CONFLICT THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY
The concept of social conflict has already been introduced to the
reader. In the chapter on Individualistic Social Thought the prolonged
struggle between individual rights and genuine social control was
analyzed. Malthus described the conflict between population and the
means of subsistence. Comte insisted that man is not naturally a social
being. Hence this unsocial nature of mankind is a fruitful source of
human conflict. Marx pictured the class struggle; and Darwin elaborated
the doctrine of the survival of the fittest.
The slightest grasp of social thought reveals the fact that human
association is characterized at times by deep-seated and subtle
conflicts; and at other times by a fundamental co-operative spirit.
Some sociological writers have seen only or chiefly the conflicts
of life; others have sought out the co-operative activities; still
others have tried to discover the relationships between conflict and
co-operation in societal development. This chapter will deal with the
concept of social conflict, while the next chapter will be centered on
the ideal of social co-operation and upon the relationship of conflict
to co-operation in group processes.
One of the outstanding believers in the theory that conflict dominates
societal life was Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1910). His system of thought
begins with the assertion that primitive hordes were the original
units of society. Gumplowicz dissented from Herbert Spencer’s belief
in the individual as the original societary unit, although he accepted
the determinism that is inherent in Spencer’s theory of evolution.
Gumplowicz also repudiated Comte’s belief in social amelioration
through prevision, but subscribed to Comte’s positivism.
According to Gumplowicz, society began with a large number of primitive
groups, which were self-sustaining and self-conscious units. Each one
of these hordes was a warring group, possessing an instinctive hatred
of all other hordes.[XX-1] As these hordes increased in size, the
general food supply failed to meet the needs. Consequently, inter-group
struggle resulted and the members of the weaker hordes were either
destroyed or enslaved. The existence of slaves led to situations of
intra-group inequality, which in turn created problems involving
justice and injustice.
As a result of continual conflicts between groups, there are
frequent changes taking place in their personnel. The vanquished are
continually being absorbed by victorious groups. In a given successful
group two classes are at once established, namely, the victors and
the vanquished. Classes are thus continually arising out of new
juxtapositions of heterogeneous racial elements.[XX-2]
It was in an intense form of group self-interest that Gumplowicz
found the mainspring of social progress. This self-interest leads to
an exaggerated group appraisement, a strong degree of group unity, a
state of warfare between groups--and perhaps progress. Basic to this
group self-interest, there are the material needs of the members of the
group; the economic desires and the occupational interests; and the
moral and spiritual tendencies. The group is bound together by various
factors, such as a common social life, a common language, religion, and
culture.
Gumplowicz advocated a theory of potential race equality. He argued
against innate racial superiority and racial inferiority. He doubted
the existence of any pure races. Each race is a compound of other
races, and hence races are potentially similar in fundamental respects.
National progress, therefore, holds no connection with race purity.
Gumplowicz minimized the importance of the individual. Society rules.
Centuries of traditions dominate. The thoughts of the individual are
almost, if not entirely, a mere reflection of the social environment.
The group develops group pride or group disloyalty in the minds of its
members. The distinguished leader is largely the man who expresses the
will of the group during the group crisis. Gumplowicz makes only a
brief reference to the process of interaction between the individual
and the group.[XX-3] An underlying theory of natural determinism
vitiates much of Gumplowicz’s ideas concerning the individual.
Inasmuch as society, like individuals, passes through a cycle of growth
and decay, subject to unchangeable natural and societary laws, there
is no justification for individual interference with social processes.
In fact, this theory led Gumplowicz into pessimistic conclusions
concerning life. He failed to see that societal life is not necessarily
a series of hopeless cyclical conflicts, and that social processes are
becoming increasingly subject to human control--for good or ill. He did
not appreciate the fact that groups are not subject to laws of cyclical
growth and decay after the manner of individuals. Hence, his conflict
theory of societal life ended in confusion and pessimism.
A reference was made in Chapter XI to the theories of Friedrich
Nietzsche (1844–1900). This German philosopher developed the idea of
social conflict, basing it on the concept of the “will to power.”
Leaders desire power. They enjoy to exercise power and they thrive
under that exercise. Jealousy of the leaders arises. The weaker members
of society join together against the possessors of power. They develop
a will to power, but of a weaker type than that of the leaders.
Conflicts ensue between the will to power of the superior and the will
to power of the inferior.
The superior and the inferior types each possess a distinctive code
of morality.[XX-4] The supermen develop a harsh and rigorous attitude
toward themselves and others. They gird and prepare themselves for
the crises of life. They strive to augment their power. They become
self-contained. They take pride in crushing weakness and in deifying
strength. Their morality stresses those factors in life which create
power. They feel a condescending pity for the weak. They experience no
sense of responsibility for the inferior classes. Since supermen are
the supreme goal of nature, supermen feel that all persons and things
should contribute to increasing the power of supermen.[XX-5] It is a
waste of energy for supermen to give their lives in behalf of inferior
persons. They are interested only in the welfare of other supermen.
