THE SOMME RETREAT: GAUCHE AND MARRIÈRES WOODS.
(March 21-27, 1918.)
The German Assault—The Fight at Gauche Wood—The Brigade Right
Flank turned—The Fight for Chapel Hill—The Brigade in the
Yellow Line—The Fighting of 22nd March—Loss of Chapel Hill and
Revelon Farm—The Withdrawal to the Green Line—The Situation
on the Evening of the Second Day—Gough decides to abandon the
Péronne Bridgehead—The Retreat of 23rd March—The Dangerous
Position of the 9th Division—General Tudor’s Instructions to
Dawson—The Brigade retires to Marrières Wood—The Fight of
Sunday the 24th—The Brigade cut off—Death of Lieutenant-Colonel
Heal—The Last Stand—The End of the Brigade—The Splendour of the
Achievement—Its Value to the British Defence.
Our artillery replied to the German barrage as well as it might; but no
gunner or machine gunner or observer could see fifty yards before him.
Under the cloak of the mist the vanguards of the enemy were everywhere
cutting the wire and filtering between the Allied strongholds. The
infantry attack was timed differently along the front, in parts beginning
as early as eight o’clock, but by ten in the morning it was general. The
garrisons of the outposts, beaten to the ground by the bombardment and
struggling amid clouds of gas, were in desperate case. In the thick
weather the enemy was beyond the places where the cross-fire of machine
guns might have checked him long before the redoubts were aware of his
presence. The first thing which most of the outposts knew was that the
Germans were in their rear, and they were overwhelmed before they could
send back warning. Even when they had longer notice, the S.O.S. signals
were everywhere blanketed by the fog. Presently the bulk of the outpost
line was gone, and the enemy was well into our forward zone. There the
line of resistance held on gallantly for hours; and long after the main
battle had swept beyond it, messages continued to be received from odd
posts, until that silence came which meant destruction. The havoc wrought
among our communications kept the battle zone in the dark as to what
was happening in front. Often, too, in those mad hours of fog, our guns
received their first news of the assault from the appearance of German
infantry on flank and rear. A little after eleven the brume lightened,
and it was possible to see something of the landscape to the east. With
the lightening came the German airplanes, flying low to attack with
machine guns our troops and batteries. The men in the battle zone waited
with anxious hearts till the shock of the assault should reach them.
[Illustration: THE SOMME RETREAT.]
We have seen that the main outposts of the forward zone held by the South
African Brigade were Quentin Redoubt and Gauche Wood. At the first, where
a company of the 1st Regiment was stationed, there was no attack. The
main enemy shock in that area fell upon the left Brigade of the 21st
Division, and “B” Company of the 2nd South Africans in Gauche Wood. This
company was under the command of Captain Garnet Green, an officer of
the most proven courage and coolness, whose doings at Delville Wood I
have already recounted. He had three strong-points inside the wood and
one in the open on the south-west side; there were also in the wood two
machine guns and a detachment of the Brigade Trench Mortar Battery under
Lieutenant Hadlow. Under cover of the fog the enemy worked his way into
the wood from the east. Second-Lieutenant Kennedy fought his machine-gun
till all his team were killed or wounded, and he himself was wounded and
taken. About 10.15 Captain Green reported that the Germans were in the
wood, but that the strong-points were intact. Presently the enemy began
to creep in from the north, and the two posts in the eastern half, under
Lieutenant Bancroft and Lieutenant Beviss, were overpowered. Bancroft
and most of his men fell, and the rest were wounded and captured, with
the exception of one who rejoined company headquarters. Beviss, with
nearly half his garrison, succeeded in cutting his way through and
reaching Captain Green. The latter, finding that the enemy was on three
sides of him in overpowering numbers, withdrew the garrison of the third
post in the wood to join the fourth post in the open ground to the
south-west. Every yard was fiercely contested, and, since the Germans
exposed themselves recklessly, they lost heavily from Green’s Lewis guns
and rifles. They attempted to dig themselves in on the western edge of
the wood, but our fire was too strong for them and they fell back in
confusion into cover.
The situation was now clear to General Dawson. He directed the fire of
all the guns at his disposal on Gauche Wood. Further, before midday the
mist had lifted and the garrison of Quentin Redoubt on the north were
able to open a heavy flanking fire on the advancing enemy. Throughout
the rest of the day Green, with his little band, was able to maintain
his position on the western and south-western skirts of the wood. The
situation, however, had become very serious farther south. At the first
rush the Germans had forced back the left Brigade of the 21st Division
and taken the cluster of ruined buildings called Vaucellette Farm. This
they used as an assembly position for extending their attacks. The right
flank of the South African Brigade at Gauche Wood was therefore wholly
exposed, and by the early afternoon the enemy had worked his way more
than a mile eastward, reaching the slopes of the little height called
Chapel Hill.
