THE BATTLE OF THE LYS.
(March 27-May 5, 1918.)
The New Brigade—General Tanner takes Command—Ludendorff’s
Strategy in the North—The Weakness of the British Position—The
Attack of 9th April—Von Armin attacks on the 10th—The
Brigade moves into Line—Attached to the 19th Division—The
Counter-attack on Messines—The Situation on the Evening of the
10th—The South Africans forced back from Messines—Plumer’s
General Withdrawal—The Brigade relieved—The Fight for Mont
Kemmel—The Brigade in the Vierstraat Line—The Counter-attack
on Wytschaete—Von Armin’s Failure of the 17th—The Brigade
withdrawn—The Composite Battalion formed—The New South African
Brigade—Attached to the 49th Division—The Attack of 26th
April—The Attack of 29th April—End of the Battle of the Lys—The
Forty-five Days.
[Sidenote: _April 1._]
The old Brigade had come to an end, but the glory which South Africa
had won on the Western front required that without delay it should have
a successor. The story of Marrières Wood, for all its tragedy, was
too great to be permitted to lack a fitting sequel. General Botha, on
behalf of the Union Government, telegraphed to Haig during these days:
“We are watching with appreciation the strenuous efforts which you and
your gallant men are making in this supreme struggle for the liberty of
mankind.” To this the Commander-in-Chief replied: “The fine part already
played by South Africa in this great battle is a symbol of the strength
and unity of purpose that binds together all parts of the British
Empire.” When the composite battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Young,
was withdrawn from the line on the night of 27th March, it marched along
with the rest of the 9th Division to Candas, arriving there on 1st April.
It detrained at Abeele on the morning of the 2nd, and moved into the
Ridgewood area. Every man who could be found was brought from England,
and during the next few days drafts to the number of 17 officers and 945
other ranks arrived. The reorganization of the Brigade was immediately
begun, and General Tanner, the former leader of the 2nd Regiment, came
from the 8th Brigade to its command. The presence of Tanner was in itself
a pledge of continuity in tradition. Presently the Brigade had a strength
of 39 officers and 1,473 other ranks, and the old regiments were once
more in being, the 1st under Lieutenant-Colonel Young, the 2nd under
Captain Jacobs, and the 4th under Captain Reid.
[Sidenote: _April 6._]
By the 6th of April the German thrust towards Amiens had failed, and for
the moment the gate of the Somme was closed. Brought to a standstill,
Ludendorff cast about for a diversion, for he could not permit the battle
to decline into a stalemate, and so lose the initiative. His main purpose
was the same, but he sought to achieve it by a new method. He would
attack the British elsewhere on some part of the front where they were
notoriously weak, and compel Foch to use up his reserves in its defence.
Then, when the Allied “mass of manœuvre” had shrunk, he would strike
again at the weakened door of Amiens. On Ludendorff’s plan the operation
was to be a strictly subsidiary one, designed to prepare the way for the
accomplishment of his main task farther south. He proposed to allot only
nine divisions for the initial stroke, and to choose a battle-ground
where even a weak force might obtain surprising results.
That battle-ground was the area on both sides of the Lys between the La
Bassée Canal and the Wytschaete Ridge. The German Staff were aware that
it had already been thinned to supply ten divisions for the contest in
the south, and that at the moment it was weakly held, mainly by troops
exhausted in the Somme battle. Haig, as we know from his dispatch, had
drawn especially upon this section, since a retreat there would not
imperil the whole front so gravely as would the loss of ground between
La Bassée and Arras. Nevertheless, it was a very real danger-point.
The enemy had the great city of Lille to screen his assembly. Certain
key-points of communications, like Béthune and Hazebrouck, lay at no
great distance behind the British front. The British communications
were poor, and the German were all but perfect. Any advance threatened
the Channel Ports, and might be expected to cause acute nervousness in
the mind of British Headquarters. Reinforcements would be demanded from
Foch, and the place was far enough from the Amiens battle-ground to put
a heavy strain upon the Allied power of reinforcement. Ludendorff’s aim
was by a sharp, short thrust to confuse the Allied plans and absorb
their reserves. If he could break through at once between La Bassée
and Armentières and capture Béthune, he could swing north-westward and
take Hazebrouck and the hills beyond Bailleul, and so compel a general
retirement west of Dunkirk and the floods of the river Aa. But to succeed
he must have a broad enough front. He must take Béthune at once and the
Messines Ridge soon after, for, if the British pillars of the gate at
Givenchy and Messines should stand, his advance would be squeezed into
narrows where even a weak and tired force might hold it.
