THE OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE
The battle of the Aisne, destined to develop into the longest conflict
on record--it extended over two whole months--began on the afternoon of
Sunday, September 13. To follow its complexities it is necessary clearly
to grasp, not only the military purposes or objectives the two sides had
immediately in view, but the respective situations of the opposing
masses as regards fighting efficiency. When operations are on this
gigantic scale a certain amount of imagination must be exercised to
realise even the barest facts.
From Compiègne eastward to Rheims the Allied line was formed by the 6th
French, the British, and the 5th French armies. To the first for the
moment was assigned the duty of forcing the passages of the Aisne from
below Soissons, clearing the enemy off the western end of the ridge, and
pushing him up to Noyon on the Oise.
The business which fell to the British army was that of delivering a
frontal attack on this natural hill fortress from Soissons as far as
Craonne.
The 6th French army, which by a vigorous forward thrust had driven the
enemy out of Rheims, was to push up through the transverse gap to
Berry-au-Bac, and assault the hostile positions on the hillsides along
the east side of the gap. Along these hills the Germans had settled
themselves in force. Here, too, there were many chalk quarries and
caves, which the Germans were using as shelters and stores.
At first sight it might well seem that the frontal attack undertaken by
the British was not strictly a necessary operation. Clearly, the
feasible way of driving the Germans out of their fastness was to turn
the flanks of the position on the west through Lassigny and Noyon, and
on the east through Berry-au-Bac. The main operation was, of course,
that of turning the position from the west, for the right of the German
position remained its vulnerable point. It was essential, however, to
the success of that operation that General von Kluck should not be able
to meet it in force until, at all events, the Allied troops had taken a
firm grip.
Now, if the British army had assumed a merely watching attitude on the
south side of the Aisne, and had in consequence been able to extend
their line from the south of Craonne down the river to, say, Attichy,
some ten miles below Soissons, that, while leaving nearly the whole
strength of the 6th French army free to undertake the turning movement,
would at the same time have left General von Kluck also free to throw
his main strength against it.
A vigorous and pressing attack along his front was consequently
essential, in order to keep his main force employed. Not only was the
attack essential, but it had to be launched against him without delay,
and before he could recover from the effects of his retreat.
Including the troops recalled from Amiens, Generals von Kluck and von
Bülow had under their command, nominally at any rate, ten army corps.
If, deducting losses and war wastages, we put their strength in
effectives at not more than the equivalent of six corps--it could have
been very little more--yet six corps was, _in the positions they held_,
a force fully able to cope with the nine corps making up the three
Allied armies pitted then against them. Bearing in mind, indeed, the
natural defensive advantages of the ridges on which the Germans had
established themselves, and their facility for moving troops either for
the purposes of defence or of counter-attack, their strongholds could
have been held by three corps, leaving the remainder to be used on the
flank for active operations.
Intended to frustrate that manoeuvre, the British attack compelled the
German commanders to await, before they could make any such attempt, the
arrival of reinforcements. On both sides there was now a race against
time. French reinforcements and reserves had to be brought up and massed
against the flank of the German position. Many of those troops had,
however, to cover long distances afoot. The movements of mass armies are
comparatively slow. After all, the roads and railways traversing a
country have a capacity which is limited. Some idea of what such
movement involves may be formed from the traffic on a popular bank
holiday. In the case of armies there is, in addition to human numbers,
the artillery, the munitions, the camp equipment, the foodstuffs, and
all the rest of the transport. No one, therefore, can be surprised that
by the time these masses could be concentrated on the German flank,
there were German masses who, under the same conditions, had been
hurried forward to meet them. From the very necessities of time and
space the race resulted to a great extent in a draw.
The Battle of the Aisne is in every respect unique. A battle in the
ordinary sense of field operations it was not. It was a siege. Nothing
at all like it had ever occurred before in war. There have been many
sieges of banditti in mountain retreats. There have been sieges in old
times of fortified camps. There had never been the siege under such
conditions of a great army.
The operations in this amazing and gigantic conflict, though
inter-related, must for the purposes of clear narration be dealt with in
sections. The story divides itself into:--
The attack upon the German positions north of the Aisne.
