A DECISION AND THE PLAN
_8th June, 1915. Imbros._ We are getting "three Divisions of the New
Army"! The Cabinet "are determined to support" us! And why wouldn't they
be? Thus runs the cable:--
"(No. 5217, cipher). Your difficulties are fully recognized by the
Cabinet who are determined to support you. We are sending you three
divisions of the New Army. The first of these will leave about the end
of this week, and the other two will be sent as transport is available.
"The last of the three divisions ought to reach you not later than the
first fortnight in July. By that time the Fleet will have been
reinforced by a good many units which are much less vulnerable to
submarine attack than those now at the Dardanelles, and you can then
count on the Fleet to give you continuous support.
"While steadily pressing the enemy, there seems no reason for running
any premature risks in the meantime."
In face of K.'s hang-fire cable of the 3rd, and in face of this long
three weeks of stupefaction, thank God our rulers have got out of the
right side of their beds and are not going to run away.
The first thing to be done was to signal to the Admiral to come over. At
2 p.m. he and Roger Keyes turned up. The great news was read out and
yet, such is the contrariness of human nature that neither the hornpipe
nor the Highland Fling was danced. Three weeks ago--two weeks ago--we
should have been beside ourselves, but irritation now takes the fine
edge off our rejoicings. Why not three weeks ago? That was the tone of
the meeting. At first:--but why be captious in the very embrace of
Fortune? So we set to and worked off the broad general scheme in the
course of an hour and a half.
Just as the Admiral was going, Ward (of the Intelligence) crossed over
with a nasty little damper. The Turks keep just one lap ahead of us. Two
new Divisions have arrived and have been launched straightway at our
trenches. At the moment we get promises that troops asked for in the
middle of May will arrive by the middle of July the Turks get their
divisions in the flesh:--so much so that they have gained a footing in
the lines of the East Lanes: but there is no danger; they will be driven
out. We have taken some prisoners.
Dined on board the _Triad_. Sat up later than usual. Not only had we
news from home and the news from the Peninsula to thresh out, but there
was much to say and hear about E.11 and that apple of Roger Keyes' eye,
the gallant Nasmith. Their adventures in the sea of Marmora take the
shine out of those of the Argonauts.
Coming back along the well-beaten sandy track, my heart sank to see our
mess tent still lit up at midnight. It might be good news but also it
might not. Fortunately, it was pleasant news; i.e., Colonel Chauvel,
commanding 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, waiting to see me. I had
known him well in Melbourne where he helped me more than anyone else to
get the hang of the Australian system. He stays the night.
_9th June, 1915. Imbros._ A cable saying the new Divisions will form the
9th Corps and asking me my opinion of Mahon as Corps Commander. I shall
reply at once he is good up to a point and brave, but not up to running
a Corps out here.
Have been sent a gas-mask and a mosquito-net. Quite likely the mask is
good bizz and may prolong my poor life a little bit, but this is
problematical whereas there's no blooming error about the net. This
morning instead of being awakened at 4.30 a.m. by a cluster of
house-flies having a garden party on my nose I just opened one eye and
looked at them running about outside my entrenchments, then closed it
and fell asleep again for an hour.
_10th June, 1915. Imbros._ Nothing doing but sheer hard work. The
sailors the same. Sent one pretty stiff cable as we all agreed that we
must make ourselves quite clear upon the question of guns and shell.
After all, any outsider would think it a plain sailing matter enough--a
demand, that is to say, from Simpson-Baikie at Helles that he should be
gunned and shell supplied on the same scale as the formations he quitted
on the Western Front only a few weeks ago. Simpson-Baikie has been
specially sent to us by Lord K., who has a high opinion of his merits. A
deep-thinking, studious and scientific officer. Well, Baikie says that
to put him on anything like the Western Front footing he wants another
forty-eight 18-pounders; eight 5-inch hows.; eight 4.5. hows.; eight
6-inch; four 9.2 hows.; four anti-aircraft guns and a thousand rounds a
month per field gun; these "wants" he puts down as an absolute minimum.
He also wishes me at once to cable for an aeroplane squadron of three
flights of four machines each, one flight for patrol work; the other two
for spotting.
There is no use enraging people for nothing and "nothing" I am sure
would be the result of this demand were it shot in quite nakedly. But I
have pressed Baikie's vital points home all the same, _vide_ attached:--
"(No. M.F. 316).
