The siege operations meanwhile were pushed on. Fresh batteries were

established to sweep the harbour, and to render more difficult the

communication of the citadel and the Trinity fort with the English

ships. A new attack was started against the eastern front of the

town, and measures were taken to concentrate a heavier fire on the

dilapidated bastion of the citadel, which had been destroyed in the

old siege of 1794 and never properly repaired. On the twenty-sixth

an assault was directed by Pino’s division against the town front.

This was defended by no more than a ditch and earthwork: the

Italians carried it at the first rush, but found more difficulty in

evicting the garrison from the ruined houses along the shore. Five

hundred _miqueletes_, who were barricaded among them, made a very

obstinate resistance, and were only driven out after sharp fighting.

One hundred and sixty were taken prisoners, less than a hundred

escaped into the citadel: the rest perished. The besiegers at once

established a lodgement in the town, covering themselves with the

masonry of the demolished houses. It was in vain that the _Fame_ and

_Impérieuse_ ran close in shore and tried to batter the Italians out

of the ruins. They inflicted considerable loss, but failed to prevent

the enemy from finding shelter. Next night the lodgement in the town

was connected with the rest of the siege works, and used as the base

for an attack against a hitherto unmolested front of the citadel.

Just after the storming of the town, the garrison received the

only succour which was sent to it during the whole siege; a weak

battalion of regulars from the regiment of Borbon was put ashore near

the citadel under cover of the darkness. It would have been more

useful on the preceding day, for the defence of the outer works.

After the arrival of this small succour the Governor, O’Daly, sent

eighty men of the Irish regiment of Ultonia to reinforce Cochrane in

the Trinity fort, withdrawing a similar number of _miqueletes_ to the

citadel.

The guns established by the besiegers in their new batteries among

the ruins of the town made such good practice upon the front of the

citadel that Reille thought it worth while on the twenty-eighth to

summon the Governor to surrender. O’Daly made a becoming answer,

to the effect that his defences were still intact and that he

was prepared to continue his resistance. To cut him off from his

communication with the sea, the only side from which he could expect

help, Reille now began to build batteries along the water-front of

the town, which commanded the landing-places below the citadel. The

English ships proved unable to subdue these new guns, and their power

to help O’Daly was seriously diminished. It was only under cover of

the darkness that they could send boats to land men or stores for

the citadel. On the thirtieth they tried to take off the sick and

wounded, who were now growing very numerous in the place: but the

shore-batteries having hit the headmost boat, the rest drew off and

abandoned the attempt. The prospects of the garrison had grown most

gloomy.

Meanwhile the Trinity fort had been perpetually battered for ten

days, and the hole in the great frontal tower was growing larger.

It can hardly be called a breach, as owing to the impossibility of

searching the lower courses of the wall by the plunging fire from the

Puig-Rom, the lowest edge of the gap was forty feet from the ground.

The part of the tower which had been opened was the upper section

of a lofty bomb-proof casemate, which composed its ground story.

Lord Cochrane built up, with the débris that fell inwards, and with

hammocks filled with earth and sand, new walls inside the bomb proof,

cutting off the hole from the interior of the tower: thus enemies

entering at the gap would find that they had only penetrated into the

upper part of a sort of cellar. The ingenious captain also set a long

slide or shoot of greased planks just under the lip of the hole, so

that any one stepping in would be precipitated thirty feet into the

bottom of the casemate. But the mere sight of this mantrap, as he

called it, proved enough for the enemy, who never pushed the attack

into it.

On November 30 Pino’s division assaulted the fort, the storming

party being composed of six grenadier and voltigeur companies of the

1st and 6th Italian regiments. They came on with great courage, and

planted their ladders below the great hole, amid a heavy fire of

musketry from the garrison. The leaders succeeded in reaching the

edge of the ‘breach,’ but finding the chasm and the ‘mantrap’ before

them, would not enter. They were all shot down: grenades were dropped

in profusion into the mass at the foot of the ladders, and after a

time the stormers fled back under cover, leaving two officers and

forty men behind them. They were rallied and brought up again to the

foot of the breach, but recoiled after a second and less desperate

attempt to enter. The garrison lost only three men killed and two

wounded, of whom four were Spaniards. They captured two prisoners,

men who had got so far forward that they dared not go back under the

terrible fire which swept the foot of the tower. These unfortunates

had to be taken into the fort by a rope, so inaccessible was the

supposed breach. After this bloody repulse, the besiegers left Lord

Cochrane alone, merely continuing to bombard his tower, and throwing

up entrenchments on the beach, from which they kept up an incessant

musketry fire on the difficult landing-place by which the fort

communicated with the ships.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF UCLÉS

JANUARY 13TH 1809]

[Illustration: SIEGE OF ROSAS

NOV. 6 TO DEC. 5 1809]

Their main attention was now turned to the citadel, where O’Daly’s

position was growing hopeless. ‘Their practice,’ says Cochrane, ‘was

beautiful. So accurately was their artillery conducted that every

discharge “ruled a straight line” along the lower part of the walls.

This being repeated till the upper portion was without support, as

a matter of course the whole fell into the ditch, forming a breach

of easy ascent. The whole proceedings were clearly visible from the

Trinity[59].’ On December 3 the Governor played his last card: the

worst of the damage was being done by the advanced batteries placed

among the ruins of the town, and it was from this point that the

impending assault would evidently be delivered. O’Daly therefore

picked 500 of his best men, opened a postern gate, and launched

them at night upon the besiegers’ works. The sortie was delivered

with great dash and vigour: the trench guards were swept away, the

breaching batteries were seized, and the Spaniards began to throw

down the parapets, spike the guns, and set fire to the platforms and

fascines. But heavy reserves came up from the French camp, and their

attack could not be resisted. Before any very serious damage had been

done, the besieged were driven out of the trenches by sheer force of

numbers, and forced to retire to the citadel, leaving forty-five dead

behind them. Reille acknowledged the loss of one officer and twelve

men killed, and nineteen men wounded.

[59] Cochrane, _Autobiography_, i. 307.

On the fourth the siege works were pushed forward to within 200 yards

of the walls of the citadel, and the breach already established

in the dilapidated bastion was enlarged to a great breadth. After

dark the French engineers got forward as far as the counterscarp,

and reported that an assault was practicable, and could hardly

fail. The same fact was perfectly evident to O’Daly, who sent out a

_parlementaire_ to ask for terms. He offered to surrender in return

for leave to take his garrison off by sea. Reille naturally refused,

as the Spaniards were at his mercy, and enforced an unconditional

surrender.

The state of things being visible to Lord Cochrane on the next

morning, he hastily evacuated the Trinity fort, which it was useless

to hold after the citadel had fallen. His garrison, 100 Spaniards and

eighty British sailors and marines, had to descend from the fort by

rope ladders, as the enemy commanded the proper point of embarkation.

They were taken off by the boats of the _Fame_ and _Impérieuse_ under

a heavy musketry fire, but suffered no appreciable loss. The magazine

was left with a slow match burning, and exploded, ruining the fort,

before the garrison had got on board their ships.

St. Cyr, in his journal of the war in Catalonia, suggests that

Bennett and Cochrane ought to have tried to take off the garrison of

the citadel in the same fashion. But this was practically impossible:

the communication between the citadel and the sea had been lost

for some days, the French batteries along the beach rendering

the approach of boats too dangerous to be attempted. If Captain

Bennett had sent in the limited supply of boats that the _Fame_, the

_Impérieuse_ and the two smaller vessels[60] possessed they would

probably have been destroyed. For they would have had to make many

return journeys in order to remove 2,500 men, under the fire of heavy

guns placed only 200 or 300 yards away from the landing-place. It

was quite another thing to remove 180 men from the Trinity, where

the enemy could bring practically nothing but musketry to bear, and

where the whole of the garrison could be taken off at a single trip.

Another futile charge made by the French against the British navy, is

that the _Fame_ shelled the beach near the citadel while the captive

garrison was marching out, and killed several of the unfortunate

Spaniards. If the incident happened at all (there is no mention of

it in Lord Cochrane or in James) it must have been due to an attempt

to damage the French trenches; Captain Bennett could not have known

that the passing column consisted of Spaniards. To insinuate that the

mistake was deliberate, as does Belmas, is simply malicious[61].

[60] These were the two bomb-vessels _Meteor_ and _Lucifer_. The

_Magnificent_ 74 came up the same day, but after the evacuation

of the Trinity.

[61] St. Cyr does not say so (p. 50), but only that the Spaniards

imagined that it was done deliberately. Belmas (p. ii. 453) asks

if it was not irritation on the part of the British. Arteche does

not repulse the silly suggestion, as he reasonably might (iv.

270).

O’Daly went into captivity with 2,366 men, leaving about 400 more

in hospital. The total of the troops who had taken part in the

defence, including the reinforcements received by sea, had been about

3,500, so that about 700 must have perished in the siege. The French

loss had been at least as great--Pino’s division alone lost thirty

officers and 400 men killed and wounded[62], besides many sick. It

is probable that the total diminution in the ranks of Reille’s two

divisions was over 1,000, the bad weather having told very heavily on

the ill-equipped troops.

[62] Belmas, ii. 454, and Vacani, ii. 315, agree in these figures.

So ended an honourable if not a very desperate defence. The place

was doomed from the first, when once the torpid and purblind Vives

had made up his mind to keep his whole force concentrated round

Barcelona, and to send no more than the insignificant division of

Alvarez and Lazan to the help of O’Daly. Considering the dilapidated

condition of the citadel of Rosas, and the almost untenable state of

the town section of the fortifications, the only wonder is that the

French did not break in at an earlier date. The first approaches of

Reille’s engineers were, according to Belmas, unskilfully conducted,

and pushed too much into the marsh. When once they received a right

direction, the result was inevitable. Even had the artillery failed

to do its work Rosas must nevertheless have fallen within a few days,

for it was insufficiently provisioned, and, as the communication

with the sea had been cut off since November 30, must have yielded

ere long to starvation. The French found an ample store of guns

(fifty-eight pieces) and much ammunition in the place, but an utterly

inadequate supply of food.

[N.B.--Belmas, St. Cyr, and Arteche have all numerous slips in their

narration, from not having used the British authorities. Vacani’s

account is, on the whole, the best on the French side. Much may be

learnt from James’s _Naval History_, vol. v, but more from Lord

Cochrane’s picturesque autobiography. From this, e.g., alone can

it be ascertained that the column which attacked the Puig-Rom on

November 23 was composed of _miqueletes_, not of British soldiers.

Cochrane is represented by several writers as arriving on the

twenty-fourth or even the twenty-sixth, while as a matter of fact

he reached Rosas on the twenty-first. It may interest some to know

that Captain Marryat, the novelist, served under Cochrane, and

was mentioned in his dispatch. So the description of the siege of

Rosas in Marryat’s _Frank Mildmay_, wherein his captain is so much

glorified, is a genuine personal reminiscence, and not an invention

of fiction.]

SECTION X: CHAPTER II

ST. CYR RELIEVES BARCELONA: BATTLES OF CARDADEU AND MOLINS DE REY

When Rosas had fallen St. Cyr was at last able to take in hand the

main operation which had been entrusted to him by Napoleon--the

relief of Barcelona. While the siege was still in progress he had

received two letters bidding him hasten to the relief of Duhesme

without delay[63], but he had taken upon himself the responsibility

of writing back that he must clear his flank and rear before he dared

move, and that he should proceed with the leaguer of Rosas, which

could only last a few days longer, unless he received formal orders

to abandon the undertaking. He ventured to point out that the moral

and political effects of taking such a step would be deplorable[64].

Napoleon’s silence gave consent, and St. Cyr’s plea was justified by

the fall of the place on December 5.

[63] Berthier to St. Cyr, Burgos, Nov. 13. ‘Si Roses tarde à être

pris, il faut marcher sur Barcelone sans s’inquiéter de cette

place, &c.,’ and much to same effect from Coubo, Nov. 16 [wrongly

printed in St. Cyr, Nov. 10].

[64] St. Cyr to the Emperor, Nov. 17, from Figueras.

Rosas having been captured, the French general had now at his

disposition all his four divisions, those of Souham, Pino, Reille,

and Chabot, which even after deducting the casualties suffered in

the siege, and the losses experienced by the covering troops from

the bad weather, still amounted to 22,000 men. After counting up

the very considerable forces which the Spaniards might place in his

way, he resolved to take on with him for the relief of Barcelona

the troops of Souham, Pino, and Chabot, and to leave behind only

those of Reille. With about 5,000 or 5,500 soldiers of not very good

quality that officer was to hold Figueras and Rosas, watch Gerona,

and protect the high-road to Perpignan. St. Cyr himself with the

twenty-six battalions and nine squadrons forming the other three

divisions, a force of some 15,000 infantry and 1,500 horse, took his

way to the south.

