SECTION XVI

THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN (JULY-AUG. 1809)

I. Wellesley at Abrantes: Victor evacuates Estremadura 433

II. Wellesley enters Spain 449

III. Wellesley and Cuesta: the interview at Mirabete 463

IV. The March to Talavera: Quarrel of Wellesley and Cuesta 483

V. Concentration of the French Armies: the King takes

the offensive: Combats of Torrijos and Casa de Salinas 494

VI. The Battle of Talavera: the Preliminary Combats

(July 27-28) 507

VII. The Battle of Talavera: the Main Engagement (July 28) 527

VIII. The Retreat from Talavera 559

IX. The end of the Talavera Campaign: Almonacid 599

APPENDICES

I. The ‘Army of the Centre,’ Jan. 11, 1809. The Spanish Army

at the Battle of Ucles 621

II. The Garrison of Saragossa 622

III. The French Army in Spain, in Feb. 1809 624

IV. The Spanish Army at Medellin 627

V. The Portuguese Army in 1809: organization and numbers 629

VI. Papers relating to the intrigues at Oporto,

April-May 1809 632

VII. Strength of Wellesley’s Army, May 6, 1809 640

VIII. Soult’s Report on Galicia, June 25, 1809 642

IX. Suchet’s and Blake’s Armies, May and June 1809 643

X. Papers relating to the Talavera Campaign: strength and

losses of the British, Spanish, and French Armies 645

XI. The British Royal Artillery in the Peninsula, 1809 654

XII. Venegas’s Army of La Mancha in June-July 1809 655

INDEX 657

MAPS AND PLANS

I. UCLES AND ROSAS _To face_ 54

II. GENERAL MAP OF CATALONIA: BATTLE OF VALLS ” 88

III. SARAGOSSA, THE SECOND SIEGE ” 134

IV. MEDELLIN ” 166

V. BRAGA (LANHOZO) AND OPORTO ” 248

VI. NORTHERN PORTUGAL, SHOWING SOULT’S AND WELLESLEY’S

CAMPAIGNS OF 1809 ” 360

VII. ALCAÑIZ AND MARIA ” 426

VIII. TALAVERA ” 550

IX. CENTRAL SPAIN, SHOWING THE LOCALITIES OF

THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN ” 596

ILLUSTRATIONS

JOSEPH PALAFOX, EQUESTRIAN PORTRAIT BY GOYA _Frontispiece_

A PORTUGUESE CAVALRY SOLDIER, 1809 212

A PORTUGUESE INFANTRY SOLDIER, AND A MAN OF THE ORDENANZA 222

THE DOURO ABOVE OPORTO, THE LOCALITY OF WELLESLEY’S

CROSSING 336

COINS STRUCK IN SPAIN DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR 478

ERRATA IN VOL. II

The following facts I discovered in Madrid and Lisbon when it was too

late to correct the chapters in which the mis-statements occur.

(1) Page 82, note 93. I have found from a Madrid document that part,

though not the whole, of the Regiment of Baza was present at Valls.

One battalion was left behind with Wimpffen: one marched with Reding:

about 800 men therefore must be added to my estimate of the Spanish

infantry.

(2) Page 318, note 394. I found in Lisbon that the regiments which

marched with Beresford to Lamego were not (as I had supposed) nos. 7

and 19, but nos. 2 and 14, with the 4th cazadores. Those which joined

from the direction of Almeida were two battalions of no. 11 (1st of

Almeida) and one of no. 9.

(3) Page 366. A dispatch of Beresford at Lisbon clears up my doubts

as to Silveira’s culpability. Beresford complains that the latter

lost a whole day by marching from Amarante to Villa Pouca without

orders; the dispatch directing him to take the path by Mondim thus

reached him only when he had gone many miles on the wrong road. The

time lost could never be made up.

SECTION IX

AFTER CORUNNA

(JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1809)

CHAPTER I

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOORE’S DIVERSION: RALLY OF THE SPANISH ARMIES:

BATTLE OF UCLES

With the departure of Napoleon from Madrid on December 21, the

offensive action of the French army in central Spain came to a

stand. The Emperor had taken away with him the field army, which

had been destined to deliver those blows at Lisbon and Seville

that were to end the war. The troops which he had left behind him

in the neighbourhood of Madrid were inadequate in numbers for any

further advance, and were forced to adopt a defensive attitude. The

only regions in which the invaders continued to pursue an active

policy were Aragon and Catalonia, from which, on account of their

remoteness, the Emperor had not withdrawn any troops for his great

encircling movement against Sir John Moore. In both those provinces

important operations began on the very day on which Bonaparte set out

to hunt the English army: it was on December 21 that Lannes commenced

the second siege of Saragossa, and that St. Cyr, after relieving

Barcelona, scattered the army of Catalonia at the battle of Molins de

Rey. But the campaigns of Aragon and Catalonia were both of secondary

importance, when compared with the operations in central Spain. As

the whole history of the war was to show, the progress of events in

the valley of the lower Ebro and in the Catalan hills never exercised

much influence on the affairs of Castile and Portugal. It is not,

therefore, too much to assert that it was Moore’s march on Sahagun,

and that march alone, which paralysed the main scheme of the Emperor

for the conquest of Spain.

Between December 21 and January 2 the central reserves of the French

army had been hurried away to the Esla and the plains of northern

Leon. It was not till the new year had come that the Emperor began

to think of sending some of them back to the neighbourhood of

Madrid. The 8th Corps had been incorporated with the 2nd, and sent

in pursuit of Moore: the corps of Ney and the division of Lapisse

were left to support Soult in his invasion of Galicia. The Imperial

Guard marched back to Valladolid. Of all the troops which had been

distracted to the north-west, only Dessolles’ division of the Central

Reserve returned to the capital. Such a reinforcement was far from

being enough to enable Joseph Bonaparte, and his military adviser

Jourdan, to assume the offensive towards the valleys of the Tagus

and Guadiana. The consequences of Moore’s diversion were not only

far-reaching but prolonged: it was not till the middle of March

that the army of the king was able to resume the attempt to march

on Seville, and by that time the condition of affairs had been

profoundly modified, to the advantage of the Spaniards.

The intervening time was not one of rest for Joseph and his army.

Their movements require careful attention. When Napoleon hurried

the main body of his troops across the Somosierra in pursuit of

the British, he left behind him the corps of Victor, shorn of

Lapisse’s division, the whole of the corps of Lefebvre[1], and the

three independent cavalry divisions of Lasalle, Latour-Maubourg and

Milhaud--in all 8,000 horse and 28,000 foot with ninety guns. There

was also the Royal Guard of King Joseph, four battalions of foot,

and a regiment of horse, beside two skeleton regiments of Spanish

deserters, which the ‘Intrusive King’ was raising as the nucleus of a

new army of his own[2].

[1] Save two Dutch and one German regiment of Leval’s division,

which had been left behind on garrison duty in Biscay and Old

Castile.

[2] This was done by the Emperor’s orders. The _cadres_ of these

regiments, called _Royal-Étranger_ and _Royal-Napoléon_, were

formed partly of Frenchmen, partly of Spanish _Afrancesados_. The

rank and file of the first regiment were to be raised from the

Swiss and Germans who had served in the old Spanish army: some

of them had adhered to the French, others, when taken prisoners

in the late campaign, had offered to serve King Joseph. The

second regiment was to be composed of native Spaniards. See

_Correspondance de Napoléon_, 14,531.

Of these troops the incomplete German division of Leval (2nd of the

4th Corps) and King Joseph’s guards formed the garrison of Madrid.

This force seeming too small, the division of Ruffin (1st of the 1st

Corps) was ordered in to reinforce them. The rest of the army lay

in two concentric semicircles outside Madrid: the inner semicircle

was formed of infantry: there was a regiment at Guadalajara[3], a

whole division under Marshal Victor himself at Aranjuez[4], and two

divisions of the 4th Corps under Marshal Lefebvre at Talavera[5].

Outside these troops was a great cavalry screen. In front of

Victor the three cavalry brigades of Latour-Maubourg’s division

lay respectively at Tarancon, Ocaña, and Madridejos, watching the

three roads from La Mancha. West of them lay Milhaud’s division

of dragoons, in front of Talavera, in the direction of Navalmoral

and San Vincente, observing the passes of the Sierra de Toledo.

Lastly, as a sort of advanced guard in the direction of Estremadura,

Lasalle’s light cavalry had pushed on to the great bridge of Almaraz,

behind which the wrecks of the mutinous armies of Belvedere and San

Juan were beginning to collect, under their new commander Galluzzo[6].

[3] The 55th, a stray remnant left behind by Dessolles.

[4] Division of Villatte. It had one battalion detached, along

with the 26th Chasseurs, at Toledo.

[5] Division of Valence and Sebastiani.

[6] Lasalle’s division (often altered in composition) now

consisted of the 10th and 26th Chasseurs, 9th Dragoons and Polish

Lancers.

The Emperor’s parting orders to Jourdan had been to send forward

Lasalle and Lefebvre to deal a blow at the Estremaduran army. They

had, he wrote, twice the numbers necessary to break up the small

force of disorganized troops in front of them. On December 24,

Lefebvre was to cross the Tagus, scatter Galluzzo’s men to the winds,

and then come back to Talavera, after building a _tête-de-pont_ at

Almaraz. Lasalle’s cavalry would be capable of looking after what was

left of this force, for it would not give trouble again for many a

week to come. Victor, on the side of La Mancha, must keep watch on

any movements of the Spaniards from the direction of Cuenca or the

Sierra Morena. He would have no difficulty in holding them off, for

‘all the débris of the insurgent armies combined could not face even

the 8,000 French cavalry left in front of them--to say nothing of the

infantry behind[7].’

[7] See for all these details _Nap. Corresp._, 14,609.

The first portion of the orders of the Emperor was duly carried out.

On December 24 the Duke of Dantzig advanced from Talavera upon the

bridges of Arzobispo and Almaraz, behind which lay 6,000 or 7,000 of

Galluzzo’s dispirited levies. He made no more than a feint at the

first-mentioned passage, but attacking the more important bridge of

Almaraz carried it at the first rush, and took the four guns which

Galluzzo had mounted on the southern bank to command the defile.

The Spaniards, scattered in all directions, abandoned the banks of

the Tagus, and placed themselves in safety behind the rugged Sierra

de Guadalupe. So far the Emperor’s design was carried out: but

Lefebvre then took a most extraordinary step. Instead of returning,

as he had been ordered, to Talavera, and remaining in that central

position till further orders should be sent him, he went off on an

inexplicable adventure of his own. Leaving only Lasalle’s cavalry

and two Polish battalions on the Tagus, he turned north, as if

intending to join the Emperor, crossed the mountains between New

and Old Castile, and on January 5 appeared at Avila in the latter

province[8]. Not only was the march in complete contravention of the

Emperor’s orders, but it was carried out in disobedience to five

separate dispatches sent from Madrid by Jourdan, in the name of King

Joseph. Lefebvre paid no attention whatever to the ‘lieutenant of the

Emperor,’ in spite of vehement representations to the effect that

he was exposing Madrid by this eccentric movement. It was indeed

an unhappy inspiration that led him to Avila, for at this precise

moment the Spaniards were commencing a wholly unexpected offensive

advance against the Spanish capital, which Lefebvre, if he had

remained at Talavera, might have aided in repelling. Much incensed

at his disobedience Napoleon deprived him of the command of the 4th

Corps, and sent him back to France. ‘This marshal,’ he wrote to King

Joseph, ‘does nothing but make blunders: he cannot seize the meaning

of the orders sent him. It is impossible to leave him in command of

a corps;--which is a pity, for he is a brave enough fellow on the

battle-field[9].’ Sebastiani, Lefebvre’s senior divisional general,

replaced him in command of his corps.

[8] Napier misrepresents this move in the strangest way, saying

(i. 364) merely that ‘the Duke of Dantzig recrossed the Tagus and

took post between Talavera and Plasencia.’ Avila is fifty miles

north of these places, and on the other side of the Guadarrama.

[9] Napoleon to Joseph from Valladolid, Jan. 9, _Nap. Corresp._,

14,671.

The new Spanish advance upon Madrid requires a word of explanation.

We have seen that the weary and dilapidated Army of the Centre, now

commanded by the Duke of Infantado, had reached Cuenca on December

10, after escaping from the various snares which Napoleon had set for

it during its march from Calatayud to the valley of the upper Tagus.

When he had escaped from Bessières’ pursuit, the duke proceeded to

give his army a fortnight’s much-needed rest in the mountain villages

round Cuenca. He sent back to Valencia the wrecks of Roca’s division,

which had originally been raised in that kingdom. It had dwindled

down to 1,455 men, from its original 8,000[10]. The other troops, the

2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions of the old army of Andalusia[11], had not

suffered quite so much, as they had not been seriously engaged at

Tudela, but they were half-starved and very disorderly. Infantado was

forced to shoot an officer and two sergeants for open mutiny before

he could restore the elements of discipline[12].

