THE THIRD DIALOGUE

PHILONOUS. Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's

meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting?

or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

HYLAS. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and

uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir

about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas I

we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to

know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few.

Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

PHIL. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

HYL. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know

the real nature, or what it is in itself.

PHIL. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

HYL. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but

this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own

mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense.

Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly

in the dark as to THAT.

PHIL. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that

which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

HYL. KNOW? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it.

All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your

own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that

colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real

natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said

of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the

world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible

qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or

know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example,

from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

HYL. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own

ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think

you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses,

and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to

distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind,

you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of

a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

PHIL. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of

things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I

wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

HYL. Even so.

PHIL. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on,

and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is,

but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life,

as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they

are conversant about.

HYL. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a

nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes,

and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But

philosophers know better things.

PHIL. You mean, they KNOW that they KNOW NOTHING.

HYL. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

PHIL. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you

seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you

are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like

another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

HYL. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any

one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen,

ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I

declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every

other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the

true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be

denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot

be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think

on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that

it is impossible any REAL corporeal thing should exist in nature.

PHIL. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than

the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all

these extravagances by the belief of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE? This makes you

dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your

distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It

is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else

knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the

true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really

exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you

attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence,

wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the

end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or

nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own

hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real

existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the

deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas,

is it not as I say?

HYL. I agree with you. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was no more than an

hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my

breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or

whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it

will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you

upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant

it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to

the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at

all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave

things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things

are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I

know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life,

have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece

of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten

thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you

speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible

qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking

that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by SNOW and fire mean

certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right

to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in THEM. But I, who

understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think

like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of

things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be

really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is

to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in

thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name

and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known

them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the

senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are

ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore

consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived

there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that

scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it

for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he

hath it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our

knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration! I

might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I

actually see and feel.

HYL. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible

things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

PHIL. I do.

HYL. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible

that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

PHIL. _I_ can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny

sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in

particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence

exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of

it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the

intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they

did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as

the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it

necessarily follows there is an OMNIPRESENT ETERNAL MIND, which knows

and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a

manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are

by us termed the LAWS OF NATURE.

HYL. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or

have they any agency included in them?

PHIL. They are altogether passive and inert.

HYL. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

PHIL. I acknowledge it.

HYL. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of

God?

PHIL. It cannot.

HYL. Since therefore you have no IDEA of the mind of God, how can you

conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can

conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be

allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no

idea of it?

PHIL. As to your first question: I own I have properly no IDEA,

either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be

represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do

nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as

certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the

terms I AND MYSELF; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though

I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The

Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks,

acts, and perceives. I say INDIVISIBLE, because unextended; and

UNEXTENDED, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and

that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no

idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And

Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not

therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the

word IDEA in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an

idea, that is, an image or likeness of God--though indeed extremely

inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting

on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its

imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in

MYSELF some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though

I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by

reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate

knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the

possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my

own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do,

by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all

created things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For

the second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you

neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea;

nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you

mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet

collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which

makes the case of MATTER widely different from that of the DEITY.

HYL. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or

image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly

speaking, no IDEA of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a

sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea

can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit

nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea

of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance,

because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act

consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you

to this?

PHIL. _I_ say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of

material substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because

the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is

repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I

know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any

idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that

is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I

say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not

perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists,

without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing

the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither

can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or

passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance--either

by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my

Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know

by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer

to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of MATERIAL

SUBSTANCE, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency.

But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist

in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is

repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should

be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is

granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative

knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not

thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances:

if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to

suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there

is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating

distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom

whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I

have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of

it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it

by reflexion.

HYL. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according

to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles,

it should follow that YOU are only a system of floating ideas, without

any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a

meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE than

in MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

PHIL. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own

being; and that _I_ MYSELF am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a

thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates

about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both

colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a

colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from

colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible

things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of

the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing

inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an

inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a

spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and

perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an

unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or

the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of

case between Spirit and Matter.

HYL. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think

the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually

perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?

Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, TO BE PERCEIVED is

one thing, and TO EXIST is another.

PHIL. _I_ am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world

for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder

cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees

and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him

why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you,

because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he

terms a real, being, and saith it IS OR EXISTS; but, that which is not

perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists

in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

PHIL. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist

without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed

between us.

HYL. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny

it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the

fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer

think you he would make?

PHIL. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of

his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say,

the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended

by (that is EXISTS IN) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at

first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this;

inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing,

implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The

question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a

REAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they

have an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and

exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have

affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the

Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

HYL. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between

real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a

dream--since they are all equally in the mind?