The first obstacle in his way was Gerona: but if he stopped to

besiege and take it, it was clear that he would never reach Barcelona

in time to save Duhesme from starvation: that general had reported

that his food would only last till the end of December, and Gerona

would certainly hold out more than three weeks. Indeed, as we shall

see, when it was actually beleaguered in the next year, it made a

desperate defence, lasting for nearly six months[65]. St. Cyr saw

from the first that he must leave the fortress alone, and slip past

it. As it commanded the high-road, this resolution forced him to

abandon any intention of taking forward his artillery and his wheeled

transport. They could not face the rugged by-paths on to which he

would be compelled to throw himself, and he marched without a single

gun, and with his food and provisions borne on pack-horses and mules,

of which he had a very modest provision.

[65] May 30 to Dec. 10, 1809.

St. Cyr was quite well aware that if General Vives were to resign

the blockade of Barcelona to his _miqueletes_ and _somatenes_, and

to come against him with his whole army, the task of relieving

Duhesme would be dangerous if not impossible. There are but two

roads from Gerona to Barcelona, and across each of them lie half a

dozen positions which, if entrenched and held by superior numbers,

he could not hope to force. These two routes are the coast-road

by Mataro and Arens de Mar--which the French had used for their

first march to Gerona in August--and the inland road up the valley

of the Besos by Hostalrich and Granollers. But the former had

been so conscientiously destroyed by Lord Cochrane and the local

_somatenes_[66] that St. Cyr regarded it as impassable; there were

places where it had been blasted away for lengths of a quarter or

a half of a mile. Moreover, at many points the army would have to

defile under the cliffs for long distances, and might be shelled by

any British men-of-war that should happen to lie off the coast[67].

Accordingly the French general determined to try the inland road,

though he would have to march round Gerona and the smaller fortress

of Hostalrich, and though it was cut by several admirable positions,

where the Catalans might offer battle with reasonable prospects of

success. It was all-important that Vives should be left as long as

possible in uncertainty as to his adversary’s next move, and that the

Catalans should be dealt with in detail rather than in mass. St. Cyr

resolved, therefore, to make a show of attacking Gerona, and to try

whether he could not catch Lazan and Alvarez, and rout them, before

the Captain-General should come up to their assistance.

[66] See vol. i. p. 331.

[67] St. Cyr, _Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne_, p. 58.

On December 9, therefore, St. Cyr had his whole corps, minus the

division of Reille, concentrated on the left bank of the river Ter.

On the next day he manœuvred as if about to envelop Gerona. He had

hoped that this move would tempt Lazan and Alvarez to come out and

meet him in the open. But fully conscious that their 8,000 men would

be exposed to inevitable defeat, the two Spanish officers wisely kept

quiet under the walls of their stronghold. Having worked round their

flank, St. Cyr on the eleventh sent back the whole of his artillery

and heavy baggage to Figueras, and plunged into the mountains; at La

Bispal he distributed four days’ biscuit to his men, warning them

that there would be no further issue of rations till they reached

Barcelona. The light carts which had been dragged thus far with the

food were burnt. As to munitions, each soldier had fifty cartridges

in his pouch, and the pack-mules carried 150,000 more, a reserve

of only ten rounds for each man[68]. The equipment of the army, in

short, was such that if it failed to force its way to Barcelona

within six days it must starve, while if it was forced to fight

three or four heavy engagements it would be left helpless, without

a cartridge for a final battle. The general, if not the men in the

ranks, fully realized the peril of the situation.

[68] St. Cyr says that Napoleon falsified his report, when

reprinting it in the _Moniteur_, and put 150 instead of 50 rounds

per man, to disguise the risk that had been run (p. 58).

On the twelfth St. Cyr pushed along the mountains above Palamos and

San Feliu, brushing away a body of _miqueletes_ from the coast-land

under Juan Claros, who tried to hold the defile. On the thirteenth

the French reached Vidreras, where they were again on a decent road,

that which goes from Gerona to Malgrat. They now perceived that

they were being followed by Lazan and the garrison of Gerona, whose

camp-fires were visible on the heights to the north, while troops,

evidently detached from the blockade of Barcelona, were visible in

front of them. It was clear that St. Cyr had at least succeeded in

placing himself between the two main forces which the enemy could

oppose to him, and might engage them separately. He might also count

on the Spaniards looking for him on the Malgrat-Mataro road, on

which he was now established, while it was his intention to abandon

it, in order to plunge inland once more, and to fall into the main

_chaussée_ to Barcelona, south of Hostalrich. That a path existed,

along which such a movement could be carried out, was only known to

the general by the report of a Perpignan smuggler, who had once kept

sheep among these hills. But when exploring parties tried to find

it, they lost their way, and reported that no such route existed. If

this was the fact, St. Cyr was ruined: but he refused to believe the

officers who assured him that the smuggler had erred, and pushing

among the rocks finally discovered it himself. During his exploration

he was nearly cut off by a party of _somatenes_, and his escort had

to fight hard in order to save him.

But the road was found, and on the fifteenth the army followed it,

almost in single file, while the dragoons had to dismount and lead

their horses. They saw the fortress of Hostalrich in the valley below

them, and passed it in sight of the garrison. Some of the latter came

out, and skirmished with the rearguard of St. Cyr’s long column,

but they were too weak to do much harm, while Lazan, whose advent

from the north would have caused more serious difficulties, had been

completely eluded, and never came in sight.

In the afternoon the whole expeditionary force safely descended into

the Barcelona _chaussée_ near San Celoni, from which place they drove

out four battalions of _miqueletes_, the first troops that the tardy

Vives had detached from his main army. The men were much fatigued,

and the _somatenes_ were beginning to give trouble both in flank and

rear, but St. Cyr insisted that they should not encamp by San Celoni,

but push southward through the difficult defile of the Trentapassos,

so that they might not find it held against them on the following

morning. This was done, and the best of the many positions which

the Spaniards might have held to oppose the march of the invaders

was occupied without the least resistance. St. Cyr encamped at the

southern end of the pass, and saw before him, when the night had

fallen, a line of watch-fires far down the valley of the Besos which

showed that the Spaniards from the leaguer of Barcelona had at last

come out to oppose him.

The conduct of Vives during the last six days had been in perfect

keeping with the rest of his slow and stupid guidance of the

campaign. He had received in due course news of the fall of Rosas,

and soon after the additional information that St. Cyr had crossed

the Ter and was threatening Gerona. Opinion was divided in the camp

of the Catalans as to whether the French were about to lay siege to

that fortress, or to pass it by and make a dash for the relief of

Duhesme. If they sat down before Gerona there was no need to hurry:

if they should pass it by, it would be necessary to move at once,

in order to occupy the defiles against them. The opinion of the

more intelligent officers was that St. Cyr would be forced to march

to aid Duhesme, whose want of provisions was well known by secret

intelligence sent out from Barcelona. Unfortunately Vives inclined

to the other side: he preferred to believe the alternative which did

not impose on him the necessity for instant and decisive action. He

did nothing, and pretended to be waiting for further news. It reached

him on the night of December 11-12, in the form of a message from the

Junta of Gerona, to the effect that the French had sent back their

artillery and were plunging into the mountains in the direction of La

Bispal, so that it was clear that they must be marching to relieve

Duhesme. It might have been expected that the Captain-General would

now at last break up from his lines, and hasten to throw himself

across the path of the approaching enemy. But after holding a long

and fruitless council of war he contented himself with sending

out Reding, with that part of the newly-arrived Granadan division

which had reached Catalonia. On the twelfth therefore the Swiss

General started by the inland road with seven battalions of his own

Andalusian levies and a regiment of cavalry. Next day he reached

Granollers and halted there. At the same time Francisco Milans, with

four tercios of _miqueletes_, was sent out to guard the coast-road,

the other possible line of approach by which St. Cyr might arrive.

Reding had 5,000 men, Milans 3,000: but Vives still lay before

Barcelona with two-thirds of his army, at least 16,000 or 17,000

bayonets. It was in vain that Caldagues, the preserver of Gerona,

implored him to leave no more than a screen of _miqueletes_ in the

lines, and to sally forth to fight with every regular soldier that he

could muster. The Captain-General refused to listen, supporting his

inactivity by pleading that the advice sent from Gerona did not speak

of the enemy’s force as very large: the defiles, he urged, were so

difficult that Reding and Milans, aided by Lazan, ought to be able to

hold them against any small expeditionary force.

Thus St. Cyr was left to work out his daring plan without any serious

opposition. The only force with which he came in contact was Milans’

brigade of _miqueletes_, who, finding the coast-road clear, had

crossed the mountains and occupied San Celoni. These were the troops

whom St. Cyr drove away on the afternoon of the fifteenth, before

entering the defile of the Trentapassos.

On receiving news of this combat, which had taken place only

twenty-one miles from his lines, Vives at last set out in person.

But persisting in his idiotic notion of blocking Barcelona to the

last moment, he left Caldagues before the place with 12,000 men,

and marched with a single brigade of 4,000 bayonets to join Reding.

Moving all through the night of the fifteenth-sixteenth he joined

the Granadans at daybreak at Cardadeu on the high-road. Their united

strength was only 9,000 men, of whom 600 were cavalry, and seven

guns[69]. This was the whole force which fought St. Cyr, for Lazan,

moving with culpable slowness, was still far north of San Celoni,

when he should have been pressing on the rear of the French, while

Milans with the _miqueletes_, who had been beaten on the previous

day, was some miles away in the mountains on the right, and quite out

of touch with his commander-in-chief. Nine thousand Spaniards, in

short, were within ten miles of the field, yet took no part in the

battle. St. Cyr in his central position kept them apart, and they

failed to combine with Vives and his force at Cardadeu.

[69] Cf. Cabanes, with Arteche, iv. 276.

The valley of the Besos at this point has broadened out, and is

no longer the narrow defile that is seen a few miles further to

the north. But there is much broken ground on both sides of the

high-road. A little way north of Cardadeu is a low hill covered with

pines, lying to the right of the _chaussée_: at the foot of the hill

is a ravine which the road has to cross at right angles, and which

falls into the stream called the Riera de la Roca. The country-side

was composed partly of cultivated ground, partly of thickets of pine

and oak, which rendered it difficult for either side to get a general

view of its adversaries’ movements.

Vives, who had only reached his fighting-ground at dawn, had no time

to reconnoitre his position, or to make any elaborate scheme for

getting the best use out of the _terrain_. He hastily drew up his

army in two lines across the high-road: the front line was behind

the ravine, the second higher up on the pine-clad hill. Reding’s

troops held the right wing on the lowest ground, and extended as

far as the river Mogent, a branch of the Besos. Vives’ own Catalan

regiments formed the centre and left: they were mainly placed on the

hill commanding the road, with three guns in front of their centre,

and two further to the left on a point from which they could enfilade

a turn of the _chaussée_. The _miqueletes_ of Vich, on the extreme

left, held a spur of the higher mountains which bound the valley of

the Besos. The reserve drawn up on the high-road, behind the main

position, consisted of two guns, two squadrons of horse (Husares

Españoles, lately arrived from Majorca) and two battalions.

St. Cyr could make out very little of his adversaries’ force or

position; the woods and hills masked the greater part of the

Spanish line. But he knew that he must attack, and that promptly,

for every hour that he delayed would give time for Lazan to come

up in his rear, and Milans on his left flank. He left behind him

at the southern outlet of the Trentapassos the three battalions

of Chabot’s division, with orders to hold the defile at all costs

against Lazan, whenever the latter should appear. With the other

twenty-three battalions forming the divisions of Pino and Souham

he marched down the high-road to deal with Vives. It was necessary

to attack at once: ‘the biscuit distributed at La Bispal was just

finished: the cartridges were running low, for many had been spent

in the preceding skirmishes. There was, in fact, only ammunition

for one hour of battle[70].’ St. Cyr saw that he must win by one

short and swift stroke, or suffer a complete disaster. Accordingly,

he had resolved to form his two strong divisions--more than 13,000

men--into one great column, which was to charge the Spanish centre

and burst through by its own impetus and momentum. Pino’s thirteen

Italian battalions formed the head of the mass: Souham’s ten French

battalions its rear. The General’s plan is best expressed in his

own words: his orders to Pino, who was to lead the attack, ran as

follows:--

[70] St. Cyr, _Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne_, p. 64.

‘The corps must fight in the order in which I have arranged it this

morning. There is neither time nor means to make dispositions to

beat the Spaniards more or less thoroughly. The country-side is so

broken and wooded that it would take three hours to reconnoitre

their position, and in two hours Lazan may be on the spot attacking

our rear. Not a minute can be lost: we must simply rush at and

trample down[71] the corps in our front, whatever its strength may

be. Our food is done, our ammunition almost exhausted. The enemy

has artillery, which is a reason the more for haste: the quicker we

attack, the less time will he have to shell us. There must be no

attempt to feel his position; not one battalion must be deployed.

