THE DISPUTED TERRITORY.
We must now look back and gather up the threads—hitherto interwoven
with accounts of other matters—connected with what has been rightly
called the “burning question” of the disputed territory, which led
eventually to the Zulu War.
The disputes between the Boers and Zulus concerning the boundary line
of their respective countries had existed for many years, its origin
and growth being entirely attributable to the well-known and usually
successful process by which the Dutch Boers, as we have already said,
have gradually possessed themselves of the land belonging to their
unlettered neighbours. This process is described by Mr. Osborn,
formerly resident magistrate of Newcastle, now Colonial Secretary of
the Transvaal Government, September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196).
“I would point out here that this war (with Sikukuni) arose solely
out of dispute about land. The Boers—as they have done in other
cases, and are still doing—encroached by degrees upon native
territory; commencing by obtaining permission to graze stock upon
portions of it at certain seasons of the year, followed by individual
graziers obtaining from native headmen a sort of license to squat
upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to keep other
Boer squatters away from the same land. These licenses, temporarily
extended, as friendly or neighbourly acts, by unauthorised, headmen,
after a few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed by him
as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is
levied by him upon the very men from whom he obtained right to squat,
to which the natives submit out of fear of the matter reaching the
ears of the paramount Chief, who would in all probability severely
punish them for opening the door of encroachment to the Boer. After
awhile, however, the matter comes to a crisis, in consequence of the
incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives; one or other
of the disputants lays the case before the paramount Chief, who,
upon hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence
and threats by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this,
the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to collect a few
neighbouring Boers, including an Acting Field Cornet, or even an
Acting Provisional Field Cornet, appointed by the Field Cornet or
Provisional Cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although
without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few
cattle are collected among themselves, which the party takes to
the Chief, and his signature is obtained to a written instrument,
alienating to the Republican Boers a large slice of, or all, his
territory. The contents of this document are, so far as I can make
out, never clearly or intelligibly explained to the Chief, who signs
it and accepts of the cattle, under the impression that it is all in
settlement of hire for the grazing licenses granted by his headmen.”
“This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the usual method by which
the Boers obtain what they call cessions of territories to them by
native Chiefs. In Sikukuni’s case, they say that his father, Sikwata,
ceded to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square miles)
for one hundred head of cattle.”
Also Sir H. Barkly, late Governor of the Cape, writes as follows,
October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140):
“The following graphic description of this process (of Boer
encroachment) is extracted from a letter in the Transvaal _Advocate_
of a few weeks ago: ‘Frontiers are laid down, the claim to which
is very doubtful. These frontiers are not occupied, but farms are
inspected (“guessed at” would be nearer the mark), title-deeds for
the same are issued, and, when the unlucky purchaser wishes to take
possession, he finds his farm (if he can find it) occupied by tribes
of Kafirs, over whom the Government has never attempted to exercise
any jurisdiction.’ ‘Their Chief,’ it adds, ‘is rather bewildered
at first to find out that he has for years been a subject of the
Transvaal.’ ‘The Chief in question is one Lechune, living on the
north-west of the Republic. But the account is equally applicable
to the case of Sikukuni, or Umswazi, or half-a-dozen others, the
entire circuit of the Republic, from the Barolongs and Batlapins on
the west, to the Zulus on the east, being bordered by a _series of
encroachments disputed by the natives_.’”
A memorandum from Captain Clarke, R.A., Special Commissioner at
Lydenburg, dated April 23rd, 1879 (C. 2367, p. 152), also gives
an account of the way in which the Boers took possession of the
Transvaal itself, highly illustrative of their usual practice, and
of which the greater part may be quoted here, with a key to the real
meaning of phrases which require some study to interpret.
“On the entrance of the Fou Trekkers into the Transvaal, they
were compelled against their hereditary instincts to combine for
self-defence against a common foe.” (That is to say, that, having
forced themselves into a strange country, they necessarily combined
to oust those they found there.) “External pressure was removed by
success, and the diffusive instinct asserted itself”—which being
translated into ordinary English simply signifies that, having
conquered certain native tribes, they settled themselves upon their
lands, and returned to their natural disunited condition. “Isolated
families, whose ambition was to be out of sight of their neighbours’
smoke, pushed forward into Kafir-land” (as yet unconquered).
