HOW GENERAL VON KLUCK AVERTED RUIN
The German defeat had indeed been decisive. On the other hand, the
defeat did not, in the immediate sequel, yield for the Allies all the
results which might have been looked for. There have been misimpressions
on both points.
Take the first misimpression. A victorious general, it has been well
said, rarely knows the full damage he inflicts. Over the wide area
covered by the Battle of the Marne and by the pursuit, it was not
humanely possible to collect and to collate precise information without
some delay. All the same, the French General Staff and the French War
Ministry had by September 12 gathered facts enough to form a fairly
accurate estimate of advantages won. Beyond vague indications of their
nature, however, these facts were not made public. There was at the time
a good reason. Situated as the German armies were, and with their
intercommunication disorganised, they would take two or three days
longer at least to discover on their part the full measure of their
losses, and to judge of the effect. To the Allies, that difference in
time was of the utmost moment. Certainly it would have been against
their interest by publication of details to tell the German General
Staff in effect what reinforcements they ought to send, and where they
ought to send them. Why the difference in time was of moment will
presently appear.
Again it has been repeatedly stated that the foremost effect of the
Battle of the Marne was to confirm to the Allies the initiative which
the strategy of General Joffre had so skilfully gained. That was one
effect assuredly, and a vitally important effect. Another effect,
however, hardly less important, was that, in point of military value and
for effective operations, the German force in France was no longer the
same. The blow had been too severe. Never again could that force be
levelled up to those armies which had crossed the Marne in the
confidence of prospective victory.
The effect was not moral merely, though _moral_ had not a little to do
with it. The effect was in the main material. War wastage arising from
fatigue and privation must have reduced the effective strength of the
German armies in nearly as great a degree as losses in killed and
wounded. If _on September 12_ we put the armies which turned to hold the
new line from Compiègne to Verdun at 600,000 men still fit for duty, we
shall be adopting probably an outside figure.
Had this force, so reduced, not been able to make a stand along that
new line, it must have been destroyed largely through exhaustion and
famine. It was saved not, as imagined, chiefly by the defence works
thrown up north of the Aisne and across the highlands to the Argonne. It
was saved mainly by the tactics and by the energy of General von Kluck.
Rightly described by the British Official Bureau, doubtless on the
authority of Sir John French himself, as "bold and skilful," those
tactics form one of the outstanding features of the campaign, and they
ought justly to be considered among the greatest feats in modern war.
They are on the same plane indeed as the strategy and tactics of General
Joffre, and these, beyond doubt, rank in point of mastery with the
campaign of Napoleon in 1814. In this very area of Champagne on the eve
of his fall the military genius of Napoleon was, like lightning in the
gloom of tempest, displayed in its greatest splendour. For a thousand
years this region of plateaux and rivers has been the arena of events
which have shaped the history of Europe.[16] The features it offers for
military defence are remarkable. Versed in the campaigns of Napoleon,
aware of what have proved to be his mistakes, knowing the country in its
every detail, knowing and judging rightly the qualities and
capabilities of his troops, General Joffre drew the Germans on step by
step to overthrow. The great feature of his plans was that this was
meant to be an overthrow which would govern the fortune of the war. In
great fact that aim was achieved, but in part also its fulfilment was
postponed.
On the retreat of the German armies from the Marne there were, in order
to bring about the destruction of those armies as a fighting force,
three things which the Allies had to accomplish, and accomplish, if
possible, concurrently. The first was to cut the German communications
with Luxemburg and Metz by barring the roads and railways across the
eastern frontier; the second was to push forward and seize Rheims, and
the outlet through the hills north of the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac; the
third was to force the troops of von Kluck eastward off their lines of
communication along the valley of the Oise, and to do that, if it could
be done, south of the Aisne.
All three objectives were of great consequence. The third, however, was
the most important of the three.
Of the three, the first, the closing of the eastern frontier, was
accomplished in part; the second was so far successful that the French
were able to seize Rheims without opposition; the third was not
accomplished. Had it been the armies of von Kluck and von Bülow forming
the German right must both have been severed from the German line to the
east of Rheims, and, with their supplies of food and of munitions cut
off, must have been compelled to surrender.
