THE EVOLUTION OF THE STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
1. THE STAFF
The origin of the Staff must be looked for in the earliest European
organization, that of the Reiters and Landsknechts in Germany about
A.D. 1500, and in the armies of Maurice and Gustavus modelled on them.
This organization was copied in England, France, Prussia, and other
military nations, and survives in essentials to this day.
We find in the sixteenth century that the fighting officers of the
troop or company left the drill to the Sergeant, an officer of
experience in handling troops, and a most important personage in the
unit. In action, while the other officers were in front, fighting, the
Sergeant was in rear correcting the men’s movements, and giving orders.
In the Infantry he had to run up and down the ranks for this purpose,
and was therefore not armed with the long pike, which would hamper him.
The Sergeant therefore either retained the halberd when Infantry gave
it up for the pike, or was armed with a half-pike. These arms long
survived in the British Army, where sergeants carried a halberd down
to 1829, and the subalterns a half-pike or “spontoon,” down to 1786.
Similar duties to those of the Sergeant in the Company were performed
in the Regiment by the Sergeant-Major, who supervised the drilling of
the Companies by the Sergeants, regulated the march of the Regiment
and its manœuvres in battle, and was therefore charged with the issue
of orders. He was thus virtually a Staff Officer to the Colonel.
Similarly, in an army, the Commander required an officer of experience
to draw up the army in line of battle, a difficult task, and a delicate
one, as the precedence of each corps had to be respected. This officer
was called the Sergeant-Major-General, as he filled for the Army the
same functions as the Sergeant-Major for the Regiment. He was the Staff
Officer of the Army, responsible for planning the battle manœuvres,
regulating marches, arranging for the quartering of the troops, and
necessarily, therefore, for issuing the orders dealing with these
matters. The word _Sergeant_ was soon dropped from both these titles.
The _Sergeant-Major_ became the _Major_ of the Regiment, with the
duties of the modern _Adjutant_, and the _Sergeant-Major-General_
became the _Major-General_ of the Army.
We thus find in the sixteenth century that the Staff work of the Army
was performed by the officer known in France as _le Major-Général des
Logis_, or _Major-General of Quarters_, as the allotment of quarters
was one of his chief duties. It may be mentioned that the old word
for Staff duties was _Logistics_, formed from the word _Logis_, and
meant the duties of the Major-Général des Logis. This title was then
shortened to _le Major-Général_, by which name the chief Staff officer
of the Army has been always called in France down to this day.
The full word was translated _Quartier-Meister-General_ in German,
or _Quarter-Master-General_ in English, and this Staff Officer was
charged with the Staff duties of the Sergeant-Major-General--namely:
Orders, Drill, Manœuvres, Quarters. But the necessity of preceding
the army to allot quarters for it entails deciding which road the
army is to march by, so the duty of reconnoitring the roads, and
thus that of reconnaissance generally, was added to the list of the
duties of the Q.M.G. We thus find, in the eighteenth century, that
what are now the duties of the General Staff were allotted to the
_Quarter-Master-General_ in the British and Prussian Services, and to
the _Major-Général_ in the French.
These duties continued to be performed by the Q.M.G. Staff in England,
down to a few years ago. In Prussia the Q.M.G. was the second officer
to Moltke on the General Staff in the war of 1870, and the appointment
was only abolished in 1888.
At the close of the seventeenth century another Staff Officer was
established at Head-Quarters by the name of Adjutant-General, who
was charged with all questions relating to personnel, and with
routine duties, as distinguished from those connected with movement,
quartering, and fighting, which were the duties of the Q.M.G. The
A.G.’s Staff is in all armies charged to-day with the same duties as
in the eighteenth century.
There were generally attached to the Staff some Engineer Officers,
who were charged with map-making for military purposes. The maps of
European countries are therefore known as Staff Maps, while that of
Great Britain is called the _Ordnance Survey_, because made by the
Royal Engineers, a Corps under the “Master-General of the Ordnance.”
The General Staff was created in Prussia in 1815, in consequence of the
experience gained in the Napoleonic Wars. The then Q.M.G. Staff was
transformed into the General Staff, and placed under the direct orders
of the King. Some of the General Staff Officers were attached to Army
Corps and Brigades (there were not yet any Divisions), and the rest
formed the Great General Staff at Berlin. There has been but little
change in this organization of the Prussian General Staff, which, it
may be noted, acts for the whole military forces of the German Empire,
for there is no _German_ General Staff in the sense in which there is a
_German_ navy.
All armies have now copied the Prussian General Staff system, with
modifications, but it is an error to suppose that the General Staff
duties were not performed before the Prussians so styled them. We have
seen that they were carried out by the Q.M.G. Staff. In the small
armies commanded by Frederick and Wellington, and by Napoleon at the
outset of his career, these great Generals were virtually their own
Chief of the General Staff. They wrote or dictated detailed orders,
worked out movements on the map, and perused states and returns.
Frederick himself gave orders for marching, pitching camp, and
fighting, sent them out by his orderly officers, and watched their
execution personally.
As Napoleon’s armies increased in size, the General Staff duties
became very heavy, and were carried out most ably by Berthier, his
“Major-Général,” or Chief of the Staff. Their nature is stated in quite
modern shape by the great Swiss Military writer Jomini, who had himself
been Chief of the Staff to Ney in 1805, as well as to the Russian
Army in 1813, after his desertion from the French. (See “L’Art de la
Guerre,” Vol. ii., chap, vi., par. 41.)
The Head-Quarters Staff in Napoleon’s great wars was organized in the
following manner:[B]
[B] These particulars are taken from an article in the _Times_
by the Military Correspondent of that newspaper.
The Staff was divided into five branches:
1. Personal Staff of Napoleon.
2. Personal Staff of the Chief of Staff.
3. The Staff proper.
4. Officers “at disposal,” generally away on special missions.
5. Topographical Bureau, comprising a dozen officers employed in
mapping.
1. Napoleon’s Personal Staff consisted of:
(_a_) The Civil Secretariat.
(_b_) The Military Secretariat, which had charge of the Map, and
took down Napoleon’s dictated Orders.
(_c_) Several Generals, Aides de Camp to the Emperor, available for
special missions.
(_d_) Orderly Officers to carry Orders.
(_e_) Equerries.
2. Berthier’s Staff comprised:
(_a_) The Civil Secretariat.
(_b_) The Military Secretariat.
(_c_) A dozen Aides de Camp.
