THE STRAITS
Cast anchor at Tenedos at 3 p.m., 17th March, 1915, having entered the
harbour at the very same instant as le général d'Amade.
Hurried over at once to a meeting aboard that lovely sea monster, H.M.S.
_Queen Elizabeth_.
Present:--
Admiral de Robeck,
Commodore Roger Keyes,
Admiral Guépratte, cmdg. French Fleet,
General d'Amade,
General Braithwaite,
Admiral Wemyss,
Captain Pollen,
Myself.
De Robeck greeted me in the friendliest fashion. He is a fine looking
man with great charm of manner. After a word or two to d'Amade and being
introduced to Wemyss, Guépratte and Keyes, we sat down round a table and
the Admiral began. His chief worry lies in the clever way the enemy are
now handling their mobile artillery. He can silence the big fortress
ordnance, but the howitzers and field guns fire from concealed
positions and make the clearing of the minefields something of a V.C.
sort of job for the smaller craft. Even when the Fleet gets through,
these moveable guns will make it very nasty for store ships or
transports which follow. The mine-sweepers are slow and bad with worn
out engines. Some of the civilian masters and crews of the trawlers have
to consider wives and kids as well as V.C.s. The problem of getting the
Fleet through or of getting submarines through is a problem of clearing
away the mines. With a more powerfully engined type of mine-sweeper and
regular naval commanders and crews to man them, the business would be
easy. But as things actually stand there is real cause for anxiety as to
mines.
The Peninsula itself is being fortified and many Turks work every night
on trenches, redoubts and entanglements. Not one single living soul has
been seen, since the engagement of our Marines at the end of February,
although each morning brings forth fresh evidences of nocturnal
activity, in patches of freshly turned up soil. All landing places are
now commanded by lines of trenches and are ranged by field guns and
howitzers, which, thus far, cannot be located as our naval seaplanes are
too heavy to rise out of rifle range. There has been a muddle about
these seaplanes. Nominally they possess very powerful Sunbeam engines;
actually the d----d things can barely rise off the water. The naval
guns do not seem able to knock the Turkish Infantry out of their deep
trenches although they can silence their fire for awhile. This was
proved at that last landing by Marines. The Turkish searchlights are
both fixed and mobile. They are of the latest pattern and are run by
skilled observers. He gave us, in fact, to understand that German
thoroughness and forethought have gripped the old go-as-you-please Turk
and are making him march to the _Parade-schritt_.
The Admiral would prefer to force a passage on his own, and is sure he
can do so. Setting Constantinople on one side for the moment, _if_ the
Fleet gets through and the Army _then_ attacks at Bulair, we would have
the Turkish Army on the Peninsula in a regular trap. Therefore, whether
from the local or the larger point of view, he has no wish to call us in
until he has had a real good try. He means straightway to put the whole
proposition to a practical test.
His views dovetail in to a hair's breadth with K.'s views. The Admiral's
"real good try" leads up towards K.'s "after every effort has been
exhausted."
That's a bit of luck for our kick-off, anyway. What we soldiers have to
do now is to hammer away at our band-o-bast[5] whilst the Navy pushes as
hard, as fast and as far as its horsepower, manpower and gunpower will
carry it.
The Admiral asked to see my instructions and Braithwaite read them out.
When he stopped, Roger Keyes, the Commodore, inquired, "Is that all?"
And when Braithwaite confessed that it was, everyone looked a little
blank.
Asked what I meant to do, I said I proposed to get ready for a landing,
as, whether the Fleet forces the passage and disembarked us on the
Bosphorus; or, whether the Fleet did not force the passage and we had to
"go for" the Peninsula, the _band-o-bast_ could be made to suit either
case.
The Admiral asked if I meant to land at Bulair? I replied my mind was
open on that point: that I was a believer in seeing things for myself
and that I would not come to any decision on the map if it were possible
to come to it on the ground. He then said he would send me up to look at
the place through my own glasses in the Phaeton to-morrow; that it would
not be possible to land large forces on the neck of Bulair itself as
there were no beaches, but that I should reconnoitre the coast at the
head of the Gulf as landing would be easier with every few miles we drew
away towards the North. I told him it would be useless to land at any
distance from my objective, for the simple reason that I had no
transport, mechanical or horse, wheeled or pack, to enable me to support
myself further than five or six miles from the Fleet and it would take
many weeks and many ships to get it together; however, I ended, I would
to-morrow see for myself.
The air of the Aegean hardly differs so much from the North Sea haze as
does the moral atmosphere of Tenedos differ from that of the War Office.
This is always the way. Until the plunge is taken, the man in the arm
chair clamps rose coloured spectacles on to his nose and the man on the
spot is anxious; _but_, once the men on the spot jump off they become
as jolly as sandboys, whilst the man in the arm chair sits searching for
a set-back with a blue lens telescope.
Here, the Peninsula looks a tougher nut to crack than it did on Lord K.'s
small and featureless map. I do not speak for myself for I have so far
only examined the terrain through a field glass. I refer to the tone of
the sailors, which strikes me as being graver and less irresponsible
than the tone of the War Office.
The Admiral believes that, at the time of the first bombardment, 5000
men could have marched from Cape Helles right up to the Bulair lines.