Dawson was in a serious quandary. He had his line intact, except for
the single point of Gauche Wood, which was an outpost of his forward
zone; but with the enemy on Chapel Hill not only was the whole forward
zone turned, but the first part of the battle zone, for this eminence
commanded all the trench system in what was known as the Yellow Line. The
front had now a singular formation, running back sharply from the extreme
point of Quentin Redoubt in the north-east, by the west side of Gauche
Wood to the north side of Chapel Hill, which itself was in the area of
the 21st Division. The two forward battalions of the South Africans, the
1st and the 2nd, were most gravely menaced. After midday came worse news,
for the enemy was reported to be as far west as Genin Well Copse. At
all costs it was necessary to recapture Chapel Hill,[26] so “A” Company
of the 2nd Regiment, which had been reserved for a counter-attack, was
sent early in the afternoon to strengthen the right flank. They found the
Germans holding the trenches on the north ridge of the hill, and could
make no further progress. Meantime the 4th Regiment, which, as we have
seen, was manning the battle zone, was able to bring flanking fire to
bear on the Germans at Genin Well Copse, and this, aided by a detachment
of machine gunners at Revelon Farm, stayed further enemy progress on the
south.
At 3.30 the 2nd Regiment reported that the Germans were concentrating in
large numbers south-west of Vaucellette Farm for a further attack. It
was difficult to check them with artillery, for the guns of the Brigade
at the time were covering not only their own front, but 600 yards of
that of the 21st Division. At half-past five Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod,
commanding the 4th Regiment, was ordered to send a company to retake
Chapel Hill. “A” Company, under Captain Bunce, was detailed for the
purpose, and by a spirited counter-attack they took the crest as well as
the trenches on the south and south-east slopes, and so enabled posts to
be established linking up the ridge with Genin Well Copse.
During the afternoon orders arrived from the division for a general
retirement of all forward troops to the Yellow Line, and for Brigade
Headquarters to fall back upon Sorel. The reason for this order lay
in the general position of the battle. On the Fifth Army front the
Germans had before midday broken into our battle zone at Ronssoy,
Hargicourt, Templeux, and Le Verguier, and were threatening the valley
of the Omignon. Later came news that the same thing had happened at
Essigny and Maissemy. In the Third Army area the forward zone had gone
at Lagnicourt and Bullecourt, and the fight was being waged in the
battle zone northward from Doignies to the Sensée. Against 19 British
divisions in line Ludendorff had hurled 37 divisions as the first wave,
and before the dark fell not less than 64 German divisions had taken part
in the battle—a number much exceeding the total strength of the British
Army in France. In such a situation the Flesquières salient could not
be maintained, though it had not been seriously attacked, and Byng’s
withdrawal from it meant a corresponding retirement by the 9th Division,
which, except for Gauche Wood, had yielded nothing.
[Sidenote: _March 22._]
Accordingly during the evening and early night the South African Brigade
fell back from the whole forward zone to the Yellow Line, the reserve
position of the battle zone. The general line of the railway east of
Gouzeaucourt was held up till 2 a.m. on the 22nd, and by 5 a.m. the
retirement was complete. During the night the left brigade of the 21st
Division carried out a counter-attack, and re-established itself in the
Yellow Line. By dawn on the 22nd the following was the disposition of
the South Africans. On the left the 1st Regiment held the Yellow Line
with three companies, one platoon of each in the front line, and two in
support. Its fourth company was in the Brown Line, the last line of the
battle zone system. On the right the 4th Regiment was in the Yellow Line
and on Chapel Hill with three companies, and the remaining company at
Revelon Farm. Two companies of the 2nd assisted the 4th in holding the
advance position on Chapel Hill, and the remainder of that battalion was
in the Brown Line. So closed the first day of the battle. The Brigade had
not received the full shock of the German onrush, and its main concern
had been its right flank, where, by the gallant defence of Gauche Wood
and the rapid counter-attack on Chapel Hill, it had checked for the
moment the dangerous enemy infiltration in the area of the 21st Division.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. CHRISTIAN, D.S.O., M.C., Commanding
2nd Regiment, South African Infantry.]
The fog thickened again in the night, and by the dawn of Friday, the
22nd, it was as dense as on the previous morning. The first day of the
battle had by no means fulfilled Ludendorff’s expectations; but he had
time to spare, and had still the chance of complete victory. From the
first light the enemy pressed heavily on the whole battle-front, but
notably at the danger spots which the previous day had revealed in the
line of the Fifth Army. Once again he made no serious attack on the South
African Brigade, except on its right flank, where he laboured to work his
way through it and the left brigade of the 21st Division. He had brought
up a number of light trench mortars, and opened a heavy bombardment on
Chapel Hill, Genin Well Copse, Revelon Farm, and Railton. Dawson had a
most intricate task, for his headquarters were now at Sorel, from which
he had no proper telephone communications; and it was equally hard to
direct the fire of our artillery and to obtain news of the fighting.
