THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL.
On the 5th of October, 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., was
appointed “to be a Special Commissioner to inquire respecting certain
disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the
colony of Natal, and empowering him, in certain events, to exercise
the power and jurisdiction of Her Majesty over such territories, or
some of them.” (P. P. [C. 1776] p. 1.)
The commission stated: “Whereas grievous disturbances have broken
out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa,
with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to
the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies ...
and, if the emergency should seem to you to be such as to render
it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said
colonies and of our subjects elsewhere, that the said territories,
or any portion or portions of the same, should provisionally, and
pending the announcement of our pleasure, be administered in our
name and on our behalf; then, and in such case only, we do further
authorise you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation
under your hand, to declare that, from and after a day to be therein
named, so much of any such territories as aforesaid, as to you after
due consideration, shall seem fit, shall be annexed to and form part
of our dominions.... Provided, first, that no such proclamation
shall be issued by you with respect to any district, territory, or
state unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants thereof, or
a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof, desire to
become our subjects, nor if any conditions unduly limiting our power
and authority therein are sought to be imposed.”
Such was the tenor of the commission which, unknown to the world at
large, Sir Theophilus Shepstone brought with him when he returned to
Natal in November, 1876. The sudden annexation which followed was
a stroke which took all by surprise except the few already in the
secret; many declaring to the last that such an action on the part of
the English Government was impossible—because, they thought, unjust.
It is true that the Republic had for long been going from bad to
worse in the management of its own affairs; its Government had no
longer the power to enforce laws or to collect taxes; and the country
was generally believed to be fast approaching a condition of absolute
anarchy. Nevertheless it was thought by some that, except by the
request of those concerned, we had no right to intrude our authority
for the better control of Transvaal affairs so long as their bad
management did not affect us.
On one point, however, we undoubtedly had a right to interfere, as
the stronger, the juster, and more merciful nation—namely, the
attitude of the Transvaal Boers towards, and their treatment of, the
native tribes who were their neighbours, or who came under their
control. On behalf of the latter unfortunates (Transvaal subjects),
we did not even profess to interfere; but one of the chief causes
alleged by us for our taking possession of the country was a long and
desultory war which was taking place between the Boers and Sikukuni,
the chief of the Bapedi tribe living upon their northern borders, and
in the course of which the Boers were behaving towards the unhappy
natives with a treachery, and, when they fell into their power, with
a brutality unsurpassed by any historical records. The sickening
accounts of cruelties inflicted upon helpless men, women, and
children by the Boers, which are to be found on official record in
the pages of the Blue-book (C. 1776), should be ample justification
in the eyes of a civilised world for English interference, and
forcible protection of the sufferers; and it is rather with the
manner in which the annexation was carried out, and the policy which
followed it, than with the intervention of English power in itself,
that an objection can be raised.
The war between the Boers and the Bapedi arose out of similar
encroachments on the part of the former, which led, as we shall
presently show, to their border disputes with the Zulus. Boer farmers
had gradually deprived of their land the native possessors of the
soil by a simple process peculiarly their own. They first rented
land from the chiefs for grazing purposes, then built upon it,
still paying a tax or tribute to the chief; finally, having well
established themselves, they professed to have purchased the land
for the sum already paid as rent, announced themselves the owners of
it, and were shortly themselves levying taxes on the very men whom
they had dispossessed. In this manner Sikukuni was declared by the
Boers to have ceded to them the whole of his territory—that is to
say, hundreds of square miles, for the paltry price of a hundred head
of cattle.
An officer of the English Government, indeed (His Excellency’s
Commissioner at Lydenburg, Captain Clarke, R.A.), was of opinion
[C. 2316, p. 29] that, “had only the Boer element in the Lydenburg
district been consulted, it is doubtful if there would have been war
with Sikukuni,” as the Boers, he said, might have continued to pay
taxes to the native chiefs. And the officer in question appears to
censure the people who were “willing to submit to such humiliating
conditions, and ambitious of the position of prime adviser to a
native chief.” It is difficult to understand why there should be
anything humiliating in paying rent for land, whether to white or
black owners, and the position of prime adviser to a powerful native
chief might be made a very honourable and useful one in the hands of
a wise and Christian man.