Though his position is strong we must go straight at it in column,

and burst through the centre by striking at that one point with our

whole force. The enemy must be given no time to prepare his defence

or bring up his reserves. You must not change the disposition in

column in which we march, even in order to take great numbers of

prisoners. Our sole end is to break through and to get as close as we

can to Barcelona this evening. Our camp-fires must be visible to the

garrison by night, to show that we are at hand to raise the siege.’

[71] ‘Il faut passer sur le ventre au corps de troupes en face,

quel que soit son nombre.’ St. Cyr, p. 66.

This order of battle was most hazardous: if St. Cyr had found in

front of him two steady English divisions instead of Reding’s raw

Granadan levies and the gallant but untrained Catalan _miqueletes_,

it is certain that affairs would have gone as at Busaco or Talavera.

Dense columns attacking a fair position held by good troops in line

are bound to suffer terrible losses, and ought never to succeed. But

St. Cyr knew the enemies with whom he had to deal, and his method

was well adapted to his end. If he ran some risk of failing at the

commencement of the action, it was simply because his subordinates

did not follow out his directions.

General Pino, on whom the responsibility of opening the attack

devolved, started with every intention of obedience. But when he

arrived at the foot of the Spanish position, and the balls began to

fall thickly among his leading battalions, he lost his head. His

column only faced the Spanish right centre, and the heavy flanking

fire from the hostile wings daunted him. Instead of pushing straight

before him with his whole force, as St. Cyr had ordered, he threw

out five battalions of Mazzuchelli’s brigade to his left[72], and

two battalions under General Fontane to his extreme right[73]; the

six battalions of his rear brigade were not yet up to the front,

and took no part in the first assault. Thus he attacked on a front

of three-quarters of a mile, instead of at one single point. His

columns, after driving in the Spanish front line, came to a stand

half-way up the hill, in a very irregular array, the flanks thrown

forward, the centre hanging somewhat back. Reding, against whom the

main attack of Mazzuchelli’s brigade had been directed, brought up

his second line, and when the Italians were slackening in their

advance hurled at them two squadrons of hussars, and led forward his

whole division. The assailants broke, and fell back with loss.

[72] Three battalions of the 4th of the line, and two of the 2nd

Light Infantry.

[73] One battalion of the 2nd Light Infantry and one of the 7th

of the line.

St. Cyr, coming up to the front at this moment, was horrified to

mark the results of Pino’s disobedience of his orders. But he had

still Souham’s division in hand, and flung it, in one solid mass of

ten battalions, upon Reding’s right; at the same time he commanded

Pino to throw the two regiments of his intact rear brigade upon

the Spanish centre[74], while Fontane’s two battalions continued

to demonstrate against the enemy’s left. The result was what might

have been expected: the column of Souham burst through the Granadan

division, and completely routed the right wing of the Spanish army:

at the same moment Pino’s main column forced back Vives and the

Catalans along the line of the high-road. All at once fell into

confusion, and, when St. Cyr bade his two Italian cavalry regiments

charge up the _chaussée_, the enemy broke his ranks and fled to

the hills. Five of the seven Spanish guns were captured, with two

standards and some 1,500 unwounded prisoners. Reding, who stayed

behind to the last, trying to rally a rearguard for the protection

of the routed host, was nearly taken prisoner, and had to draw his

sword and cut his way out. Vives, whose conduct on this day was

anything but creditable, scrambled up a cliff after turning his horse

loose, and came almost alone to the sea-shore near Mongat, where he

was picked up by the boats of the _Cambrian_ frigate, and forwarded

to Tarragona. Besides the prisoners the Spaniards lost at least a

thousand men, and many of the _miqueletes_ dispersed to their homes.

St. Cyr acknowledged 600 casualties, nearly all of them, as might

have been expected, in Pino’s division.

[74] Three battalions each of the 1st and 6th of the line.

Reding at last succeeded in rallying some troops at Monmalo near San

Culgat, and covered the retreat of the main mass of the fugitives

to join the troops who had been left in the lines before Barcelona.

As to the detached Spanish corps under Milans and the Marquis of

Lazan, the former never came down from the hills till the fighting

was over, though it was only four or five miles from the scene of

action[75]. The latter, which was following in St. Cyr’s rear, moved

with such extreme slowness that it had not yet reached San Celoni

when the battle was fought, and did not even get into contact with

Chabot’s division, which had been left behind to guard against its

approach[76]. On learning of the defeat the Marquis marched back to

Gerona, and rejoined Alvarez. Thus Vives got no assistance whatever

from his outlying corps: if Lazan is to be trusted, this was largely

the fault of the Commander-in-chief himself, for no dispatch from

him reached his subordinates after December 14, and they had no

knowledge of his movements or designs.

[75] See the account of Cabanes, who was with Milans this day, in

his _History of the War in Catalonia_.

[76] See the narrative of an officer in the division of Lazan,

printed by Cabanes as an appendix.

Meanwhile Caldagues, who had been left in charge of the blockade, had

maintained his post, and repulsed a heavy sortie which Duhesme and

the garrison had directed against his posts on the sixteenth. But

when the news of the battle of Cardadeu reached him in the evening,

he evacuated all the parts of his line which lay to the east of the

Llobregat, and concentrated his 12,000 men at Molins de Rey and San

Boy, on the further bank of that river. He was forced to abandon at

Sarria the large dépôt of provisions from which the left wing of the

investing force had been fed.

The road from Cardadeu and San Culgat to Barcelona being thus left

open, St. Cyr marched in triumph into Barcelona on the morning of the

seventeenth. He complains in his memoirs that he did not discover

one single vedette from the garrison pushed out to meet him, and

that Duhesme did not come forth to receive him, or give him a single

word of thanks. Indeed, when the Governor at last presented himself

to meet the commander of the Seventh Corps, he spent his first words

not in expressing his appreciation for the service which had been

rendered him, but in demonstrating that he had never been in danger,

and could have held out for six weeks more. He was somewhat abashed

when St. Cyr replied by presenting him with a copy of one of his own

former dispatches to Berthier, which painted the condition of the

garrison in the blackest colours, and asked for instant succours lest

the worst might happen[77].

[77] St. Cyr, as any reader of his _Mémoires_ can see, was

malicious and sarcastic. But Duhesme has a bad reputation for

carelessness and selfishness, and his writings make an even worse

impression than those of St. Cyr. Probably the latter’s narrative

is fairly correct.

It was clear that the two generals would not work well together, but

as St. Cyr held the supreme command, and was determined to assert

himself, Duhesme could do no more than sulk in silence. The conduct

of the operations against the Catalans had been taken completely out

of his hands.

St. Cyr’s daring march to Barcelona had been crowned with complete

success. It was by far the most brilliant operation on the French

side during the first year of the war. That it was perilous cannot

be denied: if the commander of the Seventh Corps had found the

whole army of Vives entrenched at the passage of the Tordera, or

across the defile of the Trentapassos, it seems impossible that he

could have got forward to Barcelona. Thirty thousand men, of whom

half were regular troops, might have been opposed to him, and they

could have brought artillery against him, while he had not a single

piece. If once checked he must have retreated in haste, for he had

only ammunition for a single battle. But the rapid and unexpected

character of his movements entirely puzzled the enemy, and he was

fortunate in having a Vives to contend against. ‘When the enemy has

no general,’ as Schepeler remarks while commenting on this campaign,

‘any stroke of luck is possible.’ Against a capable officer St. Cyr

would probably have failed, but he had a shrewd suspicion of the

character of his opponent from what had happened during the siege

of Rosas: he dared much, and his daring was rewarded by a splendid

victory.

The campaign, however, was not yet completed. Barcelona had been

relieved, but only a fraction of the Spanish army had been met and

beaten. Caldagues lay behind the Llobregat with 11,000[78] men who

had not yet been engaged. Reding had joined him with the wrecks of

the troops which had fought at Cardadeu, some 3,000 or 4,000 men.

They lined the eastern bank of the river, only six or seven miles

from the suburbs of Barcelona, occupying the entrenchments which

had been constructed to shut in Duhesme during the blockade. These

were strengthened with several redoubts, some of them armed with

heavy artillery, and the positions were good, but too extensive

for a force of 14,000 or 15,000 men. Their weak point was that the

Llobregat even in December is fordable in many places, and that if

the French attacked in mass at one point they were almost certain

of being able to force their way through the line. Reding, and his

second-in-command Caldagues, were both of opinion that it would be

wise to evacuate the lines, if St. Cyr should come out in force

against them, and to fall back on the mountains in their rear,

which separate the valley of the Llobregat from the coast-plain of

Tarragona. Here there was a strong position at the defile of Ordal,

where it was intended to construct an entrenched camp. But there was

a strong temptation to hold on in the old lines for as long a time

as possible, for by retiring to Ordal the army would leave open the

high-road to Lerida and Saragossa, and give up much of the plain to

the incursions of the French foragers. Reding sent back to Vives,

who had now landed in his rear and placed himself at Villanueva de

Sitjas, to ask whether he was to retreat at once, or to hold his

ground. The Captain-General sent back the inconclusive reply that

‘he might fall back on Ordal if he could not defend the line of the

Llobregat.’ Thus he threw back the responsibility on his subordinate,

and Reding, anxious to vindicate his courage before the eyes of the

Catalans, resolved after some hesitation to retain his positions,

though he had grave doubts of the possibility of resistance.

[78] Some of his _miqueletes_ had absconded during the withdrawal

from the eastern half of the river.

He was not allowed much time to ponder over the situation. The reply

of Vives only reached him on the night of December 20-21. On the next

morning St. Cyr came out of Barcelona and attacked the lines. He

had brought with him every available man: Duhesme had been left to

hold the city with Lecchi’s Italians alone: his other division (that

of Chabran), together with the three which had formed the army of

succour--those of Souham, Pino, and Chabot--were all directed against

the lines. The plan of St. Cyr was to demonstrate against the bridge

of Molins de Rey, the strongest part of the Spanish position, with

Chabran’s 4,000 men, while he himself crossed the fords lower down

the Llobregat with the 14,000 bayonets of the other three divisions,

and turned the right flank of the enemy.

At five o’clock on a miserable gusty December morning the French

came down towards the river: Chabran led off by making a noisy

demonstration opposite the redoubts at the bridge, on the northern

flank of the position. This, as St. Cyr had intended, drew Reding’s

attention to that flank: he reinforced his left with troops drawn

from his right wing on the lower and easier ground down stream. An

hour later the other attacking columns advanced, that of Souham

crossing the ford of San Juan Despi, while Pino and Chabot passed

by that of San Feliu. No proper attempt was made to dispute their

advance. Outnumbered, and strung out along a very extensive position,

the Catalans soon saw their line broken in several places. The only

serious opposition made was by the centre, which advanced down hill

against Souham and tried to charge him, but gave back long before

bayonets had been crossed.

The most fatal part of Reding’s position was that on his extreme

right Chabot’s three battalions had got completely round his flank,

and kept edging in on the rear of his southern wing, which abandoned

hill after hill as it saw its retreat threatened. Pino and Souham

had only to press on, and each regiment in their front gave way in

turn when it saw its exposed flank in danger. At last the whole of

the Spanish right and centre was pushed back in disorder on to the

still intact left behind the bridge of Molins de Rey. Now was the

time for Chabran to turn his demonstration into a real attack: if

he had crossed the river and advanced rapidly, he would have caught

the shaken masses in front, while the rest of the army chased them

forward into his arms. But being timid or unenterprising, he let the

flying enemy pass across his front unmolested, and only forded the

river when they had gone too far to be caught. The unhappy Vives came

up at this moment, just in time to see his whole army on the run, and

headed their flight to the hills.

Thus the Spaniards got away without any very crushing losses,

though their historian Cabanes confesses that if Chabran had moved

a quarter of an hour earlier he would have captured half the army

of Catalonia. As it was, St. Cyr took about 1,200 prisoners only,

though his dragoons pursued the routed enemy for many miles. It was

a great misfortune for the Catalans that among these captives was

the Conde de Caldagues, the one first-rate officer in their ranks.

He was taken by the pursuers at Vendrell, many miles from the field,

when his exhausted horse fell under him. St. Cyr captured the whole

artillery of the Spaniards, twenty-five cannon[79], of which several

were pieces of heavy calibre, mounted in redoubts. The field-pieces

were more useful to him, as he was very short of artillery; he had

brought none with him, while Duhesme had been obliged to destroy the

greater part of his during the retreat from Gerona in August. He

also made prize of a magazine of 3,000,000 cartridges and of many

thousands of muskets, which the routed enemy cast away in their haste

to escape over the hills. Some of the fugitives fled south, and did

not stop till they reached Tortosa and the Ebro: others dispersed in

the direction of Igualada and Lerida, but the main body rallied at

Tarragona.