[Sidenote: _April 8-9._]
On the 8th the South African Brigade moved to hutments along the road
between La Clytte and the little hill of Scherpenberg. On the morning
of Tuesday, 9th April, Ludendorff struck between the Lys and La Bassée
with von Quast’s VI. Army. He broke that part of the line held by the
Portuguese, and in the afternoon had swept over the Lys on a broad front.
But at one vital point he failed. The 55th (West Lancashire) Division
still held the gatepost at Givenchy, and throughout the whole battle that
key position was never yielded by British troops.
[Sidenote: _April 10._]
That night General Tudor instructed Tanner that the South Africans would
be placed at the disposal of the 19th Division, which, along with the
25th and 9th Divisions, was holding the Messines Ridge and the line
just north of the Lys. The corps was the IX., under Lieutenant-General
Sir A. Hamilton Gordon. Next morning, 10th April, at 5.30 a.m., the IV.
German Army, under our old antagonist at Ypres, Sixt von Armin, attacked
from Frelinghien to as far north as Hill 60. Under cover of the fog the
enemy filtered into our positions from Ploegsteert Wood to Messines
along the valleys of the Warnave and Douve streams. By noon he had
taken Ploegsteert village and the south-east part of the wood, and had
got Messines, while farther north he had driven in our line as far as
Hollebeke, and was close on the Wytschaete crest. Ludendorff was striking
hard against the northern pillar of the gate.
At eight that morning the Brigade was ordered to move to a position of
assembly just south of the village of Neuve Eglise, where they formed
part of the reserve of the IX. Corps. During the morning the march was
accomplished, and for the first time the South Africans saw the impact
of war upon a land yet undevastated. Tanner wrote in his diary: “The
sights in that march from La Clytte are never likely to be forgotten by
those who witnessed them. With the falling back of our line that morning
the shelling of the back areas had greatly increased, both in density
and length of range. As a result, a large belt of country previously
unmolested became subjected to a terrifying storm of long-range
projectiles, and the inhabitants, who up to then had been conducting
peacefully their farming operations, were compelled to flee for shelter
beyond the reach of the enemy guns. As we approached Neuve Eglise the
road from Scherpenberg onward presented a constant stream of fugitives,
old men, women, and children, laden with what household goods they could
remove in carts, wheelbarrows, and perambulators. The most pitiable
sights were those of infirm old people being removed in barrows, pushed
or pulled by women and children.” That was a spectacle which British
troops had already seen east of Amiens, and it was not likely to weaken
their determination in the coming battle.
At noon Tanner saw Major-General Jeffreys, commanding the 19th Division,
and received his orders. The enemy had broken through between Messines
and the place called Pick House on the Wytschaete road, and the situation
at the moment was obscure. The South Africans were to counter-attack and
retake that section of the crest of the ridge. The front established by
the Messines victory of June 1917 had been more than two miles east of
the crest, but that morning’s fighting had brought it back generally
to the western slopes. The counter-attack, in which the 57th and 58th
Brigades of the 19th Division were to co-operate, was aimed at recovering
the ridge and its eastern slopes. The area of the South African Brigade
was between Messines village and Lumm’s Farm. Their first objective was
the Messines-Wytschaete road; the second the original British third
defence zone, bending round the village on the east from Bethlehem Farm
in the south to Pick House in the north; and the third the original
battle zone. The defence system in this area had not the elaboration
of that of the Somme, and the second and third objectives may be best
described as the old British third and second lines.
