Arnold was a delightful man to argue with, not that he could easily be

convinced that he was wrong, but he never lost his temper, and in the

most patronising way he would generally end by: “Yes, yes! my good

fellow, you are quite right, but, you see, my view of the matter is

different, and I have little doubt it is the true one!” This went so far

that even the simplest facts failed to produce any impression on him. He

had fallen in love with Émile Burnouf’s attractive but not very

scholar-like and trustworthy “Science de la Religion.” I believe that at

first he had mistaken Émile for Eugène Burnouf, a mistake which has been

committed by other people besides him. But, afterwards, when he had

perceived the difference between the two, he was not at all abashed.

Nay, he was betrayed into a new mistake, and spoke of Émile as the son

of Eugène. I told him that Eugène, the great Oriental scholar—one of the

greatest that France has ever produced, and that is saying a great

deal—had no son at all, and that he ought to correct his misstatement.

“Yes, yes,” he said, in his most good-humoured way, “but you know how

they manage these things in France. Émile was really a natural son of

the great scholar, and they call that a nephew.” This I stoutly denied,

for never was a more irreproachable _père de famille_ than my friend and

master Eugène Burnouf. But in spite of all remonstrances, Émile remained

with Arnold the son of Eugène; “For, you see, my good fellow, I know the

French, and that is my view of the matter!” If that happened in the

green wood, what would happen in the dry!

We had a long-standing feud about poetry. To me the difference between

poetry and prose was one of form only. I always held that the same

things that are said in prose could be said in poetry, and _vice versâ_,

and I often quoted Goethe’s saying that the best test of poetry was

whether it would bear translation into prose or into a foreign language.

To all that, even to Goethe’s words, Arnold demurred. Poetry to him was

a thing by itself, “not an art like other arts,” but, as he grandly

called it, “genius.”

He once had a great triumph over me. An American gentleman, who brought

out a “Collection of the Portraits of the Hundred Greatest Men,” divided

them into eight classes, and the first class was assigned to poetry, the

second to art, the third to religion, the fourth to philosophy, the

fifth to history, the sixth to science, the seventh to politics, the

eighth to industry. Arnold was asked to write the introduction to the

first volume, H. Taine to the second, myself and Renan to the third,

Noah Porter to the fourth, Dean Stanley to the fifth, Helmholtz to the

sixth, Froude to the seventh, John Fiske to the eighth.

I do not know whether Arnold had anything to do with suggesting this

division of _Omne Scibile_ into eight classes; anyhow, he did not allow

the opportunity to pass to assert the superiority of poetry over every

other branch of man’s intellectual activity. “The men,” he began, “who

are the flower and glory of our race are to pass here before us, the

highest manifestations, whether on this line or that, of the force which

stirs in every one of us—the chief poets, religious founders,

philosophers, historians, scholars, orators, warriors, statesmen,

voyagers, leaders in mechanical invention and industry, who have

appeared among mankind. And the poets are to pass first. Why? Because,

of the various modes of manifestation through which the human spirit

pours its force, theirs is the most adequate and happy.”

This is the well-known _ore rotundo_ and _spiritu profundo_ style of

Arnold. But might we not ask, _Adequate_ to what? _Happy_ in what?

Arnold himself answers a little farther on: “No man can fully draw out

the reasons why the human spirit feels itself able to attain to a more

adequate and satisfying expression in poetry than in any other of its

modes of activity.” Yet he continues to call this a primordial and

incontestable fact; and how could we poor mortals venture to contest a

primordial and incontestable fact? And then, limiting the question “to

us for to-day,” he says, “Surely it is its solidity that accounts to us

for the superiority of poetry.” How he would have railed if any of his

Philistines had ventured to recognise the true superiority of poetry in

its solidity!