He had received during the night the 11th Royal Scots from the 27th
Brigade, which he used in the Brown Line in front of Heudicourt.
Throughout the morning, under cover of a heavy bombardment from artillery
and trench mortars, the Germans gradually closed round Chapel Hill and
Revelon Farm, both of which fell in spite of a most gallant defence. It
was there that Captain Liebson, M.C., the medical officer of the 4th
Regiment, was killed. Shortly after noon orders came from the division
to give up the Yellow Line and fall back upon the Brown, the retirement
to be complete by 4.30, and to be ready to retire later to the Green
Line, three miles in the rear. The Green Line was the third defence
zone, a partly completed line of trenches between Nurlu and Equancourt.
The hour for the second withdrawal was to be announced later, but no
message on the subject ever reached Dawson. Each battalion in the Yellow
Line was directed to leave one section per company as a rearguard
on its retirement to the Brown Line. The first part was carried out
successfully. But as soon as the enemy noticed the withdrawal he advanced
in close formation, and presently had reached the Brown Line in the 21st
Division’s area, had outflanked Heudicourt, and was occupying the high
ground south-west of that village. The retirement of the 4th Regiment
was only made possible by an accurate supporting fire from the 2nd.
Dawson sent his Acting Brigade Major, Captain Beverley, about 3.30, on
horseback, to give the battalions the message about the Green Line, which
he succeeded in doing, after having his horse shot under him. All the
troops had their instructions before five o’clock.
The disposition of the Brigade was now as follows. On the right, at the
quarry on the east of Heudicourt (the old Brigade Headquarters), was “B”
Company of the 2nd, under Captain Green, with one company of the 11th
Royal Scots and a few details of the 21st Division extending the line on
the right. In the centre was the 4th Regiment, and on the left the 1st
Regiment, both in the Brown Line. But the situation was full of peril,
for the Brown Line was hopelessly outflanked on the right, and the enemy
was moving northwards round the south end of Heudicourt. Communication
with headquarters had become impossible, and a heavy responsibility
fell upon the junior commanders, who flung out defensive flanks and
fought rearguard actions with the coolness of veterans. While the guns
were falling back, about thirty enemy airplanes, flying low, kept up a
continual fire on the teams and also on the infantry in the trenches.
Everything depended on whether the German advance could be stayed till
darkness came, and under its cover the various units could reach the
Green Line.
The Brigade Headquarters were at Sorel, and in the dusk the Germans could
be seen in great strength moving westward south of the village. As our
wounded and guns were passing through the place it was vital to defend it
until the retirement was complete. The whole countryside seemed to be in
flames; Heudicourt was spouting like a volcano, and everywhere was the
glare of burning stores and bursting shells. Dawson formed up his Brigade
Headquarters Staff, and put them into the trenches east of Sorel, to give
the guns and wounded time to get clear. About this time Major Cochran,
the brigade major, returned from leave and resumed his duties—duties
which, for the two days left to him on earth, he was to perform with
a noble fidelity. The Headquarters details succeeded in arresting the
enemy’s advance, and, before he had time to reconnoitre or to organize
an attack, the last guns had passed through Sorel, Brigade Headquarters
withdrawing to Moislains. It was here that Lieutenant M. Webb was killed.
Only darkness could save the Brigade, and the darkness was fast falling.
The gravest danger was in the south, for any further enemy advance
there would turn the Green Line. Owing to the Germans moving northward
behind our front it was impossible to keep to the original route of
retirement, and all three units had to withdraw in a northern direction
before striking west. The task of the 1st Regiment on the left was the
least difficult. Under Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, it fell back upon Fins.
Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod, who commanded the 4th Regiment, was wounded
during the afternoon, and the remnant, under Captain Bunce, moved
along the Brown Line to the Fins-Gouzeaucourt road, and then westward
from Fins. The most difficult operation fell to Lieutenant-Colonel
Christian of the 2nd Regiment, but by a series of providential chances he
extricated a large part of the regiment, following mainly the direction
of the 4th. For “B” Company and its heroic commander, Captain Green,
there was no chance of withdrawal. They were destroyed, fighting to the
last. The details of the Brigade, to the strength of about 650 all ranks,
had, on the 21st, been encamped at Heudicourt under Lieutenant-Colonel
Young. Early on the 22nd they were ordered to fall back upon Nurlu,
where, together with other 9th Division details, they laboured to
improve the Green Line. The Brigade in its retreat passed through these
details, and by about two in the morning of the 23rd had reached the
Green Line and dug a position along the Nurlu-Péronne road south-east of
Moislains.
[Illustration: RETREAT OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE.]
The South Africans were now in divisional reserve. Their casualties
during the first two days of the battle had been about 900 all ranks.