PHIL. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct;

they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas

perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and,

being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the

like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding

these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with

the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And,

though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by

their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and

subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished

from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish THINGS FROM

CHIMERAS on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon

mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am

not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

HYL. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but

spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very

oddly.

PHIL. I own the word IDEA, not being commonly used for THING,

sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a

necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that

term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate

objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may

sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in

its sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that

there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every

unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its

existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet

certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we five, and move, and

have our being." Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are

not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things,

or know any thing of their real natures--though we both see and feel

them, and perceive them by all our senses?

HYL. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such

things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the

immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything

more extravagant than this?

PHIL. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say--a thing which is

inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our

perceptions, without any regard either to consistency, or the old known

axiom, NOTHING CAN GIVE TO ANOTHER THAT WHICH IT HATH NOT ITSELF.

Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so

extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred

places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of

all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to

ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This

is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to

confirm it by citations.

HYL. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate

Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder,

sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

PHIL. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt

is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an

instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of

an instrument or occasion, called MATTER, you as truly make Him the

author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those

operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or

moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or

motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason

and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or

putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the

outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since,

therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an

immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin.

Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all

the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other

agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to

thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of

limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under

the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to

all the guilt of their actions.

HYL. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there

is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the

universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most

voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the

votes.

PHIL. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the

judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a

learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses,

who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no

doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts,

your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly

acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is

no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And

that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed.

And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can

deny. It is therefore evident there can be no SUBSTRATUM of those

qualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or

property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny

therefore that there is ANY UNTHINKING-SUBSTRATUM of the objects of

sense, and IN THAT ACCEPTATION that there is any material substance.

But if by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE is meant only SENSIBLE BODY, THAT

which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare

say, mean no more)--then I am more certain of matter's existence than you

or any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes

the generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is

a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it

is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their

aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that

I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal

substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that,

granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think

themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and

philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

HYL. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the

reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking

the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square

tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water,

crooked?

PHIL. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually

perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions.

Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is

certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence

conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the

same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are

wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude

from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards

the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is

mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and

at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err

in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the

ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or,

concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines

would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with

regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of

the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we

were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other

planets, we should not then perceive its motion.

HYL. I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible

enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray,

Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you

are now that it does not?

PHIL. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was

founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry,

upon evidence.

HYL. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things.

We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with

ideas FROM WITHOUT is evident; and it is no less evident that there

must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind,

corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by

themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted;

which I call MATTER, and you call SPIRIT. This is all the difference.

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers,

extended?

HYL. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the

idea of extension.

PHIL. It is therefore itself unextended?

HYL. I grant it.

PHIL. Is it not also active?

HYL. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

PHIL. Now let me ask you two questions: FIRST, Whether it be

agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name

MATTER to an unextended active being? And, SECONDLY, Whether it be

not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of

language?

HYL. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so,

but some THIRD NATURE distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason

is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit

imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

PHIL. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of

meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from

volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a

spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean

a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no

ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely

it must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more

clearly if it be possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are

affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being

distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to

the kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter,

or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus,

I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude

there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there

are volitions, there must be a WILL. Again, the things I perceive must

have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of MY mind: but, being

ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an

understanding; there is therefore an UNDERSTANDING. But will and

understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The

powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a

SPIRIT.

HYL. And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear,

little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a

contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

PHIL. Without a doubt.

HYL. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

PHIL. It is.

HYL. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some

other Being?

PHIL. We are.

HYL. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that

Spirit God?

PHIL. I grant it.

HYL. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without

are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and

uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to

say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you

acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.

PHIL. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows,

among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation,

and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But,

that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us,

can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and

dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an

external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are

sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect,

who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and

independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by

nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be

affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We

are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with

corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every

alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible

body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities

or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So

that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more

than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas,

or things immediately perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged

from all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are

attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know

everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer,

or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees

to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are

not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where

there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity

where there is none.

HYL. But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of

Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies.

And what can withstand demonstration?

PHIL. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.

HYL. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of

motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and

quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are

equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in

each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small

inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an

equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and

consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that

motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be

demonstrated.

PHIL. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of

motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and MATTER

taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from

whence the existence of MATTER is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in

a circle?

HYL. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the

velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.

PHIL. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that

gravity is proportional to MATTER, in your philosophic sense of the

word; except you take it for granted that unknown SUBSTRATUM, or

whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities;

which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude

and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as

likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not

dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the

powers producing them, do exist in a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM; this is what

I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration,

have not yet proved.