Appreciating the peril, and fully aware that the fate of the _whole_
German force hung upon averting it, General von Kluck acted with
resource and energy. Probably no commander ever extricated himself out
of a more deadly predicament, and the achievement is all the more
notable since he was opposed to skilful generals in command of skilful
troops, directed by the greatest strategist of the age. The predicament
in which General von Kluck found himself was this. If he opposed a front
to the army of General Desperey, formed of the pick of the French
regulars, he had on his flank both the British and the troops of General
Maunoury. In that case, overwhelming defeat was certain. If on the other
hand he formed a front against the troops of General French and General
Maunoury, he presented a flank to the 5th French army. Not only in such
circumstances was a bad defeat almost equally foregone, but, forming
front to a flank and fighting along the lines of his communications, he
must, in the event of defeat, retire eastward, abandoning his lines of
communication and obstructing the retreat of von Bülow.
As events prove, the measures he adopted were these. He recalled from
Amiens the army corps sent to that place to undertake an outflanking
movement against the Allied left, and to cut off communication between
Paris and Boulogne and Calais. With all haste these troops fell back
upon the Oise to secure the German right rear. Coincidently, his two
army corps on the Ourcq were ordered to undertake against General
Maunoury a vigorous offensive to the west of that river. With the
remaining three army corps, which had crossed the Marne, General von
Kluck fell back, presenting to the British and to the 5th French army a
line protected first by the Grand Morin, and then by the Petit Morin and
the Marne. In order to carry out that movement he did not hesitate to
sacrifice a considerable part of his cavalry.
The danger-point of this disposition was La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Into
that place, consequently, he threw a strong force with orders to hold it
to the last moment. With the rest of his three corps he formed front
partly against the British, partly against the left of the army of
General Desperey. In these actions, as Mr. Maxwell has pointed out, his
troops were swept by the flank attack of part of the 6th French army.
There is no doubt they fought, despite cruel losses, with the most
stubborn courage. As the 6th French army, who displayed equally
unshakable resolution, strove, following the course of the Ourcq, to
work round against the German line of retreat, and as their attacks had
to be met as well as the attacks of the British, the expedient which the
German general resorted to was, as he retired, to hurry divisions of
troops successively from the south to the north of his flank defence,
and, as the 6th French army moved, to move his flank defence with it.
Not only was the object to do that, but there was, at the same time, an
effort to press the 6th French army towards the north-west. This, in
fact, General von Kluck managed to do. He did it by extending his flank
beyond the left of the French army, and making a feint of envelopment.
Imagine a row of coins, each coin a division, and a movement of the row
by constantly shifting a coin from one end of the row to the other. That
will give roughly an idea of what, on the events, appears to have been
the expedient.
The success of such a series of movements depended, of course, on their
rapidity, and, considering the severe and insistent pressure from the
British on the rear of the line, forming an angle with the flank, the
movements were carried out with surprising rapidity. The Ourcq, though
not a long river, is, like the Marne, deep, and over more than half its
length navigable. It flows between plateaux through a narrow valley with
steep sides. The crossing of such a stream is no easy feat.
