Meanwhile Albuquerque’s horse and Bassecourt’s second brigade,

roused from their ill-timed siesta, were pouring out of the villages

which had sheltered them from the noontide heat. The infantry--four

battalions apparently--drew up beside a wood, on the slope a mile

above the bridge, and waited to be attacked. The cavalry, however,

came on in one great mass, and charged down upon Lahoussaye’s

division, which was covering the deployment of the rest of the French

horse. Albuquerque’s only thought was to engage the enemy before he

had succeeded in passing the whole of his squadrons over the ford.

Vainly hoping to atone for his previous slackness by haste that came

too late, he had hurried his five regiments forward as soon as the

men could saddle and bridle their horses. Fractions of the different

corps were mixed together, and no proper first or second line had

been formed. The whole mass--some 2,500 sabres--in great disorder,

galloped down upon the two brigades of Lahoussaye, and engaged them

for a short time. But Lorges’ dragoons and part of Soult’s light

horse were now at hand to aid the leading division; the Spaniards

were beset in flank as well as in front, and broke after the first

shock. Albuquerque, who showed plenty of useless personal courage,

tried in vain to rally them on the 2nd Estremaduran Hussars, the only

regiment which remained intact. It was borne away by the backrush

of the rest, and scattering over the hillsides the whole body fled

westward and northward, some towards Peraleda de Garbin, others

towards Pedrosa. Bassecourt’s infantry went off to the rear as soon

as they saw their comrades routed, and took to the hills. By keeping

to rocky ground they suffered comparatively little loss.

The French urged the pursuit of Albuquerque’s fugitive horsemen for

many miles, chasing them as far as the defile of La Estrella in the

Sierra de Guadalupe in one direction, and beyond Val de la Casa in

the other. On the latter road the chase only ceased when the dragoons

came upon the divisions of Henestrosa and Zayas, from Cuesta’s main

army, drawn up across their path. The losses of the Spaniards were

very considerable--600 men and 400 horses were captured, and over 800

killed and wounded. One flag was taken, that of the regiment cut to

pieces by Lahoussaye’s dragoons at the commencement of the fighting.

The pieces in the redoubt, and the divisional battery of Albuquerque,

16 guns in all, were lost. By an additional mischance the French also

recovered fourteen of their own seventeen guns that had been taken at

Talavera. Cuesta had not been able to utilize these pieces for want

of gunners: they were trailing along in the rear of his army, very

indifferently horsed, when the French dragoons swept along the road

to Peraleda. On the approach of the pursuers they were abandoned by

the wayside. This capture enabled Soult to assert that he had taken

in all 30 cannon, and emboldened Sebastiani, a few weeks later, to

declare that he had never lost his guns at Talavera[720]. Having

recovered them he could exhibit them--all save two or three--in

evidence of his mendacious statement.

[720] The fact that these guns were actually French explains

Le Noble’s statement that the captured pieces were largely ‘de

modèle français.’ Napier has a strange statement, whose source

I cannot discover, to the effect that ‘Cuesta on his march to

Meza d’Ibor left fifteen guns upon the road, which Albuquerque’s

flight uncovered. A trumpeter attending an English flag of truce

treacherously or foolishly made known the fact to the French, who

immediately sent cavalry to fetch them off.’ Napier, ii. 189.

Soult declared in his official report that his cavalry had lost only

28 killed and 83 wounded, his artillery 4 wounded, his infantry

hardly a man, save some few drowned at the ford.

The rout of the Spanish rearguard and the capture of the bridge of

Arzobispo gave Soult a foothold on the southern bank of the Tagus,

but little more. The road by which he could now advance against

the allies was detestable--we have already seen how its cliffs and

ravines had tried the British and the Estremaduran armies. To reach

Cuesta’s new position on the Meza de Ibor the Duke of Dalmatia would

have had to make a two days’ march through these defiles, dragging

his guns with him. His cavalry he would have been forced to leave

behind him, as there would have been no means of employing it in the

mountains. Meanwhile Wellesley had established himself in the ground

which he had selected behind the broken bridge of Almaraz, and Cuesta

had got the whole of his infantry and half his artillery over the

Ibor stream and arrayed them on the Meza, where the rocky slopes are

impregnable against a frontal attack, if the defending army shows

ordinary determination[721]. All through the ninth and the morning

of the tenth the Spaniards were dragging the rest of their guns and

their baggage up the steep zigzag path between the river and the

summit of the plateau, and it was not till the end of the latter day

that everything was in position. It is probable therefore that if

Soult had pressed his pursuit with all possible speed, he might have

captured some of the Spanish _impedimenta_ on the morning of the

tenth. But there were defiles between Peraleda and the Ibor river

where Cuesta’s rearguard might possibly have detained him till the

guns and baggage were in safety[722].

[721] It will he remembered that on March 17, Victor turned Del

Parque’s division out of the Meza de Ibor position. But the

latter had only 5,000 men, not enough to man the whole line,

while the Duke of Belluno had two divisions for the frontal

attack, and turned the Meza with another, that of Villatte.

Cuesta had 30,000 men and more, quite sufficient to hold the

entire position.

[722] Wellesley went to visit his allies on the Meza upon the

morning of Aug. 10, and found that half the guns and baggage had

been dragged up on the ninth, but that there was still a great

accumulation at the foot of the steep slope, between the Ibor

river and the lower edge of the plateau. He was in great distress

at the notion that the French might come up at any moment, drive

in the rearguard, and capture the rear sections of the Spanish

train; see _Wellington Dispatches_, v. 22, to Lord Wellesley,

from Deleytosa, Aug. 10.

The Duke of Dalmatia, however, paused at the bridge of Arzobispo

before committing himself to a second advance against the allies. He

was averse to making an isolated attack upon the admirable position

now occupied by the Estremaduran army, and wished to combine it with

a simultaneous assault upon the British. It will be remembered that

he had detached Ney’s corps from the rear of his line of march, and

ordered it to attempt the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, by the

ford which he knew to exist close to the ruined bridge. He also wrote

to Victor to desire him to push forward the two infantry divisions

which had crossed the river at Talavera, and to direct them on

Mohedas and Alia, so as to turn Cuesta’s flank by a long circuitous

march among the rugged summits of the Sierra de Guadalupe.

Neither of these subsidiary movements was carried out. One division

of Ney’s corps, and Fournier’s brigade of dragoons reached Almaraz on

Aug. 8: the other division and the light cavalry had followed the 2nd

Corps so closely that it had passed Navalmoral on its way eastward,

and had to make a long counter-march. It was not till the ninth or

tenth therefore that the Duke of Elchingen would have been in a

position to attempt the passage of the Tagus. Craufurd’s detachment

had been established at Mirabete, behind the broken bridge, since

Aug. 6, and two days later the main body of the British army had

reached Deleytosa, where it was within a few hours’ march of the

vanguard, and perfectly ready to support it. If Ney had endeavoured

to pass the Tagus on the ninth or tenth with his 12,500 men, it is

clear that the head of his column must have been destroyed, for

the ford was narrow and difficult, and indeed barely passable for

infantry even in the middle of August[723]. But the Marshal did not

even attempt the passage, for the simple reason that his intelligence

officers failed to discover the ford, and reported to him that none

existed. He sent word to Soult that the scheme was impracticable, and

drawing back from the water’s edge concentrated his whole corps at

Navalmoral [Aug. 9].

[723] From Soult’s dispatch of Aug. 13, it appears that a Colonel

Ornano, with a regiment of dragoons, was detailed to examine the

banks of the Tagus in search of the ford, but failed to find

it. The cause is not hard to seek, for it crosses the river

diagonally on a narrow shelf of rock with deep water on either

side. It is not less than four feet deep, and Leach of the 95th,

who was on guard at its southern end, describes it as ‘not

exactly practicable for infantry even at the driest season of

the year’ (p. 94). The English, knowing its exact course, were

established in positions from which they could concentrate upon

it in a few minutes. We may rationally suppose, therefore, that

Ney would have found the Tagus not less difficult to pass on Aug.

9, than the Oitaben had been on June 8.

Victor, at the other end of the French line, showed no desire to

adventure his infantry among the defiles of the Sierra de Guadalupe,

without guns or cavalry, and refused to move up into the mountains in

order to turn Cuesta’s right flank. Thus the whole plan concerted by

the Duke of Dalmatia for a general attack on the allies came to an

ignominious conclusion.

It would appear, indeed, that his chance of inflicting a serious

blow on the enemy had passed away long ere he brought the 2nd and

5th Corps down to the bridge of Arzobispo. It was on the fifth, when

Mortier refused to close with Cuesta and allowed him to withdraw

across the Tagus, that Soult had lost his best opportunity. On that

day the Spaniards were still on the wrong side of the river, and the

British vanguard had not yet reached the broken bridge of Almaraz.

If Mortier had engaged the army of Cuesta, and Ney had found and

attacked the ford at Almaraz before Craufurd’s arrival, the position

of the allies would have been forlorn indeed. But on the fifth Soult

had not yet discovered the real position of affairs; and the head of

Ney’s corps was only just debouching from Plasencia, two long marches

from Almaraz. In short ‘the fog of war,’ as a modern writer has

happily called it, was still lying thick about the combatants, and

Soult’s best chance was gone before he was even aware of it.

On August 9, matters looked far less promising, even though the

bridge of Arzobispo had been won. Since Ney sent word that he could

not cross at Almaraz, while Victor declined to commit himself to any

schemes for an advance into the eastern mountains, Soult saw that

he must construct another scheme of operations. His own preference

was for a march into Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Branco.

Such an attack upon Wellesley’s base, made by the 50,000 men of

the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, would compel the British to abandon

Almaraz, to give up their connexion with Cuesta, and to march in

haste by Truxillo, Caceres, and Portalegre on Abrantes, in order to

cover Lisbon. It was even possible that, if the invading army made

great haste, it might reach Abrantes before the British: in that

case Wellesley would be forced to keep to the southern bank of the

Tagus and cross it at Santarem, comparatively close to the capital.

Thus all Central Portugal might be won without a battle, and Lisbon

itself might fall ere the campaign ended, since the 20,000 men of the

British general, even when aided by the local levies, could not (as

Soult supposed) hold back three French _corps d’armée_[724]. There

was another alternative possible--to march not on Lisbon but on

Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and to invade Portugal by the northern

road. But this plan would take a longer time to execute, and promised

less decisive results.

[724] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 9, from Arzobispo: ‘Je serai disposé

soit à marcher sur Lisbonne pour détruire les établissements

anglais avant que leur armée ne puisse y arriver, et à lui rendre

son embarquement difficile, soit à marcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo

pour en faire le siège.... Dans le cas du premier mouvement (qui

produira infailliblement de grands résultats) j’aurai l’honneur

de prier V. M. d’avoir la bonté de faire connaître à MM. les

maréchaux ducs de Trévise et d’Elchingen que telle est son

intention, afin que toute observation soit ainsi prévenue, et

qu’on ne puisse m’attribuer aucun sentiment d’amour-propre.’

But even before the combat of Arzobispo had taken place, Joseph and

Jourdan had determined that they would not permit Soult to carry

out any schemes of advance against Portugal. They could show very

good grounds for their decision. If the Duke of Dalmatia marched

off to attack Lisbon, he would leave the 1st and 4th Corps and the

King’s reserve,--less than 50,000 men in all, after the losses of

Talavera,--opposed to Cuesta, Wellesley, and Venegas, who between

them would have at least 75,000[725]. If the British army should

refuse to be drawn away towards Portugal, and should recross the

Tagus at Almaraz with Cuesta in its wake, the situation would be

deplorable. Victor would be exposed, just as he had been on July 22

and 23, to a joint attack from the two armies. And on this occasion

Sebastiani and the King would not be able to bring him help, for they

were now closely engaged with Venegas near Aranjuez. If they moved

away from the front of the army of La Mancha, Madrid would be lost in

two days. If they did not so move, Wellesley and Cuesta might crush

Victor, or drive him away on some eccentric line of retreat which

would uncover the capital. Jourdan therefore, writing in the name of

Joseph, had informed Soult in a dispatch dated Aug. 8, that it was

impossible to permit him to march on Portugal, as his departure would

uncover Madrid and probably bring about a fatal disaster. He also

urged that the exhaustion of the troops rendered a halt necessary,

and that it would be impossible to feed them, if they advanced into

the stony wilderness on the borders of Portugal before they had

collected magazines. For the present the King would be contented to

keep the allies in check, without seeking to attack or disperse them,

until the weather began to grow cooler and the troops had rested from

their fatigues.