"Your No. 5088. After a further consideration of the ammunition question
in light of the expenditure on the 4th and 5th June, I would like to
point out that I have only the normal artillery complement of two
divisions, although actually I have five divisions here. Consequently,
each of my guns has to do the work which two and a half guns are doing
in Flanders. Any comparison based on expenditure per gun must therefore
be misleading. Also a comparison based on numbers of troops would prove
to be beside the point, for conditions cannot be identical. Therefore,
as I know you will do your best for me and thus leave me contented with
the decision you arrive at, I prefer to state frankly what amount I
consider necessary. This amount is at least 30 rounds a day for 18-pr.
and 4.5 howitzer already ashore, and I hope that a supply on this scale
may be possible. The number of guns already ashore is beginning to prove
insufficient for their task, for the enemy have apparently no lack of
ammunition and their artillery is constantly increasing. Therefore I
hope that the new divisions may be sent out with the full complement of
artillery, but, if this is done, the ammunition supply for the artillery
of the fresh divisions need only be on the normal scale.
"Since the above was written, I have received a report that the enemy
has been reinforced by 1,300 Germans for fortress artillery; perhaps
their recent shooting is accounted for by this fact."
As to our Air Service, the way this feud between Admiralty and War
Office has worked itself out in the field is simply heart-breaking. The
War Office wash their hands of the air entirely (at the Dardanelles). I
cannot put my own case to the Admiralty although the machines are wanted
for overland tactics--a fatal blind alley. All I could do I did this
afternoon when the Admiral came to tea and took me for a good stiff walk
afterwards.
_11th June, 1915. Imbros._ Sailed over to Anzac with Braithwaite. Took
Birdwood's views upon the outline of our plan (which originated between
him and Skeen) for entering the New Army against the Turks. To do his
share, _durch und durch_ (God forgive me), he wants three new Brigades;
with them he engages to go through from bottom to top of Sari Bair.
Well, I will give him four; perhaps five! Our whole scheme hinges on
these crests of Sari Bair which dominate Anzac and Maidos; the
Dardanelles and the Aegean. The destroyers next took us to Cape Helles
where I held a pow wow at Army Headquarters, Generals Hunter-Weston and
Gouraud being present as well as Birdwood and Braithwaite. Everyone keen
and sanguine. Many minor suggestions; warm approval of the broad lines
of the scheme. Afterwards I brought Birdie back to Anzac and then
returned to Imbros. A good day's work. Half the battle to find that my
Corps Commanders are so keen. They are all sworn to the closest secrecy;
have been told that our lives depend upon their discretion. I have shown
them my M.F. 300 of the 7th June so as to let them understand they are
being trusted with a plan which is too much under the seal to be sent
over the cables even to the highest.
Every General I met to-day spoke of the shortage of bombs and grenades.
The Anzacs are very much depressed to hear they are to get no more bombs
for their six Japanese trench mortars. We told the Ordnance some days
ago to put this very strongly to the War Office. After all, bombs and
grenades are easy things to make if the tails of the manufacturers are
well twisted.
_12th June, 1915. Imbros._ Stayed in camp where de Robeck came to see
me. I wonder what K. is likely to do about Mahon and about ammunition.
When he told me Joffre and French thought 17 rounds per gun per day good
enough, and that he was going to give me as much, there were several
qualifications to our pleasure, but we _were_ pleased, because apart
from all invidious comparisons, we were anyway going to get more stuff.
But we have not yet tasted this new French ration of 17 rounds per gun.
Are we too insistent? I think not. One dozen small field howitzer
shells, of 4.5. calibre, save one British life by taking two Turkish
lives. And although the 4.5. are what we want the old 5-inch are none so
bad. Where would we be now, I wonder, had not Haldane against Press,
Public and four soldiers out of five stuck to his guns and insisted on
creating those 145 batteries of Territorial Field Artillery?
A depressing wire in from the War Office expressing doubt as to whether
they will be able to meet our wishes by embarking units complete and
ready for landing; gear, supplies, munitions all in due proportion, in
the transports coming out here from England. Should we be forced to
redistribute men and material on arrival, we are in for another spell of
delay.
Altogether I have been very busy on cables to-day. The War Office having
jogged my elbow again about the Bulair scheme, I have once more been
through the whole series of pros and cons with the Admiral who has
agreed in the reply I have sent:--clear negative. Three quarters of the
objections are naval; either directly--want of harbours, etc.; or
indirectly--as involving three lines of small craft to supply three
separate military forces. The number of small craft required are not in
existence.
_13th June, 1915. Imbros._ The War Office forget every now and then
other things about the coastline above the Narrows. I have replied:
"Your first question as to the fortification of the coast towards
Gallipoli can be satisfactorily answered only by the Navy as naval
aeroplane observation is the only means by which I can find out about
the coast fortifications. From time to time it has been reported that
torpedo tubes have been placed at the mouth of Soghan Dere and at Nagara
Point. These are matters on which I presume Admiral has reported to
Admiralty, but I am telegraphing to him to make sure as he is away
to-day at Mudros. I will ask him to have aeroplane reconnaissance made
regarding the coast fortifications you mention, to see if it can be
ascertained whether your informant's report is correct, but there are
but few aeroplanes and the few we have are constantly required for
spotting for artillery, photographing trenches, and for reconnaissances
of the troops immediately engaged with us."
