STRATEGY
War has been defined, "A contest between nations and states carried on
by force." But this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch
as it would exclude all civil wars.
When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called
_offensive_, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an
enemy, it is called _defensive_. A war may be essentially defensive even
where we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is
under preparation. Besides this general division of war, military
writers have made numerous others, such as--
_Wars of intervention_, in which one state interferes in favor of
another. This intervention may either have respect to the _internal_ or
to the _external_ affairs of a nation. The interference of Russia in the
affairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria and
the allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution and
under the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention of
the Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., of King William
against Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years'
war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between
France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head. Most
liberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of
nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates
of the old monarchies of Europe.
_Wars of insurrection_ to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case
with the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821.
_Wars of independence_ from foreign dictation and control as the wars of
Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France
against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish
Peninsula against France and of China and India against England. The
American war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some
judicious historians have denominated it the war of Independence, as
distinguished from the war of the Revolution.
_Wars of opinion_, like those which the Vendeans have sustained in
support of the Bourbons, and those France has sustained against the
allies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smaller
European states by the republican hordes of the French Revolution. To
this class also belong--
_Religious wars_, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, and of the
Reformation.
_Wars of conquest_, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of the English in
India, of the French in Egypt and Africa, and of the Russians in
Circassia.
_National wars_, in which the great body of the people of a state
engage, like those of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke of
Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of the Americans against England, of
the Dutch against Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against
Russia.
_Civil wars_, where one portion of the state fights against the other,
as the war of the Roses in England, of the league in France, of the
Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and South
America.
It is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these
different kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and
to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all
wars.
War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a _science_ and
an _art_. It is a science so far as it investigates general principles
and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when
considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting
campaigns, sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so far as it
investigates the general principles of fortification, and also
artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts
when considered with reference to the practical rules for the
construction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon.
This distinction has not always been observed by writers on this
subject, and some have asserted that strategy is the _science_, and
tactics the _art_ of war. This is evidently mistaking the general
distinction between science, which investigates principles, and art,
which forms practical rules.
In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of _the military art_
when we refer to the general subject of war, and of _the military
sciences_ when we wish to call attention more particularly to the
scientific principles upon which the art is founded. We shall here
consider the military art in this general sense, as including the entire
subject of war.
As thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct
branches, viz.: 1st. _Strategy_; 2d. Fortification, or _Engineering_;
3d. _Logistics_; 4th. _Tactics_. Several general treatises on this art
add another branch, called _The Policy of War_, or the relations of war
with the affairs of state.
_Strategy_ is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive
points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each
other's cannon. _Engineering_ embraces all dispositions made to enable
troops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and also
the means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material
obstacles. _Logistics_ embraces the practical details of moving and
supplying armies. _Tactics_ is the art of bringing troops into action,
or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view,
and within the reach of his artillery. All these are most intimately
connected. A fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines;
the best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to no
decisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operation
is not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, are
lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in his
dispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisite
means of locomotion and of subsistence.
1. _Strategy_ regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of
battle. It selects the important points in this theatre, and the lines
of communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan and
arranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to the
engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; it
leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on
the chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for
battle, when the armies have reached the destined points. It is well to
keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more
obvious by a few illustrations. The point where several lines of
communications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc which
is occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject
a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks
exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placed
their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in
front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but
the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently
successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a
_strategic_ movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right
from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a
corresponding _tactical_ movement. By the former there had been some
chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction.
The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more
useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The
little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the
operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army;
whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706,
caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under
Prince Eugene of Savoy.
War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If
the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war
of _invasion_. If only a province, or a military position, or an army,
be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the _initiative_ in
offensive movements.
_Offensive_ war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and
political influence. It is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares
the country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at the
same time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral
courage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. A war of
invasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. Its lines of
operation may become too _deep_, which is always hazardous in an enemy's
country. All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains,
rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but
difficult to be overcome by the invader. The local authorities and
inhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if
patriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of
its threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. But if a
political diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and its
operations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart,
paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military
resources, thus promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as the
initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable
one, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and
concentrating his masses on the decisive point.
The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your
forces as much concentrated as possible. This will not only prevent
misfortune, but secure victory,--since, by its necessary operation, you
possess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of
your enemy's position.
To this general rule some writers have laid down the following
exceptions:--
1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have
been exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause,
unable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either
you must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw from
them your supplies by _detachments_. The former is rarely compatible
with your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence the
preference which is generally given to the latter.
2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be
effected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile
corps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the general
rule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which may
be better,) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish
your object.
3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable
insurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a
division of his army, you must support this inclination by strong
_detachments_, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations
in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here meant.