Prose may be solid, it may be dense, massive, lumpish, concrete, and all

the rest, but poetry is generally prized for its being subtle, light,

ideal, air-drawn, fairy-like, or made of such stuff as dreams are made

of. However, let that pass. Let poetry be solid, for who knows what

sense Arnold may have assigned to solid? He next falls back on his great

master Goethe, and quotes a passage which I have not been able to find,

but the bearing of which must depend very much on the context in which

it occurs. Goethe, we are told, said in one of his many moods: “I deny

poetry to be an art. Neither is it a science. Poetry is to be called

neither art nor science, but genius.” Who would venture to differ from

Goethe when he defines what poetry is? But does he define it? He simply

says that it is not art or science. In this one may agree, if only art

and science are defined first. No one I think has ever maintained that

poetry was science, but no one would deny that poetry was a product of

art, if only in the sense of the _Ars poetica_ of Horace, or the

_Dichtkunst_ of Goethe. But if we ask what can be meant by saying that

poetry is genius, Goethe would probably say that what he meant was that

poetry was the product of genius, the German _Genie_. Goethe, therefore,

meant no more than that poetry requires, in the poet, originality and

spontaneity of thought; and this, though it would require some

limitation, no one surely would feel inclined to deny, though even the

authority of Goethe would hardly suffice to deprive the decipherer of an

inscription, the painter of the “Last Supper,” or the discoverer of the

bacilli of a claim to that divine light which we call genius.

Arnold then goes on to say that poetry gives the idea, but it gives it

touched with beauty, heightened by emotion. Would not Arnold have

allowed that the language of Isaiah, and even some of the dialogues of

Plato, were touched with beauty and heightened by emotion though they

are in prose? I think he himself speaks somewhere of a poetic prose.

Where, then, is the true difference between the creations of Isaiah and

of Browning, between the eloquence of Plato and of Wordsworth?

Arnold has one more trump card to play in order to win for poetry that

superiority over all the other manifestations of the forces of the human

spirit which he claims again and again. I have always been a sincere

admirer of Arnold’s poetry, still I think there is more massive force in

some of his prose than in many of his poems; nay, I believe he has left

a much deeper and more lasting impression on what he likes to call the

_Zeitgeist_ through his essays than through his tragedies. What then is

his last card, his last proof of the superiority of poetry? Poetry, he

argues, has more stability than anything else, and mankind finds in it a

surer stay than in art, in philosophy, or religion. “Compare,” he says,

“the stability of Shakespeare with that of the Thirty-nine Articles.”

Poor Thirty-nine Articles! Did they ever claim to contain poetry, or

even religion? Were they ever meant to be more than a dry abstract of

theological dogmas? Surely they never challenged comparison with

Shakespeare. They are an index, a table of contents, they were a

business-like agreement, if you like, between different parties in the

Church of England. But to ask whether they will stand longer than

Shakespeare is very much like asking whether the Treaty of Paris will

last longer than Victor Hugo. There is stay in poetry provided that the

prose which underlies it is lasting, or everlasting; there is no stay in

it if it is mere froth and rhyme. Arnold always liked to fall back on

Goethe. “What a series of philosophic systems has Germany seen since the

birth of Goethe,” he says, “and what sort of stay is any one of them

compared with the poetry of Germany’s _one_ great poet?” Is Goethe’s

poetry really so sure a stay as the philosophies of Germany; nay, would

there be any stay in it at all without the support of that philosophy

which Goethe drank in, whether from the vintage of Spinoza or from the

more recent _crues_ of Kant and Fichte? Goethe’s name, no doubt, is

always a pillar of strength, but there is even now a very great part of

Goethe’s “Collected Works” in thirty volumes that is no longer a stay,

but is _passé_, and seldom read by any one, except by the historian.

Poetry may act as a powerful preservative, and it is wonderful how much

pleasure we may derive from thought mummified in verse. But in the end

it is thought in its ever-changing life that forms the real stay, and it

matters little whether that thought speaks to us in marble, or in music,

in hexameters, in blank verse, or even in prose. Poetry in itself is no

protection against folly and feebleness. There is in the world a small

amount of good, and an immense amount of bad poetry. The former, we may

hope, will last, and will serve as a stay to all who care for the music

of thought and the harmony of language; the twaddle, sometimes much

admired in its time (and there is plenty of it in Goethe also), will, we

hope, fade away from the memory of man, and serve as a lesson to poets

who imagine that they may safely say in rhythm and rhyme what they would

be thoroughly ashamed to say in simple prose. Nor is the so-called stay

or immortality of poetry of much consequence. To have benefited millions

of his own age, ought surely to satisfy any poet, even if no one reads

his poems, or translations of them, a thousand years hence.