“Boundaries were laid down either arbitrarily or by unsatisfactorily
recorded treaty with savage neighbours. The natives, forced back,
acquired the powers of coalition lost by the Boers, and in their turn
brought pressure to bear on their invaders and whilom conquerors;
farm after farm had to be abandoned, and many of the Boers who
remained acknowledged by paying tribute that they retained their
lands by the permission of neighbouring chiefs. The full importance
of this retrograde movement was not at once felt, as a natural
safety-valve was found.”
“A considerable portion of the east of the Transvaal is called
the High Veldt, and consists of tableland at a considerable
elevation, overlying coal-measures; this district appears bleak and
inhospitable, overrun by large herds of game and watered by a series
of apparently stagnant ponds which take the place of watercourses....
From various sources, within the last six years, it has been
discovered that the High Veldt is most valuable for the grazing of
sheep, horses, and cattle; and farms which possess the advantage of
water are worth from £1,000 to £1,200, where formerly they could have
been bought for as many pence.”
“This discovery has opened a door of escape for many of the
_native-pressed borderers_. _The pressure_ on those that remain
increases, and on the north-east and west of the Transvaal is a
fringe of farmers who live by the sufferance or in fear of the
interlacing natives.”
The phrases which I have italicised seem to indicate that the
writer has lost sight of the fact that, if the border farmers are
“native-pressed,” it is because they have intruded themselves amongst
the natives, from which position a just and wise government would
seek to withdraw them, instead of endeavouring to establish and
maintain them in it by force. This latter course, however, is the
one which Captain Clarke recommends. The remainder of his memorandum
is a series of suggestions for this purpose, one of which runs as
follows: “To take away the immediate strain on the border farmer, and
the risk of collision which the present state of affairs involves,
I would suggest the establishment of Government Agents, who should
reside _on or beyond the border now occupied by the farmers_.[70] ...
Each Residency should be a fortress, built of stones and prepared for
defence against any native force.”
Sir Bartle Frere’s version of Captain Clarke’s account, given to
the Secretary of State in a despatch enclosing the above, runs as
follows: “Most of the native chiefs now there have gradually crept
in, under pressure from the northward, and finding no representatives
of the Transvaal Government able to exercise authority on the spot,
have gradually set up some sort of government for themselves, before
which many of the Boers have retired, leaving only those who were
willing to pay a sort of tribute for protection, or to avoid being
robbed of their cattle.”
With whatever oblique vision Sir Bartle Frere may have perused the
enclosure from which he gathers his facts, no unbiassed mind can
fail to detect the singular discrepancy between the account given by
Captain Clarke and that drawn from it by the High Commissioner in his
enclosing letter.
He makes no mention of the _driving out_ of the natives which
preceded their _creeping in_, and which figures so largely in Captain
Clarke’s memorandum, of which he professes to give a sketch. And he
introduces, entirely on his own account, the accusation against the
natives implied in the phrase “or to avoid being robbed of their
cattle,” of which not a single word appears in the memorandum itself.
Properly speaking, there were two disputed boundary lines up to
1879, the one being that between Zululand and the Transvaal, to
the south of the Pongolo River; the other that between the Zulus
and the Swazis, to the north of, and parallel to, that stream.[71]
The Swazis are the hereditary enemies of the Zulus, and there has
always been a bitter feeling between the two races, nevertheless the
acquisitiveness of the Transvaal Boers was at the bottom of both
disputes. They profess to have obtained, by cession from the Swazi
king in 1855, a strip of land to the north-east of the Pongolo River
and down to the Lebomba Mountains, in order that they might form a
barrier between them and the Zulus; but the Swazis deny having ever
made such cession.
In addition to the doubt thrown upon the transaction by this denial,
and the well-known Boer encroachments already described, it remains
considerably open to question whether the Swazis had the power to
dispose of the land, which is claimed by the Zulus as their own.
