CHAPTER VIII

NOMINALISM

De Morgan[31] said that, "if all mankind had spoken one language, we

cannot doubt that there would have been a powerful, perhaps universal,

school of philosophers who would have believed in the inherent connexion

between names and things; who would have taken the sound _man_ to be the

mode of agitating the air which is essentially communicative of the

ideas of reason, cookery, bipedality, etc.... 'The French,' said the

sailor, 'call a cabbage a _shoe_; the fools! Why can't they call it a

cabbage, when they must know it is one?'"

One of the chief differences between logicians and men of letters is

that the latter mean many different things by one word, whereas the

former do not--at least nowadays. Most mathematicians belong to the

class of men of letters.

I once had a manservant who told me on a certain occasion that he "never

thought a word about it." I was doubtful whether to class him with such

eminent mathematicians as are mentioned in the last chapter, or as a

supporter of Max Mueller's theory of the identity of thought and

language. However, since the man was very untruthful, and he told me

that he meant what he said and said what he meant,[32] the conclusion is

probably correct that he really believed that the meanings of his words

were not the words themselves. Thus I think it most probable that my

manservant had been a mathematician but had escaped by the aid of logic.

As regards his remark that he meant what he said and said what he

meant, he plainly wished to pride himself on certain virtues which he

did not possess, and was not indifferent to applause, which, however,

was never evoked. The virtues, if so they be, and the applause were

withheld for other reasons than that the above statements are either

nonsensical or false. Suppose that "I say what I mean" expresses a

truth. What I say (or write) is always a symbol--words (or marks); and

what I mean by the symbol is the meaning of the symbol and not the

symbol itself. So the remark cannot express a truth, any more than the

name "Wellington" won the battle of Waterloo.

FOOTNOTES:

[31] _F. L._, pp. 246-7.

[32] The Hatter (see Appendix H) pointed out that there is a difference

between these two assertions. Thus, he clearly showed that he was a

nominalist, and philosophically opposed to the March Hare who had

recommended Alice to say what she meant.

The philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll · 第 8 / 43 章