[725] Joseph, exaggerating the enemy’s force, was under the

impression that they had fully 100,000 men: see his letter to

Napoleon of July 31.

[Illustration: THE CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA

JULY-AUGUST 1809]

As if intending to put it out of Soult’s power to undertake his

projected expedition into Portugal, Jourdan and Joseph now

proceeded to deprive him of the control of one of his three army

corps. They authorized Ney to recross the mountains and to return to

Salamanca, in order to protect the plains of Leon from the incursions

of the Spaniards of Galicia. Deprived of such a large section of his

army, Soult would be unable to march against Abrantes, as he so much

desired to do. There were good military reasons, too, for sending

off Ney in this direction: Kellermann kept reporting that La Romana

was on the move, and that unless promptly succoured he should find

himself obliged to abandon Benavente and Zamora and to fall back on

Valladolid. The Spaniards from Ciudad Rodrigo had already taken the

offensive, and Del Parque’s advanced guard had even seized Salamanca.

Ney accepted with alacrity the chance of withdrawing himself from the

immediate control of his old enemy Soult; he received his permission

to return to Leon on Aug. 9: on the tenth his whole corps was on

the move, and on the eleventh he had retired to Plasencia. On the

following day he plunged into the passes and made for Salamanca with

all possible speed[726].

[726] Ney has been accused of deserting Soult, and retiring

from Almaraz and Navalmoral on his own responsibility, and

contrary to the orders of his immediate superior. But Jourdan’s

dispatch of Aug. 9 to the Minister of War shows that the Duke

of Elchingen was obeying directions sent to him from the royal

head quarters. ‘Le roi a pensé,’ he writes, ‘qu’on ne devait

pas, quant à présent, chercher à pénétrer ni en Andalousie ni en

Portugal.... Le duc de Dalmatie renverra promptement le 6me corps

sur Salamanque pour en chasser les ennemis, et couvrir la Vieille

Castille conjointement avec le Général Kellermann.’ Ney then was

strictly correct in stating in his dispatch of Aug. 18, that he

had acted in obedience to his orders.

While the 6th Corps was dispatched to the north, the King directed

Soult to take up, with the rest of his troops, a defensive position

opposite the allied armies on the central Tagus. The 2nd Corps was

to occupy Plasencia, the 5th to watch the passages at Almaraz and

Arzobispo, while keeping a detachment at Talavera. Thus all Soult’s

plans for an active campaign were shattered, and he was told off to

act as a ‘containing force.’ Meanwhile Joseph drew Victor and the

1st Corps away from Talavera, towards Toledo and La Mancha, with

the intention of bringing them into play against Venegas. For just

as Soult had always ‘an eye on Portugal,’ so Joseph had always ‘an

eye on Madrid.’ He could not feel secure so long as a Spanish army

lay near Toledo or Aranjuez, only two marches from the gates of his

capital, and was determined to dislodge it from this threatening

position before taking any other operation in hand. He had accepted

as true rumours to the effect that part of Cuesta’s troops had

retired in the direction of Ocaña[727] to join the army of La Mancha,

and even that 6,000 British[728] had been detached in this same

direction. Thus he had persuaded himself that Venegas had 40,000 men,

and was desirous of drawing in Victor to his head quarters before

delivering his attack, thinking that Sebastiani and the central

reserve would be too weak for the task.

[727] Joseph to Napoleon, from Valdemoro, August 7.

[728] Jourdan to Belliard, from Bargas, August 8.

SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IX

THE END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN: ALMONACID

While King Joseph’s orders were being carried out, Wellesley and

Cuesta found themselves, to their great surprise, unmolested by any

hostile force. The army which had been in their front at Almaraz and

Arzobispo disappeared on August 10, leaving only small detachments

to watch the northern bank of the Tagus. It was soon reported to

Wellesley that Victor had passed away towards Toledo, and that

another corps--or perhaps two[729]--had retired to Plasencia. The

object of this move however had to be determined, before the British

general could take corresponding measures. Was Soult about to invade

Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Branco, or was he merely

taking up cantonments, from which he could observe the British and

Estremaduran armies, while the King and Victor moved off against

Venegas? On the whole Wellesley was inclined to believe that the

latter hypothesis was the correct one, and that the enemy was about

to ‘refuse’ his right wing, and to use his left for offensive action

against the army of La Mancha. As was generally the case, his

prescience was not at fault, and he had exactly divined the King’s

intentions[730]. He had nevertheless to guard against the possibility

that the other alternative might prove to be correct, and that

Central Portugal was in danger--as indeed it would have been if

Joseph had allowed Soult to carry out his original plan.

[729] See Wellesley’s letter of Aug. 14 to Beresford, concerning

the departure of the French. Robert Craufurd estimated the force

that had marched on Plasencia at 15,000 men, Donkin at 25,000. If

the latter had judged the numbers correctly, Wellesley supposed

that both Ney and Soult must have gone by this road: this was

actually the case.

[730] Wellesley to Villiers, Aug. 12: ‘The French having been

moving since the ninth towards Plasencia.... I can form no

decided opinion respecting their intentions. I think, however,

that if they meditated a serious attack on Portugal they would

not have moved off in daylight, in full sight of our troops. I

suspect these movements are intended only as a feint, to induce

us to separate ourselves from the Spaniards, in order to cover

Portugal.’

Wellesley resolved therefore to maintain his present position at

Jaraicejo and Mirabete till he should be certain as to the intentions

of the French. If they were really about to invade Portugal, he would

march at once for Abrantes. If not, he would keep his ground, for by

holding the passage at Almaraz he was threatening the French centre,

and detaining in his front troops who would otherwise be free to

attack the Spaniards either in La Mancha or in Leon.

Meanwhile measures had to be taken to provide a detaining force in

front of Soult, lest an attack on Portugal should turn out to be in

progress. This force was provided by bringing down Beresford and the

Portuguese field army to Zarza and Alcantara, and sending up to their

aid the British reinforcements which had landed at Lisbon during the

month of July. Beresford, it will be remembered, had received orders

at the commencement of the campaign directing him to concentrate his

army behind Almeida, to link his operations with those of Del Parque

and the Spanish force at Ciudad Rodrigo, but at the same time to

be ready to transfer himself either northward or southward if his

presence should be required on the Douro or the Tagus. In accordance

with these instructions Beresford had collected thirty-two battalions

of regular infantry, with one more from the Lusitanian Legion, and

the University Volunteers of Coimbra, as also five squadrons from

various cavalry regiments, and four batteries of artillery--a force

of 18,000 men in all[731]. On July 31 he had crossed the Spanish

frontier, and lay at San Felices and Villa de Cervo, near Ciudad

Rodrigo. There he heard of Soult’s march from Salamanca towards

Plasencia, and very properly made up his mind to bring his army down

to Estremadura by a line parallel to that which the French had taken.

He crossed the Sierra de Gata by the rough pass of Perales, and on

August 12 fixed his head quarters at Moraleja, near Coria, on the

southern slope of the mountains. His cavalry held Coria, while his

right wing was in touch with the English brigades from Lisbon, which

had just reached Zarza la Mayor. These were the seven battalions of

Lightburne and Catlin Craufurd[732], which Wellesley had vainly hoped

to receive in time for Talavera. They numbered 4,500 bayonets, and

had with them one battery of British artillery.

[731] These regiments were, Line infantry, nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9,

10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, all (save no. 15) two battalions

strong, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Cazadores, with no.

2 of the Lusitanian Legion, and the ‘Voluntarios Académicos’ of

Coimbra.

[732] Viz. 2/5th, 2/11th, 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/42nd, 2/39th, 2/88th.

Thus even before Soult reached Plasencia, there was an army of 18,000

Portuguese and 4,500 British on the lower Tietar, ready to act as a

detaining force and to retard the Marshal’s advance, if he should

make a serious attempt to invade Portugal. On Aug. 15, by Wellesley’s

orders, Beresford left Moraleja and transferred his whole army to

Zarza, in order to be able to fall back with perfect security on

Castello Branco should circumstances so require. If he had remained

at Moraleja he might have been cut off from the high-road to Abrantes

by a sudden movement of the enemy on Coria[733].

[733] See Wellesley to Beresford, Aug. 14.

Wellesley now felt comparatively safe, so far as matters strategical

were concerned. If the enemy, contrary to his expectation, should

march into Portugal, he could join Beresford at Abrantes, and stand

at bay with some 24,000 British and 18,000 Portuguese regulars, a

force sufficient to check the 30,000 men who was the utmost force

that Soult could bring against him after Ney’s departure. Meanwhile,

till the Marshal should move, he retained his old position at

Mirabete and Jaraicejo. Though the French showed no signs of activity

in his front, the weary fortnight during which the British army

lay in position behind the Tagus were perhaps the most trying time

that Wellesley spent during his first campaign in Spain. It was a

period of absolute starvation for man and beast, and the army was

going to pieces under his eyes. Ever since the British had arrived

in front of Talavera on July 22, rations as we have already seen had

been scanty and irregular. But the fourteen days spent at Deleytosa

and Jaraicejo were even worse than those which had preceded them.

The stores collected at Plasencia had been captured by the French:

those gathered at Abrantes were so far distant that they could not

be drawn upon, now that the high-road north of the Tagus had been

cut by the enemy. The army had to live miserably on what it could

wring out of the country-side, which Victor two months before had

stripped to the very bones. Wellesley had hoped to be fed by the

Spanish Government, when he threw up his line of communication with

Abrantes, and took up that with Badajoz. But the Spanish Government

was a broken reed on which to lean: if it fed its own armies most

imperfectly, it was hardly to be expected that it would deal

more liberally with its allies. The trifling stores brought from

Talavera had long been exhausted: the country-side had been eaten

bare: from the South very little could be procured. The Spanish

Commissary-General Lozano de Torres[734] occasionally sent up a

small consignment of flour from Caceres and Truxillo, but it did not

suffice to give the army even half-rations. It was to no purpose

that at Abrantes provisions abounded at this moment, for there was

no means of getting them forward from Portugal[735]. The enemy lay

between the army and its base dépôt, and there was no transport

available to bring up the food by the circuitous route of Villa Velha

and Portalegre. Even so early as August 8 Wellesley began to write

that ‘a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose

their discipline and their spirit. They plunder in the very presence

of their officers. The officers are discontented, and almost as bad

as the men. With the army that a fortnight ago beat double their

numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half that

strength.’ On the eleventh he wrote to warn Cuesta that unless he was

provided with food of some sort he should remain no longer in his

advanced position, but fall back towards Badajoz, whatever might be

the consequences. ‘It is impossible,’ he stated, ‘for me to remain

any longer in a country in which no arrangement has been made for the

supply of provisions to the troops, and in which all the provisions

that are either found in the country or are sent from Seville (as

I have been informed for the use of the British army) are applied

solely and exclusively to the use of the Spanish troops[736].’

[734] That this official did something, if not so much as

Wellesley required, is shown by the letter to Cuesta of Aug.

11, in which it is said that ‘the British army has received no

provisions since it was at Deleytosa, excepting some sent from

Truxillo by Señor Lozano de Torres,’ while again on Aug. 8,

Wellesley says that ‘we have had nothing since the third, save

4,000 lbs. of biscuit, and that was divided among 30,000 [say

23,000] mouths.’

[735] On Aug. 12, Wellesley writes from Jaraicejo to say that the

dépôt at Abrantes is much too large, and that some of the flour

ought to be sent back to Santarem, or even to Lisbon, till only

300,000 rations should be left.

[736] Wellesley to his brother Lord Wellesley, at Seville, Aug. 8.