(Before leaving the ship I learnt that some of the sailors do not
agree). Now that phase has passed. Many more troops have come down,
German Staff Officers have grappled with the situation, and have got
their troops scientifically disposed and heavily entrenched. This
skilful siting of the Turkish trenches has been admired by all competent
British observers; the number of field guns on the Peninsula is now many
times greater than it was.
After this the discussion became informal. Referring again to my
instructions, I laid stress on the point that I was a waiting man and
that it was the Admiral's innings for so long as he could keep his
wicket up. Braithwaite asked a question or two about the trenches and
all of us deplored the lack of aeroplanes whereby we were blinded in our
attack upon an enemy who espied every boat's crew moving over the
water.
The more I revolve these matters in my mind, the more easy does it seem
to accept K.'s order not to be in too great a hurry to bring the Army to
the front. I devoutly hope indeed (and I think the fiercest of our
fellows agree) that the Navy will pull us out the chestnuts from the
fire.
At the close of the sitting I made these notes of what had happened and
drafted a first cable to Lord K., giving him an epitome of the Admiral's
opening statement about the enemy's clever use of field guns to hinder
the clearing of the minefields; his good entrenchments and the nightly
work thereon; our handicap in all these matters because the type of
seaplanes sent us "are too heavy to rise out of effective rifle
range"--(one has to put these things mildly). I add that the Admiral,
"while not making light of dangers was evidently determined to exhaust
every effort before calling upon the soldiers for their help on a large
scale"; and I wind up by telling him Lemnos seems a bad base and that I
am off to-morrow on an inspection of the coasts of the Peninsula. Having
got these matters off my chest on to the chest of K., was then taken
round the ship by the Flag Captain, G.P.W. Hope. By this time it was
nearly 7 so I stayed and dined with the Admiral--a charming host. After
dinner got back here.
_18th March, 1915._ _H.M.S. "Phaeton."_ Cleared Tenedos Harbour at 4
a.m. and reached Lemnos at 6 a.m. I never saw so many ships collected
together in my life; no, not even at Hong Kong, Bombay or New York.
Filled up with oil fuel and at 7 a.m. d'Amade and Major-General Paris,
commanding the Royal Naval Division, came on board with one or two Staff
Officers. After consulting these Officers as well as McLagan, the
Australian Brigadier, cabled Lord K. to say Alexandria _must_ be our
base as "the Naval Division transports have been loaded up as in peace
time and they must be completely discharged and every ship reloaded," in
war fashion. At Lemnos, where there are neither wharfs, piers, labour
nor water, the thing could not be done. Therefore, "the closeness of
Lemnos to the Dardanelles, as implying the rapid transport of troops, is
illusory."
The moment I got this done, namely, at 8.30 a.m., we worked our way out
of the long narrow neck of Mudros Harbour and sailed for the Gulf of
Saros. Spent the first half of the sixty mile run to the Dardanelles in
scribbling. Wrote my first epistle to K., using for the first time the
formal "Dear Lord Kitchener." My letters to him will have to be formal,
and dull also, as he may hand them around. I begin, "I have just sent
you off a cable giving my first impressions of the situation, and am now
steaming in company with Generals d'Amade and Paris to inspect the
North-western coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula." I tell him that the
real place "looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the
map,"--I say that his "impression that the ground between Cape Helles
and Krithia was clear of the enemy," was mistaken. "Not a bit of it." I
say, "The Admiral tells me that there is a large number of men tucked
away in the folds of the ground there, not to speak of several field
Batteries." Therefore, I conclude, "If it eventually becomes necessary
to take the Gallipoli Peninsula by military force, we shall have to
proceed bit by bit." This will vex him no doubt. He likes plans to move
as fast as his own wishes and is apt to forget, or to pretend he has
forgotten, that swiftness in war comes from slow preparations. It is
fairer to tell K. this now, when the question has not yet arisen, than
hereafter if it does then arise.
Passing the mouth of the Dardanelles we got a wonderful view of the
stage whereon the Great Showman has caused so many of his amusing
puppets to strut their tiny hour. For the purpose it stands matchless.
No other panorama can touch it. There, Hero trimmed her little lamp;
yonder the amorous breath of Leander changed to soft sea form. Far away
to the Eastwards, painted in dim and lovely hues, lies Mount Ida. Just
so, on the far horizon line she lay fair and still, when Hector fell and
smoke from burning Troy blackened the mid-day sun. Against this
enchanted background to deeds done by immortals and mortals as they
struggled for ten long years five thousand years ago,--stands forth
formidably the Peninsula. Glowing with bright, springtime colours it
sweeps upwards from the sea like the glacis of a giant's fortress.