Berthier’s duty was to embody Napoleon’s instructions in Orders, and
transmit them.
3. The Staff proper, which comprised a score of officers, and was
divided into three branches:
(_a_) Correspondence, orders, movements, states, intelligence.
(_b_) Camps, billets, police, subsistence, hospitals.
(_c_) Laws, decrees, conscription, prisoners.
UNITED STATES STAFF IN THE CIVIL WAR
An example of organization of a Head-Quarters Staff in a great war may
be found in the Civil War, in the United States. When General Grant was
Commander-in-Chief, his Staff consisted of nineteen Officers:
Chief of Staff 1
A. G. Department 3
Q.M.G. Department 4
Provost-Marshals 2
Military Secretaries 2
A.D.C.’s 7
PRUSSIAN STAFF IN 1870
It may be interesting to see how the Prussian Head-Quarters Staff was
organized for the strategical conduct of the War of 1870.
At the head was Moltke, the “Chief of the General Staff” in peace and
war, who really directed the operations, although nominally only the
adviser of the King of Prussia, the Supreme Commander.
Moltke was assisted, and replaced when absent, by the Q.M.G., who acted
as Chief of the Office.
The General Staff under Moltke consisted of twelve officers, and was
organized in three Sections as follows:
1. Operations.
2. Railways and Communications.
3. Intelligence.
Each Section was under a Colonel, the “Chief of the Section,” with one
Field Officer and two Captains as his assistants.
The Commissary-General of Supplies, and the Director of Military
Telegraphs were also attached to the Staff.
Each _Army_ had the following Staff, comprising six to nine General
Staff Officers:
One Chief of General Staff.
One Chief Q.M.G.
One to two Field Officers.
Three to five other Officers.
2. THE SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT SERVICES
The early forces in Europe subsisted merely by individual plunder,
each man obtaining his food and forage as he could. Later, the central
power provided certain places where supplies were collected by force.
The next step in supplying armies was taken when it was found that the
local resources could be drawn on to furnish supplies on payment. This
provided a more certain and effective supply, and demanded fewer troops
to be employed in collecting. This change had a far-reaching result.
The fact that cash had to be paid for these purchases caused Supply to
come under the Civil Finance Department. Hence we find in Cromwell’s
army this Service controlled by the Treasury, as it continued to be
down to the Crimean War, with ill results for the army.
Transport was required to carry the supplies from the districts whence
they were collected to the area occupied by the troops, where they
were stored in magazines. The next step, therefore, was to increase the
mobility of the army by providing additional Transport to move supplies
from these magazines up to the fighting troops.
The train which carried supplies was, during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, a mass of hired or pressed country carts and
wagons, driven by wagoners on foot, and difficult to manage or move
near the enemy. It was found that, unless organized under military
control, the transport was not very efficient, and by the epoch of
Napoleon both the Transport and the Supply Services had become more
and more military in organization. But they were both still _Civil
Services_, owing to the hold the Treasury had over them, from the fact
that both entailed constant expenditure during war.
During the nineteenth century the _Train_ which provided transport
became in all armies a Military Organization, with enlisted drivers
under regular officers; while Supply continued to be organized as a
Department under Civil officials, as it still is abroad. This system
tends to produce difficulties, as the Combatant Military Train Officers
have to move Supplies under the instructions of the Civil Supply
Officials, and in foreign armies it is found difficult in war to make
both work in co-operation. The tendency is, in fact, to bring about the
close union between these two Services, long since found desirable in
England. In all armies there are _Transport and Supply Columns_ formed
from the Train with the addition of Supply personnel. In England alone
are both provided from one Corps, the _Army Service Corps_, and the
description of the British Transport and Supply Services given in Part
II. illustrates what is perhaps the best organization of these Services
for war.
3. THE MEDICAL ORGANIZATION FOR WAR
In the Middle Ages there was no medical organization with armies, nor
were there even any surgeons. The sick and wounded were left to shift
for themselves, and were tended, if at all, by private persons out of
charity, or in monasteries, for the monks alone possessed any knowledge
of surgery and medicine in those days.
Rudimentary provision for surgery in armies is found in the
organization of the German mercenaries of the sixteenth century, where
a surgeon was appointed by each Captain for his Troop of Reiters
or Company of Landsknechts. Later, a Surgeon was attached to the
Regiment, and medical care, from being purely a matter for the Captain
to organize, became a Regimental responsibility. By this time the
practice of surgery had long passed from the hands of monks into those
of the barbers. Thus in the seventeenth century the Prussians had
_Feldschere_, _Field Barbers_, attached to Companies and Regiments for
surgical duties. There also began to be during the sixteenth century
a certain number of what we should call _Staff Surgeons_, attached to
the Higher Commands, who were supposed to supervise the _Regimental
Surgeons_. The latter gradually became better educated, while the
_Company Surgeons_ under their supervision remained merely rude
subordinates.
During the seventeenth century the sick and wounded were treated
in tents pitched in the rear of the camp as long as the army was
stationary, and tended by some of the women who accompanied it. When
it moved, they were handed over to local authorities, or left in the
villages near the fighting. An effort was then made in most countries
to establish hospitals in the chief towns in the theatre of war,
into which the wounded could be collected for better tending. By the
eighteenth century Army Surgeons were allotted to these hospitals,
which seem first to have been organized in France, where, however,
they were managed by contractors. The abuses of this system led to the
hospitals being placed under the Intendants of the Army, a change which
effected little improvement, as the Intendants, through ignorance and
apathy, hampered the action of the medical department, and delayed any
improvement in it. France was the first country to organize any sort
of mobile hospital, the germ of our _field ambulance_. One ambulance
wagon was provided per 1,000 men, and in battle, dressing stations
were formed in rear, to which wounded found their way, or were carried
on stretchers. Stationary hospitals were also established in rear,
and the modern system of evacuation of wounded to the rear was rudely
organized. The same idea was started in Austria, and, in a less
developed form, in Germany.
During the eighteenth century we find an organization of Regimental
Surgeons, with attendants and stretcher bearers, and a provision of
field equipment carried in wagons. Thus units corresponding to Field
Ambulances were gradually organized in the armies of France, Austria,
and Prussia. There were larger organizations of the same nature at
Head-Quarters of the Armies, and of the Higher Commands when these were
introduced in France during the Napoleonic Wars. These Field Ambulances
had ambulance wagons, and other wagons carrying the dispensary and
kitchen, and the necessary equipment, stores, and supplies, and were
manned by a Corps of Hospital Orderlies and Stretcher Bearers. In rear
of these units were stationary hospitals under military control. The
Austrian organization was nearly as good as in France, but that of
Prussia and other States lagged considerably behind them. In fact the
Prussian troops had no medical organization, beyond the provision of
regimental surgeons, at Jena, nor at Eylau, nor even at Waterloo.