The commission which sat upon the southern border question was not
permitted to enter upon that to the north of the Pongolo, which
therefore remains uncertain. The one fact generally known, however,
is undoubtedly favourable to the Zulu claim. The territory in
question was occupied until 1848 by two Zulu chiefs, Putini of the
Ama-Ngwe, and Langalibalele of the Ama-Hlubi tribe, under the rule
of the Zulu king Umpande. These chiefs, having fallen into disgrace
with the king, were attacked by him, and fled into Natal. They were
ultimately settled in their late locations under the Draakensberg,
leaving their former places in Zululand, north and south of the
Pongolo, the inNgcaka (Mountain), and inNgcuba (River) vacant.
Sir Henry Bulwer remarks on this point—(P. P. 2220, pp. 400-2):
“Sir T. Shepstone says indeed, that there is no dispute between the
Transvaal and the Ama-Swazi; but, as he adds that, should questions
arise between them, they may be settled on their own merits, it is
not impossible that questions may arise; and I am certainly informed
that the Ama-Swazi used formerly to deny that they had ever ceded
land to the _extent_ claimed by the Republic.” But that the western
portion, at all events, of the land in dispute was at that time under
Zulu rule, is apparent from an account given by members of the house
of Masobuza, principal wife of Langalibalele, and sister to the Swazi
king, who was sheltered at Bishopstowe after the destruction of the
Hlubi tribe, and died there in 1877.
“In Chaka’s time, Mate, father of Madhlangampisi, who had lived from
of old on his land north of the Pongolo, as an _independent_ chief,
not under Swazi rule, gave, without fighting, his allegiance to
Chaka; and from that time to this the district in question has been
under Zulu rule, the Swazi king having never at any time exercised
any authority over it.” The same statement applies to several other
tribes living north, and on either side of the Pongolo, amongst them
those of Langalibalele and Putini.
“Madhlangampisi’s land was transferred by the Boer Government as
late as January 17th, 1877, to the executors of the late Mr.
M’Corkindale, and now goes by the name of ‘Londina,’ in which is
the hamlet of ‘Derby.’... We are perfectly aware that the southern
portion of the block is held by command of the Zulu chief, and
the executor’s surveyors have been obstructed in prosecuting the
survey.”—_Natal Mercury_, July 23rd, 1878.
In 1856 a number of Boers claimed _Natal_ territory _west_ of the
Buffalo, as far as the Biggarsberg range, now the south-west boundary
of the Newcastle County, and some of them were in occupation of
it; and, a commission being sent to trace the northern border of
the colony along the line of the Buffalo, these latter opposed
and protested against the mission of the Commissioners; but their
opposition spent itself in threats, and ended in the withdrawal from
Natal of the leaders of the party.
Other Boers had settled _east_ of the Buffalo, in the location
vacated by the tribe of Langalibalele, as to whom the aforesaid
Commissioners write:
“During our stay among the farmers it was brought to our notice by
them that they had obtained from Panda the cession of the tract of
country beyond the Buffalo (inNcome), towards the north-west; they
had subscribed among themselves one hundred head of cattle for this
land, which had been accepted by Panda.”
And Sir T. Shepstone says:
“Panda never denied this grant (N.B.—in respect of what lay _west_
of the Draakensberg), but repudiated the idea that he had sold the
land. His account was that, when the farmers were defeated by Her
Majesty’s troops in Natal, some of them asked him for land to live
upon outside the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that he
gave them this tract ‘only to live in, as part of Zululand under Zulu
law’” (P. p. 1961, p. 28). “The cattle they say they paid for it,
Panda looked upon as a thank-offering, made in accordance with Zulu
custom” (1961, pp. 1-5).
In reply to messages sent by the Zulu king to the Natal Government,
complaining of the encroachments of the Boers on the _north_, as
well as the west of Zululand, and begging the friendly intervention
and arbitration of the English, the advice of the Natal authorities
was always to “sit still,” and use no force, for England would see
justice done in the end.[72]
From all this it would appear that the claim of Cetshwayo to land
north of the Pongolo was not an “aggressive act,” without any real
foundation in right, and merely a defiant challenge intended to
provoke war; but was a just claim, according to the tests applied
by Sir Bartle Frere—(P. p. 2222, p. 29)—viz. “actual occupation and
exercise of sovereign rights.”
