INTRODUCTION.

Faith is the implicit and absolute belief in the truth of the

communication made to us and in the trustworthiness of him who makes it

to us. The child has faith in its parents that their wishes or commands

are for its good; the pupil in his teachers that they impart correct

knowledge; we have faith in our friends that they have no intention to

deceive us; in the men of science and learning that the results of

their researches may be accepted as well established. In all these

cases the faith is but imperfect and of a relative and temporary

character. Time, investigation, and extended observation and knowledge

may either confirm the contents of our faith or may convince us that we

have been in error. This is not the case with religious faith. It keeps

within the boundaries of its own domain and does not encroach on that

of the senses and of reason. Whatever can be known by means of

scientific research and thorough investigation we need not accept on

faith. Religion—I have, of course, our own religion, the Jewish, in

mind—does not only not forbid such examination, but even encourages it.

Thus we read in the Book of Proverbs, “A fool believeth every word, but

the prudent man looketh well to his going” (xiv. 15). For this purpose

God has given us intellectual faculties that we should employ them in

our search for truth. At the same time, however, He has set limits to

our faculties, and there are things which are beyond these limits,

being nistaroth, “things hidden” from our senses, whose existence has

been made known to us through the grace of God, by such means as His

infinite wisdom determined. We search and investigate, examine and

demonstrate, within the sphere of our senses; but all that is beyond

their reach belongs to the nistaroth, the knowledge of which can only

be imparted to us directly by the Almighty, or indirectly by those to

whom they have been communicated by Him. Our belief with regard to

these nistaroth may be supported or strengthened by philosophical or

dialectical arguments, but can never be proved by mathematical or

logical demonstration.

The sources from which we derive our knowledge of these nistaroth are

Revelation and Tradition. God reveals things otherwise unknown to man

to such persons or to such a generation as His wisdom chooses, and from

those thus privileged the knowledge spreads to the rest of mankind by

means of Tradition. In addition to these two sources there is a third

one in ourselves: God implanted in our souls certain ideas common to

all of us as essential elements of our inner life, and these ideas form

to some extent the basis of our faith. Such is, e.g., the idea of an

all-powerful Being, God, who is the source and origin of everything in

existence.

There is no real conflict between faith and reason. It may sometimes

seem as if there were such a conflict, and we then naturally begin to

doubt. In such cases the truth of our faith may be doubted, but the

correctness of our reasoning is no less subject to doubt. We may have

erroneously included in our faith beliefs which do not belong to it,

and on becoming aware that they are contrary to reason, we cast them

aside without the least injury to our faith. On the other hand, our

reason is not perfect; we frequently discover mistakes in our arguments

and conclusions, and reject opinions which we hitherto have considered

as firmly established.

Through patient and thorough investigation of our doubts, without

over-estimation of our reasoning faculties, we shall be able to settle

the seeming conflict between reason and faith in a satisfactory manner.

The examination of our doubts will prove that none of the truths which

the Almighty revealed to mankind are contrary to reason.

In this way we are enabled to separate from our faith all elements that

in reality are foreign to it; we shall be able to distinguish between

faith and superstition. The latter consists of erroneous notions and

beliefs which can be tested and subjected to the ordinary means of

inquiry. Superstition is not tolerated by true religion; strict

adherence to the teachings of our holy religion is the best check to

superstitious beliefs.

The importance which the Bible attaches to implicit faith in God and

His word may be gathered from the following passages:—

“And he (Abraham) believed in the Lord, and He reckoned it to him as

righteousness” (Gen. xv. 6). The Hebrew for “righteousness” is in the

original ‏צדקה‎ which is used in the Bible as the sum-total of

everything good and noble in man’s life.

When the Israelites had crossed the Red Sea, it is said of them: “And

Israel saw the great work which the Lord did upon the Egyptians, and

the people feared the Lord: and they believed in the Lord, and in Moses

His servant” (Exod. xiv. 31).

Again, when Moses and Aaron had sinned at the waters of Meribah by

striking the rock instead of speaking to it, they were rebuked for want

of ‏אמונה‎ “faith,” in the following words: “Because ye believed not in

me (‏לא האמנתם בי‎) to sanctify me in the eyes of the children of

Israel, therefore ye shall not bring this assembly into the land which

I have given them” (Numb. xx. 12).

When Moses in his song ‏האזינו‎ blamed the Israelites for their evil

doings, he called them “children in whom there is no faith” ‏אמון‎

(Deut. xxxii. 20).

King Jehoshaphat, addressing the army before the battle, says: “Have

faith in the Lord and you will be safe; have confidence in His prophets

and you will succeed” (2 Chron. xx. 20).