It was not till during the nineteenth century that modern Medical
Organization gradually evolved into its present highly developed
condition in all civilized armies. This can be studied in the
description of the British Medical Service (Chapter X.), which is
nearly identical with that of Germany, and may be considered to
represent a high type of Medical Organization for War.
PART V
_MILITARY COMMAND_
CHAPTER XXII
PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND
This work will now conclude with some remarks on the nature of Military
Command, the methods by which it is exercised, and the psychological
characteristics of soldiers and their leaders. The final chapter is
devoted to the last subject, a matter worth deeper consideration in
connection with Command than it has yet received. When it is remembered
that, as stated in the first chapter, it is the main object of
Organization to facilitate Command, the reason for touching on these
subjects in this work will be obvious.
MODE OF EXERCISING COMMAND
Supreme Command in war is either exercised by the Sovereign or by
a Commander-in-Chief who acts as his deputy, or, in a Republic or
Constitutional State, as agent of the Government. In either case, on
him the authority of the State is devolved as regards the operations of
the war.
Governments have not always been wise in their control of the Military
Commander or in their direction of operations. Glaring instances may
be found in history, notably in the conduct of war by the younger Pitt,
by the Aulic Council in Vienna, and by Abraham Lincoln.
On the other hand, the correct principles on which a Government should
control its Commanders in war are exemplified in the highest degree in
those of the elder Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham. To his wisdom and
judgment in conducting operations by sea and land over all the world
must be credited much of the brilliant success of the Seven Years’ War.
He himself defined the object of the operations, but left the method of
attaining it to his Commanders, to whom he allowed a large measure of
latitude and discretion. He never failed to make use of every incentive
which could spur them to action and ensure success. He insisted on the
initiative being taken, and risks run, but he was always as generous
in case of failure as he was appreciative of good work. He succeeded
in inspiring the Admiralty and the War Office with his own spirit
and energy, and seconded their efforts with all the resources of the
country. The lesson which his practice may teach every Government
engaged in war is, that while the Statesmen alone can direct all the
Departments of State, and combine Navy, Army, Diplomacy, and Finance
to the common end, those responsible for the actual operations must be
unfettered in their decisions, and in their method of carrying them out.
_Command_ has in the large armies of the present day become rather a
_Direction of Operations_, differing essentially in character and
execution from the actual _Command of the Troops_. Frederick, Napoleon,
and Wellington _commanded_; Moltke and Oyama _directed_ their armies;
while it was mainly the Prussian and Japanese Division Commanders who
_commanded_ in the true sense in the wars of 1866, 1870, and 1904. Thus
we seldom see Moltke and Oyama on the battlefield, where Napoleon,
Wellington, and Lee were always to be found.
The Subordinate Commander, like the Commander-in-Chief of old times,
differs from the Supreme Commander of to-day by the fact that his
action on his Command is personal and direct. He is in close touch with
his subordinate leaders, knows the condition and spirit of his men, is
always among them in person to inspire and control their movements.
Troops take their tone from their immediate Commander, and reflect his
vigour or hesitation, his confidence or caution. An intuition of his
mental attitude seems to pass through all ranks of the Command. On the
other hand the Army Commanders, and still more the Commander-in-Chief,
are but nebulous figures to the soldiers in a very large Army.
Military Command is exercised in three ways, which differ in character
and scope. The Supreme and Army Commanders prescribe _Instructions_ to
their Subordinate Commanders; the latter issue _Orders_; Commanding
Officers of Units give _Words of Command_. The latter method needs no
comment. The former modes will now be discussed.
INSTRUCTIONS
The system of Command customary before the French Revolution survived
well into the nineteenth century. By it there were issued to each
tactical unit of the Army, Orders containing minute, and even pedantic,
details for carrying out the plan decided on by the Supreme Command.
These details were not only wearisome to peruse, and unnecessary for
experienced subordinates, but the time spent in merely copying and
distributing them was so great, that it had a most prejudicial effect
on the rapidity of the movements of the army. This system may be
said to have greatly contributed to the ill success of the Austrians
in their many wars against Napoleon, owing to the slow and dilatory
movements it entailed.
The dissemination of the French Armies of the Revolution led to the
plan systematized later by Napoleon, of giving short and general
Instructions, prescribing to each Subordinate only his own part in
the dispositions, with, perhaps, some information about the position
of adjoining bodies of troops. This system had a great effect on the
success of the French forces, but it only won its way very gradually
in other armies. It is that now universally adopted; but the modern
practice differs in one respect from that of Napoleon, who seldom
indicated the general object of the movements, no doubt in order to
avoid the danger of its becoming known by the enemy. The tendency is
now to look on the latter danger as less than the evil of imperfect
co-operation. If subordinates do not know the general situation, the
object of the operations, and the position of the enemy, they will
not always be able to act in accordance with the Commander’s purpose.
The size and dispersion of modern armies make the independence of
subordinates far greater than in the days of Napoleon, and have led to
the practice of giving them general information about the situation, so
as to ensure their co-operation to the common end.
_Instructions_ (German _Directiven_) have been defined by the German
General Staff as “Communications to a subordinate Commander intended
less to convey definite Orders for his immediate action than to
indicate leading features for his general guidance, which should
facilitate his judgment as to the subsequent decisions to be taken
independently.” _Instructions_ therefore generally describe the
situation, the operations decided on, and their object, but leave
considerable latitude in the method of carrying out the general plan.
The Subordinate Commanders are expected to act on their own judgment
in furthering the Commander’s purpose, observing the spirit rather
than the letter of their Instructions. For, it should be noticed,
military obedience in the higher ranks does not lie in literal
conformity to Orders, but rather in a true conception of their
spirit. Such obedience is quite compatible with the independence and
self-confidence indispensable in the Subordinate Commander, who has to
act on his own judgment in carrying out Orders. He must take on himself
the responsibility of giving effect to his Instructions by acting
in conformity with the situation of the moment, which may be very
different from the situation as it was when they were issued.