So we sailed on Northwards, giving a wide berth to the shore. When we
got within a mile of the head of the Gulf of Saros, we turned, steering
a South-westerly course, parallel to, and one to two miles distant from,
the coastline. Then my first fears as to the outworks of the fortress
were strengthened. The head of the Gulf is filled in with a horrible
marsh. No landing there. Did we land far away to the Westward we must
still march round the marsh, or else we must cross it on one single road
whose long and easily destructible bridges we could see spanning the bog
holes some three miles inland. Opposite the fortified lines we stood in
to within easy field gun range, trusting that the Turks would not wish
prematurely to disclose their artillery positions. So we managed a peep
at close quarters, and were startled to see the ramifications and extent
of the spider's web of deep, narrow trenches along the coast and on
either front of the lines of Bulair. My Staff agree that they must have
taken ten thousand men a month's hard work from dark to dawn. In advance
of the trenches, Williams in the crow's nest reported that with his
strong glasses he could pick out the glitter of wire over a wide expanse
of ground. To the depth of a mile the whole Aegean slope of the neck of
the Peninsula was scarred with spade work and it is clear to a tiro that
to take these trenches would take from us a bigger toll of ammunition
and life than we can afford: especially so seeing that we can only see
one half of the theatre; the other half would have to be worked out of
sight and support of our own ships and in view of the Turkish Fleet.
Only one small dent in the rockbound coast offered a chance of landing
but that was also heavily dug in. In a word, if Bulair had been the only
way open to me and I had no alternative but to take it or wash my hands
of the whole business, I should have to go right about turn and cable
my master he had sent me on a fool's errand.
Between Bulair and Suvla Bay the coastline was precipitous; high cliffs
and no sort of creeks or beaches--impracticable. Suvla Bay itself seems
a fine harbour but too far North were the aim to combine a landing there
together with an attack on the Southern end of the Peninsula. Were we,
on the other hand, to try to work the whole force ashore from Suvla Bay,
the country is too big; it is the broadest part of the Peninsula; also,
we should be too far from its waist and from the Narrows we wish to
dominate. Merely to hold our line of Communications we should need a
couple of Divisions. All the coast between Suvla Bay and for a little
way South of Gaba Tepe seems feasible for landing. I mean we could get
ashore on a calm day if there was no enemy. Gaba Tepe itself would be
ideal, but, alas, the Turks are not blind; it is a mass of trenches and
wire. Further, it must be well under fire of guns from Kilid Bahr
plateau, and is entirely commanded by the high ridge to the North of it.
To land there would be to enter a defile without first crowning the
heights.
Between Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles, the point of the Peninsula, the
coastline consists of cliffs from 100 to 300 feet high. But there are,
in many places, sandy strips at their base. Opinions differ but I
believe myself the cliffs are not unclimbable. I thoroughly believe also
in going for at least one spot that _seems_ impracticable.
Sailing Southwards we are becoming more and more conscious of the
tremendous bombardment going on in the Straits. Now and then, too, we
can see a huge shell hit the top of Achi Baba and turn it into the
semblance of a volcano. Everyone excited and trying to look calm.
At 4 p.m., precisely, we rounded Cape Helles. I had promised de Robeck
not to take his fastest cruiser, fragile as an egg, into the actual
Straits, but the Captain and the Commander (Cameron and Rosomore), were
frightfully keen to see the fight, and I thought it fair to allow one
mile as being the _mouth_ of the Straits and not _the_ Straits. Before
we had covered that mile we found ourselves on the outskirts of--dream
of my life--a naval battle! Nor did the reality pan out short of my
hopes. Here it was; we had only to keep on at thirty knots; in one
minute we should be in the thick of it; and who would be brave enough to
cry halt!
The world had gone mad; common sense was only moonshine after all; the
elephant and the whale of Bismarckian parable were at it tooth and nail!
Shells of all sizes flew hissing through the skies. Before my very eyes,
the graves of those old Gods whom Christ had risen from the dead to
destroy were shaking to the shock of Messrs. Armstrong's patent thunder
bolts!
Ever since the far-away days of Afghanistan and Majuba Hill friends have
been fond of asking me what soldiers feel when death draws close up
beside them. Before he charged in at Edgehill, Astley (if my memory
serves me) exclaimed, "O, God, I've been too busy fixing up this battle
to think much about you, but, for Heaven's sake, don't you go and
forget about me," or words to that effect.
The Yankee's prayer for fair play just as he joined issue with the
grizzly bear gives another glimpse of these secrets between man and his
Maker. As for myself, there are two moments; one when I think I would
not miss the show for millions; another when I think "what an ass I am
to be here"; and between these two moments there _is_ a border land when
the mind runs all about Life's workshop and tries to do one last bit of
stock-taking.
But the process can no more be fixed in the memory than the sequence of
a dream when the dew is off the grass. All I remember is a sort of
wonder:--why these incredible pains to seek out an amphibious battle
ground whereon two sets of people who have no cause of quarrel can blow
one another to atoms? Why are these Straits the cockpit of the world?
What is it all about? What on earth has happened to sanity when the
whale and elephant are locked in mortal combat making between them a
picture which might be painted by one of H.M.'s Commissioners in Lunacy
to decorate an asylum for homicides.
Whizz--flop--bang--what an ass I am to be here. If we keep on another
thirty seconds we are in for a visit to Davy Jones's Locker.
Now above the _Queen Elizabeth_, making slowly backwards and forwards up
in the neck of the Narrows, were other men-o'-war spitting tons of hot
metal at the Turks. The Forts made no reply--or none that we could make
out, either with our ears or with glasses. Perhaps there was an attempt;
if so, it must have been very half-hearted. The enemy's fixed defences
were silenced but the concealed mobile guns from the Peninsula and from
Asia were far too busy and were having it all their own way.