Captain Clarke continues thus: “It was the foreign element under the
late President which forced matters to a crisis. Since the annexation
the farmers have, with few exceptions, ceased to pay tribute to the
Chiefs; their relations with the natives are otherwise unchanged.
Culture and contact with civilisation will doubtless have the effect
of re-establishing the self-respect of these people, and teaching
them the obligation and benefits imposed and conferred on them by
their new position.” That is to say, apparently, teaching them that
it is beneath their dignity to pay taxes to native landowners, but
an “obligation imposed” upon them to rob the latter altogether of
their land, the future possession of which is one of the “benefits
conferred on them by their new position” (_i.e._ as subjects of the
British Crown).
“The Bapedi branch of the Basuto family,” says Captain Clarke, in the
same despatch, “essentially agricultural and peaceful in its habits
and tastes, even now irrigate the land, and would, if possible,
cultivate in excess of their food requirements. The friendly natives
assure me that their great wish is to live peacefully on their lands,
and provide themselves with ploughs, waggons, etc. The experience of
the Berlin missionaries confirms this view. Relieved of their present
anomalous position, into which they have been forced by the ambition
of their rulers,[52] and distrust of the Boers, encouraged to follow
their natural bent, the Basutos would become a peaceful agricultural
people, capable of a certain civilisation.” How well founded was this
“distrust of the Boers,” may be gathered from the accounts given in
the Blue-book already mentioned.
The objects of the Boers in their attacks upon their native
neighbours appear to have been twofold—the acquisition of territory,
and that of children to be brought up as slaves.
_The Cape Argus_ of December 12th, 1876, remarks: “Through the whole
course of this Republic’s existence, it has acted in contravention
of the Sand River Treaty;[53] and slavery has occurred not only
here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice has
been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with
all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most
of its wars.... The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting
kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children
and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through natives, who
have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them
to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their
victims amongst themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed
from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the
cognizance and for the direct advantage of the highest officials
of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town situated in the
south of the Republic the children who had been brought down from a
remote northern district.... The circumstances connected with some
of these kidnapping excursions are appalling, and the barbarities
practised by cruel masters upon some of these defenceless creatures
during the course of their servitude are scarcely less horrible than
those reported from Turkey, although they are spread over a course of
years instead of being compressed within a few weeks.” This passage
is taken from a letter to _The Argus_ (enclosed in a despatch from
Sir Henry Barkly to the Earl of Carnarvon, December 13th, 1876),
which, with other accompanying letters from the same source, gives an
account of Boer atrocities too horrible for repetition. [C. 1776].
A single instance may be mentioned which, however shocking, is less
appalling than others, but perhaps shows more plainly than anything
else could do what the natives knew the life of a slave in the
Transvaal would be. The information is given by a Boer. “In 1864,” he
says, “the Swazies accompanied the Boers against Males.[54] The Boers
did nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The men
and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby
of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through the body; and when
she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby’s neck with
her own hands, to save it from future misery. On the return of that
commando the children who became too weary to continue the journey
were killed on the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the
farmers.”
Out of this state of things eventually proceeded the war between
the Boers and Sikukuni, the result of which was a very ambiguous
one indeed; for although Sikukuni was driven out of the low-lying
districts of the country, he took refuge in his stronghold, which
affords such an impregnable position in a thickly-populated range of
mountains as hitherto to have defied all attempts, whether made by
Boers or by English, to reduce it.[55]
Another important reason alleged at the time for taking possession of
the Transvaal was that the border troubles between it and Zululand
were becoming more serious every day; that, sooner or later, unless
we interposed our authority, a war would break out between the Boers
and the Zulus, into which we should inevitably be drawn. The Zulus,
having continually entreated our protection, while at our desire they
refrained from defending themselves by force of arms, were naturally
rejoiced at an action on our part which looked like an answer to
their oft-repeated prayer, and eagerly expected the reward of their
long and patient waiting.