[79] St. Cyr says twenty-five in his report to Napoleon, but

increases the number to fifty in his _Mémoires_, p. 87.

The victorious French divisions were pushed far out from the

battle-field so as to occupy not only the whole plain of the

Llobregat, but also the defiles over the hills leading to Tarragona.

Chabran was placed at Martorell, Chabot at San Sadurni, Souham at

Vendrell, and Pino at Villanueva de Sitjas and Villafranca. Thus the

pass of Ordal was in the victor’s hands, and he had it in his power

to march against Tarragona without having any further positions to

force. But the siege of that place did not form, at present, any part

of St. Cyr’s designs. His aim was first to collect such magazines at

Barcelona as would feed his whole army of 25,000 men till the harvest

was ripe, and secondly to reopen his communication with France. The

sea route was rendered dangerous by the English ships, which were

continually hovering off the coast. The land route was blocked by

the fortresses of Hostalrich and Gerona. St. Cyr imagined that it

was more important to make an end of these places, and open his

route to Perpignan, than to attack Tarragona. The latter place was

strong, and the greater part of the Catalan army had taken refuge in

it. The siege would need, as he supposed, many months, and could not

be properly conducted till a battering-train and a large store of

ammunition had been brought down from France.

It is possible that the French general might have come to another

conclusion if he had been aware of the state of panic and

disorganization among the Catalans at this moment. The _miqueletes_

had mostly dispersed to their homes, the regular troops were

mutinous, and the populace was crying treason and looking for

scape-goats. The incapable Vives was frightened into resignation,

and finally replaced by Reding, whose courage at least was beyond

suspicion, if his abilities were not those of a great general. The

smaller towns were full of tumults and assassination: at Lerida

a certain Gomez declared himself dictator and began to seize and

execute all suspected persons. He did not stop till he was caught

and beheaded by a battalion which Reding sent out against him. In

short, anarchy reigned in Catalonia for ten days, and it is possible

that if St. Cyr had marched straight to Tarragona he might have

taken the place, though its inhabitants were working hard at their

fortifications, and vowing to emulate Saragossa. Many historians of

the war have blamed the French general for not making the attempt:

but there was much to urge in his defence. It is perfectly possible

that the Tarragonese might have made a gallant stand, in spite of

all their troubles, for the garrison was large if disorderly. If

they held out, St. Cyr had neither a siege equipage nor sufficient

magazines to feed his army when concentrated in a single spot. The

French troops were exhausted, and suffering dreadfully from the

inclement winter weather. Lazan and Alvarez were in full force in the

Ampurdam, and were giving Reille’s weak division much trouble.

Probably therefore St. Cyr was justified in halting for a month,

which he employed in clearing the whole country-side for thirty miles

round Barcelona, and in collecting the stores of food which his army

required before it could make another move. The halt allowed time

for the Catalans to rally, and for Reding to reorganize his army:

by February he was ready once more to try his fortune in the field.

Indeed, he was ere long more formidable than St. Cyr had expected,

for he was joined by the second brigade of his own Granadan division,

which came up from Valencia not long after the battle of Molins de

Rey, and the last reserves from Majorca had also sailed to aid him,

after giving over the fortifications of the Balearic Isles to the

marines of the fleet, and the urban guards of Palma and Port Mahon.

The _miqueletes_, too, returned to their standards when the first

panic was over, and in a month Catalonia could once more show an army

of 30,000 men. The first incident which occurred to encourage the

insurgents was that on January 1. Lazan fell upon and very severely

handled a detached battalion of Reille’s division at Castellon in

the Ampurdam[80], and when Reille came up against him in person with

2,500 men, inflicted on him a sharp check at the fords of the Muga.

Not long after, however, the Marquis withdrew from this region, and

marched back toward Aragon, taking with him his own division and

leaving only the weak corps of Alvarez to deal with Reille. His

retreat was caused by the news of his brother’s desperate position

in Saragossa. Hoping to make a diversion in favour of Palafox, Lazan

marched to Lerida, where he began to gather in all the men that he

could collect before moving back to his native province. Thus the

pressure on Reille was much reduced.

[80] This was the 4th battalion of the 2nd of the line, which had

joined Reille in the late autumn, and did not form part of his

original division as detailed in the Appendix to vol. i. St. Cyr

says that it only lost sixty prisoners besides some casualties.

Lazan wrote that he took ninety prisoners, and killed or wounded

over 200 more Frenchmen.

St. Cyr’s men, meanwhile, made many expeditions into the valleys

above Barcelona. They cleared the defile of Bruch leading into the

upper valley of the Llobregat, which the _somatenes_ had held so

gallantly against Schwartz and Chabran in June. They took, but did

not hold, the almost inaccessible peak of Montserrat, and on the

coast-road dominated the country as far as Mataro. But they could not

reopen the communications with France: their general did not dare to

set about the siege of Gerona while Reding had still the makings of

an army in the direction of Tarragona. It was not till that brave but

unfortunate officer had received his _third_ defeat in February that

St. Cyr was able to turn his attention to the north, and the road to

Perpignan. For the present, the French general found himself mainly

occupied by the imperious necessity for scraping together food not

only for his own army, but for the great city of Barcelona, where

both the garrison and the people were living from hand to mouth.

For the resources of the neighbouring plain were nearly exhausted,

and the only external supply came from occasional merchantmen from

Cette or Marseilles, whose captains were tempted to run the British

blockade by the enormous price which they could secure for their

corn if it could be brought safely through. It was only somewhat

later that the Emperor directed the naval authorities in Provence to

dispatch regular convoys to Barcelona under a strong escort, whenever

the British cruisers were reported to have been blown out to sea.

Meanwhile the problem of food supplies remained almost as urgent

a question for St. Cyr as the movements of his adversaries in the

field.

SECTION X: CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN OF FEBRUARY, 1809: BATTLE OF VALLS

More than a month had elapsed since the battle of Molins de Rey

before any important movements were made in Catalonia. Early in

February St. Cyr drew in his divisions from the advanced positions

in the plain of Tarragona, which they had taken up after the victory

of Molins de Rey. They had eaten up the country-side, and were being

much harassed by the _miqueletes_, who had begun to press in upon

their communications with Barcelona, in spite of all the care that

was taken to scour the country with small flying columns, and to

scatter any nucleus of insurgents that began to grow up in the French

rear. Owing to the dispersion of the divisions of the 7th Corps these

operations were very laborious; between the new year and the middle

of February St. Cyr calculated that his men had used up 2,000,000

cartridges in petty skirmishes, and suffered a very appreciable

loss in operations that were practically worthless[81]. Accordingly

he drew them closer together, in order to shorten the dangerously

extended line of communication with Barcelona.

[81] St. Cyr, _Campagne de Catalogne_, p. 98.

Reding, during this period of waiting, had been keeping quiet in

Tarragona, where he was reorganizing and drilling the harassed

troops which had been beaten at Cardadeu and Molins de Rey. He had,

as we have already seen, received heavy reinforcements from the

South[82] and the Balearic Isles[83]; but it was not in numbers only

that his army had improved. St. Cyr’s inaction had restored their

_morale_. They were too, as regards food and munitions, in a much

better condition than their adversaries, as they could freely draw

provisions from the plain of the Lower Ebro and the northern parts

of Valencia, and were besides helped by corn brought in by British

and Spanish vessels from the whole eastern Mediterranean. Reding had

also got a good supply of arms and ammunition from England. As he

found himself unmolested, he was finally able to rearrange his whole

force, so as not only to cover Tarragona, but to extend a screen of

troops all round the French position. He now divided his army into

two wings: he himself, on the right, kept in hand at Tarragona the

1st Division, consisting mainly of the Granadan troops: while General

Castro was sent to establish the head quarters of the 2nd Division,

which contained most of the old battalions of the army of Catalonia,

at Igualada. Their line of communication was by Santa Coloma,

Sarreal, and Montblanch. This disposition was probably a mistake:

while the French lay concentrated in the middle of the semicircle,

the Spanish army was forced to operate on outer lines sixty miles

long, and could not mass itself in less than three or four days. By

a sudden movement of the enemy, either Reding or Castro might be

assailed by superior numbers, and forced to fall back on an eccentric

line of retreat before he could be succoured by his colleague.

[82] Regiments of Santa Fé, and 1st of Antequera, three

battalions with 3,600 men in November, and probably 3,000 in

February.

[83] Swiss Regiment of Beschard, about 2,000 strong, and Majorca

Militia [sometimes called ‘Palma’], 600 strong.

It would seem that, encouraged by St. Cyr’s quiescence, his own

growing strength, and the protestations of the Catalans, Reding had

once more resolved to resume the offensive. The extension of his left

to Igualada was made with no less ambitious a purpose than that of

outflanking the northern wing of the French army, and then delivering

a simultaneous concentric attack on its scattered divisions as they

lay in their cantonments. Such a plan presupposed that St. Cyr would

keep quiet while the preparations were being made, that he would

fail to concentrate in time, and that the Spanish columns, operating

from two distant bases, would succeed in timing their co-operation

with perfect accuracy. At the best they could only have brought some

30,000 men against the 23,000 of St. Cyr’s field army--a superiority

far from sufficient to give them a rational chance of success. It is

probable that at this moment Reding’s best chance of doing something

great for the cause of Spain would have been to leave a strong

garrison in Tarragona, and march early in February with 20,000 men to

the relief of Saragossa, which was now drawing near the end of its

powers of resistance. Lannes and Junot would have had to raise the

siege if an army of such size had come up against them. But, though

intending to succour Saragossa in a few weeks, Reding was induced

by the constant entreaties of the Catalans to undertake first an

expedition against St. Cyr. He sent off no troops to aid the Marquis

of Lazan in his fruitless attempt to relax the pressure on his

brother’s heroic garrison, but devoted all his attention to the 7th

Corps.

St. Cyr was not an officer who was likely to be caught unprepared by

such a movement as Reding had planned. The extension of the Spanish

line to Igualada and the upper Llobregat had not escaped his notice,

and he was fully aware of the advantage which his central position

gave him over an enemy who had been obliging enough to draw out his

fighting strength on an arc of a circle sixty miles from end to end.

Without fully realizing Reding’s intentions, he could yet see that

the Spaniards were giving him a grand opportunity of beating them

in detail. He resolved to strike a blow at their northern wing,

convinced that if he acted with sufficient swiftness and energy he

could crush it long ere it could be succoured from Tarragona.

It thus came to pass that Reding and St. Cyr began to move

simultaneously--the one on exterior, the other on interior

lines--with the inevitable result. On February 15 Castro, in

accordance with the instructions of the Captain-General, began to

concentrate his troops at Igualada, with the intention of advancing

against the French divisions at San Sadurni and Martorell. At the

same time orders were sent to Alvarez, the Governor of Gerona,

to detach all the men he could spare for a demonstration against

Barcelona, in order to distract the attention of Duhesme and the

garrison. Reding himself, with the troops at Tarragona, intended to

march against Souham the moment that he should receive the news that

his lieutenants were ready to strike.

At the same moment St. Cyr started out on his expedition against

Igualada. He took with him Pino’s Italian division[84], and ordered

Chabot and Chabran to concentrate with him at Capellades, seven or

eight miles to the south-east of Castro’s head quarters. By taking

this route he avoided the northern bank of the Noya and the defiles

of Bruch, and approached the enemy from the side where he could most

easily cut him off from reinforcements coming from Tarragona.

[84] Troops from Barcelona under Lecchi came out to replace Pino

at Villafranca.

The concentration of the three French columns was not perfectly

timed, those of Pino and Chabran finding their way far more difficult

than did Chabot. It thus chanced that the latter with his skeleton

division of three battalions, arrived in front of Capellades many

hours before his colleagues. His approach was reported to Castro at

Igualada, who sent down 4,000 men against him, attacked him, and beat

him back with loss[85] into the arms of Pino, who came on the scene

later in the day [Feb. 17]. The Spaniards were then forced to give

back, and retired to Pobla de Claramunt on the banks of the Noya,

where they were joined by most of Castro’s reserves. St. Cyr had now

concentrated his three divisions, and hoped that he might bring the

enemy to a pitched battle. He drew up in front of them all his force,

save one of Pino’s brigades, which he sent to turn their right [Feb.

18]. The Spaniards, having a fine position behind a ravine, were at

first inclined to fight, and skirmished with the enemy’s main body

for some hours. They narrowly missed capturing both St. Cyr and Pino,

who had ridden forward with their staff to reconnoitre, and fell into

an ambush of _miqueletes_, from which they only escaped by the speed

of their horses[86].

[85] Chabot lost a Neapolitan colonel (Carascosa) and many other

prisoners.

[86] St. Cyr says nothing of his own danger, but the incident

is given at length by Vacani, iii. 93, who mentions that one of

Pino’s aides-de-camp was wounded.