The struggle for and around Rheims.
The operations on and against the German right flank.
In this chapter it is proposed to deal with the attack upon the German
positions north of the Aisne. The manner in which the British troops
forced the passage of that river and secured a footing on the ridge, and
held on to it, forms a particularly brilliant feat of arms.
As stated in the official account:--
The country across which the army has had to force its way is
undulating and covered with patches of thick wood.
Within the area which faced the British before the advance
commenced, right up to Laon, the chief feature of tactical
importance is the fact that there are six rivers running right
across the direction of advance, at all of which it was possible
that the Germans might make a resistance.
These are, in order from the south, the Marne, the Ourcq, the
Vesle, the Aisne, the Lette, and the Oise.
The Lette, it may here be stated, is a tributary of the Oise. Rising
just to the north of Craonne and flowing westward through an upland
valley, it is used in the lower part of its course as a section of the
Oise and Aisne Canal.
On Friday, the 11th, the official account goes on to say, but
little opposition was met with by us along any part of our front,
and the direction of advance was, for the purpose of co-operating
with our Allies, turned slightly to the north-east. The day was
spent in pushing forward and in gathering in various hostile
detachments, and by nightfall our forces had reached a line to the
north of the Ourcq, extending from Oulchy Le Château to Long Pont.
On this day there was also a general advance on the part of the
French along their whole line, which ended in substantial success,
in one portion of the field Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg's fourth
army being driven back across the Saulx; and elsewhere the whole of
the corps artillery of a German corps being captured. Several
German colours also were taken.
It was only on this day that the full extent of the victory gained
by the Allies was appreciated by them. The moral effect of this
success has been enormous.
When the British pushed forward on September 12 to the Aisne, they found
that the Germans still held the heights to the south of the river above
Soissons. German outposts also held the strip of hilly country between
the Aisne and its tributary the Vesle.
The first step was to drive the Germans across the Aisne at Soissons.
This was undertaken by the 3rd army corps. Pushing forward to Buzancy,
south-east of Soissons, the troops won the heights overlooking the old
city and the Aisne valley, which here opens to its greatest width. It
was a stiff fight. Despite, however, a heavy bombardment from across the
valley, the British, side by side with troops of General Maunoury, swept
the Germans down into and through Soissons, and as the enemy crowded
over the two bridges the artillery of the 3rd corps poured upon them a
rain of shells. Immediately the Germans had crossed, the bridges, which
had been mined, went up in two terrific explosions.
While this action was in progress, Sir John French had thrown the 1st
army corps across the Vesle at Fismes. They advanced to Vaucere with but
little opposition.
At Braisne on the Vesle, however, the Germans for a time made a resolute
stand. They held the town in force, and covered the bridge with machine
guns. They were strongly supported by artillery. Notwithstanding this,
they were ousted out of the place by the 1st British Cavalry Division
under General Allenby. While a brigade of British infantry cleared the
enemy out of the town, which lies mainly on the south bank, the cavalry
rushed the passage of the river under a galling fire and turned the
hostile position. So rapidly did the Germans take to flight that they
had to throw a large amount of their artillery ammunition into the
river. There was no time to reload it into the caissons.[22] This feat
of the British horse ranks among the finest bits of "derring do" in the
campaign. The Queen's Bays have been mentioned in despatches as
rendering distinguished service. Conspicuous gallantry was shown by the
whole division. As a result of these operations from Braisne and
Fismes, the British secured the country up to the Aisne.
Left and right, therefore, the advance had been completely successful.