[10] See the figures furnished by the Valencian Junta in

Argüelles, ii. 74. It must he remembered that 4,800 of the

division had escaped to Saragossa, and took part in its defence.

[11] The 1st division had only four battalions present, the

others having been at Madrid, in the army of San Juan.

[12] The officer, a Lieutenant Santiago, had refused to march on

Cuenca, and when the order was repeated, unlimbered his battery

across the road and threatened to fire on the troops who were

marching in that direction. See Arteche, iii. 12.

The province of Cuenca is the most thinly peopled and desolate of

all the regions of Spain[13], and though some stores and food were

procured from Valencia, it was impossible to re-equip the army in

a satisfactory way. Winter clothing, in particular, was absolutely

unprocurable, and if the men had not been placed under roofs in

Cuenca and the villages around, they must have perished of cold.

But a fortnight’s rest did much for them: many stragglers came

up from the rear, a few reinforcements were received, and to the

surprise of the whole army the brigade of the Conde de Alacha, which

had been cut off from the rest of the troops on the day of Tudela,

turned up intact to join its division. This detachment, it will

be remembered[14], had been left in the mountains near Agreda, to

observe the advance of Marshal Ney: after the rout it had nearly

fallen into the hands of the 6th Corps, and had been forced to turn

off into obscure by-paths. Then, passing in haste between the French

divisions in New Castile, it had finally succeeded in reaching Cuenca.

[13] It had only 311 inhabitants to the square league in 1803, as

compared with 926 in Andalusia, and 2,009 in Guipuzcoa.

[14] See vol. i. p. 437.

Infantado, finding that the French still hung back and advanced

no further into his mountain refuge, proceeded to reorganize his

army; the three weakened battalions of the old line regiments were

consolidated into two or often into one. The four divisions of the

original Andalusian host were amalgamated into two, with an extra

‘vanguard’ and ‘reserve’ composed of the best troops[15]. This

rearrangement had not yet been fully completed when the duke made

up his mind that he would venture on an advance against Madrid. He

could learn of nothing save cavalry in his front, and he had received

early notice of the departure of Napoleon to the north. Giving the

command of his vanguard and the greater part of his cavalry to

General Venegas, he bade him descend into the plains, and endeavour

to surprise the brigade of dragoons which lay at Tarancon[16]. This

task Venegas attempted to execute on Christmas Day: he had already

turned the town with half his force, and placed himself across the

line of retreat of the dragoons, before they knew of his approach.

Warned, just in time of his danger, the French brigadier resolved to

cut his way through: he charged down on the enemy, who fell into a

line of battalion squares with long intervals between them. Dashing

between the squares the two regiments got through with the loss of

fifty or sixty men. The Spanish cavalry, which arrived late on the

field, made no attempt to pursue. On the same day Infantado had sent

out another column under General Senra, with orders to march on

Aranjuez: finding that it was held not only by cavalry but by a heavy

force of infantry, the Spanish brigadier wisely halted at a discreet

distance, for which he was sharply taken to task by his chief. It is

certain that if he had gone on, Victor would have made mincemeat of

his little force of 4,000 men.

[15] For these changes see Appendix I.

[16] Perreimond’s brigade of Latour-Maubourg’s division.

Although the advance of Venegas and Senra soon stopped short, the

news that the Spaniards were descending in force into the plain

of New Castile was most discomposing to King Joseph, who was at

this moment very weak in troops. Lefebvre had just started on his

eccentric march to Avila: Dessolles was not yet back from the north,

and there was no disposable reserve at Madrid save the single

division of Ruffin, for the king’s guards and Leval’s Germans were

barely enough to hold down the capital, and could not be moved. The

situation was made worse by the revolt of several of the small towns

of the upper Tagus, including Chinchon and Colmenar, which rose under

the belief that Infantado’s army would soon be at their gates. There

was nothing between the duke and Madrid save the single infantry

division of Villatte, which lay with Marshal Victor at Aranjuez, and

the six dragoon regiments of Latour-Maubourg, a force of little more

than 9,000 sabres and bayonets.

Fortunately for King Joseph, Infantado was a most incapable general,

and allowed his opportunity to slip by. By driving in the French

cavalry screen, he had given notice of his existence, and spread

alarm up to the gates of Madrid. But in order to profit by the

situation he should have dashed in at once, before the enemy had time

to draw together. If he had marched from Cuenca with his reserves, in

the wake of Venegas, he could have brought 20,000 men to bear upon

Victor, before the latter could receive the very moderate succours

that King Joseph could send him. Instead of doing anything of the

kind, he remained quiescent at his head quarters, and did not even

send Venegas any further orders, either to advance or to retreat.

From December 26 to January 11, the Spanish vanguard lay at Tarancon,

as if with the express intention of giving the French time to

concentrate. The duke meanwhile, as his dispatches show, was drawing

up a grandiose plan of operations, which included not only the

eviction of King Joseph from Madrid, but the cutting of Napoleon’s

communication and the raising of the siege of Saragossa! He was

most anxious to induce the Central Junta to move forward all their

other forces to aid him. But they could do nothing, so deplorable

was the state of their army, but bid the weak division of 6,000 men,

which was guarding the Sierra Morena, to begin a demonstration in

La Mancha. In pursuance of this order Del Palacio made a forward

movement, as dangerous as it was useless, to Villaharta on the upper

Guadiana.

Jourdan and the Intrusive King, meanwhile, were for ten days in a

state of great anxiety, expecting every moment to hear that the whole

Spanish army had descended from the mountains and thrown itself upon

the upper Tagus. They ordered Victor to move from Aranjuez to Arganda

to parry such a blow, and made preparations for reinforcing him with

Ruffin’s division, while the rest of the garrison of Madrid, with

the French civilians, and the mass of _Afrancesados_, were to shut

themselves up in the forts on the Retiro, being too few to hold the

entire city. But the expected advance of Infantado never occurred,

and Jourdan and Victor were able to put down the insurrection of the

little towns in the plain without any interruption. Chinchon was

stormed, and the whole male population put to the sword; at Colmenar

there were executions on a large scale, and a fine of 50,000 piastres

was levied. The rest of the insurgents fled to the hills[17].

[17] Jourdan confesses to this massacre in the most open way.

‘Le 27e Léger s’étant présenté aux portes de Chinchon, fut

reçu à coups de fusil. Cette provocation occasionna la perte

des habitants: ils furent _tous_ tués, et la ville incendiée.’

_Mémoires du Maréchal Jourdan_, 139.

On January 8, 1809, the fears of Joseph and Jourdan came to a happy

end, for on that day the division of Dessolles marched in from Old

Castile, while on the 10th the 4th Corps appeared, having been sent

back in haste from Avila by the Emperor. This reinforcement of more

than 20,000 men completely cleared the situation. The French line of

defence could now be re-established: Valence’s Polish division was

placed at Toledo: Leval’s Germans, completed by the arrival of their

belated Dutch brigade, were sent to Talavera. Sebastiani’s division,

with Dessolles and the king’s guard, remained to garrison Madrid.

Ruffin was sent out to join Victor, who was ordered to march at once

on Tarancon and fall upon the Spanish corps which had remained there

in such strange torpidity since Christmas day[18]. The Emperor,

sending these orders from Valladolid, expressed himself in a somewhat

contemptuous strain as to his brother’s fears. ‘The army of Castaños’

(i.e. of Infantado) ‘was as great a fiction as that of La Romana:

rumour made them 20,000 strong, while really there were not more than

5,000 of them[19]. Victor had ten times as many men as were necessary

for clearing off the Spaniards. The panic at Madrid had been absurd

and discreditable: all that was wanted was to catch and hang a dozen

_mauvais sujets_, and the capital would keep quiet.’

[18] All these movements are most clearly set forth in Jourdan’s

_Mémoires_, by far the best authority for the campaign of Ucles.

[19] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,637 and 14,684.

On January 12 Victor marched from Aranjuez with the twenty-one

battalions of Villatte’s and Ruffin’s divisions, the squadrons of

light horse which formed his corps-cavalry, and the three brigades

of dragoons composing the division of Latour-Maubourg--in all some

12,000 foot and 3,500 horse. He did not find Venegas at Tarancon: on

hearing that the French were massing in front of him, that officer

had called in the outlying brigade of Senra, and had retired ten

miles to Ucles, in the foot-hills of the mountains of Cuenca. He sent

news of Victor’s approach to Infantado, but the latter gave him no

definite orders either to fight or to retreat. He merely forwarded to

him three or four more battalions of infantry, and announced that he

was coming up from Cuenca with the reserves: he fixed no date for his

probable arrival.

Much troubled by the want of definite orders, Venegas doubted

whether he ought to hold his ground and await his chief, or fall

back into the mountains. After some hesitation he resolved to take

the more dangerous course, tempted by the fine position of Ucles,

which offered every advantage for a defensive action. He had with

him about 9,500 infantry in twenty-two very weak battalions, some of

which had no more than 250 or 300 bayonets. Of cavalry he had nine

incomplete regiments, giving only 1,800 sabres[20]. There were but

five guns with the army, of which one had broken down, and was not

fit for service. The town of Ucles lies in the midst of a long ridge

stretching north-east and south-west, with a steep slope towards

the plain, from which the French were approaching. Venegas drew up

his men in a single long line, with the town in the centre. Four

battalions were barricaded in Ucles: six took post to the left of

it, eight to the right. Only one was held back in reserve, but three

with four regiments of cavalry were left out in front, to observe the

French advance, in the neighbourhood of the village of Tribaldos.

The four guns and the remainder of the cavalry were drawn up before

the town. It is almost needless to point out the faults of this

order-of-battle--over-great extension and the want of a reserve. The

position was too long for the numbers available. Moreover the men

were not in good fighting trim: though several of the old regiments

from Baylen were among them, their spirits were low: they had not yet

recovered from the dreadful fatigues of the retreat from Tudela, and

they had little confidence in their leaders.

[20] Beside the twenty battalions given in the Appendix to

Arteche, iv, Venegas’s narrative shows that at least two more

(Baylen and Navas de Tolosa) were present.

Victor marched from Tarancon at daybreak on January 13, with one

division on each of the two routes which lead eastward from that

place, Villatte’s on the southern road which goes directly to Ucles,

Ruffin’s on the longer and more circuitous path, which, running

parallel to the other, ultimately rejoins it at Carrascosa some

way behind that town. The majority of Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry

accompanied the former column.

Already on the previous night Victor’s vedettes had discovered the

Spanish outpost at Tribaldos: very early on the following morning it

was driven in by the advance of Villatte’s column, and joined the

main body of the army of Venegas. The Marshal then pushed forward to

the foot of the hills, to reconnoitre the enemy’s position. Having

discerned the lie of the ground, and the distribution of the Spanish

forces, his mind was soon made up. Orders were promptly sent to

Ruffin to leave the road on which he was advancing, and to close in

upon the right flank and rear of Venegas’s army. Meanwhile Villatte

and the cavalry drew up in front of Ucles, with a strength of about

7,000 bayonets and 2,500 sabres. The dragoons were placed in the

centre; in front of them was ranged a battery, which commenced to

shell the town and the Spanish horse drawn up before its gates.

This was only a demonstration: the real blow was to be given by an

attack on the Spanish left, where the hillside was of easier access

than on the steep and rocky northern end of the ridge. Villatte’s

second brigade, the 94th and 95th regiments, executed a circular

march under the eyes of the enemy, and having turned their extreme

flank, rapidly climbed the hill and formed up at right angles to the

Spanish line. These six battalions fell upon the exposed wing and

rolled it up without much difficulty, till they arrived under the

very walls of Ucles, driving the enemy before them. Venegas, who was

watching the fight from the court of the monastery which dominates

the town, had tried to hurry up reinforcements from his right wing:

but they arrived too late to be of any use. When the attack on the

enemy’s left was seen to be making good progress, and the attention

of the Spaniards was distracted to that point, Victor directed the

first brigade of Villatte’s division to assail the steep hill on the

Spanish right. They carried it with ease, for half the defenders had

been withdrawn to reinforce the left, and the rest were demoralized

by the evident disaster on the other flank. The whole of Venegas’s

army fled eastward without any further endeavour to hold their

ground, the considerable force of cavalry in the centre making no

attempt, as it would appear, to cover the retreat of the foot. Such

rearguard as there was consisted of two or three infantry battalions

under General Giron.

Suddenly the Spaniards of the right wing and centre saw rising up in

front of them, as they fled, an imposing line of French infantry,

barring their further progress. This force consisted of the nine

battalions of Ruffin’s division. They had lost their way while

seeking for the Spanish flank, and (like Ferguson at Roliça) made too

wide a circle to enable them to intervene in the actual fighting.