4th. When, by dispatching a _detachment_, you may be able to intercept a
convoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy.
These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of
concentration. This rule does not require that _all the army should
occupy the same position_. Far from it. Concentration requires the main
body to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, for
temporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly
legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon's
position in Spain will serve as an illustration. A hand, placed on the
map of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces.
When opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown
out on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in,
as in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory
to striking some important blow.
"If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on
the offensive principle, to keep its forces _concentrated_, it is, no
doubt, the second, _to keep them fully employed._ Is it your intention
to seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to his
capital? or to cut him off from his supplies? Whatever measure be
necessary to open your route to these objects must be _promptly_ taken;
and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must
be more rapid than his. Give him time to _breathe_,--and above all, give
him time to _rest_, and your project is blasted; his forages will be
completed, and his magazines filled and secured. The roads of approach
will be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywhere
taken and defended. You will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce
yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalent
or use."
"Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of
acting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first
movements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy,--who,
selecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds his
antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected,--and who at last
leaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or of
flying without resistance."
The British army, in the war of the American Revolution, must have been
most wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting
offensive war. Instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive
point, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and
well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extent
of country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any
one point. On the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and
discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces.
The main object in _defensive_ war is, to protect the menaced territory,
to retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to
guard the vital points of the country, and--at the favorable moment,
when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and
fatigue--to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. This
combination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. The
enemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of the
moral superiority due to successful offensive operations. There are
numerous instances of this kind of war, "the defensive-offensive," as it
is sometimes called, to be found in history. The last four campaigns of
Frederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve as models.
Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula.
To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the
advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or
provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some
fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a
system is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and
cowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian system of
defensive war.
"Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually
refusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march
undisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by
nature or by art;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks
every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy
or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never
unprepared for either attack or defence. When not employed in efforts of
courage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and
science. In its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while
it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises
batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to the
system of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of
_la petite guerre_. Dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies its
own attacks and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a single
point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks
together. Does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? It
is but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of
his hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, by
adopting the maxim, that the _enemy must be made to pay for whatever he
gains_, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last it
yields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only his
sighs."
In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are
employed, such as _theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of
operations_, or the line from which operations start; _objective
points_, or points to which the operations are directed; _line of
operations_, or the line along which an army moves; _key points_, or
points which it is important for the defensive army to secure; _line of
defence,_ or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards:
and in general, _strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions,
&c._ As these terms are very generally used in military books, it may be
well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. After
defining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it is
deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and
striking historical examples.
_The theatre of a war_ embraces not only the territory of the two
belligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary
powers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. With
maritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to
another continent. Some of the wars between France and England embraced
the two hemispheres.
_The theatre of operations_, however, is of a more limited character,
and should not be confounded with the theatre of war. In general, it
includes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to
defend, and on the other, to invade. If two or more armies be directed
towards the same object, though by different lines, their combined
operations are included in the same theatre but if each acts
independently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects,
each must have its own independent theatre of operations.
A war between France and Austria may embrace all Italy and Germany, but
the theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these
countries. Should the Oregon question lead to hostilities between the
United States and England, the theatre of war would embrace the greater
part of North America and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations
would probably be limited to Canada and our northern frontier, with
naval descents upon our maritime cities.
The first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to
select a good _base_. Many circumstances influence this selection, such
as mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military
dépôts, means of subsistence, &c. If the frontier of a state contain
strong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a good
base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defence
against invasion. A single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by
the enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the
interior becomes indispensable for a good defence.
A French army carrying on military operations against Germany would make
the Rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second
base on the Meuse or Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the
Loire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take others
perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on Béfort
and Besançon, or to the left, on Mézières and Sedan. If acting
offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would
form the first base the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the
third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth.
A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its
first base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the
gulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance
its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the
Sierra d'Estellas becomes its third base of operations against the
centre of Spain.
A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of
operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and
some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or
perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often
at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually
determine the selection.
In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base on
the Main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line
oblique or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan
of operations in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based
perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank
march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly
on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's army on the Elbe.
An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular
on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving
from the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of
operations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel
both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation, under
the circumstances, exceedingly objectionable.
Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an
advantage over his opponent, is regarded as _strategic_. Their
geographical position and political and military character, give them a
greater or less influence in directing the campaign. These points are
occupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on or
near the base, they become the _key_ points for the former, and the
_objective_ points for the latter.[3] There are also between these two a
greater or less number of strategic points, which have an important
though inferior influence upon the result of the war.
[Footnote 3: It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not
necessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerable
portion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes
denominated a _point_. In the same way, strategic lines, instead of
being mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.]