As regards the drafting of Instructions, it must be noted that the
man who can make the best plans is not always the one to express them
best. Napoleon’s brilliant combinations were embodied in Instructions
which were often involved in their sequence, and ill-balanced from the
intrusion of details among the broad outlines of the general plan. They
were also generally so terse that they were not always clear to any
intelligence inferior to his own. Jomini speaks of their “laconisme
outré,” partly due to Napoleon’s temperament, and partly a revolt
against the minute verbiage of the Military Orders of his generation.
Hence the importance of a good Chief of the Staff, who can act for his
General as Berthier did for Napoleon. He need not be a genius nor even
a great strategist, but he must be able to translate into lucid Orders
plans which he could never have originated, or perhaps even, like
Berthier, never fully understand or appreciate.
ORDERS
Subordinate Commanders, although they act with some independence on the
Instructions they themselves receive, do not leave the same latitude to
their own subordinates. They exercise Command by the issue of precise
_Orders_ for executing the idea in the manner they themselves have
decided on. These Orders will contain the substance of the Instructions
they have received, as far as it may be desirable to pass on this
information to their own subordinates. The method proposed to carry out
the general plan will probably need explaining and developing in detail
in the Orders. These will therefore prescribe the definite steps to be
taken, such as the time and direction of marches and attacks, or the
measures to be taken for security. Orders should _not_, as Instructions
often _may_, provide for contingent possibilities. The issuer of an
Order is generally on the spot, and can leave such contingencies to
form the subject of further Orders. But unless a Commander can be
present, and direct the operations himself, he must leave much latitude
to those who have actually to lead the Troops. Without this, the
operations will not always be the most suitable to the conditions of
the moment, and the vigour which is the mainspring of successful action
will suffer.
DIVISION COMMANDERS
During the war with France in 1870 the leading on the part of the
Supreme and Army Commanders left much to be desired, but the way
in which the German Subordinate Commanders worked together was
very striking, and might well be imitated in other armies. Their
co-operation was loyal, unhesitating, complete, and characterized by
initiative and resolution. Holding similar views on fighting, and
animated by the same energy, the German Commanders acted together to
one common end--namely, to beat the enemy.
Subordinate Commanders require to possess moral courage and readiness
to take responsibility, rather than merely physical bravery, while
decision and resolution are essential. There will be a solid foundation
of confidence and moral force in an army whose Divisional Commanders
are so endowed. All Commanders should be brought up in the same school,
and hold similar views on the conduct of war. This is the basis of good
Command, and ensures harmonious co-operation.
LIMITS OF INITIATIVE IN STAFF OFFICERS
There is an essential distinction between the action of _Commanders_
and that of _Staff Officers_ however capable. It is true that Staff
Officers are not mere clerks or messengers. There is often imposed
on them the duty of explaining to the immediate executive agents
the intention of their Chief, so as to solve ambiguities or remedy
misunderstandings, and to create identical views on the situation,
especially if it be rapidly changing. But it is outside the scope of
the Staff to interfere with the exercise of Command--that is, on their
own authority, to urge, or approve, or condemn any particular action on
the part of Subordinate Commanders. To do so is to usurp the function
of their Chief, and to form a lateral interference with the direct
chain of responsibility. Such action commonly leads to a struggle of
conflicting temperaments, contrary to all discipline, and tends to
produce anarchy in the Command.
Only one man can command. It is true that the nominal Commander has
not always been this one man, owing to some physical, intellectual,
or moral deficiency in his character. In that case his action is
necessarily guided by a substitute, who will really inspire the
operations, but whose influence should always be concealed. Even
in this case, however, it is essential that the Chief must rely on
_one_ man only. Should he turn for advice and guidance to more than
one, his action will soon follow divided courses, owing to alternate
predominance of contradictory counsels. Counter-orders will unfailingly
ensue, with the inevitable result, neatly summed up by the French as
“ordre, contre-ordre, désordre.” In War, it is not true that “in a
multitude of counsellors there is wisdom.” We know that “Councils of
War never fight,” and that the greatest Commanders have always regarded
them as a detestable and cowardly subterfuge. Success can never be
expected when, instead of the decision of one, the counsels of many
prevail.
CHAPTER XXIII
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMIES
An Army in action is a special instance of what may be termed a
_dynamic crowd_--that is, an assemblage of men united for common action
and inspired by the same ideas and desires. Throughout history, certain
characteristics have been exhibited by assemblages so united, however
differently they were composed, and no matter under what conditions,
or towards what ends, they were acting. Popular assemblies in epochs
of change, spiritual ebullitions such as have marked the origin, or
revival, of religions, political parties, and even juries, boards, and
committees, all show similar phenomena. But the most striking instances
of dynamic crowds are mobs collected for action. Such mobs have
usually worked harm, when they must be called criminal mobs, but have
often been violent with good intentions, as when the Paris mob took
the Bastille. Other instances of non-criminal mobs actuated by high
enthusiasm are those roused for the First Crusade by Peter the Hermit,
or that incited by Mark Antony, at the funeral of Cæsar, to avenge his
murder.
Of nature akin to crowds are unions of persons holding similar
opinions, even when not actually in touch with each other, or
physically assembled. Such unions have produced, and will yet produce,
some of the greatest changes in history, like the rise of Christianity,
the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Revolution. In
all ages, systems of religious thought have created such dynamic
aggregates, often world-wide and endowed with persistent vitality. The
most striking examples are the unions of nations and races which form
the Mohammedan world, or the Roman Catholic Church.
But a combination of armed men for the purpose of fighting has always
been the commonest and strongest form of organized assemblage. Such a
combination is the highest example of a dynamic crowd, and has effected
the most rapid and striking changes which the world has undergone.
The essential underlying character of a “dynamic crowd” of any sort is
that it possesses _religion_ in the sense defined by a great French
psychologist, as “placing all the resources of the spirit, all the
submission of the will, all the ardour of fanaticism, at the service
of a Cause, which then becomes the guide and end of all the ideas and
actions of the assemblage.”
A crowd may be looked upon as a sort of new composite personality born
of the union of a number of men whose individual qualities will not by
any means represent the character of the crowd they form. The crowd
may be said to have a collective soul which will cause it to act in a
way in which the individuals composing it would not, and indeed could
not, act. This soul is generally inferior to the average character of
the persons forming the crowd, but at times rises to heights impossible
to them. Thus crowds have often committed atrocities from which their
component individuals would have shrunk, but other crowds have shown
incredible enthusiasm and devotion, and performed acts of heroism
and self-sacrifice, to which no individual in them could ever have
risen singly. Examples of the crimes of crowds are patent in history,
but their heroisms also may be found, most of all in the innumerable
instances when troops have faced death without flinching, and thereby
gained victory for their Cause.