But General von Kluck did not mind the losses he incurred so long as he
achieved his purpose. This was clearly his best policy. In the intervals
of desperate fighting his men had to undertake long marches at a
breakneck pace. For several days together they were without rest or
sleep. To some extent they were aided by the entrenchments already dug
to guard against an attack from the west. These positions, prepared to
protect the head of the German chain of armies remaining in contact with
Paris, now proved useful in covering the retirement. Nevertheless, the
efforts of the Germans must have been exhausting to the last degree.[17]
Despite that, they were successful in reaching the Aisne in advance of
the 6th French army. The latter, it ought, however, to be said, had to
operate through a difficult area. From the Ourcq to the Aisne there is a
succession of forests. Of these the great forest of Villers-Cotterets
extends northwards from the Ourcq to within six miles of Soissons. East
of the stretch of forests the country is more open. Given these facts of
topography, it is evident that on following the line of the Ourcq, with
the object of barring its passage to the enemy, the French had in the
forest belt a formidable obstacle. Perceiving that in this lay his
chance, General von Kluck hurried as large a part of his force as
possible across the Ourcq in order to bar the advance of the French by
the forest roads through Villers, and by the comparatively narrow break
in the forest belt between Crepy and Pierrefond. He was thus able,
notwithstanding that the British were hanging on to and harrying his
rear, to hold the outlets against the troops of General Maunoury until
he slipped past them.[18]
And once on the Aisne and in touch with his Amiens rearguard, now on the
Oise above Compiègne, he was in a position to initiate a complete change
in tactics, and, his force being comparatively secure, the other German
armies could again fall into line.
Before dealing with those new German tactics, it is advisable briefly to
sketch the defence works thrown up by the Germans along their line,
because both these defence works and the character of the country are
intimately related to the tactics.
As already stated, the highlands of Champagne extend north-west nearly
as far as Peronne. They are chalk hills and uplands cut by deep valleys.
The most northerly of the valleys is that out of which flows the Somme.
Then comes the much wider valley of the Oise. Still farther south is the
valley of the Aisne. Between the Oise and the Aisne is a roughly
triangular tract of country, its apex at the point where the Oise and
the Aisne join. Across the broad end or base of this triangle run the
open downs. Towards the narrower end of the area the country becomes
broken and hilly, and is covered with great patches of wood and forest.
There is along the north of the Aisne a long wooded ridge, which on its
northern edge slopes steeply. But the top of the ridge forms a gentle
undulating slope to the south. It is not unlike the top of a rough,
slightly tilted table. To a bird's-eye view this top would appear shaped
rather like a very coarse-toothed comb, with the teeth jagged and
broken. The top, that is to say, runs out on its south side into a
succession of promontories, each ending in a round-ended bluff
overlooking the Aisne valley. Some of these bluffs jut out close above
the river. Others are much farther back. Between them are clefts and
side valleys, in which the land slopes up from the bottom of the main
valley to the top of the plateau. In the longer clefts, of course, the
general gradient is much less stiff than in the shorter ones. Both the
tops of the bluffs and most of the clefts are thickly wooded. The bluffs
are on an average above 400 feet in height, that in fact being the
general elevation of the plateau.
The aspect of the edge of the corresponding plateau on the south side of
the valley of the Aisne is exactly similar. Since the bluffs on the
opposite sides approach each other in some places and are farther apart
in others, the valley varies in breadth from half a mile to two miles.
The bottom of the valley is practically flat, and through this flat
tract of meadow land the river winds, now near one side of the valley,
now near the other. The stream is between fifty and sixty yards wide,
but, like all the rivers in this part of France, deep. Where the valley
opens out there are villages and small towns. The largest place is the
picturesque old city of Soissons.
Now the ridge north of the Aisne extends west to east for some
thirty-four miles. At Craonne, its eastern end, it rises to a summit
about 500 feet high, and then falls abruptly. There is here, going from
the Aisne northwards, a fairly level open gap some three miles wide.
South of the Aisne, the same gap extends for about ten miles to Rheims.
On each side of the gap rise hillsides clothed with woods. At the
crossing of the Aisne is situated the village of Berry-au-Bac. This gap,
it will be seen, forms an important feature in the Aisne battle.
Above and behind the hills to the east of the gap, and across the downs,
the German entrenchments extended eastward for mile after mile right
away to the Argonne. It is apposite here to note that near Rheims the
traverse gap widens out and passes right and left round an isolated,
hilly mass, lying like an island in a stream. Up the sides of this hilly
mass climb the villages of Berru and Nogent-l'Abbesse.