The subject is fully gone into, and further evidence produced, in the
Bishop of Natal’s pamphlet, “Extracts from the Blue-Books;” but the
main facts are as here stated.
On turning to the subject of the better known border dispute, between
the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers on the east, we are confronted at
once by the fact that the decision of the Commissioners, chosen by
Sir H. Bulwer to investigate the matter, was decidedly favourable
to the Zulu claim; which, after careful consideration of all the
evidence on either side, they found to be a just and good one. This
decision should, in itself, have been sufficient to relieve the Zulu
king from the accusation of making insolent demands for territory
with aggressive and warlike intentions. But as, up to July, 1878, the
above charge was the sole one brought against him, and on account
of which troops were sent for and preparations made for war; and
as, also, Sir Bartle Frere has thought fit to cast a doubt upon
the judgment of the Commissioners by the various expressions of
dissatisfaction which appear in his correspondence with the Bishop of
Natal; it will be necessary for us to enter fully into the matter, in
order to understand the extent to which the question bore fruit in
the Zulu War.
In 1861 Cetshwayo demanded from the Transvaal Government the persons
of four fugitives, who had escaped at the time of the Civil War of
1856, and had taken refuge amongst the Boers. One of these fugitives
was a younger son of Umpande, by name Umtonga, who took refuge
at first in Natal; from whence, however, he carried on political
intrigues in Zululand, with the assistance of his mother, which
resulted in the death of the latter and in a message from Cetshwayo
to the Natal Government, complaining of Umtonga’s conduct, and
requesting that he should be placed in his hands. This was refused,
but the Government undertook to place the young man under the
supervision of an old and trusted colonial chief, Zatshuke, living
in the centre of the colony. Umtonga professed to accept and to be
grateful for this arrangement; but, upon the first step being taken
to carry it out, he fired twice at the policeman who was sent to
conduct him to Zatshuke, but missed him, and then escaped to the
Transvaal territory.
From thence he, with another brother, and two indunas (captains)
were given up to Cetshwayo by the Boers, who required, in return for
their surrender, the cession of land _east_ of the Blood River, and
a pledge that the young princes should not be killed. Cetshwayo is
said by the Boers to have agreed to both conditions, and he certainly
acted up to the latter, three of the four being still alive, and the
fourth having died a natural death.[73] It is this alleged bargain
with Cetshwayo (in 1861) on which the Boers found their claim to the
main portion of the disputed territory—a “bargain in itself base and
immoral; the selling of the persons of men for a grant of land, and
which no Christian government, like that of England, could recognise
for a moment as valid and binding,” even if it were ever made. _But
it is persistently denied by the Zulus_ that such a bargain was ever
consented to by them or _by their prince_. On this point Cetshwayo
himself says: “I have never given or sold any land to the Boers of
the Transvaal. They wished me to do so when I was as yet an umtwana
(child, prince). They tried to get me to sign a paper, but I threw
the pen down, and never would do so, telling them that it was out of
my power to either grant or sell land, as it belonged to the king,
my father, and the nation. I know the Boers say I signed a paper,
and that my brothers Hamu and Ziwedu did also. I never did, and if
they say I held the pen or made a mark, giving or selling land, it is
a lie!” The Prince Dabulamanzi, and chiefs sitting round, bore out
the king in this statement. (From Report of Mr. Fynney on July 4th,
1877—P. p. 1961, p. 45.)
And so says Sir T. Shepstone (1961, p. 5): “Panda, who is still
living, repudiated the bargain, and Cetshwayo denied it. The
Emigrant Farmers, however, insisted on its validity, and proceeded
to occupy. The Zulus have never ceased to threaten and protest. And
the Government of Natal, to whom these protests and threats have been
continually made, has frequently, during a course of fifteen years,
found it very difficult to impress the Zulus with the hope and belief
that an amicable solution of the difficulty would some day be found,
provided that they refrained from reprisals or the use of force.”