But the very length of their turning movement proved advantageous,

as they had now got into the direct rear of the retreating army.

Driven on by the pursuing dragoons of Latour-Maubourg, the Spaniards

found themselves rushing into the very arms of Ruffin’s division.

The disaster was complete, and more than half of Venegas’s army was

encircled and captured. Most of the cavalry, indeed, escaped, by

dispersing and riding rapidly round the flanks of Ruffin’s line. But

the slow-moving infantry was trapped: a few battalions from the left

wing got off to the south-east, and General Giron with a remnant of

his brigade cut his way through a gap between two French regiments.

All the rest had to surrender.

Of Venegas’s 11,000 men, about 1,000 had been killed or wounded: four

generals, seventeen colonels, 306 other officers and 5,560 rank and

file were captured[21]. The French secured the four guns which formed

the sole artillery of the beaten army, and twenty standards[22].

Their own loss was insignificant--Victor returned his total

casualties at 150 men, and probably did not much understate them, as

he had met with no serious resistance.

[21] These numbers are probably exact: Jourdan quotes them

from his own official report to Berthier of Jan. 20. See his

_Mémoires_, p. 144.

[22] As the wrecks of fifteen or sixteen battalions had

surrendered, there seems no reason to doubt the number of

standards. But the Spaniards asserted that Victor eked out his

trophies, by taking down the old battle-flags of the knights of

Santiago from their church in Ucles.

Though they had suffered so little, the French showed great ferocity

after the fight. They not only sacked the town of Ucles, but executed

in cold blood sixty-nine of its notables, including many monks, who

were accused of having fired on the assailants from their convent

windows. When the column of Spanish prisoners was sent off to Madrid,

orders were given (it is said by Victor himself) that those who would

not keep up with the rest should be shot, and we have good French

authority to the effect that this was regularly done; thirty or more

a day, mostly the wounded and the sick, were shot by the wayside when

they dropped behind[23].

[23] Cf. the _Mémoires_ of Rocca (of the 2nd Hussars, Victor’s

corps-cavalry), p. 68, and Schepeler.

What, meanwhile, had happened to the Spanish Commander-in-chief, and

the 9,000 men whom he had retained at Cuenca? Infantado had started

to join Venegas on January 12: he slept that night at Horcajada,

fifteen miles to the east of Ucles. Resuming his march next morning,

he had got as far as Carrascosa, when a disorderly mob of 2,000

routed infantry hurtled into his vanguard. Questioning the fugitives,

he learnt the details of the battle of Ucles, and found that the

victorious army of the French was only five miles away. Then with a

promptitude very different from his torpor of the last three weeks,

the duke turned his column to the rear, and made off with all speed.

He first returned to his base at Cuenca to pick up his baggage and

stores, and then marched by vile cross-roads and in abominable

weather to Chinchilla in the kingdom of Murcia, which he reached on

January 20. His artillery, forced to go at a snail’s pace among the

hills and torrents, and escorted by a single cavalry regiment only,

was surprised and captured by Digeon’s dragoons at Tortola, a few

miles to the south of Cuenca (Jan. 18). Fifteen guns were lost on

this occasion: several of the French authorities ingeniously add them

to the trophies of Ucles, and write as if they had all been taken

from Venegas in open battle[24].

[24] Notably the ever-inaccurate _Victoires et Conquêtes_, and

Thiers. The usually-sensible Belmas makes the Spanish prisoners

amount to 13,000 men, two thousand more than Venegas ever put in

line.

Victor after occupying Cuenca, and finding that Infantado was now

too far away to be pursued with any chance of success, turned down

into the plains of La Mancha, to strike at the small Andalusian

force which had advanced under Del Palacio, to lend countenance to

Infantado’s projects for a march on Madrid. This division, some 6,000

strong, had reached Villaharta on the upper Guadiana, but when the

news of Ucles arrived, its commander hastily drew it back to the foot

of the passes. Finding no enemy to attack, Victor, after crossing La

Mancha unopposed, took up his post at Madridejos, on the high-road

between Madrid and the Despeña Perros, and waited for further orders

from Head Quarters.

It was only after the victory of Ucles that King Joseph was permitted

by his brother to make his formal entry into Madrid. Up to this

moment he had been told to stop at the Palace of the Pardo, far

outside the walls, and only to pay furtive and unostentatious

visits to his official abode in the city. When the inhabitants of

the capital had been sufficiently impressed by the arrival of the

numerous columns of the 4th Corps and of Dessolles, and had seen

the banners and the prisoners taken at Ucles paraded through their

streets, their king was once more sent among them. Joseph made his

appearance on January 22, passed through a long lane of French

bayonets to the church of San Isidro, where a _Te Deum_ was chanted

for the late victories, and then entered his palace. Here he received

numerous deputations of Spaniards who swore him fealty. But the moral

effect of these oaths was not very great, for the local notables

attended under the pressure of the bayonet. Napoleon had sent orders

that every town in Castile of more than 2,000 souls must dispatch

delegates to Madrid, or the consequences would be unpleasant[25]. The

delegates appeared, but it may be guessed with what feelings they

mouthed their oaths and their protestations of joy and loyalty. Yet

Joseph, determined to play the part of the benevolent monarch, took

the whole farce seriously, and answered with lavish declarations of

his love and sympathy for the great Spanish nation. Sentiments of

the kind were to be the staple of his fruitless and copious oratory

for the next four years. His heart would have sunk within him if

only he could have recognized their futility: but 1809 was but just

beginning, and he was far from realizing the full meaning of his

position: it took a very long time to thoroughly disenchant this

hard-working and well-meaning prince.

[25] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,729, from Valladolid, Jan. 16.

SECTION IX: CHAPTER II

NAPOLEON’S DEPARTURE FROM SPAIN: HIS PLANS FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE

WAR: THE COUNTER-PLANS OF THE JUNTA

Four days after the battle of Ucles Napoleon quitted Spain. He had

rested at Valladolid from January 6 to January 17, after his return

from the pursuit of Sir John Moore. Though he had failed to entrap

the British Army he was not discontented with his achievements.

He was fully convinced that he had broken the back of the Spanish

insurrection, and that he could safely return to France, leaving

the completion of the work to his brother and his marshals. He was

anxious to hear that Saragossa had fallen, and that the English had

been driven out of the Peninsula. When these two events should have

come to pass, his armies might resume, under the guidance of his

subordinates, the original advance against Portugal and Andalusia

which had been so effectually frustrated by Moore’s daring move.

Meanwhile he spent full eleven days at Valladolid, busy with all

manner of desk-work, connected not merely with Spain, but with the

affairs of the whole continent. He was evidently anxious to leave

an impression of terror behind him: he hectored and bullied the

unfortunate Spanish deputations that were compelled to come before

him in the most insulting fashion. His harangues generally wound up

with the declaration that if he was ever forced to come back to Spain

in arms, he would remove his brother Joseph, and divide the realm

into subject provinces, which should be governed by martial law. Some

French soldiers (probably marauders) having been assassinated, he

arrested and threatened to hang the whole municipality of Valladolid,

finally releasing them only when three persons accused (rightly

or wrongly) of the murders were delated to him and executed. He

sent advice to King Joseph to deal in the same way with Madrid:

nothing would keep the capital quiet, he wrote, but a good string

of executions[26]. It was to be many years before he realized that

hanging did no good in Spain, and was only repaid by additional

assassinations. In return for this good advice to his brother, he

extorted from him fifty of the choicest pictures of the royal gallery

at Madrid; but in compensation Joseph was invited to annex all that

he might choose from the private collections of the exiled Spanish

nobility and the monasteries of the capital[27].

[26] ‘Faites donc pendre une douzaine d’individus à Madrid: il

n’y manque point de mauvais sujets, et sans cela il n’y aura rien

de fait.’ _Nap. Corresp._, 14,684. Compare Lecestre, _Lettres

inédites de Napoléon_, i. 275, where orders are given that thirty

persons, who had already been acquitted by the civil tribunals,

should he rearrested, tried again before a court martial, and

promptly shot! Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 16, 1809.

[27] ‘Je préfèrerais que vous prissiez tous les tableaux qui

se trouvent dans les maisons confisquées et dans les couvents

supprimés, et que vous me fissiez présent d’une cinquantaine de

chefs-d’œuvre. Vous sentez qu’il ne faut que de bonnes choses.’

_Nap. Corresp._, 14,717.

Suggestions have sometimes been made that Napoleon hastened his

departure from Spain, because he saw that the suppression of the

insurrection would take a much longer time than he had originally

supposed, and because he wished to transfer to other hands the

lengthy and inglorious task of hunting down the last armies of the

Junta. This view is certainly erroneous: his three months’ stay in

Spain had not opened the Emperor’s eyes to the difficulties of the

business that he had taken in hand. Though many of his couriers and

aides-de-camp had already been ambuscaded and shot by the peasantry,

though he was already beginning to see that a blockhouse and a

garrison would have to be placed at every stage on the high-roads,

he believed that these sinister signs were temporary, and that the

country-side, after a few sanguinary lessons had been given, would

sink down into the quiet of despair.

His final legacy to his brother, on departing, was a long dispatch

giving a complete plan of operations for the next campaign. Soult,

after forcing the English to embark, was to march on Oporto. Napoleon

calculated that he ought to capture it on February 1, and that on

February 10 he would be in front of Lisbon. The Portuguese levies he

practically disregarded as a fighting force, and he was ignorant that

there still remained 8,000 or 10,000 British troops on the Tagus, who

would serve to stiffen their resistance.

When Soult should have captured Oporto, and be well on the way

to Lisbon, Victor was to go forward with his own 1st Corps, the

division of Leval from the 4th Corps, and the cavalry of Milhaud,

Latour-Maubourg, and Lasalle. He was to strike at Estremadura, occupy

Merida and Badajoz, and join hands with Soult along the Tagus.

Lisbon being reduced, Victor was to borrow a division from Soult and

march on Seville with 40,000 men. With such a force, as the Emperor

calculated, he would subdue the whole of Andalusia with ease.

Meanwhile Saragossa must (as Napoleon rightly thought) fall some

time in February. When it was disposed of, the 3rd and 5th Corps

would provide a garrison for Aragon, and then march on Valencia,

which would be attacked and subdued much about the same time that

Victor would arrive at Seville. St. Cyr would have made an end of

the Catalans long before. Thus the whole Peninsula would be subdued

ere the summer was over. There was nowhere a Spanish army that could

make head against even 10,000 French troops. The only possible

complication would be that Moore’s army might conceivably take ship,

not for England, but for Lisbon or Cadiz. If the English, ‘the only

enemy who could create difficulties,’ took this course, the Emperor

might have to give further orders. But it does not seem that he

regarded this as a likely contingency, since he had conceived an even

exaggerated idea of the losses and demoralization which the British

had suffered in the retreat to Corunna. To Joseph he wrote, ‘reserve

yourself for the expedition to Andalusia, which may start three weeks

hence. With 40,000 men, marching by an unexpected route [i.e. by

Badajoz, not by La Carolina], you will surprise the enemy and force

him to submit. This is an operation which will make an end of the

war: I leave the glory of it to you[28].’ To Jerome Napoleon he wrote

in the most laconic style, ‘the Spanish affair is done with[29],’ and

then proceeded to discuss the general politics of the Continent, as

if his whole attention could now be given to the doings of Austria

and Russia. On January 18 he rode out of Valladolid, and after

six days of incessant travel reached Paris on the 24th. His first

care after his arrival was to scare the intriguers of the capital

into good behaviour. His second was to endeavour to treat Austria

after the same fashion. He had not yet made up his mind whether the

ministers of Francis II meant mischief, or whether they had merely

been presuming on his long absence in Spain: on the whole he thought

that they could be reduced to order by bold language, and by the

ostentatious movement of troops on the Rhine and upper Danube. But he

was not sure of his conclusion: in his correspondence letters stating

that Austria has been brought to reason, alternate with others

in which she is accused of incorrigible perversity, and a design

to make war in the spring[30]. The Emperor’s suspicions are most

clearly shown by the fact that in February he ordered the whole of

the Imperial Guard, except two battalions and three squadrons, to be

brought up from Spain and directed on Paris[31]. In the same month he

sent secret orders to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine,

to bid them be ready to mobilize their contingents at short notice.

[28] Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 11, 1809, _Nap. Corresp._, 14,684.

[29] Almost the same words are found in a dispatch to Mollien

of Jan. 24, ‘Aujourd’hui les affaires d’Espagne sont à peu près

terminées.’ This was written _after_ the Emperor had returned to

Paris.

[30] Cf., for example, _Nap. Corresp._, 14,741 and 14,749,

where Austria is said to have changed her tone and stopped her

preparation, with 14,721 and 14,779, which show a most hostile

spirit against her.

[31] For the details, see _Nap. Corresp._, 14,780, written to

Bessières from Paris on Feb. 15.

