CHAPTER I.

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ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE: OR, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN

STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c.

EMBRACING THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, AND

ENGINEERS.

ADAPTED TO THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA.

THIRD EDITION.

WITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE MEXICAN AND CRIMEAN WARS.

BY

H. WAGER HALLECK, A.M., MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.

NEW YORK:

D. APPLETON & COMPANY,

443 & 445 BROADWAY.

LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN

1862.

Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, BY D.

APPLETON & COMPANY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the

United States for the Southern District of New York.

CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 5

I. INTRODUCTION.--Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiableness of War

briefly examined. 7

II. STRATEGY.--General Divisions of the Art.--Rules for planning a

Campaign.--Analysis of the Military Operations of Napoleon. 35

III. FORTIFICATIONS.--Their importance in the Defence of States proved

by numerous Historical Examples. 61

IV. LOGISTICS.--Subsistence.--Forage.--Marches.--Convoys.--

Castrametation. 88

V. TACTICS.--The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples of

each.--Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and

Engineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of bringing Troops into

action. 114

VI. MILITARY POLITY.--The Means of National Defence best suited to the

character and condition of a Country, with a brief Account of those

adopted by the several European Powers. 135

VII. DEFENCE OF OUR SEA-COAST.--Brief Description of our Maritime

Fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have

taken place between Ships and Forts, including the Attack on San Juan

d'Ulloa, and on St. Jean d'Acre. 155

VIII. OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.--Brief Description of the

Fortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our Northern

Campaigns. 210

IX. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Staff and Administrative Corps.--Their History,

Duties, Numbers, and Organization. 235

X. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Infantry and Cavalry.--Their History, Duties,

Numbers, and Organization. 256

XI. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Artillery.--Its History and Organization, with a

Brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of

Projectiles, &c. 275

XII. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Engineers.--Their History, Duties, and

Organization,--with a Brief Discussion, showing their importance as a

part of a modern Army Organization. 300

XIII. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress of

this Art.--Description of the several parts of a Fortress, and the

various Methods of fortifying a Position. 327

XIV. FIELD ENGINEERING.--Field Fortifications.--Military

Communications.--Military Bridges.--Sapping, Mining, and the Attack and

Defence of a Fortified Place. 342

XV. MILITARY EDUCATION.--Military Schools of France, Prussia, Austria,

Russia, England, &c.--Washington's Reasons for establishing the West

Point Academy.--Rules of Appointment and Promotion in Foreign

Services.--Absurdity and Injustice of our own System. 378

EXPLANATION OF PLATES 409

PREFACE

The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of

lectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the Lowell

Institute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intention

of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them

delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their

publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers

now likely to be called into military service. It is with this view

alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is

made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been

to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and

to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the

opinions and practice of the best generals.

Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already

appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York and

Democratic Reviews, and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence,"

published by order of Congress.

H.W.H.

MAY, 1846.

ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in

which we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new

world, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific

policy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the

acknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more than

fifty-eight of general peace; our Indian border wars have been too

limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts

of the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. This

fortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote

commerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the

greatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. Under these

circumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions

essentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not

soon be changed. But in all communities opinions sometimes run into

extremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by the

beneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in

any case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to

engage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even _brutish_.

All modern ethical writers regard _unjust_ war as not only immoral, but

as one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale. Such are all

wars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal

power or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from

mercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous

end of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions,

whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodox

religion," or of "extending the area of freedom." Such wars are held in

just abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believed

to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens.

But in addition to that respectable denomination of Christians who deny

our right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious

enthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have

adopted the same theory, and hold _all_ wars, even those in

self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has been, within the

last few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, and

many able pens have been enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular,

and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, has

adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of

Christian morality.

It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to

make a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its

justifiableness. We know of no better way of doing this than to give on

the one side the objections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral

Philosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical

writers have justified a resort to war. We do not select Dr. Wayland's

work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; but

because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these

views, and because the main arguments against war are here given in

brief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that used

by most of his followers. I shall give his arguments in his own

language.

"I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God."

It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion condemns all wars,

no matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must

expect to find in the Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least

a prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. But the Bible

nowhere prohibits war: in the Old Testament we find war and even

conquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the world

in the time of Christ and his apostles, still they said not a word of

its unlawfulness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the church

amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war

is justly declared, the Christian may engage in it either by stratagem

or open force. If it be of that highly wicked and immoral character

which some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be

condemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal.

