SUBMARINES
_22nd May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ News in to say that yesterday,
whilst Herbert was here to take orders about an armistice, some sort of
an informal parley actually took place. Both sides suddenly got panic
stricken, thinking the others were treacherous, and fire was opened,
some stretcher bearers being killed. Nothing else was to be expected
when things are done in this casual and unauthorized way. I felt very
much annoyed, but Aubrey Herbert was still on board and I saw him before
breakfast and told him Walker seemed to have taken too much upon himself
parleying with the Turks and that Birdwood must now make this clear to
everyone for future guidance. Although Aubrey Herbert is excessively
unorthodox he quite sees that confabs with enemies must be carried out
according to Cocker.
After breakfast landed at Cape Helles. Inspected the detachment of the
Works Department of the Egyptian Army as it was on its way to the French
Headquarters. Colonel Micklem was in charge. At Sedd-el-Bahr lunched
with Gouraud and his Staff. General Bailloud rode up just as I was about
to enter the porch of the old Fort. He was in two minds whether or not
to embrace me, being in very high feather, his men having this morning
carried the Haricot redoubt overlooking the Kereves Dere. At lunch he
was the greatest possible fun, bubbling over with jokes and witty
sallies. Just as we were finishing, news came through the telephone that
Bailloud's Brigade had been driven in by a big Turkish counter-attack,
with a loss of 400 men and some first class officers. Most of us showed
signs, I will not say of being rattled, but of having stumbled against a
rattlesnake. Gouraud remained unaffectedly in possession of himself as
host of a lunch party. He said, "We will not take the trenches by not
taking the coffee. Let us drink it first, and then we will consider." So
we drank our coffee; lit our smokes, and afterwards Gouraud, through
Girodon, issued his orders in the most calm and matter-of-fact way. He
declares the redoubt will be in our hands again to-morrow.
Our lunch was to furnish us with yet another landmark for bad luck. As
we were leaving, a message came in to say that an enemy submarine had
been sighted off Gaba Tepe. The fresh imprint of a tiger's paw upon the
pathway gives the same sort of feel to the Indian herdsman. Tall stories
from neighbouring villages have been going the round for weeks, only
half-believed, but here is the very mark of the beast; the horror has
suddenly taken shape. He mutters the name of God, wondering what eyes
may even now be watching his every movement; he wonders whose turn will
come first--and when--and where. This was the sort of effect of the
wireless and in a twinkling every transport round the coast was steering
full steam to Imbros. In less than no time we saw a regatta of
skedaddling ships. So dies the invasion of England bogey which, from
first to last, has wrought us an infinity of harm. Born and bred of
mistrust of our own magnificent Navy, it has led soldiers into heresy
after fallacy and fallacy after heresy until now it is the cause of my
Divisions here being hardly larger than Brigades, whilst the men who
might have filled them are "busy" guarding London! If one rumoured
submarine can put the fear of the Lord into British transports how are
German or any other transports going to face up to a hundred British
submarines? The theory of the War Office has struggled with the theory
of the Admiralty for the past five years: now there is nothing left of
the War Office theory; no more than is left of a soap bubble when you
strike it with a battleaxe. Some other stimulus to our Territorial
recruiting than the fear of invasion will have to be invented in future.
After lunch went to the Headquarters of the 29th Division where all the
British Divisional Generals had assembled together to meet me. The same
story everywhere--lack of men, meaning extra work--which again means
sickness and still greater lack of men. On my return found a letter from
the Turkish Commander-in-Chief giving his "full consent" to the
armistice he himself had asked me for! A save-face document, no doubt:
the wounded are all Turks as our men did not leave their trenches on
the 19th; the dead, also, I am glad to say, almost entirely Turks; but
anyway, one need not be too punctilious where it is a matter of giving
decent burial to so many men.
GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DE LA 5me ARMÉE
OTTOMANE.
_le 22 mai 1915._
"EXCELLENCE!
"J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que les propositions
concernant la conclusion d'un armistice pour enterrer les morts et
secourir les blessés des deux parties adverses, ont trouvé mon
plein consentement--et que seule nos sentiments d'humanité nous y
ont déterminés.
"J'ai investi le lieutenant-colonel Fahreddin du pouvoir de signer
en mon nom.
"J'ai l'honneur d'être avec l'assurance de ma plus haute
considération.
(_Sd._) "LIMAN VON SANDERS,
"Commandant en chef de la 5me
Armée Ottomane.
"Commandant en chef des Forces Britanniques,
Sir John Hamilton, Excellence."
_23rd May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Blazing hot. Wrote all day. Had an
hour and a half's talk with de Robeck--high politics as well as our own
rather anxious affairs. No one knows how the new First Lord will play
up, but Asquith, for sure, chucks away his mainspring if he parts with
Winston: as to Fisher, he too has energy but none of it came our way so
he will have no tears from us, though he has friends here too. The
submarine scare is full on; the beastly things have frightened us more
than all the Turks and all their German guns.
_24th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Vice-Admiral Nicol, French Naval
Commander-in-Chief, came aboard to pay me a visit.
Armistice from 9.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. for burial of Turkish dead. All
went off quite smoothly.... This moment, 12.40 p.m. the Captain has
rushed in to say that H.M.S. _Triumph_ is sinking! He caught the bad
news on his wireless as it flew. Beyond doubt the German submarine. What
exactly is about to happen, God knows. The fleet cannot see itself wiped
out by degrees; and yet, without the fleet, how are we soldiers to
exist? One more awful conundrum set to us, but the Navy will solve it,
for sure.
_25th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Bad news confirmed. The Admiral
came aboard and between us we tried to size up the new situation and to
readjust ourselves thereto. Our nicely worked out system for supplying
the troops has in a moment been tangled up into a hundred knotty
problems. Instead of our small craft working to and fro in half mile
runs, henceforth they will have to cover 60 miles per trip. Until now
the big ocean going ships have anchored close up to Helles or Anzac; in
future Mudros will be the only possible harbour for these priceless
floating depots. Imbros, here, lies quite open to submarine attacks, and
in a northerly gale, becomes a mere roadstead. The Admiral, who regards
soldiers as wayward water babes, has insisted on lashing a merchantman
to each side of the _Arcadian_ to serve as torpedo buffers. There are,
it seems, at least two German submarines prowling about at the present
moment between Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles. After torpedoing the _Triumph_
the same submarine fired at and missed the _Vengeance_. The _Lord
Nelson_ with the Admiral, as well as three French battleships,
zig-zagged out of harbour and made tracks for Mudros in the afternoon.