But late in the day the Spanish General received news that

Mazzuchelli, with the detached Italian brigade, was already in his

rear and marching hard for Igualada. He immediately evacuated his

position in great disorder, and fell back on his head quarters,

closely pursued by St. Cyr. The main body of the Spaniards, with

their artillery, just succeeded in passing through Igualada before

the Italians came up, and fled by the road to Cervera. The rear was

cut off, and had to escape in another direction by the path leading

to Manresa. Both columns were much hustled and lost many prisoners,

yet they fairly outmarched their pursuers and got away without any

crushing disaster[87]. But their great loss was that in Igualada

the French seized all the magazines which had been collected from

northern Catalonia for the use of Castro’s division. This relieved

St. Cyr from all trouble as to provisions for many days: he had now

food enough not only to provide for his field army, but to send back

to Barcelona.

[87] ‘Si nous ne fîmes pas dans cette affaire le nombre de

prisonniers que nous eussions dû y faire,’ says St. Cyr, ‘c’est

que dans cette journée l’ennemi fit plus usage de ses jambes que

de ses armes. Quelques centaines seulement, la plupart blessés,

tombèrent entre nos mains’ [_Campagne de Catalogne_, p. 107].

St. Cyr had now done all the harm that was in his power to the

Spanish left wing--he had beaten them, seized their magazines,

driven them apart, and broken their line. He imagined that they were

disposed of for many days, and now resolved to turn off for a blow at

Reding and the other half of the Catalonian army, who might meanwhile

(for all that he knew) be attacking Souham with very superior numbers.

Accordingly on Feb. 19 he started off with Pino’s division to join

Souham and fall upon Reding, leaving Chabot and Chabran, with all

the artillery of the three divisions, to occupy Igualada and guard

the captured magazines from any possible offensive return on the

part of Castro. He marched by cross-roads along the foot-hills of

the mountains of the great central Catalonian sierra, intending

to descend into the valley of the Gaya by San Magin and the abbey

of Santas Cruces, where (as he had learnt) lay the northernmost

detachments of Reding’s division[88]. Thus he hoped to take the enemy

in flank and beat him in detail. He sent orders to Souham to move

out of Vendrell and meet him at Villarodoña, half-way up the course

of Gaya, unless he should have been already attacked by Reding and

forced to take some other line.

[88] The details of this cross-march in a badly-surveyed country,

where the maps are very deficient, are more easily to be made

out from Vacani’s narrative (pp. 95-8) than from St. Cyr’s own

account.

At San Magin the French commander came upon some of Reding’s troops,

about 1,200 men with two guns, under a brigadier named Iranzo.

They showed fight, but were beaten and sought refuge further down

the valley of the Gaya in the fortified abbey of Santas Cruces. So

bare was the country-side, and so bad the maps, that St. Cyr found

considerable difficulty in tracking them, and in discovering the best

way down the valley. But next day he got upon their trail[89], and

beset the abbey, which made a good defence and proved impregnable

to a force unprovided with artillery. St. Cyr blockaded it for two

days, and then descended into the plain, where he got in touch with

Souham’s division, which had advanced from Vendrell, and was now

pillaging the hamlets round Villarodoña, in the central valley of the

Gaya[90] [February 21].

[89] St. Cyr (p. 109) has a curious story to the effect that he

had failed entirely to find the road, but ultimately discovered

it by giving leave to a wounded Spanish officer to return to

Tarragona. He was followed at a discreet distance by scouts, who

noted the way that he took, and he thus served as a guide of

Pino’s division as far as the convent of Santas Cruces.

[90] Souham had anticipated St. Cyr’s orders, and started to

advance from Vendrell before his chief’s dispatch from Igualada

came to hand.

Meanwhile Reding was at last on the move. On receiving the news of

the combat of Igualada, he had to choose between the opportunity

of making a counter-stroke at Souham, and that of marching to the

aid of his lieutenant, Castro. He adopted the latter alternative,

and started from Tarragona on February 20 with an escort of about

2,000 men, including nearly all his available cavalry[91]. It was

his intention to pick up on the way the outlying northern brigades

of his division. This he succeeded in doing, drawing in to himself

the troops which were guarding the pass of Santa Cristina, and

Iranzo’s detachment at Santas Cruces. This force, warned of his

approach, broke through the blockade at night, and reached its

chief with little or no loss [February 21]. Thus reinforced Reding

pushed on by Sarreal to Santa Coloma, where Castro joined him with

the rallied troops of his wing, whom he had collected when the

French attack slackened. They had between them nearly 20,000 men, an

imposing force, with which some of the officers present suggested

that it would be possible to fall upon Igualada, crush Chabot and

Chabran, and recover the lost magazines. But Reding was nervous

about Tarragona, dreading lest St. Cyr might unite with Souham and

fall upon the city during his absence. After holding a lengthy

council of war[92] he determined to return to protect his base of

operations. Accordingly, he told off the Swiss General Wimpffen,

with some 4.000 or 5,000 of Castro’s troops, to observe the French

divisions at Igualada, and started homeward with the rest of his

army, about 10,000 infantry, 700 cavalry, and two batteries of field

artillery[93]. He had made up his mind to return by the route of

Montblanch and Valls, one somewhat more remote from the position

of St. Cyr on the Gaya than the way by Pla, which he had taken in

setting out to join Castro. Reding could only have got home without

fighting by taking a circuitous route to the east, via Selva and

Reus: the suggestion that he should do so was made, but he replied

that having baggage and artillery with him he was forced to keep to

a high-road. He chose that by Valls, though he was aware that the

place was occupied: but apparently he hoped to crush Souham before

Pino could come to his aid. He was resolved, it is said, not to

court a combat, but on the other hand not to refuse it if the enemy

should offer to fight him on advantageous ground. [February 24.] The

truth is, that he was bold even to rashness, could never forget the

great day of Baylen, in which he had taken such a splendid part, and

was anxious to wash out by a victory the evil memories of Cardadeu

and Molins de Rey. He set out on the evening of February 24, and by

daybreak next morning was drawing near the bridge of Goy, where the

high-road to Tarragona crosses the river Francoli, some two miles

north of the town of Valls. His troops, as was to be expected, were

much exhausted by the long march in the darkness[94].

[91] Two battalions of _miqueletes_ (Lerida and 1st of

Tarragona), 300 cavalry, a field-battery, and a battalion of

Reding’s own regiment of Swiss, about 2,100 men in all.

[92] Col. Doyle was present at this council: his account of it

is in the Record Office. He declares that he himself was all for

fighting, that Reding wavered, and the majority refused to take

risks.

[93] There is a detailed estimate of Reding’s army given by St.

Cyr in his Appendix no. 11. He says that the figures were given

him by ‘a Spanish general taken prisoner at Valls,’ which must

mean the Marquis of Casteldosrius, the only officer of that rank

captured. The names of nearly all the battalions cited in this

list are to be verified, either in Reding’s dispatch or in the

narrative of Cabanes--all indeed except the regiment of Baza,

and the three Miquelet Tercios, 1st and 2nd of Tarragona and

Lerida. But it is probable that Casteldosrius gave St. Cyr a

morning state of the whole army collected at Santa Coloma on the

twenty-fourth, and that these corps (with a total force of 3,000

men) formed part of the force left with Wimpffen at Santa Coloma.

I am driven to this conclusion by the statement of Doyle in his

letter written from Santa Coloma, on the day before the battle,

that Reding was marching “with 500 horse and a little over 10,000

foot,” for Tarragona. Doyle is arguing in favour of fighting, and

has no object in understating the numbers. His figures are borne

out by all the Spanish narratives. The force must have stood as

follows:--

INFANTRY.

Granadan Division:

Reding’s Swiss (one batt.) 500

Iliberia (or 1st of Granada) 1,860

Santa Fé (two batts.) 2,300

1st of Antequera 1,100

------

5,760

From the Old Catalan Army:

Guards [150 Spanish, 280 Walloons] 430

Soria 1,000

2nd of Savoia 800

Provincial Grenadiers of Old and New Castile 1,300

Wimpffen’s Swiss (two batts.) 1,140

Palma Militia 350

------

5,020

CAVALRY.

Husares of Granada 450

Husares Españoles 250

----

700

ARTILLERY.

2 batteries, 8 guns 200

SAPPERS.

1 Company 100

------

Total 11,800

[Erratum from p. xii: I have found from a Madrid document that

part, though not the whole, of the Regiment of Baza was present

at Valls. One battalion was left behind with Wimpffen: one

marched with Reding: about 800 men therefore must be added to my

estimate of the Spanish infantry.]

[94] These details are from Doyle’s letter of Feb. 24, in the

Record Office.

St. Cyr, meanwhile, had not been intending to strike a blow at

Tarragona. He regarded it as much more necessary to beat the

enemy’s field army than to close in upon the fortress, which would

indubitably have offered a long and obstinate resistance. When he

got news of Reding’s march to Santa Coloma he resolved to follow

him: he was preparing to hasten to the succour of his divisions at

Igualada, when he learnt that the Swiss general had turned back,

and was hurrying home to Tarragona. He resolved, therefore, to try

to intercept him on his return march, and blocked his two available

roads by placing Souham’s division at Valls and Pino’s at Pla. They

were only eight or nine miles apart, and whichever road the Spaniards

took the unassailed French division could easily come to the aid of

the other.

Reding’s night march, a move which St. Cyr does not seem to have

foreseen, nearly enabled him to carry out his plan. In fact, as we

shall see, he had almost made an end of the French division before

the Marshal, who lay himself at Pla with the Italians, arrived to

succour it[95].

[95] The French forces engaged at Valls were:--

Souham’s Division:

1st Léger (three batts.).

42nd of the Line (three batts.).

Provisional regiment:

[One batt. each of 3rd Léger and 67th Line, two batts.

7th Line.]

10 battalions, about 5,500 men.

24th Dragoons, about 500 men, two batteries.

Pino’s Division:

1st Italian Light Regiment (three batts.).

2nd Italian Light Regiment (three batts.).

4th Line (three batts.).

6th ” ” ”

7th ” (one batt.).

13 battalions, about 6,500 men.

7th Italian Dragoons (‘Dragoons of Napoleon’) and Italian

Royal Chasseurs, together about 800 men.

Total about 13,800 men, a force somewhat superior to that of the

Spaniards, if the latter had only the corps given in the last

table.

In the early morning, between six and seven o’clock, the head of the

long Spanish column reached the bridge of Goy, and there fell in

with Souham’s vedettes. The sharp musketry fire which at once broke

out warned each party that a combat was at hand. Souham hastily

marched out from Valls, and drew up his two brigades in the plain

to the north of the town, placing himself across the line of the

enemy’s advance. Reding at first made up his mind to thrust aside the

French division, whose force he somewhat undervalued, and to hurry

on his march toward Tarragona. The whole of his advanced guard and

part of his centre crossed the river, deployed on the left bank,

and attacked the French. Souham held his ground for some hours, but

as more and more Spanish battalions kept pressing across the bridge

and reinforcing the enemy’s line, he began after a time to give

way--the numerical odds were heavily against him, and the Catalans

were fighting with great steadiness and confidence. Before noon the

French division was thrust back against the town of Valls, and Reding

had been able to file not only the greater part of his army but all

his baggage across the Francoli. The way to Tarragona was clear, and

if he had chosen to disengage his men he could have carried off the

whole of his army to that city without molestation from Souham, who

was too hard hit to wish to continue the combat. It is even possible

that if he had hastily brought up all his reserves he might have

completely routed the French detachment before it could have been

succoured.

But Reding adopted neither one course nor the other. After driving

back Souham, he allowed his men a long rest, probably in order to

give the rear and the baggage time to complete the passage of the

Francoli. While things were standing still, St. Cyr arrived at full

gallop from Pla, where he had been lying with Pino’s division, to

whom the news of the battle had arrived very late. He brought with

him only Pino’s divisional cavalry, the ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ and

Royal Chasseurs, but had ordered the rest of the Italians to follow

at full speed when they should have got together. As Pla is no more

than eight miles from Valls, it was expected that they would appear

within the space of three hours. But, as a matter of fact, Pino did

not draw near till the afternoon: one of his brigades, which lay far

out, received contradictory orders, and did not come in to Pla till

past midday[96], and the Italian general would not move till it had

rejoined him. Three hours were wasted by this _contretemps_, and

meanwhile the battle might have been lost.

[96] Vacani, iii. 105-6. This fact is mentioned by no other

author.

On arriving upon the field with the Italian cavalry, St. Cyr rode

along Souham’s line, steadied it, and displayed the horsemen in his

front. Seeing the French rallying, and new troops arriving to their

aid, the Spanish commander jumped to the conclusion that St. Cyr had

come up with very heavy reinforcements, and instead of continuing his

advance, or pressing on his march toward Tarragona, suddenly changed

his whole plan of operations. He would not stand to be attacked in

the plain, but he resolved to fight a defensive action on the heights

beyond the Francoli, from which he had descended in the morning.