It is clear that as regards the affairs of Spain the Emperor was in

January and February, 1809, as much deluded as he had been seven

months before, in June, 1808. The whole plan of campaign which he

dictated at Valladolid, and sent as his parting gift to Joseph and

Jourdan, was absolutely impracticable, and indicated a fundamental

ignorance of the character of the Spanish war. It would have been a

perfectly sensible document if the struggle had been raging in Italy

or Germany, though even there the calculations of distance and time

would have been rather hazardous. Twenty-three days were given to

Soult to expel the English, to pacify Galicia, to take Oporto, and

to march on Lisbon! Even granting that all had gone as the Emperor

desired, the estimate was too short by half. It was midwinter;

Galicia and northern Portugal form one of the most mountainous

regions in Europe: their roads are vile; their food supplies are

scanty; their climate at that season of the year detestable. Clearly

the task given to Soult could not be executed in the prescribed

time[32].

[32] As a matter of fact, as has been stated elsewhere, Soult

though working his hardest did not leave Corunna till Feb. 20,

1809, nor take Oporto till March 29.

But this is a minor point: it was not so much in his ‘logistics’ that

the Emperor went wrong as in his general conception of the character

of the war. He imagined that in dealing with Spain he might act as

if he were dealing with Austria or Prussia--indeed that he had an

enormous extra advantage in the fact that the armies of Ferdinand VII

were infinitely inferior in mere fighting power to those of Francis

II or Frederick William III. By all the ordinary rules of modern

warfare, a nation whose capital had been occupied, and whose regular

armies had been routed and half-destroyed, ought to have submitted

without further trouble. The Emperor was a little surprised that

the effect of Espinosa and Gamonal, of Tudela and Ucles, had not

been greater. He had almost expected to receive overtures from the

Junta, asking for terms of submission. But somewhat disappointed

though he might be, he had not yet realized that Spain was not as

other countries. The occupation of Madrid counted for little or

nothing. The insurrectionary armies, when driven into a corner, did

not capitulate, but dispersed, and fled in small parties over the

hills, to reunite on the first opportunity. Prussian or Austrian

troops under similar circumstances would have quietly laid down their

arms. But to endeavour to grasp a Spanish corps was like clutching

at a ball of quicksilver: the mass dispersed in driblets between the

fingers of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately

united to form a new force. Large captures of Spaniards only took

place on the actual battle-field (as at Ucles or Ocaña), or when an

army had shut itself up in a fortress and could not get away, as

happened at Saragossa and Badajoz. Unless actually penned in between

bayonets, the insurgents abandoned cannon and baggage, broke their

ranks and disappeared, to gather again on some more propitious day,

either as fresh armies or as guerrilla bands operating upon the

victor’s lines of communication.

Nor was this all: in Italy, Germany, and Austria Bonaparte had dealt

with regions where the population remained quiescent when once the

regular army had been beaten. Risings like that of Verona in 1797, or

of the Tyrol in 1805, were exceptional. The French army was wont to

go forward without being forced to leave large garrisons behind it,

to hold down the conquered country-side. A battalion or two placed in

the chief towns sufficed to secure the communication of the army with

France. Small parties, or even single officers bearing dispatches,

could ride safely for many miles through an Italian or Austrian

district without being molested. It was not thus in Spain: the

Emperor was to find that every village where there was not a French

garrison would be a focus of active resistance, and that no amount of

shooting or hanging would cow the spirits of the peasantry. It was

only after scores of aides-de-camp had been murdered or captured, and

after countless small detachments had been destroyed, that he came to

realize that every foot of Spanish soil must not only be conquered

but also held down. If there was a square of ten miles unoccupied, a

guerrilla band arose in it. If a district thirty miles long lacked a

brigade to garrison it, a local junta with a ragged apology for an

army promptly appeared. Three hundred thousand men look a large force

on paper, but when they have to hold down a country five hundred

miles broad they are frittered away to nothing. This Great Britain

knows well enough from her recent South African experience: but it

was not a common matter of knowledge in 1809. If the Emperor had been

told, on the day of his entry into Madrid, that even three years

later his communication with Bayonne would only be preserved by the

maintenance of a fortified post at every tenth milestone, he would

have laughed the idea to scorn. Still more ridiculous would it have

appeared to him if he had been told that it would take a body of 300

horse to carry a dispatch from Salamanca to Saragossa, or that the

normal garrison of Old Castile would have to be kept at 15,000 men,

even when there was no regular Spanish army nearer to it than Oviedo

or Astorga. In short he, and all Europe, had much to learn as to the

conditions of warfare in the Peninsula. If he had realized them in

March, 1808, there would have been no treachery at Bayonne, and the

‘running sore,’ as he afterwards called the Spanish war, would never

have broken forth.

Meanwhile the conquest of Spain was hung up for a month and more

after the victory of Ucles. The Emperor had bidden Joseph and Jourdan

to wait till the February rains were over, before sending out the

great expedition against Andalusia; the siege of Saragossa was

prolonged far beyond expectation, and Soult in Galicia (as we shall

presently see) found the time-allowance which his master had set him

inadequate to the verge of absurdity. The French made no further move

of importance till March.

The Central Junta, therefore, were granted three full months from the

date of their flight from Aranjuez to Seville, in which to reorganize

their armies for the oncoming campaign of 1809--a respite which they

gained (as we have already shown) purely and solely through Moore’s

splendid inspiration of the march to Sahagun.

The members of the Junta trailed into Seville at various dates

between December 14 and December 17. Their rapid journey at midwinter

through the Sierra de Guadalupe and the still wilder Sierra Morena

had been toilsome and exhausting[33]. It proved fatal to their

old president, Florida Blanca, who died of bronchitis only eleven

days after he had arrived at Seville. In his stead a Castilian

Grandee of unimpeachable patriotism but very moderate abilities,

the Marquis of Astorga, was elected to the presidential chair. The

Junta had no enviable task before it: the news of the disasters

on the Ebro and the fall of Madrid had thrown the nation into a

paroxysm of unreasoning fury. Ridiculous charges of treason were

being raised against all those who had been in charge of the war.

Blake and Castaños (of all people!) were being openly accused of

having sold themselves to Napoleon. There were a number of political

assassinations in the regions to which the French had not yet

penetrated: most of the victims were old friends of Godoy. It looked

at first as if the central government would be unable to restore any

sort of order, or to organize any further resistance. Some of the

local juntas, whose importance had disappeared with the meeting of

the Supreme Junta, showed signs of wishing to resume their ancient

independence. Those of Seville and Jaen were especially disobliging.

But the evils of disunion were so obvious that even the most

narrow-minded particularists settled down after a time into at least

a formal obedience to the central government.

[33] It will be remembered (see vol. i. p. 529), that they went

via Talavera, Merida, and Llerena.

The enforced halt made by the French after Napoleon’s departure for

Madrid was the salvation of Spain. By the month of January things

were beginning to assume a more regular aspect, and some attempt

was made to face the situation. The most favourable part of that

situation was that money at least was not wanting for the moment. The

four or five millions of dollars which the British Government had

distributed to the provincial Juntas and to the ‘Central’ had long

been spent, and in 1809 no more than £387,000 in specie was advanced

to Spain. Spent also was the enormous amount of money accruing from

patriotic gifts and local assessments. But there had just arrived

at Cadiz a large consignment of specie from America. The Spanish

colonies in the New World had all adhered without hesitation to the

cause of Ferdinand VII, and their first and most copious contribution

had just come to hand. Not only had the Governors of Mexico and

Peru and the other provinces strained every nerve to raise money,

but a vast patriotic fund had been collected by individuals. There

were rich merchants and land-holders in America who made voluntary

offerings of sums as large as 100,000 or 200,000 dollars apiece.

The money which came to hand early in 1809 amounted to more than

£2,800,000, and much more was received ere the close of the year. It

was with this sum, far more than with British money, that the Spanish

armies were paid and fed: but their equipment mainly came from

England. The stores of arms, clothing, and munition which had existed

in the arsenals of the Peninsula when the war broke out, had all been

exhausted in the autumn, and had not even sufficed to equip fully the

unfortunate armies which were beaten on the Ebro. The government and

the local juntas had set up new manufactories at Seville, Valencia,

and elsewhere, which were already turning out a large quantity of

weapons, accoutrements, and uniforms: it was now that the armies

began to appear in the rough brown cloth of the country and in

leather shakos, abandoning the old white uniform and plumed hat

which had been the garb of the Spanish line. But the reclothing and

rearmament of the troops could never have been completed without the

enormous consignments of cloth, powder, muskets, lead, and leather

work which came from England. It is true that much was lost by the

fortune of war before it could be utilized--notably the considerable

amount of muskets, ammunition, and cloth which had been landed in

Galicia for La Romana’s army. This, as we have seen, was either

destroyed by Sir John Moore’s army or captured by Soult, because

the Galician Junta had kept it waiting too long at the base. But

all that went to Andalusia, Valencia, and Catalonia came safely to

hand. Palafox’s army was re-equipped, just before the second siege of

Saragossa began, with British stores sent up by Colonel Doyle from

Tarragona. The armies of the south and east also received enormous

consignments of necessaries.

It remains to speak of the purely military aspect of the Junta’s

position. When January began, the wrecks of the Spanish armies were

distributed in a wide semicircle reaching from Oviedo to Gerona,

while the French lay in their midst. In the Asturias there were still

14,000 or 15,000 men under arms: the relics of Acevedo’s division of

Blake’s army had fallen back, and joined the other levies which the

local Junta had assembled. The whole force was watching the two lines

on which the French could conceivably move during the winter--the

coast route from Santander to Gijon, and the pass of Pajares which

leads from Leon to Oviedo.

In Galicia, La Romana’s army, now engaged in the miserable retreat

from Astorga to Orense, had fallen into the most wretched condition.

Of the 22,000 men who had been assembled at Leon in December only

6,000 or 7,000 were now to be found: the Galician battalions had

melted home when the army fell back among their native mountains.

They cannot be much blamed, for they were suffering acute starvation:

in the spring they came back to join the colours readily enough.

The regulars, who still hung together, were famished, naked,

typhus-ridden, and incapable of any great exertion. Their general’s

only care was to keep them as far as possible from Soult and Ney,

till the winter should have passed by, and food and clothing be

procured.

Between La Romana’s men at Orense and the army of Estremadura on

the Tagus there was no Spanish force in the field. When Lapisse

and D’Avenay had occupied Zamora and Salamanca, the only centre of

resistance in Leon was the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was held

by a handful of local militia. Portuguese troops were beginning to

collect in its rear at Almeida, but with them the Junta had nothing

to do.

The Estremaduran army had now passed from the hands of Galluzzo to

those of Cuesta. The Junta, in spite of the memories of Cabezon

and Rio Seco, had once more given the obstinate and incapable old

soldier an important command. Apparently they had been moved by the

widespread but idiotic cry imputing treachery to the generals who

had been beaten on the Ebro, and gave Cuesta an army because (with

all his faults) no one ever dreamed of accusing him of treachery or

sympathy with the French. His forces consisted (1) of the wrecks

of Belvedere’s army from Gamonal, (2) of the débris of San Juan’s

army from Madrid, (3) of new Estremaduran levies, which had not gone

forward to Burgos in October, but had remained behind to complete

their organization, (4) of the four dismounted cavalry regiments from

Denmark, which had been sent to the south when La Romana landed at

Santander, in order to procure equipment and horses. In all, the army

of Cuesta had no more than 10,500 foot and 2,000 or 2,500 horse. The

spirit of the old troops of San Juan and Belvedere was still very

bad, and they were hardly recovered from their December mutinies and

murders. After Lefebvre had driven them back from the Tagus, and

occupied the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, the Estremadurans had

retired to Merida and Truxillo: on January 11 their most advanced

position was at the last-named place.

To the east of Estremadura lay the weakest point of the Spanish line:

Andalusia and its mountain barrier of the Sierra Morena were almost

undefended in January, 1809. It will be remembered that all through

the autumn of the preceding year the local juntas, intoxicated

with the fumes of Baylen, had let the months slip by without doing

much to organize the ‘Army of Reserve,’ of which they had spoken

so much in August and September. It resulted that, when Reding had

marched for Catalonia, and the last belated fractions of Castaños’

army had been forwarded to Madrid, Andalusia was almost destitute

of troops. When the Junta fled to Seville, it looked around for an

army with which to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena. Nothing

of the kind existed: the only force available consisted of nine or

ten battalions, mainly new levies, which were dispersed through the

‘Four Kingdoms’ completing their armament and organization. They were

hastily mobilized and pushed forward to the Sierra Morena, but not

more than 6,000 bayonets and 500 sabres could be collected. This was

the sole force that lay between the French at Madrid and the Junta at

Seville. The charge of the division, whose head quarters were placed

at La Carolina, was given to the Marquis del Palacio, who in the

general shifting of commanders had just been recalled from Catalonia.