The Junta sent Wellesley a letter of high-flown praise for his

doings at Talavera, a present of horses, and a commission as

Captain-General in their army. But food they did not send in any

sufficient quantities. All the convoys that came up from Andalusia

were made over to Cuesta’s army, and the Estremaduran districts which

were supposed to be allotted for the sustenance of the British had

little or nothing to give. When we remember that in June Victor had

described this same region as absolutely exhausted and incapable of

furnishing the 1st Corps with even five days’ supplies, we shall

not wonder that Wellesley’s troops starved there in August. It was

impossible however to convince the British general that the suffering

of his men were the result of Spanish penury rather than of Spanish

negligence and bad faith. There was much just foundation for his

complaints, for the Junta, after so many promises, had sent him

no train from Andalusia. Moreover detachments and marauding bands

from Cuesta’s army frequently intercepted the small supplies of

food which British foraging parties were able to procure[737]. When

taxed with their misdoings, Cuesta replied that Wellesley’s men had

not unfrequently seized and plundered his own convoys, which was

undoubtedly true[738], and that the British soldiers were enjoying

such abundance that he had been told that some of them were actually

selling their bread-ration to the Spaniards because they had no need

of it--which was most certainly false[739].

[737] See Wellesley to Cuesta from Jaraicejo, Aug. 11.

[738] Lord Munster (p. 251) confesses that ‘so pressing were our

wants that one of our commissaries took from them (the Spaniards)

by force a hundred bullocks and a hundred mule loads of bread.’

Cuesta needs no further justification. But it is clear that his

own men were doing things precisely similar.

[739] See the above-quoted dispatch to Cuesta of Aug. 11.

That Wellesley was using no exaggerated terms, when he declared

that his army was literally perishing for want of food, is proved

by the narratives of a score of British officers who were present

in the Talavera campaign[740]. That his ultimate retreat was caused

by nothing but the necessity of saving his men is perfectly clear.

The strategical advantage of maintaining the position behind the

Almaraz passage was so evident, and the political disadvantages of

withdrawing were so obvious, that a man of Wellesley’s keen insight

into the facts of war must have desired to hold on as long as was

possible. Unless Soult were actually attacking Portugal, Mirabete

and Jaraicejo afforded the best ground that could be selected for

‘containing’ and imposing upon the enemy. So long as the British

army lay there it was practically unassailable from the front, while

it was admirably placed for the purpose of making an irruption into

the midst of the enemy’s lines, if he should disperse his corps in

search of food, or detach large forces towards La Mancha or Leon. ‘If

I could only have fed,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘I could, after some time,

have struck a brilliant blow either upon Soult at Plasencia, or upon

Mortier in the centre[741]. It is clear that by a dash across the

Almaraz passage he could have fallen upon either of these forces, and

assailed it with good hope of success before it could be succoured

by the other. But such a venture was impossible to an army which

had lost one-third of its cavalry horses from starvation within

three weeks, and whose battalions were brought so low by physical

exhaustion that few of them could be relied upon to march ten miles

in a day.

[740] See especially the remarks of Leach, George Napier,

Leith-Hay, Stothert, and Cooper.

[741] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Truxillo, Aug. 21, 1809.

Wellesley declared that, having once linked his fortunes to those

of the Spanish army of Estremadura, he had considered himself bound

to co-operate with it as long as was humanly speaking possible,

and implicit credit may be given to his assertion[742]. The limit

of physical endurance, however, was reached on August 20, the day

on which he was finally compelled to commence his retreat in the

direction of Truxillo and Badajoz.

[742] In his dispatch to the Marquis Wellesley, from Merida,

Aug. 24, he observes that he had considered himself in honour

bound to continue his co-operation unless (1) Soult should invade

Portugal, or (2) the Spaniards should move off towards another

theatre of war, i.e. La Mancha, or (3) he should himself be

starved out, as actually happened.

Before that day arrived one event occurred which seemed to make

useful co-operation between the two allied armies more feasible than

it had been at any date since the campaign began. On the night of

August 12-13 Cuesta, whose health had been steadily growing worse

since the injuries that he had received at Medellin, was disabled

by a paralytic stroke which deprived him of the use of one of his

legs. He resigned on the following day, and was succeeded by his

second-in-command Eguia, an officer whose conciliatory manners and

mild disposition promised to make communication between the head

quarters of the two allied armies comparatively friendly. Cuesta,

after receiving from the Central Junta a letter of recall couched

in the most flattering terms, retired to the baths of Alhama. When

he had somewhat recovered his strength, he turned his energies

to writing a long vindication of his whole conduct in 1809, and

then engaged in a furious controversy with Venegas, concerning

the latter’s disobedience of orders in July. Engaged in these

harmless pursuits he ceased to be a source of danger to his country.

Unfortunately his removal from the theatre of war was not of such

benefit to the common cause as might have been hoped. The Junta

found ere long a general just as rash and incapable, if not quite so

old, to whom to entrust the command of its largest army. Juan Carlos

Areizaga, the vanquished of Ocaña, was entirely worthy to be the

spiritual heir of Cuesta’s policy.

But for the present General Eguia was for some weeks in charge of

the Army of Estremadura. His first idea was to persuade Wellesley

to postpone his departure, and to retain his advanced position. He

urged this request upon his colleague with more zeal than tact, and

to no good effect. By using in one of his dispatches the phrase that

other considerations besides the want of food must be determining

the movements of the British army[743], he roused Wellesley’s

wrath. The famine was so real that any insinuation that it was

a mere pretext for retreat was certainly calculated to wound the

general whose troops were perishing before his eyes. Expressing

deep indignation[744] Wellesley refused to listen to a proposal

that he should divide with the Estremadurans the stores of food at

Truxillo--which indeed were hopelessly inadequate for the sustenance

of two armies. Nor would he even accept an offer made him on August

20 by Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, who came in haste from the Central

Junta, to the effect that he might appropriate the whole of the

magazine at Truxillo, leaving the Spanish army to provide for itself

from other resources. The proposal was probably honest and genuine,

but Wellesley knew the dilatory habits of the Junta so well that he

was convinced that the dépôt made over to him would never be properly

replenished, and would soon run dry[745].

[743] Eguia’s unhappy phrase was ‘If notwithstanding this answer

[to the effect that the Truxillo magazines should be placed in

charge of a British commissary] your Excellency should persist

in marching your troops into Portugal, I shall be convinced

that other causes, and not only the want of subsistence, have

induced your Excellency to decide on taking such a step.’ [From

Deleytosa, Aug. 19.]

[744] ‘I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency’s

letter of this day’s date, and I feel much concerned that

anything should have occurred to induce your Excellency to

express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you.

As however your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further

correspondence between us appears unnecessary, and accordingly

this is the last letter which I shall have the honour of

addressing to you.’ Wellesley to Eguia, Aug. 19.

[745] ‘It is said that Don L. de Calvo promised and engaged to

supply the British army, upon which I have only to observe that I

had already trusted too long to the promises of Spanish agents,

and I had particular reason for want of confidence in Don L. de

Calvo. At the moment when he was assuring me that the British

army should have all the food the country could afford, I had

in my possession an order from him directing the magistrates of

Guadalupe to send to the Spanish head quarters provisions which

a British commissary had prepared for the magazine at Truxillo.’

Oct. 30, to Marquis Wellesley.

Marching therefore by short stages, for the exhaustion of his troops

made rapid progress impossible[746], he started from Jaraicejo on

August 20, and moved by Truxillo and Miajadas to the valley of the

Guadiana, where he cantoned the army about Merida, Montijo, and

Badajoz. The British head quarters were fixed at the last-named place

from September 3 till December 27, 1809, and, excepting for some

small changes in detail, the army retained the position which it had

now taken up for nearly four months. In the fertile region along

the Guadiana the troops were fed without much trouble: but they did

not recover the health that they had lost in the time of starvation

among the barren hills behind Arzobispo and Mirabete. In spite of the

junction of reinforcements and the return of convalescents to the

ranks, the army could never show more than from 23,000 to 25,000 men

under arms during the autumn months. When the rainy season began, the

intermittent ague which was known to the British as ‘Guadiana fever’

was never absent: it did not often kill, but it disabled men by the

thousand, and it was not till Wellesley moved back into Portugal at

midwinter that the regiments recovered their normal health.

[746] ‘I have no provisions, no horses, no means of transport, I

am overloaded with sick; the horses of the cavalry are scarcely

able to march, or those of the artillery to draw their guns. The

officers and soldiers alike are worn down by want of food and

privations of every description.’ Wellesley to Marquis Wellesley,

Miajadas, Aug. 22.

If he had been free to follow his personal inclination, it is

probable that Wellesley would have moved back into Portugal

in September. But strategical and political reasons made this

impossible. While based on Badajoz he still threatened the French

hold on the valley of the Tagus, and compelled the King to keep

two army corps at least in his front. Since it was always possible

that he might return to Almaraz and threaten Madrid, a containing

force had to be told off against him. He was also in a position from

which he could easily sally out to check raids upon Portugal: from

Badajoz he could either join Beresford in a few marches, or fall by

Alcantara upon the flank of any detachment that Soult might lead

forward in the direction of Castello Branco and Abrantes. He was

convinced that no such raids would be made, but their possibility

had to be taken into consideration, and while lying in his present

cantonments he was well placed for frustrating them. But political

considerations were even more powerful than military considerations

in chaining him to Badajoz. The Junta at Seville were most anxious

to keep the British army in their front: they were convinced that,

if it retired on Portugal, Joseph and Soult would at once organize

an invasion of Andalusia, and they were well aware that Eguia and

Venegas would not suffice to hold back the 70,000 men who might

then be directed against them. In the dispatches which the Marquis

Wellesley (who had superseded Frere at Seville on August 11) kept

sending to his brother, the main fact conveyed was the absolute

despair with which the Spanish Government viewed the prospect of

the removal of their allies towards Portugal. ‘Don Martin de Garay

[the secretary to the Junta] declared to me with expressions of the

deepest sorrow and terror’--wrote the Marquis on August 22--‘that if

your army should quit Spain, at this critical moment, inevitable and

immediate ruin must ensue to his government, to whatever provinces

remain under its authority, to the cause of Spain itself, and to

every interest connected with the alliance so happily established

between Great Britain and the Spanish nation.... No argument produced

the effect of diminishing the urgency of his entreaties, and I have

ascertained that his sensations are in no degree more powerful than

those of the Government and of every description of people within

this city and its vicinity.... Viewing the painful consequences

that would follow your retreat into Portugal, I feel it my duty

to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting some

intermediate plan, which may have some of the advantages of retreat

into Portugal, without occasioning alarm in Spain, and so endangering

the foundations of the alliance between that country and Great

Britain[747].’

[747] Lord Wellesley to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, Aug. 22.

A stay at Badajoz was obviously the only ‘intermediate plan’ that was

worth taking into consideration; and considering the urgency of his

brother’s representations Wellesley could not refuse to halt within

the Spanish border. The military advantages of the position that he

had now taken up were not inconsiderable, and no profit that could

have been got by returning into Portugal could have counterbalanced

the loss of the Spanish alliance. In the valley of the Central

Guadiana, therefore, the British army remained cantoned. But no

arguments that the Junta could produce availed to persuade Wellesley

to engage in another campaign with a Spanish colleague at his side.

Not even when the tempting offer was made that Albuquerque should be

given command of half of the Estremaduran army, and placed under his

orders, would he consent to pledge himself to offensive operations.

Meanwhile, dispatches had arrived from England, containing the

official news that the Austrian War was at an end: rumours to that

effect had already reached the British camps from French sources

before Wellesley left Oropesa[748]. The whole character of the

continental struggle was changed by the fact that the Emperor had

once more the power to send reinforcements to Spain, or even to go

there himself. The situation required further consideration, and the

British Government resolved to place upon Wellesley’s shoulders the

all-important task of deciding whether the struggle in the Peninsula

could still be maintained, and how (in the event of his giving an

affirmative answer) it could best be carried on[749]. He replied that

in the existing state of affairs, and considering the bad state of

the Spanish armies, neither 30,000 nor even 40,000 British troops

would suffice to maintain Andalusia against the unlimited numbers of

French whom the Emperor could now send across the Pyrenees. But he

held that Portugal might be defended with success, if the Portuguese

army and militia could be completed to their full strength, and

the country well organized for resistance. It was probable that the

borders of Portugal could not be maintained; ‘the whole country

is frontier, and it would be difficult to prevent the enemy from

penetrating by some point or other.’ He would have therefore ‘to

confine himself to preserving what is most important,--the capital.’