The morality of the inferior is of a type which furthers weakness. It
accents sympathy. It emphasizes gregariousness. The inferior create a
slavish, cringing, meek morality. They sacrifice themselves readily and
humbly in behalf of others who may be inferior to themselves.
Nietzsche believed in a eugenics program. He declared that marriages
should be arranged with a view to producing supermen. Nietzsche’s
deterministic view of natural evolution led him to believe, however,
that equality of privileges is unattainable. He opposed democracy
because its theory of equal opportunities contradicts the tendencies
of nature. He was no socialist. He asserted that an aristocracy of
power is the only true goal for society. He carried forward the
ruthless biological laws of tooth and fang into his conception of the
highest types of civilization.
Moreover, the superman is a biological mutant. He appears sporadically.
At this point Nietzsche’s inconsistency becomes obvious. For example,
if geniuses appear sporadically and without reference to biological
laws, why attempt to arrange marriages so as to produce supermen? To
get himself out of the dilemma, Nietzsche postulated cyclical returns
of supermen and lost his bearings in trying to interpret an endless
circular movement in social evolution, endlessly repeating itself. In
an applied form Nietzsche’s philosophy has appeared in German political
life, but to the defeat of Germany.
In starting points, Nietzsche and Gumplowicz were widely different.
Nietzsche began with an apotheosis of the man of power and extolled
the achievements of supermen. Gumplowicz had little place for the
individual, even for the most powerful. Both sets of theories ended in
a deterministic philosophy of individual and social despair.
An unusually fundamental delineation of social conflict has been
advanced by Simon N. Patten in his _Theory of Social Forces_.[XX-6]
Human society is the product largely of a pain economy in which the
requisites for survival are determined “by the enemies and pains to
be avoided.” In a like manner a pain morality and a pain religion
develop. The purpose of the pain morality is “to keep persons from
committing acts and putting themselves in situations which lead to
destruction.” The pain religion, likewise, aims to invoke the aid of
higher powers in the human conflict with enemies and death. The social
forces in a pain economy have been builded up in the form of sets of
ideals, instincts, and habits.
Society, however, is now in a transition stage--entering a pleasure
economy. A large number of the sources of pain have been eliminated
through the inventive and administrative phases of civilization.
Dangerous beasts and reptiles, barbarous invasions, and superstitious
interpretations are uncommon among the advanced human groups.
No nation, unfortunately, has been able to live under a pleasure
economy. Its members have not built up sets of instincts, habits, and
ideals that withstand the effects of a pleasure economy. Consequently,
individuals and nations have fallen into lethargy, vice, and decay. The
enemies in a pleasure economy are found within the individual; these
are as yet unconquered under the allurements of a pleasure environment.
In discussing the conflicts between these habits and ideals, Dr. Patten
may err in implying that the race once was not in a pain economy
and hence did not originally develop out of such an environment,
but he nevertheless has analyzed an important societal fact in his
pain-pleasure transition concept.
Another type of conflict theory of society is advanced by Thomas Nixon
Carver. Professor Carver begins his analysis with a discussion of the
conflict of human interests. Originally all conflicts were settled on
the basis of might. But conflicts between persons who are beginning
to think, sometimes lead one or each of the contending parties to a
consideration of adjusting the conflict by other than physical strife.
At this point the concept of justice begins to take form.
Justice, according to Dr. Carver, is “that system of adjusting
conflicting interests which makes the group strong and
progressive.”[XX-7] Virtue and strength are pronounced identical, and
strength is defined “according to its ability to make itself universal.”
Conflict arises out of scarcity. Where two men want the same thing,
conflict ensues. It is this antagonism of interests which produces
moral problems and furnishes a basis of determining justice and
injustice. One reason for the lack of supply of things which people
seek is that in society human wants are unduly expended. If wants could
be kept low and production high, an adaptation of people to things
would take place which would greatly lessen conflict.
Conflicts take place in three different fields: (1) between man
and nature, (2) between man and man, and (3) between the different
interests of the same man.[XX-8] If there were no such conflicts,
there would be no moral problems. The result would be paradise.
The institutions of property, the family, and the state have developed
out of antagonism of interests, which in turn, as has been said, is
the result of scarcity. If things were not scarce, no one would think
of claiming property in anything. In a similar way the kinship group
becomes desirous of possessing property and hence acquires unity. In
asserting that _the_ unifying principle in the family is an economic
one, Dr. Carver espouses a theory of economic determinism. In fact, he
holds that “the economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which
all other social and moral problems have grown.”[XX-9]
Dr. Carver somewhat softens his rigorous social theories when he
admits that there may be a few people in the world whose feeling of
humanity is strong enough to overbalance an antagonism of interests
and to lead them to treat the world as a normal individual treats his
family.[XX-10] A world of such people would make a world of communism.
But such a world is unthinkable, because world-loving people are social
aberrations. The individual whose altruism is such that he gladly
gives his body to a tiger, is not helping to transform the world
into a world of saints but into a world of tigers.[XX-11] Extreme
forms of benevolence and meekness constitute the very food upon which
selfishness fattens.[XX-12]
Professor Carver, therefore, points out two sources of conflict,
namely, scarcity of desirable things and self-centered appreciation.