At 5.15 p.m. the South Africans moved from their position of assembly to
the line of the Steenebeek stream, where, at 5.45, they deployed for the
attack. The 1st Regiment was on the right, and directed against Messines
village; the 2nd on the left against the front between the village and
Pick House. The 4th was in support to both battalions, and one of its
companies was allotted to the assistance of the attack of the 1st on
Messines itself. The spring day had clouded over, and there was mist and
a slight drizzle when the infantry advanced. The western slopes of the
ridge were held at the time only by some units of the 19th Division. On
the South African right was the 57th Brigade, and on their left, beyond
Pick House, on the Wytschaete Ridge, the rest of the 9th Division.
[Illustration: ACTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE ON MESSINES RIDGE.]
In the mist it was not easy to keep close touch, and the 1st Regiment
reached the western slopes ahead of the time, so that for a little its
left flank was out of touch with the 2nd. As had been expected our
artillery support proved very weak, and in no way affected the German
machine gunners established in our old strong-points, and their snipers
in shell-holes. As the South Africans approached the crest they were
met by a heavy fire from the outskirts of the village, and from Middle
Farm, Four Huns Farm, and Pick House. Nevertheless, by 6.30 the 2nd
Regiment had won its first objective and crossed the Messines-Wytschaete
road. Presently it had reached the second position, “D” Company, on the
left, capturing Lumm’s Farm with two machine guns, much ammunition, and
part of the garrison, while the right companies, reinforced by part of
the 4th Regiment, took Four Huns Farm, Middle Farm, and Swayne’s Farm,
together with four machine guns and many prisoners. Pick House itself,
however, which consisted of three concrete pill-boxes, was too strongly
held, and Captain Jacobs, commanding the 2nd, was compelled to swing
back his left company to Earl Farm, where it formed a defensive flank
in touch with the 5th South Wales Borderers in the 58th Brigade. Here
it was heavily enfiladed from a strong-point north of Messines and from
Pick House, and early in the night Jacobs took up a crescent-shaped line
astride the Messines-Wytschaete road, with his right resting on Middle
Farm, his left on Petits Puits, and his own headquarters at Hell Farm.
His casualties on the left had been slight, but the companies of the 2nd
on the right had lost some 50 per cent. of their effectives, among them
Lieutenant Pope-Hennessy killed, and Lieutenant Jenner wounded.
In the meantime the 1st Regiment had met the enemy issuing from Messines,
had charged him with the bayonet, and had driven him back well over the
ridge. In the eastern outskirts of the village, however, they were held
up by heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of Bethlehem Farm, and
from various strong-points north of it. One of the latter was captured,
and many prisoners were taken. For an hour there was severe hand-to-hand
fighting, in which many casualties were sustained, all the officers in
the vicinity being either killed or wounded. Among those who fell were
Captain A. E. Ward and Lieutenants Hopgood and Griffiths, while Captains
Burgess, Larmuth, and Tobias, and Lieutenants Lawrence, Neville, Spyker,
Carstens, Christensen, and Clarke were wounded. Captain Burgess, in
especial, gallantly led a small detachment through heavy fire to the
east of the village. Owing to the shortage of men the position soon
became untenable, and what was left of the 1st Regiment was compelled to
withdraw to a line about 100 yards west of Messines. The headquarters of
the 4th Regiment in support had been established at Birthday Farm.
The situation, therefore, on the Wednesday evening was as follows. The
new German line ran from Hollebeke, east of Wytschaete, which was held by
the 9th Division; along the crest of the Messines Ridge, and just west
of the village; through the south-east corner of Ploegsteert Wood, and
west of Ploegsteert village. Farther south the advance was deeper, for
the enemy were north of Steenwerck, north and west of Estaires, just east
of Lestrem and the Lawe River, and then curving south-eastward in front
of the unbroken position at Givenchy. It was a narrow front for a great
advance, for the pillars at Givenchy and the Messines Ridge were still
standing. The safety of the British front depended upon the 55th, the
19th, and the 9th Divisions.
