ORGANIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
ORGANIZATION IN THE WARS FOLLOWING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
At the close of the eighteenth century, during the wars brought on
by the French Revolution, a great change in organization took place.
France, with her old army shattered by the Revolution, was suddenly
obliged to raise enormous numbers of troops to defend herself against
the onslaught of Europe. When, with unparalleled courage and energy,
she had stemmed the flood of invasion, a number of French armies at
once took the offensive, and carried the war beyond her frontiers in
every direction for the next twenty years.
DIVISIONS
The size of the armies, and the area covered by them, made it
impossible for the Commander to exercise personal control over his
whole force, especially as the absence of a system of supply entailed
wide dispersion for subsistence on the country invaded. It became
necessary to appoint independent Generals to command the scattered
fractions of the Army, often operating at a distance from each other.
This arrangement was instituted by Carnot in the early wars of the
Revolution.
It thus came about that the Army was _divided_ into separate portions,
which were naturally termed its _Divisions_, a designation which was
retained when they became permanent organizations, and exists in all
armies to this day.
These _Divisions_ consisted mainly of Infantry, but some Light Cavalry
and Artillery were attached to them, so as to make them capable of the
independent action demanded by the increased extent of the theatre of
war and of the battlefields.
The Division comprised generally 12 Battalions of Infantry, 4 to
8 Squadrons, and 8 to 12 guns, with the necessary administrative
services, making a total of some 10,000 to 12,000 in all, under command
of a General Officer.
The Infantry was formed in what were termed _Demi-Brigades_ of 3
Battalions, which reverted to the name of _Regiments_ in 1803. These
comprised one Battalion of regulars from the old Royal Army, and two
of Volunteers. Each Battalion had 9 Companies, each about 120 strong;
one being of Grenadiers, and two of Light Infantry. The Battalions were
numbered, their old army name being dropped. The Cavalry Regiments
were of 4 Squadrons, each 150 to 200 strong. The practice of living
on the country allowed the transport train to be greatly reduced,
especially as tents were discarded, and the troops always bivouacked,
when not billeted. Company officers were allowed no bât animals for
their baggage. By these measures the mobility of the army was greatly
increased.
This divisional organization was adopted by Austria in 1805, by Prussia
in 1806, and by Russia in 1807; we find it in the British Army in the
Peninsula in 1808, when the Divisions were formed of 2 Brigades of 3 or
4 Battalions each, with 1 or 2 Batteries, and often a Rifle Battalion.
CORPS D’ARMÉE (ARMY CORPS)
The power of independent action thus conferred on these Divisions,
which were in fact miniature armies, led to a want of concert in their
movements, and of co-ordination in their action, while at the same
time, as Armies increased in size, the number of Divisions became too
great for the Commander-in-Chief to control properly.
An attempt to remedy these drawbacks was made in 1800 by Moreau, when
planning his invasion of South Germany. He grouped his Divisions into
two Wings and a Centre, which he placed under three senior Generals,
while retaining a Reserve of four Divisions in his own hand. Each
Division was either 5,000 or 10,000 strong, and 3 or 4 of them, with 6
guns per 5,000 men, and a Cavalry Division of 2,000 or 3,000, formed
virtually a Corps d’Armée, 20,000 to 30,000 strong.
Bonaparte, when First Consul, grasping the desirability of this
arrangement for large armies, introduced a permanent organization by
Corps d’Armée.
In this manner was organized the army assembled at Boulogne, in 1804,
for the invasion of England. This formed the famous “Grande Armée,”
which overcame Austria, Prussia, and Russia in three great wars during
the succeeding three years, and formed the model of organization for
the later armies of France, and eventually for those of all the great
Powers of Europe.
The Napoleonic Army Corps was commanded by a Lieutenant-General or a
Marshal. Its size depended on the capacity of its Commander, and varied
from 2 to 4 Divisions, each of 2 or 3 Brigades of 2 Regiments of 3
Battalions. A Battalion had 6 Companies, or sometimes 9, and was 700 to
1,000 strong. A Cavalry Regiment had 4 or 5 Squadrons, of 150 to 200
men.