Denn wer den Besten seiner Zeit genug

Gethan, der hat gelebt für alle Zeiten.[10]

It is strange to go over the old ground when he with whom one travelled

over it in former times is no more present to answer and to hold his own

view against the world. There certainly was a great charm in Arnold,

even though he could be very patronising. But there was in all he said a

kind of understood though seldom expressed sadness, as if to say, “It

will soon be all over, don’t let us get angry; we are all very good

fellows,” etc. He knew for years that though he was strong and looked

very young for his age, the thread of his life might snap at any moment.

And so it did—_felix opportunitate mortis_. Not long before his death he

met Browning on the steps of the Athenæum. He felt ill, and in taking

leave of Browning he hinted that they might never meet again. Browning

was profuse in his protestations, and Arnold, on turning away, said in

his airy way: “Now, one promise, Browning: please, not more than ten

lines.” Browning understood, and went away with a solemn smile.

Arnold was most brilliant as Professor of Poetry at Oxford, from 1857 to

1867. He took great pains in writing and delivering his lectures. He

looked well and spoke well. Some of his lectures were masterpieces, and

he set a good example which was followed by Sir Francis Doyle, 1867–77,

well known by his happy occasional poems, then by John Shairp from 1877

to his death, and lastly by Francis Palgrave from 1885–95. The best of

Arnold’s lectures were published as essays; Shairp’s lectures appeared

after his death, and have retained their popularity, particularly in

America. Palgrave’s lectures, we may hope, will soon appear. They were

full of most valuable information, and would prove very useful to many

as a book of reference. I have known no one better informed on English

poetry than my friend Palgrave. His “Golden Treasury” bears evidence of

his wide reading, and his ripe judgment in selecting the best specimens

of English lyric poetry. One had but to touch on any subject in the

history of English literature, or to ask him a question, and there was

always an abundance of most valuable information to be got from him. I

owe him a great deal, particularly in my early Oxford days. For it was

he who revised my first attempts at writing in English, and gave me good

advice for the rest of my journey, more particularly as to what to

avoid. He is now one of the very few friends left who remember my first

appearance in Oxford in 1846, and who were chiefly instrumental in

retaining my services for a University which has proved a true Alma

Mater to me during all my life. Grant (Sir Alexander), Sellar, Froude,

Sandars, Morier, Neate, Johnson (Manuel), Church, Jowett, all are gone

before me.

Here are some old verses of his which I find in my album:—

An English welcome to an English shore

Such as we could, some four years since we gave thee,

Not knowing what the Fates reserved in store

Or that our land among our sons would have thee;

But now thou art endenizen’d awhile

Almost we fear our welcome to renew:[11]

Lest what we seemed to promise, should beguile,

When all we are is open to thy view.

But yet if aught of what we fondly boast—

True-hearted warmth of Friendship, frank and free,

Survive yet in this island-circling coast,

We need not fear again to welcome thee:—

So may we, blessing thee, ourselves be blest,

And prove not all unworthy of our guest.

What happy days, what happy evenings we spent together lang syne! How

patient they all were with their German guest when he first tried in his

broken English to take part in their lively and sparkling conversations.

Having once been received in that delightful circle, it was easy to make

more acquaintances among their friends who lived at Oxford, or who from

time to time came to visit them at Oxford. It was thus that I first came

to know Ruskin, Tennyson, Browning, and others.

Ruskin often came to spend a few days with his old friends, and

uncompromising and severe as he could be when he wielded his pen, he was

always most charming in conversation. He never, when he was with his

friends, claimed the right of speaking with authority, even on his own

special subjects, as he might well have done. It seemed to be his pen

that made him say bitter things. He must have been sorry himself for the

severe censure he passed in his earlier years on men whose honest

labour, if nothing else, ought to have protected them against such cruel

onslaughts. Grote’s style may not be the very best for an historian, but

in his _Quellenstudium_ he was surely most conscientious. Yet this is

what Ruskin wrote of him: “There is probably no commercial establishment

between Charing Cross and the Bank, whose head clerk could not have

written a better History of Greece, if he had the vanity to waste his

time on it.” Of Gibbon’s classical work he spoke with even greater

contempt. “Gibbon’s is the worst English ever written by an educated

Englishman. Having no imagination and little logic, he is alike

incapable either of picturesqueness or wit, his epithets are malicious

without point, sonorous without weight, and have no office but to make a

flat sentence turgid.” I feel sure that Ruskin, such as I knew him in

later years, would have wished these sentences unwritten.