I am being forced by War Office questions to say rather more than I had
intended about plans. The following cable took me the best part of the
morning. I hope it is too technical to effect a lodgment in the memories
of the gossips:--
"(No. M.F. 328). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. With
reference to your No. 5441, cipher. From the outset I have fully
realized that the question of cutting off forces defending the Peninsula
lay at the heart of my problem. See my No. M.F. 173, last paragraph, and
paragraphs 2 and 7 of my instructions to General Officer Commanding
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, of 13th April, before landing. I
still consider, as indicated therein, that the best and most practicable
method of stopping enemy's communications is to push forward to the
south-east from Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
"The attempt to stop Bulair communications further North than the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps position would give the Turks too
much room to pass our guns. An advance of little more than two miles in
a south-eastern direction would enable us to command the land
communications between Bulair and Kilid Bahr. This, in turn, would
render Ak Bashi Liman useless to the enemy as a port of disembarkation
for either Chanak or Constantinople. It would enable us, moreover, to
co-operate effectively with the Navy in stopping communication with the
Asiatic shore, since Kilia Liman and Maidos would be under fire from our
land guns.
"It was these considerations which decided me originally to land at
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps position, and in spite of the
difficulties of advancing thence, I see no reason to expect that a new
point of departure would make the task any easier. I have recently been
obliged by circumstances to concentrate my main efforts on pushing
forward towards Achi Baba so as to clear my main port of disembarkation
of shell fire. I only await the promised reinforcements, however, to
enable me to take the next step in the prosecution of my main plan from
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
"I cannot extend the present Australian position until they arrive. See
my No. M.F. 300, as to estimate of troops required, and my No. 304, 7th
June, as to state of siege at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. If
I succeed the enemy's communications _via_ Bulair and, with the Navy's
help, _via_ Asiatic coast should both be closed, as far as possible, by
the one operation. If, in addition, submarines can stop sea
communications with Constantinople the problem will be solved.
"With regard to supplies and ammunition which can be obtained by the
enemy across the Dardanelles, since Panderma and Karabingha are normally
important centres of collection of food supplies, both cereals and meat,
and since the Panderma-Chanak road is adequate, it would be possible to
provision the peninsula from a great supply depot at Chanak where there
are steam mills, steam bakeries and ample shallow draught craft. If
land communications were blocked near Bulair, ammunition could only be
brought by sea to Panderma, and thence by road to Chanak or by sea
direct to Kilid Bahr.
"Either for supplies or ammunition, however, the difficulty of
effectively stopping supply by sea may be increased by the large number
of shallow craft available at Rodosto, Chanak, Constantinople and
Panderma. But as soon as I can make good advance south-east from
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, my guns, plus the submarines,
should be able to make all traffic from the Asiatic shore very difficult
for the enemy.
"It is vitally important that future developments should be kept
absolutely secret. I mention this because, although the date of our
original landing was known to hardly anyone here before the ships
sailed, yet the date was cabled to the Turks from Vienna."
The message took some doing and could not, therefore, get clear of camp
till 11 o'clock when I boarded the destroyer _Grampus_, and sailed for
Helles. Lunched with Hunter-Weston at his Headquarters, and then walked
out along the new road being built under the cliffs from "W" Beach to
Gurkha Gully. On the way I stopped at the 29th Divisional Headquarters
where I met de Lisle. Thence along the coast where the 88th Brigade were
bathing. In the beautiful hot afternoon weather the men were happy as
sandboys. Their own mothers would hardly know them--burnt black with the
sun, in rags or else stark naked, with pipes in their mouths. But they
like it! After passing the time of day to a lot of these boys, I climbed
the cliff and came back along the crests, stopping to inspect some of
the East Lancashire Division in their rest trenches.
Got back to Hunter-Weston's about 6 and had a cup of tea. There Cox of
the Indian Brigade joined me, and I took him with me to Imbros where he
is going to stay a day or two with Braithwaite.
_14th June, 1915. Imbros._ K. sends me this brisk little pick-me-up:--
"Report here states that your position could be made untenable by
Turkish guns from the Asiatic shore. Please report on this."
No doubt--no doubt! Yet I was once his own Chief of Staff into whose
hands he unreservedly placed the conduct of one of the most crucial, as
it was the last, of the old South African enterprises: I was once the
man into whose hands he placed the defence of his heavily criticized
action at the Battle of Paardeburg. There it is: he used to have great
faith in me, and now he makes me much the sort of remark which might be
made by a young lady to a Marine. The answer, as K. well knows, depends
upon too many imponderabilia to be worth the cost of a cable. The size
and number of the Turkish guns; their supplies of shell; the power of
our submarines to restrict those supplies; the worth of our own ship and
shore guns; the depth of our trenches; the _moral_ of our men, and so on
_ad infinitum_. The point of the whole matter is this:--the Turks
haven't got the guns--and we know it:--if ever they do get the guns it
will take them weeks, months, before they can get them mounted and
shells in proportion amassed.