The British Government’s knowledge of the danger to which Andalusia

was exposed, from the absolute want of troops to defend it, led to an

untoward incident, which did much to endanger its friendly relations

with the Junta. On hearing of the fall of Madrid, and of Moore’s

retreat towards Galicia, Canning harked back to one of his old ideas

of the previous summer, the notion that British troops might be

sent to the south of Spain, if a safe basis for their operations

were secured. This, as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

believed, would best be provided by the establishment of a garrison

in Cadiz. It was all-important that this great centre of commerce

should not fall into the hands of the French, and early in January it

was known in London that there was no adequate Spanish force ready to

defend the passes of Andalusia. If Napoleon had an army large enough

to provide, not only for the pursuit of Moore, but for the dispatch

of a strong corps for an attack on Seville, it seemed probable that

the French might overrun Southern Spain as far as the sea, without

meeting with serious opposition. Accordingly, Canning wrote to Frere,

on the fourteenth day of the new year, 1809, to offer the assistance

of a considerable British force for the defence of Andalusia, if

Cadiz were placed in their hands.

‘The question of the employment of a British army in the south

of Spain,’ he wrote, ‘depends essentially upon the disposition

of the Spanish Government to receive a corps of that army into

Cadiz. Without the security to be afforded by that fortress, it is

impossible to hazard the army in the interior, after the example of

the little co-operation which Sir John Moore represents himself to

have received from the Spaniards in the north.... In consequence of

the imminent danger, and of the pressing necessity for immediate

decision arising from Sir John Moore’s retreat, and from the

defenceless state in which you represent Andalusia to be, His

Majesty’s Government have deemed it right (without waiting for the

result of your communication with the Central Junta) to send a force

direct to Cadiz, to be admitted into that fortress. Four thousand

men under Major-General Sherbrooke are directed to sail immediately,

and he is informed that he is to expect instructions from you on

his arrival, containing the determination of the Spanish Government

respecting his admission into Cadiz.... In the event of a refusal

of the Junta to afford this proof of confidence, Major-General

Sherbrooke is directed to proceed to Gibraltar[34].’

[34] Canning to Frere, Jan. 14, 1809 (Record Office).

The last paragraph of this dispatch shows that Canning’s intentions

were perfectly honourable, and that he did not intend to bring any

pressure to bear upon the Junta in the event of their refusing to

admit a British garrison into Cadiz. His views were founded upon the

information available in London when he wrote, and he was under the

impression that a French army might probably be marching upon Seville

at the moment when his letter would reach Frere’s hands. But--as we

have seen--the diversion of the main force of Napoleon’s army of

invasion against Moore, had rendered any such expedition impossible,

and no immediate danger was really to be apprehended.

The same idea, however, had entered into Frere’s mind, and long

before he received Canning’s dispatch he had been sounding members

of the Central Junta as to the way in which they would look on

a proposal to send British troops to Cadiz. The answer which he

received from their secretary, Martin de Garay, was not reassuring:

Don Martin ‘energetically repudiated’ the project: there would be

no objection, he said, to admit a garrison, if Cadiz became ‘the

ultimate point of retreat’ of the armies and government of Spain.

But the danger that had appeared so pressing some weeks before had

passed by, the French had stopped their advance, and the Junta were

now hoping to defend Estremadura and the course of the Tagus. The

invaders, as they trusted, would be met and checked on the line

of Alcantara and Almaraz. They deprecated any sending of British

troops to Cadiz, and hoped that Lisbon would be the point to which

reinforcements would be dispatched, as its evacuation would have

deplorable results. De Garay, in a second letter, spoke of rumours

to the effect that Cradock was proposing to evacuate Portugal, and

trusted that they were not true. As a matter of fact they were, and

that timid commander was already making secret preparations to embark.

Frere gave up for the present any idea of pressing the project

further, unless the French should recommence their advance on

Andalusia. He had not yet received Canning’s dispatch from London,

and did not know that the home government had taken to heart the plan

for occupying Cadiz and sending a large expedition to Andalusia. But

on February 2, before any hint of the kind had reached him, he was

informed by a dispatch from Lisbon that troops had been already sent

off to Cadiz[35]. This step was the work of Sir George Smith, one of

the numerous British military agents in the Peninsula, who had taken

upon himself to force events to an issue, without first taking the

precaution of communicating either with the home government or the

British ambassador at Seville. Smith was a hasty and presumptuous

man, full of zeal without discretion. The defencelessness of

Andalusia had impressed him, just as it had impressed Canning and

Frere. But instead of opening communications with the Junta, as

they had both done, he had merely written in very urgent terms to

Cradock, and adjured him to detach troops from the scanty garrison of

Portugal in order to secure Cadiz. The general, when thus pressed,

consented to fall in with the scheme, and set aside a brigade under

Mackenzie, which he shipped off from Lisbon at twenty-four hours’

notice (February 2). He also ordered the 40th regiment, then in

garrison at Elvas, to march on Seville. Both Cradock and Smith were

gravely to blame, for they had no authorization to attempt to occupy

Cadiz, without obtaining the consent of the Spanish Government[36].

They should have consulted both Frere and the Junta before moving a

man: but it was only when the troops had actually embarked that they

thought fit to notify their action to the ambassador at Seville.

[35] The 29th, 3/27th, and 2/9th regiments.

[36] As Canning wrote to Frere, after receiving the news of the

abortive expedition, ‘The enclosed copy of the instructions under

which Sir G. Smith was sent out, will show you that the step

taken by that officer was not to have been taken _except at the

direct solicitation of the Spanish authorities_.... He has been

directed to leave Cadiz at once, and you may assure the Junta

that no separate or secret commission was, has been, or ever will

be entrusted to any officer or other person,’ Feb. 26 (Record

Office).

On receiving their letters Frere was placed in an unenviable

position. Having just seen his own proposals negatived by the Junta

in polite but decisive terms, he now learnt that a British force had

been sent off to carry out precisely the plan which the Spaniards had

refused to take into consideration. Four days later he was informed

that Mackenzie’s brigade, which had chanced upon a favourable wind,

was actually lying in Cadiz harbour, and that Sir George Smith was

endeavouring to induce the local authorities of the place to permit

them to land. The Junta, as was inevitable, suspected Frere of having

been in the plot, and imagined that he was trying to force their hand

by the display of armed force. Cadiz was at Smith’s mercy, for it

was only garrisoned by its urban guards; and the populace were by no

means unwilling to see the British land, for the fear of the French

was upon them, and they welcomed the approach of reinforcements of

any kind.

The supreme authority in Cadiz at this moment was the Marquis of

Villel, a special commissioner sent down by the Central Junta, of

which he was a member. He refused to be cajoled by Smith, and very

properly referred his demand for permission to disembark to the

government at Seville. The latter, not unnaturally incensed, turned

for explanations to Frere. The ambassador’s conduct when placed in

this dilemma was by no means wise or straightforward. Instead of

frankly disavowing Smith’s action, he adopted the tortuous course[37]

of pretending that the expedition from Lisbon had been sent with

his knowledge and consent, but that he would not allow it to land

without the leave of the Junta. The Spaniards replied in terms of

some indignation, and returned a frank negative to the demand. Their

secretary, de Garay, wrote that the unexpected appearance of General

Mackenzie’s force was ‘painful and disagreeable intelligence, Cadiz

being no longer in danger from the French, and two Spanish regiments

being already on their way to reinforce the garrison. The measure

which had been taken would admit of a thousand interpretations, and

a consent to hand over the fortress to the British would compromise

the Central Junta with the whole nation.’ The fact was that Spanish

public opinion was strongly opposed to allowing the British to obtain

a foothold in Cadiz; there was a deeply-rooted notion abroad that, if

once occupied, the place might be kept permanently in our hands, and

be turned into a second Gibraltar.

[37] Frere, by his own showing, exceeded the bounds of diplomatic

evasion. He writes to Canning (Feb. 9) to say that the dispatch

of the Lisbon troops had been a complete surprise to him, as he

had not received any information on the subject. ‘It occurred

to me, however, that it was best to take it upon myself, and to

affect to consider it a thing of course, and to say that I had

sent orders in conformity with the note which I had received from

Mr. de Garay. In order to give this some semblance of truth, I

did afterwards write a letter to Lisbon to this effect, and sent

it off before I dispatched my note to Mr. de Garay. This did not

prevent me from being assailed by remonstrances.’ Finally he

proceeded to tell the Junta ‘that he only wished to see Cadiz

occupied in the extreme case of an immediate attack by the

French’ (Record Office).

Unfortunately for the credit of Great Britain with her allies,

tumults broke out at Cadiz within a few days of the arrival of

Mackenzie’s army, which supplied an excuse to malevolent Spaniards

for attributing the worst motives to their allies. As a matter of

fact they were not stirred up by Sir George Smith or any other

emissary of the British Government, but were the results of the

eccentric behaviour of the Marquis de Villel[38]. This personage

was a very strange character, a sort of nineteenth-century Spanish

Puritan, with a taste for playing the benevolent despot. He

attributed the misfortunes of his country (and not without much

reason) to her moral decadence. His idea of the way to commence her

regeneration was peculiar, considering the circumstances of the

time. He issued an edict commanding all married pairs living apart,

to reunite, issued laws repressing theatre-going, late hours, and

gambling, legislated concerning the length of ladies’ skirts, and

organized a grand _battue_ against women of light reputation, of whom

he imprisoned some scores. When he proceeded to engage in a sort of

moral inquisition into the private life of all classes, he naturally

became very unpopular, and on the first opportunity the populace rose

against him. He had ordered into the city a newly-embodied ‘Swiss’

battalion, raised from the prisoners of Dupont’s army and other

deserters of all nationalities. The cry was raised by his enemies

that he was admitting Frenchmen in disguise into the sacred fortress,

with the purpose of betraying it to the enemy. Other rumours were

put about to the effect that he was deliberately neglecting the

fortifications, and supplying the batteries with powder adulterated

with sand[39].

[38] For Villel’s eccentricities in detail see Toreno, i. pp.

375-6, and Arteche, v. p. 107.

[39] See Col. Leslie (of the 29th), _Memoirs_, p. 94.

When the foreign battalion drew near to Cadiz on February 22, and

began to march up the long spit which connects the city with the Isla

de Leon, the storm burst. A mixed multitude of rioters shut the gates

against the troops, and then swept the streets, maltreating Villel’s

subordinates, and slaying Don José Heredia the commander of the

coast-guard, a person very unpopular with the smugglers, who formed

an appreciable element in the crowd. The High Commissioner himself

was besieged in his house, hunted from it, and nearly murdered: he

only escaped by the kind offices of the head of a Capuchin convent,

who took him within his gates, and made himself responsible to the

rioters for keeping the refugee in safe custody. The mob next tried

to break open the state prison, for the purpose of slaying General

Caraffa and other political captives. Fortunately Felix Jones, the

military Governor, succeeded in saving these unhappy persons, by the

not over-willing aid of the urban guards, many of whom had joined in

the outbreak.

The rioters expressed great friendliness for the British, and many of

them kept inviting the troops in the offing to come ashore. It was

very lucky that no attention was paid to these solicitations[40],

for if they had landed the worst suspicions of the Junta would have

appeared justified, and the insurrection would have been attributed

to the machinations of Frere or Smith. Fortunately the latter had

died, only a few days before the troubles broke out, the victim of

a fever which carried him off after no more than twenty-four hours

of illness. If he had survived till the twenty-second, he would have

been quite capable of taking the fatal step of listening to the

appeals of the rioters, and ordering the troops ashore.

[40] Mackenzie wrote that ‘it was evident that the people were

favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for it was

frequently called for during the tumult.’ But ‘the utmost care

was taken to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any

part whatever on this occasion, and except when I was applied to

by the Governor for the interference of some British officers as

mediators, we stood perfectly clear.’ Dispatch to Castlereagh in

the Record Office, dated Lisbon, March 13, 1809.

As it turned out the whole expedition ended in an absurd fiasco.

When the riots had died down, the Junta recalled the eccentric de

Villel, but they would not listen to any proposals from Frere for

admitting British troops into Cadiz, even when he suggested that

only two battalions should remain there, while the rest, including

Sherbrooke’s division, which was expected to arrive in a few days,

should come up and join the 40th regiment at Seville, with the

ultimate purpose of marching into Estremadura. The Junta replied

that ‘the loyalty of the British Ministry and the generosity of its

efforts to assist Spain were beyond suspicion: but the National

Government must respect national prejudices, and avoid exposing

itself to censure. If there were any urgent danger, they would have

no hesitation in admitting the troops of their allies into Cadiz. But

the French were still far away, and there was no immediate prospect

of their approach. The British expedition would be more usefully

employed in Catalonia, or in some other theatre of war, than in

Cadiz[41].’ By March 4, when this final answer was sent to Frere, the

state of affairs had so much changed, that the representations made

by the Junta were more or less correct. The imminent danger which had

existed in January had passed away.