The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is to gain
possession of the Meuse, as this position would give them a decided
advantage in any ulterior operations. In attacking southern Germany, the
course of the Danube offers a series of points which exercise an
important influence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and the
country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercely
contested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war between
this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence
between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest
importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of
the war.
The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its
military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its
capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The
possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from
their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon
the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice,
Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809,
Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If
Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of
Cannae;, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of
Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the
place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal
capital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and
required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national
escutcheon.
_Lines of defence_ in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The
great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by
natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers,
lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence.
The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes;
the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places;
the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other;
the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier--are all
permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line
of defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St.
Lawrence, and the lakes, for the United States.
Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the
campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies
in Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of
temporary lines of defence.
It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not
necessarily bases of operation.
_Strategic positions_ are such as are taken up during the operations of
a war, either by a _corps d'armée_ or grand detachment, for the purpose
of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to
distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The
positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797,
to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in
Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and
Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799,
are examples under this head.
Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic
relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams.
(Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the
line DC perpendicular to the line AB, the position of the enemy being at
B.
(Fig. 2.) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover every thing in rear
of DC.
(Fig. 3.) If the army A is obliged to cover the point _a_, the army B
will cover all the space without the circle whose radius is _a_ B; and of
course A continues to cover the point _a_ so long as it remains within
this circle _a_ B.
_A line of operations_ embraces that portion of the theatre of war which
an army or _corps d'armée_ passes over in attaining its object; _the
front of operations_ is the front formed by the army as it advances on
this line.
When an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps,
the line it follows is denominated a _simple line of operations_.
If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same
opposing force, they are said to follow _double_ or _multiple lines_.
The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were
double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806,
although moving in seven distinct _corps d'armée,_ formed but a single
line of operations.
_Interior lines of operations_ are those followed by an army which
operates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to
concentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be
brought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations
in 1814, between the Marne and the Seine, where he manoeuvred with so
much skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the
allies.
_Exterior lines_ present the opposite results; they are those which an
army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. For
example, the lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of
Silesia and the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814.
Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and exterior.
_Concentric lines_ are such as start from distant points, and are
directed towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance of
their base.
If a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct
corps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue _eccentric
lines_.
Lines are said to be _deep_, when the end to be attained is very distant
from the base.
The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated
_secondary lines_.
The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and by
Bagration in 1812, were _secondary lines_, as the former were merely
secondary to the army of the Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay.
_Accidental lines_ are those which result from a change in the primitive
plan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. These
are of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results.
The direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the
geographical situation of the country, but also on the positions
occupied by the enemy. The general plan of campaign is frequently
determined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of lines
and positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the
war, and be made by the general as these events occur.
As a general rule, _a line of operations should be directed upon the
centre_, or _one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence_;
unless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurd
to act against the front and extremities at the same time.
If the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a
movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this
direction maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.)
In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of
the line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the
St. Bernard and Milan on the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of
defence: both operations were most eminently successful. (Fig. 5.)
It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the
extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for
him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very
dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this danger it is
necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our
army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base.
Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by
Turin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first
secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would
have been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which
he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every
means for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in
1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have
been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera
towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but at
the same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and
Hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear.
(Fig. 7.)
We have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of
the hostile forces may _sometimes_ render it advisable to direct our
line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence;
but, _as a general rule_ a central direction will lead to more important
results. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables the
assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered and
partially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (Fig. 8.)
Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of
1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and
successive armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations
were both interior and central: in 1808 they were most eminently
central: in 1809, by the central operations in the vicinity of
Ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the
Archduke Charles: in 1814, from his central position between the Marne
and Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than
two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of
complete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred and
twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty
thousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a
most decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by the
eccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at
Dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the
faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulm
and the Katzbach.
For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army;
grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with
advantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less
favorable than one simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the
position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation
the preferable one. In that case, interior lines should always be
adopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. Double exterior
lines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the
enemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage
of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our
isolated forces. The Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius and
Servilius opposed Hannibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and
Arrezzio, and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned the
position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies separately, gaining
a complete and decisive victory. Such also was the character of the
operations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met
with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies
under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles,
from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing
generals, and forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united had
pursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph
to Vienna.
_Converging_ lines of operation are preferable, under most
circumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be taken, however, that
the point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic
position by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before
they can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the Austrians,
under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on three separate lines,
intending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass;
but Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the
enemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way the
Archduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan,
in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single
point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on
the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon
took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and
Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of
Napoleon and Grouchy.
_Diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy
immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by
this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if
occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by
converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in
1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was
the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at
Ratisbon in 1809.
_Interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost
invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be
clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other
extraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases
where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank;
the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other
collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. But as a
general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate
forces, will lead to decisive results.
Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the
Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against
Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in
Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that
of Paris, and his operations previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815,
are all brilliant examples under this head.
To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and
follow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only be
resorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. In
such a case it may be attended with important results. It was one of
Napoleon's maxims, that "a line of operations, when once chosen, should
never be abandoned." This maxim, however, must sometimes be disregarded
by an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entire
destruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always
attended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice of
evils. A regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the
direction of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in
the new theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the result of a
good _coup d'oeil_, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the
operating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will be
left in doubt respecting its weak points. But such is the uncertainty of
this manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unless
actually forced upon them. If the army be of incongruous materials,
generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to
entirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops
for some new plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the
undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the
_accidental line of operations_ in the same manner, and with the same
probability of success, as is done by a regular force.
We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of
Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in
New-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in
military history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of
operations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory
rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an
entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces
under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if
properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced
it one of the most brilliant of his military career.
Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out
the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations.
We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering
upon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the state
determine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of its
enterprises. The chief selects certain points, on or near the borders of
the seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his
_materiel_ collected. These points, together, form his base of
operations. He now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as
the first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations
most advantageous for reaching this objective point. The temporary
positions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line in
his rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the vicinity of his
first object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he must
force this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manoeuvres. For
this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which may
deviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior events of the
campaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines,
his lines of operations. The approach of hostile forces may cause him to
detach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and
pursue double or multiple lines. The primitive object may also be
relinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans of
operations. As he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new
depots and lines of magazines. He may encounter natural and artificial
obstacles. To cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous
operation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing
bridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified place
is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his
march with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this
siege. Thus Napoleon, in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants,
could not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and its
garrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an Austrian force of 40,000
before him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his army enabled him to
detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still
to continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of the
army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel
him to give battle. If he should be victorious, the enemy must be
pursued and harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he must
form the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. If possible,
he must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare to
resume the offensive. Lines of intrenchment and temporary works may
sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when the
unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go
into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign.
Such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must
be evident, even to the most superficial reader.
Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the
strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in
actual combat. Tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's
cannon, is therefore subordinate to the _choice of positions_: if the
field of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the
loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without
reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained,
might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus
demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due
to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war,
than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.)
We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the
Danube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly
through Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, "and by
this movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and
Danube without pulling a trigger."
Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main
body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In
1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of
Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid,
in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the
French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against
vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the
maxim.
Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least
understood, of all the branches of the military art.[4]
[Footnote 4: Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general
military histories. There are very few good elementary works on this
branch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke
Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been
translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of
Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are
exceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de
Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into
English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military
histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard,
Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner,
Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Ségur, Pelet, Koch,
Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier's
History of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of any
value as a _military_ work: it is a most excellent book. Alison's great
History of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author
is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly
every page is filled with the grossest blunders.
We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy,
either directly or in connection with military history.
_Principes de la Stratégie, &c._, par le Prince Charles, traduit de
l'Allemand, 3 vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical
terms, however, are very loosely employed.
_Précis de l'Art de la Guerre_, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on
strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art.
_Grundsätze der Strategic_, Von Wagner.
_Cours Elémentaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Rocquancourt.
This work contains much valuable information connected with the history
of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an
elementary book.
_Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Jacquinot de Presle. This
work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches
of military service are but very briefly discussed.
De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains
much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same
objections as that of Rocquancourt.
_History of the Seven Years' War_, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military
writings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the
history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these
writers are now regarded as erroneous.
_Mémoires de Napoléon_. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself
to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is
hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles
of military art and science. No military man should fail to study them
thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles are
embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the
ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude.
_Essai général de Tactique_, par Guibert. A work very popular in its
day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned.
_Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens_, von Gravert.
Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment.
_Mémoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne_. Souchet.
_Mémoires de Gouvion St. Cyr._
_Statistique de la Guerre_, par Reveroni St. Cyr.
_Première Campagnes de la Revolution_, par Grimoard.
_Victoires et Conquêtes_. Beauvais.
_Campagnes de Suwarrow_. Laverne.
_Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule_. Foy.
_Précis des Evénements Militaires_. Mathieu Dumas.
_Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée en 1812_. Ségur
_Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809_. Pelet.
_La Campagne de 1814_. Koch.
_Vom Kriege--Die Feldzügge, &c._ Clausewitz.
_La Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire._ Thiers.
_Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1812--sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie,
en 1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoire
des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France_. Vaudoncourt.
_Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c._ Carion-Nisas.
_Histoire de l'Expédition en Russie en 1812_. Chambray.
_War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France_. John Jones.
_Peninsular War_. Napier.
_Notices of the War of 1812_. Armstrong
All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the
military man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with
their splendid diagrams and maps.]