K. should know better than any other man in England--Lord Bobs, alas, is
gone--that if there was any real fear of guns from Asia being able to
make us loosen our grip on the Peninsula, I would cable him quickly.
Then why does he ask? Well--and why shouldn't he ask? I must not be so
captious. Much better turn the tables on him by asking him to enable us
to knock out the danger he fears:--
"(No. M.F. 331). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With
reference to your telegram No. 5460. As already reported in my telegram,
fire from the Asiatic shore is at times troublesome, but I am taking
steps to deal with it. Of course another battery of 6-inch howitzers
would greatly help in this."
By coincidence a letter has come in to me this very night, on the very
subject; a letter written by a famous soldier--Gouraud--the lion of the
Ardennes, who is, it so happens, much better posted as to the Asiatic
guns than the Jeremiah who has made K. anxious. The French bear the
brunt of this fire and Gouraud's cool decision to ignore it in favour of
bigger issues marks the contrast between the fighter who makes little of
the enemy and the writer who makes much of him. I look upon Gouraud more
as a coadjutor than as a subordinate, so it is worth anything to me to
find that we see eye to eye at present. For, there is much more in the
letter than his feelings about the guns of Asia: there is an outline
sketch, drawn with slight but masterly touches, covering the past,
present and future of our show:--
_Q.G. le 13 juin 1915._
Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient.
CABINE DU GÉNÉRAL.
N. Cab.
SECRET.
Le Général de Division Gouraud, Commandant le
Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient, à Sir Ian
Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commandant le
Corps Expéditionnaire Méditerranéen.
QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL.
MON GÉNÉRAL,
Vous avez bien voulu me communiquer une dépêche de Lord Kitchener
faisant connaître que le Gouvernement anglais allait envoyer
incessamment aux Dardanelles trois nouvelles divisions et des
vaisseaux moins vulnérables aux sous-marins. D'après les
renseignements qui m'ont été donnés, on annonce 14 de ces monitors;
4 seraient armés de pièces de 35 à 38 m/ 4 de pièces de 24, les
autres de 15.
C'est donc sur terre et sur mer un important renfort.
J'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre ci-dessous mes idées sur son
emploi.
Jetons d'abord un coup d'oeil sur la situation. Il s'en dégage, ce
me semble, deux faits.
D'une part, le combat du 4 juin, qui, malgré une préparation
sérieuse n'a pas donné de résultat en balance avec le vigoureux et
couteux effort fourni par les troupes alliées, a montré que, guidés
par les Allemands, les Turcs ont donné à leur ligne une très grande
force. La presqu'île est barrée devant notre front de plusieurs
lignes de tranchées fortement établies, précédées en plusieurs
points de fil de fer barbelés, flanquées de mitrailleuses,
communiquant avec l'arrière par des boyaux, formant un système de
fortification comparable à celui du grand Front.
Dans ces tranchées les Turcs se montrent bons soldats, braves,
tenaces. Leur artillerie a constamment et très sensiblement
augmenté en nombres et en puissance depuis trois semaines.
Dans ces conditions, et étant donné que les Turcs ont toute liberté
d'amener sur ce front étroite toute leur armée, on ne peut se
dissimuler que les progrès seront lents et que chaque progrès sera
couteux.
Les Allemands appliqueront certainement dans les montagnes et les
ravins de la presqu'île le système qui leur a réussi jusqu'ici en
France.
D'autre part l'ennemi parait avoir changé de tactique. Il a voulu
au début nous rejeter à la mer; après les pertes énormes qu'il a
subi dans les combats d'avril et de mai, il semble y avoir renoncé
du moins pour le moment.
Son plan actuel consiste à chercher à nous bloquer de front, pour
nous maintenir sur l'étroit terrain que nous avons conquis, et à
nous y rendre la vie intenable en bombardant les camps et surtout
les plages de débarquement. C'est ainsi que les quatre batteries de
grosses pièces récemment installées entre Erenkeui et Yenishahr ont
apporté au ravitaillement des troupes une gêne qu'on peut dire
dangereuse, puisque la consommation dans dernières journées a
légèrement dépassé le ravitaillement.
Au résumé nous sommes bloqués de front et pris par derrière. Et
cette situation ira en empirant du fait des maladies, résultant du
climat, de la chaleur, du bivouac continuel, peut être des
épidémies, et du fait que la mer rendra très difficile tout
débarquement dès la mauvaise saison, fin août.
Ceci posé, comment employer les gros renforts attendus. Plusieurs
solutions se présentent à l'esprit.
Primo, en Asie.
C'est la première idée qui se présente; étant donné l'intérêt de se
rendre maître de la région Yenishahr-Erenkeui, qui prend nos plages
de débarquement à revers.