But it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or

typically forbidden to the Christian, by such passages as "Thou shalt

not kill," (Deut. v. 17,) "I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but

whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other

also," (Matt. v. 39,) &c. If these passages are to be taken as literal

commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe,

not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the

magistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence of

individual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment of

the guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, we must

infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress strongly

on our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, so

far as possible, we over come evil with good. Can any sober-minded man

suppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of

the wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the

right, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? Shall we

invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by

literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent

and the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles

with him if he bid us to go one?

Again, if the command, "Thou shalt not kill," is to be taken literally,

it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the

taking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it also

forbids, says Dr. Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even

extends to the vegetable kingdom,--for undoubtedly plants have life, and

are liable to violent death--to be _killed_. But Dr. Wayland concedes to

individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to society

the right to punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly means,

thou shalt not unjustly kill,--thou shalt do no murder; and so it is

rendered in our prayer-books. It cannot have reference to war, for on

almost the next page we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and

smite the heathen nations,--to cast them out of the land,--to utterly

destroy them,--to show them no mercy, &c. If these passages of the Bible

are to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so many

contradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of other

passages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing

or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we

should combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil

motives.

II. All wars are unjustifiable, because "God commands us to love every

man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the act

neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate

this command."

It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any

command of God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as

forbidding us to engage in just war? Is it not rather intended to

impress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great

virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy,

but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? If the

meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be

the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil

justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections.

But are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same

degree? Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On the

contrary, Christ himself had his _beloved_ disciple,--one whom he loved

pre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none

the less on that account. We are bound to love our parents, our

brothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we

do not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is not only

permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but

if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound to

protect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary

for the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the

assailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow that

we _hate_ him whom we thus destroy. On the contrary, we may feel

compassion, and even love for him. The magistrate sentences the murderer

to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence

into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner:

nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest

feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life.

So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and my

neighbors do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I do

foreigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of

friendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the

foreigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and the enslaved

African, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their

sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become

oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and

peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God has

formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be

made unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measures

in my power to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument

to desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens in

forcibly resisting his aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by no

feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; I have in my heart no

malice, no spirit of revenge; I have no desire to harm individuals,

except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. But as

instruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do harm. I do

not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight against

him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured

without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I am

prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle,

or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with

kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. All

conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with

disapprobation.

That war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the

contrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the

battle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political

events of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all

history. Soult and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous

battles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he was received by

Wellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks of

respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two

distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly

relations between the two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemed

brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the

northeastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded,

through the intervention of General Scott, between the Governors of

Maine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships

contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with

Great Britain.

III. "It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars

were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned.

Now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has

created man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at an

end; for God never places man under circumstances in which it is either

wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for the

advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or

for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?"

The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely

necessary to point out its logical defects.

My living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing,

and certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security of

my property. My living among murderers would not justify me in

committing murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why I

should not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were

unable to protect them. That other nations carry on unjust wars is no

reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we

should neglect the means of self-defence.

It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in

a world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God has

seen fit to order it otherwise. Our duties and our relations to our

fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as

we would make for ourselves.

We live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our

property--that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick

and high between the robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact laws

for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the

guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the

prevention of other thefts and robberies.

We live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical

protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of

our innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his

death, if need be. Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we

inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life.

These relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all

ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christian

morality. Even Dr. Wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty

of individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact

these laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course of

reasoning to the relations of different societies.

We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding

the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens,

in order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences

and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as

a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors,

and our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless,

unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or

scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national

ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully

armed and equipped.

Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for

the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them

with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the

employment of these means should cost human life. The prevention and

punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good

of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So,

as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to

protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who

seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. National

aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual

crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more

stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater

amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater

_caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument

against the _moral right_ to use them.

IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:

"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its

measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any

thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of

every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the

just the kind, and the merciful."

The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of

individuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so

far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases

to be a virtue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber,

and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? Reason and

experience prove the contrary. Active benevolence and kindness should

always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit

it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as well as love.

"The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury

inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does

not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent

persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall

be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints

may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.