Close to us were steam trawlers and mine-sweepers steaming along with
columns of spray spouting up close by them from falling field gun
shells, with here and there a biggish fellow amongst them, probably a
five or six inch field howitzer. One of them was in the act of catching
a great mine as we drew up level with her. Some 250 yards from us was
the _Inflexible_ slowly coming out of the Straits, her wireless cut away
and a number of shrapnel holes through her tops and crow's nest.
Suddenly, so quickly did we turn that, going at speed, the decks were at
an angle of 45° and several of us (d'Amade for one) narrowly escaped
slipping down the railless decks into the sea. The _Inflexible_ had
signalled us she had struck a mine, and that we must stand by and see
her home to Tenedos. We spun round like a top (escaping thereby a salvo
of four from a field battery) and followed as close as we dared.
My blood ran cold--for sheer deliberate awfulness this beat everything.
We gazed spellbound: no one knew what moment the great ship might not
dive into the depths. The pumps were going hard. We fixed our eyes on
marks about the water line to see if the sea was gaining upon them or
not. She was very much down by the bows, that was a sure thing. Crew and
stokers were in a mass standing strictly at attention on the main deck.
A whole bevy of destroyers crowded round the wounded warrior. In the
sight of all those men standing still, silent, orderly in their ranks,
facing the imminence of death, I got my answer to the hasty moralizings
about war, drawn from me (really) by a regret that I would very soon be
drowned. On the deck of that battleship staggering along at a stone's
throw was a vindication of war in itself; of war, the state of being,
quite apart from war motives or gains. Ten thousand years of peace would
fail to produce a spectacle of so great virtue. Where, in peace,
passengers have also shown high constancy, it is because war and martial
discipline have lent them its standards. Once in a generation a
mysterious wish for war passes through the people. Their instinct tells
them that _there is no other way_ of progress and of escape from habits
that no longer fit them. Whole generations of statesmen will fumble over
reforms for a lifetime which are put into full-blooded execution within
a week of a declaration of war. There is _no other way_. Only by intense
sufferings can the nations grow, just as the snake once a year must with
anguish slough off the once beautiful coat which has now become a strait
jacket.
How was it going to end? How touching the devotion of all these small
satellites so anxiously forming escort? Onwards, at snail's pace, moved
our cortege which might at any moment be transformed into a funeral
affair, but slow as we went we yet went fast enough to give the go-by
to the French battleship _Gaulois_, also creeping out towards Tenedos in
a lamentable manner attended by another crowd of T.B.s and destroyers
eager to stand to and save.
The _Inflexible_ managed to crawl into Tenedos under her own steam but
we stood by until we saw the _Gaulois_ ground on some rocks called
Rabbit Island, when I decided to clear right out so as not to be in the
way of the Navy at a time of so much stress. After we had gone ten miles
or so, the _Phaeton_ intercepted a wireless from the _Queen Elizabeth_,
ordering the _Ocean_ to take the _Irresistible_ in tow, from which it
would appear that she (the _Irresistible_) has also met with some
misfortune.
Thank God we were in time! That is my dominant feeling. We have seen a
spectacle which would be purchased cheap by five years of life and, more
vital yet, I have caught a glimpse of the forces of the enemy and of
their Forts. What with my hurried scamper down the Aegean coast of the
Peninsula and the battle in the Straits, I begin to form some first-hand
notion of my problem. More by good luck than good guidance I have got
into personal touch with the outer fringes of the thing we are up
against and that is so much to the good. But oh, that we had been here
earlier! Winston in his hurry to push me out has shown a more soldierly
grip than those who said there was no hurry. It is up to me now to
revolve to-day's doings in my mind; to digest them and to turn myself
into the eyes and ears of the War Office whose own so far have
certainly not proved themselves very acute. How much better would I be
able to make them see and hear had I been out a week or two; did I know
the outside of the Peninsula by heart; had I made friends with the
Fleet! And why should I not have been?
Have added a P.S. to K.'s letter:--
"Between Tenedos and Lemnos. 6 p.m.--This has been a very bad day for us
judging by what has come under my own personal observation. After going
right up to Bulair and down again to the South-west point looking at the
network of trenches the Turks have dug commanding all possible landing
places, we turned into the Dardanelles themselves and went up about a
mile. The scene was what I believe Naval writers describe as 'lively.'"
(Then follows an account based on my Diary jottings). I end:
"I have not had time to reflect over these matters, nor can I yet
realise on my present slight information the extent of these losses.
Certainly it looks at present as if the Fleet would not be able to carry
on at this rate, and, if so, the soldiers will have to do the trick.":
"Later.
"The _Irresistible_, the _Ocean_ and the _Bouvet_ are gone! The
_Bouvet_, they say, just slithered down like a saucer slithers down in a
bath. The _Inflexible_ and the _Gaulois_ are badly mauled."
_19th March, 1915._ _H.M.S. "Franconia."_--Last night I left H.M.S.