But this he was prepared to undertake, and strongly advised the

ministry to make no attempt to defend both Andalusia and Portugal,

but to leave the Junta to their own vain devices, and to make sure of

Lisbon[750].

[748] The Armistice of Znaim was signed July 12. The Falmouth

packet with the news reached Lisbon only on Aug. 9. Yet Wellesley

had heard rumours of peace as early as Aug. 4 [_Well. Disp._ iv.

560].

[749] Canning to Lord Wellesley, London, Aug. 12: ‘The question

which first arises is whether the state of things in Spain be

such as that a British army of 30,000 men, acting in co-operation

with the Spanish armies, could be reasonably expected either to

effect the deliverance of the whole Peninsula, or to make head

against the augmented force which Bonaparte may now be enabled to

direct against that country. Upon this question your Excellency

will receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley, to whom a copy of

this dispatch is transmitted. If the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley

shall be that, with so limited a force as 30,000 men, offensive

operations in Spain could not prudently be attempted, and if he

shall conceive that the utmost object to which such an army would

be adequate is the defence of Portugal, your Excellency will then

only have to state to the Spanish Government the nature of the

instructions under which Sir A. Wellesley now acts.... If on the

other hand Sir A. Wellesley shall entertain the opinion that with

an effective British army of 30,000, combined with the Spanish

and Portuguese armies, it might be possible either to expel the

French from Spain, or to resist even their augmented force with

a reasonable prospect of success ... your Excellency will then

also receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley as to the conditions

necessary to be obtained from the Spanish Government, as a

preliminary to entering on any concerted system of joint military

operations.’

[750] For Wellesley’s answer to Canning see his reply to his

brother on Sept. 5, containing his ‘Observation on Mr. Secretary

Canning’s Dispatch of Aug. 12,’ combined with the reference to

his own dispatch of Aug. 24, which (as he writes to Castlereagh

on Sept. 4) ‘gives the government my opinion upon all the points

referred to in Mr. Canning’s dispatches.’ The quotation above

comes from this last-named document of Aug. 24.

Thus, in September 1809 Wellesley enunciated with great clearness the

policy that he was about to employ in the next year. The lines of

Torres Vedras are already hovering before his imagination, and after

a flying visit to Lisbon in October they took definite shape in his

‘Memorandum for Colonel Fletcher’ of the twentieth of that month.

In that document the whole project for defending the Portuguese

capital by a series of concentric fortifications is set forth, and

the modifications which it afterwards suffered were only in matters

of detail. In short the Lines which were to check Masséna had been

thought out in the British general’s provident mind exactly twelve

months before the French army appeared in front of them.

In following the fortunes of Wellesley we have now got far beyond

the point to which we have conducted the general history of the

Talavera campaign. It is time to turn back to the movements of Soult

and King Joseph, and to explain the reasons which made it possible

for the British army to remain unmolested at Jaraicejo and Mirabete

till August 20, and then to retire to Merida and Badajoz without

imperilling the safety of their Estremaduran allies.

The King, as we have already seen, had made up his mind that the

all-important point, at this stage of the campaign, was to make an

end of the army of Venegas, and to relieve Madrid from danger. He

had therefore called Victor towards Toledo, and directed Mortier

to relieve the divisions of the 1st Corps which lay at Talavera

with troops from the 5th Corps. The result of this movement was to

leave Soult too weak to undertake any important operations against

Portugal. For Mortier’s men, being strung out on the long line from

Talavera to Navalmoral, with both Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s armies

in their front, could not be relied upon to lend aid for an advance

on Castello Branco or Abrantes. The Duke of Dalmatia therefore, when

he had reached Plasencia, could dispose of nothing but his own 2nd

Corps and Lahoussaye’s four regiments of dragoons. He dared not march

on Portugal with no more than 20,000 men, when the allies had it in

their power to fall upon Mortier the moment that his back was turned.

Accordingly he waited at Plasencia, sending out cavalry to Coria and

Torejoncillo, but did nothing more. Meanwhile Beresford and the two

British brigades from Lisbon were drawing near him, and on August

16 the Portuguese cavalry, advancing from the pass of Perales and

Moraleja, drove out the two French squadrons which were occupying

Coria, and thus warned Soult that a new army was coming into play

against him. Two days later Beresford had transferred himself to

the Castello Branco road, and a force of 23,000 men had been thrown

between the 2nd Corps and the Portuguese frontier.

Meanwhile the King had met with unexpected good fortune in his

attack on Venegas. On August 5 he had set out from Valdemoro with

the intention of attacking the army of La Mancha in its position

at Aranjuez. It seemed unlikely that he would find it there, for

Venegas had displayed such excessive caution in his advance from the

Sierra Morena to the Tagus, and had so tamely refused to take his

opportunity of pouncing upon Madrid, that it seemed probable that he

would retreat at the first sign of the King’s approach. But rushing

to the opposite extreme of conduct, the Spanish general was now

ready to court destruction. He had received on the preceding night,

that of August 4, Cuesta’s dispatch of the third, informing him

that Soult had crossed the mountains and that both the British and

the Estremaduran armies were quitting Talavera. The Captain-General

warned him that he might expect an attack from the King’s army, and

ordered him to avoid an action, and to fall back towards the Despeña

Perros if he were pressed. Serenely putting aside the orders of

Cuesta, Venegas refused to retreat, and announced that he should not

copy the conduct of a superior who had fled even before the enemy

was in sight. He announced his intention of fighting, and directed

his army to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. Of his

five divisions, three were holding that town when the French came in

sight; the other two were écheloned between Aranjuez and Tembleque,

apparently in order to watch the roads from Toledo and Añover. The

enemy might, as Venegas saw, turn his flank either by crossing the

bridges of the former place, or by passing the easy ford at the

latter. A detachment of 800 men had been left to watch the debouches

from Toledo, and a couple of battalions observed the ford of Añover.

King Joseph meanwhile, marching with a force composed of Sebastiani’s

corps, the Central Reserve, and Milhaud’s division of dragoons,

arrived in front of Aranjuez on August 5. Sebastiani, whose troops

led the advance, drove in the Spanish outposts, who retired across

the Tagus and broke the town bridge behind them. But beyond the river

the greater part of the army of La Mancha was visible in battle

order, prepared to receive the attack: Venegas himself, however,

chanced to be absent at the moment, as he had ridden over that

morning to visit his left wing, and General Giron was in temporary

charge of the defence. Sebastiani risked an attack on the Spanish

position, which was accessible by means of two fords. But finding

that the enemy was in great force and stood firm, he drew off his men

after a sharp skirmish.

King Joseph now determined not to press the attack on Aranjuez and

its fords, but to cross the Tagus at points where he could secure

a less difficult passage. He countermarched Sebastiani’s corps to

the bridge of Toledo, and gave Milhaud orders to force the ford of

Añover. This manœuvre cost him three days; it was only on the evening

of August 8 that he succeeded in concentrating his main body at

Toledo. On the following morning Sebastiani passed the bridges and

drove off the Spanish detachment that was observing them: it fell

back on a larger force, and the 4th Corps pressing its advance, came

into contact with a whole hostile division.

Venegas had not failed to guess the plan which the King would adopt,

and had moved off from Aranjuez towards Toledo, by roads parallel

to those which the French had employed. His 5th division, 4,000

bayonets, under Major-General Zerain, was in front, and thus was the

first to meet Sebastiani’s attack. It was driven in after a sharp

skirmish, and retired a few miles to the small town of Almonacid, on

the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. On the same evening Milhaud’s

dragoons assailed the ford of Añover, drove off the small force that

was guarding it, and fell into line on Sebastiani’s left flank. On

the next morning Venegas came up with his remaining four divisions,

those of Lacy, Vigodet, Giron, and Castejon, and joined Zerain at

Almonacid. Thus both sides were concentrated for battle, save that

Joseph and his reserves, owing to the delay caused by a defile over

the narrow bridge of Toledo, were some ten miles to the rear of

Sebastiani. The Spanish army, after the deduction of men in hospital

or detached, amounted to about 23,000 men, of whom nearly 3,000 were

horse: it had forty guns. The King and Sebastiani had some 21,000

sabres and bayonets, but of these nearly 4,000 were cavalry, so that

the French army enjoyed its usual preponderance in that arm, in

numbers no less than in efficiency. Two of its infantry divisions,

those of Leval and Sebastiani, had suffered heavily at Talavera:

the rest of the infantry--Valence’s Poles and the King’s guards and

reserves--had not been engaged in that battle; all the cavalry was

equally intact[751].

[751] The French force at Almonacid stood as follows:--4th

Corps; Sebastiani’s division 6,000 men, Valence’s 4,000, Leval’s

3,000, and corps-cavalry (Merlin) 1,000. Milhaud’s dragoons had

2,200 men present; the King had brought up 600 horse and about

4,800 foot of his guards and of Dessolles’ division. The total

therefore was about 3,800 cavalry and 17,800 foot.

Both armies were prepared to fight: King Joseph had resolved that

Madrid would never be safe till the army of La Mancha had been

beaten. Venegas was eager to meet him: he had persuaded himself

that the French troops which had passed the bridge of Toledo did

not amount to more than 14,000 men, and hoped for an easy victory.

He held a council of war on the night of the tenth, and found his

subordinates as ready to fight as himself. They determined to attack

Sebastiani on the dawn of August 12, and the Commander-in-chief

exclaimed with exultation that, whatever other Spanish officers

might do, he at least would never earn the nickname of _El General

Retiradas_[752].

[752] This remark I find in the narrative of General Bouligni,

the commanding officer of engineers in the Army of La Mancha

[Arteche, vi. 370]. Venegas was aiming his sneer at Castaños and

at La Romana, who had got the nickname of ‘Marquis de la Romeria’

from his perpetual strategical movements to the rear.

The French, however, anticipated Venegas, for on the morning of

August 11, at half-past five o’clock, Sebastiani presented himself in

front of the Spanish position and opened a furious attack, without

waiting for the arrival of King Joseph and the reserve. The army of

La Mancha had therefore to fight a defensive engagement, and never

got the chance of carrying out the ambitious designs of its chief.

The battle-field of Almonacid bears a strong resemblance to that of

Ucles, where Venegas six months before had made such a deplorable

début in the character of a ‘fighting general.’ As at Ucles, the

Spanish army was arrayed on a series of eminences on each side of a

small town, with a long array of infantry and guns in its centre, and

the cavalry on the wings. As if to emphasize the resemblance, Venegas

committed his old fault of keeping no adequate reserve in hand, and

distributed his whole force in one thin line, with no more than four

battalions and two cavalry regiments drawn up in support to the rear

of the centre! The only points in which there was a marked difference

between Ucles and Almonacid was that on the latter field the eminence

on the Spanish left--a hill called Los Cerrojones--was so much higher

than the rest of the ground that it formed the key of the position,

just as the Cerro de Medellin had done at Talavera. Moreover, there

was a long hill behind Almonacid--the Cerro del Castillo--which gave

an admirable rallying-point for the army if it should be forced out

of its first fighting-ground.

The main line of the Spanish order of battle was formed, counting

from right to left, by the divisions of Vigodet (no. 2), Castejon

(no. 4), Zerain (no. 5), and Lacy (no. 1), with a brigade of the

division of Giron (no. 3) continuing the array on to the Cerrojones.

The second brigade of Giron formed the sole reserve; it was drawn up

on the Cerro del Castillo, where the ruins of the mediaeval fort that

gave the hill its name were turned to account as a place of strength.

It had two cavalry regiments in its rear: the rest of the troops of

that arm were distributed between the two flanks.

When Sebastiani came upon the field he fell upon the Spanish line

without a moment’s hesitation. Apparently he thought that delay would

only give the enemy time to rearrange his troops and strengthen his

weak points. At any rate he did not wait for the arrival of the King

and the reserve, but attacked at once. It was the same fault that

Victor had committed at Talavera, but Sebastiani was not destined

to receive the condign punishment that befell the Duke of Belluno.