The characteristics of crowds may be glanced at. They will be seen to
be analogous to those which animate troops. Crowds act on instinct and
are incapable of reasoning, so that they are essentially irresponsible,
while very easily influenced by suggestion. Their impressions are
extraordinarily infectious, for Man is an imitative animal, and
still more so is Man in bulk. Hence, suggestions spread like fire,
and impressions and tendencies to action are communicated with the
greatest rapidity, for, in a crowd, reason has little influence on the
action, and self-concern, so potent in the individual, is effaced in
the confidence born from a sense of the power of numbers. So we may
note among soldiers at one time the spread of panic, and at another
the not less infectious courage due to combination. Both are capable
of producing striking action for harm or for good, and action quite
impossible for the individual when alone.
All crowds, even those of animals, have an overwhelming craving to
be led. A leader is needed to strike the spark to kindle the mass,
give shape to its idea, and instigate its action. A crowd loves to
adopt a leader to be its despot, and will be obedient and even servile
to him who shows he can command. The leader influences the crowd by
three means--_assertion_, _repetition_, and _example_. All these means
are necessary to implant ideas in an unreasoning mass, and initiate
unanimous action towards their realization. The _assertion_ must be
concise and simple, and should epitomize the ideas which form the
“religion” of the crowd. _Repetition_ is necessary to drive these ideas
home. Reasoning is out of place, and has the worst effect, for crowds
cannot reflect, and are as impatient of appeals to their reason as of
opposition to their desires. The _example_ of the leader exercises a
potent influence. A crowd is easily impressed by his coolness, courage,
self-confidence, determination, and vigour in utterance and action, and
even by his personal appearance.
Leaders are generally men who are themselves carried away by the
ideas they are striving to put in effect, although some have been
calculating, cool, and astute. They are generally men of action, and
action impresses when reason is unavailing. One quality leaders must
have, and that is Will Power. A mere crowd has none, for the will of
the individual becomes effaced when once he is united with his fellows,
and the will of the leader must replace it, flashing out from his
voice and his bearing, and felt in his words and his deeds. But the
crowd will also react strongly on the leader, and may inspire him to
a pitch far above his natural scope, but only on condition that the
leader has among his qualities and his aims some that are germane to
the “religion” of his followers, for the “Soul of the Crowd” to work on.
What has been said of crowds and mobs applies in the main to the
organized and trained mob which has become an army. A mass of soldiers
differs from a mob mainly in the habits acquired by discipline, the
facilities for action afforded by organization, and the ideal of
character which their profession, and their very uniform, suggest to
them to live up to. The discipline of the soldier, if it is to be
worth anything in a crisis, must be so habitual as to be not reasoned,
but instinctive. Under the strain of war, whether due to danger or to
privation, habits can be relied on when reason fails. Discipline is not
only the instinct of obedience, but that of reliance on leaders and
comrades, both factors of enormous value in battle. It is this which
gives troops the advantage over a mob. Psychologically they are both
“dynamic crowds,” but the mob is devoid of the higher qualities which
discipline has implanted in the soldier, and which the influences of
his profession have rendered largely instinctive.
It should be noticed that in crowds, where the individual varieties
of character are lost in the “crowd soul,” the oldest racial
characteristics come out. This is the more so in the moments when
danger inhibits reason, and instinct alone reigns. History teaches us
very clearly how persistent these characteristics are in the people as
a whole, and they are naturally brought out in a high degree by War.
Cæsar tells us that the Gauls “are very courageous and impetuous in
the attack,” and two thousand years later the “_Furia Francese_” is
still their characteristic. A French writer on the wars in Spain talks
of the “_Bulldog Ténacité_” of the British, a quality which has been
attributed to them for centuries.
The reason for this is clear if we suppose that the crowd possesses
the sum of the qualities of its members, for the different individual
qualities of each will bulk but little compared to the huge total of
the qualities common to all, of which the older and deep-rooted race
characteristics will necessarily form a large part.
Thus history shows unmistakably that the military qualities of a nation
change but little with time. The conduct of its soldiers in past wars
is likely, therefore, to be repeated in future fighting, although
organization, training, and leading may differ, and, to some extent,
modify the result.
In the case of an Army, the necessity of Will Power in the leader
cannot be too much emphasized. It is of far more importance than mere
intellect. Will power alone can go far, as we see in the cases of
Charles XII. and Blücher, whereas resolution is apt to be “sicklied
o’er with the pale cast of thought,” where the intellect is more
developed than the will.
Some Military Leaders have been energetic and resolute, but wanting in
continuity of effort, and little capable of thought and reflection.
Of this type were Ney and Murat, amazing in the conflict, heroic in
danger, but, in less inspiring moments, failures. These men need a
greater man to lead them. Such a man, in whom Will Power and Intellect
are both dominant and are equally balanced, constitutes the higher and
rarer type of leader. In him the Will Power is more lasting, if less
fiery; he can reflect, assume responsibility in cold blood, and carry
out long plans in spite of opposition. The rule of such leaders over
their followers is not liable to sudden collapse, but often outlives
failure or ruin. Of such are those who have changed the face of the
world and won undying fame--Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Cromwell,
Napoleon--men whose prestige is not buried in their grave, but still
exercises over living men an influence hardly less real than during
their life.
This prestige, unexplainable as it may be, constitutes the dominating
influence of the leader over his following. Built on success and
renown, it is made up of admiration, love, and sometimes fear, but is
always unreasoned and idolatrous. It is by the domination of prestige
that a leader is able to impress his feelings, his aims, and his will
on those he leads. The exertions to which Hannibal and Napoleon could
compel their men were incredible. A leader is at times obeyed by his
followers as the lion-tamer by his lions, although often with as little
means of coercing them, or even of saving himself from their jaws. Nor
is the effect of prestige limited to the leader’s own following; it
is as much felt by his opponents. Napoleon’s arrival on a battlefield
was, Wellington said, worth a reinforcement of forty thousand men, and
many of his successes in war were due to the fact that his enemies were
frightened by his name, before they began to fight. Probably only two
of his opponents escaped this influence--Blücher, in whom hatred left
no place for fear; and Wellington, who said before the Peninsular War
that he thought he could beat the French because he was not afraid of
them.