_Phaeton_ and went on board the _Franconia_. To-day, we have been busy
fixing things up. The chance sailors, seen by the Staff, have been using
highly coloured expletives about the mines. Sheer bad luck they swear;
bad luck that would not happen once in a hundred tries. They had knocked
out the Forts, they claim, and one, three-word order, "Full steam
ahead," would have cut the Gordian Knot the diplomats have been fumbling
at for over a hundred years by slicing their old Turkey in two. Then
came the big delay owing to ships changing stations during which mines
set loose from up above had time to float down the current, when, by the
Devil's own fluke, they impinge upon our battleships, and blow de Robeck
and his plans into the middle of next week--or later! These are
ward-room yarns. De Robeck was working by stages and never meant, so far
as we know, to run through to the Marmora yesterday.
Cabled to Lord K. telling him of yesterday's reconnaissance by me and
the battle by de Robeck. Have said I have no official report to go upon
but from what I saw with my own eyes "I am being most reluctantly driven
to the conclusion that the Straits are not likely to be forced by
battleships as at one time seemed probable and that, if my troops are to
take part, it will not take the subsidiary form anticipated. The Army's
part will be more than mere landings of parties to destroy Forts, it
must be a deliberate and progressive military operation carried out at
full strength so as to open a passage for the Navy."
To be able, if necessary, to act up to my own words I sent another
message to the Admiral and told him, if he could spare the troops from
the vicinity of the Straits, I would like to take them right off to
Alexandria so as to shake them out there and reship them ready for
anything. He has wirelessed back asking me, on political grounds, to
delay removing the troops "until our attack is renewed in a few days'
time."
Bravo, the Admiral! Still; if there are to be even a few days' delay I
must land somewhere as mules and horses are dying. And, practically,
Alexandria is the only port possible.
Wemyss has just sent me over the following letter. It confirms
officially the loss of the three battleships:--
_Friday._
"My Dear General,
"The enclosed is a copy of a Signal I have received from de Robeck. I
sincerely hope that the word disastrous is too hard. It depends upon
what results we have achieved I think. I gather from intercepted signals
that the _Ocean_ also is sunk, but of this I am not quite certain. I am
off in _Dublin_ immediately she comes in and expect I may be back
to-night. This of course depends a good deal upon what de Robeck wants.
Captain Boyle brings this and will be at your disposal. He is the Senior
Naval Officer here in my absence.
"Believe me, Sir,
"Yours sincerely,
(_Sd._) "R. Wemyss."
Copy of Telegram enclosed:--
"_From_ V.A.E.M.S.
"_To_ S.N.O. Mudros.
"_Date, 18th March, 1915._
"Negative demonstration at Gaba Tepe, 19th. Will you come to Tenedos and
see me to-morrow. We have had disastrous day owing either to floating
mines or torpedoes from shore tubes fired at long range. H.M.S.
_Irresistible_ and _Bouvet_ sunk. H.M.S. _Ocean_ still afloat, but
probably lost. H.M.S. _Inflexible_ damaged by mine. _Gaulois_ badly
damaged by gunfire. Other ships all right, and we had much the best of
the Ports."
_20th March, 1915._ _H.M.S. "Franconia." Mudros Harbour._ Stormy
weather, and even here, inside Mudros harbour, touch with the shore is
cut off.
After I was asleep last night, an answer came in from K., straight,
strong and to the point. He says, "You know my view that the Dardanelles
passage must be forced, and that if large military operations on the
Gallipoli Peninsula by your troops are necessary to clear the way, those
operations must be undertaken after careful consideration of the local
defences and must be carried through."
Very well: all hinges on the Admiral.
_21st March, 1915._ _H.M.S. "Franconia."_ A talk with Admiral Wemyss and
General d'Amade. Wemyss is clear that the Navy must not admit a check
and must get to work again as quickly as they can. Wemyss is Senior
Naval Officer at the Dardanelles and is much liked by everyone. He has
put his seniority in his pocket and is under his junior--fighting first,
rank afterwards!
A letter from de Robeck, dated "Q.E. the 19th," has only just come to
hand:--
"Our men were splendid and thank heaven our loss of life was quite
small, though the French lost over 100 men when _Bouvet_ struck a mine.
"How our ships struck mines in an area that was reported clear and swept
the previous night I do not know, unless they were floating mines
started from the Narrows!
"I was sad to lose ships and my heart aches when one thinks of it; one
must do what one is told and take risks or otherwise we cannot win. We
are all getting ready for another 'go' and not in the least beaten or
downhearted. The big forts were silenced for a long time and everything
was going well, until _Bouvet_ struck a mine. It is hard to say what
amount of damage we did, I don't know, there were big explosions in the
Forts!"
Little Birdie, now grown up into a grand General, turned up at 3 p.m. I
was enchanted to see him. We had hundreds and thousands of things to
talk over. Although the confidence of the sailors seems quite unshaken
by the events of the 18th, Birdie seems to have made up his mind that
the Navy have shot their bolt for the time being and that we have no
time to lose in getting ready for a landing. But then he did not see the
battle and cannot, therefore, gauge the extent to which the Turkish
Forts were beaten.