Noting that the steep hill on the Spanish left was the key of the

position, he resolved to storm it before attacking the rest of the

hostile line. Accordingly he threw out Milhaud’s dragoons and his

own French division to ‘contain’ the Spanish centre and right, while

Leval’s Germans and Valence’s Poles were directed to assail the

Cerrojones. The former division turned the flank of the hill, while

the latter attacked it in front.

The Spanish brigade on the hill made a stubborn resistance, and

even held back the Poles till its flank was turned by the Germans.

Venegas sent to its aid his miserably inadequate reserve under Giron,

and some battalions drawn from the first division. But these troops

came too late, the Cerrojones were lost, and the reinforcements only

succeeded in checking the French advance behind the hill, on the

slopes between it and Almonacid. The key of the position was thus in

Sebastiani’s hands, and, seeing the Spanish centre outflanked, he let

loose upon it his French division, which drove in Lacy and Zerain,

and captured the town of Almonacid and three guns. Venegas was thus

forced to draw back his whole line, and re-formed it on the Cerro

del Castillo, which lay behind his original position. The troops

were much disordered by this retrograde movement, yet made a very

creditable effort to maintain their new ground. But King Joseph and

the reserve had now come on the field, and Dessolles’ troops were

thrown into the front line to aid the infantry of the 4th Corps.

After a stubborn fight the Spanish left and centre again broke, and

Venegas was only able to save them from complete destruction by

bringing up Vigodet’s division, which was almost intact, and throwing

it in the way of the advancing enemy. It held out long enough to

allow the main body to escape, and then followed its comrades in

retreat down the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. The French

cavalry was let loose in pursuit, but does not seem to have been so

successful in its work as had been the case at Ucles and Medellin. At

any rate the bulk of the Spaniards escaped in more or less order, and

only the stragglers were cut up.

The losses of Venegas’s army would appear to have been about 800

killed and 2,500 wounded[753], besides a considerable number of

prisoners--perhaps 2,000 in all, for Sebastiani’s dispatch giving

the figure of 4,000 cannot be trusted. The army of La Mancha had

also lost twenty-one of its forty guns, all its baggage and several

standards. Still the defeat was far less crushing than Medellin had

been, and the whole army was rallied at the passes with no great

difficulty. It had fought very creditably, as is sufficiently vouched

for by the fact that Sebastiani acknowledged a loss of 319 killed

and 2,075 wounded. The Polish division in especial had suffered very

severely while storming the Cerrojones at the opening of the combat.

[753] But see General Arteche’s calculation in vi. 392 of his

_Guerra de la Independencia_.

Thus ended the part taken by the Army of La Mancha in the Talavera

campaign. No words are too strong to use in condemnation of Venegas’s

conduct. After wrecking the plan of campaign drawn up by Wellesley

and Cuesta by his criminal slackness and timidity in July, he then

proceeded to the extreme of culpable rashness. He had ample time

to retire to the South, when his position was compromised by the

departure of the British and Estremaduran armies from Talavera.

Instead of doing so he remained behind, and courted an unnecessary

battle, in which his unskilful dispositions secured the defeat of

an army which tried to do its duty and defended itself far better

than could have been expected. He should have been court-martialled

and shot for his repeated and impudent disobedience of Cuesta’s

orders. But the Junta, conscious that they were themselves to blame

for giving him secret directions which clashed with those of the

Commander-in-chief, spared him, and only removed him from command

some weeks later, in order to replace him by Areizaga, an officer of

exactly the same level of merit and intelligence.

After his--or rather Sebastiani’s--victory at Almonacid King Joseph

established the 4th Corps in cantonments around Toledo and Aranjuez,

and sent Victor and the 1st Corps into La Mancha to observe the

passes and to contain the wrecks of Venegas’s army. He returned

himself with his guards and the reserve to Madrid on August 15,

celebrated a _Te Deum_, and published an extravagant account of

his own achievements, in which he claimed to have discomfited the

attempt of 120,000 enemies (there were but 80,000 at the most liberal

estimate) with the aid of 40,000 invincible French troops. The

co-operation of Soult’s 50,000 men was consigned to oblivion in this

extraordinary document.

The moment that he heard of the defeat of Venegas, Soult wrote to

the King, renewing the demand which he had made ten days before

for permission to invade Portugal. Now that the army of La Mancha

had been disposed of, he considered that Victor might come back to

Talavera and Almaraz, so as to set free Mortier and the 5th Corps

for the attack on Portugal. He also suggested that Ney, having put

things right at Salamanca, might now be recalled to the valley of the

Tagus, and rejoin the 2nd and 5th Corps. He supported his demands

by an unfounded assertion that Wellesley was on his march to unite

with Beresford by way of Alcantara, and asked for leave to attack the

latter before the main British army should have joined him. In a few

days more, he said, it would be too late to move, for Beresford and

Wellesley would have concentrated their forces, so that he would have

45,000 Anglo-Portuguese in his front[754].

[754] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 18, from Plasencia.

Joseph refused to listen to these arguments, and had fair reasons to

show for his negative reply to the Marshal’s requests. Wellesley, as

he truly remarked, was not marching for Alcantara to join Beresford:

he was still at Jaraicejo in close touch with the Estremaduran army.

If Mortier were removed to the Portuguese border, Wellesley and Eguia

might descend upon Victor and crush him. It was impossible to leave

less than two corps to defend the Middle Tagus. As for Ney, he could

not quit Leon, for Del Parque and the Galicians were concentrating

in great force upon his front. Indeed, he had just written to

request that the 2nd Corps might be moved up to Salamanca to support

him[755]. It was not now the time to engage in further offensive

operations either against Portugal or against Andalusia. The troops

were exhausted; the hospital of Madrid contained at the moment 12,000

sick and wounded, the cavalry was so distressed by incessant work

that few regiments could put 250 men in line. The transport was worn

out, and new horses and mules were impossible to procure, for the

King had no money with which to purchase them. Finally, and this was

the most conclusive point of all, orders had been received from the

Emperor countermanding all active operations till the hot season

should be over[756]. It was impossible to say what his intentions

might be, now that he was freed from the Austrian War. He might come

himself to Spain, or he might send large reinforcements to the King.

In any case it would be impossible to move till his will was known

and his mind made up[757].

[755] Ney to Jourdan, from Salamanca, Aug. 22.

[756] See Joseph to Clarke, Aug. 22, and Napoleon to Clarke,

Sept. 7.

[757] For a presentment of Joseph’s case see Chapter xii. of

Jourdan’s _Mémoires_.

These arguments were conclusive, and Soult was forced to remain

quiescent: all that he could do was to push small parties to Zarza

and Coria when Beresford had evacuated those places.

Thus the Talavera campaign came to an end. There was now a long

pause in the movements both of the allies and of the French. The

subsequent fighting in October belongs to a totally independent

series of operations. The combatants who had been engaged in July and

August rested in September: Soult was left at Plasencia, Mortier at

Talavera and Navalmoral, Ney at Salamanca; Victor’s head quarters

were at Daymiel in La Mancha, Sebastiani lay along the Tagus from

Aranjuez to Toledo. Of the allied troops Wellesley’s army was

cantoned about Badajoz and Merida. The Estremadurans under Eguia

covered the passages of the Tagus from Deleytosa, Jaraicejo, and

Truxillo: Venegas was reorganizing his depleted corps at his old

quarters in the passes by La Carolina. Beresford was observing Soult

from Castello Branco, and lastly, the Galicians were moving down by

divisions to join Del Parque’s forces at Ciudad Rodrigo, where a

formidable army was now beginning to be collected.

The Talavera campaign, in short, had settled nothing. The attempt

of the allies to capture Madrid had failed, but the attempt of the

French to surround Wellesley and Cuesta by Soult’s flank march had

failed also. Looking to the net results of all the fighting since

May, it could be said that the balance of loss stood against the

French. They had abandoned Galicia and the Asturias, as well as

their precarious hold on Northern Portugal. They had gained nothing,

save that their forces were concentrated in a good central position,

instead of being scattered from Corunna and Oporto as far as Merida

and Manzanares. The next move was in the hands of the Emperor: it

remained to be seen how he would deal with the situation in the

Peninsula, now that he, at last, had time to study it in detail.

Before passing on to the new series of operations which took place

in the late autumn, one minor side-issue of the Talavera campaign

remains to be narrated--the fate of the small roving column of

4,000 Spaniards and Portuguese under Sir Robert Wilson, which had

been threatening Madrid in the King’s absence, and which had caused

so many misgivings in the mind of Marshal Victor. Wilson’s doings

were to give one more proof of his extraordinary resourcefulness

and vigour, if any further evidence were needed after his masterly

handling of Lapisse in the spring. It will be remembered that on

August 4 he had slipped away from Escalona, on hearing from Wellesley

that Soult had descended upon Plasencia. He intended to join the

main army at Talavera, but on nearing that place discovered that

it had already been evacuated, and that both the British and the

Estremaduran armies had disappeared in the direction of Oropesa.

Accordingly he directed his steps to the westward, hoping to overtake

Wellesley on his march. On his way, however, he was caught up by

Villatte’s division of Victor’s corps, which had been vainly hunting

for him at Nombella and Escalona since the fifth. Thrown out of his

path by this force, Wilson turned up into the mountains, intending to

escape by the northern bank of the Tietar. He soon learnt, however,

from the peasantry that Soult had sent a brigade under Foy to look

for him in the Vera of Plasencia, and that Hugo, the governor of

Avila, had come down to hold against him the passes of Arenas and

Monbeltran. Thus ringed around with foes, he did not lose his nerve,

but turning up into the Sierra de Gredos, by a mule-path that leads

from Aldea Nueva to the upper valley of the Alagon, escaped in the

direction of Bejar. From thence he intended to strike across towards

Portugal. But a new enemy now came upon him: he had evaded Villatte

and Foy only to run into the arms of Ney, who on this day [August 12]

was preparing to cross the Puerto de Baños on his way to Salamanca.

There was still time to escape from the Marshal’s front and to retire

to Ciudad Rodrigo unmolested. But Wilson saw the rocky defile of

the Puerto in front of him, and could not resist the temptation of

holding it against the enemy, though he was well aware that with

a force of less than 4,000 men, destitute of artillery, he could

not seriously hope to repulse a whole army corps. Nevertheless he

offered battle in the pass, and fought a running fight for nine hours

against Ney’s vanguard, defending three successive positions, from

each of which he had to be expelled. In his last stand he held on too

long, and allowed the enemy to close. His four battalions were all

broken, and fled over the hills to Miranda de Castañar, where they

rallied on the next day. The Marshal acknowledged in his dispatch to

King Joseph a loss of five officers and thirty men killed, and ten

officers and 140 men wounded, which shows that he had been forced

to fight hard to clear the pass. He claimed to have ‘destroyed’

Wilson’s detachment, and declared that 1,200 Spaniards and Portuguese

had fallen. But Wilson’s returns show that his total loss, killed,

wounded, and missing, was under 400, among whom there was not a

single field officer or captain. Having assuaged his thirst for a

fight by this gallant, if unnecessary, engagement, Wilson escaped to

the Pass of Perales, and finally reached Castello Branco on August

24, where he fell in with Beresford, and was at last in safety, after

his many wanderings among the summits of the Sierra de Gredos and

the Sierra de Gata. This hazardous march was his last achievement in

the Peninsula; after a bitter quarrel with Beresford concerning the

status of his Lusitanian Legion in the Portuguese army, he sailed for

England in October, and never returned to Portugal.

APPENDICES

I

THE ‘ARMY OF THE CENTRE,’ JAN. 11, 1809

THE SPANISH ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF UCLES

[N.B.--From the Tables in Arteche, vol. v.]

The Battalions which fought at Ucles are indicated by a star *.