He was really the most tolerant and agreeable man in society. He could

discover beauty where no one else could see it, and make allowance where

others saw no excuse. I remember him as diffident as a young girl, full

of questions, and grateful for any information. Even on art topics I

have watched him listening almost deferentially to others who laid down

the law in his presence. His voice was always most winning, and his

language simply perfect. He was one of the few Englishmen I knew who,

instead of tumbling out their sentences like so many portmanteau, bags,

rugs, and hat-boxes from an open railway van, seemed to take a real

delight in building up their sentences, even in familiar conversation,

so as to make each deliverance a work of art. Later in life that even

temperament may have become somewhat changed. He had suffered much, and

one saw that his wounds had not quite healed. His public lectures as

Professor of Fine Art were most attractive, and extremely popular at

first. But they were evidently too much for him, and on the advice of

his medical friends he had at last to cease from lecturing altogether.

Several times his brain had been a very serious trouble to him. People

forget that, as we want good eyes for seeing, and good ears for hearing,

we want a strong, sound brain for lecturing.

I have seen much of such brain troubles among my friends, and who can

account for them? It is not the brain that thinks, nor do we think by

means of our brain; but we cannot think without our brain, and the

slightest lesion of our brain in any one of its wonderful convolutions

is as bad as a shot in the eye.

If ever there was an active, powerful brain, it was Ruskin’s. No doubt

he worked very hard, but I doubt whether hard work by itself can ever

upset a healthy brain. I believe it rather strengthens than weakens it,

as exercise strengthens the muscles of our body. His was, no doubt, a

very sensitive nature, and an overwrought sensitiveness is much more

likely to cause mischief than steady intellectual effort. And what a

beautiful mind his was, and what lessons of beauty he has taught us all.

At the same time, he could not bear anything unbeautiful; and anything

low or ignoble in men revolted him and made him thoroughly unhappy. I

remember once taking Emerson to lunch with him, in his rooms in Corpus

Christi College. Emerson was an old friend of his, and in many respects

a cognate soul. But some quite indifferent subject turned up, a heated

discussion ensued, and Ruskin was so upset that he had to quit the room

and leave us alone. Emerson was most unhappy, and did all he could to

make peace, but he had to leave without a reconciliation.

It is very difficult to make allowance for these gradual failures of

brain power.

Again and again I have seen such cases at Oxford, where men were clearly

no longer themselves, and yet had to be treated as if they were; nay,

continue to exercise their old influence till at last the crash came,

and one began to understand what had seemed so strange, and more than

strange, in their behaviour. I believe there are as many degrees of

insanity as there are of shortsightedness and deafness, and the line

that divides sanity from insanity is often very small. I have had to

watch the waverings of this line in several cases, and it is enough to

upset one’s own equilibrium to have to deal with a friend who to-day is

quite like himself and quite like ourselves, and the next day a raving

lunatic. My predecessor at Oxford, Dr. Trithen, half Russian, half Swiss

by birth, and a man of extraordinary gifts and wonderfully attractive,

went slowly out of his mind and had at last to be sent to an asylum. But

even then he wrote the most reasonable and touching letters to me on all

sorts of subjects, though when I went to see him he was quite

unapproachable. Fortunately he died soon after from brain disease, but

who could say what was the cause of it? Nothing remains of him but the

edition of a Sanskrit play, the Vîracharitra.

But his knowledge of Sanskrit and all sorts of languages, his peculiar

power of mimicry in imitating the exact pronunciation of different

dialects, and his knack of copying Oriental MSS. so that one could

hardly tell the difference between the original and the copy were quite

amazing. He might have grown to be another Mezzofanti if the fates had

not been against him. He was the very type of a fascinating Russian,

full of kindness and courtesy, sparkling in conversation, always ready

to help others and most careless about himself; but there always was an

expression in his coruscating eyes which spoke of danger, and foreboded

the tragedy which finished his young and promising life.