[Sidenote: _April 11._]
Little happened during the night of the 10th. The South Africans retained
their ground, and endeavoured to gain touch with the troops of the 9th
Division about Pick House, while the 4th Regiment took over part of the
line of the depleted 1st. On the morning of the 11th the 108th Brigade
was moved forward in support of the South Africans, and took up a line
along the Steenebeek stream. The South African front at the time ran from
the western skirts of Messines through the Moulin de l’Hospice, then to
Middle Farm and Lumm’s Farm northwards, and back to Petits Puits, with an
outpost at Rommen’s Farm.
Early in the afternoon von Armin attacked with fresh troops, and the
situation north of the Lys became very grave. On the British right the
40th Division was forced well north of Steenwerck. On its left the
34th Division was strongly attacked, and with difficulty succeeded in
holding Nieppe, which, owing to the pressure on the 25th Division from
Ploegsteert, had now become an ugly salient. That afternoon the crest of
the Messines Ridge was lost. The enemy attacked in great force on the
South African left on the line between Middle Farm and Petits Puits,
and drove the 2nd Regiment back to a front parallel to and about 600
yards west of the Messines-Wytschaete road. Captain Jacobs having been
wounded during the morning, Captain L. Greene assumed command, and, with
Lieutenant Thompson of the 4th Regiment, immediately counter-attacked
and regained the lost ground. Presently, however, the enemy succeeded in
working round the left flank, and the South Africans were compelled to
retire to a line 200 yards east of Hell Farm, where they were in touch on
their left with the 5th South Wales Borderers. In this position, in spite
of repeated assaults, they were able to remain during the evening. There
was also trouble on the right, where the 4th Regiment had relieved the
1st. Middle Farm had been strongly assaulted, and our counter-attack had
sustained severe casualties. The 108th Brigade moved up in support, and
for the moment the German advance was arrested.
The loss of the Messines Ridge, though the 9th Division was still
standing south of Hollebeke and at Wytschaete, compelled Plumer to
rearrange his front. Early on the night of the 11th he relinquished
Nieppe, retiring the 34th Division to the neighbourhood of Pont
d’Echelles. This involved the falling back of the 25th and 19th Divisions
to a front about 1,000 yards east of Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, and the
consequent abandonment of the important point, Hill 63, just north of the
western extremity of Ploegsteert Wood. South of the Lys there had been
heavy fighting. The line of the Lawe had been lost, and by this time the
enemy was in Merville. That night the British front ran from Givenchy to
Locon, west of Merville, west of Neuf Berquin, north of Steenwerck and
Nieppe, east of Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, west of Messines, and along
the ridge just covering Wytschaete. The gate was open, but it was narrow,
and the gate-posts still held.
[Sidenote: _April 12._]
About four on the afternoon of the 11th orders had been received from
the 19th Division for a general withdrawal. The South Africans were to
fall back to a line from North Midland Farm by Kruisstraat Cabaret and
Spanbroekmolen to Maedelstaede Farm, with the 108th Brigade on their
right and the 57th in reserve along the Neuve Eglise-Kemmel road. About
eight o’clock the Germans were found to be working round the left flank
in the vicinity of L’Enfer, and accordingly two companies of the 1st
Royal Irish Fusiliers from the 108th Brigade were sent to the north
of L’Enfer to obtain touch with the 9th Division. For the rest, the
withdrawal was carried out without incident. By 5 a.m. on the 12th the
South Africans were in their new front.
Up to now the enemy had not used more than sixteen divisions; but on
the morning of Friday, the 12th, he began to throw in his reserves at
a furious pace. Elated by his rapid success, he turned what was meant
as a diversion into a major operation, and dreamed of Boulogne and
Calais. It was Ludendorff’s first blunder, and it was fatal. It saved
the Allied front, but for the moment it all but destroyed the British
army. Our reinforcements were arriving from the south, but they could
only gradually come into line. That day the enemy came very near to
crossing the La Bassée Canal. He made an ugly gap in our line south-west
of Bailleul, which let through detachments, who seized Merris and
Oultersteene north of the railway. He was now close on Bailleul Station,
pushing direct for Hazebrouck, and but for a gallant stand of a brigade
of the 33rd Division, would have been through the breach. In the section
of the 9th and 19th Divisions nothing happened. The enemy, having gained
the Messines Ridge, was apparently content to rest there for a time, and
made no further attack.
