HYL. I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All
this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had
not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.
PHILONOUS. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were
any mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from
them, you will now discover them to me.
HYL. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search
after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined
the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the
notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident;
and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my
assent.
PHIL. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that
they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and
beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to
advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure
being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.
HYL. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be
more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long
as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are
out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so
satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of
explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.
PHIL. I know not what way you mean.
HYL. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.
PHIL. How is that?
HYL. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the
brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to
all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different
impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain
vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits
propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according
to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is
variously affected with ideas.
PHIL. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are
affected with ideas?
HYL. Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?
PHIL. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis.
You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our
ideas. Pray tell me whether by the BRAIN you mean any sensible thing.
HYL. What else think you I could mean?
PHIL. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things
which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the
mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.
HYL. I do not deny it.
PHIL. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists
only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable
to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all
other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin
of that primary idea or brain itself?
HYL. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is
perceivable to sense--this being itself only a combination of sensible
ideas--but by another which I imagine.
PHIL. But are not things imagined as truly IN THE MIND as things
perceived?
HYL. I must confess they are.
PHIL. It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all
this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the
brain; that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or
imaginable it matters not.
HYL. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.
PHIL. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas.
When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the
brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of
ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If
you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a
reasonable hypothesis.
HYL. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.
PHIL. You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of
explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any
reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves,
and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible
these should be the effect of that?
HYL. But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to
have.
PHIL. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things
have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?
HYL. It is too plain to be denied.
PHIL. Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is
there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear
springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the
prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is
lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled
with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an
agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural
beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not
the veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not
change her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed!
What variety and use in the meanest productions of nature! What
delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies I
How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends,
as to constitute opposite parts of the whole I And, while they mutually
aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other?
Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious
luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation
of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those
(miscalled ERRATIC) globes once known to stray, in their repeated
journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the
sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws
by which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How
vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and
rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered
throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it
brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye.
Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs
of fight at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you
must call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry
innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds
the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But,
neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless
extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind
exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out
ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose
this mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret
mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and
intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was almost slipt
from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system
immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What
treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these
noble and delightful scenes of all REALITY? How should those Principles
be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the
creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this
Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men
of sense?
HYL. Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have
nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as
I am.
PHIL. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.
HYL. What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now
deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself
which you led me into? This surely is not fair.
PHIL. _I_ deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to
Scepticism. You indeed said the REALITY of sensible things consisted in
AN ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OUT OF THE MINDS OF SPIRITS, or distinct from
their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, YOU are
obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is,
according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I
neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined
after that manner. To me it is evident for the reasons you allow of, that
sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I
conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they
depend not on my thought, and have all existence distinct from being
perceived by me, THERE MUST BE SOME OTHER MIND WHEREIN THEY EXIST. As
sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an
infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.
HYL. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all
others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends
all things.
PHIL. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all
things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a
God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude
the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.
HYL. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it
how we come by that belief?
PHIL. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers,
though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet
they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being
perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no
difference between saying, THERE IS A GOD, THEREFORE HE PERCEIVES ALL
THINGS; and saying, SENSIBLE THINGS DO REALLY EXIST; AND, IF THEY
REALLY EXIST, THEY ARE NECESSARILY PERCEIVED BY AN INFINITE MIND:
THEREFORE THERE IS AN INFINITE MIND OR GOD? This furnishes you with a
direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the
BEING OF A GOD. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all
controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the
creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that--setting aside all
help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the
contrivance, order, and adjustment of things--an infinite Mind should be
necessarily inferred from the bare EXISTENCE OF THE SENSIBLE WORLD, is
an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: that the
sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that
nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea
or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now,
without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of
reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most
strenuous advocate for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an
eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous
concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and
Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely
overthrown, by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in
supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of
the visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one of those abettors
of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can
conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of
atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist
independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his
folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and
leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought,
what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real
existence?
HYL. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to
religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a
notion entertained by some eminent moderns, of SEEING ALL THINGS IN
GOD?
PHIL. I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.
HYL. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of
being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves;
but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God,
which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of
being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides the Divine
essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being;
and which are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to
the mind.
PHIL. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether
passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of
the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible,
pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which
occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it
is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a
created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Besides all
which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world
serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other
hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine
wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout
methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and
compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes
the whole world made in vain?
HYL. But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all
things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.