Mais c'est là une mesure d'un intérêt défensif, qui ne fera pas
faire un pas en avant. Il est permis d'autre part de penser que les
canons des monitors anglais, qui sont sans doute destinés à
détruire les défenses du détroit, commenceront par nous débarrasser
des batteries de l'entrée. Enfin nous disposerons d'ici peu d'un
front de mer Seddul-Bahr Eski Hissarlick, dont les pièces
puissantes contrebattront efficacement les canons d'Asie.
Secundo, vers Gaba-Tépé.
Au Sud de Gaba Tépé s'étend une plaine que les cartes disent
accessible au débarquement. Des troupes débarquées là se trouvent à
8 kilomètres environ de Maidos, c'est à dire au point où la
presqu'île est la plus étroite.
Sans nul doute, trouveront elles devant elles les mêmes difficultés
qu'ici et il sera nécessaire notemment de se rendre maître des
montagnes qui dominent la plaine au Nord. Mais alors que la prise
d'Achi Baba ne sera qu'un grand succès militaire, qui nous mettra
le lendemain devant les escarpements de Kilid-Bahr, l'occupation de
la région Gaba Tépé-Maidos nous placerait au delà des détroits,
nous permettrait d'y constituer une base où les sous-marins de la
mer de Marmara pourraient indéfiniment s'approvisionner.
Si le barrage des Dardanelles n'était pas brisé, il serait tourné.
Tertio, vers Boulair.
Cette solution apparait comme le plus radicale, celui qui
déjouerait le plan de l'ennemi. Constantinople serait directement
menacé par ce coup retentissant.
Toute la question est de savoir si, avec leurs moyens nouveaux, les
monitors, les Amiraux sont en mesure de protéger un débarquement,
qui comme celui du 25 avril nécessiterait de nombreux bateaux.
En résumé, j'ai l'honneur d'émettre l'avis de poser nettement aux
Amiraux la question du débarquement à Boulair, d'y faire
reconnaître l'état actuel des défenses par bateaux, avions et si
possible agents, sans faire d'acte de guerre pour ne pas donner
l'éveil.
Au cas où le débarquement serait jugé impossible, j'émet l'avis
d'employer les renforts dans la région Gaba-Tépé, où les
Australiens ont déjà implanté un solide jalon.
Concurremment, je pense qu'il serait du plus vif intérêt pour hâter
la décision, de créer au Gouvernement Turc des inquiétudes dans
d'autres parties de l'Empire, pour l'empêcher d'amener ici toutes
ses forces.
Dans cet ordre d'idées on peut envisager deux moyens. L'un, le plus
efficace, est l'action russe ou bulgare. La Grêce est mal placée
géographiquement pour exercer une action sur la guerre. Seule la
Bulgarie, par sa position géographique, prend les Turcs à revers.
Sans doute, à voir la façon dont les Turcs amènent devant nous les
troupes et les canons d'Adrianople, ont ils un accord avec la
Bulgarie, mais la guerre des Balkans prouve que la Bulgarie n'est
pas embarrassée d'un accord si elle voit ailleurs son intérêt. La
question est donc d'offrir un prix fort à la Bulgarie.
L'autre est de provoquer des agitations dans différentes parties de
l'Empire, d'y faire opérer des destructions par des bandes,
d'obliger les Turcs à y envoyer du monde. Cela encore vaut la peine
d'y mettre le prix.
Je suis, avec un profond respect, mon Général,
Votre très dévoué,
(_Sd._) GOURAUD.
Boarded a destroyer at 11.15 a.m. and sailed straight for Gully Beach.
Then into dinghy and paddled to shore where I lunched with de Lisle at
the 29th Divisional Headquarters. Hunter-Weston had come up to meet me
from Corps Headquarters.
With both Generals I rode a couple of miles up the Gully seeing the 87th
Brigade as we went. When we got to the mouth of the communication trench
leading to the front of the Indian Brigade, Bruce of the Gurkhas was
waiting for us, and led me along through endless sunken ways until we
reached his firing line.
Every hundred yards or so I had a close peep at the ground in front
through de Lisle's periscope. The enemy trenches were sometimes not more
than 7 yards away and the rifles of the Turks moving showed there was a
man behind the loophole. Many corpses, almost all Turks, lay between the
two lines of trenches. There was no shelling at the moment, but rifle
bullets kept flopping into the parapet especially when the periscope was
moved.
At the end of the Gurkha line I was met by Colonel Wolley Dod, who took
me round the fire trenches of the 86th Brigade. The Dublin Fusiliers
looked particularly fit and jolly.
Getting back to the head of the Gully I rode with Hunter-Weston to his
Corps Headquarters where I had tea before sailing.
When I got to Imbros the Fleet were firing at a Taube. She was only
having a look; flying around the shipping and Headquarters camp at a
great height, but dropping no bombs. After a bit she scooted off to the
South-east. Cox dined.