DETAILS OF NAPOLEON’S ORGANIZATION
In 1805, light companies, or _Voltigeurs_, were added to Battalions
for skirmishing duties, thus relieving the Grenadier Companies from
this work. Napoleon then detached the latter from their Battalions to
form a _Grenadier Corps_ as an Army Reserve, to which all the Voltigeur
companies were afterwards added.
In 1808, in the first French army sent to Spain, the Brigades were of 2
or sometimes 3 Regiments, or 6,000 to 10,000 strong. The Companies had
become increased up to 140 men, but their number was only six when the
Grenadier and the two Voltigeur Companies had been detached.
The Cavalry not allotted to Divisions of Infantry was formed into
Divisions of 2 or 3 Brigades, those of Light Cavalry being attached
to Army Corps, while the Heavy Cavalry Divisions formed the _Cavalry
Reserve_. This was practically a Cavalry Corps of 4 Divisions, with 2
Batteries of Horse Artillery, or 20,000 in all. Its function was to
enable Napoleon to influence the battle by the decisive effect of an
overwhelming mass of Cavalry, as well as to furnish a body of Cavalry
under one command for action well to the front of the Army during its
advance--in fact, to perform the duty of Independent Cavalry of to-day.
The Artillery not allotted to Army Corps was similarly formed into one
body called the _Reserve Artillery_, under Napoleon’s own Orders. This
was used in one mass against the centre of the enemy’s line, where
Napoleon intended to launch his main attack.
He invariably kept the Reserve Army Corps, as well as the Cavalry and
Artillery Reserve, in his own hands, for decisive action at the crucial
moment of the battle.
These Army Corps were soon imitated by Prussia after 1806, by
Austria before 1809, and by Russia by 1812, and became the permanent
organization of the first two nations down to this day; but it was not
definitely adopted by Russia until the close of the nineteenth century.
In the Civil War in the United States both sides adopted Army Corps,
which the size of their armies rendered desirable.
STRENGTH OF ARMY CORPS
The strength of Napoleon’s Army Corps was very variable. In the Grande
Armée it was at first 2 or 3 Divisions of 2 or 3 Brigades, with 1
Cavalry Division, or from 19,000 to 30,000 in all. The Cavalry Corps
was of 20,000 with 2 Horse Artillery Batteries.
In later campaigns the Army Corps grew larger, and their strength
varied with the quality of their Commander.
In 1809 they were of 30,000 to 40,000 men, and one was of 4 Divisions
with 60,000. In 1812 the French Corps varied from 30,000 to 70,000,
the largest having 5 Divisions; but the Corps of the foreign allies
were less than 25,000 strong. There were four Cavalry Corps, each of
28 Squadrons of Light Cavalry, 16 of Cuirassiers, and 16 of Dragoons.
In 1813 the French Corps varied from 20,000 to 50,000, and the Cavalry
Corps from 10,000 to 16,000. In 1815 the Corps were from 16,000 to
24,000 strong, and the Cavalry Corps was in 4 Divisions. Throughout
these campaigns most of the Army Corps had a Cavalry Division attached
to them.
Since Napoleon’s time the organization of the French Army has been on
similar lines.
In the war with Austria in 1859 the Army Corps had 2 Divisions, each of
2 Brigades, or 18 to 20 Battalions, with 40 to 56 guns.
In 1870 the Army Corps were of 3 Divisions with a Light Cavalry
Division of 2 Brigades. Those commanded by a Marshal had 4 Divisions
and a Cavalry Division of 4 Brigades. The Artillery with each Division
consisted of 3 Field Batteries and 1 of Mitrailleuses; the Corps
Artillery of 5 Batteries. As in Napoleon’s armies, there were Reserve
Divisions of Heavy Cavalry, comprising 2 Brigades of 2 Regiments,
with 2 Batteries of Horse Artillery. One evil of this organization
was that the Light Cavalry Divisions kept close to their Army Corps,
and the distant reconnoitring for the whole army fell to the Reserve
Heavy Divisions, which were unsuited to this duty, and were often kept
actually in reserve.