Two weak companies of the 1st Regiment, under Captains Burgess and Ward,
had become detached in the darkness, and for the next days fought along
with the 26th Brigade. Of the 2nd Regiment, Captain Green and Lieutenants
Bancroft and Terry had been killed, Captains Rogers and Stein wounded
and captured, Lieutenant Beviss was missing, and Captains Jenkins and
Pearse and Lieutenant Sprenger had been wounded. Of the 4th Regiment,
all the senior officers—Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod, Majors Clerk and
Browne, and the Adjutant, Captain Mitchell, had been wounded. In the
circumstances the withdrawal of the Brigade to the Green Line must be
regarded as a very remarkable feat of arms. For two days they had fought
with their flank turned, and only the tenacity and courage of the men
and the extreme coolness and daring of the junior officers had prevented
a wholesale disaster. At about five in the evening of the 22nd it might
well have seemed that nothing could save them.
While we leave the South Africans secure for the moment in the Green Line
we must note what happened elsewhere that day on the battle-front. Byng
had been the less heavily engaged, and during the day yielded little
ground. The enemy’s main effort was against the Fifth Army, especially
at the three critical points of the Cologne and Omignon valleys and
the Crozat Canal. By midday the canal had been lost, and early in the
afternoon Gough was almost everywhere in the third defensive zone. By
the evening that zone had been broken around Vaux and Beauvois. Our
last reserves had been thrown in, and, save for a French division and
some French cavalry, now heavily engaged on the Crozat Canal, there was
no help available for the hard-pressed Fifth Army. The gaps could not
be stopped, so at all costs our front must withdraw. At 11 p.m. that
night Gough gave orders to fall back to the bridgehead position east of
the Somme, a position which, as we have seen, was not yet completed.
Maxse’s XVIII. Corps was to retire to the river line; Watts’ XIX. Corps
and Congreve’s VII. Corps were to hold the Péronne bridgehead on a line
running from Voyennes through Monchy-Lagache to Vraignes, and thence
continue in the third zone to the junction with the Third Army at
Equancourt. This compelled Byng to fall back to conform, and his front
ran now in the third zone to Hénin-sur-Cojeul, whence the old battle zone
was continued to Fampoux.
The third zone was nowhere a real defence, and presently it was clear
that the Péronne bridgehead was little better. During the thick night,
while the divisions of the Fifth Army, now in the last stages of fatigue,
struggled westward, Gough was faced with a momentous decision. He now
knew the weight of the German attack; his right flank was in desperate
peril; he had no hope of support for several days; and his men strung
out on an immense front had been fighting without rest for forty-eight
hours. If he faced a general engagement on the morrow he might suffer
decisive defeat. There seemed no course open to him but to abandon the
Péronne bridgehead, and fall back behind the river. It was a difficult
decision, for it shortened our time for defending the river line and for
clearing troops and material from the east bank. But the alternative
was certain disaster, and beyond doubt in the circumstances Gough’s
judgment was right. Accordingly, very early on the morning of Saturday,
the 23rd March, instructions were given to Watts to withdraw gradually to
the river line, while Congreve, on his left, was to take up a position
between Doingt and Nurlu. The front of the VII. Corps would now just
cover Péronne on the north, and it would have behind it, flowing from
north to south, the little river Tortille.
[Sidenote: _March 23._]
Saturday, 23rd March, dawned again in fog, and from an early hour it
became clear that the position allotted to Congreve could not be held.
That day von der Marwitz began the most dangerous movement of all—the
attempt to drive a wedge between the Third and Fifth Armies. Very early
in the morning he attacked the Green Line, which was held by details of
the 9th Division. The advance was checked; but the position was clearly
untenable, and the South African details, under Lieutenant-Colonel Young,
fell back to Bouchavesnes, where they again came under Dawson’s orders.
That day the South Africans were nominally in reserve, holding a position
in echelon on the right flank of the 27th Brigade. But a wavering
front, faced by preposterous odds, called every man into the fight,
and presently the Brigade was in the front line again on the right of
the 27th, endeavouring to maintain touch with the 21st Division, which
was compelled to retire by the withdrawal on its right from the Péronne
bridgehead. During the morning Dawson fell back from Moislains, and
took up ground about midday on the ridge south-west of that village,
overlooking the Tortille River, where, during the afternoon, he was
heavily shelled. Once again came the old menace on the right wing. The
21st Division, itself outflanked by the withdrawal farther south, was
again retiring, and presently Dawson’s flank was in the air, and the
enemy in the immediate south was more than a mile behind his front. He
had five tanks as a flank-guard, and he endeavoured to fling out posts
as a defensive flank across the Péronne-Arras road. An officer and
twenty men were sent to occupy the cutting on the summit of the ridge
overlooking Mont St. Quentin. All afternoon the enemy poured down the
slopes along the Péronne-Nurlu road, and before dark fell he had occupied
Moislains and Haute-Allaines.