[41] Martin de Garay to Frere, March 4 (Record Office).

Accordingly, after lying idly for four weeks in their transports,

and gazing with much unsatisfied curiosity on the white houses, the

green shutters, and the flat roofs of Cadiz, across the beautiful

bay, Mackenzie’s regiments set sail again for Lisbon on March 6. As

they ran out of the harbour, they met Sherbrooke’s belated convoy,

whose arrival had been delayed by fearful tempests in the Bay of

Biscay. The whole force, 6,000 bayonets strong, was brought back to

Portugal. It might have been of infinite service to Cradock if it had

remained at Lisbon and had never been sent to Cadiz, and its presence

might have induced him to adopt measures less timid and futile than

those which (as we shall see) he had pursued during January and

February[42].

[42] Napier enlarges on this incident at great length in pages

14-19 of his second volume. In his persistent dislike for

Canning, Castlereagh and Mr. Frere, as well as for the Spaniards,

he concludes that the business ‘indicated an unsettled policy,

shallow combination, and had agents on the part of the British

Cabinet, and an unwise and unworthy disposition in the Supreme

Junta,’ while Smith was ‘zealous and acute’ and Cradock ‘full of

zeal and moral courage.’ It is hard to give an unqualified assent

to any one of these views. Smith was wrong in acting without

giving any notice of his intentions to the Junta: Cradock’s zeal

was equally untempered by discretion. The British Cabinet, acting

on the information available in the end of December, was right to

be anxious about Cadiz, and equally right to abandon its attempt

to occupy the place in March, when the conditions of the war had

changed, and the Junta had shown its dislike to the proposal.

As to the Spaniards, the matter was only broached to them in

February, when the danger of an immediate French advance had

passed away, and they were entirely justified in their answer,

which was framed as politely as could be contrived. We must not

blame them overmuch for their suspicion: England, though now a

friend, had long been an enemy--and the fate of Gibraltar was

always before their eyes.

But this unfortunate incident has detained us too long; we must

return to the state of the Spanish armies at the end of the month of

January. Beyond the levies of the Marquis Del Palacio at La Carolina,

there was a long gap in the Spanish line of defence. The next force

under arms was the army of Infantado, now engaged in its exhausting

winter march from Cuenca to the Murcian border. After the rout of

Ucles it was still 12,000 strong, though destitute of all supplies

and not fit for immediate service. The Junta ordered it to march from

Chinchilla to join Del Palacio’s force at the mouth of the Despeña

Perros, and so to strengthen the defences of Andalusia. This was

done, and the two forces were safely united, so that when a few more

new battalions had been brought up from Granada, 20,000 men were

placed between Victor and Andalusia. The Junta removed Infantado from

command, rightly judging that he had sacrificed Venegas at Ucles by

his neglect to send orders and his sloth in coming up to join his

subordinate. The charge of the force at La Carolina (still called

‘the Army of the Centre’) was made over to General Cartaojal.

Beyond Infantado’s depleted corps lay the army of Valencia. Its

nucleus was the remains of the old division of Llamas and Roca, which

had served with Castaños at Tudela. The local Junta rapidly recruited

this skeleton force from 1,500 up to 5,000 men[43]. They added to

it several new regiments raised during the winter in Valencia and

Murcia, and by February had 10,000 men available for succouring

Aragon and Catalonia, though their quality left much to be desired.

[43] See the table in Argüelles on p. 74 of his Appendix-volume.

A little further north Palafox was still holding out with splendid

desperation in Saragossa, where he had shut himself up with the whole

army of Aragon. His original 32,000 men were already much thinned

by pestilence and the sword, but in January their spirit was yet

unbroken, and though it was clear that they were doomed to final

destruction, if they were not relieved from the outside, yet they

were still doing excellent work in detaining in front of them the

whole of the 3rd and 5th French Army Corps.

There yet remains to be described the strongest of all the Spanish

armies, that of Catalonia. In addition to the original garrison of

the province, and to its gallant _miqueletes_ and _somatenes_, there

had been gradually drafted into the principality (1) the greater

part of the garrison of the Balearic Isles, some 9,000 men; (2)

Reding’s Granadan division which started from its home over 10,000

strong; (3) 2,500 men of Caraffa’s old division from Portugal; (4)

the Marquis of Lazan’s Aragonese division from the side of Lerida,

about 4,000 bayonets. Thus in all some 32,000 men in organized corps

had been massed in Catalonia, and the _somatenes_ added some 20,000

irregulars. Of course the Spanish strength in January did not reach

these figures. Many men had been lost at the siege of Rosas and in

the battles of Cardadeu and Molins de Rey: yet there were still

40,000 troops of one sort or another available; the spirit of the

country was irritated rather than lowered by the late defeats; the

French only occupied the ground that was within the actual circle of

fire of their garrisons. If the Catalans had been content to avoid

general engagements, and to maintain an incessant guerrilla warfare,

they might have held their own. Though the enemy had a very capable

commander in General St. Cyr, they had as yet accomplished nothing

more than the capture of the antiquated fortress of Rosas, the relief

of Barcelona, and the winning of two fruitless battles. Catalonia

remained unsubdued till the very end of the struggle.

Reckoning up all their armies, the Junta had in the end of January

some 135,000 men in arms,--a force insufficient to face the French in

the open, for the latter (even after the departure of the Imperial

Guard) had still nearly 300,000[44] sabres and bayonets south of the

Pyrenees, but one quite capable of keeping up the national resistance

if it were only conducted upon the proper lines. For, as Napoleon

and his marshals had yet to learn, no Spanish district could be

considered conquered unless a garrison was left in each of its towns,

and flying columns kept in continual motion through the open country.

Of the 288,000 French who now lay in Spain more than half were really

wanted for garrison duty. A district like Galicia was capable of

keeping 40,000 men employed: even the plains of Old Castile and Leon

swallowed up whole divisions.

[44] 288,000 on Feb. 15. See Napier’s extracts from the Imperial

muster rolls, i. 514. These numbers include the sick and detached.

But, unfortunately for Spain, the mania for fighting pitched battles

was still obsessing the minds of her generals. Within a few weeks

three wholly unnecessary and disastrous engagements were to be

risked, at Valls, Ciudad Real, and Medellin. Instead of playing a

cautious defensive game, and harassing the French, the Spaniards

persisted in futile attempts to face the enemy in general actions,

for which their troops were wholly unsuited. The results were so

deplorable that but for a second British intervention--Wellesley’s

march to Talavera--Andalusia would have been in as great peril in

July, 1809, as it had been in January.

The Central Junta must take its share of the responsibility for this

fact no less than the Spanish generals. It still persisted in its old

error of refusing to appoint a single commander-in-chief, so that

each army fought for its own hand, without any attempt to co-ordinate

its actions with those of the others. Indeed several of the generals

were at notorious enmity with their colleagues--notably Cuesta and

Venegas. It was to no purpose that the Central Government displayed

great energy in organizing men and collecting material, if, when

the armies had been equipped and sent to the front, they were used

piecemeal, without any general strategical scheme, and led ere long

to some miserable disaster, such as Ucles, or Medellin, or Ocaña. The

Junta, the generals, and the nation were all alike possessed by the

delusion that with energy and sufficient numbers they might on some

happy morning achieve a second Baylen. But for such a consummation

Duponts and Vedels are required, and when no such convenient

adversaries were to be found, the attempt to encompass and beat a

French army was certain to end in a catastrophe.

The only Spanish fighters who were playing the proper game in 1809

were the Catalonian _somatenes_, and even they gave battle far

too often, and did not adhere with a sufficient pertinacity to

the harassing tactics of guerrilla warfare. General Arteche has

collected in his fourth volume something like a dozen schemes for

the expulsion of the French from Spain, which were laid before the

Junta, or ventilated in print, during this year. It is interesting to

see that only one of them advocates the true line of resistance--the

avoiding of battles, the harassing of the enemy’s flanks and

communications, and the employment of numerous flying bands instead

of great masses[45]. Some of the other plans are the wild imaginings

of ignorant fools--one wiseacre wished to run down the French

columns with pikemen in a sort of Macedonian phalanx, another to arm

one-sixth of the troops with hand-grenades! But the majority of the

Junta’s self-constituted advisers thought that numbers were the only

necessary thing, and proposed to save Spain by crushing the invaders

with levies _en masse_ of all persons between sixteen and fifty--one

enthusiast makes the age-limit fourteen to seventy!

[45] See Arteche, iv. 115-51: the advocate of the guerrilla game

was a certain Faustino Fernandez.

These were the views of the nation, and the generals and the Junta

were but infected with the common delusion of all their compatriots.

They would not see that courage and raw multitudes are almost

helpless when opposed by equal courage combined with skill, long

experience of war, superior tactics, and intelligent leading.

SECTION X

THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGN IN CATALONIA

CHAPTER I

THE SIEGE OF ROSAS

Before we follow further the fortunes of Southern Spain, it is

necessary to turn back and to take up the tale of the war on the

Eastern coast at the point where it was left in Section V.

The same torpor which was notable in the operations of the main

armies of the Spaniards and the French during the months of September

and October was to be observed in Catalonia also. On the Ter and the

Llobregat the inability of the French to move was much more real, and

the slackness of the Spaniards even more inexplicable, than on the

Ebro and the Aragon.

In the early days of September the situation of the invaders was

most perilous. After the disastrous failure of the second siege of

Gerona, it will be remembered that Reille had withdrawn to Figueras,

close to the French frontier, while Duhesme had cut his way back to

Barcelona, after sacrificing all his artillery and his baggage on the

way. Both commanders proceeded to report to the Emperor that there

was need for ample reinforcements of veteran troops, or a catastrophe

must inevitably ensue. Meanwhile Reille preserved a defensive

attitude at the foot of the Pyrenees; while Duhesme could do no more

than hold Barcelona, and as much of its suburban plain as he could

safely occupy without risking overmuch his outlying detachments.

He foresaw a famine in the winter, and devoted all his energies to

seizing and sending into the town all foodstuffs that he could find

in the neighbourhood. His position was most uncomfortable: the late

expedition had reduced his force from 13,000 to 10,000 sabres and

bayonets. The men were demoralized, and when sent out to forage saw

_somatenes_ behind every bush and rock. The populace of Barcelona

was awaiting a good opportunity for an _émeute_, and was in constant

communication with the insurgents outside.

The blockade was not as yet kept up by any large section of the

Captain-General’s regular troops, nor had any attempt been made to

run lines around the place. It was conducted by an elastic cordon of

four or five thousand _miqueletes_, supported by no more than 2,000

infantry of the regular army and possessing five or six field-guns.

The charge of the whole line was given to the Conde de Caldagues,

who had so much distinguished himself in the previous month by his

relief of Gerona. He had been entrusted with a force too small to

man a circuit of twelve or fifteen miles, so that Duhesme had no

difficulty in pushing sorties through the line of Spanish posts,

whenever he chose to send out a sufficiently strong column. But any

body that pressed out too far in pursuit of corn or forage, risked

being beset and mishandled on its return march by the whole of the

_somatenes_ of the country-side. Hence there was a limit to the power

to roam of even the largest expeditions that Duhesme could spare

from his depleted garrison. The fighting along the blockading cordon

was incessant, but never conclusive. On September 2 a strong column

of six Italian battalions swept aside the Spaniards for a moment

in the direction of San Boy, but a smaller expedition against the

bridge of Molins de Rey was repulsed. The moment that the Italians

returned to Barcelona, with the food that they had scraped together

in the villages, Caldagues reoccupied his old positions. There were

many skirmishes but no large sorties between September 2 and October

12, when Milosewitz took out 2,000 men for a cattle-hunt in the

valley of the Besos. He pierced the blockading line, routing the

_miqueletes_ of Milans at San Jeronimo de la Murtra, and penetrated

as far as Granollers, twenty miles from Barcelona, where he made an

invaluable seizure, the food dépôt of the eastern section of the

investing force. But he was now dangerously distant from his base,

and as he was returning with his captures, Caldagues fell upon him

at San Culgat with troops brought from other parts of the blockading

line. The Italians were routed with a loss of 300 men[46], and their

convoy was recaptured. After this Duhesme made no more attempts to

send expeditions far afield: in spite of a growing scarcity of food,

he could not afford to risk the loss of any more men by pushing his

sorties into the inland.

[46] So Vacani. Laffaille gives the incredible figure of 48!

Meanwhile Reille at Figueras was in wellnigh as forlorn a situation.