The first message from the Zulus on the subject of the disputed
territory was received on September 5th, 1861, in the very year
in which (according to the Boers) the cession in question was
made (1961, p. 7). The Bishop of Natal, in his “Extracts” already
mentioned, records eighteen messages on the same subject, commencing
with the above and concluding with one brought on April 20th, 1876
(1748, p. 49), showing that for a period of fifteen years the Zulu
king (whether represented by Umpande or by Cetshwayo) had never
ceased to entreat “the friendly intervention and arbitration of this
Government between them and the Boer Government” (1961, p. 9). These
eighteen messages acknowledge the virtual supremacy of the English,
and the confidence which the Zulus feel in English justice and
honour, and they request their protection, or, failing that, their
permission to protect themselves by force of arms; they suggest that
a Commission sent from Natal should settle the boundary, and that a
Resident or Agent of the British Government should be stationed on
the border between them and the Boers, to see that justice was done
on both sides. They report the various aggressions and encroachments
by which the Zulus were suffering at the hands of their neighbours,
but to which they submitted because the question was in the hands of
the Government of Natal; and they repeatedly beg that the English
will themselves take possession of the disputed country, or some part
of it, rather than allow the unsettled state of things to continue.
“They (the Zulus) beg that the Governor will take a strip of country,
the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the
Zulus and the Commissioners (for whom they are asking) sent from
Natal, the strip to abut on the Colony of Natal, and to run to the
northward and eastward in such a manner, in a line parallel to the
sea-coast, as to interpose in all its length between the Boers and
the Zulus, and to be governed by the Colony of Natal, and form a
portion of it if thought desirable.
“The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried
out immediately, because they have been neighbours of Natal for so
many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question has
arisen between them and the Government of Natal; they know that where
the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English there it will
remain.
“Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled,
directed us to urge in the most earnest manner upon the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated.”
This is the concluding portion of the fourth message, received
on June 5th, 1869 (1961, p. 9). The fifth, reporting fresh Boer
aggressions, was received on December 6th, 1869.
In the course of the same year Lieutenant-Governor Keate addressed
the President of the South African Republic on the subject, and
suggested arbitration, which suggestion was accepted by the
President, provided that the expenses should be paid by the losing
party; and during the following two years repeated messages were
sent by Mr. Keate reminding the President that being “already in
possession of what the Zulu authorities put forward as justifying
their claims,” he only awaits the like information from the other
side before “visiting the locality and hearing the respective
parties.”—(P. p. 1961, p. 24).
On August 16th, 1871, the Government Secretary of the South African
Republic replies that he has “been instructed to forward to the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the necessary documents bearing on the
Zulu question, together with a statement of the case, and hopes to do
so by next post; but that, as the session, of the Volksraad had been
postponed from May to September, it would be extremely difficult to
settle the matter in 1871,” he therefore proposed January, 1872, as a
convenient time for the purpose.
Nearly eight weeks later (October 9th) Lieutenant-Governor Keate
informs the President that the documents promised, upon the Zulu
border question, have not yet reached him; but sees nothing, at
present, likely to prevent his “proceeding, in January next, to the
Zulu border for the purpose of settling the matter at issue.”
But the promised papers appear never to have been sent. The
arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate was relieved
from the government of Natal in 1872; and the next stage of the
question is marked by the issue on May 25th, 1875, of a proclamation
by Acting-President Joubert, annexing to the dominion of the South
African Republic the territory, the right to which was to have been
decided by this arbitration.
In this proclamation no reference is made to the (alleged) Treaty
of 1861 (see p. 176), by which “what is now and was then disputed
territory had been ceded to the South African Republic,” though
it certainly annexes to the Republic all the country included in
the Treaty, and seems to annex more. But no ground of claim is set
forth or alluded to upon which the right to annex is founded, “with
reservation of all further claims and rights of the said Republic,”
nor any reason assigned for the act, except to “prevent disagreement”
between the Boers and the Zulus. And Sir T. Shepstone goes on to say
(1961, p. 5):
“The officers of the South African Republic proceeded to exercise
in this annexed territory the ordinary functions of government, and
among these, the levying taxes on natives. The Zulus, who had been
persistent in repudiating the cession, and who have continued to
occupy the territory as theirs, resisted the demand by Cetshwayo’s
directions, and a collision appeared imminent, when the difficulty
was avoided by the officers withdrawing the order they had issued.”
Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated disappointments with which
they met, the Zulus continued to send complaints and entreaties
to the Government of Natal; which messages, although they never
varied in their respectful and friendly tone towards the English,
show plainly how deeply they felt the neglect with which they were
treated. The English “promises” are spoken of again and again, and
the thirteenth message contains a sentence worth recording, in its
simple dignity. “Cetshwayo desired us,” say the messengers, “to urge
upon the Governor of Natal to interfere, to save the destruction of
perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to
state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own
houses. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the
aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet” (1748, p. 14).
Sir Henry Bulwer’s answers to these messages contain passages which
sufficiently prove that up to this time the Government of Natal
had no complaints to make against the Zulu king. “This is the
first opportunity the Lieutenant-Governor has had,” he says, “of
communicating with Cetshwayo since his (Sir H. Bulwer’s) arrival
in the Colony. He therefore takes the opportunity of sending him a
friendly greeting, and of expressing the pleasure with which he had
heard of the satisfactory relations that have existed between this
Colony and the Zulus,” November 25th, 1875 (1748, p. 15).
“This Government trusts that Cetshwayo will maintain that moderation
and forbearance which he has hitherto shown, and which the Government
has great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the councillors of
the great Queen, and that nothing will be done which will hinder the
peaceful solution of the Disputed Territory question,” July 25th,
1876 (1748, p. 97).
Meanwhile repeated acts of violence and brutality on the part of
the Boers are reported, and in the Blue-books before us the Zulu
complaints are confirmed from various official sources, by Mr. Fynn,
Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division (1748, p. 10), by Sir
Henry Bulwer (1748, pp. 8, 11, 12, 25), by Sir T. Shepstone himself
(1748, pp. 10, 24, 29, 52, 56), by Mr. Osborn (1748, p. 82), and by
Sir Henry Barkly (1748, p. 25). No attempt at settlement, however,
had been made in answer to these appeals up to the time of the
annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, by Sir T. Shepstone; after
which so great a change took place in the tone of the latter upon the
subject of the disputed territory.
Upon this question we may quote again from Mr. Fynney’s report of
the king’s answer to him upon the announcement of the annexation of
the Transvaal. “I hear what you have said about past disputes with
the Boers, and about the settlement of them,” said the king; “the
land question is one of them, and a great one. I was in hopes, when I
heard it was you who visited me, that you had brought me some final
word about the land, as Somtseu had sent from Newcastle by Umgabana
to say that his son would come with the word respecting the land so
long in dispute, and I felt sure it had come to-day, for you are his
son. Now the Transvaal is English ground, I want Somtseu to send
the Boers away from the lower parts of the Transvaal, that near my
country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are a bad people, bad
altogether; I do not want them near my people; they lie, and claim
what is not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas (Mr.
Burgers)?”
“I informed him,” says Mr. Fynney, “that Mr. Burgers had left the
Transvaal.”
“Then let them pack up and follow Thomas,” said he, “let them go. The
Queen does not want such people as those about her land. What can
the Queen make of them or do with them? Their evil ways puzzled both
Thomas and Rudolph (Landdrost of Utrecht); they will not be quiet.
They have laid claim to my land, and even down to _N’Zabankulu_ (you
saw the line), burned it with fire, and my people have no rest.”
“Umnyamana (Prime Minister) here remarked,” continues Mr. Fynney, “we
want to know what is going to be done about this land; it has stood
over as an open question for so many years. Somtseu took all the
papers to England with him to show the great men there, and we have
not heard since.” To which Mr. Fynney, of course, had no reply to
make.
Within a fortnight of the annexation the Boers on the Zulu border
presented Sir T. Shepstone with an address, stating that during the
last ten or twelve years (_i.e._ from 1861, when this encroachment
was begun by the Boers) they had “suffered greatly in consequence of
the hostile behaviour of the Zulu nation, but more so for the last
two years” (_i.e._ from 1875, when the Boer Government proclaimed the
disputed territory to belong to the Transvaal, and proceeded to levy
taxes upon its Zulu inhabitants), so that, they said, their lives and
goods were in danger (1814, p. 14).