We are left all alone in our glory with our two captive merchantmen. The
attitude is heroic but not, I think, so dangerous as it is
uncomfortable. The big ocean liners lashed to port and starboard cut us
off from air as well as light and one of them is loaded with Cheddar.
When Mr. Jorrocks awoke James Pigg and asked him to open the window and
see what sort of a hunting morning it was, it will be remembered that
the huntsman opened the cupboard by mistake and made the reply, "Hellish
dark and smells of cheese." Well, that immortal remark hits us off to a
T. Never mind. Light will be vouchsafed. Amen.
The burial of 3,000 Turks by armistice at Anzac seems to have been
carried out without a hitch. All these 3,000 Turks were killed between
the 18th and 20th instant. By the usual averages this figure implies
over 12,000 wounded so the Lord has vouchsafed us a signal victory
indeed. Birdwood's men were all out and his reserves, or rather the lack
of them, would not permit him to counter-attack the moment the enemy's
assault was repulsed. When we read of battles in histories we feel, we
see, so clearly the value of counter-attack and the folly of passive
defence; but, in the field, the struggle has sometimes been so close
that the victorious defence are left gasping. The enemy were very polite
during the armistice, and by way of being highly solemn and correct, but
they could not refrain from bursting into laughter when the Australians
held up cigarettes and called out "baksheesh."
Last night the French and the Naval Brigade made a good advance with
slight loss. The East Lancs also pushed on a little bit.
_26th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Entertained a small party of
Australian officers as my private guests for 48 hours, my idea being to
give them a bit of a rest. Colonel Monash, commanding 4th Australian
Infantry Brigade, was the senior. He is a very competent officer. I have
a clear memory of him standing under a gum tree at Lilydale, near
Melbourne, holding a conference after a manoeuvre, when it had been
even hotter than it is here now. I was prepared for intelligent
criticisms but I thought they would be so wrapped up in the cotton wool
of politeness that no one would be very much impressed. On the contrary,
he stated his opinions in the most direct, blunt, telling way. The fact
was noted in my report and now his conduct out here has been fully up to
sample.
A horrid mishap. Landing some New Zealand Mounted Rifles at Anzac, the
destroyer anchored within range of the Turkish guns instead of slowly
steaming about out of range until the picket boats came off to bring the
men ashore. The Turks were watching and, as soon as she let go her
anchor, opened fire from their guns by the olive, and before the
destroyer could get under weigh six of these fine New Zealand lads were
killed and forty-five wounded. A hundred fair fighting casualties would
affect me less. To be knocked out before having taken part in a battle,
or even having set foot upon the Promised Land--nothing could be more
cruel.
A special order to the troops:--
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
_25th May, 1915._
1. Now that a clear month has passed since the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force began its night and day fighting with the enemy, the
General Commanding desires me to explain to officers, non-commissioned
officers and men the real significance of the calls made upon them to
risk their lives apparently for nothing better than to gain a few yards
of uncultivated land.
2. A comparatively small body of the finest troops in the world, French
and British, have effected a lodgment close to the heart of a great
continental empire, still formidable even in its decadence. Here they
stand firm, or slowly advance, and in the efforts made by successive
Turkish armies to dislodge them the rotten Government at Constantinople
is gradually wearing itself out. The facts and figures upon which this
conclusion is based have been checked and verified from a variety of
sources. Agents of neutral powers possessing good sources of information
have placed both the numbers and the losses of the enemy much higher
than they are set forth here, but the General Commanding prefers to be
on the safe side and to give his troops a strictly conservative
estimate.
Before operations began the strength of the defenders of the Dardanelles
was:--
Gallipoli Peninsula 34,000 and about 100 guns.
Asiatic side of Straits 41,000
All the troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula and fifty per cent. of the
troops on the Asiatic side were Nizam, that is to say, regular first
line troops. They were transferable, and were actually transferred to
this side upon which the invaders disembarked. Our Expeditionary Force
effected its landing it will be seen, in the face of an enemy superior,
not only to the covering parties which got ashore the first day, but
superior actually to the total strength at our disposal. By the 12th
May, the Turkish Army of occupation had been defeated in several
engagements, and would have been at the end of their resources had they
not meanwhile received reinforcements of 20,000 infantry and 21
batteries of Field Artillery.
Still the Expeditionary Force held its own, and more than its own,
inflicting fresh bloody defeats upon the newcomers and again the Turks
must certainly have given way had not a second reinforcement reached the
Peninsula from Constantinople and Smyrna amounting at the lowest
estimate to 24,000 men.
3. From what has been said it will be understood that the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force, supported by its gallant comrades the Fleet, but
with constantly diminishing effectives, has held in check or wrested
ground from some 120,000 Turkish troops elaborately entrenched and
supported by a powerful artillery.
The enemy has now few more Nizam troops at his disposal and not many
Redif or second class troops. Up to date his casualties are 55,000, and
again, in giving this figure, the General Commanding has preferred to
err on the side of low estimates.
Daily we make progress, and whenever the reinforcements close at hand
begin to put in an appearance, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force
will press forward with a fresh impulse to accomplish the greatest
Imperial task ever entrusted to an army.
_27th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ The _Majestic_ has been torpedoed
and has sunk off Cape Helles. Got the news at mid-day. Fuller, my
Artillery Commander, and Ashmead-Bartlett, the correspondent, were both
on board, and both were saved--minus kit! About 40 men have gone under.
Bad luck. A Naval Officer who has seen her says she is lying in shallow
water--6 fathoms--bottom upwards looking like a stranded whale. He says
the German submarine made a most lovely shot at her through a crowd of
cargo ships and transports. Like picking a royal stag out of his harem
of does. To my Staff, they tell me, he delivered himself further but, as
I said to the Officer who repeated these criticisms to me, "judge not
that ye be not judged."
_28th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Went for a walk with the Admiral.
He refuses any longer to accept the responsibility of keeping us afloat.
As Helles, Anzac and Tenedos have each been ruled out, we are going to
doss down on this sandbank opposite us. One thing, it will be central to
both my theatres of work.