_22nd March, 1915._ _H.M.S. "Franconia."_ At 10 a.m. we had another
Conference on board the _Queen Elizabeth_.
Present:--
Admiral de Robeck,
Admiral Wemyss,
General Birdwood,
General Braithwaite,
Captain Pollen,
Myself.
The moment we sat down de Robeck told us _he was now quite clear he
could not get through without the help of all my troops_.
Before ever we went aboard Braithwaite, Birdwood and I had agreed that,
whatever we landsmen might think, we must leave the seamen to settle
their own job, saying nothing for or against land operations or
amphibious operations until the sailors themselves turned to us and said
they had abandoned the idea of forcing the passage by naval operations
alone.
They have done so. The fat (that is us) is fairly in the fire.
No doubt we had our views. Birdie and my own Staff disliked the idea of
chancing mines with million pound ships. The hesitants who always make
hay in foul weather had been extra active since the sinking of the three
men-of-war. Suppose the Fleet _could_ get through with the loss of
another battleship or two--how the devil would our troopships be able to
follow? And the store ships? And the colliers?
This had made me turn contrary. During the battle I had cabled that the
chances of the Navy pushing through on their own were hardly fair
fighting chances, but, since then, de Robeck, the man who should know,
had said twice that he _did_ think there was a fair fighting chance. Had
he stuck to that opinion at the conference, then I was ready, as a
soldier, to make light of military croaks about troopships.
Constantinople must surrender, revolt or scuttle within a very few hours
of our battleships entering the Marmora. Memories of one or two obsolete
six inchers at Ladysmith helped me to feel as Constantinople would feel
when her rail and sea communications were cut and a rain of shell fell
upon the penned-in populace from de Robeck's terrific batteries. Given a
good wind that nest of iniquity would go up like Sodom and Gomorrah in a
winding sheet of flame.
But once the Admiral said his battleships could not fight through
without help, there was no foothold left for the views of a landsman.
So there was no discussion. At once we turned our faces to the land
scheme. Very sketchy; how could it be otherwise? On the German system
plans for a landing on Gallipoli would have been in my pocket,
up-to-date and worked out to a ball cartridge and a pail of water. By
the British system (?) I have been obliged to concoct my own plans in a
brace of shakes almost under fire. Strategically and tactically our
method may have its merits, for though it piles everything on to one
man, the Commander, yet he is the chap who has got to see it through.
But, in matters of supply, transport, organisation and administration
our way is the way of Colney Hatch.
Here am I still minus my Adjutant-General; my Quartermaster-General and
my Medical Chief, charged with settling the basic question of whether
the Army should push off from Lemnos or from Alexandria. Nothing in the
world to guide me beyond my own experience and that of my Chief of the
General Staff, whose sphere of work and experience lies quite outside
these administrative matters. I can see that Lemnos is practically
impossible; I fix on Alexandria in the light of Braithwaite's advice and
my own hasty study of the map. Almost incredible really, we should have
to decide so tremendous an administrative problem off the reel and
without any Administrative Staff. But time presses, the responsibility
cannot be shirked, and so I have cabled K. that Lemnos must be a
wash-out and that I am sending my troops to get ship-shape at Alexandria
although, thereby, I upset every previous arrangement. Then I have had
to cable for Engineers, trench mortars, bombs, hand grenades,
periscopes. Then again, seeing things are going less swimmingly than K.
had thought they would, I have had to harden my heart against his horror
of being asked for more men and have decided to cable for leave to bring
over from Egypt a Brigade of Gurkhas to complete Birdwood's New Zealand
Division. Last, and worst, I have had to risk the fury of the Q.M.G. to
the Forces by telling the War Office that their transports are so loaded
(water carts in one ship; water cart horses in another; guns in one
ship; limbers in another; entrenching tools anyhow) that they must be
emptied and reloaded before we can land under fire.
These points were touched upon at the Conference. I told them too that
my Intelligence folk fix the numbers of the enemy now at the Dardanelles
as 40,000 on the Gallipoli Peninsula with a reserve of 30,000 behind
Bulair: on the Asiatic side of the Straits there are at least a
Division, but there _may_ be several Divisions. The Admiral's
information tallies and, so Birdie says, does that of the Army in Egypt.
The War Office notion that the guns of the Fleet can sweep the enemy off
the tongue of the Peninsula from Achi Baba Southwards is moonshine. My
trump card turns out to be the Joker; best of all cards only it don't
happen to be included in this particular pack!
As ideas for getting round this prickly problem were passing through my
mind, two suggestions for dealing with it were put forward. The sailors
say some lighters were being built, and probably by now are built, for
the purpose of a landing in the North: they would carry five hundred
men; had bullet-proof bulwarks and are to work under their own gas
engines. If I can possibly get a petition for these through to Winston
we would very likely be lent some and with their aid the landing under
fire will be child's play to what it will be otherwise. But the cable
must get to Winston: if it falls into the hands of Fisher it fails, as
the sailors tell me he is obsessed by the other old plan and grudges us
every rope's end or ha'porth of tar that finds its way out here.