_15th June, 1915. Imbros._ Yesterday I learned some detail about the
conduct of affairs the other day--enough to make me very anxious indeed
that no tired or nervy leaders should be sent out with the new troops.
So I have sent K. a cable!--
"(No. M.F. 334). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener.
"With reference to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 5250, cipher,
and my No. M.F. 313. I should like to submit for your consideration the
following views of the qualities necessary in an Army Corps Commander on
the Gallipoli Peninsula. In that position only men of good stiff
constitution and nerve will be able to do any good. Everything is at
such close quarters that many men would be useless in the somewhat
exposed headquarters they would have to occupy on this limited terrain,
though they would do quite good work if moderately comfortable and away
from constant shell fire. I can think of two men, Byng and Rawlinson.
Both possess the requisite qualities and seniority; the latter does not
seem very happy where he is, and the former would have more scope than a
cavalry Corps can give him in France."
Left camp the moment I got this weight off my chest; boarded the
_Savage_, or rather jumped on her ladder like a chamois and scrambled on
deck like a monkey. It was blowing big guns and our launch was very
nearly swamped. Crossing to Helles big seas were making a clean sweep of
the decks. Jolly to look at from the bridge.
After a dusty walk round piers and beaches lunched with Hunter-Weston
before inspecting the 155th and 156th Brigades. On our road we were met
by Brigadier-Generals Erskine and Scott-Moncrieff. Walked the trenches
where I chatted with the regimental officers and men, and found my
compatriots in very good form.
Went on to the Royal Naval Division Headquarters where Paris met me.
Together we went round the 3rd Marine Brigade Section under
Brigadier-General Trotman. These old comrades of the first landing gave
me the kindliest greetings.
Got back to 8th Corps Headquarters intending to enjoy a cup of tea _al
fresco_, but we were reckoning without our host (the Turkish one) who
threw so many big shell from Asia all about the mound that, (only to
save the tea cups), we retired with dignified slowness into our dugouts.
Whilst sitting in these funk-holes, as we used to call them at
Ladysmith, General Gouraud ran the gauntlet and made also a slow and
dignified entry. He was coming back with me to Imbros. As it was getting
late we hardened our hearts to walk across the open country between
Headquarters and the beach, where every twenty seconds or so a big
fellow was raising Cain. Fortune favouring we both reached the sea with
our heads upon our shoulders.
An answer is in to our plea for a Western scale of ammunition, guns and
howitzers. They cable sympathetically but say simply they can't. Soft
answers, etc., but it would be well if they could make up their minds
whether they wish to score the next trick in the East or in the West. If
they can't do that they will be doubly done.
A purely passive defence is not possible for us; it implies losing
ground by degrees--and we have not a yard to lose. If we are to remain
we must keep on attacking here and there to maintain ourselves! But; to
expect us to attack without giving us our fair share--on Western
standards--of high explosive and howitzers shows lack of military
imagination. A man's a man for a' that whether at Helles or Ypres. Let
me bring my lads face to face with Turks in the open field, we _must_
beat them every time because British volunteer soldiers are superior
individuals to Anatolians, Syrians or Arabs and are animated with a
superior ideal and an equal joy in battle. Wire and machine guns prevent
this hand to hand, or rifle to rifle, style of contest. Well, then the
decent thing to do is to give us shells enough to clear a fair field.
To attempt to solve the problem by letting a single dirty Turk at the
Maxim kill ten--twenty--fifty--of our fellows on the barbed
wire,--ten--twenty--fifty--_each of whom is worth several dozen Turks_,
is a sin of the Holy Ghost category unless it can be justified by dire
necessity. But there is no necessity. The supreme command has only to
decide categorically that the Allies stand on the defensive on the West
for a few weeks and then Von Donop can find us enough to bring us
through. Joffre and French, as a matter of fact, would hardly feel the
difference. If the supreme command can't do that; and can't even send us
trench mortars as substitutes, let them harden their hearts and wind up
this great enterprise for which they simply haven't got the nerve.
If only K. would come and see for himself! Failing that--if only it were
possible for me to run home and put my own case.
_16th June, 1915. Imbros._ Gouraud, a sympathetic guest, left for French
Headquarters in one of our destroyers at 3.30 p.m. He is a real Sahib; a
tower of strength. The Asiatic guns have upset his men a good deal. He
hopes soon to clap on an extinguisher to their fire by planting down two
fine big fellows of his own Morto Bay way: we mean to add a couple of
old naval six-inchers to this battery. During his stay we have very
thoroughly threshed out our hopes and fears and went into the plan which
Gouraud thinks offers chances of a record-breaking victory. If the
character of the new Commanders and the spirit of their troops are of
the calibre of those on his left flank at Helles he feels pretty
confident.
Talking of Commanders, my appeal for a young Corps Commander of a "good
stiff constitution" has drawn a startling reply:--
"(No. 5501, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to Sir Ian Hamilton. Your No.