In the same sense Isaiah says to King Ahaz: “If you have no faith,

surely you will not be safe” (Isa. vii. 9).

Also Jeremiah, speaking of Israel’s disobedience to the word of God,

exclaims: “The faith, ‏האמונה‎ is perished, and it is cut off from

their mouth” (Jer. vii. 28).

The prophet Habakkuk, praying to God for an explanation why evil-doers

succeed and prosper, receives the divine answer: “The righteous shall

live by his faith” ‏וצדיק באמונתו יחיה‎ (Hab. ii. 4); and when Hosea

predicts the future redemption of Israel, he tells them in the name of

God, “And I will betroth thee unto me by faith” ‏וארשתיך לי באמונה‎

(Hos. ii. 22).

Our teachers, the sages and rabbis, who succeeded the prophets, have

been equally emphatic in commending religious faith. The following are

a few of their sayings concerning faith:—

“Great is the merit of faith. Through their faith in the Creator of the

universe the Israelites were inspired by the holy spirit, and were

enabled to sing praises to the Lord.” “Faith in the Lord was the source

of all the temporal and eternal blessings which were bestowed upon

Abraham; it gave him the enjoyment of this world and the world to

come.” “When the Psalmist says: ‘This gate leads to the Lord; righteous

people (‏צדיקים‎) shall come in through it,’ he denoted by the term

‘righteous’ those who possess faith in God” (Yalkut on Ex. xiv. 31).

In spite of the fact that the Torah and the prophets most emphatically

declare faith ‏אמונה‎ to be a very essential element in Judaism, it

does not seem to have the same importance in the writings of Jewish

theologians and philosophers, some of whom have endeavoured to

substitute reasoning and logical arguments for simple faith, and to

rebuild upon scientific research the religious edifice erected on the

foundation of faith. The following are the utterances of the principal

Jewish theologians since the close of the Talmud on the relation

between faith and reason:—

The Gaon Saadiah of Fayyum wrote a book on creeds and religious beliefs

(‏אמאנאת ואעתקאד־אמונות ודעות‎). In the Introduction to this work the

philosopher describes the causes of human error and doubt, and assumes

four classes of believers. There are, first, those who recognise the

truth found by them, cling to it, and are happy in it. There are,

secondly, those who have the true principle before them, but do not

recognise it, doubt its correctness, and abandon it again. The third

class includes those who adopt an opinion without having recognised it

as true; they mistake falsehood for truth. The last division consists

of those who form no definite opinion, but remain continually in an

unsettled state of mind. Saadiah is anxious to see at least his

co-religionists in the first class, and his work was intended to help

them towards this end.

According to Saadiah, belief or faith must be an integral part of our

soul; the various truths which form the faith are stored up in the soul

as in a repository, completely ready for use whenever required. It is,

however, possible that we store up opinions as true which are false.

Tests must be applied to each opinion in order to ascertain its right

character. Three of the tests are of a general nature, but the fourth

has its force only for us, the believers in the truth of the Holy

Writings. The first three tests will show us whether a certain opinion

is confirmed or contradicted by our senses, by our innate ideas, or by

our logical reasoning. In addition to these we possess a fourth test in

the trustworthy communication (‏הגדה הנאמנת‎), i.e., the contents of

Holy Writ and Tradition. Holy Writ recognises the necessity of the

three general tests, and frequently exhorts us to apply them. On the

other hand, Saadiah is convinced that the contents of Holy Writ and

Tradition are never contradicted, but in many cases are confirmed by

these tests. Such confirmation is in reality superfluous; but the human

mind feels more at ease when it finds that the teaching of Holy Writ is

supported by other proofs. Besides, attacks on the Bible come

frequently from these tests, and it is therefore useful to learn how to

refute them. According to Saadiah, the truth taught in the Bible can

never be contradicted by the results of scientific or philosophical

research.

Thus to Saadiah philosophy and science are mere luxuries, and cannot be

considered as handmaids to the Torah. They are not studied on account

of their intrinsic value or as helps for the understanding of Holy

Writ, but merely for the purpose of procuring proper weapons for

theological warfare, or of superadding the conviction that what is

known to us from the most trustworthy source is confirmed from other

less reliable sources.