General Tudor visited Dawson in the evening. The situation of the whole
9th Division under von der Marwitz’s thrust had grown desperate. It
was holding an impossibly long line, and a gap had opened between its
left and Fanshawe’s V. Corps in the Third Army, of which the enemy had
promptly taken advantage, in spite of gallant attempts to fill the breach
made by the 47th London Division and a Brigade of the 2nd. On its right
it was out of touch with the 21st Division; so that that evening it was
holding a salient of high ground with both flanks hopelessly in the air.
There was no other course but to fall back, especially as the retirement
of the 21st Division was by no means at an end. The 1st Regiment had been
moved from the left of the South African Brigade to strengthen the right
flank, but it could not hope to fill the breach, the more as the enemy
was pressing hard from Moislains against this weak spot.
General Tudor told Dawson that instructions had come for the division to
withdraw after dark to a position on the line from Government Farm by
the east of St. Pierre Vaast Wood to the road just west of Bouchavesnes
which led to Cléry. He informed him that Sir Walter Congreve had ordered
that this line must be held “at all costs,” and added that he presumed,
if it was broken, it would be retaken by a counter-attack. These words
of Tudor’s are of importance, for they were Dawson’s charter for the
fighting of the next day. He was also bidden keep in close touch with
the troops on his right—a counsel of perfection hard to follow, for
Gough’s decision on the night of the 22nd involved an indefinite retreat
westward, and in such circumstances a unit which had orders to stand at
all costs must inevitably be left in the void. Dawson saw his commanding
officers, Heal and Christian (the remnants of the 4th had now been
attached to the 2nd), and explained to them the gravity of the position.
Whoever retired, the Brigade must stand.
The withdrawal started at 9.45 p.m., and the last troops had begun their
retreat by 11 p.m. At 3 a.m. on the morning of the 24th all were in
position in the new line. It was not the line which General Tudor had
indicated, for by this time the left brigade of the 21st Division was
more than a mile westward of that front, and if the South Africans were
to stand they must find ground which, at any rate to begin with, was not
hopelessly untenable. Dawson decided to occupy a ridge some 1,500 yards
west of Tudor’s line, so that by throwing back his right flank he might
reduce the gap between him and the 21st to a less dangerous size. His
Brigade Major, Cochran, was sent to prospect the position while it was
still light, and to get into touch with the neighbouring Brigadier of
the 21st, from whom he learned that immediately after dark that brigade
intended to make a further retirement. In the South African withdrawal
some of the posts flung out on the right flank lost their way, and
wandered back to the transport lines. They were destined to be among
the few survivors. During the night touch was obtained with the 21st
Division, which, after retiring, had again advanced. The left flank of
the Brigade was in touch with a company of the 6th K.O.S.B. of the 27th
Brigade. The situation on that flank, however, was far from secure, for
the K.O.S.B. did not know the whereabouts of the rest of their battalion
or of their brigade. Dawson sent out patrols to look for them, but there
was no sign of them anywhere in the countryside.
[Sidenote: _March 24._]
By dawn on Sunday, the 24th, the two regiments of the South Africans
were holding a patch of front which, along with Delville Wood, is the
most famous spot in all their annals. It lay roughly behind the northern
point of Marrières Wood, running north-east in the direction of Rancourt,
a little over two miles north-west of Bouchavesnes village. The ground
sloped eastward, and then rose again to another ridge about 1,000 yards
distant—a ridge which gave the enemy excellent chances for observation
and machine-gun positions. There was one good trench and several bad
ones, and the whole area was dotted with shell-holes. Dawson took up his
headquarters in a support trench some 300 yards in rear of the front
line. The strength of the Brigade was about 500 in all, composed of 478
men from the infantry, one section of the 9th Machine Gun Battery, and
a few men from Brigade Headquarters. The previous day some officers
had joined from the transport lines, and in consequence the number of
officers was out of all proportion to the other ranks. The 2nd Regiment,
for example, with a strength of 110, had no less than fourteen officers.
Dawson’s only means of communication with divisional headquarters was by
runners, and he had long lost touch with the divisional artillery.
[Illustration: THE FIGHT AT MARRIÈRES WOOD.]
The South Africans seemed fated to have their greatest deeds linked
always with some broken woodland. So far the proudest names in their
record were those wraiths of copses, Delville and Gauche. To them must
now be added a third, the splintered desert which had once been the wood
of Marrières. It was a weary and broken little company which waited on
that hilltop in the fog of dawn. During three days the 500 had fought a
score of battles. Giddy with lack of sleep, grey with fatigue, poisoned
by gas and tortured by the ceaseless bombardment, officers and men had
faced the new perils which each hour brought forth with a fortitude
beyond all human praise. But wars are fought with the body as well as
with the spirit, and the body was breaking. Since the 20th of March,
while the men had received rations, they had had no hot food or tea.