Undoubtedly, one of the surprises of the war was the discovery that the
Germans had prepared the positions just described. The preparation must
have involved great labour. But it should not be forgotten that from
time out of mind one of the chief industries in this part of France is
represented by the chalk quarries, out of which is dug the material,
known in its prepared state as plaster of Paris. All through Champagne
there was, before the war, a considerable German population. Not a few
of the plaster quarries had passed into the hands of Germans. The
principal quarries are on the steep north slope of the ridge along the
Aisne. Cut into the hillsides, these chalk pits present a labyrinth of
galleries and chambers, where the quarrymen were accustomed to take
their meals and even to sleep. These quarries, numbered by scores, might
well form the refuge and stronghold of an army. The region is
remarkable, also, for its many natural caves.
Even more important, however, from a military standpoint, is the
southern side of this plateau. The only means of approaching the plateau
from that side is either up the clefts or side valleys, or from the
western end where the level gradually falls. But an attack made up one
of the side valleys could be assailed from both sides. In possession of
the plateau above, the defence, while keeping its force undivided, could
move that force to any point where attack was threatened, having itself
no clefts or fissures to deal with. It will be seen, therefore, that the
ridge formed a sort of vast ready-made castle, big enough to stretch
from London to beyond Oxford, or from Liverpool to Manchester, and that
the quarries and galleries made it habitable, at all events on the
banditti level of existence.
As Sir John French has pointed out,[19] owing to the patches of wood on
the upper slopes and tops of the bluffs, only small areas of the plateau
were open to view from the tops of bluffs on the south side of the
river. Hence the movements of the defenders were, looked at from across
the river, to no small extent concealed.
Two further _military_ features of the ridge should be noted. One is the
fact that its steep northern slope forms one side of the valley of the
Lette, and that, therefore, it is bounded by a river on both sides; the
other is, that some eight miles from its eastern end at Craonne the
plateau narrows to a mere neck less than a mile wide, and that across
this neck is carried the Oise and Aisne canal.
Not relying, however, merely on the natural features of the place, the
Germans dug along the plateau lines of entrenchments connected by
galleries with other trenches in the rear where reserves, not in the
firing line, were held. These back trenches formed living places. The
mass of men was too large, for any save the smaller proportion, to find
shelter in the quarries.
It will be seen, therefore, that the business of turning the Germans out
of such a fastness could be no easy matter.
On the choice of this position two questions suggest themselves. How was
it that the Germans came to pitch upon this place--for there can be no
doubt the choice was deliberate[20]--and what operations did they intend
to undertake on the strength of its possession?
The answers to these questions are in no sense speculations in the
secrets of War Offices. Those secrets it would be idle to profess to
know. Like the observations made in preceding pages, the answers are
deductions from admitted facts and events, perfectly plain to anyone who
has knowledge enough of military operations to draw them. Only ignorance
can assume that no true commentary can be written concerning a campaign
save upon official confidences.
As to the German choice of this position, it should not be forgotten
that the present war represents the fourth campaign which the Prussians
have fought in this area of France. In forming their plans they had, we
ought to presume, considered--bearing in mind the difference in military
conditions--not only the war of 1870-1, but the campaign of Frederick
William II., and the campaign of Blucher in 1814. A little earlier it
was said that this arena offers great facilities for defence. The reason
is that, since there is here a system of rivers flowing to a conjunction
near Paris, it is always open to the defence to attack in superior force
between any two of the rivers, while the assailant must, in advancing
from east to west, have his forces divided by one or more of the
streams. The whole German plan was intended to obviate and to overcome
that difficulty, and yet the plan came to grief because, at the moment
when their forces were divided by the Marne and by the Grand Morin, the
defence were able to attack them in superior force on their extreme
right--the vital point--and when the crossing of the rivers made it
difficult to meet that attack.[21]
Foreseeing, however, the _possibility_, though not accepting the
probability, of having to stand for a time on the defensive, the German
General Staff, we cannot now doubt, had formed the subsidiary and
provisional plan of concentrating, as far as possible and in case of
necessity, between two of the rivers--the Oise and the Aisne--in
positions which could be held with a minimum of numbers.
But this concentration was only preliminary. It was intended to aid the
massing on their own right flank of an echelon of reserve formations to
be thrown against the left of the Allied forces.