The poet and philosopher Solomon ibn Gabirol, who is lost in enthusiasm

in contemplating the powers of the human soul, humbly acknowledges that

it was his faith that saved him from fall and ruin. Referring to man’s

faculty of acquiring knowledge, he says in his “Royal Crown” ‏כתר

מלכות‎: “Who can comprehend Thy wisdom in giving to the soul the

faculty of acquiring knowledge, on which her existence depends,

knowledge being her foundation? She is permanent and immortal in the

same measure as her foundation is well established.” But, reflecting on

human weakness, he expresses his feeling of gratitude to the Creator

for His guidance in the following words: “Thou hast done yet more for

me. Thou hast implanted in my heart a perfect faith, so that I believe

in Thee as the true God, and in Thy prophets as true prophets; Thou

hast not cast my lot among those that rebel against Thee, or among

those who provoke Thy name, despise Thy Law, attack Thy servants, and

disbelieve Thy prophets.” Knowledge—philosophy and science—is the very

essence, the immortal element of the soul, and yet without the Word of

God man would go astray and be lost.

The boundaries between faith and reason are more distinctly set forth

in the Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah by Dunash ben Tamim (ed. L. Dukes

in Shire Shelomoh, i. p. vi. seq.): “All these beings above and below

have been created by God, and it is within the province of man to

explore and to examine all of them; but he must not pass beyond these

boundaries to investigate into the essence of God; ‘for in the city of

his refuge shall he dwell,’ and ‘if he goeth out of his place, and the

avenger of blood smite him, he hath no remedy.’ Besides, wisdom and

science acknowledge that man is unable to comprehend by his own

intellect anything that exists outside the sphere of created beings.”

R. Bachya, son of Joseph hassephardi, who lived in the eleventh

century, treats, in the Introduction to his “Duties of the Heart,” of

the three sources of human knowledge—Holy Writ, Tradition, and Reason.

Bachya is fully convinced that the knowledge derived from the first two

sources is complete and correct. “If you are a man endowed with

knowledge and reason, and are able to demonstrate the principles of

your belief and your religious practice, which you have been taught by

the Sages in the name of the prophets, it is your duty to do so, and to

let reason confirm what Tradition teaches. If you abstain from

attempting this investigation, you neglect your duty towards your

Creator.”

Still more emphatic is Shem-tob ibn Palqera in demanding the right of

free inquiry into everything taught by Revelation and Tradition. In a

dialogue between the believer and the inquirer (Hammebhakkesh) the

former is represented as ignorant of everything our mind desires to

know; whilst the wise man, who combines belief and confidence in

Tradition with the right use of his reason, knows how to satisfy the

inquirer, and lays down the rule, “Let the study of the Torah be the

foundation, and the study of other things secondary; believe nothing

that is not proved by reason or by God” (i.e., by the word of

Revelation).

R. Abraham ben David, in Emunah ramah: “Because three out of four

scholars (R. Akiba, Ben-azai, Ben-zoma, and Elisha) were unsuccessful

in their philosophical researches, therefore many turn their backs upon

science, and in consequence of this neglect they remain ignorant of the

chief principles of our religion.” The object of his book is to

reconcile religion and science.

R. Judah hallevi, in his “Kuzari,” endeavours to convince the Kuzarite

king of the truth of the Jewish religion by philosophical arguments,

but gives unhesitatingly the preference and the higher authority to

Divine revelation. He is convinced that reason or philosophical

argument could never refute any principle taught in the Law. He says:

“Prophecy is certainly stronger than logical inference.”

R. Abraham ibn Ezra believes that man’s intellectual faculties are

insufficient to solve all transcendental problems; thus, e.g., the

nature of the spirit of man is unknown to most, and is only

comprehended by him “whose thoughts are weighed in the balance of

reason, and are established on the four elements of wisdom, viz., the

three R’s: reading, writing, and reckoning; (in Hebrew, the three ‏ס‎:

‏סְפָר סֵפֶר סִפּוּר‎) and the Divine Law.” Ibn Ezra recommends the study of

science, united with the belief in Divine revelation. “The Torah,” Ibn

Ezra remarks in his Commentary on Ps. xix. 8, “is perfect in itself; it

requires no evidence from without for the truths which it teaches.”

Maimonides’ “Guide to the Perplexed” is entirely devoted to the problem

how to reconcile Scripture and reason. Scripture cannot contain

anything contrary to reason; nor can the result of scientific research

and philosophical speculation be conceived as contrary to reason, which

is their very basis. But where any such contradiction is perceived, we

are at fault either in our reasoning or in our interpretation of the

Divine Writings. The Incorporeality and Unity of God are doctrines that

have been fully proved, and Scripture cannot teach anything that is

contrary to them. Where we believe them to be contradicted in the Holy

Writings the contradiction is only apparent, and by assuming an

allegorical use of words and phrases the seeming contradiction is

removed.