[Sidenote: _April 13._]
The South African Brigade was to have been relieved during the night
of the 12th, but the relief was cancelled, since the troops detailed
to take its place had to be used to restore the situation farther
south. During the night Tanner established an outpost line along the
Wulverghem-Wytschaete road. On the morning of Saturday, the 13th, his
outposts reported that the Germans, under cover of the mist, were
massing opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret. They were quickly dispersed by
our artillery, which during the day dealt faithfully with similar
concentrations. That night the Brigade was relieved in line by the 58th,
and withdrew to hutments at La Clytte, where it came once more under the
9th Division.
The stand at Messines by the South Africans played a vital part in the
battle of the Lys. For thirty hours the Brigade delayed the enemy’s
advance, and took heavy toll of him. In the words of the special order of
the IX. Corps, “Its tenacity in the face of superior numbers and heavy
firing undoubtedly relieved a serious situation, and obliged the enemy,
when he was able to occupy the ridge, to be content to stay there during
the whole of the 12th April without any further attempt to advance.”
Major-General Jeffreys, commanding the 19th Division, and Sir A. Hamilton
Gordon, the Corps Commander, bore testimony to the quality of the
exploit. The latter wrote, “I wish to express to the General of the South
African Brigade and to all his officers and men, my appreciation of their
wonderful fighting spirit and most gallant doings in the great fight
which we have been having in the last three days against heavy odds.” Sir
Herbert Plumer wrote that if any unit could be selected for exceptional
praise it was the South African Brigade. Remember that the great majority
of the men were new drafts, who had just arrived from home. Once again
the Brigade had performed what seemed to be its predestined duty in an
action—fighting outside its own area with its flank turned; and, as was
inevitable, it paid a heavy price. For the three days its casualty list
amounted to 639 all ranks; of these 89 were killed, 270 were wounded, and
280 were missing, of whom the majority were afterwards proved to be dead.
Yet, as the men marched back from the line, their spirits seemed to be as
high as when they had entered it.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _April 14-15._]
The spell of rest was destined to be short. Von Armin was pressing hard
for Mont Kemmel. On the 13th the 29th and 31st Divisions had fought a
most gallant fight in front of Bailleul, where, with the assistance
of the 4th Guards Brigade, they held the line till the 1st Australian
Division could come up and organize positions east of the Forest of
Nieppe. “No more brilliant exploit,” wrote Sir Douglas Haig, “has taken
place since the opening of the enemy’s offensive, though gallant actions
have been without number.” All that day, too, the 33rd and 49th Divisions
were hotly engaged in front of Neuve Eglise. In the evening the enemy
made his way between that village and La Crèche, and so outflanked the
left of the 34th. During the night Plumer withdrew to the high ground
called the Ravelsberg, between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul, and the former
village the following morning passed into German hands. The threat to
Hazebrouck was now acute, for von Armin was on the edge of the line of
upland from Mont des Cats to Kemmel, which commanded all the northern
plain towards the Channel. On Sunday, the 14th, there was a little
respite; but on Monday morning the 19th Division was hard pressed at
Wytschaete, and three fresh German divisions, including the Bavarian
Alpine Corps, attacked our front on the Ravelsberg, and at nine in the
evening entered Bailleul. About that time the remnants of the South
African Brigade were moved to the Reninghelst area, with orders to be
prepared to march at an hour’s notice.
[Sidenote: _April 16._]
In the early hours of Tuesday, the 16th, the British front at Wytschaete
and Spanbroekmolen was attacked in force, with the result that both
places fell. At 8.30 came orders from the 9th Division that the South
Africans should move at once to a position in the Vierstraat line from
Desinet Farm, in the north, to La Polka, just east of Kemmel village.
General Tudor was about to attempt the recapture of Wytschaete. By noon
the South Africans were in position, the 1st Regiment on the right, 250
strong, and the 4th Regiment, with the same strength, on the left; while
the 2nd Regiment, 292 strong, was disposed in the second line along the
whole front in the trenches which were known as Sackville Street.