_29th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ The Commodore, Roger Keyes, arrived
mid-day and invited me to come over to Helles with him on a destroyer,
H.M.S. _Scorpion._ He was crossing in hopes--_in hopes,_ if you
please--of hitting off the submarine. The idea that it might hit him had
not seemed to occur to him. On the way we were greatly excited to see
the bladder of an indicator net smoking. So we rushed about the place
and bombs were got ready to drop. But the net remained motionless and,
as the water was too deep for the submarine to be lying at the bottom,
it seemed (although no one dared to say so) that a porpoise had been
poking fun at the Commodore.
Landing at Helles inspected the various roads, which were in the making.
Next saw Hunter-Weston. Canvassed plans with him and felt myself
refreshed. Then went on to Gouraud's Headquarters, taking the Commodore
with me. My Commanders are an asset which cancels many a debit. Gouraud
is in excellent form and gave us tea. Walked down to "V" Beach at 6 p.m.
When we got on to the pier, which ends in the _River Clyde_, we found
another destroyer, the _Wolverine_, under Lieutenant-Commander Keyes,
the brother of the Commodore. She was to take us across, and (of all
places in the world to select for a berth!) she had run herself
alongside the _River Clyde_ which was, at that moment, busy playing
target to the heavy guns of Asia. I imagined that taking aboard a boss
like the Commander-in-Chief, as well as that much bigger boss (in naval
estimates) his own big brother, the Commodore, our Lieutenant-Commander
would nip away presto. Not a bit of it! No sooner had he got us aboard
than he came out boldly and very, very slowly, stern first, from the lee
of the _River Clyde_ and began a duel against Asia with 4-inch lyddite
from the _Wolverine's_ after gun. The fight seems quite funny to me now
but, at the time, serio-comic would have better described my
impressions. Shells ashore are part of the common lot; they come in the
day's work: on the water; in a cockleshell--well, you can't go to
ground, anyway!
[Illustration: VIEW OF "V" BEACH, TAKEN FROM S.S. "RIVER CLYDE"
_"Central News" photo._]
Heavy fighting at Anzac. The Turks fired a mine under Quinn's Post and
then rushed a section of the defence isolated by the explosion. At 6 in
the morning the crater was, Birdie says, most gallantly retaken with the
bayonet. There are excursions and alarms; attacks and counter-attacks;
bomb-showers to which the bayonet charge is our only retort--but we hold
fast the crater!
When I tell them at home that if they will give me munitions enough to
let me advance two miles I will give them Constantinople, that is the
truth. On paper, the Turks no doubt might assert with equal force that
if they got forces enough together to drive the Australians back a short
two hundred yards they could give the Sultan the resounding prestige of
a Peninsula freed from the Giaour. But that would require more Turks
than the Turks could feed, whereas we know we could do it now, as we
are--given the wherewithal--trench mortars, hand grenades and bombs, for
example.
A message from Hanbury Williams, who is with the Grand Duke Nicholas, to
say that all idea of sending me a Russian Army Corps to land at the
Bosphorus has been abandoned!!!
_30th May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Went to Anzac in a destroyer. The
Cove was being heavily shelled, and the troops near the beach together
with the fatigue parties handling stores and ammunition, had dashed
into their dugouts like marmots at the shadow of an eagle. Birdwood came
out to meet me on this very unhealthy spot; indeed, in spite of my
waving him back, he walked right on to the end of the deserted pier.
Just as we were getting near his quarters, a couple of shrapnel burst at
an angle and height which, by the laws of gravity, momentum and velocity
ought to have put a fullstop to this chronicle. Actually, we walked
on--through the "Valley of Death"--past the spot where the brave Bridges
bit the dust, to the Headquarters of the 4th Australian Infantry
Brigade. Thence I could see the enemy trenches in front of Quinn's Post,
and also a very brisk bomb combat in full flame where the New Zealand
Mounted Rifles were making good the Turkish communicating post they had
seized earlier in the day. Nothing more strange than this inspection.
Along the path at the bottom of the valley warning notices were stuck
up. The wayfarer has to be as punctilious about each footstep as
Christian in the "Pilgrim's Progress." Should he disregard the placards
directing him to keep to the right or to the left of the track, he is
almost certainly shot. Half of the pathway may be as safe as Piccadilly,
whilst he who treads the other had far better be up yonder at hand grips
with the Turks. Presumably some feature of the ground defilades one
part, for the enemy cannot see into the valley, although, were they only
20 yards nearer the edge of the cliff, they would command its whole
extent. The spirit of the men is invincible. Only lately have we been
able to give them blankets: as to square meals and soft sleeps, these
are dreams of the past, they belonged to another state of being. Yet I
never struck a more jovial crew. Men staggering under huge sides of
frozen beef; men struggling up cliffs with kerosine tins full of water;
men digging; men cooking; men card-playing in small dens scooped out
from the banks of yellow clay--everyone wore a Bank Holiday
air;--evidently the ranklings and worry of mankind--miseries and
concerns of the spirit--had fled the precincts of this valley. The
Boss--the bill--the girl--envy, malice, hunger, hatred--had scooted far
away to the Antipodes. All the time, overhead, the shell and rifle
bullets groaned and whined, touching just the same note of violent
energy as was in evidence everywhere else. To understand that awful din,
raise the eyes 25 degrees to the top of the cliff which closes in the
tail end of the valley and you can see the Turkish hand grenades
bursting along the crest, just where an occasional bayonet flashes and
figures hardly distinguishable from Mother earth crouch in an irregular
line. Or else they rise to fire and are silhouetted a moment against the
sky and then you recognize the naked athletes from the Antipodes and
your heart goes into your mouth as a whole bunch of them dart forward
suddenly, and as suddenly disappear. And the bomb shower stops dead--for
the moment; but, all the time, from that fiery crest line which is
Quinn's, there comes a slow constant trickle of wounded--some dragging
themselves painfully along; others being carried along on stretchers.
Bomb wounds all; a ceaseless, silent stream of bandages and blood. Yet
three out of four of "the boys" have grit left for a gay smile or a
cheery little nod to their comrades waiting for their turn as they pass,
pass, pass, down on their way to the sea.