But, however strongly we may feel that it was the duty of the more
powerful nation to put a stop to the doings of the Transvaal Boers,
even at considerable expense to ourselves, the manner in which we
have acted, and the consequences which followed, have been such as to
cause many sensible people to feel that we should have done better
to withdraw our prohibition from Cetshwayo, and allow him and the
Boers “to fight it out between them.”[56]
We might have honestly and openly interfered and insisted upon
putting a stop to the atrocities of the Boers, annexing their country
if necessary to that end, but then we ourselves should have done
justice to the natives on whose behalf we professed to interfere,
instead of taking over with the country and carrying on those very
quarrels and aggressions which we alleged as a sufficient reason for
the annexation.
When Sir Theophilus Shepstone went up to Pretoria it was, ostensibly,
merely to advise the President and Volksraad of the Transvaal
Republic as to the best means of extricating themselves and the
country from the difficulties into which they were plunged, and
with the expressed intention of endeavouring to produce a peaceful
settlement with Sikukuni, which should protect him and his people
for the future from the tyranny of the Boers. Up to the last the
notion that there was any intention of forcibly annexing the country
was indignantly repudiated by the members of the expedition,
although their chief meanwhile was in possession of his commission
as Administrator of the British Government in the Transvaal. There
were some who suspected that there was more in the movement than
was confessed to by those concerned. It was argued that, were Sir
Theophilus Shepstone’s visit of a purely friendly nature, no armed
force would have been sent to escort him, as he was going, not into
a savage country, but into one which, at all events, professed to
have a civilised government and an educated class. The unsettled
state of feeling amongst the Boers was pleaded in answer to this
argument, but was commonly met by the suggestion that if, under the
circumstances, the armed force of mounted police which accompanied
the important visitor might be looked upon as a justifiable
precaution, yet the possible danger to strangers from the violence
of a few lawless men in a country in which the government was not
strong enough to keep them in check, was not great enough to account
for the fact that a regiment of British infantry was hastily moved
up to Newcastle, from whence they could speedily be summoned into
the Transvaal. The presence of a Zulu army upon the other border,
where it lay quiet and inoffensive for weeks during Sir Theophilus
Shepstone’s proceedings in the Transvaal, was naturally looked upon
as a suspicious circumstance. There can be little doubt that—whether
or no Cetshwayo obeyed a hint from his old friend the Secretary for
Native Affairs, and sent his army to support him, and to overawe the
Boers by a warlike demonstration—the Zulus were present in a spirit,
however inimical to the Boers, entirely friendly to the English. The
mere fact that the army lay there so long in harmless repose, and
dispersed promptly and quietly _immediately_ upon receiving orders to
do so from Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proves that, at all events, they
and their king thought that they were carrying out his wishes. The
feeling expressed at the time by a British officer,[57] in speaking
of this Zulu army, and recommending that it should be dispersed, that
“it were better the little band of Englishmen (including, of course,
himself) should fall by the hand of the Boers than that aught should
be done by the former to bring about a war of races,” can hardly have
been shared by Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, or the message to
the Zulu king to withdraw his army would have been despatched some
weeks earlier.
In face of these facts it strikes one as strange that the temporary
presence of this Zulu army on the Transvaal borders, manifestly in
our support (whether by request or not), and which retired without
giving the least offence, or even committing such acts of theft or
violence as might be expected as necessary evils in the neighbourhood
of a large European garrison, should have been regarded, later, as a
sign of Cetshwayo’s inimical feeling towards _the English_.[58]
Mr. Pretorius, member of the Dutch executive council, and other
influential Transvaalers, assert that Sir T. Shepstone threatened to
let loose the Zulus upon them, in order to reduce them to submission;
but the accusation is denied on behalf of the Administrator of the
Transvaal. And Mr. Fynney (in the report of his mission to Cetshwayo
from Sir T. Shepstone, upon the annexation of the Transvaal, dated
July 4, 1877) gives the king’s words to him, as follows: “I am
pleased that Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone) has sent you to let
me know that the land of the Transvaal Boers has now become part of
the lands of the Queen of England. I began to wonder why he did not
tell me something of what he was doing. I received one message from
him, sent by Unkabano, from Newcastle, and I heard the Boers were
not treating him properly, and that they intended to put him into a
corner. If they had done so, I should not have wanted for anything
more. Had one shot been fired, I should have said, ‘What more do I
wait for? they have touched my father.’”