R. Joseph Albo prefaces his book on the principles of Judaism as

follows: “As the human understanding is incapable of finding out what

is true and what is good, there must be a higher Being that assists us

in determining what is good and in comprehending what is true. It is

therefore necessary, above all, to study and to know the divine Law

that guides man in these problems.”

R. Eliah del Medigo, in his Bechinath haddath (Examination of Religion)

says as follows:—

“Let us first see whether or not the study of philosophy is permitted

to the followers of our religion; and, if it be permitted, whether the

study is to be considered a duty and a laudable act. The right-minded

Jew does not doubt that the Law aims at leading us to humane conduct,

good deeds, and true knowledge, the common people according to their

capacity, and the more gifted according to their abilities. Certain

fundamental truths are therefore set forth in the Law and the Prophets

in an authoritative, poetical, or dialectical style; but the higher

order of intellects are encouraged to search for proper proofs. Thus

the whole nation is addressed by Isaiah: ‘Lift up your eyes on high and

see who hath created these,’ and the like. Also the chief of the

Prophets tells the Israelites: ‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God;

the Lord is One.’ Those who are more highly endowed than their

fellow-men are exhorted, either directly or indirectly, to follow the

course which is suitable to them. The direct exhortation to

philosophical research is contained in the words: ‘Know then this day,

and take it to thy heart, that the Lord He is God,’ &c.; and indirectly

it is contained in the commandment to love and to fear God, as has been

explained by R. Moses Maimonides.—The study of science will certainly

be of use to the scholar; it leads to a knowledge of the created

things, and through these to a knowledge of the Creator. Such study may

even be considered as necessary to the Jewish scholar, though not to

the ordinary Jew. The scholar must, however, not entirely rely on his

research, but on that which is taught in the Law. In this the scholar

and the ordinary man are equal, that both accept the teaching of the

Torah as infallible; only with this difference, that the scholar can in

addition satisfy his thirst for knowledge and confirm by scientific

proof what he has already accepted as true on the authority of the

Bible.”

Of modern scholars I only quote Moses Mendelssohn’s theory. He accepts

unconditionally the teaching of the Bible; all its truths are absolute

and perfect; no reasoning whatever can refute them; but difficulties

may sometimes present themselves to us in reconciling the teaching of

the Bible with that of our reason. What have we then to do? The

philosopher declares: “If I were to find my reason in contradiction to

the Word of God, I could command reason to be silent; but the

arguments, so long as they have not been refuted, will nevertheless

assert themselves in the innermost recesses of my heart; the arguments

will assume the form of disquieting doubts, which will resolve

themselves into childlike prayers, earnest supplication for

enlightenment. I should utter the words of the Psalmist: ‘Lord, send me

Thy light, Thy truth, that they may guide me, and bring me to Thy holy

mount, to Thy dwelling-place!’”

The conception which Moses Mendelssohn had of Jewish belief and its

relation to reason we learn from the following passage:—“I recognise no

other eternal truths than those which are not only comprehensible to

the human mind, but also demonstrable by human powers. This principle

by no means brings me into conflict with my own religion; on the

contrary, I consider it an essential element in Judaism, and the

characteristic difference between Judaism and Christianity. Judaism has

no revealed religion in the sense in which Christianity has. The Jews

have a revealed legislation which instructs them in the divinely

ordained means by which they may attain the eternal bliss. Laws and

rules for conduct in life were revealed to Moses in a supernatural way,

but no doctrines, no saving truth, and no general laws of logic. The

latter the Eternal reveals to us, as to all men, through nature and

through the things themselves; never through words and letters. The

divine book revealed to Moses, though a book of laws, includes an

inexhaustible treasure of truths and doctrines.... The more we study it

the more we wonder at the depth of the knowledge contained in it. But

these truths are taught, and not forced upon us as dogmas. Belief does

not allow itself to be commanded; it is based upon conviction. In the

Hebrew language, the very word which is generally translated ‘faith,’

viz., ‏אמונה‎ denotes originally confidence, trust that the promise

made will also be fulfilled, and not what we understand by ‘religious

faith.’”

These words of Mendelssohn show how greatly those err who quote his

opinions in support of the dictum that Judaism recognises no dogmas.

According to Mendelssohn, Judaism does not consist entirely of laws; it

teaches also certain truths. We have certain dogmas without which the

laws can have no meaning, yet there is no precept, “Thou shalt

believe.” Nowhere in our Law, whether written or oral, is a solemn

declaration of our creed demanded. In so far Mendelssohn’s view is

correct; but when he believes that all the truths we are taught in

Scripture can be made evident by logical demonstration he is mistaken.

As to the meaning of ‏אמונה‎ comp. supra, p. 4.

The Jewish religion · 第 16 / 151 题