In the centre, however, the 2nd army corps had an exceptionally tough
piece to negotiate. They advanced up to the Aisne between Soissons and
Missy. The latter place lies on the north bank, just below the junction
of the Aisne and the Vesle. Here there is a broad stretch of meadow
flats, commanded north, east, and south by bluffs. On the south is the
Sermoise bluff or spur; across the flats, directly opposite to the
north, stands out the Chivre spur. The summit of the latter is crowned
by an old defence work, the Fort de Condé. This the Germans held, and
they made use of the spur, like a miniature Gibraltar, to sweep the
flats of the valley with their guns. On this 12th September the 5th
division found themselves unable to make headway. They advanced to the
Aisne, which just here sweeps close under the Chivres spur, leaving
between the cliff and the bank a narrow strip, occupied by the village
of Condé-sur-Aisne. Across the river at Condé there was a road bridge,
and the enemy had left the bridge intact, both because they held the
houses of the village, which they had loop-holed, and because their guns
above commanded the approach road. It may be stated that they held on to
the Chivre spur and on to Condé all through the battle.
On the night of September 12 the British had possession of all the south
bank of the Aisne from Soissons up to Maizy, immediately to the south
of Craonne.
At daybreak on Sunday, September 13, Sir John French ordered a general
advance across the river. Opposite the places where the waterway could
most readily be crossed, the enemy had posted strong bodies of infantry
with machine guns. Along the bluffs, and behind the side valleys above,
they had disposed their artillery in a range of batteries upwards of
fifteen miles in length.
The battle began with one of the most tremendous and concentrated
artillery duels that has ever taken place, for the line was prolonged
both east and west by the French artillery, until it stretched out to
more than twice the length of the British front.
Of the nine bridges over this section of the Aisne, all save that at
Condé had been blown up. Near a little place called Bourg on the north
bank, some three miles below Maizy, the valley is crossed by an aqueduct
carrying the Oise and Aisne canal. This canal passes in a series of
locks over the ridge north-west. The canal is much used in connection
with the chalk quarries.
Troops of the 1st British division, defying a fierce bombardment,
advanced in rushes along the towing path, or crept along the parapets of
the aqueduct. Every man deliberately took his life in his hands. Others
crept breast high in the water along the canal sides. The German guns
stormed at them, and many fell, but foot by foot and yard by yard they
crawled on, while supporting riflemen from the ridges behind them
picked off the Germans who strove to oppose their passage. The
resistance was furious. They won, however, a footing on the north bank.
Once there, no counter-assaults could dislodge them.
This bridgehead formed at the opposite end of the aqueduct, more troops
rushed across, covered by a concentration of the British artillery. In
this way, at length, the whole division got over, including the cavalry.
Forthwith they advanced up the road leading across the ridge from Bourg,
along the side valley, towards Chamouille.
While these events were taking place, troops of the 2nd division were,
five miles farther down the river, near Vailly, carrying out a feat of
equal daring. Just about Vailly, the Aisne is crossed obliquely by the
railway line from Soissons. The railway bridge, a structure of iron, now
lay in the stream. Most of the confusion of massive ribs and girders was
under water, and the deep and smoothly sweeping current, swollen by
recent rains, foamed and chafed against the obstacle. One of the long
girders, however, still showed an edge above the flood. It was possible
for men to cross upon this girder, but only in single file. Not more
than two feet in breadth at the outside, not less than 250 feet in
length, this path of iron resembled, if anything could, that bridge,
narrow as the edge of a scimitar, over which the faithful Mussulman is
fabled to pass into Paradise. It was swept by shot and shell. From the
heights across the valley belched without ceasing the hail of death.
Wounded or unnerved a man saw his end as surely in the grey-green swirl
of waters. But the soldiers who undertook this service did not hesitate.
It may be doubted if there has ever been anything in ancient or in
modern war more coolly heroic. Here was the spirit which has made
Britain the mother of mighty nations. Not a few of these heroes fell,
inevitably, but the spirit was in all, and if some fell, others won
their way over, and having won it kept their footing against heavy odds.
In sight of this struggle, amid the unceasing roar of the batteries on
either side, the 4th Guards Brigade were, a mile away at Chavonne,
ferrying themselves over in boats. Notwithstanding the furious efforts
to annihilate them, both as they crossed and as they sprang ashore, a
whole battalion in this way got across and made good their foothold.
Half-way between Condé and Soissons, at the village of Venizel, at the
same time, the 14th brigade were rafting themselves over on tree-trunks
crossed with planks, derelict doors, and stairways.