PRUSSIAN ORGANIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The Divisional organization was introduced just before the campaign of
Jena in 1806, when the Division had 10 to 12 Battalions, 15 Squadrons,
and 24 to 30 guns. By 1813, in the War of Liberation, Army Corps of 4
Brigades had replaced the Division. The Brigade was a mixed one of all
Arms, and comprised 2 Regiments, or 6 Battalions, and 1 Battalion of
Grenadiers formed by massing the Grenadier Companies of the Battalions.
There were allotted to the Brigades 3 Regiments of Cavalry and 2
Batteries of 8 guns each.
In 1815, in the Waterloo campaign, we find a similar organization, but
the Brigades were of 3 Regiments, and dearth of Cavalry and Artillery
only allowed 2 Squadrons, and 1 Battery of 8 guns, for each Brigade.
The mistake of the Prussian organization in the Napoleonic Wars was
that the whole of the Cavalry and Artillery were split up among the
Brigades, and there was no body of either to oppose the massed Horse
and guns of Napoleon’s Reserve, which he threw into action at the
crucial moment with overpowering effect. This error was corrected, and
after Waterloo the Army Corps comprised 3 Divisions which represented
the old Brigades, and a Cavalry Division of 2 Brigades of 2 Regiments
each, with 2 Horse Artillery Batteries. In 1853 the Army Corps was
organized in its modern shape in 2 Divisions, of 2 Brigades, of 2
Regiments, with 1 Cavalry Regiment; but it had only 4 Batteries, or 32
guns, with each Division, and no Corps Artillery.
In 1860 the Field Batteries, which had until then 8 guns, were reduced
to their present strength of 6 guns.
The experience gained in 1866 caused considerable modification in
organization to be made before the war of 1870 broke out. The Reserve
Artillery was abolished, and divided among the Army Corps, thus forming
“Corps Artillery” of 7 Batteries. The 5th Squadron of Cavalry was made
into a depôt, and Regiments took the field in 1870 with 4 Squadrons
only, as at present. The Reserve Cavalry was abolished, and Cavalry
Divisions formed. These were attached, not to Army Corps as in France,
but to Armies, being intended for reconnaissance far to the front.
Of recent years the Corps Artillery has been abolished, and the
Batteries comprising it are distributed among the two Divisions, so as
to increase the co-operation of the Artillery with the Infantry.
PROPORTIONS OF THE ARMS
CAVALRY AND INFANTRY
In the sixteenth century the Horse outnumbered the Foot, but in the
Thirty Years’ War they were roughly equal. In the English Civil War,
and later in the seventeenth century, the Infantry began to outnumber
the Cavalry, and in the eighteenth century the proportion of Foot to
Horse rose, till it was in the proportion of 3, or even 4 to 1, and in
the Napoleonic Wars, of 6 or 8 to 1.
In the nineteenth century, when armies became much larger, the
proportion of Infantry to Cavalry increased still more, owing to the
expense of the latter Arm, and the longer training it needed, till in
1870 it was 10 to 1 in the French Army, and 13 to 1 in the German. It
is still 13 to 1 in the German Army, but only 16 to 1 in the French.
GUNS AND INFANTRY
The number of guns was small till the close of the seventeenth century;
in the armies of Maurice it was 1 gun to 1,000 Infantry, a proportion
which Gustavus raised considerably. In Marlborough’s army it was over
3 per 1,000. The number of guns to 1,000 Infantry rose during the
eighteenth century, till it became 4 or even 5 in the later armies of
Frederick the Great; but it was only 3 or 4 in the larger armies of
the Napoleonic Wars. In 1866 there were 6 guns per 1,000 Infantry in
the Austrian Army, and 5 in the Prussian; in 1870, 3 to 4 guns in the
German Army, and 3 in the French. There are at present 6 guns per 1,000
Infantry in the German Army, and slightly more in the British, but
rather less in the other armies.