His communications with Perpignan were open, so that he had not,

like Duhesme, the fear of starvation before his eyes. But in other

respects he was almost as badly off: the _somatenes_ were always

worrying his outposts, but this was only a secondary trial. The main

trouble was the want of clothing, transport, and equipment: the

heterogeneous mob of _bataillons de marche_, of Swiss and Tuscan

conscripts, had been hurried to the frontier without any proper

preparations: this mattered comparatively little during the summer;

but when the autumn cold began Reille found that troops, who had

neither tents nor greatcoats, and whose original summer uniforms were

now worn out, could not keep the field. His ranks were so thinned by

dysentery and rheumatic affections that he had to put the men under

cover in Figueras and the neighbouring towns, and even to withdraw

to Perpignan some of his battalions, whose clothing was absolutely

dropping to pieces. His cavalry, for want of forage in the Pyrenees,

were sent back into Languedoc, where occupation was found for them

by Lord Cochrane who was conducting a series of daring raids on

the coast villages between the mouth of the Rhone and that of the

Tech[47]. Reille continued to solicit the war minister at Paris for

clothing and transport, but could get nothing from him: all the

resources of the empire were being strained in September and October

to fit out the main army, which was about to enter Spain on the side

of Biscay, and Napoleon refused to trouble himself about such a minor

force as the corps at Figueras.

[47] See Cochrane’s _Autobiography_, pp. 269-85.

The Spaniards, therefore, had in the autumn months a unique

opportunity for striking at the two isolated French forces in

Catalonia. Two courses were open to them: they might have turned

their main army against Barcelona, and attempted to besiege instead

of merely to blockade Duhesme: or on the other hand they might have

left a mere cordon of _somatenes_ around Duhesme, and have sent all

their regulars to join the levies of the north and sweep Reille

across the Pyrenees. The resources at their disposition were far

from contemptible: almost the whole garrison of the Balearic Isles

having disembarked in Catalonia, there were now some 12,000 regulars

in the Principality, and the local Junta had put so much energy

into the equipment of the numerous _tercios_ of _miqueletes_ which

it had raised, that the larger half of them, at least 20,000 men,

were more or less ready for the field. Moreover they were aware that

large reinforcements were at hand. Reding’s Granadan division, 10,000

strong, was marching up from the south, and was due to arrive early

in November. The Aragonese division under the Marquis of Lazan, which

had been detached from the army of Palafox, was already at Lerida.

Valencia had sent up a line regiment[48], and the remains of the

division of Caraffa from Portugal were being brought round by sea to

the mouth of the Ebro[49]. Altogether 20,000 men of new troops were

on the way to Catalonia, and the first of them had already come on

the scene.

[48] Two battalions of the 2nd of Savoia: the old regiment

of the name had been completed to four battalions, two were

with Castaños and called 1st of Savoia, the other two came to

Catalonia.

[49] Four battalions of Provincial Grenadiers of Old and New

Castile had already come up.

Unfortunately the Marquis Del Palacio, the new Captain-General

of Catalonia, though well-intentioned, was slow and undecided to

the verge of absolute torpidity. Beyond allowing his energetic

subordinate Caldagues to keep up the blockade of Barcelona he did

practically nothing. A couple of thousand of his regulars, based

on Gerona and Rosas, lay opposite Reille, but were far too weak

to attack him. About 3,000 under Caldagues were engaged in the

operations around Barcelona. The rest the Captain-General held back

and did not use. All through September he lay idle at Tarragona,

to the great disgust of the local Junta, who at last sent such

angry complaints to Aranjuez that the Central Junta recalled him,

and replaced him by Vives the old Captain-General of the Balearic

Islands, who took over the command on October 28.

This gave a change of commander but not of policy, for Vives was as

slow and incapable as his predecessor. We have already had occasion

to mention the trouble that he gave in August, when he refused to

send his troops to the mainland till actually compelled to yield by

their mutiny. When he took over the charge of operations he found

20,000 foot and 1,000 horse at his disposition, and the French

still on the defensive both at Barcelona and at Figueras. He had a

splendid opportunity, and it was not yet too late to strike hard. But

all that he chose to attempt was to turn the blockade of Barcelona

into an investment, by tightening the cordon round the place. To

lay siege to the city does not seem to have been within the scope

of his intentions, but on November 6 he moved up to the line of the

Llobregat with 12,000 infantry and 700 horse, mostly regulars. He

had opened negotiations with secret friends within the walls, and

had arranged that when the whole forces of Duhesme were sufficiently

occupied in resisting the assault from outside, the populace should

take arms and endeavour to seize and throw open one of the gates.

But matters never got to this point: on November 8 several Spanish

columns moved in nearer to Barcelona, and began to skirmish with the

outposts of the garrison. But the attack was incoherent, and never

pressed home. Vives then waited till the 26th, when he had received

more reinforcements, the first brigade of Reding’s long-expected

Granadan division. On that day another general assault on Duhesme’s

outlying posts was delivered, and this time with considerable

success: several of the suburban villages were carried, over a

hundred Frenchmen were captured, and the line of blockade was drawn

close under the walls. Duhesme had no longer any hold outside the

city. But Barcelona was strong, and its garrison, when concentrated

within the place, was just numerous enough to hold its own. Duhesme

had thought for a moment of evacuating the city and retiring into the

citadel and the fortress of Montjuich: but on mature consideration

he resolved to cling as long as possible to the whole circuit of the

town. He had heard that an army of relief was at last on the way,

and made up his mind to yield no inch without compulsion.

Thus Vives wasted another month without any adequate results: he

had, with the whole field army of Catalonia, done nothing more than

turn the French out of their first and weakest line of defence. The

fortress was intact, and to all intents and purposes might have been

observed as well by 10,000 _somatenes_ as by the large force which

Vives had brought against it.

Meanwhile the enemy, utterly unopposed on the line of the Pyrenees,

was getting together a formidable host for the relief of Barcelona.

When he had recognized that Reille’s extemporized army was

insufficient alike in quantity and in quality for the task before

it, the Emperor had directed on Perpignan (as we have already

seen[50]) two strong divisions of the Army of Italy, one composed of

ten French battalions under General Souham, the other of thirteen

Italian battalions. The order to dispatch them had only been given

on August 10, and the regiments, which had to be mobilized and

equipped, and then to march up from Lombardy to the roots of the

Pyrenees, did not begin to arrive at Perpignan till September 14: the

artillery, and the troops which came from the more distant points,

only appeared on October 28. Even then there was a further week’s

delay, for the Emperor had monopolized for the main army, on the

side of the Bidassoa, all the available battalions of the military

train: the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees had no transport save that

which the regiments had brought with them, and it was with the

greatest difficulty that a few hundred mules and some open carts were

collected from the French border districts. It was only on November

5 that the army crossed the Pyrenees, by the great pass between

Bellegarde and La Junquera.

[50] Vol. i. p. 333.

The officer placed in command was General Gouvion St. Cyr, who

afterwards won his marshal’s bâton in the Russian war of 1812. He was

a general of first-rate ability, who had served all through the wars

of the Revolution with marked distinction: but he disliked Bonaparte

and had not the art to hide the fact. This had kept him back from

earlier promotion. St. Cyr was by no means an amiable character: he

was detested by his officers and his troops as a confirmed grumbler,

and selfish to an incredible degree[51]. He was one of those men who

can always show admirable and convincing reasons for not helping

their neighbours. _C’était un mauvais compagnon de lit_, said one of

the many colleagues, whom he had left in the lurch, while playing

his own game. From his morose bearing and his dislike for company he

had got the nickname of ‘_le hibou_.’ He was cautious, cool-headed,

and ready of resource, so that his troops had full confidence in

him, though he never commanded their liking. Even from his history

of the Catalonian war, one can gather the character of the man. It

is admirably lucid, and illustrated with original documents, Spanish

no less than French, in a fashion only too rare among the military

books of the soldiers of the Empire. But it is not only entirely

self-centred, but full of malevolent insinuations concerning Napoleon

and the author’s colleagues. In his first chapter he broaches the

extraordinary theory that Napoleon handed over to him the Catalonian

army without resources, money, or transport, in order that he might

make a fiasco of the campaign and ruin his reputation! He actually

seems to have believed that his master disliked to have battles won

for him by officers who had not owed to him the beginning of their

fortunes[52], and would have been rather pleased than otherwise to

see the attempt to relieve Barcelona end in a failure.

[51] For several curious and interesting stories concerning

St. Cyr, the reader may search the third volume of Marbot’s

_Mémoires_. Marbot is not an authority to be followed with much

confidence, but the picture drawn of the marshal is borne out by

other and better writers.

[52] ‘On ne pourra pas échapper à la pensée que Napoléon, avec sa

force immense, a été assez faible pour ne vouloir que des succès

obtenus par lui-même, ou du moins sous ses yeux. Autrement on eût

dit que la victoire était pour lui une offense: il en voulait

surtout à la fortune quand elle favorisait les armes d’officiers

qui ne lui devaient pas leur élévation.’ _Journal de l’Armée de

Catalogne_, p. 26.

These are, of course, the vain imaginings of a jealous and suspicious

hypochondriac. It is true that Napoleon disliked St. Cyr, but he

did not want to see the campaign of Catalonia end in a disaster. He

gave the new general a fine French division of veteran troops, and,

as his letter to the Viceroy Eugène Beauharnais shows, the picked

regiments of the whole Italian army. The Seventh Corps mustered

in all more than 40,000 men, and 25,000 of these were concentrated

under St. Cyr’s hand at Perpignan and Figueras. It is certain that

the troops were not well equipped, and that the auxiliary services

were ill represented. But this was not from exceptional malice on

Napoleon’s part: he was always rather inclined to starve an army with

which he was not present in person, and at this moment every resource

was being strained to fit out the main force which were to deliver

the great blow at Madrid. Catalonia was but a ‘side show’: and when

St. Cyr tries to prove[53] that it was the most important theatre of

war in the whole peninsula, he is but exaggerating, after the common

fashion of poor humanity, the greatness of his own task and his own

victories.

[53] St. Cyr, p. 23.

Before starting from Perpignan St. Cyr refitted, as best he could,

the dilapidated battalions of Reille, which were, he says, in

such a state of nudity that those who had been sent back within

the French border had to be kept out of public view from motives

of mere decency[54]. The whole division had suffered so much from

exposure that instead of taking the field with the 8,000 men which it

possessed in August, it could present only 5,500 in November, after

setting aside a battalion to garrison Figueras[55].

[54] Ibid., p. 19.

[55] For composition see the table of the 7th Corps in Appendix

of vol. i. The figures given by St. Cyr are Pino 8,368, Souham

7,712, Chabot 1,988, Reille 4,000. The last is an understatement,

as shown by the morning state of Reille’s division in Relmas, ii.

456, which shows 4,612 excluding the garrison of Figueras, more

than 1,000 strong.

But though Reille was weak, and the division of Chabot (a mere corps

of two Neapolitan battalions and one regiment of National Guards)

was an almost negligible quantity, the troops newly arrived from

Italy were both numerous and good in quality. Souham’s ten French

battalions had 7,000 bayonets, Pino’s thirteen Italian battalions

had 7,300. Their cavalry consisted of one French and two Italian

regiments, making 1,700 sabres. The total force disposable consisted

of 23,680 men, of whom 2,096 were cavalry, and about 500 artillery.

In this figure are not included the National Guards and dépôts left

behind to garrison Bellegarde, Montlouis, and other places within

the French frontier, but only the troops available for operations

within Catalonia.

On his way to Perpignan, St. Cyr had visited the Emperor at Paris,

so as to receive his orders in person. Napoleon informed him that he

left him _carte blanche_ as to all details; the one thing on which he

insisted was that Barcelona must be preserved: ‘si vous perdiez cette

place, je ne la reprendrais pas avec quatre-vingt mille hommes.’

This then was to be the main object of the coming campaign: there

were about two months available for the task, for Duhesme reported

that, though food was growing scarce, he could hold out till the end

of December. To lessen the number of idle mouths in Barcelona he

had been giving permits to depart to many of the inhabitants, and

expelling others, against whom he could find excuses for severity.

The high-road from Figueras to Barcelona was blocked by the fortress

of Gerona, whose previous resistance in July and August showed

that its capture would be a tedious and difficult matter. St. Cyr

calculated that he had not the time to spare for the siege of this

place: long ere he could expect to take it, Duhesme would be starved

out. He made up his mind that he would have to march past Gerona,

and as the high-road is commanded by the guns of the city, he would

be forced to take with him no heavy guns or baggage, but only light

artillery and pack-mules, which could use the by-paths of the

mountains. It was his first duty to relieve Barcelona by defeating

the main army of Vives. When this had been done, it would be time

enough to think of the siege of Gerona.

But there was another fortress which St. Cyr resolved to clear

out of his way before starting to aid Duhesme. On the sea-shore,

only ten miles before Figueras, lies the little town of Rosas,

which blocks the route that crawls under the cliffs from Perpignan

and Port-Vendres to the Ampurdam. The moment that the French army

advanced south from Figueras, it would have Rosas on its flank, and

even small expeditions based on the place could make certain of

cutting the high-road, and intercepting all communications between

the base and the field force that had gone forward. But it was more

than likely that the Spaniards would land a considerable body of

troops in Rosas, for it has an excellent harbour, and every facility

for disembarkation. Several English men-of-war were lying there; it

served them as their shelter and port of call while they watched for

the French ships which tried to run into Barcelona with provisions,

from Marseilles, Cette, or Port-Vendres. Already they had captured

many vessels which endeavoured to pierce the blockade.