[Illustration: SCENE OF FIGHTING AROUND MONT KEMMEL.]
At 3.30 in the afternoon Tanner was instructed to send 100 men of the
2nd Regiment to occupy an advanced position between Store Farm and Van
Damme Farm, part of the line from which it was proposed to make the
counterstroke. These men were required to form a garrison there, while
the attack was delivered by the French. Meantime on the left the 26th
Brigade of the 9th Division was to move on Wytschaete. The latter attack
was launched at 7.30 in the evening, but was held up in the north-west of
the village. A quarter of an hour before midnight Tudor ordered Tanner
to place the 4th South Africans under the orders of Colonel Mudie, the
officer commanding the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, in order to assist in
clearing up the situation. At midnight the 1st South Africans and, two
hours later, the 2nd South Africans (less the garrison on the Store-Van
Damme Farm line) were also dispatched to the Seaforths. The 4th Regiment
on its arrival was employed to fill a gap in the line on the north-west
skirts of the village, while the 1st and 2nd Regiments were held in
reserve. Some hours later Captain Farrell, who was now in command of
the 4th, reported that parties of his men had succeeded in entering
Wytschaete, but on account of heavy machine-gun fire and the lack of
touch with their flanks, had been compelled to fall back.
[Sidenote: _April 17._]
Such was the situation on the morning of the 17th. It was for the enemy
the most critical moment, perhaps, in the whole Battle of the Lys. He
had reached his greatest strength, and the British troops were not yet
reinforced at any point within sight of security. That morning von
Armin’s right attacked in the Ypres salient, and wholly failed to break
the Belgian front. At the same time his left, now that the possession
of the Wytschaete Ridge gave him observation over all the land to the
west, assaulted the wooded slopes of Kemmel, the key of the countryside.
After an intense bombardment the German infantry advanced with great
resolution from their new positions at Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, but
were repulsed at all points with heavy losses by the 34th, 49th, and
19th Divisions. Von Armin’s cherished plan had signally failed. During
the 17th the South African Brigade was temporarily placed under the 26th
Brigade, and the 100 men of the 2nd in the Store-Van Damme Farm line
rejoined their regiment in front of Wytschaete. In that position during
the night the 1st and 2nd South Africans relieved the 4th Regiment and
the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, the 4th returning to the La Polka-Desinet
Farm section, where it came once again under Tanner.
[Sidenote: _April 18._]
[Sidenote: _April 19-20._]
Meantime Tudor had received the 62nd and 64th Brigades from the 21st
Division as reinforcements, and contemplated a further attack upon
Wytschaete. The 64th Brigade relieved the 26th, while the 1st and 2nd
South Africans remained in line under the orders of the former Brigade.
This plan, however, did not mature. During the morning of the 18th, under
cover of mist, the enemy assaulted the position held by the 1st Regiment,
and captured its advanced posts, one officer, Lieutenant Hogg, being
killed, and 48 other ranks missing. Save for this incident the situation
remained unchanged that day. On the 19th 100 men of the 4th Regiment
were detailed to relieve some troops of the 19th Division. On the night
of the 20th, the 4th was relieved in the southern part of the Vierstraat
line and moved into support, while the detachment lent to the 19th
Division rejoined its unit. Early on the morning of the 22nd the 1st and
2nd Regiments were also relieved and moved to Dickebusch, and on the 23rd
the whole Brigade reassembled in the Hopoutre area.
[Sidenote: _April 23._]
It was clear that the reconstructed Brigade could not continue. The
drafts received after the _débâcle_ of 24th March had been used up
in the heavy fighting on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and further
reinforcements were not forthcoming to build it up to some semblance
of fighting strength. No other course was possible but to organize the
remnants into one battalion. The history of the doings of the South
Africans in France is now the history of this composite unit, which
was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H. W. M. Bamford, M.C., of the 2nd
Regiment, with Major H. H. Jenkins of the 1st as second-in-command, and
Second-Lieutenant MacFie of the 4th as adjutant. The four companies were
made up of officers, N.C.O’s, and men of the old regiments, and these,
with the drafts arriving from England, brought the battalion to a total
strength of 59 officers and 1,527 other ranks.