"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the proper

appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force,

but to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set

forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the

consciences of men be aroused to justice."

Argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be

resorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to

deter the wicked, force must be employed. I may reason with the robber

and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my

house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral

appeals, I employ physical force,--I call in the strong arm of the law

to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life

that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.

"If," says Puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his

feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the

highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I

should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in

other words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own

preservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he

may act with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, since he

shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in

a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the

duties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which

menaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to

accuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity." _De

Jure Nat. et Gent_, lib. ii., ch. v., §1. This same course of

reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in

respect to war.

"3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us suffer the evil."

This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be

subversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the

most evil and wicked men in the community. Reason with the nation that

invades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and

should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! Reason with the

murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder our

wives and our children! Reason with the robber and the defaulter, and if

they will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! We cannot

appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they

employ _force_ to _compel_ obedience to their mandates. But Dr. Wayland

considers the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men.

He forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards our

fellow-men of the same _society_, and even allows us to punish the

murderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greater

forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if another

nation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the

thousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or

to punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for

an individual act of the same character. The greater the scale of crime,

then, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent

it!

"4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued

aggression? I answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the

moral principle which God has placed in the bosom of every man. I think

that obedience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is the

surest preventive against the repetition of injury. I answer, secondly,

suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not

prevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of

retaliation prevent it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreign

nation to be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the law of

benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty,

in this respect, to each other. So that aggression seems to me in no

manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call for

special kindness and good-will."

This argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to

individual aggressions. We are bound to regard them as intimations of

our want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the

intimations! Is it true, that in this world the wicked only are

oppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? Even

suppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, deserve God's anger, is

this any reason why I should not resist the assassin, and seek to bring

him to punishment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland applies

with much greater force to municipal courts than to war.

V. "Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of

defence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for

self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the

moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the

consciences of men. * * * * How would such a nation be protected from

external attack, and entire subjugation? I answer, by adopting the law

of benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highest

degree improbable. The causes of national war are, most commonly, the

love of plunder and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, if

ever, sufficient to stimulate men to the _ferocity necessary to war_,

unless when assisted by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our

conduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause

is taken away. There is not a nation in Europe that could be led on to

war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people."

History teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been

attacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or

could not defend themselves. Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his

murderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? Did the

Quakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient New Englanders any

the more because of their non-resisting principles? Have the Jews

escaped persecutions throughout Christendom any the more because of

their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? Poland was

comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great European

powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing

between themselves the Polish territory, and enslaving or driving into

exile the Polish people.

"Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time,

Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!"

We need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled

with them.

Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army

and navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to

our physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed

to the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations

for justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the ability

to defend ourselves against aggression. Think you that the African and

Asiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vessels

trading to China, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" Would

England be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, or

be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from

searching our merchant-ships? Experience shows that an undefended state,

known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, and

history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of

Washington--"IF WE DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE ARE

AT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR."

But let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be known to-morrow

that the people of Boston or New York have adopted the strictly

non-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on the

consciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout the

whole extent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you have

destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police and

executive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be

allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no

longer employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and

the virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solely

for protection to "the law of active benevolence." Think you that the

thieves, and robbers, and murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and

New Orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account,

refrain from molesting the peace of New York and Boston, and that the

wicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely to

turn from the evil of their ways?

Assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence," as Dr. Wayland

denominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from

attacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely to

prevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense is

less active in communities than where the responsibility is individual

and direct.

Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that all wars are wars of

aggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory," or through "hatred" or

"revenge," whereas such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes

speaks of war as being _generally_ of this character; at others he

speaks of it as being _always_ undertaken either from a spirit of

aggression or retaliation. Take either form of his argument, and the

veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz.,

_All_ wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;

Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws;--therefore,

_All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable.

Or,

Wars are _generally_ undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;

Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws--therefore,

_All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable.

VI. "Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and

the awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years

have occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident,

that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed

in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, long

before this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered the

civilized world like the garden of Eden? If this be true, it will follow

that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community,

inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions

of the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct

the evil itself."

Much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the

cultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on

community. And members of the clergy and of the bar have not

unfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least the

common courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military

profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. We are declared not

only parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of God's

laws--men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit of

justice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;"

it is said that "murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited

with the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice."[1] It has never been

the habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other

professions. We prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the

"stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth of-July

addresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn a

tale," we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse.