The prestige of Hannibal, like that of Nelson, always weakened the
resolution of his foes. Dundonald with one ship chased a Portuguese
squadron from Brazil to Europe. Drake’s very name was an abiding terror
to Spain. “Stonewall” Jackson’s reputation was a constant alarm to
Lincoln and the Federals. Lee’s personality was one of the main factors
in staving off defeat from the South.
When the crisis of her fate arrives, a country can only pray that a
_Leader_ may be granted her. History can teach us that England has
seldom prayed in vain. Cromwell, Marlborough, Clive, Wellington, the
men of the Mutiny, and, above all, the long line of Admirals which
culminates in Nelson, were living answers to her prayers.
APPENDIX A
ORIGIN OF MILITARY TERMS
This chapter is intended to give an explanation of the way in which
military terms--especially those connected with Organization--came to
have their present technical meaning. Their derivation and, in some
cases, the date of their introduction are given. Many of these terms
have been noticed in the body of the text, and their origin mentioned.
They are here collected for facility of reference.
It will be noted that most of our commonest military terms are of
considerable antiquity, and that they are essentially cosmopolitan
words, widespread in use through Western Europe. Most of them were
introduced in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
The terms are arranged alphabetically in four lists:
1. Ranks and Offices.
2. Names of the different varieties of Troops, and of their Units and
Formations.
3. Arms and Accoutrements.
4. Miscellaneous.
1. RANKS AND OFFICES
Adjutant: French _adjudant_; Latin _adjutant-em_--_adjutare_, to
assist. An assistant. An office introduced in the English Army
in 1660.
Bombardier: from _bombard_, old name of a cannon (_bombo et
ardore_, with noise and heat); Latin _bombus_, a humming
noise--_ardor_, heat.
Captain: French _capitaine_; Late Latin _capitan-us_--_caput_,
head. A chief.
Captain-General: name of Commander-in-Chief till Marlborough’s
time. Probably taken from the Spanish _Capitan-General_.
Colonel: French _colonnel_; Italian _colonello_, a little column;
Latin _columna_. Column-leader.
Cornet: French _cornette_, a hornshaped flag for Cavalry; Latin
_cornu_, a horn.
Corporal: Old French _corporal_ (16th cent.); Latin _corporalis_,
belonging to the body, _corpus_; or, by confusion with
_corporalis_, from French _caporal_; Italian _capo di squadra_
or squad-leader, from Latin _caput_, head.
General: _i.e._ general officer, or officer with general command
over all troops, and not over those of his own Arm only.
Généralissime: the Supreme Commander of Armies. A term adopted by
Richelieu, and used in France to-day.
Lance-Sergeant (or Lance-Corporal): from _lanz pesado_ or
dismounted lance, superior to the ordinary infantry with whom
he had perforce to march on foot after losing his horse.
Lieutenant: French _lieu-tenant_; Latin _locum tenens_. A deputy,
of the Captain, the Colonel, or the General.
Major: originally Sergeant-Major (17th cent.).
Major-General: originally Sergeant-Major-General (17th cent.).
Marshal: a farrier. Old French _mareschal_; Low Latin
_mariscalcus_; Teutonic _maraschalk_, from _mara_, a
battle-horse, and _skalk_, a servant.
Officer: French _officier_; Late Latin _officiar-ius_--_officium_.
An office-holder.
Private: _i.e._ a _private_ man, not an officer (used from 16th
cent.).
Quarter-Master: a _quarter_, _i.e._ one-fourth of a locality,
came to mean generally a _district_, and then a _lodging_ for
soldiers assigned to that district.
Rank: French _rang_; Old German _hrang_, a ring, and later a row,
of men.
Sapper: French _sapeur_--_saper_, to dig; Italian _zappa_, a
mattock.
Sergeant: Old French _serjent_, _servjent_, or _servient_; Latin
_servient-em_--_servire_, to serve.
Sergeants-at-Arms (_Servientes ad Arma_) were instituted by Richard
I. during his Syrian campaign as his personal guard.
Soldier: Old French _soldier_; Latin
_soldarius_--_solidarius_--_sold-us_, pay--_solidus_, a solid
piece.
Staff: what the General leans on--a stick; from Aryan root _sta_ =
stand.
Trumpeter: French _trompeteur_. [See Trumpet.]
Yeomen of the Guard: Personal Guard of Henry VII. The first regular
military organization in England (1485).
2. VARIETIES OF TROOPS, AND THEIR UNITS AND FORMATIONS
Ambulance: French _ambulance_, movable hospital; Latin _ambulare_,
to go--_ambi_, around, and root _ba_, go, as in Greek _bainein_.
Army: French _armée_; Latin _armata_, past participle of _armare_,
to arm, an armed force.
Army Corps: German _Armee-Korps_, from French _Corps
d’Armée_--_Corps_ from _corpus_, body.
Artillery: French _artillerie_; Italian _artilleria_, the art of
the _artillarius_, or _articularius_, from _articula_, dim. of
_art-em_. Used for _guns_ 16th cent.; for the _Arm_ 18th cent.
[See Chap. XVII., par. 1.]
Battalion: French; Italian _battaglione_--_battaglia_ (16th cent.).
[See Battle.]
Battery: French _batterie_--_battre_; Late Latin _battere_, beat;
Latin _batu-ere_.
Brigade: French (16th cent.); Spanish _brigade_--_brigar_, to
brawl; Italian _briga_, a quarrel. Hence a body of contesting
troops.
Carbineers: Cavalry armed with the _carabine_. Old French
_calabrin_--_calabre_, war engine, from Low Latin _chatabula_;
Greek _kataball-ein_, throw down.
Cavalry: French _cavallerie_ (16th cent.); Italian _cavalleria_;
Late Latin _caballarius_--_caballus_, a nag.
Column: Latin _columna_, a column, from _columen_--_culmen_,
height--cf. _collis_, hill.
Command: Old French _commander_, to order; Latin _commendare_,
to entrust to one’s charge--later, to order; from _cum_ and
_mandare_, to order.
Commissariat: from commissary, a person entrusted; Latin
_com-mittere_, to commit to.
Company: Old French _compainie_; Late Latin _companio_--_cum pane_,
with bread, _i.e._ a messmate.
Cuirassiers: French _cuirasse_ (15th cent.), from _cuir_; Latin
_corium_, leather.
Dragoons: from carrying a short musket called a dragon. Italian
_dragone_; Latin _draco-n-em_, a dragon.