There are poets and writers who see naught in war but carrion, filth,
savagery and horror. The heroism of the rank and file makes no appeal.
They refuse war the credit of being the only exercise in devotion on the
large scale existing in this world. The superb moral victory over death
leaves them cold. Each one to his taste. To me this is no valley of
death--it is a valley brim full of life at its highest power. Men live
through more in five minutes on that crest than they do in five years of
Bendigo or Ballarat. Ask the brothers of these very fighters--Calgoorlie
or Coolgardie miners--to do one quarter the work and to run one
hundredth the risk on a wages basis--instanter there would be a riot.
But here,--not a murmur, not a question; only a radiant force of
camaraderie in action.
The Turks have heaps of cartridges and more shells, anyway, than we
have. They have as many grenades as they can throw; we have--a dozen per
Company. There is a very bitter feeling amongst all the troops, but
especially the Australians, at this lack of elementary weapons like
grenades. Our overseas men are very intelligent. They are prepared to
make allowances for lack of shell; lack of guns; lack of high
explosives. But they know there must be something wrong when the Turks
carry ten good bombs to our one bad one; and they think, some of them,
that this must be my fault. Far from it. _Directly_ after the naval
battle of the 18th March--i.e., over two months ago, I wrote out a cable
asking for bombs. I sent this on my own happy thought, and I had hoped
for a million by the date of landing five weeks later. But I got,
practically, none; nor any promise for the future. In default of help
from home, we have tried to manufacture these primitive but very
effective projectiles for ourselves with jam pots, meat tins and any old
rubbish we can scrape together. De Lothbinière has shown ingenuity in
thus making bricks without straw. The Fleet, too, has played up and de
Robeck has guaranteed me two thousand to be made by the artificers on
the battleships. Maxwell in Egypt has been improvising a few; Methuen at
Malta says they can't make them there. But what a shame that the sons of
a manufacturing country like Great Britain should be in straits for
engines so simple.
Yesterday and to-day we have fired, for us, a terrible lot of shells
(1,800 shrapnel) but never was shot better spent. We reckon the enemy's
casualties between 1,000 and 2,000 mainly caused by our guns playing on
the columns which came up trying to improve upon their lodgment in
Quinn's Post. Add this to the 3,000 killed, and, say, 12,000 wounded on
the 18th instant, and it is clear no troops in the world can stand it
very long. But we are literally at the end of our shrapnel; and as to
high explosive, according to the standards of the gunners, we have never
had any!
Left on a picket boat with Birdie to board my destroyer to an
accompaniment of various denominations of projectiles. One or two shells
burst hard by just as we were scrambling up her side.
Vice-Admiral Nicholls called after my return. Courtauld Thomson, the Red
Cross man, dined; very helpful; very well stocked with comforts and
everyone likes him, even the R.A.M.C.
_31st May, 1915. H.M.T. "Arcadian."_ Worked in the forenoon. Gouraud,
Girodon and Hunter-Weston lunched and we spent the afternoon at the
scheme for our next fight. Each of us agreed that Fortune had not been
over kind. By one month's hard, close hammering we had at last made the
tough _moral_ of the Turks more pliant, when lo and behold, in broad
daylight, thousands of their common soldiery see with their own eyes two
great battleships sink beneath the waves and all the others make an exit
more dramatic than dignified. Most of the Armada of store ships had
already cleared out and now the last of the battleships has offed it
over the offing; a move which the whole of the German Grand Fleet could
not have forced them to make! What better pick-me-up could Providence
have provided for the badly-shaken Turks? No more inquisitive cruisers
ready to let fly a salvo at anything that stirs. No more searchlights by
night; no more big explosives flying from the Aegean into the
Dardanelles!
_1st June, 1915. Imbros._ Came ashore and stuck up my 80-lb. tent in the
middle of a sandbank whereon some sanguine Greek agriculturalist has
been trying to plant wheat.
We shall live the simple life; the same life, in fact, as the men, but
are glad to be off the ship and able to stretch our legs.
Hard fighting in the North zone and the South. Both outposts captured by
us on the 29th May at Anzac and on the French right at Helles heavily
attacked. In the North we had to give ground, but not before we had made
the enemy pay ten times its value in killed and wounded. Had we only had
a few spare rounds of shrapnel we need never have gone back. The War
Office have called for a return of my 4.5 howitzer ammunition during the
past fortnight, and I find that, since the 14th May, we have expended
477 shell altogether at Anzac and Helles combined. In the South the
enemy twice recaptured the redoubt taken by the French on the 29th, but
Gouraud, having a nice little parcel of high explosive on hand, was able
to drive them out definitely and to keep them out.
_2nd June, 1915. Imbros._ Working all day in camp. Blazing hot, tempered
by a cool breeze towards evening. De Robeck came ashore and we had an
hour together in the afternoon. Everything is fixed up for our big
attack on the 4th. From aeroplane photographs it would appear that the
front line Turkish trenches are meant more as traps for rash forlorn
hopes than as strongholds. In fact, the true tug only begins when we try
to carry the second line and the flanking machine guns. Gouraud has
generously lent us two groups of 75s with H.E. shell, and I am cabling
the fact to the War Office as it means a great deal to us. When I say
they are lent to us, I do not mean that they put the guns at our
disposal. They are only ours for defensive purposes; that is to say,
they remain in their own gun positions in the French lines and are to
help by thickening the barrage in front of the Naval Division.
De Robeck and Keyes are quite as much at sea as Braithwaite and myself
about this original scheme of the British Government for treating a
tearing, raging crisis; i.e., by taking no notice of it. I guess that
never before in the history of war has a Commander asked urgently that
his force might be doubled and then got no orders; no answer of any sort
or kind!
When I sent K. my M.F. 234 of the 17th May asking for two Corps, or for
Allies, one or the other, I got a reply by return expressing his
disappointment; since then, nothing. During that fortnight of silence
the whole of the Turkish Empire has been moving--closing in--on the
Dardanelles. Then, by a side-wind I happen to hear of the abstraction of
a Russian Army Corps from my supposed command; an Army Corps, who by the
mere fact of "being," held off a large force of Turks from Gallipoli.
So I have put down a few hard truths. Unpalatable they may be but some
day they've got to be faced and the sooner the better. Time has slipped
away, but to-day is still better than to-morrow.
