considerably behind. For an hour then the two squadrons had
probably been keeping about twenty-one knots at a distance of about
19,000 yards. Half an hour’s chase at twenty-five knots brought the
range to 17,000 and twenty-five minutes later, to something less than
15,000.
The German squadron was now under fire and Von Spee made the signal,
“I intend to fight the battle-cruisers as long as I can, the light
cruisers are to scatter and to escape if possible.” The reader will
of course realize that up to this moment _Leipzig_, _Nürnberg_, and
_Dresden_ had been limiting their speed by the speed of _Scharnhorst_.
This was undoubtedly Von Spee’s second mistake, if we assume he was
wrong in not attacking the British squadron as it issued from the
harbour. By keeping his light cruisers with him until the British were
within ten miles of him, he brought their chance of escape to a very
low ebb indeed. It is clear that Admiral Sturdee’s drop in speed at
11:20 completely deceived him. He probably thought that none of the
British cruisers could exceed the speed the Vice-Admiral then ordered.
We now have to treat of the rest of the day’s work as three separate
actions, though it is really more correct to call it four, because the
actions between _Kent_ and _Nürnberg_, _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ with
_Leipzig_ had, after the first phase, no influence one upon the other.
We will deal first, as the Vice-Admiral does, with the action with the
armoured cruisers.