The name of the South African Brigade was still to be retained, and the
unit was to include, in addition to the Composite Battalion, the 9th
Scottish Rifles (formerly in the 27th Brigade) and the 2nd Royal Scots
Fusiliers, that famous battalion which at Ramillies had, along with the
Buffs, led the decisive movement, and which at First Ypres had been all
but annihilated. General Tanner was to be the Brigadier. To reconstruct
a new brigade and a new battalion takes time, and while the work was in
process the unfinished product had to be flung into the fight, for the
Battle of the Lys was not over. Ludendorff had dipped too deeply in the
north to withdraw easily. He had incurred great losses without gaining
any real strategical objective, and he could not bring himself to write
off these losses without another effort to pluck the fruit which was
so near his grasp. If he could seize Kemmel Hill, he would broaden his
comfortless salient and win direct observation over the northern plain.
In front of Kemmel was the junction of the British and French lines,
which he regarded as the weakest spot in our front. Accordingly on
Thursday, the 25th April, he struck again for Kemmel.
[Sidenote: _April 25._]
In the early hours of that day a heavy enemy bombardment presaged the
coming attack. At 3.35 a.m. the South African Battalion, which had been
taken over on the 24th by Lieutenant-Colonel Bamford, was warned to be
ready to move at fifteen minutes’ notice. At 5 a.m. von Armin attacked
with nine divisions, five of which were fresh. His purpose was to
capture Kemmel by a direct assault on the French, and by a simultaneous
attack on the British right south of Wytschaete to turn their flank and
separate the two forces. At first he seemed about to succeed. By ten that
morning he had worked his way round the lower slopes and taken Kemmel
village and the hill itself, though isolated French troops still held
out in both places. In the British area the 9th and 49th Divisions were
hotly engaged west of Wytschaete, and before midday the right of the
9th was forced back to Vierstraat. In the afternoon the 21st Division,
farther north, was also attacked, and by the evening the British front
had been compelled to withdraw to positions running from Hill 60 in the
north by Voormezeele and Ridge Wood to the hamlet of La Clytte on the
Poperinghe-Kemmel road, where it linked up with the French.
[Sidenote: _April 26._]
By the next morning supports had arrived, and Plumer made a great effort
to recapture the lost ground. The 25th Division, along with French troops
and elements of the 21st and 49th Divisions, re-entered Kemmel village,
but found themselves unable to maintain it against flanking fire from the
northern slopes of the hill. After midday came the second wave of the
German assault. It failed to make ground owing to the gallant resistance
of the 49th (West Riding) Division, under Major-General Blacklock, and
of troops of the 21st, 30th, 39th, and 9th Divisions, all four of which
had been fighting for five weeks without rest. That afternoon the French
recaptured Locre, on the saddle between Kemmel Hill and the heights
to the west, so that our line in that quarter now ran just below the
eastern slopes of the Scherpenberg, east of Locre, and then south of St.
Jans-Cappel to Méteren.
[Sidenote: _April 27._]
At 2.15 that afternoon General Tanner took over command of the sector
held by the 26th Brigade. He had the 9th Scottish Rifles in line, and
the 8th Black Watch and the 5th Camerons (both of the 26th Brigade)
in support and reserve, for the South African Battalion was still in
divisional reserve at Hopoutre. Presently the Black Watch and the
Camerons were relieved by the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The South
African Brigade was for the moment under the command of the G.O.C.
49th Division. Tanner’s line ran roughly from the crossroads called
Confusion Corner, west of Vierstraat, to the southern end of Ridge Wood.
The 9th Division was now back in support, and Tanner had on his right
troops of the 49th, and on his left the 21st. The German attack came at
3 o’clock in the afternoon, and was repulsed with heavy losses; but the
9th Scottish Rifles suffered so gravely that they were relieved by the
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. The night passed quietly, and on the 27th the
South African Battalion, with a strength of 23 officers and 707 other
ranks, moved forward and took up position in the La Clytte-Dickebusch
support line. There it remained for two days under considerable
shell-fire, which occasioned some 60 casualties.