Neither they nor their officers had any guess at what was happening
elsewhere. They seemed to be isolated in a campaign of their own, shut
out from the knowledge of their fellows and beyond the hope of mortal
aid. Yet in a sense they were fortunate in their ignorance, for only the
High Command knew how desperate was the position. When Ludendorff on the
Saturday night announced that the first stage of the great battle had
ended and counted his prisoners, he did not exaggerate his success. It
was true that he had not yet broken the British line, but he had worn it
to a shadow, and any hour might see that shadow dissolve.
The South African position was well placed for defence, for it had before
it a long, clear field of fire. But it was a trap from which there could
be no retreat, since all the land to the west was bare to the enemy’s
eyes. Dawson’s 500, on the morning of the 24th, had, each man, 200 rounds
of ammunition and a fair supply of Lewis gun drums. One section, however,
of the Machine Gun Battery had only four belts of ammunition, and three
of the guns with their teams were therefore sent back to the transport
lines at Savernake Wood.
Soon after daylight had struggled through the fog the enemy was seen
massing his troops on the ridge to the east, and about nine o’clock he
deployed for the attack, opening with machine-gun fire, and afterwards
with artillery. Dawson, divining what was coming, sent a messenger back
to the rear with the Brigade records. He had already been round every
part of the position, and had disposed his scanty forces to the best
advantage. At ten o’clock some British guns opened an accurate fire,
not upon the enemy, but upon the South African lines, especially on the
trench where was situated Brigade Headquarters. Dawson was compelled
to move to a neighbouring shell-hole. He sent a man on his last horse,
followed by two runners, to tell the batteries what was happening, but
the messengers do not seem to have reached their goal, and the fire
continued for more than an hour, though happily with few casualties.
After that it ceased, because the guns had retired. One of our heavies
continued to fire on Bouchavesnes, and presently that, too, was silent.
It was the last the Brigade heard of the British artillery.
Meantime the enemy gun-fire had become intense, and the whole position
was smothered in dust and fumes. Men could not keep their rifles clean
because of the débris choking the air. The Germans were now some 750
yards from our front, but did not attempt for the moment to approach
closer, fearing the accuracy of the South African marksmanship. The
firing was mostly done at this time by Lewis guns, for ammunition had to
be husbanded, and the men were ordered not to use their rifles till the
enemy was within 400 yards. He attempted to bring a field gun into action
at a range of 1,000 yards, but a Lewis gunner of the 1st Regiment knocked
out the team before the gun could be fired. A little later another
attempt was made, and a field gun was brought forward at a gallop. Once
again the fire of the same Lewis gunner proved its undoing. The team got
out of hand and men and horses went down in a struggling mass.
This sight cheered the thin ranks of the defence, and about noon came
news which exalted every heart. General Tudor sent word that the 35th
Division, which had arrived at Bray-sur-Somme, under Major-General
Franks, had been ordered to take up position 1,000 yards in rear of the
Brigade. For a moment it seemed as if they still might make good their
stand. But the 35th Division was a vain dream. It was never during that
day within miles of the South Africans. Dawson sent back a report on the
situation to General Tudor.
It was the last communication of the Brigade with the outer world.
At midday the frontal attack had been held, an attack on the south had
been beaten off, and so had a very dangerous movement in the north. The
grass in that parched week was as dry as tinder. The enemy set fire to
it and, moving behind the smoke as a screen, managed to work his way to
within 200 yards of our position in the north. There, however, he was
again checked. But by this time the German thrust elsewhere on the front
was bearing fruit. Already the enemy was in Combles on the north and at
Péronne and Cléry on the south. The 21st Division had gone, and the other
brigades of the 9th Division were being forced back on the South African
left. At about half-past two on that flank an officer with some thirty
men began to withdraw under the impression that a general retirement had
been ordered. As they passed Headquarters, Major Cochran and Captain
Beverley, with Regimental Serjeant-Major Keith of the 4th Regiment, went
out to stop them under a concentrated machine-gun fire. The party at once
returned to the firing-line and were put into shell-holes on the north
flank. Unhappily Cochran was hit in the neck by a machine-gun bullet and
died within three minutes.
Dawson, early in the afternoon, attempted to adjust his remnant. The
enemy now was about 200 yards from his front and far in on his flank
and rear. Major Ormiston took out some twenty-five men as a flank-guard
for the left, in which performance he was dangerously wounded. All
wounded who could possibly hold a rifle were stopped on their way to
the dressing-station, and sent back to the front line, and in no single
instance did they show any reluctance to return. Ammunition was conserved
with a noble parsimony, and the last round was collected from casualties.
But it was now clear that the enemy was well to the west of the Brigade,
for snipers’ fire began to come from that direction. Unless the miracle
of miracles happened the limit of endurance must be reckoned not in
hours but in minutes. For the moment the most dangerous quarter seemed
to be the north, and Lieutenant Cooper of the 2nd Regiment, with twenty
men, was sent out to make a flank-guard in shell-holes 100 yards from
Brigade Headquarters. The little detachment did excellent work, but their
casualties were heavy, and frequent reinforcements had to be sent out to
them. Lieutenant Cooper himself was killed by a fragment of shell.