HYL. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you

shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all

this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of

the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?

PHIL. What mean you, Hylas, by the PHENOMENA?

HYL. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.

PHIL. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?

HYL. I have told you so a hundred times.

PHIL. Therefore, to explain the phenomena, is, to shew how we come to

be affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are

imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the

production of any one idea in our minds by the help of MATTER, I shall

for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as

nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of

phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or

exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly

destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any

sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say,

though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew

its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far

from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in

the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers

have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the

connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which

is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

HYL. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do

you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of

Matter, if there was no such thing?

PHIL. That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or

passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it,

I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it

must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural

revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which

were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold

our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence

that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter,

TAKEN FOR SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM WHAT WE PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES, is

thought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few

philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question

supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall

think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it

suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at

all.

HYL. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger.

New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds,

and nobody knows where they will end.

PHIL. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in

sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to

unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of

these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are

dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there

the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making

anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge:

and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would have

made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my

business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we

perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses:

that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be

assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing

but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves

neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions,

without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid,

thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle

of a body contains innumerable extended parts:--these are the novelties,

these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted

judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with

endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like

innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing

this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some AMBAGES, and ways of speech

not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which

is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more

than this.--that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction,

to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a

Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at

this time of day, and in a Christian country.

HYL. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those

are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion.

Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into

ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me WITH SCEPTICISM.

This is so plain, there is no denying it.

PHIL. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but

rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception,

which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the

real things themselves.

HYL. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you

leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which

strikes the senses.

PHIL. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me

the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise

than upon your supposition--that Matter is an essential part of all

corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive

only sensible forms: but herein we differ--you will have them to be empty

appearances, I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I

do.

HYL. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that

in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true

nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that

disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities,

perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the

better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to

the naked eye?

PHIL. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we

feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by

the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to

constitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of

names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as

well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men

combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the

same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but

observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect

to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and

consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other

senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the

same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not

being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a

microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived

already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite

different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know

what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the

connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things.

What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in

all circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence

follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either

with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived

notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real

Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise

from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking

of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And,

indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the

philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build

their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by

the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of

life, without any regard to speculation.

HYL. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

PHIL. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not

real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is

no farther real than as our ideas are the true REPRESENTATIONS OF THOSE

ORIGINALS. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown,

it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they

resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real

knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any

change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot

all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is

impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us

yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot

conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute

existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there

should be any real thing in nature. The result of all which is that we

are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me

leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain

absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not

the source of all this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed,

either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals?

And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them?

Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly

conceived or meant by the ABSOLUTE OR EXTERNAL EXISTENCE OF UNPERCEIVING

SUBSTANCES? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the

wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all

anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with the

vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

HYL. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I

would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the

objects perceived by the SENSES of one, likewise perceivable to

others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the

garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the

same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my IMAGINATION. Does not

this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

PHIL. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the

objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from

thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because

they are perceived by many.

HYL. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me

into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only

the ideas existing in our minds?

PHIL. It is.

HYL. But the SAME idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in

any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that

no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?

PHIL. If the term SAME be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is

certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that

different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea

exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since

men are used to apply the word SAME where no distinction or variety is

perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows

that, as men have said before, SEVERAL SAW THE SAME THING, so they may,

upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any

deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But,

if the term SAME be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who

pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their

sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that

philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers

persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think

fit to CALL a thing the SAME or no, is, I conceive, of small

importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same

faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and

who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without

question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to

the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived,

might call it the SAME thing: others, especially regarding the

diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of

DIFFERENT things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a

word? to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet

have the term SAME applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or

outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and

new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the SAME,

and I should say it was not the SAME house.--would we not, for all

this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself?

And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say,

We differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the

house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would

tell you, I know not what you mean by THE ABSTRACTED IDEA OF IDENTITY;

and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you

understood yourself.--Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men

may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in

their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther

reflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the

case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists

themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be

our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same

thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

HYL. Ay, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to

which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive

the same thing.

PHIL. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so

may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;--EXTERNAL, _I_

MEAN, TO YOUR OWN MIND: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in

that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the

ends of IDENTITY, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure

you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

HYL. You have indeed clearly satisfied me--either that there is no

difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes

equally against both opinions.

PHIL. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions

can be a proof against neither.

HYL. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider

the substance of what you advance against SCEPTICISM, it amounts to no

more than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word,

that we are affected with sensible impressions.