Painful as these intellectual breakdowns are, they are not half so

painful as when we see in our friends what is at first called mere

wrongheadedness, but is apt to lead to a complete deterioration of moral

fibre, and in the end to an apparent inability to distinguish between

right and wrong, between truth and falsehood. In the former case we know

that a slight lesion in one of the ganglion cells or nerve-fibres of the

brain is sufficient to account for any disturbance in the intellectual

clock-work. The man himself remains the same, though at times hidden

from us, as it were, by a veil, and we feel towards him the same

sorrowful sympathy which we feel towards a man who has lost the use of

his eyes or his legs, who cannot see or cannot walk. We know that the

instruments are at fault, not the operator. But it is very difficult to

make the same allowance in cases of moral deterioration. Here

instruments and operator seem to be the same, though, for all we know,

here too the brain may be more at fault than the heart. A well-known

oculist maintained that the peculiarities, or what he called the

distortions, in Turner’s latest pictures were due to a malformation in

the muscles of his eyes. He actually invented some spectacles by which

everything that seemed ill-proportioned in Turner’s latest productions

came right if looked at through these corrective lenses. May not what we

call shortsightedness, conceit, vanity, envy, hatred and malice—all, as

it seems, without rhyme or reason—be due in the beginning to some

weakness or dimness of sight that might have been corrected, if treated

in time, by those who are nearest and dearest to the sufferer? This may

seem a dangerous view of moral responsibility; but, if so, it can be

dangerous to the sufferer only, not to those who ought to sympathise,

_i.e._ to feel and suffer, with him. To me it has proved a solution of

many difficulties during a long and varied intercourse with men and

women; the only difficulty is how to make these invalids harmless to

themselves.

Ruskin’s influence among the undergraduates at Oxford was most

extraordinary. He could persuade the young Christ Church men to take

spade and wheelbarrow and help him to make a road which he thought would

prove useful to a village near Oxford. No other professor could have

achieved that. The road was made, but was also soon washed away, and, of

course, Ruskin was laughed at, though the labour undergone by his pupils

did them no doubt a great deal of good, even though it did not benefit

the inhabitants of the village for any length of time. It was sad to see

Ruskin leave Oxford estranged from many of his friends, dissatisfied

with his work, which nevertheless was most valuable and highly

appreciated by young and old, perhaps by the young even more than by the

old. His spirit still dwells in the body, and if any one may look back

with pride and satisfaction upon the work which he has achieved it is

surely Ruskin.

Another though less frequent visitor to Oxford was Tennyson. His first

visit to our house was rather alarming. We lived in a small house in

High Street, nearly opposite Magdalen College, and our establishment was

not calculated to receive sudden guests, particularly a Poet Laureate.

He stepped in one day during the long vacation, when Oxford was almost

empty. Wishing to show the great man all civility, we asked him to

dinner that night and breakfast the next morning. At that time almost

all the shops were in the market, which closed at one o’clock. My wife,

a young housekeeper, did her best for our honoured guest. He was known

to be a gourmand, and at dinner he was evidently put out when he found

the sauce with the salmon was not the one he preferred. He was pleased,

however, with the wing of a chicken, and said it was the only advantage

he got from being Poet Laureate, that he generally received the

liver-wing of a chicken. The next morning at breakfast we had rather

plumed ourselves on having been able to get a dish of cutlets, and were

not a little surprised when our guest arrived to see him whip off the

cover of the hot dish, and to hear the exclamation: “Mutton chops! the

staple of every bad inn in England.” However, these were but minor

matters, though not without importance at the time in the eyes of a

young wife to whom Tennyson had been like one of the Immortals. He was

simply delightful and full of inquiries about the East, more

particularly about Indian poetry, and I believe that it was then that I

told him that there was no rhyme in Sanskrit poetry, and ventured to ask

him why there should be in English. He was not so offended as Samuel

Johnson seems to have been when asked the same question. The old bear

would probably have answered my question by, “You are a great fool, sir;

use your own judgment,” while Tennyson gave the very sensible answer

that rhyme assisted the memory.

Auld lang syne · 第 7 / 17 段