Vanguard Division, Major-General Duke of Albuquerque:

Corona (1st and 3rd batts.) 415, *Murcia 652, *Cantabria

(1st batt.) 315, *Provincial of Jaen 342, *Provincial of

Chinchilla 354, *Voluntarios Catalanes 499, *Cazadores de

Barbastro 221, *Campomayor 465, Tiradores de Castilla 666 = 3,929

1st Division, Lieut.-General Marquis de Coupigny:

Reyna (1st and 3rd batts.) 494, *Africa (1st and 3rd batts.)

771, *Burgos (1st and 3rd batts.) 519, 1st of Seville 193,

*3rd of Seville 106, Provincial of Granada 176, Provincial

of Bujalance 101, *Provincial of Cuenca 626, Provincial of

Ciudad Real 268, Provincial of Plasencia 180, Voluntarios

de Valencia 327, *Navas de Tolosa 542, *Tiradores de Cadiz

818 = 5,121

2nd Division, Major-General Conde de Orgaz:

*Ordenes Militares (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 848, *4th of

Seville 224, 5th of Seville 304, 1st Voluntarios de Madrid

688, Provincial de Leon 484, Provincial de Logroño 265,

*Provincial de Toro 265, Provincial de Valladolid 378,

*Baylen 472, Tiradores de España 407, *Voluntarios de

Carmona 456, Voluntarios de Ledesma 497 = 5,288

Reserve, Lieut.-General La Peña:

Spanish Guards (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,217, *Walloon Guards

(1st batt.) 425, *Granaderos Provinciales de Andalucia 522,

*Irlanda (1st batt.) 377, Granaderos del General 324,

Provincial de Cordova 622, Provincial de Guadix 391,

Provincial de Lorca 417 = 4,295

CAVALRY.

*Reyna 276, *Principe 141, *Borbon 119, *España 342,

*Santiago 74, *Tejas 131, *Pavia 428, *Lusitania 158,

*Dragones de Castilla 125, Farnesio ?, Montesa ?,

Calatrava ?, Sagunto ?, Alcantara ? = 1,814

Estimating the 5 regiments without returns at 1,000 sabres, we get

2,814 in all.

ARTILLERY 386.

*SAPPERS 383.

Total of the Army, 21,216.

Of these the following, with a strength of 11,500 men, were present

at Ucles,

Of the Vanguard 2,848

” 1st Division 2,804

” 2nd ” 1,917

” Reserve 1,634

” Cavalry 1,814

” Sappers 383

” Artillery 100

------

Total 11,500

There is a discrepancy between this total and the numbers borne

in the battalions above. It is caused by the fact that Irlanda,

Ordenes Militares, and Tiradores de Cadiz were not complete on the

battle-morning, but had companies detached.

II

THE GARRISON OF SARAGOSSA

[From the return of Jan. 1, 1809, given by Ibieca, corrected by

reference to Arteche iv. 550-1, and the Conde de Clonard, ii. 284-93.]

INFANTRY.

1st DIVISION, Brigadier-General F. BUTRON:

_Present

_Gross under

Total._ arms._

Walloon Guards 530 450

Estremadura 610 390

Granaderos de Palafox 1,005 752

Fusileros del Reyno 1,571 1,291

Don Carlos 1,014 534

Batallon del Carmen 771 661

Batallon del Portillo 834 594

Batallon de Torrero 720 485

Batallon de Calatayud 967 881

1st Ligero de Zaragoza 680 566

2nd Ligero de Zaragoza 666 546

1st Cazadores Catalanes 625 465

2nd Voluntarios de Aragon 1,200 1,060

------ -----

Divisional Total 11,193 8,675

2nd Division, Brigadier-General D. FIBALLER:

Spanish Guards 898 676

2nd of Valencia 954 726

1st Volunteers of Aragon 1,183 970

Cazadores de Fernando

VII (Aragonese) 545 345

----- -----

Divisional Total 3,580 2,717

3rd Division, Brigadier-General JOSÉ MANSO:

Peñas de San Pedro 594 241

1st of Huesca 1,274 973

Florida Blanca 352 229

1st Tiradores de Murcia 750 343

1st of Murcia 1,272 631

2nd of Murcia 1,159 477

3rd of Murcia 1,098 438

Suizos de Aragon 496 361

----- -----

Divisional Total 6,995 3,693

4th Division, Major-General F. ST. MARCH:

Voluntarios de Borbon 436 317

Voluntarios de Castilla 542 292

Voluntarios de Chelva 789 529

Voluntarios de Turia 903 483

Cazadores de Fernando

VII (Valencians) 304 190

Segorbe 412 313

Soria [Militia] 172 130

1st of Alicante 730 309

5th of Murcia 1,040 423

2nd Tiradores de Murcia 131 91

----- -----

Divisional Total 5,459 3,077

ROCA’S DIVISION of the ‘Army of the Centre’:

1st of Savoia 347 105

Orihuela 731 315

1st Cazadores de Valencia 505 275

Murcia [Militia] 633 426

America ? 148

Avila [Militia] ? 277

----- -----

Total 2,216 1,546

Details from Regiments of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions of the

‘Army of the Centre’: viz.:--

Carmona, Guadix [Militia], Voluntarios de Madrid, Ordenes

Militares, Toro (Militia) Africa, Burgos [Militia] Navas

de Tolosa, Baylen, 5th of Seville, Campomayor, Cadiz,

Cuenca, Tiradores de Cartagena, 1st of Valencia--all small

fragments of regiments which had fought at Tudela in the

left wing, but had taken refuge in Saragossa: the numbers

vary from 200 to ten men Total, perhaps 1,200

CAVALRY.

Rey, Numancia, Fuensanta, Husares de Palafox, Cazadores de

Fernando VII, Husares de Aragon. With fragments of the

following regiments of the ‘Army of the Centre’: Borbon,

Lusitania, Olivenza, Pavia, Reyna, Santiago, Tejas

Gross Total sabres, about 2,000

ARTILLERY about 1,800

ENGINEERS.

Zapadores de Aragon, ditto de Valencia, ditto de Calatayud 800

TOTALS.

_Effectives

_Gross._ Present._

Infantry of the four Aragonese Divisions 27,227 18,162

Cavalry 2,000 1,600

Artillery 1,800 1,600

Engineers 800 700

Details of the Army of the Centre 4,191 2,746

------ ------

36,018 24,808

All these are regularly organized corps. It is impossible to state the

figures of the irregulars with any certainty.

N.B.--Ibieca errs in including Doyle, La Reunion, Fieles Zaragozanos

and 3rd of Valencia in the Garrison, they were detached in Aragon, the

first at Jaca, the two next with the Marquis of Lazan. See the tables

on pp. 284-293 of vol. vi. of the Conde de Clonard’s great work.

III

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN,

FEBRUARY 1, 1809

N.B.--This return includes effective men, _présents sous les armes_,

only, not sick or detached.

1st Corps, Marshal VICTOR:

1st Division, Ruffin [9th Léger, 24th and 96th Line (three

batts. each)] 5,429

2nd Division, Lapisse [16th Léger, 8th, 45th, and 54th Line

(three batts. each)] 7,692

3rd Division, Villatte [27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, and 95th Line

(three batts. each)] 6,376

Corps-Cavalry, Beaumont [2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs] 1,386

Westphalian Chevaux-Légers 487

Artillery [with 48 guns] 1,523

État Major 33

------

Total 22,926

2nd Corps, Marshal SOULT:

1st Division, Merle [2nd and 4th Léger, 15th (four batts.

each) and 36th Line (three batts.)] 6,498

2nd Division, Mermet [31st Léger (four batts.), 47th Line

(four batts.), 122nd (four batts.), 2nd, 3rd, 4th Swiss

(one batt. each)] 5,459

3rd Division, Delaborde [17th, 70th, 86th Line (three batts.

each)] 4,954

4th Division, Heudelet [26th Line (two batts.), 66th Line

(two batts.), 15th Léger (one batt.), 32nd Léger (one

batt.), 82nd Line (one batt.), _Légion du Midi_ (one

batt.), Hanoverian Legion (one batt.), _Garde de Paris_

(one batt.)] 3,158

Corps-Cavalry, Franceschi [1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd

Chasseurs, Hanoverian Chevaux-Légers] 1,340

Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 54 guns

État Major 43

------

Total 21,452

N.B.--Lahoussaye’s Dragoons, and one brigade of Lorges’ Dragoons, were

also present with the corps, with a strength of 2,000 sabres.

3rd Corps, General JUNOT:

1st Division, Grandjean [14th Line (three batts.), 44th

Line (three batts.), 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula (two

batts. each)] 5,866

2nd Division, Musnier [114th and 115th Line (three batts.

each), 1st of the Vistula (two batts.), 2nd Legion of

Reserve] 3,544

3rd Division, Morlot [5th Léger (one batt.), 116th and

117th Line (four batts. each), 121st Line (four batts.)] 2,637

Corps-Cavalry, Wathier [13th Cuirassiers, 4th Hussars,

Polish Lancers, Provisional regiments] 1,652

Engineers and Sappers (for siege of Saragossa) 2,336

Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 40 guns

État Major 36

------

Total 16,071

4th Corps, General SEBASTIANI:

1st Division, Sebastiani [28th, 32nd, 58th, 75th Line

(three batts. each)] 5,660

2nd Division, Leval [Holland, Nassau, Baden, Hesse (two

batts. each), Frankfort (one batt.)] 3,127

3rd Division, Valence [4th, 7th, 9th Polish (two batts.

each)] 3,915

Corps-Cavalry [5th Dragoons, 3rd Dutch Hussars, Polish

Lancers] 1,781

Artillery (with 30 guns) 894

État Major 22

------

Total 15,399

5th Corps, Marshal MORTIER:

1st Division, Suchet [17th Léger, 40th, 64th, 88th Line

(three batts. each), 34th Line (four batts.)] 8,477

2nd Division, Gazan [21st, 28th, 100th, 103rd Line (three

batts. each)] 7,110

Corps-Cavalry, Delaage [10th Hussars, 21st Chasseurs] 926

Artillery (with 30 guns) 1,420

État Major 26

------

Total 17,959

6th Corps, Marshal NEY:

1st Division, Marchand [6th, 39th, 69th, 76th Line (three

batts. each)] 6,853

2nd Division, Maurice Mathieu [25th Léger, 27th, 50th,

59th (three batts. each)] 6,917

Corps-Cavalry, Lorcet [3rd Hussars, 15th Chasseurs] 840

Artillery (with 30 guns) 1,534

État Major 32

------

Total 16,176

N.B.--One brigade of Lorges’ Dragoons was also present with the corps.

7th Corps, General GOUVION ST. CYR:

1st Division, Souham [1st Léger (three batts.), 3rd Léger

(one batt.), 7th Line (two batts.), 42nd Line (three

batts.), 67th Line (one batt.)] 6,220

2nd Division, Chabran [2nd, 10th, 37th, 56th, 93rd Line,

and 2nd Swiss (one batt. each)] 4,037

3rd Division, Chabot [Chasseurs des Montagnes (one batt.),

2nd Neapolitans (two batts.)] 1,633

4th Division, Reille [2nd Line (one batt.), 32nd Léger

(one batt.), 113th Line (two batts.), 16th and 56th Line

(one batt. each), Valais (one batt.)] 3,980

5th Division, Pino [Italian 1st and 2nd Léger, 4th and 6th

Line (three batts. each), 7th Line (one batt.)] 8,008

6th Division, Lecchi [Italian 2nd, 4th, 5th Line, Velites

(one batt. each), 1st Neapolitans (two batts.)] 3,941

German Division, Morio [2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 1st Light of

Westphalia] 5,321

Cavalry, French [24th Dragoons, 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers,

3rd ditto Chasseurs] 1,730

Cavalry, Italian [Dragoons of Napoleon, Royal Chasseurs,

Chasseurs of the Prince Royal, Neapolitan Chasseurs] 1,862

Artillery, French 2,050

Artillery, Italian 585

Artillery, German 48

------

Total 39,415

RESERVE CAVALRY.

