CHAPTER XXII

1848 IN EUROPE--CRIMEAN WAR.

The Revolution of 1831 was only the mild precursor of the one which shook

Europe to its foundations in 1848. It had centers wherever there were

patriots and aching hearts. In Paris, Louis Philippe had fled at the

sound of the word Republic, and when in Paris workmen were waving the

national banner of Poland, with awakened hope, even that land was

quivering with excitement. In Vienna the Emperor Ferdinand, unable to

meet the storm, abdicated in favor of his young nephew, Francis Joseph.

Hungary, obedient to the voice of her great patriot, Louis Kossuth, in

April, 1849, declared itself free and independent. It was the Hungarians

who had offered the most encouragement and sympathy to the Poles in 1831;

so Nicholas determined to make them feel the weight of his hand. Upon

the pretext that thousands of Polish exiles--his subjects--were in the

ranks of the insurgents, a Russian army marched into Hungary. By the

following August the revolution was over--thousands of Hungarian patriots

had died for naught, thousands more had fled to Turkey, and still other

thousands were suffering from Austrian vengeance administered by the

terrible General Haynau. Francis Joseph, that gentle and benign

sovereign, who sits today upon the throne at Vienna, subjected Hungary to

more cruelties than had been inflicted by Nicholas in Poland. Not only

were the germs of nationality destroyed--the Constitution and the Diet

abolished, the national language, church, and institutions effaced; but

revolting cruelties and executions continued for years. Kossuth, who

with a few other leaders, was an exile and a prisoner in Asia Minor, was

freed by the intervention of European sentiment in 1851. The United

States government then sent a frigate and conveyed him and his friends to

America, where the great Hungarian thrilled the people by the magic of

his eloquence in their own language, which he had mastered during his

imprisonment by means of a Bible and a dictionary.

It was to Russia that Austria was indebted for a result so satisfactory.

The Emperor Nicholas returned to St. Petersburg, feeling that he had

earned the everlasting gratitude of the young ruler Francis Joseph,

little suspecting that he was before long to say of him that "his

ingratitude astonished Europe."

There can be no doubt that the Emperor Nicholas, while he was, in common

with the other powers, professing to desire the preservation of Ottoman

integrity, had secretly resolved not to leave the Eastern Question to

posterity, but to crown his own reign by its solution in a way favorable

to Russia. His position was a very strong one. By the Treaty of 1841

his headship as protector of Eastern Christendom had been acknowledged.

Austria was now bound to him irrevocably by the tie of gratitude, and

Prussia by close family ties and by sympathy. It was only necessary to

win over England. In 1853, in a series of private, informal interviews

with the English ambassador, he disclosed his plan that there should be a

confidential understanding between him and Her Majesty's government. He

said in substance: "England and Russia must be friends. Never was the

necessity greater. If we agree, I have no solicitude about Europe. What

others think is really of small consequence. I am as desirous as you for

the continued existence of the Turkish Empire. But we have on our hands

a sick man--a very sick man: he may suddenly die. Is it not the part of

prudence for us to come to an understanding regarding what should be done

in case of such a catastrophe? It may as well be understood at once that

I should never permit an attempt to reconstruct a Byzantine Empire, and

still less should I allow the partition of Turkey into small

republics--ready-made asylums for Kossuths and Mazzinis and European

revolutionists; and I also tell you very frankly that I should never

permit England or any of the Powers to have a foothold in Constantinople.

I am willing to bind myself also not to occupy it--except, perhaps, as a

guardian. But I should have no objection to your occupying Egypt. I

quite understand its importance to your government--and perhaps the

island of Candia might suit you. I see no objection to that island

becoming also an English possession. I do not ask for a treaty--only an

understanding; between gentlemen that is sufficient. I have no desire to

increase my empire. It is large enough; but I repeat--the sick man is

dying; and if we are taken by surprise, if proper precautions are not

taken in advance, circumstances may arise which will make it necessary

for me to occupy Constantinople."

It was a bribe, followed by a threat. England coldly declined entering

into any stipulations without the concurrence of the other Powers. Her

Majesty's government could not be a party to a confidential arrangement

from which it was to derive a benefit. The negotiations had failed.

Nicholas was deeply incensed and disappointed. He could rely, however,

upon Austria and Prussia. He now thought of Louis Napoleon, the new

French Emperor, who was looking for recognition in Europe. The English

ambassador was coldly received, and for the first time since the

abdication of Charles X., the representative of France received a cordial

greeting, and was intrusted with a flattering message to the Emperor.

But France had not forgotten the retreat from Moscow, nor the presence of

Alexander in Paris, nor her attempted ostracism in Europe by Nicholas

himself; and, further, although Louis Napoleon was pleased with the

overtures made to win his friendship, he was not yet quite sure which

cause would best promote his own ends.