Rotten luck to have cut myself off from wiring to Winston: still I see
no way out of it: with K. jealous as a tiger--what can I do? Also,
although the sailors want me to pull this particular chestnut out of the
fire, it is just as well they should know I am not going to speak to
their Boss even under the most tempting circs.: but they won't cable
themselves: frightened of Fisher: so I then and there drafted this to K.
from myself:--
"Our first step of landing under fire will be the most critical as well
as the most vital of the whole operations. If the Admiralty will
improvise and send us out post haste 20 to 30 large lighters difficulty
and duration of this phase will be cut down to at least one half. The
lighters should each be capable of conveying 400 to 500 men or 30 to 40
horses. They should be protected by bullet-proof armour."
Everyone agreed but Birdwood pointed out that, by sending this message,
we implied in so many words, that we would not land until the lighters
came out from England. He assumed that we had definitely turned down any
plan of scrambling ashore forthwith, as best we could? I said, "Yes,"
and that the Navy were with me in that view, a statement confirmed by de
Robeck and Wemyss who nodded their heads. Birdwood said he only wanted
to be quite clear about it, and there the matter dropped.
Actually I had thought a lot about that possibility. To a man of my
temperament there was every temptation to have a go in and revenge the
loss of the battleships forthwith. We might sup to-morrow night on Achi
Baba. With luck we really might. Had I been here for ten days instead of
five, and had I had any time to draft out any sort of scheme, I might
have had a dart. But the operation of landing in face of an enemy is the
most complicated and difficult in war. Under existing conditions the
whole attempt would be partial, _décousu_, happy-go-lucky to the last
degree. There are no small craft to speak of. There is no provision for
carrying water. There is no information _at all_ about springs or wells
ashore. There is no arrangement for getting off the wounded and my
Principal Medical Officer and his Staff won't be here for a fortnight.
My orders against piecemeal occupation are specific. But the 29th
Division is our _pièce de résistance_ and it won't be here, we
reckon--not complete--for another three weeks.
All the same, I might chance it, for, by taking all these off chances we
_might_ pull off the main chance of stealing a march upon the Turks.
What puts me off is not the chances of war but the certainties of
commonsense. If I did so handle my troops on the spot as to sup on Achi
Baba to-morrow night, I still could not counter the inevitable reaction
of numbers, time and space. The Turks would have at least a fortnight to
concentrate their whole force against my half force; to defeat them and
then to defy the other half.
I must wait for the 29th Division. By the time they come I can get
things straight for a smashing simultaneous blow and I am resolved that,
so far as in me lies, the orders and preparations will then be so
thoroughly worked out--so carefully rehearsed as to give every chance to
my men.[6]
If the 29th Division were here--or near at hand--I could balance
shortage against the obvious evils of giving the Turks time to reinforce
and to dig. Could I hope for the 29th Division within a week it might be
worth my while to fly in the face of K. by grasping the Peninsula firmly
by her toe: or,--had my staff and self been here ten days ago, we could
have already got well forward with our plans and orders, as well as with
the laying of our hands upon the thousand odds and ends demanded by the
invasion of a barren, trackless extremity of an Empire--odds and ends
never thought of by anyone until the spur of reality brought them
galloping to the front. Then the moment the Fleet cried off, we might
have had a dash in, right away, with what we have here. The onslaught
could have been supported from Egypt and the 29th Division might have
been treated as a reserve.
But, taking things as they are:--
(1). No detail thought out, much less worked out or practised, as to
form or manner of landing;
(2). Absence of 29th Division;
(3). Lack of gear (naval and military) for any landing on a large scale
or maintenance thereafter;
(4). Unsettled weather; my ground is not solid enough to support me
were I to put it to K. that I had broken away from his explicit
instructions.
The Navy, i.e., de Robeck, Wemyss and Keyes, entirely agree. They see as
well as we do that the military force ought to have been ready before
the Navy began to attack. What we have to do now is to repair a first
false step. The Admiral undertakes to keep pegging away at the Straits
whilst we in Alexandria are putting on our war paint. He will see to it,
he says, that they think more of battleships than of landings. He is
greatly relieved to hear _I_ have practically made up my mind to go for
the South of the Peninsula and to keep in closest touch with the Fleet.
The Commodore also seems well pleased: he told us he hoped to get his
Fleet Sweeps so reorganised as to do away with the danger from mines by
the 3rd or 4th of April; then, he says, with us to do the spotting for
the naval guns, the battleships can smother the Forts and will alarm the
Turkish Infantry as to that tenderest part of an Army--its rear. So I
may say that all are in full agreement,--a blessing.
Have cabled home begging for more engineers, a lot of hand grenades,
trench mortars, periscopes and tools. The barbed wire bothers me! Am
specially keen about trench mortars; if it comes to close fighting on
the Peninsula with its restricted area trench mortars may make up for
our lack of artillery and especially of howitzers. Luckily, they can be
turned out quickly.
_23rd March, 1915. H.M.S. "Franconia."_ At 9 a.m. General d'Amade and
his Staff came aboard. D'Amade had been kept yesterday by his own
pressing business from attending the Conference. I have read him these
notes and have shown him my cable of yesterday to Lord K. in which I say
that "The French Commander is equally convinced that a move to
Alexandria is a practical necessity, although a point of honour makes it
impossible for him to suggest turning his back to the Turks to his own
Government." But, I say, "he will be enchanted if they give him the
order." D'Amade says I have not quite correctly represented his views.