Concentration between two of the rivers was, as a defensive, beyond
question the best measure in the situation. A mere defensive, however,
would be tantamount to a confession that the whole expedition against
France had proved a failure. Undoubtedly, therefore, as the later events
show, the design was, at the earliest moment, to resume the offensive by
means of masses of reserves. These, pivoting upon Noyon, at the western
end of the fortified line, might sweep round and, by threatening to
envelop the Allied armies compel their retirement.
Conversely, the Allied tactic was plainly to envelop the Germans and to
threaten their main communications through Belgium. The question now
was: Which side could carry out its manoeuvre first?
FOOTNOTES:
[16] The Italian historian, Signor Guglielmo Ferrero, has expressed the
opinion that the Battle of the Marne has altered the face of European
history. There is little doubt that time will prove this view to be
fully justified.
[17] An official British note on this retreat stated: "Many isolated
parties of Germans have been discovered hiding in the numerous woods a
long way behind our line. As a rule they seem glad to surrender.
"An officer, who was proceeding along the road in charge of a number of
led horses, received information that there were some of the enemy in
the neighbourhood. Upon seeing them he gave the order to charge,
whereupon three German officers and 106 men surrendered."
[18] An interesting sidelight on the German movements is afforded by
these particulars given on official authority:--
"At Villers-Cotterets, though supplies far in excess of the capabilities
of the place were demanded, the town was not seriously damaged. The
Germans evacuated the place on September 11th in such haste that they
left behind a large amount of the bread requisitioned. It was stated by
the inhabitants that the enemy destroyed and abandoned fifteen
motor-lorries, seven guns, and ammunition wagons.
"At Crepy, on Sept. 3, various articles were requisitioned under threat
of a fine of 100,000f. for every day's delay in the delivery of the
goods. The following list shows the amounts and natures of the supplies
demanded, and also the actual quantities furnished:
REQUISITIONED. SUPPLIED.
Flour 20,000 kilos. 20,000 kilos.
Dried vegetables 5,000 " 800 "
Coffee 1,000 " 809 "
Salt 1,000 " 2,000 "
Oats 100,000 " 55,000 "
Red wine 2,500 litres. 2,500 litres.
All smoked meats, ham, cloth, }
new boots, tobacco, biscuits, } 61 prs. of boots.
handkerchiefs, shirts, braces, } 91 bicycles.
stockings, horse shoes, bicycles,} 15 motor tyres.
motor-cars, petrol. } 6 inner tubes.
[19] See Appendix, Despatch of Sir John French, Oct. 8, 1914.
[20] The opinion on this point of the officers who took part in the
Battle of the Aisne is embodied in the following official note published
by the British Press Bureau:--
"There is no doubt that the position on the Aisne was not hastily
selected by the German Staff after the retreat had begun. From the
choice of ground and the care with which the fields of fire have been
arranged to cover all possible avenues of approach, and from the amount
of work already carried out, it is clear that the contingency of having
to act on the defensive was not overlooked when the details of the
strategically offensive campaign were arranged."
[21] The late General Hamley, describing what he considered the most
effective lines for an invasion of France from Germany in opposition to
the defensive adopted by Napoleon, points out that if the left of the
defence threatens the invaders' communications, the invaders, leaving
their right on the Ourcq and Marne, march through Sezanne to fight on
the right bank of the Seine. Pushing the French right and centre to the
Yères with their own centre and left, they fight then the decisive
battle. It should be decisive, for the [Germans] on the two rivers,
approaching each other in the narrowing angle can combine in a movement
on Paris, holding the passages at Melun and Montereau on the one side,
and at Meaux on the other.
"In executing such a plan the weapons of the defender would be in some
measure turned against himself.... But the assailants in taking these
forward steps do so at the disadvantage of attacking a strongly posted
enemy and under penalty of exposing a flank to him. This course demands
a superiority in numbers of not less than 4 to 3, and probably greater
than that."
The Germans had adopted this very plan, but they had not the superiority
they imagined.