What a change since the War Office sent us packing with a bagful of
hallucinations. Naval guns sweeping the Turks off the Peninsula; the
Ottoman Army legging it from a British submarine waving the Union Jack;
Russian help in hand; Greek help on the _tapis_. Now it is our Fleet
which has to leg it from the German submarine; there is no ammunition
for the guns; no drafts to keep my Divisions up to strength; my Russians
have gone to Galicia and the Greeks are lying lower than ever.
"No. M.F. 288. From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With
reference to my telegrams No. M.F. 274 of 29th May, and No. M.F. 234 of
17th May. If the information sent by Hanbury-Williams, to which I
referred in my No. M.F. 274, is correct it is advisable that I should
send you a fresh appreciation of the situation.
"I assumed in my No. M.F. 234 that you had adequate forces at your
disposal, but on the other hand I assumed that some 100,000 Turks would
be kept occupied by the Russians. By the defection of Russia, 100,000
Turks are set free in the Caucasus and European Turkey. After deduction
of casualties there are at least 80,000 Turks now against us in the
Peninsula. There are 20,000 Turks on the Bulgarian frontier which,
assuming that Bulgaria remains neutral, are able to reinforce Gallipoli;
some, in fact, have already arrived showing the restoration of Turkish
confidence in King Ferdinand. Close by on the Asiatic side there remain
10,000 Turks, making a total of 210,000, to which must be added 65,000
who are under training in Europe.
"The movement of the Turkish troops has already begun. There are
practically no troops left in Smyrna district, and there are already in
the field numbers of troops from European garrisons, while recently it
was reported that more are coming.
"The movement of a quarter of a million men against us seems to be well
under way, and although many of these are ill-trained still with
well-run supply and ammunition columns and in trenches designed by
Germans the Turk is always formidable.
"As regards ammunition, the enemy appears to have an unlimited supply of
small-arm ammunition and as many hand-grenades as they can fling. Though
there is some indication that gun ammunition is being husbanded, it was
reported as late as 27th May, that supplies of shells were being
received _via_ Roumania, and yesterday it was suggested that artillery
ammunition can be manufactured at Constantinople where it is reported
that over two hundred engineers have arrived from Krupp's.
"At the same time, the temporary withdrawal of our battleships owing to
enemy submarines has altered the position to our disadvantage; while not
of the highest importance materially this factor carries considerable
moral weight.
"Taking all these factors into consideration, it would seem that for an
early success some equivalent to the suspended Russian co-operation is
vitally necessary. The ground gained and the positions which we hold are
not such as to enable me to envisage with soldierly equanimity the
probability of the large forces adumbrated above being massed against my
troops without let or hindrance from elsewhere. Fresh light may be shed
on the matter by the battle now imminent, but I am cabling on reasoned
existing facts. Time is an object, but if Greece came in, preferably
_via_ Enos, the problem would be simplified. It is broadly my view that
we must obtain the support of a fresh ally in this theatre, or else
there should be got ready British reinforcements to the full extent
mentioned in my No. M.F. 234, though as stated above the disappearance
of Russian co-operation was not contemplated in my estimate."
_3rd June, 1915. Imbros._ Meant to go to Anzac; sea too rough; in the
afternoon saw de Robeck and Roger Keyes. Braithwaite came over and we
went through my cable of yesterday. The sailors would just as soon I had
left out that remark about the enemy being bucked up by the retreat of
our battleships. But the passage implied also that their mere visible
presence was shown to be most valuable. Both of them agree that I am
well within the mark in saying what I did about the loss of my Russian
Army Corps. Roger Keyes next launched a dry land criticism. He rightly
thinks that the weakness of our _present_ units is _the_ real weakness:
he thinks we are far more in need of drafts than of fresh units; he
suggests that a rider be sent now to insist that the estimates in
yesterday's cable were only made on the assumption that my present force
is kept up to strength. I did press that very point in my first cable of
17th May, which is referred to in the opening of this cable; further, we
keep on saying it every week in our War Office cable giving strengths.
After all, K. is 65. He still believes "A man's a man and a rifle's a
rifle"; I still believe that half the value of every human being depends
upon his environment:--we are not going to convert one another now.
As we were actually talking, Williams brought over an answer:--
"No. 5104, cipher. From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. With
reference to your No. M.F. 288. Owing to the restricted nature of the
ground you occupy and the experience we have had in Flanders of
increased forces acting in trench positions, I own I have some doubts of
an early decisive result being obtained by at once increasing the forces
at your disposal, but I should like your views as soon as you
can--to-day if possible. Are you convinced that with immediate
reinforcements to the extent you mention you could force the Kilid Bahr
position and thus finish the Dardanelles operations?
"You mentioned in a previous telegram that you intended to keep
reinforcements on islands, is this your intention with regard to the
Lowland Division, now on its way to you, and the other troops when
sent?"
K.'s brief cable is _intensely_ characteristic. I have taken down
hundreds of his wires. We are face to face here with his very self at
_first hand_. How curiously it reveals the man's instinct, or
genius--call it what you will.
K. sees in a flash what the rest of the world does not seem to see so
clearly; viz., that the piling up of increased forces opposite
entrenched positions is a spendthrift, unscientific proceeding. He
wishes to know if I mean to do this. To draw me out he assumes if I get
the troops, I _would_ at once commit them to trench warfare by crowding
them in behind the lines of Helles or Anzac. Actually I intend to keep
the bulk of them on the islands, so as to throw them unexpectedly
against some key position which is _not_ prepared for defence. But I
have to be very careful what I say, seeing that the Turks got wind of
the date of our first landing from London _via_ Vienna. Least said to a
Cabinet, least leakage.
That is not all. Curt as is the cable it has yet scope to show up a
little more of our great K.'s outfit. His infernal hurry. "To-day":--I
am to reply, to-day! He has taken some two and a half weeks to answer my
request for two Army Corps and I am to answer a far more obscure
question in two and a half minutes. Why, since my appeal of 17th May the
situation has not stood still. A Commander in the field is like a cannon
ball. If he stops going ahead, he falls dead. You can't stop moving for
a fortnight and then expect to carry on where you left off; I think the
Duke of Wellington said this; if he didn't he should have. To err is to
be human and the troops, if sent at once, may or may not, fulfil our
hopes. All we here can say is this:--
(1) If the Army Corps had been sent at once (i.e., two weeks ago) the
results should have been decisive.