[Sidenote: _April 29._]
On the 28th the fighting fell chiefly to the lot of the French at Locre,
and there was no material change in the situation. But on the morning
of Monday, the 29th, after one of the most intense German bombardments
of the war, von Armin attacked the whole front from west of Dranoutre
to Voormezeele. The Allied line at the moment ran round the eastern
base of Mont Rouge, just covering Locre, across the low saddle of the
range to the meadows in front of La Clytte, and thence by Voormezeele to
the Ypres-Comines Canal. The British right was in the neighbourhood of
the crossroads which we called Hyde Park Corner, on the saddle between
the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge. There lay the 25th Division as far as
the little stream which runs from Kemmel to the Dickebusch Lake. On
its left was the 49th Division as far as Voormezeele, and beyond it
the 21st Division to the canal. Von Armin made three main assaults—the
first against the French to carry Locre and Mont Rouge; the second, at
the junction of the French and the 25th Division, aimed at turning the
Scherpenberg; and the third, between the 49th and 21st Divisions, to turn
the obstacle of Ridge Wood.
The infantry attack was launched at 5 a.m. in a dense mist by at least
eleven divisions—six against the French and five against the British.
It was delivered in mass formation, the density being from six to eight
bayonets to the yard. On the British front no ground was gained at all.
The three divisions in line, with the assistance of troops of the 30th
and 39th Divisions, not only stood firm, but in some cases advanced to
meet the Germans and drove them back with the bayonet. By the end of the
day the single German gain was the village of Locre, which was retaken by
the French the following morning.
The battle of the 29th was a complete and most costly German repulse.
The enemy had attacked with some 80,000 men, and his casualties were at
least a quarter of his strength. The Royal Scots Fusiliers in Tanner’s
brigade had suffered heavily, and the South African Battalion was ordered
to relieve them. The work was complete by four o’clock on the morning
of the 30th. For the next five days the situation was unchanged, for
the fight on the 29th was the last great episode of the Battle of the
Lys. Lieutenant B. W. Goodwin was killed by shell-fire on the 30th, and
throughout the time the South African lines were consistently shelled.
The enemy posted at Kemmel dominated our trenches, and movement during
the day was dangerous. Happily, however, the misty weather and the poor
visibility were on the side of the defence. On the 4th, Second-Lieutenant
E. C. Addison, who had but recently joined, was killed by a shell, and
the total casualties in this part of the line were, approximately, 200.
On the night of the 5th the Battalion was relieved, and moved back
without losses, though a party of guides under Lieutenant Stokes, who
had gone ahead of the main body, was less fortunate. Lieutenant Stokes,
whose gallantry had been conspicuous during the past days, was severely
wounded, and four of his men were killed. The Brigade had now rejoined
the 9th Division.
[Sidenote: _May 5._]
If we take 5th May as marking the close of the Battle of the Lys we may
pause to reflect upon the marvels of the forty-five preceding days.
More history had been crowded into their span than into many a year of
campaigning. They had seen Ludendorff’s great thrust for Amiens checked
in the very moment of success. They had seen the not less deadly push
for the Channel ports held up for days by weak divisions which bent but
did not break, and finally die away with its purpose still far from
achievement. In those forty-five days the South African Brigade had been
twice destroyed as a unit, and in each case its sacrifice had been the
salvation of the British army. At Marrières Wood it delayed the advance
which would have made an irreparable breach between Gough and Byng; on
the ridge of Messines it maintained the northern pillar of our defence
long enough to permit reserves to come up from the south. On 11th April
Haig had issued his famous order, in which he warned his troops that
they were fighting with their backs to the wall, and that every position
must be held to the last man. The veterans of Marrières Wood and the new
drafts of Messines obeyed this command to the letter. When the Composite
Battalion was formed, there were men in it who had been fighting with
Dawson or Tanner since the 21st of March. The few survivors of the
forty-five days had behind them such a record of fruitful service as the
whole history of the War could scarcely parallel.