[Footnote 1: Sumner's Oration.]

Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects

and also in their cause. But just wars and just litigation are not

demoralizing. Suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be

abolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered

to commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would not

immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? Few events

rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much

as a just and patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, and

destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so

often result from a long-protracted peace. Such was the Dutch war of

independence against the Spaniards; such the German war against the

aggressions of Louis XIV., and the French war against the coalition of

1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proof

in our own history. Can it be said that the wars of the American

Revolution and of 1812, were demoralizing in their effects? "Whence do

Americans," says Dr. Lieber, "habitually take their best and purest

examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit,

devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the

daring band of their patriots of the Revolution?"

The principal actors in the military events of the Revolution and of

1812, held, while living, high political offices in the state, and the

moral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the

character stamped on their administration of the government. These men

have passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled by

men who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. To the true

believer in the efficacy of _non-resistance,_ and in the demoralizing

influence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these

different periods in our political history! How infinitely inferior to

the rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of their

infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender their

life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! Let us trace out this

contrast:--

In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose

moral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and

was less pure than at later periods in our history. The object of the

principal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the

opinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is to

sustain their own opinions by argument. Then, each party claimed to

itself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliens

and the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great

forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. Then, men

obtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble

for the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal

political proscription on the other, were regarded as the natural

results of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office has

ceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to be

called from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake.

Then, in electing men to office the most important social and

constitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the

august spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of

strict moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were frequently

filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the _small men_ of community:

now, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as

representatives. Then, the magnates of party were the mere timid,

temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom

of their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking

train of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon the

judgment of the honest and enlightened. Then, the rank and file of party

were mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who

reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, just

as they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed political

patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of

Louis XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole: now, all

political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of

peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the Roman farmer,

take office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the

state can spare their services. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and

gamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted by

men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting

partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no man

clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community

by receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing

public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society.

Such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the

legitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a

long-protracted peace on the other. But there are men of less vivid

imaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal,

who fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see the

reverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of

Washington, Hamilton, and Knox, to show that they were the less virtuous

because they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail

to perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military

spirit on the military students of West Point, whose graduates, they

think, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of

Yale and Cambridge. Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our

army, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes in

civil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots,

thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in

other pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral

character to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare

favorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers, for

example. In justification of these opinions--which may, perhaps, be

deemed singularly erroneous--they say, that in the many millions of

public money expended during the last forty years, by military officers,

for the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, but

a single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even to the

smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the

army brought into court for violating the laws.

But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality

through community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to

the injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend

still more to degrade and demoralize any people?

With regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence,

many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. With

respect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the head

of war department, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase of

Indian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of

rivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for the

preservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in

fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war

department, is put down as "expenses for military defence." Similar

misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example,

the new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fifty

to seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be

required to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost

of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or

twelve hundred millions of francs! The facts are these: the works, when

done, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the pleasure of

examining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer

officers employed on the works. They were then three-fourths done, and

had cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these officers that

the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the

original estimate of twenty-eight millions. Had we time to enter into

details, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be

given.

But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence

have cost vast amounts of money. So also have litigation and the means

deemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. It has

been estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirty

thousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. Allowing each of these

to cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have

the annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars.

Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making

laws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different

courts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks,

witnesses, &c., employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the

personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, the

individual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all these

together, and I doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat

astonish these modern economists. But if all the expenditures of this

nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual

"war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text

might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! But

could any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of

maintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be

abolished?

If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure

justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the

means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures

commensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon

the "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers

of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the

world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its

requisitions?

The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in

the further discussion of this subject.

It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend

with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes.

To this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument

ends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution,

I apply to the court,--that is, to _legal_ force,--to compel him to do

me justice. So nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when all

other means fail to prevent aggression and injury.

But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent

repeated and continued aggression.

So does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less

proper and just on that account.

But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the

guilty triumph.

So it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimes

permits the wicked to triumph for a season.

But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war

is unjust on both sides.

So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both

resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends.

But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle

their differences.