St. Cyr therefore was strongly of opinion that he ought to make

an end of the garrison of Rosas before starting on his expedition

to aid Duhesme. The place was strategically important, but its

fortifications were in such bad order that he imagined that it might

be reduced in a few days. The town, which counted no more than 1,500

souls, consisted of a single long street running along the shore. It

was covered by nothing more than a ditch and an earthwork, resting

at one end on a weak redoubt above the beach, and at the other upon

the citadel. The latter formed the strength of the place: it was a

pentagonal work, regularly constructed, with bastions, and a scarp

and counterscarp reveted with stone. But its resisting power was

seriously diminished by the fact that the great breach which the

French had made during its last siege in 1794 had never been properly

repaired. The government of Godoy had neglected the place, and, when

the insurrection began, the Catalans had found it still in ruins,

and had merely built up the gap with loose stones and barrels filled

with earth. A good battering train would bring down the whole of

these futile patchings in a few days. A mile to the right of the

citadel was a detached work, the Fort of the Trinity, placed above a

rocky promontory which forms the south-eastern horn of the harbour.

It had been built to protect ships lying before the place from being

annoyed by besiegers. The Trinity was built in an odd and ingenious

fashion: it was commanded at the distance of only 100 yards by the

rocky hill of Puig-Rom: to prevent ill effects from a plunging fire

from this elevation, its front had been raised to a great height,

so as to protect the interior of the work from molestation. A broad

tower 110 feet high covered the whole side of the castle which faces

inland. ‘Nothing in short, for a fortress commanded by adjacent

heights, could have been better adapted for holding out against

offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them. The

French battery on the cliff was too elevated for artillery to reach,

while the tower, which prevented their shot from reaching the body

of the fort, also prevented any return fire at them, even if the fort

had possessed artillery. In consequence of the elevated position of

the French on the cliff, they could only breach the central portion

of the tower. The lowest part of the breach they made was nearly

sixty feet above its base, so that it could only be reached by long

scaling ladders[56].’ It is seldom that a besieger has to complain of

the difficulty caused to him by the possession of ground completely

dominating a place that he has to reduce: but in the course of

the siege of Fort Trinity the French were undoubtedly incommoded

by the height of the Puig-Rom. The garrison below, hidden in good

bomb-proofs and covered by the tower, suffered little harm from their

fire. To batter the whole tower to pieces, by a downward fire, was

too long and serious a business for them; they merely tried to breach

it.

[56] Lord Cochrane’s _Autobiography_, i. 303. He adds ‘A pretty

correct idea of our relative positions may be formed if the

unnautical reader will imagine our small force placed in the nave

of Westminster Abbey, with the enemy attacking the great western

tower from the summit of a cliff 100 feet higher than the tower,

so that the breach in course of formation corresponds to the

great west window of the Abbey. It was no easy matter to them to

scale the external wall of the tower up to the great window, and

more difficult still to get down from the window into the body

of the church. These were the points I had to provide against,

for we could not prevent the French either from breaching or from

storming.’

If the ground in front of Fort Trinity was too high for the French,

that of the town of Rosas was too low. It was so marshy that in wet

weather the ditches of their siege works filled at once with water,

and their parapets crumbled into liquid mud. The only approach

on ground of convenient firmness and elevation was opposite a

comparatively narrow front of the south-eastern corner of the place.

The garrison of Rosas, when St. Cyr undertook its siege, was

commanded by Colonel Peter O’Daly, an officer of the Ultonia, who

had distinguished himself at Gerona; it was composed of a skeleton

battalion (150 men) of the governor’s own Irish corps, of half the

light infantry regiment 2nd of Barcelona, of a company of Wimpffen’s

Swiss regiment, and 120 gunners. These were regulars: of new levies

there were the two _miquelete tercios_ of Lerida and Igualada, with

some companies of those of Berga and Figueras. The whole force

was exactly 3,000 strong. It would be wrong to omit the mention of

the British succours which took part in the defence. There lay in

the harbour the _Excellent_, 74, and two bomb-vessels: when the

_Excellent_ departed on November 21 she was replaced by the _Fame_,

another 74-gun ship, and during the last days of the siege Lord

Cochrane in his well-known frigate the _Impérieuse_ was also present.

It is well to remember their exact force, for the French narrators of

the leaguer of Rosas are prone to call them ‘the British squadron,’

a term which seems rather too magnificent to apply to a group of

vessels never numbering more than one line-of-battle ship, one

frigate, and two bomb-vessels.

St. Cyr moved forward on November 5, with the four divisions of

Souham, Pino, Reille, and Chabot, which (as we have seen) amounted in

all to about 23,000 men. He had resolved to use Pino and Reille--some

12,000 men--for the actual siege, and Souham and Chabot for the

covering work. Accordingly the weak division of the last-named

officer was left to watch the ground at the foot of the passes, in

the direction of Figueras and La Junquera, while Souham took up the

line of the river Fluvia, which lay across the path of any relieving

force that might come from the direction of Gerona. St. Cyr remained

with the covering army, and gave the conduct of the siege to Reille,

perhaps because he had already made one attack on the town in August.

On November 6 Reille marched down to the sea, driving before him

the Spanish outlying pickets, and the peasantry of the suburban

villages, who took refuge with their cattle in Rosas. On the seventh

the investment began, Reille’s own division taking its position on

the marshy ground opposite the town, while Pino encamped more to the

left, upon the heights that face the fort of the Trinity. The head

quarters were established at the village of Palau. A battalion of the

2nd Italian light infantry was placed far back, to the north-east, to

keep off the _somatenes_ of the coast villages about Llanza and Selva

de Mar from interfering in the siege.

Next day the civil population of Rosas embarked on fishing-vessels

and small merchantmen, and departed to the south, abandoning

the whole town to the garrison. They just missed seeing some

sharp fighting. The covering party who had been detached to the

neighbourhood of Llanza were beset during a dense mist by the

_somatenes_ of the coast: two companies were cut to pieces or

captured; the rest were saved by General Fontane, who led out

three battalions from Pino’s lines to their assistance. While this

engagement was in progress, the garrison sallied out with 2,000 men

to beat up the main camp of the Italians; they were repulsed after

a sharp fight; the majority got back to the citadel, but one party

being surrounded, Captain West of the _Excellent_ landed with 250 of

his seamen and marines, cut his way to them, and brought them off in

safety. West had his horse shot under him (a curious note to have to

make concerning a naval officer), and lost ten men wounded.

After the eighth there followed seven days of continuous rain, which

turned the camp of Reille’s division into a marsh, and effectually

prevented the construction of siege works in the low-lying ground

opposite to the town. The only active operation that could be

undertaken was an attempt to storm the fort of the Trinity,

which the French believed to be in far worse condition than was

actually the case. It was held by eighty Spaniards, under the Irish

Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald, and twenty-five of the _Excellent’s_

marines[57]. The six voltigeur and grenadier companies of the 2nd

Italian light infantry delivered the assault with great dash and

resolution. But as the strong frontal tower of the fort was high

and unbreached, they could make no impression, their ladders proved

useless, and they were repulsed with a loss of sixty men. Their

leader, the _chef-de-bataillon_ Lange, and several other officers

were left dead at the foot of the walls.

[57] James’s _Naval History_, v. p. 90.

Seeing that nothing was to be won by mere escalade, Reille had to

wait for his siege artillery, which began to arrive from Perpignan

on November 16. He at once started two batteries on the Puig-Rom to

breach the Fort of the Trinity, and when the ground had begun to grow

dry in front of the town, opened trenches opposite its north-eastern

angle. When a good _emplacement_ had been found a battery was

established which played upon the citadel, and commanded so much

of the harbour that Reille hoped that the British ships would be

compelled to shift their anchorage further out to sea. The Spaniards

and the _Excellent_ replied with such a heavy fire that in a few

hours the battery was silenced, after its powder magazine had been

exploded by a lucky shell [November 19].

Next day, however, the French repaired the damage and mounted more

guns, whose fire proved so damaging that Captain West had to move

further from the shore. The assailants had established a marked

superiority over the fire of the besieged, and availed themselves of

it by pushing out parallels nearer to the town, and building four

more breaching batteries. With these additional resources they began

to work serious damage in the unstable bastions of the citadel. They

also knocked a hole in the Fort of the Trinity: but the breach was so

far from the foot of the wall that it was still almost inaccessible,

the heaps of rubbish which fell into the ditch did not even reach the

lowest part of the gap.

On the twenty-first the _Excellent_ was relieved by the _Fame_, and

Captain West handed over the task of co-operating with the Spaniards

to Captain Bennett. The latter thought so ill of the state of

affairs, that after two days he withdrew his marines from the Trinity

Fort, an action most discouraging to the Spaniards. But at this

juncture there arrived in the bay the _Impérieuse_ frigate, with her

indefatigable commandant Lord Cochrane, a host in himself for such a

desperate enterprise as the defence of the much-battered town. He got

leave from his superior officer to continue the defence, and manned

the Trinity again with his own seamen and marines. They had hardly

established themselves there, when the Italian brigade of Mazzuchelli

made a second attempt to storm the fort: but it was repulsed without

even having reached the foot of the breach.

Cochrane, seeing that the battery which was playing on the Trinity

was on the very edge of a precipitous cliff, resolved to try whether

it would not be possible to surprise it at night, by landing

troops on the beach at the back of the Puig-Rom; if they could get

possession of the guns for a few minutes he hoped to cast them over

the declivity on to the rocks below. O‘Daly lent him 700 _miqueletes_

from the garrison of the town, and this force was put ashore with

thirty of the _Impérieuse’s_ marines who were to lead the assault.

The Italians, however, were not caught sleeping, the attack failed,

and the assailants were beaten back to the rocks by the beach, with

the loss of ten killed and twenty wounded, beside prisoners[58].

The boats of the frigate only brought off 300 men, but many more

escaped along the beach into the hilly country to the east, and were

neither captured nor slain [November 23]. The sortie, however, had

been disastrous, and the Governor, O’Daly, was so down-hearted at

the loss of men and at the way in which the walls of the citadel

were crumbling before his eyes, that he began to think of surrender.

Nor was he much to blame, for the state of things was so bad that

it was evident that unless some new factor was introduced into the

siege, the end was not far off. The utter improbability of relief

from without was demonstrated on the twenty-fourth. Julian Alvarez,

the Governor of Gerona and commander of the Spanish forces in the

Ampurdam, was perfectly well aware that it was his duty to do what he

could for the succour of Rosas. But his forces were insignificant:

Vives had only given him 2,000 regular troops to watch the whole

line of the Eastern Pyrenees, and of this small force half was shut

up in Rosas. Nevertheless Alvarez sallied out from Gerona with

two weak battalions of Ultonia and Borbon, and half of the light

infantry regiment of Barcelona. Picking up 3,000 local _miqueletes_

he advanced to the line of the Fluvia, where Souham was lying,

with the division that St. Cyr had told off to cover the siege.

The Spaniards drove in the French outposts at several points, but

immediately found themselves opposed by very superior numbers, and

brought to a complete stand. Realizing that he was far too weak to

do anything, Alvarez retreated to Gerona after a sharp skirmish. If

he had pushed on he would infallibly have been destroyed. O’Daly

received prompt news of his colleague’s discomfiture, and saw that

relief was impossible. The fact was that Vives ought to have brought

up from Barcelona his whole field army of 20,000 men. With such a

host Souham could have been driven back, and Reille compelled to

relax the investment, perhaps even to raise the siege. But the

Captain-General preferred to waste his men and his time in the futile

blockade of Duhesme, who could have been just as well ‘contained’ by

10,000 _somatenes_ as by the main Spanish army of Catalonia. The only

attempt which Vives made to strengthen his force in the Ampurdam was

to order up to Gerona the Aragonese division of 4,000 men under the

Marquis of Lazan, which was lying at Lerida. This force arrived too

late for the skirmish on the Fluvia, and when it did appear was far

too small to accomplish anything. Alvarez and Lazan united had only

8,000 bayonets, while St. Cyr’s whole army (as we have already seen)

was 25,000 strong, and quite able to maintain the siege, and at the

same time to provide a covering force against a relieving army so

weak as that which now lay at Gerona.

[58] Compare the narrative of Lord Cochrane, i. 299-300, with

those of Belmas, ii. 441, and St. Cyr. The latter is, of course,

wrong in saying that the whole sortie was composed of British

seamen and marines. It is curious that Cochrane states his own

loss at more than the French claimed to have killed or taken.