But all doubt upon the subject of Sir T. Shepstone’s intention
was quickly and suddenly set at rest—the silken glove of friendly
counsel and disinterested advice was thrown aside, and the mailed
hand beneath it seized the reins of government from the slackened
fingers of the President of the Transvaal. On the 22nd January,
1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered Pretoria, the capital of
the country, where he was received with all kindness and attention
by the president, Mr. Burgers, and other important men, to whom he
spoke of his mission in general terms, as one the object of which
was “to confer with the Government and people of the Transvaal, with
the object of initiating a new state of things which would guarantee
security for the future.”[59]
On April 9th, 1879, Sir T. Shepstone informed President Burgers that
“the extension over the Transvaal of Her Majesty’s authority and
rule” was imminent.
The following protest was officially read and handed in to Sir T.
Shepstone on the 11th April:
“Whereas I, Thomas François Burgers, State President of the
South African Republic, have received a despatch, dated the
9th instant, from Her British Majesty’s Special Commissioner,
Sir Theophilus Shepstone, informing me that his Excellency has
resolved, in the name of Her Majesty’s Government, to bring the
South African Republic, by annexation, under the authority of the
British Crown:
“And whereas I have not the power to draw the sword with good
success for the defence of the independence of the State against
a superior power like that of England, and in consideration of
the welfare of the whole of South Africa, moreover, feel totally
disinclined to involve its white inhabitants in a disastrous war,
without having employed beforehand all means to secure the rights
of the people in a peaceable way:
“So, I, in the name and by the authority of the Government and
the people of the South African Republic, do hereby solemnly
protest against the intended annexation.
“Given under my hand and under the Seal of the State at the
Government Office at Pretoria, on this the 11th day of April, in
the year 1877.
(Signed) “THOMAS BURGERS,
“State President.”
A strong protest was handed in on the same date by the Executive
Council, in which it was stated “the people, by memorials or
otherwise, have, by a large majority, plainly stated that they are
averse to it” (annexation).
On April 17th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon:
“On Thursday last, the 12th instant, I found myself in a position
to issue the proclamations necessary for annexing[60] the South
African Republic, commonly known as the Transvaal, to Her Majesty’s
dominions, and for assuming the administration thereof.” P. P. [C.
1776] pp. 152-56.
His intentions had been so carefully concealed, the proclamation took
the people so completely by surprise; that it was received in what
might be called a dead silence, which silence was taken to be of that
nature which “gives consent.”
It has been amply shown since that the real feeling of the country
was exceedingly averse to English interference with its liberties,
and that the congratulatory addresses presented, and demonstrations
made in favour of what had been done, were but expressions of feeling
from the foreign element in the Transvaal, and got up by a few
people personally interested on the side of English authority. But
at the time they were made to appear as genuine expressions of Boer
opinions favourable to the annexation, which was looked upon as a
master-stroke of policy and a singular success.
It was some time before the Transvaalers recovered from the stunning
effects of the blow by which they had been deprived of their
liberties, and meanwhile the new Government made rapid advances, and
vigorous attempts at winning popularity amongst the people. Sir T.