1st Division of Dragoons, Latour-Maubourg:

1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 26th Dragoons 2,527

2nd Division of Dragoons, Milhaud:

12th, 16th, 20th, 21st Dragoons 2,125

3rd Division of Dragoons, Lahoussaye:

17th, 18th, 19th, 27th Dragoons 1,335

4th Division of Dragoons, Lorges:

13th, 15th, 22nd, 25th Dragoons 1,228

5th Division of Dragoons, Millet:

3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th Dragoons 1,470

Light-Cavalry Division of Lasalle:

10th, 26th Chasseurs, 8th Dragoons 1,495

Artillery, batteries attached to the Cavalry Divisions: 712

------

Total 10,892

RESERVE AT MADRID:

Division Dessolles [12th Léger, 43rd, 51st, 55th Line

(each three batts.), 8,507; Royal Guards, 2,200; 27th

Chasseurs, 500] 11,207

GARRISONS OF THE NORTH (Marshal BESSIÈRES):

In Biscay, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Santander, Old Castile,

and Leon 19,902

GRAND PARK OF ARTILLERY 2,579

GRAND TOTAL OF ‘_Présents sous les armes_,’ 193,978.

At the same time there were Sick 56,404, Detached 36,326, Prisoners

1,843.

GROSS TOTAL of the whole army in Spain, 288,551.

IV

THE SPANISH ARMY AT MEDELLIN

Cuesta’s army at Medellin was composed of the following regiments.

It is, unfortunately, impossible to say how they were brigaded

at the moment, as the only return available is that of April 4,

when the original distribution of the army had been broken up,

and the Andalusian division distributed among the other four. The

Estremaduran battalions were very strong, some few of them ranging up

to 1,100 and even 1,400 bayonets, though others had but 500 or 700.

(1) Troops of Belvedere’s old army of Estremadura:

*Spanish Guards (4th batt.); *Walloon Guards (4th batt.); *2nd

of Majorca; *2nd Light of Catalonia; †Provincial of Badajoz;

†Provincial Grenadiers; ‡Badajoz (two batts.); ‡Zafra; ‡Truxillo;

‡Merida; ‡Plasencia; ‡La Serena; ‡Leales de Ferdinando VII (two

batts.)

Total. Fifteen batts.

(2) Troops of San Juan’s old ‘Army of Reserve of Madrid’:

Walloon Guards (2nd batt.); *Jaen (two batts.); *Irlanda (two

batts.); †Provincial of Toledo; †Provincial of Burgos; ‡2nd

Volunteers of Madrid; ‡3rd of Seville

Total. Nine batts.

(3) Troops under Albuquerque, from the Army of the Centre:

*Campomayor; †Provincial of Guadix; †Provincial of Cordova;

‡Osuna (two batts.); ‡Granaderos del General; ‡Tiradores de Cadiz

Total. Seven batts.

N.B.--Of these troops, Plasencia, Zafra, Truxillo, and the ‘Leales

de Ferdinando VII’ (two batts.) were in garrison at Badajoz and not

present in the field.

The probable strength of the infantry engaged at Medellin was about

20,000 bayonets.

CAVALRY.

(1) Old troops of the Army of Estremadura:

*4th Hussars (‘Volunteers of Spain’); *1st Hussars of Estremadura

[late Maria Luisa].

(2) Old troops of La Romana’s army, from Denmark:

*Rey; *Infante; *Almanza.

(3) New Levies:

‡Cazadores de Llerena; ‡Imperial de Toledo.

There was also present one regiment from Andalusia, which had joined

with Albuquerque, apparently *Reyna.

Eight regiments in all, with an odd squadron of Carabineros Reales

in addition. Effectives very low. Total about 3,000 or 3,200 sabres.

Several regiments had a squadron detached in Andalusia, in search of

remounts.

ARTILLERY.

Thirty guns, about 650 men; Sappers, two companies, about 200 men.

Total, about 24,000 men.

V

ORGANIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY IN 1809

The numbers are from the first complete return available, that of

Sept. 15 in the Record Office.

INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

N.B.--Each regiment consisted of two battalions of seven companies

each, which should have numbered 770 officers and men, the regiment

totalling 1,550, with staff.

_Strength._

1st Regt. (1st of Lisbon or La Lippe) 1,330

2nd Regt. (Lagos or Algarve) 1,301

3rd Regt. (1st of Olivenza[758]) 679

4th Regt. (Freire) 1,477

5th Regt. (1st of Elvas) 759

6th Regt. (1st of Oporto) 1,082

7th Regt. (Setubal) 1,312

8th Regt. (Evora) 369

9th Regt. (Viana) 1,511

10th Regt. (2nd of Lisbon) 1,370

11th Regt. (1st of Almeida) 1,498

12th Regt. (Chaves) 1,491

13th Regt. (Peniche) 1,361

14th Regt. (Tavira) 1,239

15th Regt. (2nd of Olivenza[758]) 577

16th Regt. (Viera Telles) 696

17th Regt. (2nd of Elvas) 1,218

18th Regt. (2nd of Oporto) 1,371

19th Regt. (Cascaes) 1,519

20th Regt. (Campomayor) 1,218

21st Regt. (Valenza) 193

22nd Regt. (Serpa) 1,479

23rd Regt. (2nd of Almeida) 1,521

24th Regt. (Braganza) 505

------

Total 27,076

[758] Though named from Olivenza these regiments were actually

raised in Northern Beira, with head quarters at Lamego, Olivenza

having been ceded to Spain in 1801 at the treaty of Badajoz.

CAZADORES.

N.B.--These were single-battalion corps with a proper effective of

770 men.

_Strength._

1st (Castello de Vide) 620

2nd (Moura) 425

3rd (Villa Real) 607

4th (Vizeu) 619

5th (Campomayor) 321

6th (Oporto) 560

-----

Total 3,152

The 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores were formed later, out of the three

battalions of the Lusitanian Legion. The 10th, 11th, and 12th were

raised in the year 1811.

The brigading of the Portuguese regular infantry was practically

permanent, very few changes having been made after 1810, when the

greater part of the regiments were attached in pairs to the British

divisions. The arrangement was as follows, 1811-14:--

1st Brigade 1st (Lisbon) and 16th (Viera Telles) [attached to 1st

Division].

2nd ” 2nd (Lagos) and 14th (Tavira).

3rd ” 3rd (1st of Olivenza) and 15th (2nd of Olivenza)

[attached to 5th Division].

4th ” 4th (Freire) and 10th (2nd of Lisbon) [attached

to 2nd Division].

5th ” 5th (1st of Elvas) and 17th (2nd of Elvas).

6th ” 6th (Oporto) and 18th (2nd of Oporto).

7th ” 7th (Setubal) and 19th (Cascaes) [attached to 7th

Division].

8th ” 8th (Evora) and 12th (Chaves) [attached to 6th

Division].

9th ” 9th (Viana) and 21st (Valenza) [attached to 3rd

Division].

10th ” 11th (1st of Almeida) and 23rd (2nd of Almeida)

[attached to 4th Division].

11th ” 13th (Peniche) and 24th (Braganza).

The 20th (Campomayor) and 22nd (Serpa) were never brigaded.

The 1st and 3rd Cazadores were attached to the Light Division.

The 2nd was attached to the 7th Portuguese Brigade, in the 7th Division.

The 4th was attached to the 1st Portuguese Brigade, in the 1st Division.

The 6th was attached to the 6th Portuguese Brigade.

CAVALRY.

N.B.--Each regiment should have had 594 men, in four strong squadrons.

_Strength._

1st (Alcantara Dragoons) 559

2nd (Moura) 400

3rd (Olivenza) 394

4th (Duke of Mecklenburg, Lisbon) 559

5th (Evora) 581

6th (Braganza) 578

7th (Lisbon) 564

8th (Elvas) 287

9th (Chaves) 572

10th (Santarem) 475

11th (Almeida) 482

12th (Miranda) 589

-----

Total 6,040

ARTILLERY.

Four regiments with head quarters respectively at (1) Lisbon, (2) Faro

in Algarve, (3) Estremoz in Alemtejo, (4) Oporto. The total strength

was 4,472 officers and men.

There were also a few garrison companies, largely composed of invalids,

which were mainly stationed in the forts round Lisbon. Their force is

not given in Beresford’s _General State_ of the Regular Army.

THE LUSITANIAN LEGION.

This abnormal force, under Sir Robert Wilson, comprehended in 1809-10

three battalions of infantry, with an establishment of ten companies

and 1,000 men each, one regiment of cavalry of three squadrons, which

never seems to have been complete, and one battery of field artillery.

Its total force was about 3,500 men. In 1811 the three battalions were

taken into the regular army as the 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores.

ENGINEERS.

There were a few officers of the old army, who were engaged in raising

new companies of sappers, which were not yet ready when Beresford’s

report was drawn up. No figures are there given.

It would appear then that the total Regular force of Portugal in 1809

amounted to about 33,000 foot, 6,300 horse, and 5,000 artillery.

MILITIA.

The Portuguese Militia was raised by conscription, on a local basis,

the kingdom being divided into forty-eight regions, each of which

was to supply a regiment. These districts were combined into three

divisions, called the North, South, and Centre, each of which gave

sixteen regiments. The unit was a two-battalion corps, with nominally

1,500 men in twelve companies: this number was in practice seldom

reached. It was usual to keep the battalions under arms alternately,

for periods of two, three, or six months: it was seldom that the

whole regiment was embodied at once. In 1809 the whole force was but

in process of organization, many corps had not even been officered

or armed, and the majority had not commenced to raise their second

battalion. The local distribution was as follows:--

1ST DIVISION: ‘THE SOUTH.’ Comprising Algarve, Alemtejo, and Beira

Alta.

Regiments of Lagos, Tavira, Beja, Evora, Villaviciosa,

Portalegre, Castello Branco, Idanha, Vizeu, Guarda, Trancoso,

Arouca, Tondella, Arganil, Covilhão, Lamego.

2ND DIVISION: ‘THE CENTRE.’ Comprising Estremadura and Beira Baixa.

Four Lisbon regiments, and one each from Torres Vedras, Santarem,

Thomar, Leyria, Soure, Lousão, Alcazar do Sul, Setubal, Coimbra,

Figueira, Aveiro, and Oliveira de Azemis.

3RD DIVISION: ‘THE NORTH.’ Comprising Tras-os-Montes and

Entre-Douro-e-Minho.

Regiments of Oporto, Villa de Conde, Braga, Viana, Barcelos,

Guimaraens, Penafiel, Arcos, Feira, Barca, Baltar, Mayo, Chaves,

Villa Real, Miranda and Braganza.

VI

PAPERS RELATING TO THE INTRIGUES AT OPORTO, APRIL-MAY 1809

I. GENERAL RICARD’S CIRCULAR.

_Le général Ricard, chef d’état-major du 2e corps d’armée en Espagne,

à M. le général de division Quesnel._

Oporto, le 19 avril 1809.

Mon général,

Son Excellence M. le maréchal duc de Dalmatie m’a chargé de vous écrire

pour vous faire connaître les dispositions que la grande majorité des

habitants de la province du Minho manifestent.

La ville de Braga, qui une des premières s’était portée à

l’insurrection, a été aussi la première a se prononcer pour un

changement de système, qui assurât à l’avenir le repos et la

tranquillité des familles, et l’indépendance du Portugal. Le corrégidor

que son Excellence avait nommé s’était retiré à Oporto lors du départ

des troupes françaises, dans la crainte que les nombreux émissaires que

Sylveira envoyait n’excitassent de nouveaux troubles, et n’attentassent

à sa vie. Les habitants ont alors manifesté le vœu que ce digne

magistrat leur fût renvoyé, et une députation de douze membres a été

à cet effet envoyée près de Son Excellence. Pendant ce temps les

émissaires de Sylveira étaient arrêtés et emprisonnés.