These two bases of conflict are fundamentally natural and normal.
Conflicts appear, however, in a great variety of forms. This
classification of the methods of struggling for existence is
fourfold.[XX-13]
(1) There is a group of conflicts which are primarily destructive, such
as war, robbery, dueling, sabotage, brawling. These conflicts are all
crude, primitive, brutal. They represent man at his lowest ebb. They
are militant in character, depending upon the individual’s power to
destroy, to harm, or to inflict pain and injury.[XX-14]
(2) Deceptive conflicts are of an order slightly higher than the
militant. They include thieving, swindling, adulteration of goods,
false advertising. They imply a greater degree of intelligence than the
purely destructive types of conflict.
(3) Another form of conflict is persuasive in character, for example,
political, erotic, commercial, and legal conflicts. Political
competition includes seeking governmental appointments, running for
office, campaigning for a political party. Erotic conflicts are in
the main different forms of courtship. Commercial persuasion utilizes
the agencies of advertising and salesmanship. Legal conflicts include
litigations in the courts. In all these illustrations the individual
strives to further his own interests by his persuative ability.
Oftentimes resort is made to cheap persuasive methods, such as
demagogy or political claptrap. Sometimes the persuasion falls to the
level of deception and, occasionally, to destructive depths.
(4) The highest form of conflicts are the productive types. Some
productive conflicts refer to rivalries in producing economic
goods; others to rivalries in rendering service. In his _Essays in
Social Justice_, Professor Carver discusses three forms of economic
competition at length. Here he includes competitive production,
competitive bargaining, and competitive consumption of economic goods.
The second class has already been referred to as commercial persuasion.
Competitive production increases the supply of economic goods and
“always works well.” Competitive consumption, however, “always works
badly.” It means “rivalry in display, in ostentation, in the effort
to outshine or to outdress all one’s neighbors, or at least not to
be outshone or outdressed by them.” It is usually deceptive; it has
no productive features about it. It may even assume a form of waste
and destruction. The highest type of conflict is friendly rivalry in
rendering service to other people.
Professor Carver would have self-interest direct its efforts toward the
welfare of the nation. Since neither law nor government can eliminate
self-interest, the next best thing is to connect it with national
well-being. Nearly all useful things that are done in a community are
undertaken through self-interest.[XX-15] Even co-operation is a form
of competition.[XX-16] The purpose of co-operation is to enable groups
of individuals to compete more effectively against opposing groups.
Competition is not an evil in itself. The spirit which dominates
competition is the important thing. Some people are motivated by the
pig-trough philosophy, which emphasizes struggle for the sake of
possession and consumption of goods. The workbench philosophy accents
“action and not possession, production and not consumption.”
These theories, excellent in many particulars, apparently do not rate
at full value the fact that education and love can and do modify the
self-interest of the individual, and at the same time direct the
attention of the individual toward unselfish service. In stressing
service through achievement and production, they neglect to emphasize
achievement through service. Competition in rendering unselfish service
is underrated.
It was Novicow, the Russian sociologist, who laid bare the alleged
benefits of war, showing that the gains which come from war may be
obtained through other methods of social interaction.[XX-17] Novicow
argued forcefully that the real enemies of a group of people are
disease germs and death, not the best people of other nationality
groups. Novicow’s vision enabled him to perceive the foolishness of men
who lock themselves together in destructive conflict, when the real
enemies are microscopic disease bacteria and the gaunt black specter
of death.
Conflict bulks large in the sociology of Edward A. Ross. Any
interference with the carrying out of the individual’s plans and
with the satisfying of his interests creates opposition. The best
characteristic of the phenomenon of opposition is that it awakens and
stimulates.[XX-18] Competition operates according to psychologic laws;
for example, the intensity of competition varies according (1) to the
degree of personal liberty, (2) to the rate of social change, and (3)
inversely as the efficiency of the selective agents.[XX-19]
One of the most important forms of competition is found in
industrialism. The invention and adoption of the power-driven machine
has created an industrialism which is moulding and transforming society
in startling ways, and which is causing “its members more and more to
cluster at opposite poles of the social spindle.”[XX-20] Professor Ross
expresses slight hope that the ownership of industrial capital will be
disseminated through the working class according to the conflict rules
of the present economic system.
Other conflict theories will be presented in the following chapters;
for example, the conflict theories of Gustav Ratzenhofer and Albion
W. Small will be noted in the chapter on co-operation concepts, and
Gabriel Tarde’s analysis of conflict will be taken up in the discussion
of psycho-sociological thought.
In general, the social conflict doctrines, when carried to the extreme,
fail to recognize that conflict and co-operation are correlative
social processes. Humanly speaking, one is as old as the other. Both
spring from the deepest types of human needs. While the earliest types
of associative life may have been characterized by a predominance of
conflict, the highest stages are ruled by the co-operative spirit. This
transition together with the leading co-operation theories of social
progress will be taken up in the chapter which follows.
Suffice it to say here that conflict and competition are essential
to social advance. They are both highly useful when operating in the
fields of production and service.