Shepstone hastened to fill up every office under him with his own
men, although there were great flourishes of trumpets concerning
preserving the rights of the people to the greatest extent possible,
and keeping the original men in office wherever practicable. The
first stroke by which popularity was aimed at was that of remitting
the war taxes levied upon the white population (though unpaid)
to meet the expenses of the war with Sikukuni. It became apparent
at this point what an empty sham was our proposed protection of
Sikukuni, and how little the oppression under which he and his people
suffered had really called forth our interference. Sir T. Shepstone,
while remitting, as stated, the tax upon the Boers, insisted upon the
payment in full of the fine in cattle levied by them upon Sikukuni’s
people. So sternly did he carry out the very oppressions which he
came to put an end to, that a portion of the cattle paid towards
the fine (two thousand head, a large number, in the reduced and
impoverished state of the people) were sent back, by his orders, on
the grounds that they were too small and in poor condition, with the
accompanying message that better ones must be sent in their place. A
commission (composed of Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Osborne) was
sent, before the annexation, by Sir T. Shepstone, to inquire into a
treaty pressed by the Boers upon Sikukuni, and rejected by him, as
it contained a condition by which he was to pay taxes, and thereby
come under the Transvaal Government.[61] To these gentlemen “Sikukuni
stated that the English were great and he was little [C. 1776, p.
147], that he wanted them to save him from the Boers, who hunted him
to and fro, and shot his people down like wild game. He had lost
two thousand men” (this included those who submitted to the Boers)
“by the war, ten brothers, and four sons.... He could not trust
the Boers as they were always deceiving him.” After saying that “he
wished to be like Moshesh” (a British subject), and be “happy and at
peace,” he “asked whether he ought to pay the two thousand head of
cattle, seeing that the war was not of his making.”
“To this we replied,” say the Commissioners, “that it was the custom
of us English, when we made an engagement, to fulfil it, cost what it
might; that our word was our word.”
Small wonder if the oppressed and persecuted people and their chief
at last resented such treatment, or that some of them should have
shown that resentment in a manner decided enough to call for military
proceedings on the part of the new Government of the Transvaal.
In point of fact, however, it was not Sikukuni, but his sister—a
chieftainess herself—whose people, by a quarrel with and raid upon
natives living under our protection, brought on the second or English
“Sikukuni war.”
Turning to the other chief pretext for the annexation of the
Transvaal, the disturbed condition of the Zulu border, we find
precisely the same policy carried out. When it was first announced
that the English had taken possession of the country of their
enemies, the Zulus, figuratively speaking, threw up their caps, and
rejoiced greatly. They thought that now at last, after years of
patient waiting, and painful repression of angry feelings at the
desire of the Natal Government, they were to receive their reward in
a just acknowledgment of the claims which Sir T. Shepstone had so
long supported, and which he was now in a position to confirm.
But the quiet submission of the Boers would not have lasted, even
upon the surface, had their new Governor shown the slightest sign
of leaning to the Zulu side on the bitter boundary question; and as
Sir T. Shepstone fancied that the power of his word was great enough
with the Zulus to make them submit, however unwillingly, there was
small chance of their receiving a rood of land at his hands. He had
lost sight of, or never comprehended the fact, that that power was
built upon the strong belief which existed in the minds of the Zulu
king and people with regard to the justice and honesty of the English
Government. This feeling is amply illustrated by the messages from
the Zulu king, quoted in our chapter upon the Disputed Territory, and
elsewhere in this volume, and need therefore only be alluded to here.
But this belief, so far as Sir T. Shepstone is concerned, was
destroyed when the Zulus found that, far from acting according to his
often-repeated words, their quondam friend had turned against them,
and espoused the cause of their enemies, whom, at his desire, they
had refrained these many years from attacking, when they could have
done so without coming into collision with the English.
The Zulus, indeed, still believed in the English, and in the Natal
Government; but they considered that Sir T. Shepstone, in undertaking
the government of the Boers, had become a Boer himself, or, as
Cetshwayo himself said, his old friend and father’s back, which
had carried him so long, had become too rough for him—if he could
carry him no longer he would get down, and go to a man his equal
in Pietermaritzburg (meaning Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieut.-Governor of
Natal), who would be willing and able to take him up.
It is a curious fact, and one worthy of note, that Sir T. Shepstone,
who for so many years had held and expressed an opinion favourable
to the Zulus on this most important boundary question, should yet
have studied it so little that, when he had been for six months
Administrator of the Transvaal, with all evidence, written or oral,
official or otherwise, at his command, he could say, speaking of a
conversation which he held with some Dutch farmers at Utrecht—Parl.
p. (2079, p. 51-4): “I then learned for the first time, what
has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible,
overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line[62] had been
formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by
the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks, and that the beacons
had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the
Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of Commissioners from
both Panda and Cetshwayo, and that the spot on which every beacon was
to stand was indicated by the Zulu Commissioners themselves placing
the first stones on it.