A Oporto, et à Barcelos, les habitants ont aussi manifesté les mêmes

sentiments, et tous sentent la nécessité d’avoir un appui auquel les

citoyens bien intentionnés puissent se rallier pour la défense et

le salut de la patrie, et pour la conservation des propriétés. A ce

sujet de nouvelles députations se sont présentées à Son Excellence,

pour la supplier d’approuver que le peuple de la province du Minho

manifestât authentiquement le vœu de déchéance du trône de la maison

de Bragance, et qu’en même temps S. M. l’Empereur et roi fût suppliée

de désigner un prince de sa maison, ou de son choix, pour régner en

Portugal, mais qu’en attendant que l’Empereur ait pu faire connaître

à ce sujet ses intentions, Son Excellence le duc de Dalmatie serait

prié de prendre les rênes du gouvernement, de représenter le souverain,

et de se revêtir de toutes les attributions de l’autorité suprême: le

peuple promettant et jurant de lui être fidèle, de le soutenir et de le

défendre aux dépens de la vie et de la fortune contre tout opposant,

et envers même les insurgés des autres provinces, jusqu’à l’entière

soumission du royaume.

Le maréchal a accueilli ces propositions, et il a autorisé les

corrégidors des Comarques à faire assembler les Chambres, à y appeler

des députés de tous les ordres, des corporations, et du peuple dans

les campagnes, pour dresser l’acte qui doit être fait, et y apposer

les signatures de l’universalité des citoyens. Il m’a ordonné de vous

faire part de ces dispositions, pour que, dans l’arrondissement où

vous commandez, vous en favorisiez l’exécution, et qu’ensuite vous en

propagiez l’effet sur tous les points du royaume, où vous pourrez en

faire parvenir la nouvelle.

M. le Maréchal ne s’est pas dissimulé qu’un évènement d’aussi grande

importance étonnera beaucoup de monde et doit produire des impressions

diverses; mais il n’a pas cru devoir s’arrêter à ces considérations:

son âme est trop pure pour qu’il puisse penser qu’on lui attribue aucun

projet ambitieux. Dans tout ce qu’il fait il ne voit que la gloire des

armes de Sa Majesté, le succès de l’expédition qui lui est confiée, et

le bien-être d’une nation intéressante, qui, malgré ses égarements,

est toujours digne de notre estime. Il se sent fort de l’affection de

l’armée, et il brûle du désir de la présenter à l’Empereur, glorieuse

et triomphante, ayant rempli l’engagement que Sa Majesté a elle-même

pris, de planter l’aigle impériale sur les forts de Lisbonne, après une

expédition aussi difficile que périlleuse, où tous les jours nous avons

été dans la nécessité de vaincre.

Son Excellence ne s’est pas dissimulé non plus que depuis Burgos

l’armée a eu des combats continuels à soutenir; elle a réfléchi

sur les moyens d’éviter à l’avenir les maux que cet état de guerre

occasionne, et elle n’en a pas trouvé de plus propre que celui qui lui

est offert par la grande majorité des habitants des principales villes

du Minho, d’autant plus qu’elle a l’espoir de voir propager dans les

autres provinces cet exemple, et qu’ainsi ce beau pays sera préservé

de nouvelles calamités. Les intentions de Sa Majesté seront plus tôt

et plus glorieusement remplies, et notre présence en Portugal, qui

d’abord avait été un sujet d’effroi pour les habitants, y sera vue avec

plaisir, en même temps qu’elle contribuera à neutraliser les efforts

des ennemis de l’Empereur sur cette partie du continent.

La tâche que M. le Maréchal s’impose dans cette circonstance est

immense, mais il a le courage de l’embrasser, et il croit la remplir

même avec succès, si vous voulez bien l’aider dans son exécution. Il

désire que vous propagiez les idées que je viens de vous communiquer,

que vous fassiez protéger d’une manière particulière les autorités ou

citoyens quelconques qui embrasseront le nouveau système, en mettant

les uns et les autres dans le cas de se prononcer et d’agir à l’avenir

en conséquence. Vous veillerez plus soigneusement que jamais à la

conduite de votre troupe, l’empêcherez de commettre aucun dégât ou

insulte qui pourrait irriter les habitants, et vous aurez la bonté,

monsieur le général, d’instruire fréquemment Son Excellence de l’esprit

des habitants et du résultat que vous aurez obtenu.

J’ai l’honneur de vous prier d’agréer l’hommage de mon respect et de

mon sincère attachement.

_Le général chef de l’état-major général_

_Signé_: RICARD.

Pour copie conforme à l’original resté dans les mains du général de

division Quesnel.

Paris, le 11 juillet 1809.

_Le ministre de la guerre_

Comte d’Hunebourg.

II. WELLESLEY’S ACCOUNT OF ARGENTON’S PLOT.

‘To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

‘Villa Nova, 15th May, 1809.

‘My Lord,

‘In my secret dispatch, of the 27th ultimo, I apprised your Lordship

that I had had certain communications with an Officer of the French

army, in respect to the discontent which prevailed against Marshal

Soult. I have since had further communications with the same Officer,

with the details of which I proceed to acquaint your Lordship.

‘Captain Argenton met me within the posts of the British army, between

Coimbra and Aveiro on the night of the 6th instant, accompanied by

Mons. Viana, in the presence of Lieut.-Colonel Bathurst. He informed me

that the discontent had increased, and that there were a larger number

of Officers who were determined to seize their General than when he

had last seen me. He said, however, that they were divided into two

parties, one discontented with Buonaparte himself, and determined to

carry matters to extremities against him: the other, consisting of

Loison, Laborde, and others (whom he had before mentioned as attached

to the cause of the Emperor,) were dissatisfied with Soult’s conduct,

particularly with an intention which he was supposed to entertain to

declare himself King of Portugal; and that they were determined, if

he should take that step, to seize him and to lead the army back into

France, where it was understood the Emperor wished to see it.

‘Captain Argenton then urged me again to lose no time in pressing upon

Soult, as the mode most likely to induce the more violent of the two

parties to endeavour to accomplish their purpose. But he said that if

my attack was likely to be delayed, it was desirable that I should

endeavour to prevail upon some of the towns over which I was supposed

to have influence, such as Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., to follow the example

of Oporto, and petition Soult to take upon himself the government of

the kingdom, as King; and that I even should write to him to urge the

adoption of this measure.

‘In answer to this, I told him, that I certainly should make my attack

as soon as it was in my power, but that I could not fix any day, nor

state to him the plan of my operations; and that in respect to his

propositions, regarding the measures to be adopted by me to induce

Soult to declare himself King of Portugal, they were quite out of the

question; that I could not risk the loss of the confidence of the

people of Portugal by doing what he desired in respect to the people of

Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., nor my own character by writing the letter which

he proposed I should. I told him at the same time that I considered

that, notwithstanding all that had passed between him and me, I had a

full right to take what steps I pleased, even if the Officers of the

French army should seize their General.

‘He then went away, and Mons. Viana returned with me to Coimbra, and

confirmed all the statements which Captain Argenton had made of the

discontent of the Officers of the army.

‘I heard no more of Captain Argenton till the 13th, the day after the

capture of Oporto, on which day the original orders for the arrest

and secret detention of Captain Argenton, Colonel Lafitte of the 18th

dragoons, and Colonel Donadieu of the 47th regiment of infantry, were

found among some papers sent to me by the police of the town; the order

for the arrest of the first bearing date the 9th, and of the last two

the 10th instant.

‘In a few hours afterwards, on the same day, Captain Argenton came into

Oporto, and informed me that, on the night of the day he had returned

from his last interview with me, he had been arrested, and his papers

had been seized, among which had been found the three passports which

I had given him. He said that he attributed his arrest to the General

of Division Lefevre, a man of weak intellect, to whom he had formerly

been aide de camp, and on whom he had endeavored to prevail, as he

thought successfully, to join the party. General Lefevre had, however,

informed Soult of all the circumstances, requiring only his promise

that Argenton should not be injured, and should retain his commission

and his military pretensions.

‘Soult examined him in presence of General Lefevre respecting his

accomplices, but he declined to name any, and he was sent back to

prison in charge of a Captain of Gendarmerie. This person prevailed

upon him, with promises of pardon and indemnity to all concerned, to

consent to tell Soult the names of his accomplices, which he did on the

following night, notwithstanding, as he says himself, similar promises

in his own favor, made to General Lefevre, had not been performed, and

that as soon as he had named Colonels Lafitte and Donadieu, immediate

orders were sent for their arrest and secret detention. They marched,

in confinement, with the army from Oporto on the 12th, and on the 13th,

at five o’clock in the morning, Captain Argenton made his escape, at

the desire of Colonel Lafitte, from the party of Gendarmes in whose

charge he was detained. He now declares that the conspiracy still

exists, and that sooner or later it must burst forth and fall heavily

upon the head of the usurper; and he talked of the war in Spain as

being odious to the army and to the whole nation.

‘Captain Argenton expressed a desire to return secretly to France, and

to bring to England his wife and family, she having, as he says, some

property, to enable him to live in England till the arrival of better

times in France.

‘I told him that I would send him to England when an opportunity should

offer to apply for permission to go to France; and I shall have the

honor of addressing him to your Lordship when the opportunity shall

occur of sending him.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.,

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.’

III. RÉSUMÉ DE L’AFFAIRE ARGENTON.

(This analysis of the documents in the French archives relating to the

Oporto conspiracy has been placed at my disposal by the great kindness

of Commandant Balagny.)

Le 8 mai 1809, dans la nuit, le capitaine Argenton était arrêté

à Oporto par ordre du maréchal Soult. Son arrestation avait été

provoquée par les déclarations que, dans cette même nuit du 8, le

général Lefebvre et son aide de camp Favre étaient venus faire au

maréchal. Argenton leur avait, disent-ils, fait à l’un et à l’autre,

dans la journée du 8, des confidences sur l’objet de deux voyages

successifs à Lisbonne et à Coïmbre, près des généraux anglais, et leur

avait développé le plan d’une vaste conspiration militaire, dont les

ramifications s’étendaient dans toutes les armées impériales et dans

plusieurs départements de la France. Malgré la promesse formelle qu’ils

avaient faite à Argenton de garder un secret absolu, après s’être

concertés à Richuza, ils vinrent, dans la nuit, à Oporto, et, après

avoir obtenu du maréchal une audience secrète (à 10 heures et demie du

soir), lui dévoilèrent ce que leur avait confié Argenton. Aux termes

de leurs déclarations, il aurait dit, à l’un et à l’autre séparément,

qu’il était l’agent d’un comité, composé des généraux Laborde, Loison,

Merle, Lorges, Lahoussaye, Debelle, et des colonels Donadieu, Mejean,

Lafitte, Girardin, Corsin, et dont le but était de renverser l’Empereur

pour mettre fin au régime de guerres continuelles et de perpétuelles

conscriptions, que la France était lasse de supporter pour servir

l’ambition de Napoléon. Pour réaliser ce projet, le comité devait

par son intermédiaire passer une convention avec l’armée anglaise en

Portugal. Aux termes de cette convention, l’armée française évacuerait

le Portugal, suivie de l’armée anglaise, qui l’escorterait jusqu’aux

Pyrénées, où cette dernière resterait en observation pour l’appuyer

et pour déterminer les départements du Midi à se déclarer pour le

nouvel état de choses. A la faveur de trois passe-ports, délivrés

par les généraux anglais, trois officiers français[759], dont lui,

Argenton, devaient se rendre, l’un aux armées d’Espagne, l’autre à

l’armée d’Autriche, un troisième en France, pour rallier à la cause de

l’entreprise les mécontents de l’intérieur et des armées. L’Angleterre

promettait d’appuyer de son argent le succès de l’entreprise, et

Wellesley aurait promis à Argenton 60,000 fr. pour les débuts. Le

général Moreau devait être ramené d’Amérique par un navire anglais, et

prendre, sous un titre non encore désigné, la place de Napoléon déchu.

Le maréchal Soult serait invité à se mettre à la tête du mouvement. Si

le maréchal refusait, on devait s’emparer de sa personne, de façon à ce

que son opposition ne nuisît en rien à la réussite de l’entreprise.

[759] Ces passe-ports devaient être délivrés aux noms supposés

de _Dupont_ et _Garis_, d’après les déclarations d’Argenton

lui-même, du maréchal Soult, du général Ricard, &c. L’un de ces

passe-ports devait être utilisé par le capitaine Favre, aide de

camp du général Lefebvre, qui voulait rentrer en France pour

démissionner. L’autre devait servir à un officier supérieur

_qu’Argenton ne nomme pas_, qui devait aller rendre compte de la

situation à l’Empereur.