Accordingly, first his baggage, then his main body, and lastly his

vanguard, which covered the retreat of the rest, slowly filed back

over the bridge of Goy, and took position on the rolling hills to the

east. Here Reding drew them up in two lines, with the river flowing

at their feet as a front defence, and their batteries drawn up so as

to sweep the bridge of Goy and the fords. The right wing was covered

by a lateral ravine falling into the Francoli; the left, facing the

village of Pixamoxons, was somewhat ‘in the air,’ but the whole

position, if long, was good and eminently defensible.

St. Cyr observed his adversary’s movement with joy, for he would have

been completely foiled if Reding had refused to fight and passed on

toward Tarragona. Knowing the Spanish troops, a pitched battle with

superior numbers was precisely what he most desired. Accordingly he

took advantage of the long time of waiting, while Pino’s division

was slowly drawing near the field, to rest and feed Souham’s tired

troops, and then to draw them up facing the southern half of Reding’s

position, with a vacant space on their right on which the Italians

were to take up their ground, when at last they should arrive.

When St. Cyr had lain for nearly three hours quiescent at the foot

of the heights, and no reinforcements had yet come in sight, Reding

began to grow anxious. He had, as he now realized, retired with

unnecessary haste from in front of a beaten force, and had assumed a

defensive posture when he should have pressed the attack. At about

three o’clock he made up his mind that he had committed an error,

but thinking it too late to resume the fight, resolved to retire on

Tarragona by the circuitous route which passes through the village

of Costanti. He sent back General Marti to Tarragona to bring out

fresh troops from the garrison to join him at that point, and issued

orders that the army should retreat at dusk. He might perhaps have

got off scatheless if he had moved away at once, though it is equally

possible that St. Cyr might have fallen upon his rearguard with

Souham’s division, and done him some damage. But he waited for the

dark before marching, partly because he wished to rest his troops,

who were desperately fatigued by the night march and the subsequent

combat in the morning, partly because he did not despair of fighting

a successful defensive action if St. Cyr should venture to cross the

Francoli and attack him. Accordingly he lingered on the hillside in

battle array, waiting for the darkness[97].

[97] Arteche, v. 207-9, makes Reding deliver a second attack

on Souham in the early afternoon. This is, I think, an error,

caused by a misreading of Cabanes’ somewhat confused account of

the fight, from which it might be possible (if no other sources

existed) to deduce a second Spanish advance. But Cabanes is

really dealing with the later phases of the first combat only.

It is conclusive that neither Reding himself, in his official

dispatch, St. Cyr, Doyle, nor Vacani mention any engagement in

the early afternoon.

This gave St. Cyr his chance; at three o’clock Pino’s belated

division had begun to come up: first Fontane’s brigade, then, an hour

and a half later, that of Mazzuchelli, whose absence from Pla had

caused all the delay. It was long past four, and the winter afternoon

was far spent when St. Cyr had at last got all his troops in hand.

Allowing barely enough time for the Italians to form in order of

battle[98], St. Cyr now led forward his whole army to the banks

of the Francoli. The two divisions formed four heavy columns of a

brigade each: and in this massive formation forded the river and

advanced uphill, driving in before them the Spanish skirmishers. The

Italian dragoons went forward in the interval between two of the

infantry columns; the French cavalry led the attack on the extreme

right, near the bridge of Goy.

[98] St. Cyr in his Memoirs (p. 123) makes the curious statement

that he silenced his artillery after it had fired only three

rounds, lest he should frighten off the Spaniards before he

could reach them with his infantry, and so prevent the latter

from closing and winning as decisive a victory as possible. One

is almost prone to doubt the story, and to suppose that the

cessation of fire was due to the fear of killing his own men when

they were getting close to the Spanish line. Arteche puts this

incident too early in the fight, during Reding’s supposed second

attack.

For a moment it seemed as if the two armies would actually cross

bayonets all along the line, for the Spaniards stood firm and opened

a regular and well-directed fire upon the advancing columns. But St.

Cyr had not miscalculated the moral effect of the steady approach of

the four great bodies of infantry which were now climbing the hill

and drawing near to Reding’s front. Like so many other continental

troops, who had striven on earlier battle-fields to bear up in line

against the French column-formation, the Spaniards could not find

heart to close with the formidable and threatening masses which were

rolling in upon them. They delivered one last tremendous discharge

at 100 yards’ distance, and then, when they saw the enemy looming

through the smoke and closing upon them, broke in a dozen different

places and went to the rear in helpless disorder, sweeping away the

second line, higher up the hill, which ought to have sustained them.

The only actual collision was on the extreme left, near the bridge

of Goy, where Reding himself charged, with his staff, at the head of

his cavalry, in a vain attempt to save the desperate situation. He

was met in full career by the French 24th Dragoons, and thoroughly

beaten. In the _mêlée_ he was surrounded, three of his aides-de-camp

were wounded[99] and taken, and he himself only cut his way out

after receiving three sabre wounds on his head and shoulders, which

ultimately proved fatal.

[99] Among them was an English officer named Reid.

If there had not been many steep slopes and ravines behind the

Spanish position, nearly the whole of Reding’s army must have

perished or been captured. But the country-side was so difficult that

the majority of the fugitives got away, though many were overtaken.

The total loss of the Spaniards amounted to more than 3,000 men, of

whom nearly half were prisoners[100]. All the guns of the defeated

army, all its baggage, and several stands of colours fell into the

hands of the victors. The French lost about 1,000 men, mostly in the

early part of the engagement, when Souham’s division was driven back

under the walls of Valls.

[100] Including Colonels Dumont and Antunez commanding

respectively the Walloon and Spanish guards, the Marquis of

Casteldosrius commanding the cavalry brigade, three of Reding’s

aides-de-camp, and eighty other officers. Two colonels were

killed, a brigadier-general (Saint Ellier) and many other

superior officers wounded.

[Illustration: PART OF CATALONIA

TO ILLUSTRATE ST CYR’S CAMPAIGN

NOV. 1808 TO MARCH 1809]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF VALLS

FEB. 25 1809]

The Spaniards had not fought amiss: St. Cyr, in a dispatch to

Berthier, acknowledges the fact--not in order to exalt the merit of

his own troops, but to demonstrate that the 7th Corps was too weak

for the task set it and required further reinforcements[101]. But

Reding did not give his men a fair chance; he hurried them into the

fight at the end of a long night march, drew them off just when they

were victorious, and altered his plan of battle thrice in the

course of the day. No army could have done itself justice with such

bad leading.

[101] ‘Votre Altesse me dit qu’il n’y a rien autour de nous

qui puisse résister à 6,000 hommes. Je lui demande pardon. La

division Souham a été quelque temps seule le 25, et nous avons

vu qu’il était temps que l’autre division arrivât.... On ne peut

nier que les troupes espagnoles gagnent tous les jours, et nous

sommes forcés de leur rendre justice; à la bataille de Valls

elles se sont très-bien battues.’ St. Cyr to Berthier, Valls,

March 6, 1809.

The wrecks of the beaten force straggled into Tarragona, their

spirits so depressed that it was a long time before it was possible

to trust them again in battle. When they once more took the field it

was under another leader, for Reding, after lingering some weeks,

died of his wounds, leaving the reputation of a brave, honest, and

humane officer, but of a very poor general.

St. Cyr utilized his victory merely by blockading Tarragona. He

moved Souham to Reus, and kept Pino at Valls, each throwing out

detachments as far as the sea, so as to cut off the city from all

its communications with the interior. An epidemic had broken out in

the place, in consequence of the masses of ill-attended wounded who

cumbered the hospitals. It would seem that the French General hoped

that the pestilence might turn the hearts of the garrison towards

surrender. If so, he was much deceived: they bore their ills with

stolid patience, and being always victualled from the sea suffered

no practical inconvenience from the blockade. It seems indeed that

St. Cyr would have done far better to use the breathing time which he

won at the battle of Valls for the commencement of a movement against

Gerona. Till that place should be captured, and the high-road to

Perpignan opened, there was no real security for the 7th Corps. Long

months, however, were to elapse before this necessary operation was

taken in hand.

SECTION XI

THE SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA

(DECEMBER 1808-FEBRUARY 1809)

CHAPTER I

THE CAPTURE OF THE OUTWORKS

While Napoleon was urging on his fruitless pursuit of Sir John

Moore, while St. Cyr was discomfiting the Catalans on the Besos and

the Llobregat, and while Victor was dealing his last blow to the

dilapidated army of Infantado, there was one point on which the war

was standing still, and where the French arms had made no great

progress since the battle of Tudela. Saragossa was holding out, with

the same tenacity that she had displayed during the first siege in

the July and August of the preceding summer. In front of her walls

and barricades two whole corps of the Emperor’s army were detained

from December, 1808, till February, 1809. As long as the defence

endured, she preserved the rest of Aragon and the whole of Valencia

from invasion.

The battle of Tudela had been fought on November 23, but it was not

till nearly a month later that the actual siege began. The reason

for this delay was that the Emperor had called off to Madrid all the

troops which had taken part in the campaign against Castaños and

Palafox, save Moncey’s 3rd Corps alone. This force was not numerous

enough to invest the city till it had been strengthened by heavy

reinforcements from the North.

After having routed the Armies of Aragon and the Centre, Marshal

Lannes had thrown up the command which had been entrusted to him,

and had gone back to France. The injuries which he had suffered

from his fall over the precipice near Pampeluna[102] were still far

from healed, and served as the excuse for his retirement. Moncey,

therefore, resumed, on November 25, the charge of the victorious

army: on the next day he was joined by Ney, who, after failing

to intercept Castaños in the mountains[103], had descended into

the valley of the Ebro, with Marchand and Dessolles’ divisions of

infantry, and Beaumont’s light cavalry brigade. On the twenty-eighth

the two marshals advanced along the high-road by Mallen and Alagon,

and on the second day after appeared in front of Saragossa with

all their troops, save Musnier’s division of the 3rd Corps and the

division of the 6th Corps lately commanded by Lagrange, which had

followed the retreating army of Castaños into the hills on the road

to Calatayud. They were about to commence the investment of the city,

when Ney received orders from the Emperor, dispatched from Aranda,

bidding him leave the siege to Moncey, and cross the mountains into

New Castile with all the troops of the 6th Corps: he was to find

Castaños, and hang on his heels so that he should not be able to

march to the help of Madrid.

[102] See vol. i. p. 436.

[103] See vol. i. pp. 446-7.

Accordingly the Duke of Elchingen marched from the camp in front

of Saragossa with the divisions of Marchand and Dessolles, and

the cavalry brigades of Beaumont and Digeon. At Calatayud he

came up with the force which had been dispatched in pursuit of

Castaños,--Musnier’s division of the 3rd Corps, and that of the 6th

Corps which Maurice Mathieu had taken over from Lagrange, who had

been severely wounded at Tudela[104]. Leaving Musnier at Calatayud

to protect his communications with Aragon, Ney picked up Maurice

Mathieu, and passed the mountains into New Castile, where he fell

into the Emperor’s sphere of operations. We have seen that he took a

prominent part in the pursuit of Sir John Moore and the invasion of

Galicia.

[104] Few of the French historians mention these changes, but

they are quite certain. On Nov. 23 ‘the division Maurice Mathieu’

means the 1st of the 3rd Corps; on Dec. 1, it means the 2nd of

the 6th Corps.

Moncey, meanwhile, was left in front of Saragossa with his 1st, 3rd,

and 4th Divisions--the 2nd being still at Calatayud. This force

consisted of no more than twenty-three battalions, about 15,000 men,

and was far too weak to undertake the siege. The Marshal was informed

that the whole corps of Mortier was to be sent to his aid, but it

was still far away, and with very proper caution he resolved to draw

back and wait for the arrival of the reinforcements. If the Spaniards

got to know of his condition, they might sally out from Saragossa and

attack him with more than 30,000 men. Moncey, therefore, drew back

to Alagon, and there waited for the arrival of the Duke of Treviso

and the 5th Corps. It was not till December 20 that he was able to

present himself once more before the city.

Thus Saragossa gained four weeks of respite between the battle of

Tudela and the commencement of the actual siege. This reprieve was

invaluable to Palafox and the Aragonese. They would have been in

grave danger if Lannes had marched on and assaulted the city only two

days after the battle, and before the routed army had been rallied.