“I shall shortly transmit to your Lordship” (the Secretary of State
for the Colonies) “the further evidence on the subject that has been
furnished to me.” This “further evidence,” if forwarded, does not
appear in the Blue-books. It is plain that the Border Commissioners
of 1878 found both the “evidence the most incontrovertible,
overwhelming, and clear,” and the “further evidence” promised,
utterly worthless for the purpose of proving the case of the Boers;
but, even had it been otherwise, Sir T. Shepstone’s confession
of ignorance up to so late a date on this most vital question is
singularly self-condemnatory.
“When I approached the question,”[63] he says, “I did so supposing
that the rights of the Transvaal to land on the Zulu border had very
slender foundation. I believed, from the representations which had
been systematically made by the Zulus to the Natal Government on
the subject, of which I was fully aware from the position I held in
Natal, that the beacons along the boundary line had been erected by
the Republican Government, in opposition to the wishes, and in spite
of the protests, of the Zulu authorities.[64]
“I, therefore, made no claims or demand whatever for land. I invited
Cetshwayo to give me his views regarding a boundary, when I informed
him from Pretoria that I should visit Utrecht on the tour I then
contemplated making. When I met the Zulu prime minister and the
indunas on the 18th October last” (six weeks before he discovered,
in conversation with some Boers, the “evidence incontrovertible,
overwhelming, and clear”), “on the Blood River, I was fully prepared,
if it should be insisted on by the Zulus, as I then thought it might
justly be, to give up a tract of country which had from thirteen
to sixteen years been occupied by Transvaal farmers, and to whose
farms title-deeds had been issued by the late Government; and I
contemplated making compensation to those farmers in some way or
another for their loss. I intended, however, first to offer to
purchase at a fair price from the Zulu king all his claims to land
which had for so many years been occupied and built upon by the
subjects of the Transvaal, to whom the Government of the country was
distinctly liable.”[65]
Sir T. Shepstone, when he met the Zulu indunas at the Blood River,
was prepared to abandon the line of 1861 (claimed by the Boers), for
that of the Blood River and the Old Hunting Road (“if it should be
insisted on by the Zulus,” as he “then thought it might justly be”),
which, in point of fact, would have satisfied neither party; but
he does not say by what right he proposed to stop short of the old
line of 1856-7—viz. the Blood River—and insist upon the “Old Hunting
Road.” If the half-concession were just, so was the whole—or neither.
To these half-measures, however, the Zulus would not submit, and the
conference failed of its object.
“Fortunately, therefore, for the interests of the Transvaal,”
says Sir T. Shepstone, “I was prevented by the conduct of the
Zulus themselves from surrendering to them at that meeting what my
information on the subject then had led me to think was after all
due to them, and this I was prepared to do at any sacrifice to the
Transvaal, seeing, as it then appeared to me, that justice to the
Zulus demanded it.”
In spite, however, of the concession to the Boers, made in Sir T.
Shepstone’s altered opinion on the border question, they were by
no means reconciled to the loss of their independence, although
Captain Clarke says (C. 2316, p. 28), in speaking of the Boers in
Lydenburg district, “they, in the majority of cases, would forget
fancied wrongs if they thought they had security for their lives
and property, education for their children, and good roads for the
transport of their produce.”[66]
The following “agreement signed by a large number of farmers at
the meeting held at Wonderfontein,” and translated from a Dutch
newspaper, the _Zuid Afrikaan_, published at Capetown on the 15th
February (C. 2316, p. 1), gives a different impression of the state
of feeling amongst the Boers:
“In the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, and
prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of
the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, and we do hereby
agree, to make a holy covenant for us, and for our children, which we
confirm with a solemn oath.
“Fully forty years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order
to become a free and independent people. Those forty years were forty
years of pain and suffering.
“We established Natal, the Orange Free State, and the South African
Republic, and three times the English Government has trampled our
liberty and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had
baptised with their blood and tears.