(2) If the Army Corps are not sent at once, there can be no early
decision.
Braithwaite, De Robeck and Keyes agree to (1) and (2) but the cabled
answer will not be so simple and, in spite of K.'s sudden impatience, I
must sleep over it first.
Written whilst Williams waits:--
"No. M.F. 292. From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Secret.
To-morrow, 4th June, I am fighting a general action. Therefore I feel
sure that you will wish me to defer my answer to your telegram No. 5104,
cipher, until I see the result."
These lofty strategical questions must not make me forget an equally
vital munitions message just to hand. I have cabled K. twice in the past
day or two about shells. On the 1st instant I had said, "I still await
the information promised in your x. 4773, A. 5, of 19th instant. In my
opinion the supply of gun ammunition can hardly be considered adequate
or safe until the following conditions can be filled:--(1) That the
amounts with units and on the Lines of Communication should be made up
to the number of rounds per gun which is allowed in War Establishment
figures of 29th Division. (2) That these full amounts should be
maintained and despatched automatically without any further application
from us, beyond a weekly statement of the expenditure which will be
cabled to you every Saturday. (3) In view of the number and the extent
of the entrenchments to be dealt with it is necessary that a high
proportion of high explosive shell for 18 pounder and howitzers be
included in accordance with the report of my military advisers."
We now have his reply:--
"No. 5088, cipher. From Earl Kitchener to Sir Ian Hamilton. With
reference to your telegrams No. M.F. 281 and No. M.F.G.T. 967. We cannot
supply ammunition to maintain a 1,000 rounds a gun owing to the demands
from France, but consignments are being sent which amount to 17 rounds
per gun per day for the 18 pounder and 4.5.-inch howitzer; this is
considered by General Joffre and Sir John French as necessary. As much
as possible of other natures will be sent. As regards quantities, you
will be informed as early as possible. As available, H.E. shells will be
sent for 18 pounder guns and howitzers."
If we get 17 rounds per gun per day for the 18 pounders and 4.5
howitzers we shall indeed be on velvet. To be given what satisfies
Joffre and French--that sounds too good to be true. So ran my thoughts
and Braithwaite's on a first reading. Then came the C.R.A. who puts
another light on the proposal and points out that the implied comparison
with France is fallacious. We are undergunned here as compared with
France in the proportion of 1 to 3. I mean to say that, in proportion to
"bayonets" we have rather less than one third of the "guns."
_Therefore_, if we were really to have munitions on the scale
"considered necessary by General Joffre and Sir John French," we ought
to have three times 17 rounds per day per gun; i.e. 51 rounds per day
per gun. But never mind. _If we do get_ the 17 rounds we shall be
infinitely better off than we have been: "and so say all of us!" Putting
this cable together with yesterday's we all of us feel that the home
folk are beginning to yawn and rub their eyes and that ere long they may
really be awake.
_4th June, 1915. Imbros._ Left camp after breakfast and boarded the
redoubtable _Wolverine_ under that desperado Lieutenant-Commander Keyes.
The General Staff came alongside and we made our way to Cape Helles
through a blinding dust storm--at least, the dust came right out to sea,
but it was on shore that it became literally blinding.
On the pier I met Gouraud who walked up with me. Gouraud was very grave
but confident. My post of command had been "dug out" for me well forward
on the left flank by Hunter-Weston. In that hole two enormous tarantulas
and I passed a day that seems to me ten years. The torture of suspense;
the extremes of exaltation and of depression; the Red Indian necessity
of showing no sign: all this varied only by the vicious scream of shell
sailing some 30 feet over our heads on their way towards the 60 pounders
near the point. A Commander feels desperately lonely at such moments. On
him, and on him alone, falls the crushing onus of responsibility: to be
a Corps Commander is child's play in _that_ comparison. The Staff are
gnawed with anxiety too--are saying their prayers as fast as they can,
no doubt, as they follow the ebb and flow of the long khaki line through
their glasses. Yes, I have done that myself in the old days from
Charasia onwards. Yet how faintly is my anguish reflected in the mere
anxiety of their minds.
Chapters could be written about this furious battle fought in a
whirlwind of dust and smoke; some day I hope somebody may write them.
After the first short spell of shelling our men fixed bayonets and
lifted them high above the parapet. The Turks thinking we were going to
make the assault, rushed troops into their trenches, until then lightly
held. No sooner were our targets fully manned than we shelled them in
earnest and went on at it until--on the stroke of mid-day--out dashed
our fellows into the open. For the best part of an hour it seemed that
we had won a decisive victory. On the left all the front line Turkish
trenches were taken. On the right the French rushed the _"Haricot"_--so
long a thorn in their flesh; next to them the Anson lads stormed another
big Turkish redoubt in a slap-dash style reminding me of the best work
of the old Regular Army; but the boldest and most brilliant exploit of
the lot was the charge made by the Manchester Brigade[19] in the centre
who wrested two lines of trenches from the Turks; and then, carrying
right on; on to the lower slopes of Achi Baba, had _nothing_ between
them and its summit but the clear, unentrenched hillside. They lay
there--the line of our brave lads, plainly visible to a pair of good
glasses--there they actually lay! We wanted, so it seemed, but a reserve
to advance in their support and carry them right up to the top. We
said--and yet could hardly believe our own words--"We are through!"
Alas, too previous that remark. Everything began to go wrong. First the
French were shelled and bombed out of the _"Haricot"_; next the right of
the Naval Division became uncovered and they had to give way, losing
many times more men in the yielding than in the capture of their ground.