Even if Ney and Moncey had been permitted to begin a serious attack

on November 30, the day of their arrival before the place, they would

have had some chance of success. But their sudden retreat raised the

spirits of the defenders, and the twenty extra days of preparation

thus granted to them sufficed to restore them to full confidence,

and to re-establish their belief in the luck of Saragossa and the

special protection vouchsafed them by its patron saint Our Lady of

the Pillar. Napoleon must take the blame for all the consequences of

Ney’s withdrawal. He had ordered it without fully realizing the fact

that Moncey would be left too weak to commence the siege. Probably he

had over-estimated the effect of the defeat of Tudela on the Army of

Aragon. For the failure of Ney’s attempt to surround Castaños he was

only in part responsible, though (as we have seen) he had sent him

out on his circular march two days too late[105]. But to draw off the

6th Corps to New Castile (where it failed to do any good), before the

5th Corps had arrived to take its place before Saragossa, was clearly

a blunder.

[105] See vol. i. pp. 446-7.

Palafox made admirable use of the unexpected reprieve that had been

granted him. He had not, it will be remembered, taken part in person

in the battle of Tudela, but had returned to his head quarters on the

night before that disaster. He was occupied in organizing a reserve

to take the field in support of his two divisions already at the

front, when the sudden influx of fugitives into Saragossa showed him

what had occurred. In the course of the next two days there poured

into the place the remains of the divisions of O’Neille and St.

March from his own Army of Aragon. With them came Roca’s men, who

properly belonged to Castaños, but having fought in the right wing

had been separated from the main body of the Andalusian army[106].

In addition, fragments of many other regiments of the Army of the

Centre straggled into Saragossa. At least 16,000 or 17,000 men of

the wrecks of Tudela had come in ere four days were expired. To help

them, Palafox could count on all the newly organized battalions of

his reserve, which had never marched out to join the field army: they

amounted to some 10,000 or 12,000 men, but many of the regiments had

only lately been organized and had not received their uniforms or

equipment. Nor was this all: several belated battalions from Murcia

and Valencia came in at various times during the next ten days[107],

so that long ere the actual siege began Palafox could count on

32,000 bayonets and 2,000 sabres of more or less regularly organized

corps. He had in addition a number of irregulars--armed citizens

and peasants of the country-side--whose numbers it is impossible to

fix, for though some had been collected in _partidas_ or volunteer

companies, others fought in loose bands just as they pleased, and

without any proper organization. They may possibly have amounted to

10,000 men at the time of the commencement of the siege, but so many

were drafted into the local Aragonese battalions before the end of

the fighting, that when the place surrendered in February, there were

less than a thousand[108] of these unembodied irregulars under arms.

[106] By far the larger part of Roca’s division reached

Saragossa; the Spanish returns show that 4,500 men joined

Palafox, and only 1,500 escaped to Cuenca with the rest of the

‘Army of the Centre.’

[107] Among these were the 1st and 2nd Tiradores de Murcia, the

regiment of Florida Blanca, the 3rd and 5th Volunteers of Murcia,

and the 3rd Volunteers of Valencia, all of which had arrived too

late for Tudela.

[108] To be exact, 756 was the number of _paisanos_ as opposed to

_tropa_ in the return of the garrison on Feb. 20. See Arteche,

Appendix to vol. iv.

But it was not so much for the reorganization of his army as for the

strengthening of his fortifications that Palafox found the respite

during the first three weeks of December profitable. During the first

siege it will be remembered that the fortifications of Saragossa

had been contemptible from the engineer’s point of view: the flimsy

mediaeval _enceinte_ had crumbled away at the first fire of the

besiegers, and the real defence had been carried out behind the

barricades. By the commencement of the second siege everything had

changed, and the city was covered by a formidable line of defences,

executed, as was remarked by one of the French generals[109],

with more zeal and energy than scientific skill, but presenting

nevertheless most serious obstacles to the besieger.

[109] See Cavallero’s criticism of this statement of Rogniat on

p. 17 of his interesting little work.

After the raising of the first siege by Verdier, the Spaniards had

been for some time in a state of such confidence and exultation

that they imagined that there was no need for further defensive

precautions. The next campaign was to be fought, as they supposed,

on the further side of the Pyrenees. But the long suspension of

the expected advance during the autumn months began to chill their

spirits, and, as the year drew on, it was no longer reckoned

unpatriotic or cowardly to take into consideration the wisdom of

strengthening the inland fortresses in view of a possible return of

the French. In September, Colonel San Genis, the engineer officer who

had worked for Palafox during the first siege, received permission

to commence a series of regular fortifications for Saragossa. The

work did not progress rapidly, for the Aragonese had not as yet

much belief in the possibility that they might be called on once

again to defend their capital. San Genis only received a moderate

sum of money, and the right to requisition men of over thirty-five

from the city and the surrounding villages. The labour had to be

paid, and therefore the labourers were few. The new works were

sketched out rather than executed. Things progressed with a leisurely

slowness, till in November the dangers of the situation began to be

appreciated, and the approach of the French reinforcements drove the

Saragossans to greater energy. But it was only the thunderclap of

Tudela that really alarmed them, and sent soldiers and civilians,

men, women, and children, to labour with feverish haste at the

completion of the new lines. Between November 25 and December 20 the

amount of work that was carried out was amazing and admirable. If Ney

and Moncey had been allowed to commence the regular siege before the

month of November had expired, they would have found the whole system

of works in an incomplete condition. Three weeks later Saragossa had

been converted into a formidable fortress.

The only point where San Genis’ scheme had not been fully developed

was the Monte Torrero. It will be remembered that this important

hill, whose summit lies only 1,800 yards from the walls of Saragossa,

overlooks the whole city, and had been chosen during the first siege

as the _emplacement_ for the main breaching batteries. To keep the

French from this commanding position was most important, and the

Spanish engineer had intended to cover the whole circuit of the

hill with a large entrenched camp, protected by continuous lines of

earthworks and numerous redoubts, with the Canal of Aragon, which

runs under its southern foot, as a wet ditch in its front. But, when

the news of Tudela arrived, little or nothing had been done to carry

out this scheme: the fortification of the city had absorbed the main

attention of the Aragonese, and while that was still incomplete

the Monte Torrero had been neglected. In December it was too late

to begin the building of three or four miles of new earthworks,

and in consequence nothing was constructed on the suburban hill

save one large central redoubt, and two small works serving as

_têtes-de-pont_, at the points where the Madrid and the La Muela

roads cross the Canal of Aragon. St. March’s Valencian division,

still 6,000 strong, was told off for the defence of the hill, but had

no continuous line of works to cover it. The only strength of the

position lay in the canal which runs round its foot: but this was not

very broad, and was fordable at more than one point. In short, the

Monte Torrero constituted an outlying defence which might be held for

some time, in order to keep the besiegers far off from the body of

the place, rather than an integral part of its line of defence.

It was on the works of Saragossa itself that the energy of more

than 60,000 enthusiastic labourers, military and civilian, had

been expended during the month that followed Tudela. The total

accomplished in this time moves our respect: it will be well to take

the various fronts in detail.

On the Western front, from the Ebro to the Huerba, there had been

in August nothing more than a weak wall, many parts of which were

composed of the rear-sides of convents and buildings. In front of

this line there had been constructed by November 10 a very different

defence. A solid rampart reveted with bricks taken from ruined

houses, and furnished with a broad terrace for artillery, and a ditch

forty-five feet deep now covered the entire western side of the

city. The convents of the Augustinians and the Trinitarians, which

had been outside the walls during the earlier siege, had been taken

into this new _enceinte_ and served as bastions in it. There being

a space 600 yards long between them, where the curtain would have

been unprotected by flanking fires, a great semicircular battery had

been thrown out, which acted as a third bastion on this side. Strong

earthworks had also been built up to cover the Portillo and Carmen

gates. As an outlying fort there was the castle of the Aljafferia,

which had received extensive repairs, and was connected with the

_enceinte_ by a ditch and a covered way. It would completely enfilade

any attacks made on the north-western part of the new wall.

On the Southern front of the defences the work done had been even

more important. Here the new fortifications had been carried down

to the brink of the ravine of the Huerba, so as to make that stream

the wet ditch of the town. Two great redoubts were pushed beyond

it: one called the redoubt of ‘Our Lady of the Pillar’ lay at the

bridge outside the Santa Engracia gate. It was provided with a deep

narrow ditch, into which the water of the river had been turned, and

armed with eight guns. The corresponding fort, at the south-east

angle of the town, was made by fortifying the convent of San José,

on the Valencia road, just beyond the Huerba. This was a quadrangle

120 yards long by eighty broad, furnished with a ditch, and with a

covered way with palisades, cut in the counterscarp. It held twelve

heavy guns, and a garrison of no less than 3,000 men. Between San

José and the Pillar redoubt, the old town wall above the Huerba had

been strengthened and thickened, and several new batteries had been

built upon it. It could not well be assailed till the two projecting

works in front of it should be reduced, and if they should fall it

stood on higher ground and completely commanded their sites. The

convent of Santa Engracia, so much disputed during the first siege,

had been turned into a sort of fortress, and heavily armed with guns

of position.

On the eastern front of the city from San José to the Ebro, the

Huerba still serves as a ditch to the place, but is not so steep or

so difficult as in its upper course. Here the suburb of the Tanneries

(Las Tenerias), where that stream falls into the Ebro, had been

turned into a strong projecting redoubt, whose fire commanded both

the opposite bank of the Ebro on one side, and the lower reaches of

the Huerba on the other. Half way between this redoubt and San José

was a great battery (generally called the ‘Palafox Battery’) at the

Porta Quemada, whose fires, crossing those of the other two works,

commanded all the low ground outside the eastern front of the city.

It only remains to speak of the fortifications of the transpontine

suburb of San Lazaro. This was by nature the weakest part of the

defences, as the suburb is built in low marshy ground on the river’s

edge. Here deep cuttings had been made and filled with water, three

heavy batteries had been erected, and the convents of San Lazaro and

Jesus had been strengthened, crenellated and loopholed, and turned

into forts. The whole of these works were joined by palisades and

ditches. They formed a great _tête-de-pont_, requiring a garrison

of 3,000 men. As an additional defence for the flanks of the suburb

three or four gunboats, manned by sailors brought up from Cartagena,

had been launched on the Ebro, and commanded the reach of the river

which runs along the northern side of the city.

Yet great as were the works which now sheathed the body of Saragossa,

the people had not forgotten the moral lesson of the first siege.

When her walls had been beaten down, she had resisted behind her

barricades and the solid houses of her narrow streets. They fully

realized that this might again have to be done, if the French

should succeed in breaking in at some point of the long _enceinte_.

Accordingly, every preparation was made for street fighting. Houses

were loopholed, and communications were pierced between them, without

any regard for private property or convenience. Ground-floor windows

were built up, and arrangements made for the speedy and solid closing

of all doors. Traverses were erected in the streets, to guard as

far as was possible against the dangers of a bombardment, and an

elaborate system of barricades, arranged in proper tactical relation

to each other, was sketched out. The walls might be broken, but the

people boasted that the kernel should be harder than the shell.

Outside the city, where the olive groves and suburban villas and

summer houses had given much cover to the French during the first

siege, a clean sweep had been made of every stone and stick for 800

yards around the defences. The trees were felled, and dragged into

the city, to be cut up into palisades. The bricks and stones were

carried off to revet the new ramparts and ditches. The once fertile

and picturesque garden-suburbs were left bald and bare, and could be

perfectly well searched by the cannon from the walls, so that the

enemy had to contrive all his cover by pick and shovel, or gabion and

fascine.

The soldiery, whose spirits had been much dashed by the disaster of

Tudela, soon picked up their courage when they noted the enthusiasm

of the citizens and the strength of the defences. Indeed, it was

dangerous for any man to show outward signs of doubt or fear, for the

Aragonese had been wrought up to a pitch of hysterical patriotism

which made them look upon faintheartedness as treason. Palafox

himself did his best to keep down riots and assassinations, but his

followers were always stimulating him to apply martial law in its

most rigorous form. A high gallows was erected in the middle of the

Coso, and short shrift was given to any man convicted of attempted

desertion, disobedience to orders, or cowardice. Delations were

innumerable, and the Captain-General had the greatest difficulty in

preserving from the popular fury even persons whom he believed to

be innocent. The most that he could do for them was to shut them

up in the prisons of the Aljafferia, and to defer their trial till

the siege should be over. The fact was that Palafox was well aware

that his power rested on the unlimited confidence reposed on him by

the people, and was therefore bent on crossing their desires as

little as he could help. He was careful to take counsel not only

with his military subordinates, but with all those who had power

in the streets. Hence came the prominence which is assigned in all

the narratives of the siege to obscure persons, such as the priests

Don Basilio (the Captain-General’s chaplain) and Santiago Sass, and

to the demagogues ‘Tio Jorge’ and ‘Tio Marin.’ They represented

public opinion, and had to be conciliated. It is going too far to

say, with Napier, that a regular ‘Reign of Terror’ prevailed in

Saragossa throughout the second siege, and that Palafox was no

more than a puppet, whose strings were pulled by fanatical friars

and bloodthirsty gutter-politicians. But it is clear that the

Captain-General’s dictatorial power was only preserved by a careful

observation of every gust of popular feeling, and that the acts

of his subordinates were often reckless and cruel. The soldiers

disliked the fanatical citizens: the work of Colonel Cavallero, the

engineer officer who has left the best Spanish narrative of the

siege, is full of this feeling. He sums up the situation by writing

that ‘The agents of the Commander-in-chief sometimes abused their

power. Everything was demanded in the name of King and Country,

every act of disobedience was counted as high treason: on the other

hand, known devotion to the holy cause gave unlimited authority, and

assured impunity for any act to those who had the smallest shadow of

delegated power. Even if the citizens had not been unanimous in their

feelings, fear would have given them an appearance of unanimity.