Echelon: French _échelon_--_échelle_, ladder; Latin _scala_,
step--_scando_, climb.
Engineer (16th cent.): _engynour_ (16th cent.), earlier
_engigneor_; Old French _engineur_; Late Latin _ingeniator_
(used in 12th cent.), from _ingeniare_, from _ingenium_, whence
Engine. [See Chap. XVII., par. 1.]
File: number of men in depth (1598); a row, from French _file_;
Latin _fila_, a thread.
Fusiliers: men armed with the fusil, a firelock (17th cent.). Latin
_focile_, a flint, from _focus_, a hearth-fire.
Gentlemen-at-Arms: originally a band of Horse, created 1509;
subsequently Court Officers.
Grenadiers (late 17th. cent.): men armed with the grenade, invented
1594. Spanish _grenada_, pome-granate, the fruit full of seeds,
from Latin _granum_, grain.
Guards: soldiers who guard the Sovereign. Guard, French _garde_,
is the Teutonic _ward_, from _war_, to defend, connected with
_ware_ and _wary_.
Hussars: Hungarian _Huszar_, from _Husz_, twenty. Every twentieth
man served in the Light Cavalry on the Turkish frontier.
Infantry: French _infanterie_; Italian _infanteria_; Latin
_infant-em_, child (16th cent.), _i.e._ one who cannot
speak--_in_, not, _fari_, speak.
Lancers: men armed with the lance. French _lance_; Latin _lancea_;
Greek _lonche_.
Line: French _ligne_; Latin _linea_, a line or string--_linum_,
flax.
Musketeers: men armed with the Musket, which see.
Ordnance Corps: the R.A. and R.E., which were controlled by the
Master-General of the Ordnance, an officer created as early as
1414.
Patrol (late 17th cent.) French _patrouille_:
(1539)--_patrouiller_, to paddle in mud--Old French _patoueil_,
mud.
Platoon: French _peloton_, a little ball--_pelote_, a small bundle;
Latin _pila_, a ball.
Rear: Old French _riere_, behind; Latin _retro_, back.
Regiment: French _régiment_, rule; Latin _regiment-um_--_regere_,
rule.
Rifles: a body of soldiers armed with rifles. Rifle is short for
rifled gun; to rifle means to groove--_rive_, to tear.
Squad: French _escouade_; Italian _squadra_, a square; Latin
_ex-quadra-re_, to square, from _quatuor_, four.
Squadron: from Italian _squadrone_, a large square. [See Squad.]
Train: French _train_; Old French _trahiner_, to trail; Low Latin
_trahin-are_, from _trah-ere_, to draw.
Troop: French _troupe_, connected with root of _drive_, German
_treiben_, a drove; Italian _truppa_, by some connected with
Latin _turba_, a crowd, by a not uncommon process of bringing
the “r” before the vowel [cf. _brent_, burnt].
Vanguard: shortened to van; Old French _avant garde_--_avant_ is
Latin _ab-ante_, from in front. [See Guard.]
3. ARMS AND ACCOUTREMENTS
Accoutrements: French _accoutrement_; _accoutre_--_ad_, to, and
_coutre_, from Latin _custos_, keeper.
Ammunition: store for defence. Latin _ad-munition-em_--_munire_,
fortify, defend.
Arms: French _armes_; Latin _arma_.
Arsenal: _arx navalis_, naval citadel, or from an Arabic word.
Ball: French _balle_; Old German _bal_, from a Teutonic root found
in _bulge_, bole.
Bayonet: French _baïonnette_, from Bayonne, where first made.
Belt: Anglo-Saxon _belt_; Irish _balt_--from which Latin _balteus_,
a belt, probably derived.
Bullet: French _boulet_, a little ball--_boule_, a ball; Latin
_bulla_, a knob.
Cannon: _i.e._ the gun-barrel; Latin _canna_, a hollow cane.
Carbine: see Carbineers.
Carriage: Old French _charrier_, or _carier_, to carry. [See Cart.]
Cart: dim. of _car_; French _charette_; Old French _carete_; Low
Latin _careta_--_carrus_, a car.
Cartridge: corruption of _cartrage_; French _cartouche_, a charge
wrapped up in a cornet of paper; Latin _carta_, paper.
Cuirass: see Cuirassiers.
Equip: Old French _esquiper_, to equip; Norse _skipa_, to arrange,
shape.
Gun: Old English _gonne_; Welsh _gwn_; Gaelic _gunna_. Derivation
unknown, perhaps from Old French _mangonel_; dim. of Latin
_mangonum_, Greek _mangonon_, a war machine.
Halberd or Halbard: a long-handled weapon; _helve_ or handle;
_barde_, axe.
Haversack (used in 18th cent.): from German _haver-sack_, sack for
oats.
Helmet: Anglo-Saxon _helm_; Teutonic root _hal_ or _kal_, to cover.
Howitzer: German _hautbitze_ (so written by Gen. Wolfe about 1750),
older _hauffnitz_, from _haufnice_, a sling. A Czech word of
time of the Hussites (15th cent.).
Magazine: storehouse. Spanish _magacen_; Arabic _makhzan_,
storehouse.
Matross: old word for a gunner. German _matrose_; Latin _matarius_,
a man who uses a mat or hammock.
Mortar: called from resemblance to apothecary’s mortar. Old French
_mortier_; Latin _mortarium_, from _martulus_, a hammer.
Musket: French _musquet_, from the Spanish, meaning a sparrow-hawk,
probably from Latin _musca_, fly, as being the smallest of
hawks. First used for the firearm, 16th cent.
Ordnance = Artillery, from the _ordinance_ to regulate calibre and
size of guns (15th cent.).
Pistol: from the city of Pistoia in Italy, where made (early 16th
cent.).
Pontoon: French _ponton_; Italian _pontone_, a great bridge; Latin
_pont-em_, bridge.
Pouch: Old French _pouche_--_poche_, pocket; Celtic _poca_, a bag.
Shell: Anglo-Saxon _scell_, a thin covering; Teutonic root _skal_,
to separate, peel off; a hollow ball.
Shrapnel: a shell with balls inside, invented by General Shrapnel,
British Army (early 19th cent.).
4. MISCELLANEOUS
Base: area on which army relies for supplies and reinforcements.
Formed from analogy with the base of a triangle, by the German
military writer, Willisen, 1820. Greek _basis_--_bai-no_, go.