M.F. 334. I am afraid that Sir John French would not spare the services
of the two Generals you mention, and they are, moreover, both junior to
Mahon, who commands the 10th Division which is going out to you. Ewart,
who is very fit and well, would I think do. I am going to see him the
day after to-morrow.
"Mahon raised the 10th Division and has produced an excellent unit. He
is quite fit and well, and I do not think that he could now be left
behind."
So the field of selection for the new Corps is to be restricted to some
Lieutenant-General senior to Mahon--himself the only man of his rank
commanding a Division and almost at the top of the Lieutenant-Generals!
Oh God, if I could have a Corps Commander like Gouraud! But this block
by "Mahon" makes a record for the seniority fetish. I have just been
studying the Army List with Pollen. Excluding Indians, Marines and
employed men like Douglas Haig and Maxwell, there _are_ only about one
dozen British service Lieutenant-Generals senior to Mahon, and, of that
dozen only two are _possible_--Ewart and Stopford! There _are_ no
others. Ewart is a fine fellow, with a character which commands respect
and affection. He is also a Cameron Highlander whose father commanded
the Gordons. As a presence nothing could be better; as a man no one in
the Army would be more welcome. But he would not, with his build and
constitutional habit, last out here for one fortnight. Despite his
soldier heart and his wise brain we can't risk it. We are unanimous on
that point. Stopford remains. I have cabled expressing my deep
disappointment that Mahon should be the factor which restricts all
choice and saying,
"However, my No. M.F. 334[20] gave you what I considered to be the
qualities necessary in a Commander, so I will do my best with what you
send me.
"With regard to Ewart. I greatly admire his character, but he positively
could not have made his way along the fire trenches I inspected
yesterday. He has never approached troops for fifteen years although I
have often implored him, as a friend, to do so. Would not Stopford be
preferable to Ewart, even though he does not possess the latter's calm?"
I begin to think I shall be recalled for my importunity. But, in for a
penny in for a pound, and I have fired off the following protest to a
really disastrous cable from the War Office saying that the New Army is
to bring _no_ 4.5-inch howitzers with it; no howitzers at all, indeed,
except sixteen of the old, inaccurate 5-inch Territorial howitzers, some
of which "came out" at Omdurman and were afterwards--the whole
category--found so much fault with in South Africa. Unless they are
going to have an August push in France they might at least have lent us
forty-eight 4.5 hows. from France to see the New Army through their
first encounter with the enemy. They could all be run back in a fast
cruiser and would only be loaned to us for three weeks or a month. If
the G.S. at Whitehall can't do those things, they have handed over the
running of a world war to one section of the Army. I attach my
ultimatum: I cannot make it more emphatic; instead of death or victory
we moderns say howitzers or defeat:--
"(No. 5489, cipher, M.G.O.) From War Office to General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Your No. M.F.
316. It is impossible to send more ammunition than we are sending you.
528 rounds per 18-pr will be brought out by each Division. Instead of
4.5-inch howitzers we are sending 16 5-inch howitzers with the 13th
Division, as there is more 5-inch ammunition available. By the time that
the last of the three Divisions arrive we hope to have supplied a good
percentage of high explosive shells, but you should try to save as much
as you can in the meantime. Until more ammunition is available for them,
we cannot send you any 4.5-inch howitzers with the other two Divisions,
and even if more 5-inch were sent the fortnightly supply of ammunition
for them would be very small."
"(No. M.F. 337). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. With
reference to your No. 5489, cipher. I am very sorry that you cannot
send the proper howitzers, and still more sorry for the reason, that of
ammunition. The Turkish trenches are deep and narrow, and only effective
weapon for dealing with them is the howitzer. I realize your
difficulties, and I am sure that you will supply me with both howitzers
and ammunition as soon as you are able to do so. I shall be glad in the
meantime of as many more trench mortars and bombs as you can possibly
spare. We realize for our part that in the matter of guns and ammunition
it is no good crying for the moon, and for your part you must recognize
that until howitzers and ammunition arrive it is no good crying for the
Crescent."
The Admiral and Godley paid me a visit; discussed tea and sea transport,
then a walk.
There is quite a break in the weather. Very cold and windy with a little
rain in the forenoon.
_17th June, 1915. Imbros._ Smoother sea, but rough weather in office. A
cable from the Master General of the Ordnance in reply to my petition
for another battery of 6-inch howitzers:--
"(No. 5537, cipher, M.G.O.) From War Office to the General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Your telegram
No. M.F. 331. We can send out another battery of 6-inch howitzers, but
cannot send ammunition with it. Moreover, we cannot increase the present
periodical supply, so that if we send the additional howitzers you must
not complain of the small number of rounds per gun sent to you, as
experience has shown is sometimes done in similar cases. It is possible
that the Navy may help you with 6-inch ammunition. Please say after
consideration of the above if you want the howitzers sent."