Then came the turn of the Manchesters, left in the lurch, with their
right flank hanging in the air. By all the laws of war they ought to
have tumbled back anyhow, but by the laws of the Manchesters they hung
on and declared they could do so for ever. How to help? Men! Men, not so
much now to sustain the Manchesters as to force back the Turks who were
enfilading them from the _"Haricot"_ and from that redoubt held for
awhile by the R.N.D. on their right. I implored Gouraud to try and make
a push and promised that the Naval Division would retake their redoubt
if he could retake the _"Haricot"_. Gouraud said he would go in at 3
p.m. The hour came; nothing happened. He then said he could not call
upon his men again till 4 o'clock, and at 4 o'clock he said definitely
that he would not be able to make another assault. The moment that last
message came in I first telephoned and then, to make doubly sure, ran
myself to Hunter-Weston's Headquarters so as not to let another moment
be lost in pulling out the Manchester Brigade. I had 500 yards to go,
and, rising the knoll, I would have been astonished, had I had any
faculty of astonishment left in me, to meet Beetleheim, the Turk, who
was with French in South Africa. I suppose he is here as an interpreter,
or something, but I didn't ask. Seeing me alone for the moment he came
along. He had quite a grip of the battle and seemed to hope I might let
the Manchesters try and stick it out through the night, as he thought
the Turks were too much done to do much more. But it was not good
enough. To fall back was agony; not to do it would have been folly.
Hunter-Weston felt the same. When Fate has first granted just a sip of
the wine of success the slip between the cup and lip comes hardest. The
upshot of the whole affair is that the enemy still hold a strong line of
trenches between us and Achi Baba. Our four hundred prisoners, almost
all made by the Manchester Brigade, amongst whom a good number of
officers, do not console me. Having to make the Manchesters yield up
their hard won gains is what breaks my heart. Had I known the result of
our fight before the event, I should have been happy enough. Three or
four hundred yards of ground plus four hundred prisoners are distances
and numbers which may mean little in Russia or France, but here, where
we only have a mile or two to go, land has a value all its own. Yes, I
should have been happy enough. But, to have to yield up the best
half--the vital half--of our gains--to have had our losses trebled on
the top of a cheaply won victory--these are the reverse side of our
medal for the 4th June.
Going back we fell in with a blood-stained crowd from the Hood, Howe and
Anson Battalions. Down the little gully to the beach we could only walk
very slowly. At my elbow was Colonel Crauford Stuart, commanding the
Hood Battalion. He had had his jaw smashed but I have seen men pull
longer faces at breaking a collar stud. He told me that the losses of
the Naval Division has been very heavy, the bulk of them during their
retreat. From the moment the Turks drove the French out of the
_"Haricot"_ the enfilade fire became murderous.
On the beach was General de Lisle, fresh from France. He is taking over
the 29th Division from Hunter-Weston who ascends to the command of the
newly formed 8th Army Corps. De Lisle seemed in very good form although
it must have been rather an eye-opener landing in the thick of this huge
stream of wounded. How well I remember seeing him galloping at the head
of his Mounted Infantry straight for Pretoria; and my rage when, under
orders from Headquarters, I had to send swift messengers to tell him he
must rein back for some reason never made clear.
_5th June, 1915. Imbros._ Best part of the day occupied in a hundred and
one sequels of the battle. The enemy have been quiet; they have had a
belly-full. De Robeck came off to see me at 5.30, to have a final talk
(amongst other things) as to the Enos and Bulair ideas before I send my
final answer to K. If we dare not advertise the detail of our proposed
tactics, we may take the lesser risk of saying what we are _not_ going
to attempt. The Admiral is perfectly clear against Bulair. There is no
protection there for the ships against submarines except Enos harbour
and Enos is only one fathom deep. After all, the main thing they want is
that I should commit myself to a statement that if I get the drafts and
troops asked for in my various cables, I will make good. That, I find
quite reasonable.
_6th June, 1915. Imbros._ A very hot and dusty day. Still sweeping up
the _débris_ of the battle. Besides my big cable have been studying
strengths with my A.G. The Battalions are dwindling to Companies and the
Divisions to Brigades.
The cable is being ciphered: not a very luminous document: how could it
be? The great men at home seem to forget that they cannot draw wise
counsels from their servants unless they confide in them and give them
_all_ the factors of the problem. If a client goes to a lawyer for
advice the first thing the lawyer asks him to do is to make a clean
breast of it. Before K. asks me to specify what I can do if he sends me
these unknown and--in Great Britain--most variable quantities,
Territorial or New Army Divisions, he ought to make a clean breast of it
by telling me:--
(1) What he has.
(2) What Sir John French wants.
(3) Whether Italy will move--or Greece.
(4) What is happening in the Balkans,--in the
Caucasus,--in Mesopotamia.
After all, the Armies of the Caucasus and of Mesopotamia are not
campaigning in the moon. They are two Allied Armies working with me (or
supposed to be working with me) against a common enemy.
The first part of my cable I discuss the cause which led to the
disappointing end to the battle of the 4th already described and then go
on to say, "I am convinced by this action that with my present force my
progress will be very slow, but in the absence of any further important
alteration in the situation such as a definite understanding between
Turkey and Bulgaria, I believe the reinforcements asked for in my No.
234 will eventually enable me to take Kilid Bahr and will assuredly
expedite the decision. I entirely agree that the restricted nature of
the ground I occupy militates against me in success, however much I am
reinforced; that was why in my Nos. M.F. 214 and M.F. 234 I emphasized
the desirability of securing co-operation of new Allied Forces acting on
a second line of operations. I have been very closely considering the
possibility of opening a new line of operations myself, _via_ Enos, if
sufficient reinforcements should be available. The Vice-Admiral,
however, is at present strongly averse to the selection of Enos owing to
the open and unprotected nature of anchorage and to the presence of
enemy submarines. Otherwise Enos offers very favourable prospects, both
strategically and tactically, and is so direct a threat to
Constantinople as to necessitate withdrawal of Turkish troops from the
Peninsula to meet it. Smyrna or even Adramyti which are not open to the
same objections are too far from me, but the effect of entry of a fresh
Ally at either place would inevitably make itself felt before very long
in preventing further massing of the Turkish army against me, and
perhaps even in drawing off troops; a considerable moral and political
effect might also be produced, and all information points to those
districts being denuded of troops.
"With regard to the employment of the reinforcements asked for in my No.
M.F. 234, General Birdwood estimates that four Brigades are necessary to
clear and extend his front sufficiently to prepare a serious move
towards Maidos. I should therefore allocate a corps to the
Australian-New Zealand Army Corps as the other two brigades would be
required to give weight to his advance. The French Force as at present
constituted, and the Naval Division which has been roughly handled,
would be replaced in front of the line by the other corps. This
reinforcement to be exclusive of any help we may receive from Allied
troops operating on a second line of operations so distant as Smyrna.
