Masséna’s invasion of Portugal—Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida—Craufurd’s fight on the Coa—Anecdote of Colonel Charles
Napier—The British retire to the position of Busaco.
In the month of January, 1810, Lord Wellington established his
headquarters at Viseu, in Upper Beira, and the different brigades of
cavalry and infantry were quartered in the neighbouring villages.
General Hill was left with five thousand British, and about as many
Portuguese, at Abrantes; and with his army posted as has been described,
the British General awaited the development of Masséna’s plan of
invasion. The amount of the French force at this period in the Peninsula
counted over three hundred and sixty thousand troops of all arms; but
the army commanded by Masséna, and called “the army of Portugal,” did
not amount to ninety thousand. The amount of the British and Portuguese
forces has been already stated to be about fifty-five thousand men; and
it will be recollected that of the Portuguese army scarcely one man in
one hundred had ever discharged a musket against an enemy. As to the
British, when Lord Wellington moved his army from the Guadiana its
numbers counted about thirty thousand, but those under arms scarcely
reckoned twenty thousand; the remainder were in hospital, and many of
those in the ranks were but ill able to carry their knapsacks and
firelocks, having not yet recovered from the effects of past illness.
The French preparations were so formidable, our own force so small, that
in the British ranks it was generally believed that the entire army
would retreat on Lisbon when the French advanced, and embark there. The
same was asserted in England; the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army
universally believed it, and the British ministers seem to have
entertained the same opinion; for at this time an officer of engineers
arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from Lord
Liverpool, though unknown to Lord Wellington, commenced thus: “_As it is
probable that the army will embark in September._”
Fortunately for us, the French lingered long ere they began their
invasion. It was not till June 1810 that Ney began the siege of Ciudad
Rodrigo, while Masséna still remained at Madrid. The garrison of the
fortress amounted to about six thousand men, and was commanded by the
Spanish general, Herrasti, an old and gallant man who had served his
country with honour for more than half a century. The town was amply
supplied with artillery, provisions, and stores of all kinds; and the
vigorous resistance which was expected was made by Herrasti and his
brave garrison.
General Robert Craufurd, with his superb division, occupied the line of
the Coa, while General Cole, with the 4th Division, and Picton with the
3rd, were posted at Guarda and Pinhel; and these troops were directed to
be in readiness to render any support that could with safety be given to
the Spanish governor. That assistance could never be given, and Ciudad
Rodrigo fell, after sustaining a siege of upwards of a month. Its
gallant defence reflected great credit on both the governor and
garrison, and the delay it caused the French army was of the greatest
importance to Lord Wellington’s plan of resistance, because the heavy
rains which were almost sure to fall in the autumn would greatly aid in
the defence of the country.
After his capture of Rodrigo, Masséna lost no time in laying siege to
Almeida, and it was hoped that this town, which was, though by no means
a model of perfection, a more regularly constructed fortress than Ciudad
Rodrigo, would hold out for at least as long. But here we were to be
bitterly disappointed. On August 26, 1810, the bombardment began: in a
short time a great portion of the town was in flames, and it was found
impossible in the confusion that prevailed to put a stop to the
calamity. But this mattered little; no great damage had been done to the
walls, and the guns of the garrison replied with vigour. But at midnight
a terrible explosion was heard, the castle was rent into a thousand
pieces, and the entire town disappeared, as if swallowed by an
earthquake. This tremendous crash was heard for a distance of many
leagues. The main magazine had been blown up by a French shell, and the
Governor, Colonel Cox, was obliged to surrender next day.
While these events were taking place, a variety of movements between our
advance and that of the enemy occurred. Upon one occasion a portion of
the 14th Dragoons came in contact with a body of the enemy’s infantry,
and their commanding officer, Colonel Talbot, fell in the midst of a
square against which he made a gallant, but fruitless charge. But this
was of little import in comparison with what took place with the Light
Division, under Craufurd, on the banks of the Coa. His force consisted
of four thousand infantry, a thousand cavalry, and a brigade of guns.
The force opposed to him was about six times his own number, but yet he,
with a hardihood bordering on rashness, held his post, and fought a very
dangerous battle—contrary to orders, I believe—and lost upwards of three
hundred men, with nearly thirty officers, and had it not been for the
superior description of the troops he commanded, the division would have
been destroyed to a man. The French, it is true lost three times the
number Craufurd did; but what of that? Masséna could have better spared
one thousand men than Wellington one hundred!
It has been said that Craufurd fully expected Picton would have joined
him with the 3rd Division, stationed at Pinhel. The division of Picton
were within hearing of the fire, but not a man was ordered to move to
the support of Craufurd. The wounded men and officers of the Light
Division came into Pinhel in the best manner they could, some on foot,
others on cars, and the 3rd Division were much excited at not being
allowed to join their old companions.
Colonel Wallace held the 88th in readiness, as I believe did every other
officer commanding a battalion, and the division could have assembled
and marched in ten minutes had any order been given to that effect.