My mind plays agreeably with the idea of chaining the M.G.O. on to a
rock on the Peninsula whilst the Asiatic batteries are pounding it. That
would learn him to be an M.G.O.; singing us Departmental ditties whilst
we are trying to hold our Asiatic wolf by the ears. I feel very
depressed; we are too far away; so far away that we lie beyond the
grasp of an M.G.O.'s imagination. That's the whole truth. Were the
Army in France to receive such a message, within 24 hours the
Commander-in-Chief, or at the least his Chief of the Staff, would walk
into the M.G.O.'s office and then proceed to walk into the M.G.O. I
can't do that; a bad tempered cable is useless; I have no weapon at my
disposal but very mild sarcasm:--
"(No. M.F. 343). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. Your No.
5537, cipher, M.G.O. Please send the battery of 6-inch howitzers. Your
admonition will be borne in mind. Extra howitzers will be most useful to
replace pieces damaged by enemy batteries on the Asiatic side of the
Dardanelles. No doubt in time the ammunition question will improve. Only
yesterday prisoners reported that 14 more Turkish heavy guns were coming
to the Peninsula."
Have written another screed to French. As it gives a sort of summing up
of the state of affairs to-day I spatchcock (as Buller used to say) the
carbon:--
"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
"MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
_17th June, 1915._
"MY DEAR FRENCH,
"It must be fully a month since I wrote you but no one understands
better than you must do, how time flies under the constant strain of
these night and day excursions and alarms. Between the two letters there
has been a desperate lot of fighting, mostly bomb and bayonet work, and,
except for a good many Turks gone to glory, there is only a few hundred
yards of ground to show for it all at Anzac, and about a mile perhaps in
the southern part of the Peninsula. But taking a wider point of view, I
hope our losses and efforts have gained a good deal for our cause
although they may not be so measurable in yards. First, the Turks are
defending themselves instead of attacking Egypt and over-running Basra;
secondly, we are told on high authority, that the action of the Italians
in coming in was precipitated by our entry into this part of the
theatre; thirdly, if we can only hold on and continue to enfeeble the
Turks, I think myself it will not be very long before some of the Balkan
States take the bloody plunge.
"However all that may be, we must be prepared at the worst to win
through by ourselves, and it is, I assure you, a tough proposition. In
a manoeuvre battle of old style our fellows here would beat twice
their number of Turks in less than no time, but, actually, the
restricted Peninsula suits the Turkish tactics to a 'T.' They have
always been good at trench work where their stupid men have only simple,
straightforward duties to perform, namely, in sticking on and shooting
anything that comes up to them. They do this to perfection; I never saw
braver soldiers, in fact, than some of the best of them. When we
advance, no matter the shelling we give them, they stand right up firing
coolly and straight over their parapets. Also they have unlimited
supplies of bombs, each soldier carrying them, and they are not half bad
at throwing them. Meanwhile they are piling up a lot of heavy artillery
of very long range on the Asiatic shore, and shell us like the devil
with 4.5, 6-inch, 8, 9.2 and 10-inch guns--not pleasant. This
necessitates a very tough type of man for senior billets. X--Y--, for
instance, did not last 24 hours. Everyone here is under fire, and really
and truly the front trenches are safer, or at least fully as safe, as
the Corps Commander's dugout. For, if the former are nearer the
Infantry, the latter is nearer the big guns firing into our rear.
"Another reason why we advance so slowly and lose so much is that the
enemy get constant reinforcements. We have overcome three successive
armies of Turks, and a new lot of 20,000 from Syria are arriving here
now, with 14 more heavy guns, so prisoners say, but I hope not.
"I have fine Corps Commanders in Birdwood, Hunter-Weston and Gouraud.
This is very fortunate. Who is to be Commander of the new corps I cannot
say, but we have one or two terrifying suggestions from home.
"Last night a brisk attack headed by a senior Turkish Officer and a
German Officer was made on the 86th Brigade. Both these Officers were
killed and 20 or 30 of their men, the attack being repulsed. Against the
South Wales Borderers a much heavier attack was launched. Our fellows
were bombed clean out of their trenches, but only fell back 30 yards and
dug in. This morning early we got maxims on to each end of the place
they had stormed, and then the Dublins retook it with the bayonet. Two
hundred of their dead were left in the trench, and we only had 50
casualties--not so bad! A little later on in the day a d----d submarine
appeared and had some shots at our transports and store ships. Luckily
she missed, but all our landing operations of supplies were suspended.
These are the sort of daily anxieties. All one can do is to carry on
with determination and trust in providence.
"I hope you are feeling fit and that things are going on well generally.
Give my salaams to the great Robertson, also to Barry. Otherwise please
treat this letter as private. With all kind remembrance.
"Believe me,
"Yours very sincerely,
"(_Sd._) IAN HAMILTON."