As it drew towards three o’clock there came a last flicker of hope. The
enemy in the north seemed to be retiring. The cry got up, “We can see
the Germans surrendering,” and at the same time the enemy artillery
lengthened and put down a heavy barrage 700 yards to the west of the
Brigade. It looked as if the 35th Division had arrived, and for a little
there was that violent revulsion of feeling which comes to those who see
an unlooked-for light in darkness. The hope was short-lived. All that had
happened was that the enemy machine guns and snipers to the west of the
Brigade were causing casualties to his troops to the east. He therefore
assumed that they were British reinforcements.
About this time Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, commanding the 1st Regiment, was
killed. He had already been twice wounded in the action, but insisted
on remaining with his men. He had in the highest degree every quality
which makes a fine soldier. I quote from a letter of one of his officers.
“By this time it was evident to all that we were bound to go under, but
even then Colonel Heal refused to be depressed. God knows how he kept
so cheery all through that hell; but right up to when I last saw him,
about five minutes before he was killed, he had a smile on his face and a
pleasant word for us all.”
All afternoon the shell-fire had been terrific. Batteries of 7.7 cm.,
10.5 cm., and 15 cm. were in action, many of them in full view of our
men. A number of light trench mortars were firing against the north-east
corner of our front and causing heavy losses. The casualties had been
so high that the whole line was now held only by a few isolated groups,
and control was impossible. About four o’clock Christian made his way
to Dawson and told him that he feared his men could not hold out much
longer. Every machine gun and Lewis gun was out of action, the ammunition
was nearly gone, the rifles were choked, and the breaking-point had been
reached of human endurance. The spirit was still unconquered, but the
body was fainting.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. H. HEAL, D.S.O., Commanding 1st
South African Regiment. Killed at Marrières Wood, near Bouchavesnes, 24th
March 1918.]
Dawson had still the shadow of a hope that he might maintain his ground
until the dark and then fight his way out. Like all good soldiers in such
circumstances he was harassed by doubts. The Brigade was doomed; even if
the struggle could be protracted till dusk, only a fragment would escape.
Had he wished to withdraw he must have begun in the early morning as soon
as the enemy appeared, for once the battle was joined the position was a
death trap. He had orders from the division to hold his ground “at all
costs”—a phrase often given an elastic interpretation in war, but in this
case literally construed. He wondered whether the stand might be of value
to the British front, or whether it was not a useless sacrifice. He could
only fall back for comfort on his instructions. As he wrote in his diary:
“I cannot see that under the circumstances I had any option but to remain
till the end. Far better go down fighting against heavy odds than that
it should be said we failed to carry out our orders. To retire would be
against all the traditions of the service.”
Some time after 4.15 enemy masses appeared to the east-north-east of
Brigade Headquarters. It was the final attack, for which three fresh
battalions had been brought up, and the assault was delivered in close
formation. There were now only 100 South Africans, some of them already
wounded. There was not a cartridge left in the front line, and very few
anywhere except in the pistols of the officers. Had they had ammunition
they might have held even this last attack; as it was, it could be met
only by a few scattered shots. The South Africans had resisted to the
last moment when resistance was possible; and now they had no weapon.
The Germans surged down upon a few knots of unarmed men. Dawson, with
Christian and Beverley, walked out in front of a group which had gathered
round them, and was greeted with shouts of “Why have you killed so many
of us?” and “Why did you not surrender sooner?” One man said, “Now we
will soon have peace,” at which Dawson shook his head. Before he went
eastward into captivity he was allowed to find Cochran’s body and rescue
his papers.
[Sidenote: _March 26._]
[Sidenote: _March 27._]
The Brigade had ceased to be. It had surrendered—such a surrender as
Sir Richard Grenville made, when the _Revenge_ fought for a day and a
night against the fleets of Spain. Less than 100 unwounded prisoners
fell to the enemy; the rest were killed or crippled or lost, all but the
little group of details and stragglers now in the transport lines. Heal
and Cochran were dead, MacLeod was wounded, Dawson and Christian were
prisoners. The rest of the 9th Division, along with the remnants of the
21st, were now fighting desperately north of the Somme behind Cléry,
struggling to the line from Hem through Trônes Wood to Longueval, where
the 35th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division were to come to their aid.