These footholds won, the troops, like the 1st division, lost no time in
pushing forward to seize points of vantage before the enemy could rally
from his astonishment. The 2nd division advanced along the road from
Vailly towards Courteçon; the 12th brigade made an attack in the
direction of Chivres, situated in a small side valley to the west of
the Chivres bluff. Slightly higher up this side valley, and on its
opposite slope, the Germans held the hillside village of Vregny in
force. The cleft at once became the scene of a furious combat.
Coincidently the work went on of throwing pontoon bridges across the
river. Under persistent bombardment the Royal Engineers stuck to this
business with grim resolve. The battle had gone on without a pause from
daybreak. At half-past five in the evening, opposite Bucy-le-Long, three
miles above Soissons, the first pontoon bridge had been completed, and
the 10th brigade crossing by it drove the enemy out of Bucy. Working
right through the night the Engineers completed eight pontoon bridges
and one footbridge. On the following day they temporarily repaired the
road bridges at Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the bridge at Villers.
The army had thus twelve bridges connecting with the south bank, and was
able to move across in force with a large part of his artillery.
Crossing the Aisne at Soissons, the main road running for about a mile
and a half north-east to the little village of Crouy, there divides. On
the right is a lower road eastward up the valley of the Aisne, past and
under the bluffs on the north side to Berry-au-Bac. On the left is a
road which climbs up hill, carried in some places through cuttings and
tunnels, at others over short viaducts, until it reaches the summit of
the ridge. There, parallel in direction with the lower road three miles
away, it continues for some twelve miles to Craonne. From this summit
road there is, between the patches of woods, a wide view of the
country--to the north the valley of the Lette, and beyond it the height
round which lies the town and fortress of Laon, to the south the rich
woodland glimpses of the Aisne valley. This panoramic highway is the
famous Chemins des Dames.
It is evident that command of the higher and of the lower roads meant
command of all the part of the ridge between Soissons and Berry, and the
operations were an effort on the one side to obtain, and on the other to
retain, that command.
Already, with the exception of the break at Condé, the lower road, and
the villages and the town of Vailly lying along its length, were, as the
result of the fighting on September 13, in the hands of the British. The
higher road remained in the possession of the Germans. Up the clefts and
side valleys are a number of small villages and hamlets, inhabited for
the most part by quarrymen and lime-burners, but with, here and there, a
small factory. A sprinkling of these civilians were Germans. Most were
known to the enemy, and were active spies, and one of the first measures
taken by the Germans was to establish at various points secret
telephones, forming an exchange of intercommunication with and along
their positions. Where telephones could not be employed they arranged a
system of ruses and signals. Among these devices was that of smoke from
cottage chimneys.
On the morning of September 14, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Brigades,
defeating a heavy counter-attack, seized the roads between Condé and
Soissons. The object was to cut into the centre of the German defence.
During this day further bodies of British troops crossed the river. The
forces already on the north side were heavily engaged. Towards nightfall
the Germans attempted a counter-attack. It was beaten off after severe
fighting. Three hours later, about ten o'clock at night, they again
descended in force against the positions and villages held by the
British troops. While the clefts and side valleys blazed with flashing
fire of infantry, the valley of the Aisne was lit up for miles with the
fluctuating and lurid flare from the heavy guns. Masses of German
infantry tried to drive the British troops out of the villages they had
seized. It was evidently hoped to prevail by weight of numbers. The
onset fell back crippled by the losses sustained.
By this time the fact was becoming plain that the battle was no mere
rearguard action. The enemy had manifestly resolved to make a stand. To
ascertain the character and strength of his disposition, Sir John French
ordered a general advance. It was timed to begin at daybreak.
The dawn broke amid rain and heavy mists, but this, if a disadvantage to
the attack, was equally a disadvantage to the defence. One of the
leading features of this offensive was what Sir John French has justly
called the bold and decisive action of the 1st army corps, commanded by
Sir Douglas Haig.