PHIL. And how are WE concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel

it, I taste it: and I am sure NOTHING cannot be seen, or felt, or

tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness,

moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is

not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a

congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:

which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by

the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the

palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected

with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I

see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the

cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing

abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word CHERRY, you mean

an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its

EXISTENCE something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I

own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

HYL. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very

same reasons against the existence of sensible things IN A MIND, which

you have offered against their existing IN A MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM?

PHIL. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to

them.

HYL. Is the mind extended or unextended?

PHIL. Unextended, without doubt.

HYL. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

PHIL. They are.

HYL. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

PHIL. I believe you may.

HYL. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be

room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended

things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine

impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects

are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on

it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to

understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall

then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my

SUBSTRATUM.

PHIL. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind,

or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross

literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to

make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends

or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being

distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how

it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material SUBSTRATUM

intelligible, I would fain know.

HYL. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made

of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

PHIL. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is

the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for

philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as

things existing in the mind. 'Nor is there anything in this but what is

conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental

operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is

plain in the terms COMPREHEND, reflect, DISCOURSE, &C., which,

being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original

sense.

HYL. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still

remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over.

And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others,

without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to

make me a proselyte to your principles.

PHIL. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

HYL. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me

utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a

creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things,

solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and

I shall perhaps agree with you.

PHIL. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants

and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning

created by God, I make no question. If by IDEAS you mean fictions

and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by IDEAS you mean

immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot

exist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But

whether you do or do not call them IDEAS, it matters little. The

difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or

rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same.

In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed IDEAS, but

THINGS. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any

absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a

word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things,

of REAL things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my

principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been

evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so

often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to

show where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be

mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be

incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar

acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic

acceptation, for Matter, or AN UNKNOWN QUIDDITY, WITH AN ABSOLUTE

EXISTENCE. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then)

may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

HYL. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to

refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some

peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your

notions?

PHIL. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of

Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other,

then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you

may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all

you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither

do you pretend they exist without the mind.

HYL. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

PHIL. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I

should have seen things produced into being--that is become

perceptible--in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever

before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no

alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or

end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but

His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the

same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things,

before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible

to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect

to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the

creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became

gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties;

so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them.

This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the

Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of

SUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, upon

inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who

believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What

metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

HYL. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created

things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical

being: that is to say, upon supposition there were MEN to perceive

them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein

creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly

impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of

man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

PHIL. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to

exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will

not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my

notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created

spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the

creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of

all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was

present--that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with

my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or

imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and

undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all

things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence,

which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in

making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I

say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested

of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the

ACTUALITY OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed raise a dust with those

terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you

calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a

useless and unintelligible jargon.

HYL. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say

you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in

their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of

God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you?

And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be

clearer or better connected than this?

PHIL. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from

eternity?

HYL. I am.

PHIL. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

HYL. This I acknowledge.

PHIL. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to

be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.

HYL. What shall we make then of the creation?

PHIL. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of

finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said

to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should

become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner

which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may

call this a RELATIVE, or HYPOTHETICAL EXISTENCE if you please. But,

so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal

sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all

the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can

assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this?

Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything

nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory

of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the

corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind

of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could

this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the

necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would

it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

HYL. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things

perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either

execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to

will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will?

If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of

existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge

something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and

all change argues imperfection.

PHIL. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this

objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against

every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None

of which can WE conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and

having a beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited

perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite

spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether

Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the

Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer

anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the

inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is

unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there

is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

HYL. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are

such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to

that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring

myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation

and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly

know.

PHIL. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of

things--the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The

former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the

mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or,

is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But

you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.

To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this

one point. Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any

hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or

complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able

to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby

nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the

full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you

could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses,

or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive,

imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion

you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it

still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion

at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very

plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown

and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope

it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not

make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it

inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

HYL. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point

of the creation.

PHIL. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me

indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but

you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I

should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all

that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy

between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

HYL. And so I am.

PHIL. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a

plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the

way?

HYL. In the plain sense, doubtless.

PHIL. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been

created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by

those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

HYL. I cannot help thinking so.

PHIL. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied

a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

HYL. This I have already acknowledged.

PHIL. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the

creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of

certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation

might terminate?

HYL. True.

PHIL. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the

plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly

inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something

equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

HYL. I cannot contradict you.