PHIL. Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are
superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in
themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with
each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not
therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm
of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on
the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an
absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived
by our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and
figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So
that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite
than his and mine. It must be owned that I entirely agree with what
the holy Scripture saith, "That in God we live and move and have our
being." But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set
forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning:--It is
evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can
exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or
things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist
independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it
being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I
shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore
exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited
to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations,
call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or
be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is
inconceivable. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk
nonsense: is it not?
HYL. Without doubt.
PHIL. But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should
exist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is no more than I daily
experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an
act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my
imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy
are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those
perceived by my senses--which latter are called RED THINGS. From all
which I conclude, THERE IS A MIND WHICH AFFECTS ME EVERY MOMENT WITH ALL
THE SENSIBLE IMPRESSIONS I PERCEIVE. AND, from the variety, order, and
manner of these, I conclude THE AUTHOR OF THEM TO BE WISE, POWERFUL,
AND GOOD, BEYOND COMPREHENSION. MARK it well; I do not say, I see
things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible
Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me
perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an
infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any
more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that
which passeth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges
us to acknowledge.
HYL. I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give
of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing
that God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there
not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a
subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for
all that be MATTER?
PHIL. How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things
immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but
there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately:
therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The
Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I
suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.
HYL. You are in the right.
PHIL. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded
on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.
HYL. I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not
the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another,
or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive,
fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore SOME cause distinct
from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is THE
CAUSE OF MY IDEAS. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.
PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current
proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For
example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country
men pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found
he meant by the word fire that which others call WATER. Or, if he
should assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men
by the term TREES. Would you think this reasonable?
HYL. No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard
of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly
is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose
than to protract and multiply disputes, where there is no difference in
opinion.
PHIL. And doth not MATTER, in the common current acceptation of the
word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive
Substance?
HYL. It doth.
PHIL. And, hath it not been made evident that no SUCH substance can
possibly exist? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can
that which is INACTIVE be a CAUSE; or that which is UNTHINKING be a
CAUSE OF THOUGHT? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word
MATTER a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you
understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the
cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and
run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do
by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a cause
from the PHENOMENA: BUT I deny that THE cause deducible by reason
can properly be termed Matter.
HYL. There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid
you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be
thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of
all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent,
there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which CONCURS in the
production of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency,
but by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. MOTION.
PHIL. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded
conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing
without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or
are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth
this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which
you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist
farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas
are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.
HYL. They are.
PHIL. And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?
HYL. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.
PHIL. But is not MOTION a sensible quality?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Consequently it is no action?
HYL. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my
finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is
active.
PHIL. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being
allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition:
and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing
be not to talk nonsense: and, lastly, whether, having considered the
premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active
Cause of our ideas, other than SPIRIT, is highly absurd and
unreasonable?
HYL. I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a
cause, yet what hinders its being an INSTRUMENT, subservient to the
supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?
PHIL. An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs,
wheels, and motions, of that instrument?
HYL. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and
its qualities being entirely unknown to me.
PHIL. What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown
parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?
HYL. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being
already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an
unperceiving substance.
PHIL. But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of
all sensible qualities, even extension itself?
HYL. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.
PHIL. And what reason have you to think this unknown, this
inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act
as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such
thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?
HYL. You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what
reasons have you not to believe it?
PHIL. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of
anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on
reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know WHAT IT IS
you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of
it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a
philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe
you know not what and you know not why.
HYL. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an INSTRUMENT, I do
not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of
instrument; but, however, I have some notion of INSTRUMENT IN GENERAL,
which I apply to it.
PHIL. But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the
most general notion of INSTRUMENT, as taken in a distinct sense from
CAUSE, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine
attributes?
HYL. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.
PHIL. What mean you by the general nature or notion of INSTRUMENT?
HYL. That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the
general notion.
PHIL. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the
doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our
wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger,
because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to
remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the
same mind? Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made
use of in producing an effect IMMEDIATELY depending on the will of the
agent?
HYL. I own I cannot.
PHIL. How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on
whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should
need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it?
Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless
inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of
God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.
HYL. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.
PHIL. But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has
been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers,
are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument
sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and
that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions.
Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent
useth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is
no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which,
if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any
real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any
effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those
conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above
all limitation or prescription whatsoever.
HYL. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I
would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since,
notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an OCCASION.
PHIL. How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be
proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say
no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame
you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal
term)--I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an
occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have
shewn in what sense you understand OCCASION, pray, in the next place,
be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such
an occasion of our ideas?
HYL. As to the first point: by OCCASION I mean an inactive
unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.
PHIL. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?
HYL. I know nothing of its nature.
PHIL. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we
should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.
HYL. When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and
constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular
occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.