Fortunately Russia had a grievance against Turkey. It was a very small

one, but it was useful, and led to one of the most exciting crises in the

history of Europe. It was a question of the possession of the Holy

Shrines at Bethlehem and other places which tradition associates with the

birth and death of Jesus Christ; and whether the Latin or the Greek monks

had the right to the key of the great door of the Church at Bethlehem,

and the right to place a silver star over the grotto where our Saviour

was born. The Sultan had failed to carry out his promises in adjusting

these disputed points. And all Europe trembled when the great Prince

Menschikof, with imposing suite and threatening aspect, appeared at

Constantinople, demanding immediate settlement of the dispute. Turkey

was paralyzed with fright, until England sent her great diplomatist Lord

Stratford de Redcliffe--and France hers, M. de Lacour. No simpler

question was ever submitted to more distinguished consideration or was

watched with more breathless interest by five sovereigns and their

cabinets. In a few days all was settled--the questions of the shrines

and of the possession of the key of the great door of the church at

Bethlehem were happily adjusted. There were only a few "business

details" to arrange, and the episode would be closed. But the trouble

was not over. Hidden away among the "business details" was the germ of a

great war. The Emperor of Russia "felt obliged to demand guarantees,

formal and positive," assuring the security of the Greek Christians in

the Sultan's dominions. He had been constituted the Protector of

Christianity in the Turkish Empire, and demanded this by virtue of that

authority. The Sultan, strengthened now by the presence of the English

and French ambassadors, absolutely refused to give such guarantee,

appealing to the opinion of the world to sustain him in resisting such a

violation of his independence and of his rights. In vain did Lord

Stratford exchange notes and conferences with Count Nesselrode and Prince

Menschikof and the Grand Vizier and exhaust all the arts and powers of

the most skilled diplomacy. In July, 1853, the Russian troops had

invaded Turkish territory, and a French and English fleet soon after had

crossed the Dardanelles,--no longer closed to the enemies of Russia,--had

steamed by Constantinople, and was in the Bosphorus.

Austria joined England and France in a defensive though not an offensive

alliance, and Prussia held entirely aloof from the conflict.

Nicholas had failed in all his calculations. In vain had he tried to

lure England into a secret compact by the offer of Egypt--in vain had he

preserved Hungary to Austria--in vain sought to attach Prussia to himself

by acts of friendship; and his Nemesis was pursuing him, avenging a long

series of affronts to France. Unsupported by a single nation, he was at

war with three; and after a brilliant reign of twenty-eight years

unchecked by a single misfortune, he was about to die, leaving to his

empire the legacy of a disastrous war, which was to end in defeat and

humiliation.

But a strange thing had happened. For a thousand years Europe had been

trying to drive Mohammedanism out of the continent. No sacrifice had

been considered too great if it would help to rid Christendom of that

great iniquity. Now the Turkish Empire,--the spiritual heir and center

of this old enemy,--no less vicious--no less an offense to the instincts

of Christendom than before, was on the brink of extermination. It would

have been a surprise to Richard the lion-hearted, and to Louis IX. the

saint, if they could have foreseen what England and France would do eight

hundred years later when such a crisis arrived! While the Sultan in the

name of the Prophet was appealing to all the passions of a mad fanaticism

to arise and "drive out the foreign infidels who were assailing their

holy faith"--there was in England an enthusiasm for his defense as

splendid as if the cause were a righteous one.

It is not a simple thing to carry a bark deeply loaded with treasure

safely through swift and tortuous currents. England was loaded to the

water's edge with treasure. Her hope was in that sunken wreck of an

empire which fate had moored at the gateway leading to her Eastern

dominions, and what she most feared in this world was its removal. As a

matter of state policy, she may have followed the only course which was

open to her; but viewed from a loftier standpoint, it was a compromise

with unrighteousness when she joined Hands with the "Great Assassin" and

poured out the blood of her sons to keep him unharmed. For fifty years

that compromise has embarrassed her policy, and still continues to soil

her fair name. In the War of the Crimea, England, no less than Russia,

was fighting, not for the avowed, but unavowed object. But frankness is

not one of the virtues required by diplomacy, so perhaps of that we have

no right to complain.

On the 4th of January, 1854, the allied fleets entered the Black Sea.

The Emperor Nicholas, from his palace in St. Petersburg, watched the

progress of events. He saw Menschikof vainly measuring swords with Lord

Raglan at Odessa (April 22); then the overwhelming defeat at the Alma

(September 20); then the sinking of the Russian fleet to protect

Sebastopol, about which the battle was to rage until the end of the war.

He saw the invincible courage of his foe in that immortal act of valor,

the cavalry charge at Balaklava (November 5), in obedience to an order

wise when it was given, but useless and fatal when it was received--of

which someone made the oft-repeated criticism--"_C'est magnifique--mais

ce n'est pas la guerre_." And then he saw the power to endure during

that awful winter, when the elements and official mismanagement were

fighting for him, and when more English troops were perishing from cold

and neglect than had been killed by Russian shot and shell.

But the immense superiority of the armies of the allies could not be

doubted. His troops, vanquished at every point, were hopelessly

beleagured in Sebastopol. The majesty of his empire was on every side

insulted, his ports in every sea blockaded. Never before had he tasted

the bitterness of defeat and humiliation. Europe had bowed down before

him as the Agamemnon among Kings. He had saved Austria; had protected

Prussia; he had made France feel the weight of his august displeasure.

Wherever autocracy had been insulted, there he had been its champion and

striven to be its restorer. But ever since 1848 there had been something

in the air unsuited to his methods. He was the incarnation of an old

principle in a new world. It was time for him to depart. His day had

been a long and splendid one, but it was passing amid clouds and darkness.

A successful autocrat is quite a different person from an unsuccessful

one. Nicholas had been seen in the shining light of invincibility. But

a sudden and terrible awakening had come. The nation, stung by repeated

defeats, was angry. A flood of anonymous literature was scattered

broadcast, arraigning the Emperor--the administration--the ministers--the

diplomats--the generals. "Slaves, arise!" said one, "and stand erect

before the despot. We have been kept long enough in serfage to the

successors of Tatar Khans."

The Tsar grew gloomy and silent. "My successor," he said, "may do what

he likes. I cannot change." When he saw Austria at last actually in

alliance with his enemies he was sorely shaken. But it was the voice of

bitter reproach and hatred from his hitherto silent people which shook

his iron will and broke his heart. He no longer desired to live. While

suffering from an influenza he insisted upon going out in the intense

cold without his greatcoat and reviewing his guards. Five days later he

dictated the dispatch which was sent to every city in Russia: "The

Emperor is dying."

A Short History of Russia · 第 22 / 26 章