“As by a thief in the night has our Republic been stolen from us. We
may nor can endure this. It is God’s will, and is required of us by
the unity of our fathers, and by love to our children, that we should
hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that
purpose it is that we here come together and give each other the
right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful
to our country and our people, and with our eye fixed on God, to
co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our
Republic.
“So help us Almighty God.”
These pious words, side by side with the horrible accounts of the
use made by the Boers of their liberty while they had it, strike one
as incredibly profane; yet they are hardly more so than part of the
speech made by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the Transvaal on
the occasion of the annexation.
“Do you know,” he asks them, “what has recently happened in Turkey?
Because no civilised government was carried on there, the Great
Powers interfered and said, ‘Thus far and no farther.’ And if
this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when
it misbehaves? Complain to other powers and seek justice there?
Yes, thank God! justice is still to be found even for the most
insignificant, but it is precisely this justice which will convict
us. If we want justice we must be in a position to ask it with
unsullied hands.”[67]
Our first quotation was from the words of ignorant Boers, our second
from those of a man South African born and bred, South African in
character and education. But perhaps both are surpassed by words
lately written by an English statesman of rank. Let us turn to a
“minute” of Sir Bartle Frere’s, forwarded on November 16th, 1878
(2222, p. 45), and see what he says in defence of Boer conquests and
encroachments. “The Boers had force of their own, and every right of
conquest; but they _had also what they seriously believed to be a
higher title, in the old commands they found in parts of their Bible
to exterminate the Gentiles, and take their land in possession_.[68]
We may freely admit that they misinterpreted the text, and were
utterly mistaken in its application. But _they had at least a sincere
belief in the Divine authority for what they did, and therefore a far
higher title than the Zulus could claim for all they acquired_.”[68]
(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 45).
If the worship of the Boers for their sanguinary deity is to be
pleaded in their behalf, where shall we pause in finding excuses for
any action committed by insane humanity in the name of their many
gods? But the passage hardly needs our comments, and we leave it to
the consideration of the Christian world.
A paragraph from _The Daily News_ of this day, November 8th, 1879,
will suitably close our chapter on the Transvaal. It is headed
“Serious Disturbance in the Transvaal,” and gives a picture of the
disposition of the Boers, and of the control we have obtained over
them.
“PRETORIA, October 13th.
“A somewhat serious disturbance has occurred at Middleberg. A
case came in due course before the local court, relating to a
matter which took place last July. A Boer, by name Jacobs, had
tied up one of his Kaffir servants by his wrists to a beam, so
that his feet could not touch the ground. The man was too ill
after it to move for some days. The case against the Boer came on
on October 8th. A large number of Boers attended _from sympathy
with the defendant_,[69] and anxious to _resist any interference
between themselves and their Kaffirs_. The Landrost took the
opportunity to read out Sir Garnet’s proclamation, declaring the
permanency of the annexation of the Transvaal. The attitude of
the Boers appeared to be so threatening that after a time the
Landrost _thought it better to adjourn the hearing for a couple
of hours_.
“On the court’s reassembling, he was informed that
five-and-twenty Boers had visited two of the stores in the town,
and had seized gunpowder there, gunpowder being a forbidden
article of sale. The following day a much larger attendance of
Boers made their appearance at the court. Seventy of them held
a meeting, at which they bound themselves to protect those who
had seized the gunpowder, and their attitude was so threatening
that the Landrost, on the application of the public prosecutor,
_adjourned the case sine die_. A fresh case of powder seizing
was reported on the same day. Colonel Lanyon has already gone to
the scene of disturbance, which will be dealt with purely, _at
all events at present_, as a civil case of violence exercised
against the owners of the stores. At the same time a troop of
dragoons will be there about the day after to-morrow, and a
company of infantry in a few days more, while a considerable
number of the 90th Regiment will in a short time be, in regular
course, passing that way. The spark will therefore no doubt be
stamped out quickly where it has been lighted. The only danger is
in the tendency to explosion which it perhaps indicates in other
directions.”