Battle: French _bataille_; Italian _bataglia_; Late Latin
_battalia_, _batt-ere_, from Latin _batu-ere_, to beat.
Billet: French _billet_, a ticket for quarters; hence the quarters
themselves.
Bivouac: German _bewachen_, to watch.
Bugle; short for bugle-horn, the horn of the bugle or wild ox. Old
French _bugle_; Latin _buculus_, dim. of _bos_, ox, a bullock.
Camp: French _camp_; Latin _campus_, field.
Colours: first use temp. Elizabeth for military flags, because of
their gay colours. French _couleur_; Latin _color_.
Communications (used by military writers in 19th cent.): Latin
_communicare_, _communis_, common.
Condottieri: Italian mercenaries. Latin _conductitii_, led men.
Crew: or detachment working a gun, from French _crue_, from
_croître_, to grow.
Drum: from Teutonic _trom_.
Fife: Old German _pfifa_, a pipe.
Logistics: French _logistique_; what are now called Staff duties,
from _logis_, quarters, _i.e._ the Q.M.G.’s duties.
Order: French _ordre_; Latin _ordin-em_.
Parade: Spanish _parada_, ready, or adorned, from _parar_, to get
ready, to adorn, also to parry; Latin _parare_, to prepare.
Brought from the Netherlands to England in 1625.
Reconnoitre: French, to make oneself acquainted with--_connaître_;
Latin _cognoscere_, know.
Strategy: Greek _strategos_, a general--_stratos_, army--_ago_,
lead. The art of the General.
Tactics: Greek _taktike_ (_techne_), _tasso_, arrange. The tactical
art, or art of drawing up soldiers for battle.
Trumpet: French _trompette_, dim. of _trompe_; Spanish _trompa_,
perhaps from Latin _tuba_.
War: Teutonic _werre_, strife, connected with _worse_, and German
_wirren_, confuse.
APPENDIX B
REMARKS ON MILITARY NOMENCLATURE
In any Science the first step towards systematizing it is to form a
definite terminology on systematic lines. Nor is this mere pedantry.
Words are the expressions of thought; without defined terms there can
be no clear thinking.
None can have read much, or written at all, on military matters
without noticing the unsatisfactory nature of many of the terms used.
Few are short, crisp, and definite, like _Troop_, _Squad_, _Staff_.
Compare these with _Regiment_, _Division_, _Artillery_. Confusion
also constantly arises from the indeterminate meanings of words like
_Commander_, _Section_, _Brigade_, _Unit_.
Other words are cumbrous, like _Medical Services_ (or _Officer_),
_Mounted Infantry_, _Ammunition Column_, _Lines of Communication_,
_Mounted Brigade_, _Veterinary Services_ (or _Officer_). Some single
words are urgently needed instead of these.
In British Establishments, simplification would result if there were
one word for _Drummers_, _Buglers_, and _Trumpeters_, and one for all
personnel except Officers. _Dismounted men_ is a poor name for men who
were never mounted.
The organization of Artillery cries out for some systematized terms.
_Field Artillery_ includes in foreign armies the batteries of Field
Guns, Howitzers, and Horse Artillery, but is generally used for those
of Field Guns only. A general word to include guns and howitzers is
needed. _Wagon_ is used for transport wagons and ammunition wagons,
and a single word for the latter is much needed; the American word
_caisson_, or the old English _tumbril_, might be used. A better
word is wanted for _Machine-Gun_, which is not a gun, but a rifle.
_Divisional Artillery_, a unit of several Brigades under a General,
might have a special name. _Divisional Ammunition Column_ seems a very
long term when writing Orders.
_Cavalry_ and _Infantry_ might well be usually replaced by _Horse_ and
_Foot_. The words _Troop_ and _Squadron_ might be used without the
addition of “Cavalry,” as indeed _Company_ and _Battalion_ without
adding “Infantry.” It would be convenient if, in the British Service at
any rate, the word _Regiment_ always connoted Horse, to avoid adding
“Cavalry,” just as Battalion connotes Foot.
Turning to ranks of Officers, the word _General_ might be used instead
of _G.O.C._ The term _Commander_ is used indiscriminately, and might
be confined to Subordinate Commanders of Corps and Divisions, leaving
_Commander-in-Chief_ for the Army Command, with _Supreme Commander_
where there are several Armies. A single word for the _Divisional
Commander_ would be convenient, like _Brigadier_ for the Brigade
Commander. _Commanding Officer_ should always imply the C.O. of a
Cavalry Regiment, Infantry Battalion, or Artillery Brigade, and might
be rendered, as in French, by the word _Chief_. The word _Captain_ does
not imply the important and similar functions of the Squadron, Company,
and Battery _Leader_, who is often a Major; and the word _Leader_
might be adopted. The good old words “Cornet” and “Ensign” might be
reintroduced.
_D.A.A.G._ and _D.A.Q.M.G._ are deplorable titles, as are also
_Inspector-General of Communications_ and _Commander of Lines of
Communication Defences_.
We have _Gunner_, _Driver_, and _Sapper_; why should not _Trooper_ be
officially used for private of Cavalry?
It would be convenient if the word _Train_ were officially used for all
the non-fighting Trains.
Now that the whole force of a great nation includes several Armies,
it is desirable to have a separate word for the whole _Army_. Perhaps
_Host_?
A short word (like _Base_) is much needed for the _L. of C._ and the
_Advanced Base_. Perhaps _Rear-Routes_ and _Fore-Base_ might be used?
A better word for _Advanced Guard_ would be _Foreguard_, on the analogy
of Rear-Guard and Vanguard. The cumbrous expression “Commander of the
Advanced Guard” might then be replaced by _Foreguard Chief_.
The awkward French word _depôt_ (with its accent) might be replaced by
the Old English word _stow_, which we find surviving in place-names,
where it meant a military depôt during the English conquest of Britain.
The importance of shortening and defining military terms does not rest
only on the convenience of writers and readers. The advantage in saving
time, and conducing to lucidity, cannot be overestimated when Orders
are to be written and read, often under difficulties and in a hurry.
A scientific system of Military Terminology would thus prove of
real value in war. The above observations are made in order to call
attention to this matter, in the hope that official action may one day
lead to a more logical system of military terms.
_Printed and bound by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and
Aylesbury._
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Page 84: In this eBook, the table uses a Key in order to minimize
the width of the columns. In the original book, the column headings
appeared within the columns.
Page 183: “The Regiment was 100 strong“ probably should be “1000“.