For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a

congress of nations, as it has been called,--would be more productive

of evil than of good. By such an arrangement the old and powerful

European monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the

domestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the effects of

establishing such a tribunal in the so-called Holy Alliance, whose

influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous

than the Holy Inquisition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent

war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its

decisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to

rely on the present system of International Law. Under this system, and

in this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of

impulse and passion,--a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" of

our nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative

power,--of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the

high council of the people. It is this power which must determine when

all just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national

justice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. If

this decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also,

should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same

body, and under the same circumstances. A declaration of war, in this

country, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under the

high sanction of the constitution. It is true that such a law may be

unjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be

so. The distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and

"international Lynch-law" is too evident to need comment.

But it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by

the evils it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by which

we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military

despotism at home."

Much has been said and written about _military_ despotism; but we think

he who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military

despotism to a despotism of mere politicians. The governments of

Alexander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the

petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no one

so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no

better than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other "lawyers" who

preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned.

"Cæsar," says a distinguished senator of our own country, "was

rightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he

that destroyed the liberties of Rome. That work was done by the

profligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his death

did not restore the republic. There were no more elections: rotten

politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Cæsar, as heir to his

uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary

succession."

"And here History appears in her grand and instructive character, as

Philosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her

warning voice. Superficial readers believe it was the military men who

destroyed the Roman republic! No such thing! It was the politicians who

did it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians--destroying public

virtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals by

crime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringing

elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were

conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no elections that

could bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold

the consulship. Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud,

violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury

commanded votes. The people had no choice; and long before the time of

Cæsar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and the

abuse. Read Plutarch. In the 'Life of Cæsar,' and not three pages before

the crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined state of the

elections,--shows that all elective government was gone,--that the

hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the

corrupt,--and that in choosing between Pompey and Cæsar, many preferred

Pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they

thought he would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small part

of Cæsar's reliance, when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than

the sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated

treasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten

politicians. There was no longer a popular government; and in taking all

power himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which

profligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and paid

the forfeit with his life. But in contemplating his fate, let us never

forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic,

before he came to seize and to master it."

We could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have

more than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only

to the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for

long ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibal

was at her gates, we should now be in the night of African ignorance and

barbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman

civilization. Had France adopted this principle when the allied armies

invaded her territories in 1792, her fate had followed that of Poland.

Had our ancestors adopted this principle in 1776, what now had been,

think you, the character and condition of our country?

Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite.

"The continued efforts," says he, "requisite for a nation to protect

themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be

infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic

war, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied,

I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage to

Rome of having conquered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, was

undeniable. But even if it were not so, are there no other advantages to

be secured? No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance,

nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the

immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to

mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over the

rolling masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe

like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all

the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is

good and noble. Think what we should have been had Europe become an

Asiatic province, and the Eastern principles of power and stagnation

should have become deeply infused into her population, so that no

process ever after could have thrown it out again! Has no advantage

resulted from the Hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust,

and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude,

and the wars which followed their resolution? The Netherlands war of

independence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern

history, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and

elementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one,

both directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently been, in

the hands of Providence, the means of disseminating civilization, if

carried on by a civilized people--as in the case of Alexander, whose

wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension

of civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into

lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently

we find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to

recover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refined

nation. Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless,

amply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent

exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, between

two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. War is a

struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that

struggling process without which--in proportion to the good to be

obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the

good that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to the

share of man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Our

religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal

rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor."

One word more, and we must leave this subject. It has been said by some

that the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our

ancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that are

past the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their

country's cause, such a course being not only _dishonorable_, but in the

eye of the Christian, _wicked_, and even _infamous_! It is believed,

however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the

religious people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires of

Religion and Patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their

descendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that both

still burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame.

Our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their God,

because they also faithfully served their country. If we are called upon

to excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of Christian

virtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of

patriotism.[2]

[Footnote 2: For further discussion of this subject the reader is

referred to Lieber's Political Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3;

Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy; Legare's Report of June 13,

1838, in the House of Representatives; Mackintosh's History of the

Revolution of 1688, chap. x.; Bynkershock; Vatel; Puffendorf;

Clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of

war.

Dr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by Dymond

in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of

Christianity; Jay's Peace and War; Judd's Sermon on Peace and War;

Peabody's Address, &c.; Coue's Tract on What is the Use of the Navy?

Sumner's True Grandeur of Nations.]