To the intoxication of confidence and national pride caused by

the results of the first siege, to the natural obstinacy of the

Aragonese, to the strength of a dictatorial government supported

by democratic enthusiasm, there was added an exalted religious

fanaticism. Our Lady of the Pillar, patroness of Saragossa, had, it

was supposed, displayed her power by the raising of the first siege:

it had been the greatest of her miracles. Anything could be got from

a people in this frame of mind[110].’

[110] Cavallero, pp. 68-9. Belmas translates the paragraph almost

word for word in ii. 144-5 of his work, without acknowledgement.

Palafox knew well how to deal with his followers. He kept himself

always before their eyes; his activity was unceasing, his supervision

was felt in every department. His unending series of eloquent, if

somewhat bombastic, proclamations was well suited to rouse their

enthusiasm. He displayed, even to ostentation, a confidence which he

did not always feel, because he saw that the strength of the defence

lay in the fact that the Aragonese were convinced in the certainty of

their own triumph. The first doubt as to ultimate success would dull

their courage and weaken their arms. We cannot blame him, under the

circumstances, if he concealed from them everything that was likely

to damp their ardour, and allowed them to believe everything that

would keep up their spirits.

Meanwhile he did not neglect the practical side of the defence. The

best testimony to his capacity is the careful accumulation which

he made of all the stores and material needed for a long siege.

Alone among all the Spanish garrisons of the war, that of Saragossa

never suffered from hunger nor from want of resources. It was the

pestilence, not starvation, which was destined to prove the ruin of

the defence. Before the French investment began Palafox had gathered

in six months’ provisions for 15,000 men; the garrison was doubled by

the arrival of the routed army from Tudela: yet still there was food

for three months for the military. The citizens had been directed

to lay in private stocks, and to feed themselves: this they had

done, and it was not till the end of the siege that they began to

run short of comestibles. Even when the place fell there were still

large quantities of corn, maize, salt fish, oil, brandy, and forage

for horses in the magazines[111]. Only fresh meat had failed, and

the Spaniard is never a great consumer of that commodity. Military

stores had been prepared in vast quantities: there was an ample

stock of sandbags, of timber for palisading, of iron work and spare

fittings for artillery. Instead of gabions the garrison used the

large wicker baskets employed for the vintage, which were available

in profusion. Of artillery there were some 160 pieces in the place,

but too many of them were of small calibre: only about sixty were

16-pounders or heavier. Of these more than half were French pieces,

abandoned by Verdier in August in his siege-works, or fished out of

the canal into which he had thrown them. Of cannon-balls there was

also an ample provision: a great part, like the siege-guns, were

spoil taken in the deserted camp of the French in August. Shells,

on the other hand, were very deficient, and the workmen of the local

arsenal could not manufacture them satisfactorily. The powder was

made in the place throughout the siege: the accident in July, when

the great magazine in the Seminary blew up with such disastrous

results, had induced Palafox to order that no great central store

should be made, but that the sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal should

be kept apart, and compounded daily in quantities sufficient for

all requirements. So many thousand civilians were kept at work on

powder-and cartridge-making that this plan never failed, and no great

explosions took place during the second siege.

[111] Cavallero, pp. 81 and 148.

It will be remembered that want of muskets had been one of the chief

hindrances of the Aragonese during the operations in July and August.

It was not felt in December and January, for not only had Palafox

collected a large store of small arms during the autumn, to equip his

reserves, but he received, just before the investment began, a large

convoy of British muskets, sent up from Tarragona by Colonel Doyle,

who had gone down to the coast by the Captain-General’s desire,

to hurry on their transport. As the siege went on, the mortality

among the garrison was so great that the stock of muskets more than

sufficed for those who were in a state to bear arms.

Such were the preparations which were made to receive the French,

when they should finally present themselves in front of the walls.

All had been done, save in one matter, to enable the city to make

the best defence possible under the circumstances. The single

omission was to provide for a field force beyond the walls capable

of harassing the besiegers from without, and of cutting their

communications with their base. From his 40,000 men Palafox ought

to have detached a strong division, with orders to base itself upon

Upper Aragon, and keep the French in constant fear as to their

supplies and their touch with Tudela and Pampeluna. Ten thousand

men could easily have been spared, and the mischief that they might

have done was incalculable. The city had more defenders than were

needed: in the open country, on the other hand, there was no nucleus

left for further resistance. Almost every available man had been

sent up to Saragossa: with the exception of Lazan’s division in

Catalonia, and of three other battalions[112], the whole of the

32,000 men raised by the kingdom of Aragon were inside the walls.

Outside there remained nothing but unorganized bands of peasants to

keep the field and molest the besiegers. The only help from without

that was given to the city was that supplied by Lazan’s small

force, when it was withdrawn from Catalonia in January, and 4,000

men could do nothing against two French army corps. Even as it was,

the French had to tell off the best part of two divisions to guard

their communications. What could they have done if there had been a

solid body of 10,000 men ranging the mountains, and descending at

every favourable opportunity to fall upon some post on the long line

Alagon-Mallen-Tudela-Pampeluna by which the besiegers drew their food

and munitions from their base?

[112] The battalions of Alcañiz, Tauste, and _Tiradores de

Doyle_; the last were at Jaca, and afterwards served with Blake’s

army at Maria and Belchite. They are wrongly put in Saragossa, in

Arteche, iv. Appendix.

It would seem that the neglect of Palafox to provide for this

necessary detachment arose from three causes. The first was his

want of real strategical insight--which had been amply displayed

during the autumn, when he was always urging on his colleagues his

ridiculous plan for ‘surrounding’ the French army, by an impossible

march into Navarre and the Pyrenees. The second was his conviction,

well-founded enough in itself, that his troops would do much better

behind walls than in the open[113]. The third was a strong belief

that the siege would be raised not by any operations from without,

but by the rigours of the winter. In average years the months of

January and February are tempestuous and rainy in Aragon. The low

ground about Saragossa is often inundated: even if the enemy were not

drowned out (like the besiegers of Leyden in 1574), Palafox thought

that they would find trench-work impossible in the constant downpour,

and would be so much thinned by dysentery and rheumatism that they

would have to draw back from their low-lying camps and raise the

siege. Unfortunately for him the winter turned out exceptionally

mild, and (what was worse) exceptionally dry. The French had not

to suffer from the awful deluge which in Galicia, during this same

month, was rendering the retreat of Sir John Moore so miserable.

The rain did no more than send many of the besiegers to hospital: it

never stopped their advance or flooded their trenches.

[113] See the remarks in defence of Palafox in Arteche, iv. 332-4.

When Palafox had nearly completed his defences--the works on the

Monte Torrero alone were still hopelessly behindhand--the French at

last began to move up against him. On December 15 Marshal Mortier

arrived at Tudela with the whole of the 5th Corps, veterans from

the German garrisons who had not yet fired a shot in Spain. Their

ranks were so full that though only two divisions, or twenty-eight

battalions, formed the corps, it counted 21,000 bayonets. It had also

a brigade of two regiments of hussars and chasseurs as corps-cavalry,

with a strength of 1,500 sabres. The condition of Moncey’s 3rd Corps

was much less satisfactory: it was mainly composed of relics of the

original army of Spain--of the conscripts formed into provisional

regiments with whom Napoleon had at first intended to conquer the

Peninsula[114]. Its other troops, almost without exception, had

taken part in the first siege of Saragossa under Verdier, a not very

cheerful or inspiriting preparation for the second leaguer[115]. All

the regiments had been thinned by severe sickness in the autumn; on

October 10 they had already 7,741 men in hospital--far the largest

figure shown by any of the French corps in Spain. The number had

largely increased as the winter had drawn on, and the battalions

had grown so weak that Moncey consolidated his four divisions into

three during his halt at Alagon. The whole of the 4th division was

distributed between the 2nd and 3rd, so as to bring the others up

to a decent strength. On December 20 the thirty-eight battalions

only made up 20,000 effective men for the siege, while more than

10,000 lay sick, some with the army, some in the base hospitals

at Pampeluna. The health of the corps grew progressively worse

in January, till at last in the middle days of the siege it had

15,000 men with the colours, and no less than 13,000 sick. We find

the French generals complaining that one division of the 5th Corps

was almost as strong and effective at this time as the whole

combined force of the 3rd Corps[116]. Nevertheless these weary and

fever-ridden troops had to take in charge the main part of the siege

operations.

[114] The 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, 121st, and 2nd Legion of

Reserve were all formed in this way.

[115] These were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula, 44th and

14th of the line, and one battalion each of the 70th and 5th

Léger.

During the twenty days of his halt at Alagon, Moncey had employed

his sappers and many of his infantry in the manufacture of gabions,

wool-packs, and sandbags for the projected siege. He was continually

receiving convoys of heavy artillery and ammunition from Pampeluna,

and when Mortier came up on December 20, had a sufficiency of

material collected for the commencement of the leaguer. The two

marshals moved on together on that day, and marched eastward towards

Saragossa, with the whole of their forces, save that four battalions

were left to guard the camp and dépôts at Alagon, and three more

at Tudela to keep open the Pampeluna road[117]. Gazan’s division

crossed the Ebro opposite Tauste, to invest the transpontine suburb

of Saragossa: the rest of the army kept to the right bank. Late in

the evening both columns came in sight of the city. They mustered,

after deducting the troops left behind, about 38,000 infantry,

3,500 cavalry, and 3,000 sappers and artillerymen. They had sixty

siege-guns, over and above the eighty-four field-pieces belonging to

the corps-artillery of Mortier and Moncey. The provision of artillery

was copious--far more than the French had turned against many of

the first-class fortresses of Germany. The Emperor was determined

that Saragossa should be well battered, and had told off an extra

proportion of engineers against the place, entrusting the general

charge of the work to his aide-de-camp, General Lacoste, one of the

most distinguished officers of the scientific corps.

[116] See the table in Belmas, ii. 381.

[117] These were all detached from Moncey. The Alagon garrison

consisted of four battalions of the 2nd Legion of Reserve, 2,500

strong. At Tudela were three battalions of the 121st regiment,

1,800 bayonets.

When the reinvestment began, Gazan on the left bank established

himself at Villanueva facing the suburb of San Lazaro. Mortier

with Suchet’s division took post at San Lamberto opposite the

western front of the city. Moncey, marching round the place, ranged

Grandjean’s troops opposite the Monte Torrero, on the southern front

of the defences, and Morlot further east near the mouth of the

Huerba. His other division, that of Musnier, formed the central

reserve, and guarded the artillery and the magazines. The Spaniards

made no attempt to delay the completion of the investment, and kept

quiet within their walls.

On the next morning the actual siege began. It was destined to last

from December 20 to February 20, and may be divided into three

well-marked sections. The first comprises the operations against the

Spanish outworks, and terminates with the capture of the two great

bridge-heads beyond the Huerba, the forts of San José and Our Lady of

the Pillar: it lasted down to January 15. The second period includes

the time during which the besiegers attacked and finally broke

through the main _enceinte_ of the city: it lasts from January 16 to

January 27. The third section consists of the street-fighting, after

the walls had been pierced, and ends with the fall of Saragossa on

February 20.

Having reconnoitred the whole circuit of the Spanish defences on

the very evening of their arrival before the city (December 20),

Moncey and Mortier recognized that their first task must be to evict

the Spaniards from the Monte Torrero, the one piece of dominating

ground in the whole region of operations, and the spot from which

Saragossa could be most effectively attacked. They were rejoiced to

see that the broad hill was not protected by any continuous line

of entrenchments, but was merely crowned by a large open redoubt,

and defended in front by the two small bridge-heads on the Canal of

Aragon. There was nothing to prevent an attempt to storm it by main

force. This was to be made on the following morning: at the same

time Gazan, on the left bank of the Ebro, was ordered to assault the

suburb of San Lazaro. Here the marshals had underrated the strength

of the Spanish position, which lay in such low ground and was so

difficult to make out, that it presented to the observer from a

distance an aspect of weakness that was far from the reality.