From Bourg, the scene of the crossing on the aqueduct, there runs
northward climbing to the summit of the ridge a road to the village of
Cerny, about half-way along the Chemin des Dames. The distance from
Bourg to Cerny is rather more than three miles. It is, however, a stiff
climb. Two-thirds of the way up, where the road bends sharply to the
left round a spur, is the village of Vendresse-et-Troyon. The capture of
this place was one of the immediate objectives, and the troops told off
to accomplish it were the 1st infantry brigade and the 25th artillery
brigade, under General Bulfin.[23] At Cerny there is a slight dip on the
level of the ridge.
Vendresse is on the west slope of this side valley, and Troyon on the
east slope just behind the spur. The Germans held in strong force both
the spur and the houses on each slope. At Troyon they had fortified
themselves in a factory.
Few operations could be more ticklish than the seizure of such a place.
From the spur the Germans came down in a counter-attack like a human
avalanche. After stemming this rush by a withering fire the Northamptons
were ordered to carry the spur at the point of the bayonet. They did it.
As they were chasing the survivors of the counter-attack up the slope
there suddenly appeared on the skyline a second mass of German infantry,
the reserves supporting the counter-attacking column. In a matter of
seconds, however, the fugitives and the Northamptons were on them.
Their ranks broken, they also turned and fled in rout across the
plateau.
In the meantime the North Lancashires had stormed the factory and
cleared the enemy out of Vendresse at the point of the bayonet. Other
troops of the 1st army corps pushed on to Meulins, a mile to the
south-east, and seized positions along the east end of the ridge. During
the fighting the Germans lost 12 field guns and 600 prisoners. Many of
the latter were found to belong to the Landwehr, proving that the enemy
had already been compelled to fill up his formations from second
reserves.
The fury of this fighting was intense. There could be no better evidence
of its character than an unposted letter found later on an officer of
the 7th German army reserve corps. The letter runs:--
CERNY, S. OF LAON, _Sept. 17, 1914_.
MY DEAR PARENTS,--Our corps has the task of holding the heights
south of Cerny in all circumstances till the 15th corps on our left
flank can grip the enemy's flank. On our right are other corps. We
are fighting with the English Guards, Highlanders, and Zouaves.[24]
The losses on both sides have been enormous. For the most part this
is due to the too brilliant French artillery. The English are
marvellously trained in making use of the ground. One never sees
them, and one is constantly under fire.
Three days ago our division took possession of these heights, dug
itself in, &c. Two days ago, early in the morning, we were attacked
by immensely superior English forces (one brigade and two
battalions), and were turned out of our positions; the fellows took
five guns from us. It was a tremendous hand-to-hand fight. How I
escaped myself I am not clear. I then had to bring up supports on
foot (my horse was wounded and the others were too far in rear).
Then came up the Guard Jager Battalion, 4th Jager, 65th Regiment,
Reserve Regiment 13, Landwehr Regiments 13 and 16, and with the
help of the artillery drove back the fellows out of the position
again.
... During the first two days of the battle[25] I had only one
piece of bread and no water, spent the night in the rain without my
great coat. The rest of my kit was on the horses which have been
left miles behind with the baggage, which cannot come up into the
battle because as soon as you put your nose out from behind cover
the bullets whistle.
Yesterday evening about six p.m., in the valley in which our
reserves stood, there was such a terrible cannonade that we saw
nothing of the sky but a cloud of smoke. We had few casualties.
Just to the west of Vendresse the 5th infantry brigade advanced against
the part of the ridge where is situated the village of Courteçon.
Simultaneously the 4th Guards Brigade, with the 36th brigade of
artillery, debouched from Bourg along the Aisne and Oise canal, with the
object of seizing Ostel. They had to fight their way, opposed foot by
foot, through dense woods. The 6th brigade pressed up farther along the
canal to Braye-en-Laonnois. It is immediately to the north of that
place that the plateau is at the narrowest. Evidently to obtain
possession of that neck would be a great advantage. The enemy held on to
Braye at all costs.
Further west, again, the British advanced from Vailly to Aizy along
another of the approaches to the plateau. The object was to hem in the
Germans holding the Chivres bluff and Condé. On the farther side of the
bluff from Aizy the division of Sir Charles Fergusson held on to Chivres
village in the face of a succession of determined onslaughts.