PHIL. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown

quiddities, of occasions, or SUBSTRATUM? No, certainly; but of things

obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions,

if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

HYL. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

PHIL. Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE; was there ever known a more

jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible

that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain

anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute

existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the

creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and

infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a

creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence

without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the

mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to

all reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated

among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers

have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together,

and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the

creation of things.

HYL. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the CREATION is

the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been

sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be

overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself

towards your notions.

PHIL. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the

question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of

prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And

indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very

much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned

education.

HYL. I confess it seems to be as you say.

PHIL. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us

throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of

Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being

of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of

religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate

evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general

Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict

and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence,

providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous

as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the

fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more

reason to doubt than of our own being.--Then, with relation to human

sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what

contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of

the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity,

gravity, divisibility, &c.--do they not pretend to explain all things by

bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are

they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting

there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with

a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to

another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant

suppositions, have they been able to reach the MECHANICAL production of

any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of

motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course

of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude

and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe?

But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the

efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy

and intelligible? If the PHENOMENA are nothing else but IDEAS; God is

a SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they

demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and

omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and

usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is

infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance

and design. These surely are great advantages in PHYSICS. Not to

mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men

to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious

of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their

minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second

causes.--Then in METAPHYSICS: what difficulties concerning entity in

abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,

substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of

Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent

substances so widely different as SPIRIT AND MATTER, should mutually

operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless

disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do

we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?--Even the MATHEMATICS

themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things,

become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and

intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite

divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition--But

what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that

opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and

modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much

as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of

that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose

their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this

supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a

pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be

allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we

do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the

reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;--however,

not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For,

herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the

concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the

IRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.

HYL. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can

incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is

attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment

in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement,

what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be

avoided by that single notion of IMMATERIALISM!

PHIL. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You

may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination

should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.

This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the

ABSOLUTE existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same

notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued

in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be

a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the

marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.

But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full

assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty

will occur hereafter?

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once

evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or

difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the

doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the

asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out

against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence

of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not

how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties ATTENDING

IMMATERIALISM, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of

it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more

numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are

those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what

they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a

sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never

yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly

and solidly soever demonstrated.

HYL. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

PHIL. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:

That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be

proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if

you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the MATERIALISTS.

Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you

cannot conceive it easier by the help of MATERIALISM, it is plain it

can be no objection against IMMATERIALISM. Had you proceeded all along

by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of

trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to

shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more

unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes

rather AGAINST than FOR it. You should consider, in each particular,

whether the difficulty arises from the NON-EXISTENCE OF MATTER. If it

doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of

extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty

against IMMATERIALISM. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will

find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should

likewise take heed not to argue on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. One is apt to

say--The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than

the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external

substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our

ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such

external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?

But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that

vulgar sophism which is called IGNORATIO ELENCHI. You talked often as

if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas

in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I

am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it.

Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses,

is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours.

Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it

may be termed SOMEWHAT), which is quite stripped of all sensible

qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the

mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft,

hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I

affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct

from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.

Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept

in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question;

without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and,

instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have

been) against your own notions.

HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from

agreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In

denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the

things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for

it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and

applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in

your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them

to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in

opinion.

PHIL. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the

objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them

any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never

quarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE,

are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort

of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a

mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify

the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as

the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE,

SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word

MATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical

discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is

not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the

depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general

confused term.

HYL. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of

an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to

deny me the privilege of using the word MATTER as I please, and

annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the

mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than

SPIRIT. But I have been so long accustomed to the term MATTER that I

know not how to part with it: to say, there is no MATTER in the world,

is still shocking to me. Whereas to say--There is no MATTER, if by that

term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if

by MATTER is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in

being perceived, then there is MATTER:--THIS distinction gives it

quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small

difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the

controversy about MATTER in the strict acceptation of it, lies

altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I

acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense

of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either

desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of

our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief,

pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown

entities, ABSTRACTED FROM ALL RELATION TO US? It is evident, things

regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please

or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore,

we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them.

Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not

now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I

would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have

added to, or altered in my former notions.

PHIL. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours

tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was

before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:--the former being

of opinion, that THOSE THINGS THEY IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE ARE THE REAL

THINGS; and the latter, that THE THINGS IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED ARE

IDEAS, WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE MIND. Which two notions put together,

do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.

HYL. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw

things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are

removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly

convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in

pain about their UNKNOWN NATURES OR ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. This is the

state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that

brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the

same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually

do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their

philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly

opposite to theirs.

PHIL. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced

upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it

breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as

well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of

GRAVITATION. just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to

Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.