Not fantastic honour, he says, caused him to say we had better, for a
while, hold on, but rather the sense of prestige. He thought the
departure of the troops following so closely on the heels of the naval
repulse would have a bad moral effect on the Balkans. But he agrees
that, in practice, the move has now become imperative; the animals are
dying; the men are overcrowded, whilst Mudros is impossible as a base.
My cable, therefore, may stand.
At 10 o'clock he, Birdie and myself landed to inspect a Battalion of
Australians (9th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade). I made them carry out a
little attack on a row of windmills, and really, they did not show much
more imagination over the business than did Don Quixote in a similar
encounter. But the men are superb specimens.
Some of the troop transports left harbour for Egypt during the
afternoon. Bad to see these transports sailing the wrong way. What a
d----d pity! is what every soldier here feels--and says. But to look
on the bright side, our fellows will be twice as well trained to boat
work, and twice as well equipped by the time the 29th turn up, and by
then the weather will be more settled. As d'Amade said too, it will be
worth a great deal to us if the French troops get a chance of working a
little over the ground together with their British comrades before they
go shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy. All the same, if I had
my men and guns handy, I'd rather get at the Turks quick than be sure of
good weather and good _band-o-bast_ and be sure also of a well-prepared
enemy.
In the afternoon Braithwaite brought me a draft cable for Lord K. _re_
yesterday's Conference. I have approved. In it I say, "on the
thoroughness with which I can make the preliminary arrangements, of
which the proper allocation of troops, etc., to transports is not the
least important, the success of my plans will largely depend."
Therefore, I am going to Alexandria, as a convenient place for this work
and, "the Turks will be kept busy meanwhile by the Admiral."
_24th March, 1915. H.M.S. "Franconia."_ D'Amade and Staff came aboard at
10 a.m. He has got leave to move and will sail to Alexandria forthwith.
Roger Keyes from the Flagship came shortly afterward. He is sick as a
she-bear robbed of her cubs that his pets: battleships, T.B.s,
destroyers, submarines, etc., should have to wait for the Army. Well, we
are not to blame! Keyes has been shown my cables to K. and is pleased
with them. He accepts the fact, I think, that the Army must tackle the
mobile artillery of the Turks before the Navy can expect to silence the
light guns protecting the mine fields and then clear out the mines with
the present type of mine sweeper. But the Admiral's going to fix up the
mine sweeper question while we are away. Once he has done that, Keyes
believes the Fleet can knock out the Forts; wipe out the protective
batteries and sweep up the mines quite comfortably. He said one
illuminating and encouraging thing to Braithwaite; viz., that he had
never felt so possessed of the power of the Navy to force a passage
through the Narrows as in the small hours of the 19th when he got back
to the Flagship after trying in vain to salve the _Ocean_ and the
_Irresistible_.
Keyes brought me a first class letter from the Admiral--very much to the
point:--
"H.M.S. _Q.E._
_24th March, 15._
"My Dear General,
"I hear the Authorities at 'Home' have been sending hastening telegrams
to you. They most unfortunately did the same to us and probably if our
work had been slower and more thorough it would have been better. If
only they were on the _spot_, they would realise that to hurry would
write failure. In my very humble opinion, good co-operation and
organisation means everything for the future. A great triumph is much
better than scraping through and poor results! We are entirely with you
and can be relied on to give any assistance in our power. We will not be
idle!
"Believe me,
"Yours sincerely,
(_Sd._) "J.M. de Robeck."
11-15. Admiral Thursby (just arrived with the _Queen_ and _Implacable_)
came to make his salaams. We served together at Malta and both broke
sinews in our calves playing lawn tennis--a bond of union.
Have cabled to Lord K. telling him I am just off to Alexandria. Have
said that the ruling factor of my date of landing must be the arrival of
the 29th Division "(see para. 2 of your formal instructions to me the
foresight of which appeals to me with double force now we are at close
quarters with the problem[7])." I have pointed out that Birdwood's
Australians are very weak in artillery; that the Naval Division has none
at all and that the guns of the 29th Division make that body even more
indispensable than he had probably realised. I would very much like to
add that these are no times for infantry divisions minus artillery
seeing that they ought to have three times the pre-war complement of
guns, but Braithwaite's good advice has prevailed. As promised at the
Conference I express a hope that I may be allowed "to complete
Birdwood's New Zealand Division with a Brigade of Gurkhas who would work
admirably in the terrain" of the Peninsula. In view of what we have
gathered from Keyes, I wind up by saying, "The Admiral, whose confidence
in the Navy seems to have been raised even higher by recent events, and
who is a thruster if ever there was one, is in agreement with this
telegram."
Actually Keyes will show him a copy; we will wait one hour before
sending it off and, if we don't hear then, we may take it de Robeck will
have endorsed the purport. Of course, if he does not agree the last
sentence must come out, and he will have to put his own points to the
Admiralty.
_Later_.--Have sent Doughty Wylie to Athens to do "Intelligence": the
cable was approved by Navy; duly despatched; and now--up anchor!