As the outcome of this day's fighting, which had been very severe, the
1st army corps had won close up to the ridge by Craonne, and held
positions extending along the plateau across the canal to Soupir, a
distance of nearly nine miles. Concurrently the 2nd and 3rd corps had
gained the plateau from Chavonne westward to Croucy, and with the
exception of the Chivres bluff all the outer or southern edge of the
plateau, as well as the intervening side valleys, were in the British
hands, from Soissons to Craonne.
As soon as they had gained these positions the British troops set about
digging themselves in, and although the rain fell all night in torrents,
and the men had been through a long and fierce struggle since daybreak,
they worked magnificently.
Next day (September 15) heavy rain blurred the view. Neither force could
see the movements of the other, but when the mists lifted somewhat the
Germans must have been surprised to discover that the foe were already
in their stronghold.
On their side they had not been idle. They had brought along from
Maubeuge the batteries of heavy howitzers used to destroy the forts at
that place, and were putting them into well-concealed positions. Besides
this they worked with energy to strengthen their entrenchments. These
lines of trenches among and along the edges of the woods crowning the
slopes of the ridge were elaborately made, and in general cleverly
hidden.
They were so placed as to sweep with rifle and machine gun fire the
approaches to the plateau up the various clefts. Lengths of barbed-wire
entanglements and rabbit fencing further defended the approaches, both
in the woods and across open ground. Where behind or between the lines
of trenches the land rose--the top of the plateau had been worn by ages
of weather into sweeping undulations--there were batteries of field
guns, so arranged that they laid approaches under a cross fire. Round
and in front of these knobs of land the trenches swept like ditches
round bastions. Everything, in fact, that resource could suggest had
been done to make the positions impregnable.[26]
In addition to trenches, hamlets and villages were held by the two
armies as advanced posts, and had been turned roughly into groups of
block houses.
FOOTNOTES:
[22] A buried store of the enemy's munitions of war was also found not
far from the Aisne, ten wagon-loads of live shell and two wagons of
cable being dug up; and traces were discovered of large quantities of
stores having been burnt, all tending to show that so far back as the
Aisne the German retirement was hurried.
[23] This able and distinguished officer has since been promoted for his
services.
[24] Part of the 5th French Army, which was operating on the right of
the British from Rheims and Berry-au-Bac.
[25] The reference is evidently to the fighting on Sept. 13 and 14.
[26] The following descriptive notes on the German positions were made
by the official "Eye-witness" with the British forces:--"Owing to the
concealment afforded to the Germans' fire trenches and gun emplacements
by the woods and to the fact that nearly all the bridges and roads
leading to them, as well as a great part of the southern slopes, are
open to their fire, the position held by them is a very strong one.
Except for these patches of wood, the terrain generally is not enclosed.
No boundaries between the fields exist as in England. There are ditches
here and there, but no hedges, wire fences, or walls, except round the
enclosures in the villages. A large proportion of the woods, however,
are enclosed by high rabbit netting, which is in some places supported
by iron stanchions. The top of the plateau on the south of the river to
some extent resembles Salisbury Plain, except that the latter is
downland while the former is cultivated, being sown with lucerne, wheat,
and beetroot.
"A feature of this part of the country, and one which is not confined to
the neighbourhood of the Aisne, is the large number of caves, both
natural and artificial, and of quarries. These are of great service to
the forces on both sides, since they can often be used as sheltered
accommodation for the troops in the second line. Other points worthy of
note are the excellence of the metalled roads, though the metalled
portion is very narrow, and the comparative ease with which one can find
one's way about, even without a map. This is due partly to the
prevailing straightness of the roads and partly to the absence of
hedges. There are signposts at all cross-roads, whilst the name of each
village is posted in a conspicuous place at the entry and exit of the
main highway passing through it.
"In addition to the absence of hedges, the tall, white ferro-concrete
telegraph posts lining many of the main roads give a somewhat strange
note to the landscape."