"With reference to your last paragraph I have no alternative, until Achi
Baba is in my possession, but to keep reinforcements on islands or
elsewhere handy. I have made arrangements at present, however, for one
Infantry Brigade and Engineers of the Lowland Division on the Peninsula,
one Infantry Brigade at Imbros and the remaining Infantry Brigade at
Alexandria to be ready to start at 12 hours' notice whenever I telegraph
for it. Besides all the reasons given above, no troops in existence can
continue fighting night and day without respite."
Three weeks have passed now since I asked for two British Corps or for
Allies and still no reply or notice of any sort except that message of
the 3rd instant expressing doubts as to whether any good purpose will be
served by sending us help "at once." Well; there hasn't been much "at
once" about it but I have not played the Sybilline book trick or doubled
my demand with each delay as I ought perhaps to have done. Now I think
we are bound to hear something but I can't make out what has come over
K. of K. In the old days his prime force lay in his faculty of focusing
every iota of his energy upon the pivotal project, regardless (so it
used to appear) of the other planks of the platform. A "side show" to
him meant the non-vital part of the business, _at that moment_: it was
not a question of troops or of ranks of Generals. For the time being the
interests of an enterprise of five thousand would obliterate those of
fifty. No man ever went the whole hog better. He would turn the whole
current of his energy to help the man of the hour. The rest were bled
white to help him. If they howled they found that K. and his Staff were
deaf, and for the same reason, as the crew of Ulysses to the Sirens.
Several times in South Africa K., so doing, carried the Imperial
Standard to victory through a series of hair's breadth escapes. But
to-day, though he sees, the power of believing in his own vision and of
hanging on to it like a bulldog, seems paralysed. He hesitates. Ten
short years ago, if K.'s heart had been set on Constantinople, why, to
Constantinople he would have gone. Paris might have screamed; he would
not have swerved a hair's breadth till he had gripped the Golden Horn.
_7th June, 1915. Imbros._ Left camp early and went to Cape Helles on a
destroyer. On our little sandbag pier, built by Egyptians and Turkish
prisoners, I met General Wallace and his A.D.C. (a son of Walter
Long's). Wallace has come here to take up his duty as Inspector-General
of Communications. About ten days ago he was forced upon us. He is
reputed a good executive Brigadier of the Indian Army, but we want him,
not to train Sepoys but to create one of the biggest organizing and
administrative jobs in the world. His work will comprise the whole of
the transhipment of stores from the ships to small craft; their dispatch
over 60 miles of sea to the Peninsula, and the maintenance of all the
necessary machinery in good running order. The task is tremendous, and
here is a simple soldier, without any experience of naval men or
matters, or the British soldier, or of Administration on a large scale,
or even of superior Staff duties, sent me for the purpose. We want a
competent business man at Mudros, ready to grapple with millions of
public money; ready to cable on his own for goods or gear by the ten
thousand pounds worth. We want a man of tried business courage; a man
who can tackle contractors. We are sent an Indian Brigadier who has
never, so far as I can make out, in his longish life had undivided
responsibility for one hundred pounds of public belongings. I cabled to
K. my objection as strongly as seemed suitable, but he tells me to carry
on. He tells me to carry on and, in doing so, throws an amusing
sidelight upon himself. Into his cable he sticks the words, "Ellison
cannot be spared." K. believes that my protest _re_ Wallace has, at the
back of it, a wish to put in the Staff Officer he took from me when I
started. He doesn't believe in my zeal for efficiency at Mudros; he
thinks my little plan is to work General Ellison into the billet.
Certainly, I'd like an organizer of Ellison's calibre, but he had not,
it so happens, entered my mind till K. put him there!
Landing at "W" Beach, I walked over to the 9th Division and met Generals
Hunter-Weston, de Lisle and Doran. As we were having our confab, the
Turkish guns from Asia were steadily pounding the ridge just South of
Headquarters. One or two big fellows fell within 100 yards of the Mess.
After an A.1 lunch (for which much glory to Carter, A.D.C.) visited
Gouraud at French Headquarters. Going along the coast we were treated
to an exciting spectacle. The Turkish guns in Asia stopped firing at
Headquarters and turned on to a solitary French transport containing
forage, which had braved the submarines and instead of transhipping (as
is now the order) at Mudros, had anchored close to "V" Beach. After
several overs and unders they hit her three times running and set her on
fire. Destroyers and trawlers rushed to her help. Bluejackets boarded
her; got her fire under control; got her under steam and moved out. The
amazing part of the affair lay in the conduct of the Turks. Having made
their three hits, then was the moment to sink the bally ship. But no;
they switched back once more onto the Peninsula, and left their helpless
prize to make a leisurely and unmolested escape. Anyone but a Turk would
have opened rapid fire on seeking his target smoking like a factory
chimney, ringed round by a crowd of small craft. But these old Turks are
real freaks. Their fierce courage on the defensive is the only cert
about them. On all other points it becomes a fair war risk to presume
upon their happy-go-lucky behaviour. If this crippled ship had been full
of troops instead of hay they would equally have let her slip through
their fingers.
I stayed the best part of an hour with Gouraud. He can throw no light
from the French side upon the reason for the strange hesitations of our
Governments. As he says, after reporting an entirely unexpected and
unprepared for situation and asking for the wherewithal to cope with
it, a Commander should get fresh orders. Either: we cannot give you what
you ask, so fall back onto the defensive; or, go ahead, we will give you
the means. Taking leave we came back again by the 29th Headquarters
where I saw Douglas, commanding the 42nd Division. Got home latish. As I
was on my way to our destroyer took in a wireless saying that submarine
E.11 had returned safely after three fruitful weeks in the Marmora.
A most singular message is in:--
"(No. 5199).
"From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
"With reference to your telegram No. M.F. 301, instead of sending such
telegrams reporting operations, privately to Earl Kitchener, will you
please send them to the Secretary of State. A separate telegram might
have been sent dealing with the latter part about Doran."
May the devil fly away with me if I know what that means! Braithwaite is
as much at a loss as myself. No one knows better than we do how much
store K. sets on having all these messages addressed to him personally.
There's more in this than meets the common or garden optic!
Very heavy firing on the Peninsula at 8 o'clock; a ceaseless tremor of
the air which--faint here--denotes tremendous musketry there.