However, the Light Division, after performing more than could have been
expected, even from it, and doing so alone, without the aid which it
looked for, and which might have been afforded it, held their ground,
and sustained no disaster, but on the contrary inflicted a severe loss
on the enemy, and covered itself with glory.
Craufurd, after his gallant fight, lay, with his division, in the
different villages in our front, and a quiet calm succeeded the first
outburst. There was an inactivity in the movements of the enemy,
notwithstanding that the soldiers had been supplied with bread for many
days; and a curious incident took place at the time that is worthy of
mention. It shows the good terms upon which the British and French
officers stood in regard to each other.
Colonel Napier of the 50th Regiment, who had been badly wounded at
Corunna, and who had been treated with much attention by Soult and Ney
after he was made prisoner at that battle, stopped at Pinhel. He was on
his _parole_, and when asked by some of our officers, whom he knew,
“where he was going?” replied, “I am going to pass some time with my
friend Marshal Ney!” He did pass some time with him, and was an
eye-witness to all that went on in his camp; but where such confidence
was shown to any British officer, much less one of such high character
and honour as Colonel Napier, it is needless to say that it was not
forfeited.
Napier, after having stayed with his friend Ney for some weeks,[4]
returned on his way to England, when _en passant_ he found the ridge of
Busaco was about to be contested, and the gallant Colonel, although not
on duty, or in any way connected with the army, being in fact on his
_parole_, wished to be a looker-on. It so happened that he was wounded,
while standing near Lord Wellington. His name was returned, and the
French official paper, the _Moniteur_, made some remarks upon the
Colonel breaking his _parole_. It was, however, soon explained by the
gallant officer, and, in return, the Paris papers did not let pass an
occasion which afforded them amusement, and they quaintly remarked “that
a man who was so fond of French fire, after what he had got of it
before, ought to live in France!”
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Footnote 4:
This story is true; but the visit was only for one day (see _Charles
Napier’s Life_, i. 133).
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After a good deal of delay and vacillation, it appeared that Masséna had
at last seriously resolved on his enterprise. He had, under his
immediate command, nearly one hundred and twenty thousand bayonets and
sabres, but from this force some deductions must be made, by which it
would appear that at the utmost he did not bring more than sixty
thousand fighting men across the Coa. Finally he passed that river, and
our army retired towards the banks of the Mondego, and Lord Wellington
was obliged to give battle. But this obligation did not emanate from
him—quite the contrary.
It was necessary that he should do something, and the thing was forced
upon him by the refractory spirit of the Portuguese councils. If then he
was to fight, for the first time, with an army of Portuguese to back
him, he judged that the ridge of Busaco was a good spot to try them, and
he accordingly resolved to take his stand there. This ridge of mountain
extends for about eight miles, and near its termination, and on a high
point, stands a convent, inhabited by monks and friars. The face of the
mountain is rugged, filled with dells and dykes, and the intervening
space between its base and the top is one mass of rock and heath.
On the 26th of September, all the different corps were placed in the
stations they should occupy, and the entire ridge of Busaco was fully
manned; during the evening we could perceive the enemy occupying their
different stations in our front, and the light troops of both armies
were warmly engaged along the entire of the line.
At night we lay down to rest; each man, with his firelock in his grasp,
remained at his post, anxiously waiting the arrival of the morrow, which
was destined to be the last that many amongst us were to behold. We had
no fires, and the death-like stillness that reigned throughout our army
was only interrupted by the occasional challenge of an advanced sentry,
or a random shot fired at some imaginary foe.
The night at length passed over, but long before the dawn of day the
warlike preparations of the enemy were to be heard. The trumpets sounded
for the horsemen to prepare for the fight, and the roll of the drums and
shrill notes of the fife gave notice to the French infantry that the
hour had arrived when its claim to be the best in Europe was to be
disputed.
On our side all was still as the grave. Lord Wellington lay amongst his
soldiers, under no other covering than his cloak, and as he passed
through the ranks of the different battalions already formed, his
presence and manner gave that confidence to his companions which had a
magical effect. All was now ready on our part; the men stood to their
arms; and as each soldier took his place in the line, his quiet
demeanour, and orderly, but determined appearance, was a strong contrast
to the bustle and noise which prevailed amongst our opposite neighbours;
but those preparations were of short continuance, and some straggling
shots along the brow of the mountain gave warning that we were about to
commence the battle of Busaco.[5]
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Footnote 5:
For the better comprehension of the ensuing narrative of the doings of
the 3rd Division at Busaco, it will be well to give its strength and
organisation on that day. They were as follows:—
1st Brigade, General Mackinnon.
1st Battalion 45th Foot: 74th Foot: 1st Battalion 88th Foot
(Connaught Rangers).
2nd Brigade, General Lightburne.
2nd Battalion 5th Foot: 2nd Battalion 83rd Foot: 3 companies of
5th Battalion 60th Foot.
Portuguese Brigade, Colonel Champlemond.
9th and 21st Regiments of the Line (each two Battalions).
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