It will be remembered that two companies of the South Africans had gone
astray on the night of the 22nd and had since been fighting with other
brigades. There were also the parties left behind in the Brown Line on
that date, which had been unable to rejoin their units, and there were
the posts which Dawson had flung out on his right flank on the 23rd, and
which had lost their road in the last withdrawal. These oddments, along
with the details and the transport of the Brigade, collected that evening
half-way between Bray and Maricourt, and on the following day were formed
into a composite battalion of three companies under Lieutenant-Colonel
Young. Each company represented a regiment of the Brigade, No. 1 being
under Captain Burgess, No. 2 under Lieutenant Jenner, and No. 3 under
Lieutenant G. Smith. The fighting strength was some 450 rifles. On the
26th they were ordered to Dernancourt to report to General Kennedy of
the 26th Brigade. They there found the 9th Division holding a line from
that village to south of Albert, and took up a position in trenches and
along the railway embankment south-east of the former place. This ground
they held in spite of furious enemy efforts to dislodge them, until they
were relieved by the Australians on the night of the 27th, when the whole
division was withdrawn from the line.
* * * * *
In all that amazing retreat, when our gossamer front refused to be
broken by the most fantastic odds, no British division did more nobly
than the 9th. It held a crucial position in the line, and only by its
stubborn endurance was a breach between Gough and Byng prevented. Among
the brigades of the 9th, the chief brunt was borne by the South African.
A great achievement is best praised in the language of the commanders
themselves. General Tudor wrote:—
“I think everybody should know how magnificently the South
African Brigade fought. None but the best could have got
through on the 22nd from the Yellow Line with Heudicourt in the
hands of the enemy. They were sadly thinned then, only about
900 rifles all told when they got back, but they left their
mark on the Hun. The story of the magnificent stand made by the
Brigade when afterwards surrounded can only be told by those
who were with it to the last; but this much is certain, that
it was shortage of ammunition alone which made the survivors
surrender. The division will not seem the same again without
them, and it was they who bore the brunt of the fighting of the
9th on the 21st and 22nd.”
Here are Dawson’s words:—
“It is impossible for me to do justice to the magnificent
courage displayed by all ranks under my command during this
action. For the two years I have been in France I have seen
nothing better. Until the end they appeared to me quite
perfect. The men were cool and alert, taking advantage of every
opportunity, and, when required, moving forward over the open
under the hottest machine-gun fire and within 100 yards of the
enemy. They seemed not to know fear, and in my opinion they put
forth the greatest effort of which human nature is capable. I
myself witnessed several cases of great gallantry, but do not
know the names of the men. _The majority, of course, will never
be known._ It must be borne in mind that the Brigade was in an
exhausted state before the action, and in the fighting of the
three previous days it was reduced in numbers from a trench
strength of over 1,800 to 500.”
Let us take the testimony of the enemy. During the German advance,
Captain Peirson, the brigade major of the 48th Brigade of the
16th Division, was taken prisoner. When he was examined at German
Headquarters, an officer asked him if he knew the 9th Division; for, said
he, “We consider that the fight put up by that division was one of the
best on the whole of your front, especially the last stand of the South
African Brigade, which we can only call magnificent.” In the course of
his journey to Le Cateau Captain Peirson was spoken to by many German
officers, all of whom mentioned the wonderful resistance of the South
Africans. There is a more striking tribute still. On the road to Le
Cateau a party of British officers was stopped by the Emperor, who asked
if any one present belonged to the 9th Division. “I want to see a man of
that division,” he said, “for if all divisions had fought like the 9th I
would not have had any troops left to carry on the attack.”
It was no piece of fruitless gallantry. Dawson, as he was tramping
eastwards, saw a sight which told him that his decision had been right,
and that his work had not been in vain. The whole road for miles east
of Bouchavesnes was blocked by a continuous double line of transport
and guns, which proved that the South Africans had for over seven hours
held up not only a mass of German infantry, but all the artillery and
transport advancing on the Bouchavesnes-Combles highway. Indeed, it
is not too much to say that on that fevered Sabbath the stand of the
Brigade saved the British front. It was the hour of von der Marwitz’s
most deadly thrust. While Gough was struggling at the river crossings,
the Third Army had been forced west of Morval and Bapaume, far over our
old battle-ground of the Somme. The breach between the two armies was
hourly widening. But for the self-sacrifice of the Brigade at Marrières
Wood and the delay in the German advance at its most critical point, it
is doubtful whether Byng could ever have established that line on which,
before the end of March, he held the enemy.
“The majority will never be known.” That is the comment which has to be
made after every great episode in war. The names of commanders stand out,
and now and then some single feat of gallantry emerges into light; but
a great thing is achieved not only by the spirit of the leaders, but by
the faithfulness and devotion of those who disappear without record into
the dark, or are remembered only by a wooden cross on an obscure grave.
In that last stand every man of the Brigade “took counsel from the valour
of his heart,” and the glory became less that of the individual than of
the race. Two strong stocks, coming together from the ends of the earth,
had each of them in their blood the spirit that defends lost hopes and is
undismayed by any odds. The kinsfolk of the men who shattered Dingaan’s
hordes and under Andries Potgieter beat off the indunas of Mosilikatse
at Vechtkop, and those who had in their tradition the Ridge of Delhi and
the laager at Rorke’s Drift, joined hands at the wood of Marrières in an
achievement more fateful and not less heroic than any in their splendid
past.