PHIL. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and
that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.
HYL. That is my opinion.
PHIL. Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He
perceives.
HYL. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.
PHIL. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or
answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I
only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our
ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the
wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those
attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when
and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether,
in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your
purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute
existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived,
can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived
by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in
us?
HYL. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of OCCASION
seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.
PHIL. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different
acceptations of MATTER, you have been only supposing you know not what,
for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?
HYL. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been
so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused
perception that there is such a thing as MATTER.
PHIL. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately.
If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If
mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things
which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the
Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, SUBSTRATUM, cause,
instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these,
shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one
shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved
and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would
gladly bear it.
HYL. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I
am at a loss what more to urge.
PHIL. And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to
make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been
hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition
that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected
by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you
might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and
consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you
now can have.
HYL. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as
we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I
conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce' any idea in our
minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is
impossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing
acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is MATTER in
some sense or other. WHAT THAT IS I do not indeed pretend to determine.
PHIL. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that
unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and
if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case
you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me
know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's
supporting them?
HYL. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to
them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present
understand by MATTER neither substance nor accident, thinking nor
extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something
entirely unknown, distinct from all these.
PHIL. It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter
nothing but the general abstract idea of ENTITY.
HYL. Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the
negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I
perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.
PHIL. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?
HYL. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say
it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since
it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am
not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am
sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you
must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about
Matter.
PHIL. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform
me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its
EXISTENCE?
HYL. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.
PHIL. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its
existence?
HYL. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion
or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my
ignorance. I know not what is meant by its EXISTENCE, or how it exists.
PHIL. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me
sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general,
prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all
particular things whatsoever.
HYL. Hold, let me think a little--I profess, Philonous, I do not find
that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion
of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite
vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in
my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not
pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of
Matter, its WHERE, its HOW, its ENTITY, or anything belonging to
it.
PHIL. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have
not any notion in your mind?
HYL. None at all.
PHIL. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus--At first, from a belief
of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects
existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes;
next instruments; then occasions: lastly SOMETHING IN GENERAL, which
being interpreted proves NOTHING. So Matter comes to nothing. What
think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?
HYL. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being
able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.
PHIL. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other
circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing
not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue
against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and
positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all
this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the
existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it;
where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from
Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most
inadequate or faint idea pretended to--I will not indeed thence conclude
against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my
inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words
to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever.
And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.
HYL. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in
themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to
produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends
demonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know
not what, MATTER.
PHIL. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to
take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a
visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any
imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it
will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well
grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of
prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a
sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is
need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a
frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in
different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat
and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in
pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason,
to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or
science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so
barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest
of common conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may
exist; though at the same time you neither know WHAT IS MEANT by
MATTER, or by its EXISTENCE. This indeed is surprising, and the more
so because it is altogether voluntary and of your own head, you not
being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that
thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.
HYL. THE REALITY of things cannot be maintained without supposing the
existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I
should be earnest in its defence?
PHIL. The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?
HYL. Sensible things.
PHIL. My glove for example?
HYL. That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.
PHIL. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient
evidence to me of the existence of this GLOVE, that I see it, and feel
it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be
assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place,
by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see,
exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at
all? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof
that anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible,
that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is
imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall
think nothing too hard for you.
HYL. Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is
highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does
not appear to me.
PHIL. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account
merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or
a centaur.
HYL. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and
that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.
PHIL. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not,
evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the
common sense of the word MATTER, is there any more implied than an
extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind?
And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident
reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?
HYL. True, but that is only one sense of the term MATTER.
PHIL. But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if
Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with
good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved
impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or
other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common
signification of words?
HYL. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately
than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation
of a term.
PHIL. But this now mentioned is the common received sense among
philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been
allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used
this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at
others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for
the present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of
reason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun
out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly
examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And
can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing,
than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you
or any one else understands it in?
HYL. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the
impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and
indefinite sense.
PHIL. . When is a thing shewn to be impossible?
HYL. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended
in its definition.
PHIL. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be
demonstrated between ideas?
HYL. I agree with you.
PHIL. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the
word MATTER, it is plain, by your own confession, there was
included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the
same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a
repugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility
of Matter taken in an UNKNOWN sense, that is, no sense at all. My
business was only to shew you meant NOTHING; and this you were brought
to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either
to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not
sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let
me know what is.
HYL. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I
see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I
give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be
more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false
and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the
point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would
willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this
morning's conversation, and tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here again
about the same time.
PHIL. I will not fail to attend you.