Accordingly Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon as follows:
“I shall be forced to take some action with regard to the Disputed
Territory, of which your lordship has heard so much, but I shall be
careful to avoid any direct issue.”[74]
“It is of the utmost importance,” he continues, “that all questions
involving disturbance outside of this territory should be, if
possible, postponed until the Government of the Transvaal is
consolidated, and the numerous tribes within its boundaries have
begun to feel and recognise the hand of the new administration.”
These remarks already show the change in sentiment, on Sir T.
Shepstone’s part, which was more markedly displayed at the Blood
River meeting between him and the Zulu indunas. The conference
proved an utter failure, as also did several other attempts on Sir
T. Shepstone’s part to persuade the Zulus to relinquish to him, on
behalf of the Transvaal, the claims upon which they had so long
insisted.
On December 5th, 1877, two indunas came from Cetshwayo to the
Bishop of Natal with a request that he would put the Zulu claim in
writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. The same indunas,
a few days later, with Umfunzi and ’Nkisimane—messengers from
Cetshwayo—appointed, before a notary public, Dr. Walter Smith and Mr.
F. E. Colenso to be “diplomatic agents” for Cetshwayo, “who should
communicate on his behalf in the English language, and, when needful,
in writing,” and especially to “treat with the British Government on
the boundary question” (2000, p. 58);[75] which appointment, however,
Sir H. Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone refused to recognise; and the
former, having proposed the Border Commission before receiving notice
of this appointment—though the Commissioners had not yet started from
’Maritzburg—did not feel it advisable, as “no such appointment had
been made by the Zulu king,”[76] to communicate to Messrs. Smith and
Colenso Lord Carnarvon’s despatch (January 21st, 1878), which said:
“I request that you will inform Mr. Smith and Mr. Colenso that
the desire of Her Majesty’s Government in this matter is that the
boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just
arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir T.
Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the
subject.”[77]
Meanwhile, however, Sir T. Shepstone’s “negotiations” had proved
unsuccessful, and Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere (2000,
p. 68): “It seems but too clear, from all that has now happened, that
the prospect of a settlement of the question by direct negotiations
between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king is at an
end. The feeling against the Boers on the part of the Zulu king
and people is too bitter, and they are now scarcely less angry
against the new Government of the Transvaal than they were against
the old Government.” He then suggests arbitration as a way by which
the Zulu king “can escape the alternative of war, by which he can
obtain justice, and by which, at the same time, he can avoid direct
negotiations with the Government of a people whom he dislikes and
distrusts.”
The diplomatic agents were never recognised by the colonial
authorities, or allowed to exercise their functions; but a visit
which Mr. Colenso paid to the Zulu king in connection with the
appointment is worth recording for the sake of the glimpse it gives
of Cetshwayo’s habits and daily life, as told by a disinterested
eye-witness.
The king, it appears, whom so many have delighted to represent as
a corpulent unwieldy savage, to whom movement must be a painful
exertion, was in the habit of taking a daily constitutional of about
six miles out and back. Mr. Colenso observed that this was his
regular habit, and during his stay at the royal kraal he daily saw
Cetshwayo start, and could trace his course over the hills by the
great white shield carried before him as the emblem of kingship.
On his return the king regularly underwent a process of ablution at
the hands of his attendants, who poured vessels of water over him,
and rubbed the royal person down with a species of soft stone. This
performance over, Cetshwayo ascended his throne or chair of state,
upon which he remained, hearing causes, and trying cases amongst his
people, until the shades of evening fell, before which time he did
not break his fast.
This description, of the accuracy of which there can be no question,
gives a picture of a simple, moderate, and useful kingly existence,
very different from the idea commonly received of a savage monarch,
wallowing in sloth and coarse luxury, and using the power which he
holds over his fellow-creatures only for the gratification of every
evil or selfish human passion. Cetshwayo ruled his people well
according to his lights: let us hope that, now we have wrested his
kingdom from him, our government may prove a _more_ beneficent one.